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Article (Accepted version) (Refereed)

Original citation:

Renwick, Matthew J., Mossialos. (2017) *Crowdfunding our health: economic risks and benefits.* <u>Social Science & Medicine</u>. ISSN 0277-9536

DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.08.035

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Accepted Manuscript

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PII: S0277-9536(17)30516-6

DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.08.035

Reference: SSM 11375

To appear in: Social Science & Medicine

Received Date: 13 November 2016

Revised Date: 9 June 2017

Accepted Date: 28 August 2017

Please cite this article as: Renwick, M.J., Mossialos, E., Crowdfunding our health: Economic risks and benefits, *Social Science & Medicine* (2017), doi: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.08.035.

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Crowdfunding our health: economic risks and benefits

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Running head: Crowdfunding our health

Keywords: crowdfunding / alternative financing / health policy / health economics / global health

1 ABSTRACT

2

3 Crowdfunding is an expanding form of alternative financing that is gaining traction in the 4 health sector. This article presents a typology for crowdfunded health projects and a 5 review of the main economic benefits and risks of crowdfunding in the health market. 6 We use evidence from a literature review, complimented by expert interviews, to extend 7 the fundamental principles and established theories of crowdfunding to a health market 8 context. Crowdfunded health projects can be classified into four types according to the 9 venture's purpose and funding method. These are projects covering health expenses, 10 fundraising health initiatives, supporting health research, or financing commercial health 11 innovation. Crowdfunding could economically benefit the health sector by expanding 12 market participation, drawing money and awareness to neglected health issues, 13 improving access to funding, and fostering project accountability and social 14 engagement. However, the economic risks of health-related crowdfunding include 15 inefficient priority setting, heightened financial risk, inconsistent regulatory policies, 16 intellectual property rights concerns, and fraud. Theorized crowdfunding behaviours 17 such as signalling and herding can be observed in the market for health-related 18 crowdfunding. Broader threats of market failure stemming from adverse selection and 19 moral hazard also apply. Many of the discussed economic benefits and risks of 20 crowdfunding health campaigns are shared more broadly with those of crowdfunding 21 projects in other sectors. Where crowdfunding health care appears to diverge from 22 theory is the negative externality inefficient priority setting may have towards achieving 23 broader public health goals. Therefore, the market for crowdfunding health care must be

- economically stable, as well as designed to optimally and equitably improve public
- 25 health.
- 26
- 27 Key words
- 28 Crowdfunding, alternative financing, health policy, health economics, global health

29 INTRODUCTION

30

31 Crowdfunding has recently emerged as an innovative method of financing ventures that 32 fall outside the purview of traditional capital markets (infoDev, 2013; Kirby & Worner, 33 2014). Crowdfunding is an alternative channel for financing a project that uses an online 34 platform to solicit generally small contributions from numerous participants (i.e. the 35 crowd). Crowdfunding is increasingly being used to bankroll health-related campaigns 36 (Moran, 2017; "Mind the gap", 2017; Young & Scheinberg, 2017). 37 38 Crowdfunding in the health market presents unique economic applications, benefits, 39 and risks, which have been inadequately explored. The purpose of this article is to 40 formulate a helpful typology for crowdfunded health campaigns and review the broad 41 economic benefits and risks of crowdfunding in the health market. Our typology and 42 assessment aims to equate the fundamental principles and theory of crowdfunding with 43 evidence and examples of health-related crowdfunding. This process was informed by a rapid evidence review and from interviews with selected experts on crowdfunding. 44 45 BACKGROUND 46 47

The fundamental principles and theory of crowdfunding, discussed below, guided the methodological development of our literature search and interview questions. In addition, these principles and theoretical lenses provide the sensitizing and inductive devices used in our empirical analysis.

52	
53	Fundamental principles of crowdfunding
54	
55	A crowdfunding transaction involves three key players: the project initiator who is
56	seeking the funding, the funders who are offering the financing, and the platform
57	provider who is linking the project initiator with funders through an online forum (Kuti,
58	2014). The project initiator is not always the beneficiary of the funding and may act as a
59	representative for another individual. What separates crowdfunding from more
60	traditional financing mechanisms is the online forum, which provides a uniquely
61	accessible method of allowing average people to participate in the funding process and
62	allowing small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to seek funding external from
63	banks.
64	
65	Three funding models typically characterize crowdfunding: reward-based, donation-
66	based, and investment-based. Reward-based crowdfunding asks funders to contribute
67	money in return for prizes (Belleflamme, Omrani, & Peitz, 2015). Donation-based
68	crowdfunding involves participants offering philanthropic contributions to a project
69	(Belleflamme et al., 2015). Finally, investment-based crowdfunding is characterized by
70	participants providing financing through high-interest loans or in return for an equity-
71	stake in the company (Belleflamme et al., 2015). These tend to be much larger projects
72	as they present earning potential for funders.

74 Well known crowdfunding platforms include Kickstarter, GoFundMe, Indiegogo, 75 Crowdcube, and FundRazr. According to Massolution (2015), a US research firm, there 76 are over 1250 crowdfunding platforms around the world, raising US \$16.2 billion in 77 2014, up 167% from US \$6.1 billion the previous year. Massolution estimated that this 78 growth rate will have held for 2015 with expected crowdfunding volumes to reach US 79 \$34.4 billion by 2016. This progress is generated from growing uptake in North America 80 and Europe as well as significant growth in Asia. The global crowdfunding market could 81 be further augmented by up to US \$96 billion, unlocked from emerging economies in 82 Africa, Asia, and South America (infoDev, 2013). While dwarfed by the trillions of dollars 83 financed through traditional capital markets, these figures demonstrate a growing and 84 formidable niche market in the financial world (Belleflamme et al., 2015).

85

86 Crowdfunding theory

87

88 Behavioural and economic theory can aid in understanding the recent rise of 89 crowdfunding, the main benefits from participating, and possible market failures. 90 According to Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb (2014), crowdfunding has developed as a 91 result of the commercialization of modern-day Internet. Web 2.0 has lowered the 92 transaction costs and financial risks of crowdfunding to the point where it is an 93 economically viable method of financing small ventures. For instance, the Internet 94 lowers search costs by facilitating cheap, effective, and efficient matching of funders 95 and project initiators (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2014). Communication costs are 96 also lower, allowing funders to easily gather information, monitor their investment, and

97 engage with the project initiator, regardless of their geographic location (Agrawal et al.,
98 2014). In addition, the large number of funders accessible through the Internet allows a
99 project's risk to be spread over many contributors and permits funders to contribute
100 small denominations (Agrawal et al., 2014).

101

102 In some circumstances, market participants may prefer crowdfunding over traditional 103 funding sources (Agrawal et al., 2014). From the project initiator's perspective, 104 crowdfunding can lower the cost of accessing capital by: matching project initiators with 105 funders that have the highest willingness to pay; bundling multiple project goals 106 together; and generating valuable social media attention. Project initiators may also 107 view crowdfunding as a way of engaging their customer base and accessing valuable 108 market information from funders such as customer preferences (Agrawal et al., 2014; 109 Gerber & Hui, 2013). Funders may participate because they can access affordable 110 investment opportunities without being an accredited investor, acquire products before 111 mainstream uptake, participate in the crowdfunding community, support a project that is 112 important to them, and formalize their contribution through a reputable platform 113 (Agrawal et al., 2014). The crowdfunding platforms themselves are motivated by the 114 profit potential generated from nominal and percentage transaction charges on 115 contributions (Agrawal et al., 2014; Belleflamme et al., 2015).

116

However, the market for crowdfunding is susceptible to market inefficiencies that may
impede economically valuable transactions or even cause market failure. The primary
dilemma appears to be asymmetrical information (Agrawal et al., 2014; Belleflamme et

120 al., 2015; Belleflamme & Lambert, 2014; Schweinbacher & Larralde, 2012). In reality, 121 the project creator will know more about the project than the funder. This discrepancy in 122 information availability is amplified in the crowdfunding setting. Project initiators are 123 often geographically isolated from their funders whom are often inexperienced in the 124 project field (Agrawal et al., 2014; Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2015). Thus, the 125 relationship between funders and the project initiator is described as that of a principal 126 and agent (Figure 1) (Ley & Weaven, 2011). The project initiator (i.e. the agent) is 127 essentially paid to carry out the project's stated goals on behalf of the funders (i.e. the 128 principal).

129

130 Two chief negative outcomes can arise from a principal-agent relationship: moral 131 hazard and adverse selection (Agrawal et al., 2014). Moral hazard would describe a 132 situation where a project initiator acts in self-interest and fails to deliver on project goals 133 (Agrawal et al., 2014; Strausz, 2016). Given the nature of crowdfunding, funders cannot 134 easily hold the initiator accountable or may not be privy to information regarding the 135 project's progress and success. Adverse selection might occur when high-quality project 136 initiators consistently choose to access funding through more traditional avenues like 137 banks, leaving only low-quality ventures in the crowdfunding market pool (Agrawal et 138 al., 2014). Both moral hazard and adverse selection could drive funders out of the 139 market. Consequently, signalling is an important aspect of crowdfunding (Belleflamme 140 et al., 2015). Project initiators will actively signal to potential investors that they have a 141 high-guality campaign and are committed to fulfilling their stated long-term goals by

- promoting on social media, brandishing past successful projects, and offering prizes toearly contributors.
- 144

145 Herding behaviour is another consequence of information asymmetry that has been 146 observed in the crowdfunding market (Agrawal et al., 2014; Belleflamme et al., 2015; E. 147 Lee & Lee, 2012). Herding occurs when funders collectively make inferences about 148 project quality based on decisions of other funders. There is a tendency for funders to 149 swarm projects that are receiving strong support because the crowd perceives these 150 projects to be higher quality. Several studies suggest that herding behaviour in 151 crowdfunding can lead to efficient outcomes in certain circumstances (Burtch, Ghose, & 152 Wattal, 2013; Freedman & Jin, 2008; J. Zhang & Liu, 2012), while another study found 153 that irrational herding dominates the market (Chen & Lin, 2014). Herding is particularly 154 problematic when collective funder decisions are made at the expense of conducting 155 individual due diligence. A free-rider scenario could arise when funders choose to 156 postpone funding until a project has been vetted by early contributors and reached a 157 certain threshold indicating quality (Agrawal et al., 2014; Belleflamme et al., 2015; 158 Boudreau, Jeppesen, Reichstein, & Rullani, 2015). The market could fail if everyone 159 acts as a free-rider resulting in no projects being fully funded. 160

161 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

162

Our research has two key objectives: determine how crowdfunding is applied in the
health sector and assess the important economic benefits and risks of crowdfunding in

165 the health market. Our research methodology was a rapid evidence review of peer- and 166 non-peer reviewed literature that was supplemented with targeted interviews with 167 crowdfunding experts. The literature search and interview questions were informed and 168 directed by the principles and theories of crowdfunding discussed above. 169 170 We reviewed peer-reviewed articles with use of EconLit, MEDLINE (PubMed), Embase 171 (Ovid), Scopus, and Web of Science. We used the following search terms across the 172 above databases: "crowdfund", "theory", "model", "platform", "reward", "donation", "investment", "equity", "loan", "market failure", "principle-agent", "information 173 174 asymmetry", "moral hazard", "adverse selection", "herd", "signal", "output", "impact", "benefit", "risk", and "challenge". 175 176 177 The search was restricted to papers published between January 1, 2006 and May 10, 178 2017, in English, and either journal articles, comments, editorials, or reviews. Following 179 the initial compilation of search results and removal of duplicates, we further excluded 180 papers that did not centrally focus on the topic of crowdfunding. Our search identified a 181 total of 281 unique peer-reviewed papers focusing on crowdfunding. 182 183 A selection of non-peer reviewed literature was incorporated and identified through a 184 Google search and from citations in key papers. In total, 51 non-peer reviewed texts 185 were included and consisted of policy documents, working papers, conference 186 presentations, and consulting reports. Upon reviewing 332 relevant documents, 43 texts 187 were identified as specifically discussing health-related crowdfunding (Supplementary

- Material). Finally, a review of 25 key crowdfunding websites was conducted to link real
 world examples to the literature and theory.
- 190

191 We performed a series of hour-long telephone interviews with experts in the field of 192 crowdfunding to validate and complement our conclusions drawn from the literature 193 review. We used a combination of convenient and judgment sampling to select 194 interviewees that were accessible and would have professional insight into the political 195 and regulatory environment of crowdfunding (Marshall, 1996). We chose crowdfunding 196 policy experts from the US and UK, as these are the two largest crowdfunding markets. 197 In addition, we solicited input from the OECD to gain a global policy perspective and the 198 European Crowdfunding Network to gather an industry perspective. Five out of the nine 199 contacted experts were interviewed. We employed a semi-structured interview protocol 200 (Supplementary Material) that covered the benefits and challenges of health-related 201 crowdfunding, the role of regulations and policy, and future market prospects. We then 202 allowed for unstructured dialogue of relevant topics. We did not believe it was beneficial 203 for this exploratory review to conduct a larger, systematic interview process of 204 stakeholders. Due to our small sample size, we did not use a coding system for 205 interpreting the interviews. 206 207 RESULTS 208 209 A typology for crowdfunding in the global health sector

211 Based on our review, we propose a typology for crowdfunded health projects, which can 212 be classified into four categories based on the purpose and funding-type of the project 213 (Table 1). The first can be termed health expenses, which are donation-based 214 campaigns to fund out-of-pocket expenses for patients unable to afford particular 215 medical services or products (Sisler, 2012). Examples of crowdfunded health expenses 216 include cataract surgery, chemotherapy, motorized wheelchairs, and household 217 accessibility adaptations. GoFundMe, one of the largest donation-based crowdfunding 218 forums in the world, raised US \$147 million for medically-related projects in 2014, up 219 from US \$6 million in 2012 (Cunha, 2015). Their health section for donations is the 220 platform's most popular category and generated 26% of all donations in 2014. 221 222 The second type are not-for-profit health initiatives that include fundraising for medical 223 institutions or charitable organizations, patient education programs, disease awareness 224 campaigns, and global health missions. Contributions to these crowdfunded campaigns 225 are typically incentivized through donations or offering rewards. A particularly well-226 known instance of a crowdfunded health initiative is the 2014 Ice Bucket Challenge,

227 which supported patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. The project raised over

228 \$115 million towards the ALS Association and Motor Neuron Disease Association

229 (Chakradhar, 2015).

230

The third classification is health research. There is an emerging trend for health
scientists to directly crowdfund donations for their not-for-profit research work (P. P.
Cameron, 2013; Kaplan, 2013; Ozdemir, J, & S, 2015; Otero, 2015; Perlstein, 2013;

234	Philippidis, 2013; Vachelard, Gambarra-Soares, Augustini, Riul, & Maracaja-Coutinho,
235	2016; Wheat, Wang, Byrnes, & Ranganathan, 2013). Crowdfunding, alongside
236	crowdsourcing, has supported valuable scientific breakthroughs in understanding
237	human metagenomics and microbiome dynamics (Debelius et al., 2016). Oncology
238	research has been another major focus for crowdfunding efforts with a number of
239	platforms dedicated to cancer-specific crowdfunding (Dragojlovic & Lynd, 2014).
240	
241	Finally, innovative health care ventures that have commercial potential could access
242	capital through investment-based, typically equity, crowdfunding. Pharmaceutical and
243	biotech SMEs as well as spin-off companies from university research groups are using
244	platforms such as Crowdcube and ShareIn to sell equity stakes in their company in
245	return for capital (Fiminska, 2015). This money may be used to accelerate clinical
246	testing and development of a novel therapy, expand health service offerings, or scale-
247	up production and operations for a medical product.
248	
249	Economic benefits of health-related crowdfunding
250	
251	We identified four major economic benefits of health-related crowdfunding: expanding
252	market participation, increasing funding access for individuals and SMEs, drawing
253	awareness and funding to neglected issues, and improving social engagement. Table 2
254	summarizes these benefits across the four types of health-related crowdfunding.
255	

256 1. Expands funder participation in the health market

257

258 Crowdfunding appears to support and magnify systems of economic sharing on local, 259 national, and global stages by breaking down institutional barriers and encouraging 260 active participation (Share the World's Resources, 2014). Light and Briggs argue (2017) 261 that "crowdfunding platforms collectively change the economic landscape and 262 enfranchise new pockets of society to contribute and see their choices enacted." 263 Therefore, rather than redirecting funds through a different financing avenue, health 264 crowdfunding may leverage globalization and capture new funding that would not have 265 existed. Snyder et al. (2016) suggests that "compared to the experience people have 266 when giving or considering donations to a large charitable organization, an individual's 267 medical crowdfunding initiative can feel much more personal and compelling, leading to giving that would not have occurred otherwise." In addition, more inclusive regulations 268 269 for investment-based crowdfunding are increasingly permitting non-accredited investors 270 to participate in the private equity market for biotech companies (Moran, 2017). A 2015 271 Biocom report estimates that there are over 100 million non-accredited US investors 272 who could potentially participate in this venture capital market (M. Cameron, Flach, 273 MacDonald-Korth, Manaktala, & Walker, 2015).

274

275 2. Improves individual and SME access to financial support

276

277 Crowdfunding may improve general access to financial support for SMEs and
278 individuals (Valančienė & Jegelevičiūtė, 2013). A 2014 UK industry report found that
279 64% of those who raised money through a donation-based campaign indicated that it

280 was 'unlikely' or 'very unlikely' they would have been able to access funds if alternative 281 financing was not available (Baeck, Collins, & Zhang, 2014). Similarly, 53% of those 282 using reward-based campaigns thought obtaining financing through traditional methods 283 would have been 'unlikely' or 'very unlikely'. The benefit of improved access to funding 284 is evident in the health sector. In the US, medical expenses were the leading cause of 285 bankruptcy in 2014 (Himmelstein, Thorne, Warren, & Woolhandler, 2009). 286 Crowdfunding now averts between an estimated 114 and 136 bankruptcies per quarter 287 in the US, representing 3.9% of total bankruptcies caused by medical expenses (Burtch 288 & Chan, 2015). A higher proportion of these US medical expense campaigns are hosted 289 by patients located in states without the Affordable Care Act Medicaid expansion 290 (Berliner & Kenworthy, 2017). Moreover, according to the 2015 Biocom analysis of life 291 science crowdfunding, biotech companies are increasingly relying on investment-based 292 crowdfunding as a means of raising capital (Wirsching, Lagua, & Colthorpe, 2015). 293 Between 2010 and 2015, a total of 42 European biotech companies raised €23 million 294 through crowdfunding. The average amount raised by these companies was €550,000 295 and multiple companies raised over €1 million. This is a significant trend upwards from 296 2010 when the average equity-based life science campaign raised €127,000. Some of 297 these SMEs state that they would not have been able to raise this capital and start their 298 company without access crowdfunding.

299

300 3. Draws awareness and funding to neglected health issues

301

302 In the health sector, rare diseases can sometimes be neglected by traditional financing 303 sources. Crowdfunding may help pull money into these unique funding gaps. A 2016 304 Pew Research Centre survey found that 84% of donors believe that crowdfunding 305 "highlights causes or businesses that might not get much attention otherwise" (Smith, 306 2016). For instance, GoFundMe's largest campaign to date raised more than USD \$2 307 million from over 37,000 donors around the world to support a young girl with a very 308 rare neurological condition, Sanfilippo Syndrome Type A (Young & Scheinberg, 2017). 309 Additionally, crowdfunding may fill holes in health research agendas by funding niche or 310 high-risk health science fields. There is building evidence to suggest that crowdfunding 311 may be an effective method for bringing scientists and donors together to finance early 312 stage clinical trials targeting rare and neglected diseases (Dragojlovic & Lynd, 2014; 313 Hawkes & Thomson, 2015; Sharma, Khan, & Devereaux, 2015). Crowdfunding proof-of-314 concept research and initial clinical trials could allow scientists to attain more substantial 315 grant funding or entice private investment (Dragojlovic & Lynd, 2014; Orelli, 2012). 316 317 4. Improved social engagement

318

In the article "A guide to scientific crowdfunding", Vachelard et al. (2016) recommend
that engaging the public and their contributors is critical to a campaign's success. The
most effective initiators tend to provide frequent project updates, reply to funder
inquiries, and harness the power of social media (Belleflamme, Lambert, &
Schwienbacher, 2013; Vachelard et al., 2016). On the other side, funders can see how
the project is progressing, provide input where possible, and monitor the project's

325	practices. Social networks of funders create a community around various projects that
326	can quickly spread awareness and signal legitimacy to new contributors (Belleflamme et
327	al., 2015; Lehner & Nicholls, 2014). Moreover, funder feedback delivers early-stage
328	market testing for those projects that have a product or service output (Belleflamme et
329	al., 2015). In the health sector, transparency and social engagement are particularly
330	powerful because funders often have a personal connection with the individual, issue or
331	business being financed (Smith, 2016). This intrinsic connection fosters openness and
332	accountability in the crowdfunding relationship (Perlstein, 2013).
333	
334	Economic risks of health-related crowdfunding
335	
336	Based on our review, we have highlighted five economic risks related to crowdfunding
337	health projects: inefficient priority setting, financial risks, unclear regulatory frameworks,
338	issues of accountability, transparency, and due diligence, and risk of fraud and money
339	laundering. Table 2 summarizes these concerns across the four types of health-related
340	crowdfunding.
341	
342	1. Inefficient health priority setting
343	
344	Crowdfunding may be an inefficient method of health priority setting and allocation of
345	financing because decisions may be determined by funder sentiment and swayed by
346	behavioural economic principles such as signalling and herding (Agrawal et al., 2014;
347	Belleflamme et al., 2015). An increasing number of life science researchers and patients

348 are turning to social media to solicit donations and attention for their campaign (Berliner 349 & Kenworthy, 2017; Vachelard et al., 2016). The success of a research project or 350 medical expense campaign is often largely based on an initiators ability to tap social 351 networks (Barclay, 2012; Byrnes, et al., 2014). There is concern that this may come at 352 the cost of determining health research financing based on scientific merit or health care 353 funding based on clinical need (Del Savio, 2017; Snyder, 2016). Moreover, allowing 354 patients to crowdfund or pay to participate in clinical trials poses an especially difficult 355 ethical and economic dilemma. Patients may tend to support the short-term goals of a 356 new intervention at the potential expense of longer-term medical evidence production 357 (Wenner, Kimmelman, & London, 2015). In addition, crowdfunded clinical trials may not 358 go through the same rigorous peer-review process as publicly funded trials to validate 359 preclinical evidence (Wenner, Kimmelman, & London, 2015).

360

361 2. Financial risks

362

An increasing number of countries are amending regulations to allow non-accredited investors to participate in investment-based crowdfunding (Cusmano, 2015; Hemmadi, 2015). However, introducing non-accredited investors to private equity investing and lending may expose inexperienced retail investors to more financial risk than they are aware (Kirby & Worner, 2014; Pazowski & Czudec, 2014). Start-up businesses seeking equity investment often have failure rates between 75% and 90% in the first five years (Hemmadi, 2015). Crowdfunded loans are often unsecured and there is minimal liquidity

- in the investment-based crowdfunding market, which has no secondary market(Hemmadi, 2015).
- 372

373 Financial risks also apply to donation- and reward-based crowdfunding campaigns 374 where there is the possibility that a backed project does not produce its projected goal. 375 Kickstarter, a reward-based platform, noted that 25% of start-up projects failed in the 376 first year, 55% failed by year 5, and 71% failed by year 10 ("Investors navigate the risks 377 of crowdfunding," 2015). In cases where reward-based projects do not actually fail, the majority of campaigns do not deliver their reward on time. A 2014 study of 48,500 378 379 crowdfunded projects found that over 75% delivered their products later than originally 380 promised (Mollick, 2014).

381

382 Another financial concern is that transaction fees levied by platform providers may be a 383 source of economic inefficiency. Investment-based crowdfunding platforms typically 384 charge around 5% on funds raised, which is in line with what major banks charge on 385 initial public offerings (5 – 7%) (Belleflamme et al., 2015; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 386 2012). However, some donation-based and reward-based crowdfunding platforms seem 387 to charge higher transaction fees on funds raised. For example, GoFundMe has a 5% 388 participation fee, a 2.9% processing fee, and a flat 30 cent charge on all donations 389 (Belleflamme et al., 2015). An average \$10 donation with GoFundMe would incur a 390 10.9% charge. Kisskissbankbank, a popular French platform, charges a 5% commission 391 plus a 3% bank fee, creating a total transaction fee of 8% (Belleflamme et al., 2015). 392

393 3. Unclear regulatory framework

394

395 Existing regulatory definitions of crowdfunding appear to be ill-defined and there is little 396 consensus among policy-makers regarding what should fall under existing and future 397 crowdfunding regulation (INT-2, INT-3) (Cusmano, 2015). All the interviewed experts 398 could not specify a country that employed a particularly enabling policy environment for 399 crowdfunding that could guide future regulation development (INT-1, INT-2, INT-3, INT-400 4, INT-5). Regulators may be operating with limited knowledge and experience (INT-2, 401 INT-3) and risk applying the wrong policy frameworks to differing crowdfunding models. 402 This confusion is particularly evident with regards to peer-to-peer lending and 403 crowdfunding securities, which often fall under the same regulations (European 404 Crowdfunding Network, 2014). 405

406 Determining appropriate regulations for equity-based crowdfunding appears to be 407 particularly challenging given its potential for economic impact (INT-1, INT-5). Important 408 regulatory considerations include the size of equity offerings, capital requirements, 409 registration with the national licensing authority, the number of investors per offer, 410 restrictions on who can invest, and controls on how much they can invest (Kirby & 411 Worner, 2014). Moreover, a common set of legal frameworks has not been established 412 across borders (European Crowdfunding Network, 2014; Gabison, 2015). Countries 413 frequently have divergent taxation and tax incentivization schemes for international 414 platforms (European Commission, 2014). Finally, it is unclear the degree of liability

international platform providers hold for screening risky, incompetent, unethical, orillegal projects (INT-2, INT-3).

417

418 These challenging questions are being discussed by government agencies like the 419 European Commission, US Securities and Exchange Commission, UK Financial 420 Conduct Authority, the Ontario Securities Commission, and the Australian Corporations 421 and Markets Advisory Committee (Cusmano, 2015; Wirsching et al., 2015). There does 422 not appear to be a practical role for a global crowdfunding regulator, but it seems that 423 there is a trend towards international harmonization of crowdfunding regulation (INT-1, 424 INT-2, INT-3). Large multinational banks, who perceive the crowdfunding market to 425 have an unfair advantage over traditional capital markets, are responsible for increasing 426 pressure and lobbying of regulators to further limit crowdfunding (INT-2, INT-3). Despite 427 this, large banks are entering the crowdfunding space, which has benefited from years 428 of low regulation.

429

The increasing regulation of the equity crowdfunding market is spilling into the noninvestment markets. In the US, there are currently no specific policies or laws that govern donation- and reward-based crowdfunding (INT-1). But, the Federal Trade Commission and Association of United States Attorneys is now exploring ways to respond to the growing incidence of fraud on donation- and reward-based platforms (INT-1).

436

437 4. Issues of accountability, transparency, and due diligence

438

439 The anonymity, geographic distance, and information asymmetry between funders and 440 project initiators makes it challenging to ensure accountability, transparency, and due 441 diligence across all projects (Agrawal et al., 2014; Kirby & Worner, 2014). Much of this 442 responsibility falls on project initiators to provide necessary information to contributors 443 and to fulfil the project's stated objectives (Agrawal et al., 2014). However, project 444 initiators can avoid their responsibilities and there is a risk that contributors could lose 445 their capacity to hold initiators accountable. Even when project information is made 446 readily available, project goals can be vague or have unclear metrics on which 447 contributors can gauge project progress or success. In addition, the average 448 contribution is often small thereby reducing individual contributors' incentive to hold 449 initiators accountable (Agrawal et al., 2014). Platform providers are increasingly 450 expected to provide some screening, rule setting, and information to protect contributors 451 from incompetent project initiators and to help contributors make informed decisions 452 (Belleflamme et al., 2015).

453

An important issue related to transparency is intellectual property rights. Crowdfunded health and biotechnology start-ups are at risk for having their intellectual property stolen or plagiarized by others on the Web (European Commission, 2014). In the US, Title III of the JOBS Act requires equity-based crowdfunded projects to disclose detailed reports of company operations and finances to its investors (112th US Congress, 2012). The project initiator must therefore balance their responsibilities of disclosure with the dangers of divulging proprietary information or company details to market competitors

461	(Adams & Constantine, 2015). There is concern that disclosure of any proprietary
462	information to funders may constitute as prior art, thus barring the initiator from claiming
463	patent rights in the future (Adams & Constantine, 2015). While there are exemptions in
464	the US that would allow project initiators to patent their invention post-crowdfundraising,
465	many foreign patent systems do not have the same leniencies (INT-2). Finally, it is
466	important to recognize the expansive trademark and copyright entitlements platform
467	providers attain through hosting a campaign (Adams & Constantine, 2015).
468	
469	5. Risk of fraud and money laundering
470	
471	Online crowdfunding leaves contributors susceptible to fraud because traditional legal
472	and reputation security measures may not work (Gabison, 2015). There have been
473	several legal cases against crowdfunders whom fraudulently collected donations for a
474	medical condition they did not have (Snyder, 2016). The relatively small average
475	contribution and anonymity of the project initiator disincentivizes legal action in the
476	event of fraudulent behaviour (Agrawal et al., 2014). Also, initiators often do not have
477	the same traditional motivation to protect their reputation and goodwill because they are
478	anonymous and frequently one-off participants. There appears to be some risk for
479	money laundering, which could support narcotics deals, terrorism, and other illegal
480	activities (Robock, 2014). Both fraud and money laundering seem to be rare and do not
481	significantly discourage people from participating in crowdfunding (European
482	Commission, 2014). Nonetheless, states are working to further develop anti-fraud and
483	anti-money laundering safeguards (INT 01) (European Commission, 2014).

484

485 **DISCUSSION**

486

487 Health policy makers need to be aware of and understand the growing economic impact 488 of health-related crowdfunding. Countries will likely continue to embrace health-related 489 crowdfunding because it expands health market participation, improves individual and 490 SME access to funding, pulls funding to neglected health issues, and encourages 491 project accountability and community engagement. Regulators in North America and 492 Europe are working to delineate regulatory systems that integrate crowdfunding into 493 their existing financial markets (European Crowdfunding Network, 2014). However, 494 policy makers are faced with market risks that could impact the health sector such as 495 inefficient priority setting, heightened financial risk, inconsistent regulatory policies, 496 intellectual property rights concerns, and fraud. Self-regulation within the crowdfunding 497 community may serve to compliment formal policy. Professional accreditation (e.g. 498 Crowdfunding Accreditation for Platform Standards) and systems for tracking fraudulent 499 campaigns exist (e.g. www.gofraudme.org), however these programs do not seem 500 widely recognized or utilized.

501

502 Crowdfunding theory and the principle-agent relationship are useful tools for
503 understanding crowdfunding in the health sector. Theorized crowdfunding behaviours
504 such as signalling and herding are likely present in the market for crowdfunding health.
505 In addition, broader threats of market failure stemming from adverse selection and
506 moral hazard may also apply. Consequently, many of the discussed benefits and risks

of crowdfunding health campaigns are shared more broadly with those of crowdfunding
projects in other sectors. Equity-based projects seem particularly prone to market
failures due to the financial sensitivity of their investors and the greater size of the
potential market compared to those of reward- or donation-based campaigns.
Therefore, the outlined economic risks in this paper may apply more significantly to
equity-based projects in health care.

513

514 Where crowdfunding in health appears to diverge from generalized crowdfunding theory 515 is the negative externality inefficient priority setting may have towards achieving broader 516 public health goals. Where most of the highlighted benefits and risks focus on 517 crowdfunding participants, the issue of inefficient priority setting could affect the health 518 of people beyond the crowdfunding market. Scientific research, social initiatives, and 519 innovation in health care have a uniquely direct impact on individuals suffering from 520 medical conditions. Therefore, this new market for health cannot just be economically 521 stable; it must also be designed to optimally and equitably improve public health. 522

Policy makers in countries with insurance gaps and inadequate universal health care coverage must realize that health-related crowdfunding is often a symptom of gaps in health policy. Individuals crowdfund their medical expenses because health insurance coverage in their country is incomplete (Snyder, 2016); scientists turn to crowdfunding as public grant funding declines and pharmaceutical companies de-risk their R&D portfolios (Dragojlovic & Lynd, 2014); start-up entrepreneurs solicit the 'crowd' because they are unable to access capital through conventional avenues (Wirsching et al.,

530 2015). It seems impractical to patch all these gaps in access to financing using 531 crowdfunding. It is our opinion that crowdfunding is a complimentary financing tool in 532 health care that can offer interim financial relief while improved policies are designed 533 and implemented. Particularly troublesome is the inordinate number of crowdfunding 534 projects for covering medical expenses, highlighting the need for improved health 535 insurance coverage around the world. While altruistic crowdfunding partially fills this 536 medical insurance gap, it should not be thought of as a practical method for mitigating 537 user charges and attaining universal health coverage in any country, particularly 538 developing countries.

539

Crowdfunding could play a more valuable role in health science research, non-profit 540 541 health initiatives, and commercial innovation. Crowdfunding offers the possibility of 542 much needed access to funding for scientists that can make important contributions to 543 often-neglected medical research. Valuable non-profit health programs are additionally 544 benefiting from new financing driven by crowdfunding. We believe this opportunity to 545 expand funding for non-profit health ventures should be better guided by sound 546 evidence and health priority setting, which are often lacking in the current system. Crowdfunding for-profit health ventures also seems promising and allows SMEs to more 547 548 effectively compete in the health sector. At present, the scalability of health care 549 crowdfunding appears generally capped at projects under €1 million (Moran, 2017). 550 However, crowdfunding may allow health researchers and SMEs to validate the 551 worthiness or profitability of their venture to larger companies and major private 552 investors thereby opening access to additional financing. Regulators look to be moving

in the right direction by trying to improve the market's stability, but it appears there is a
need for greater legal and regulatory harmonization across borders. Additionally, the
risk of illegal activity could threaten needed confidence in the fledgling crowdfunding
market and, thus policy makers must approach this issue seriously.

557

558 Many of the economic risks stem, at least in part, from the principal-agent relationship 559 and the associated information asymmetry. Thus, there could be an important role for 560 targeted regulation that minimizes steep information asymmetry gradients between 561 initiators and funders. For instance, it may be valuable to have a credentialing body 562 endorsed by relevant scientific associations that could certify a crowdfunding project's 563 credibility and rate the project's health care value. In parallel, a financial regulatory 564 agency specific to crowdfunding could assess project financial riskiness, impose 565 solvency requirements on funders and initiators, monitor illegal activity, regulate transaction charges levied by platforms, and ensure platform transparency. In this way, 566 567 public health objectives could be fostered and the market's economic stability could be 568 strengthened.

569

570 There are a couple limitations to this review. First, the simple sampling strategy used to 571 solicit interviews does not capture the full range of stakeholders in the crowdfunding 572 market. This sampling technique was only used to validate and compliment the main 573 results from our rapid evidence review. It is our hope that a comprehensive primary 574 research project employing a rigorous interviewing protocol will build on this introductory 575 review. Second, this review solely focuses on the economic issues of crowdfunding

health care; there are a variety of important ethical and social issues, discussed in other

576

577	articles, that we do not broach such as equity, access, autonomy, and privacy (Berliner
578	& Kenworthy, 2017; Shaw et al., 2016; Snyder, 2016; Snyder, Mathers, & Crooks,
579	2016). Understanding the role of these other aspects in conjunction with the economic
580	issues we raise is critical to understanding the complete set of benefits and risks of
581	crowdfunding health care, especially crowdfunding medical expenses.
582	
583	CONCLUSION
584	
585	This review demonstrates that crowdfunding plays a unique and growing role in the
586	global health sector. There appears to be four major types of crowdfunded health
587	projects that present important economic benefits and risks. The limited scope of
588	literature on this topic indicates that the importance of health-related crowdfunding may
589	be underappreciated. Consequently, as crowdfunding seizes a larger role in health care,
590	there will be a need for greater academic scrutiny and scholarship in this field. Research
591	in health-related crowdfunding can support evidence-based policy frameworks that
592	enhance the health sector and allow it to evolve with crowdfunding. A valuable first step
593	would be a comprehensive mapping and quantification of health-related crowdfunding
594	campaigns with the goal of identifying measures to mitigate the economic risks
595	identified in this review.
596	
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to thank the following for taking the time to be interviewed: Richard Swart (Institute for Money, Technology, & Financial Inclusion, University of California, Irvine); Lucia Cusmano and Kris Boschmans (Centre for Entrepreneurship, SMEs, and Local Development, OECD); Oliver Gajda (European Crowdfunding Network); and Jason Pope (UK Financial Conduct Authority). The discussion and conclusions made in this paper are wholly the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those individuals that were interviewed.

Project type	Definition	Financing method	Project examples	Platform examples
Health expenses	Crowdfunded health projects that finance an individual's out-of-pocket expenses for medical services and products	Donation- based	Surgery, chemotherapy, rehabilitative care, and mobility & accessibility adaptations	GoFundMe; Indiegogo; Watsi; Crowdfund Health; YouCaring; GiveForward
Health initiatives	Crowdfunded not-for- profit health initiatives that provide benefit to the wider public or a specific group of people.	Donation- based; Reward- based	Charitable fundraising, patient education programs, and disease awareness campaigns	KickStarter; Indiegogo, MedStartr
Health research	Crowdfunded not-profit- profit health research that typically focuses on treatments for rare or neglected diseases.	Donation- based	Basic health science research, genomic studies, and preclinical & early clinical studies	MyProjects; Consano; Cure Cancer Starter; Experiment; RocketHub; StartACure; WhenYouWish; Cancer Research UK; Give To Cure
Commercial health innovation	Crowdfunded for-profit health ventures that need additional capital to get off the ground.	Investment- based	Drug development, therapy innovations, and complimentary & alternative medical treatments	Crowdcube; ShareIn; MedStartr; Healthios Xchange; Wiseed; Venture Health; Homestrings

 Table 1. A typology of crowdfunded health projects

Project type	Benefits	Risks
Health expenses (Donation- based)	 Expands the pool of potential donors Draws money and attention to neglected and under-supported medical conditions Partially fills gap in medical care coverage for patients in need Backers can provide support community for the patient 	 Asymmetrical information and poor project transparency makes it difficult for backers to ensure project accountability Risk of fraud and money laundering High transaction fees charged by platform may make crowdfunding an inefficient method of financing
Health initiatives (Donation- based; Reward- based)	 Expands the pool of potential donors Draws money and attention to neglected and under-supported health care issues Partially fills gap in access to financing for SMEs and individuals Backers can hold project initiators accountable & be engaged in initiative progress 	 Asymmetrical information and poor project transparency can make it difficult for backers to ensure project accountability Risk of fraud and money laundering High transaction fees charged by platform may make crowdfunding an inefficient method of financing
Health research (Donation- based)	 Expands the pool of potential donors Draws money and attention to neglected and under-supported health research Partially fills gap in public and private funding of health research Backers can hold researchers accountable and be engaged in research progress 	 Community unlikely able to efficiently select high-priority projects from a public health perspective Research projects may not be funded based on scientific merit Ethical dilemma created when patients can fund and participate in research pertinent to their own treatment Backer short-term goals can supersede more important long-term research goals Asymmetrical information and poor project transparency can make it difficult for backers to ensure project accountability Risk of fraud and money laundering High transaction fees charged by platform may make crowdfunding an inefficient method of financing
Commercial health innovation (Investment- based)	 Allows non-accredited investors to access the private equity market Draws money and attention to neglected and under-supported health innovation Partially fills gap in access to financing for SMEs Backers can hold SMEs accountable and be engaged in development progress Backers can offer additional expertise, resources, and support for SMEs 	 Backers may not have expertise to efficiently select profitable projects Community unlikely able to efficiently select high-priority projects from a public health perspective High risk of project failure and backers losing their financial investment Asymmetrical information and poor project transparency can make it difficult for backers to ensure project accountability Laws and regulation of equity-based crowdfunding is limited in many countries Concerns of intellectual property rights protection limit the applicability of crowdfunding innovative ideas Risk of fraud and money laundering High transaction fees charged by platforms may make crowdfunding a relatively inefficient method of financing compared to traditional financing avenues

 Table 2. Key economic benefits and concerns across the types of crowdfunded health projects




Figure 1. Information asymmetry in crowdfunding

RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS

- \cdot There has been a rapid uptake of crowdfunding in the global health sector
- \cdot Crowdfunding finances health expenses, initiatives, research, and innovation
- \cdot There are several possible economic benefits and risks of crowdfunding the health market
- \cdot Regulations should facilitate stability and efficiency in the crowdfunding market
- \cdot The market for crowdfunding health should be designed to improve public health

CER MAN