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War, state collapse and reconstruction: phase 2 of the Crisis States Programme

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In this paper we lay out the plans for our research over the next five years. The Crisis States team is in the process of revising these plans and interested in receiving feedback and comments. A more detailed plan of the work will be published after this process is complete. The paper outlines a programme of work, which involves rigorous comparative analysis of processes of war, state collapse (or its avoidance) and reconstruction. The programme is divided into three major components, hinged on comparative national level study, study at the level of the city and study of regional and global processes. An appendix at the end of the paper already highlights some evolution in the team’s thinking about our case selection.

During Phase 1 of the Crisis States Programme our research focused on the ability of public authorities at local, national and international levels to manage conflict. We believe it has been strategically important for understanding and acting upon the governance dilemmas facing the developing world and particularly its poorest communities, countries and regions. Hallmarks of the Centre’s analytical approach have been: to see states on a continuum rather than in dichotomous and rigid typologies; to focus on ways communities manage conflict rather than assume it can be avoided (thus we have rejected the language of ‘conflict resolution’ and ‘post-conflict’); to link local, national, regional and global levels of analysis; and finally to privilege an historical perspective within our interdisciplinary institutional approach. We plan to build upon these strengths in our Phase 2.

Phase 1 allowed us to develop a set of concepts, categories and hypotheses about ‘crisis states’, which will now be explored in rigorous comparative analysis in Phase 2. Our research in Phase 2 takes a harder look at actual processes of collapse into war and intense episodes of violence, or prolonged episodes of violence and war where the state has remained intact, as well as differential experiences in securing peace and pursuing reconstruction. In Phase 2, we will be able to offer explanations about processes of collapse, war and of reconstruction.

What do we expect to learn?

We will examine the historical political economy processes through which violent and non-violent challenges to state authority generate legitimacy crises, and why such crises generate state collapse in some contexts and not others. We will also explore why political violence in some contexts contributes to the construction of more developmental and welfare-minded states, and it does not do so in others. We intend to uncover the broad patterns of the political economy of conflict in order to discover the conditions under which state reconstruction is likely to endure.

In Phase 1 we identified crucial governance dilemmas for developing states. In Phase 2 we will build on this knowledge to identify the mechanisms and dynamics behind war and breakdown, state resilience, and the combination of both. We will strive to understand the co-evolution of world order and state building in the developing world: the set of
opportunities and constraints that order establishes, and the assets, responses, and processes within the state at the national and city levels.

We believe our research in Phase 2 will also allow us to assess the long-term impact of international interventions in fragile states and countries where states have collapsed, as well as those undergoing reconstruction. The international community has become deeply involved in designing interventions in these situations, but the interventions are often based on a poor understanding of history and usually evaluated in technical terms on very short time horizons. Soon after new governments came to power in Uganda and Rwanda, for instance, attention to securing immediate development objectives eclipsed the longer-term impact of the conflicts on the possibilities for reconstruction.

Our focus on local, national and global dimensions in Phase 1 proved useful. We want to extend this approach to considering, from a comparative perspective, additional levels of analysis that we identified as important. These include regional dynamics, which are critical in explaining the dilemmas of conflict and reconstruction. Moreover, beyond our focus on local and micro-level dynamics we recognise the importance of meso-level political processes and institutions, particularly at the metropolitan or city level. For Phase 2 we are proposing to address this as follows.

There will be a much more focused research agenda, based on more systematic comparative analysis. The Centre’s work would be divided around three major interrelated components that will allow us to maintain our work at local, national and global levels, while extending our successful regional level work and scaling-up the local level focus:

1) Development as State-Making: Collapse, War and Reconstruction
2) Cities and States: Conflict, War and Reconstruction
3) Regional and Global Axes of Conflict

Although we are adopting states as our principal focus of investigation, we recognise that they do not exist in isolation but are embedded within wider contexts and overlay complex meso-level processes and microcosms. Focusing on the relationship between cities and states will allow us to examine how cities can help build nation-states as well as undermine them, while the exploration of regional and global axes of conflict will permit us to understand the kinds of macro-level processes that can fundamentally affect states and cities and their capacity to act effectively and in concert. Our research will shift more towards Sub-Saharan Africa while maintaining a comparative perspective in work on Latin America and Asia, especially for understanding differential outcomes in managing conflict and reducing instability, stagnation and poverty.

**Development as State Making: Collapse, War & Reconstruction**

The first component of the research involves a systematic comparative study of processes of state collapse, war and reconstruction. From an historical perspective, much of the developing world today is characterised by states in the process of formation. The focus of this study will be on the organisations and institutions that make up fragile states and the proposition that the quality of political action and organisation at the level of the state determines the trajectory of collapse, the avoidance of collapse and processes of
reconstruction. We aim to study six cases in great depth supplemented by a wider comparative set comprising ten additional cases.

**Our central research questions will be:**

1. What has been the pattern of state collapse in the countries we are studying and can we, in hindsight, identify the main symptoms indicating that a collapse was on the horizon?
2. Why have some fragile states that have experienced prolonged warfare managed to survive while others have not?
3. How and why, when non-state actors emerge to challenge the state in certain domains, has this lead to war while in others it has not? What has been the role of non-state actors, including civil society organisations that intervene to facilitate negotiations between the state and warring groups (civil liberty organisations, human rights and humanitarian INGOs and citizen groups) as well as international actors, in the avoidance of war?
4. What processes of reform and state organisation (in relation to non-state or societal actors) have been most successful in periods of reconstruction in terms of achieving security, growth and development, and welfare? Are there trade-offs we can identify in terms of achieving these objectives?
5. How do developing states respond to and interact with global markets?
6. What has been the role of interventions from the international community in processes of decline into war and state collapse, as well as processes of reconstruction, and which interventions have contributed positively to security, growth and welfare?

Our six core case studies all have experienced important episodes of violence and war and we will include three types of experiences: (1) countries which experienced war, where states collapsed, but where there is at least a decade of reconstruction experience; (2) countries which experienced war, where states collapsed and the future is uncertain; and (3) countries where states have avoided collapse despite prolonged warfare.

Our wider set of countries are chosen with these three criteria in mind, but will add two additional categories allowing us to examine longer-term processes of reconstruction after war and to include a control set of countries that avoided war and state collapse. They are also chosen with a view to other issues of policy relevance.

During Phase 1, we began to elaborate this framework in the context of our work on state building in Afghanistan. During the final year of Phase 1, we are piloting this work in a small comparative study of African cases of states that experienced collapse and those that have avoided it.

**Our conception of the state and fragile states**

During Phase 1 we defined fragile states as states where economic development has lagged behind the rich countries and where the institutions that manage conflict and govern the organisation of economic, political and social life are vulnerable to crisis. A crisis, we argued, is a situation where the political, economic or social system is confronted with challenges with which reigning institutions are potentially unable to cope. In other words, crisis is a condition of disruption severe enough to threaten the continued existence of established
systems. By studying how particular instances of crisis, like a fiscal collapse, an explosion of violence, or the HIV/AIDS epidemic, challenge reigning institutions and how they are acted upon, we can learn more about the dynamics of state fragility. We will study such periods of crisis in a systematic and comparative manner at national, city and regional levels and assess the part played in outcomes by state and non-state actors and organisations and the institutional frameworks in which they can be found. We plan to build on this conception of the state to continue to explore why some fragile states succumb to crises and enter a spiral of violence, collapse and war while others do not.

Our general framework lies at the intersection between a Weberian understanding of the state and the political economy of state building, as developed by Tilly, Tarrow, Olson, and others. We will look at the state in functional terms encompassing a set of four ‘sub-systems’, the quality of which has a major impact on the key outcomes that will concern us: security, growth and welfare. These four ‘sub-systems’ are the: security system, administrative system, legal system and political system. We understand the organisations and institutions that compose the state as emerging from society (as the result of conflict and reflecting a particular balance of power) to provide the organisational and institutional framework for economic and social reproduction and development, including the provision or non-provision of public goods and, importantly, social goods (effective redistribution, respect of democracy and human rights, and the institutionalisation of recognition of ethnic minorities) all of which contribute to achieving security and welfare. Importantly, the evolution of these processes are influenced by international institutions and organisations in an indeterminate direction.

This approach has three important implications for the way we will study the problems of state collapse, state survival and state reconstruction and that will define the framework of our case studies:

- We must study the economic foundations in which particular states operate and their historical evolution;
- We must study both the quality and nature of state organisations and institutions and their relation to alternative sources of power in society;
- We will evaluate performance of the state in terms of outcomes in ensuring security, growth and welfare, and will assess the impact (if any) of international institutions and organisations on securing these outcomes

The framework of economic analysis

We will base our analysis of the evolution of particular states on an understanding of the economic parameters in which they operate. We will employ a simple model of the economy, taking into account the evolution of formal and informal sectors of production and exchange, and domestic and international markets, placing some importance on patterns of inequality (related especially to region, religion, ethnicity and language).1

Economic activity (production, employment, exchange) takes place across ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ economies. By the ‘formal economy’, we mean economic activities that have a legal status and are subject to regulation, surveillance and measurement, by local and national

1 In this we follow Frances Stewart, et al., War and Underdevelopment: Volume 1: The economic and social consequences of conflict, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, but with a view to looking at patterns of inequality in access to political power as well, a central element lacking in their earlier analyses.
political authorities. The ‘informal economy’ encompasses a huge amount of activity in developing countries, from subsistence-oriented activities, to economic activities lodged within households, to larger scale activities with no legal status, including both large and small scale criminal activities – largely beyond the reach of regulation, surveillance and measurement.\(^2\) Phase 1 of our research demonstrated significant evidence of the expansion of the informal economy, not only in poor but in middle income countries (a movement from quadrants A and C in Table 1 towards B), with transformative impacts on the possibilities of political organisation and serious implications in relation to a public authority’s ability to tax or regulate economic activity.

Table 1: Simple Model of the Economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Formal Economy</th>
<th>Informal Economy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Markets</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Markets</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We would suggest that fragile states are characterised by considerable proportions of economic activities located in quadrants B and D of Table 1. Quadrant D represents an area likely to be almost entirely composed of criminal activities. We propose to analyse the historical evolution of the economies in our case study countries according to this template and to develop our political and institutional analyses of the processes of collapse, war and reconstruction (and resistance to these processes) with this simple model in mind.\(^3\) We believe both domestic and international interventions in recovering from war and state collapse need to be assessed in terms of their impact on these structural characteristics of the economy.

The framework for analysing particular states

We will examine the performance of states (that is of the four subsystems that make up the state) by analysing: (a) the character of the institutions reigning; (b) the capabilities of individuals and organisations in each; and (c) the countervailing non-state institutions and organisations that vie for control with, or effectively carry out these functions in the absence of, the state. What is perhaps different about this vantage point on evaluating the state is the examination of the exercise of state functions as a contested terrain between public authorities and various non-state actors. In some cases the state contracts out, or co-opts in non-state actors to perform these functions, but in others non-state actors emerge to fill the gaps left by absent state authority, or, importantly, to challenge the state (Table 2).

The security system provides for protection of the territory/society from external threats, protection from violence and threats from within the society, enforcement of laws and

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\(^2\) There may be purposeful neglect of the informal sector by state actors, particularly if the same patron-client networks operate within and outside the state (P. Chabal & J-P Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*, Oxford: James Currey, 1999).

\(^3\) It is notoriously difficult to study the informal economy at a macro-level. We can capture trends in the informal economy at the macro-level by studying changes in the formal economy in relation to investments, business activities and employment, imputing consequences for informal economic activity and supplementing this with the study of particular activities in the informal economy (through sectoral analysis).
judicial and administrative decisions. As such it involves both military and police organisations at national, regional and local levels, intelligence agencies and presidential guards or other special forces. Institutions – both laws and norms – and capabilities determine principles of civilian authority or the lack of it, compliance with human rights standards, standards of discipline, etcetera. A variety of non-state actors often possess coercive power – from private security firms, to local and regional organisations and their leaders (for instance, warlords or tribal authorities), crime syndicates and their bosses, gangs and vigilantes, and dissident political organisations and their guerrilla armies. We will be interested in explaining the conditions under which state organisations co-opt or contract these non-state actors under their authority and where such actors emerge as rivals and challengers to the state.

Table 2: Analysing the State (national, regional and local)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State subsystem</th>
<th>State Actors</th>
<th>Non-state Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security</strong></td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Private security firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Institutional</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Community defence groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arrangements)</td>
<td>Intelligence agencies</td>
<td>Warlords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presidential guards and other special forces</td>
<td>‘Traditional’ authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Crime syndicates gangs/vigilantes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political orgs and their armies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Civil liberty, women and citizens groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administrative</strong></td>
<td>Finance esp. revenue</td>
<td>Private firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Institutional</td>
<td>Social services (health, education)</td>
<td>Local potentates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arrangements)</td>
<td>Public works (transport, utilities)</td>
<td>Gangsters or warlords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Religious/traditional organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign affairs</td>
<td>Community organisations and NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eco planning</td>
<td>Private and community media orgs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal</strong></td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>‘Traditional’/religious authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Institutional</td>
<td>Judges</td>
<td>Local warlords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arrangements)</td>
<td>Court officials (prosecutors, lawyers)</td>
<td>Wealthy families and businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Justices of peace, ombudsmen</td>
<td>Political organisations with territorial control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td>State political parities</td>
<td>Patronage networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Institutional</td>
<td>Election authorities</td>
<td>Traditional /religious orgs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arrangements)</td>
<td>Constitutionally recognised competitive political parties and other representative orgs</td>
<td>Local and regional power brokers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra-constitutional political or criminal organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Media orgs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, civil liberty, women, or citizen organisations that aim at expanding the notion of security dot the landscape of beleaguered states. We will analyse the conditions under which these can expand the welfarist or social security agenda of the state to enhance personal security.
The administrative system importantly provides for the collection of revenue, the delivery of services related to public goods (such as health, education, transport or water), information circulation and regulation, management of international relations and, particularly in situations of late development, the institutional and organisational arrangements to ensure capital formation and investment. It involves bureaucratic organisations at national, regional and local levels and both formal laws and informal norms determine their behaviour (links to private interests, traditional authorities, and so on). A variety of non-state actors (private firms, local potentates, gangsters or warlords, religious organisations, community organisations, NGOs, media organisations) may be contracted to perform these functions, may traditionally perform them, may simply fill the gaps where no state organisations exist, or may emerge to challenge the state in fulfilling these functions.

The legal system provides dispute resolution mechanisms, codifies property rights and regulations governing all sorts of social, economic and political activities. It involves both state and non-state actors, including courts, judges, prosecutors and lawyers and their respective organisations at all levels. Here there is often a huge gap between what is formally organised at the level of the state and everyday practices of dispute resolution and definitions of control over property by all sorts of non-state actors, including traditional authorities, local warlords, local wealthy families and businesses, political organisations with territorial control exercised through alternative institutional arrangements, as well as vigilante groups and informal justice systems.

Finally, the political system provides the institutional framework governing access to public authority, determining who holds positions of power within the state at national, regional and local levels. The rules (constitutions, legal regulations about elections or appointments to positions of authority within the state) often diverge considerably from the norms that actually reign in this domain. While organisations like political parties, or political movements, may formally be recognised as vehicles for participation, in reality patronage networks, tribal authorities, religious authorities, media organisations, and local and regional power brokers may either effectively control state organisations or appropriate their functions at local, regional and national levels. The organisations that operate on this political terrain play a major role in defining what constitutes legitimate behaviour within, and by, the state. Indeed a major function of political organisation is engaging a battle over establishing the grounds of legitimacy, whether in constitutional/legal, religious, traditional or ethnic or other terms.4 Our study of state breakdown also must include the study of regime breakdown, to which it is sometimes tied.

International institutions (for example, international laws and conventions, norms of business behaviour, or associational behaviour) and the actions of international organisations (multilateral agencies like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation, bilateral aid agencies, NGOs, international crime syndicates, Christian Churches and Muslim schools) affect, in a multitude of ways, the evolution of all these patterns across the economic and political terrains.

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**Political Economy of State Collapse and Crisis**

1. ‘Institutional multiplicity’

In Phase 1 of our research we developed a concept of *institutional multiplicity*, where individuals and organisations appear to operate often simultaneously in multiple institutional systems, governed by very different sets of incentives. Institutional multiplicity is a situation in which different sets of rules of the game, often contradictory, coexist in the same territory, putting citizens and economic agents in complex, often unsolvable, situations, but at the same time offering them the possibility of switching strategically from one institutional universe to another. Often the interventions of the international community simply add a new layer of rules, without overriding others. In such situations, the conventional political economy of state modernisation – which suggests that if the state establishes an appropriate set of incentives and sends the correct signals political and economic agents follow suit – is clearly insufficient.

In terms of analysing the state, institutional arrangements encompass both formal and informal rules governing the behaviour of those who occupy positions within the state as well as those non-state actors that are co-opted/contracted by the state or rivals to the state in fulfilling the functions ascribed to the state. Constitutions and law are formal institutions affecting all subsystems of the state and each subsystem has specific institutional arrangements important to our analytical framework: security (mix of public and private provision, codes of ethics governing armed forces and police, security doctrine, etcetera); administrative (procedures for appointments/ promotions, mix of public-private provision, centralised-decentralised authority, regulations governing taxation and powers granted); legal (pattern of judicial appointments, hierarchical structures of decision making, the mix of ‘traditional’ and modern liberal judicial authority, etcetera); political (division of executive, legislative and judicial authority, method of attaining office, the regulation of organisations that can contest for political office, etcetera). Non-state actors are always affected by the formal and informal institutional arrangements governing the behaviour of state actors, but may have evolved alternative formal and informal institutional arrangements distinct from the state. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka have their own constitutional/legal arrangements in the territories they dominate; and urban gangs have their codes of ethics and justice, as do the regional power brokers of the DRC.

2. ‘State capacity and capability’

In analysing the performance of the subsystems of the state and among non-state rivals, we will in every case be looking at the evolution of capacity – the abilities and skills of personnel and the organisational culture within the subsystems of the state we are considering. While we separate these subsystems for analytical purposes, we will attempt to form a judgement about their interaction to arrive at an assessment of state capacity and effectiveness at any given point in time. The capabilities of non-state rivals are important as well, including their ability to win popular support and to extend their presence territorially. In terms of capabilities, there are important agency factors that always need to be taken into account, including the quality of leadership and the development strategies adopted. While capacity is influenced by path-dependent factors, the developmental states of Northeast Asia and followers in Southeast Asia provide ample evidence that capacity is also created through political decision and action. At a methodological level, we want to develop better qualitative and quantitative means of assessing state capacity and its strengths, weaknesses and deficits.
3. ‘Influencing’ or rent-seeking

It is useful to consider that in post-war and poor economies there are multiple mechanisms that link state and society. In adapting Weber’s ideas on economic sociology, there are several competing mechanisms through which influencing, or rent-seeking, activities occur. The first are legal and institutional influencing activities, which are the dominant form of rent-seeking in advanced economies and the least developed form in poor economies. Business chambers and labour unions represent a small part of the population and political parties are often factionalised and unstable the less developed the economy is. In contrast, lobby groups, political parties, labour unions and legal campaign contributions to parties on the part of business groups are well-established forms of institutionalised rent-seeking or influencing in richer countries. The second mechanism of influencing comprises informal patron-client networks, which are a central feature of many poor economies. Such clientelism is a substitute for the welfare state, which is often inadequate in meeting welfare demands of large parts of the population. Third, and closely related to the second, are illegal forms of rent-seeking or corruption. In the absence of viable institutionalised mechanisms to influence the state, corruption (and clientelism) become important substitute forms of influencing in less developed economies. When one or more of the above three mechanisms fail to provide influencing opportunities to political actors, political violence represents a fourth path to influence, capture or usurp the state altogether.

It is possible to consider these four influencing mechanisms as functional substitutes that operate to a greater extent under different stages of development and under different political settlements. An important component of the research agenda is to consider the relationships between alternate forms of influencing and state capture and the mechanisms through which declines in the first three forms of influencing contribute to the rise of political violence. In turn, we need to explain why political violence generates state collapse in some contexts and not others.

4. Coalitional analysis

The emergence of political violence is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for state collapse. This is because there may exist a significantly powerful coalition of supporters who benefit from the formal and informal mechanisms of influencing the state. In order to explain why political violence escalates into state collapse, we will employ coalitional analysis, according attention to the shifting constellations of power that underpin formal and informal institutional arrangements that govern the exercise of different forms of authority within society. We are concerned with the ways in which shifting coalitions of power contribute to state collapse; are forged in order to prevent state collapse; and emerge as a result of state collapse and war.

Coalitional analysis will enable us to overcome the limitations of purely structural and actor-based explanations of breakdown and collapse. Structural arguments examine the conditions most conducive to state collapse, but do not explain how and why a particular country’s state breaks down. Agency-based arguments emphasise the role a leader’s policies play in contributing to state-building or collapse but do not explain why such policies endure.

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By linking questions of why state collapse occurs and why it persists, the research promotes an integrative approach. It assumes neither that historical institutions dictate future political outcomes nor that political actors determine outcomes on the basis of will alone. It assesses the historically constituted conditions that lead to state collapse and reconstruction. It takes structures seriously since the organisations of state, society and economy institutionalise a given distribution of power. These institutions provide the conditions within which and against which actors manoeuvre. They are also likely to provide the conditions that predispose actors to favour one outcome over another. But individuals are the ones who take action. Politics is about defining legitimate grounds for rule and about redefining what is possible.

Political coalitions, Yashar suggests, serve as an analytic lens to assess the ways in which structures condition political options and the future to which actors aspire. Coalitions are defined as alliances among social actors and groups. They provide the organisational framework for delineating who sides with whom, against whom, and over what. Coalitions bring together groups or institutions with heterogeneous goals that are willing to sacrifice for some intermediate, collective goals. Coalitions are the nexus at which structure and agency meet and modify individuals’ options and capacities to affect change. The research will analyse which conditions generate coalitions that generate political violence and state collapse, and which conditions generate coalitions that generate political violence without generating state collapse. Moreover, coalitional analysis will inform the reasons that reconstruction policies were not just initiated, but endured in some cases.

Another important reason to incorporate coalitional analysis is that the state itself is an agent of coalitions. As opposed to the technical views that see the state as simply a set of institutions with functional attributes, the state is a social relation. Regardless of regime type, state leaders require social support and thus the state and the institutional rules it creates and sanctions is the by-product of prior bargaining solutions, or settlements among relevant political forces. It is thus necessary to identify the nature of coalitions and factions underlying the state in order to understand the historically situated rationality of state policies, and in particular, the reasons why a certain distribution of assets and patronage is reproduced.

5. Divisibility and Boundary Activation

The nature of political coalitions underlying state support (and in particular, the extent to which these coalitions survive through activating and maintaining boundaries) determines the extent to which political, economic and social conflicts are more indivisible. The creation and activation of boundaries contribute to the escalation of political conflict and violence.

An important component of identifying the nature of coalitions is to examine the extent to which they merge heterogeneous groups with conflicts of interest (and therefore more amenable to peaceful bargains), as opposed to a political structure where collective actors are more narrowly focused and therefore potentially less tolerant of policies that disadvantage them. Politics based on ethnicity, region, or religion is likely to pertain more to the latter category.

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Narrow identity-based conflict tends to all-or-nothing struggles for indivisible stakes (control of the state, and state patronage, land and other valuable resources and the rights associated with them). Divisibility refers to the extent to which the conflict over a right is a question of ‘more or less’ (such as in the capital-labour struggle) as opposed to ‘all-or nothing’. When political coalitions are organised around regional, ethnic or other identity aspects, the distribution of assets and resources tends to be more indivisible. As Hirschman and Wood argue, the greater the indivisibility of asset distribution and state patronage, the more intense conflicts over rights associated with these income flows will likely become. In turn, the greater the intensity of conflict, the more likely such conflicts will be resolved through violent as opposed to non-violent means.\(^8\)

Moreover, as Wood argues, the extent to which conflicts involve divisible benefits, and the contending parties are economically interdependent (as with labour-capital struggles), the more likely a range of mutually acceptable arrangements may be possible.\(^9\) In such cases where the principal antagonists are economically interdependent (such as South Africa and El Salvador), the cessation of violence and other forms of hostile relations (labour strikes, capital flight) promises substantial potential benefits to both parties sufficient to create a structural basis for compromise that is self-reinforcing. It is more probable that peace will endure if there is a material interest on both sides of a conflict to negotiate. For instance, in addressing the HIV/AIDS crisis, the adoption of successful measures to fight the epidemic can provide benefits in terms of a public good in the interest of all groups. In the case of indivisible stakes, compromise is more difficult because neither party believes the returns will be adequate unless it can control all of the stakes.

There are two important implications of the above discussion for examining post-war reconstruction. First, the political economy of conflict is central to understanding the prospects for peace-building. In particular, an examination of the economic structure underlying conflict is crucial to understanding the extent to which there are interdependencies among the antagonists. Secondly, in situations where conflicts are based more on indivisible stakes, it may be necessary to inject significant resources across contending groups to maintain political legitimacy and stability. Insufficient donor injections of resources may amount to battling a large fire with a few hoses.

**Assessing Outcomes: security, growth and welfare**

**Economic Growth and Development:** When assessing outcomes of state performance we distinguish between economic growth and economic development. The former can occur if there is a natural resource boom. The latter refers to the former plus qualitative changes in production structure and in productivity levels. Thus, we include diversification of production and exports, savings and investment rates to measure development.

In assessing *Welfare*, we will consider health and education indicators, investments in health and education and, also, the extent to which this spending is pro-poor. Important, in terms of many of the countries we are studying, will be progress made in addressing the HIV/AIDS crisis.

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We will assess *Security*, both in terms of national security and ‘personal security’. National security is improved as a greater percentage of the territory is controlled by the state. In ‘small-n’ studies we can examine how this dimension of security changes over time. Of course, positive outcomes in achieving national security do not always lead to improvements in personal security. In many Latin American countries, urban crime is very high despite there not being an issue of national security (Colombia is an exception). Thus both these dimensions of security must be assessed.

**Choosing our ‘universe’ of cases**

We have decided to undertake largely qualitative comparative analysis of a small number (‘small-n’) of countries that have experienced war as our intention is to investigate, understand and explain *processes and patterns* of state collapse and reconstruction. As Ragin argues, small-n is not a ‘second best’ solution when statistics are unavailable, but rather the first option when the focus of interest is processes and patterns rather than variables.\(^\text{10}\) Our interest in historically based analysis, where we can evaluate the interaction of economic conditions and the functioning of states along the four parameters explained above, makes this the decidedly preferred approach. We are building this research on a rich tradition of scholarship.\(^\text{11}\)

**Table 3: Six Core Case Studies - Countries that experienced war**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Case Studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Major war and collapse with reconstruction over at least ten years | Uganda
Rwanda                                           |
| Major war, collapse and future is uncertain         | Afghanistan
Democratic Republic of Congo                     |
| Prolonged warfare but state did not collapse        | Colombia
Mozambique                                        |

In choosing our universe of cases, we have decided to focus on a central set of six countries (Table 3), which all have experienced important episodes of violence and war, and we will include three types of experiences: (1) countries which experienced war, where states collapsed, but where there is at least a decade of reconstruction experience (Uganda/Rwanda); (2) countries which experienced war, where states collapsed and the future is uncertain (Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo); and (3) countries where states have avoided collapse despite prolonged warfare (Colombia and Mozambique).

In each case we want to examine the economic condition of countries before war broke out and the evolution of their state organisations (along the parameters outlined above) and the

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\(^{11}\) Examples of comparative studies that inspire us are: Moore’s book on the paths of capitalist development that lead or not to democracy; Scokpol’s work on revolutions; O’Donnell, Przeworski, Linz’s and others programme on democratic transitions; Linz’s study of democratic breakdown; Rokkan’s and Duverger’s work on political parties; and Hirschman’s reflection on development.
relation between the two in leading to the outbreak of war. We want to understand what led to the collapse of the state in four cases and not in the other two. We will examine the processes of state reconstruction in the first two cases and processes of state maintenance and reform during war in the last two cases. It is our intention to discuss and apply the analytical insights concerning reconstruction in Uganda and Rwanda to the policy discussion and debates about reaching peace and launching reconstruction in Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. We will place considerable importance on evaluating how international interventions in our case study countries in relation to the four domains of state organisation (security, administrative/fiscal, legal, political) have fared over time – what has worked and what has not (see also the ‘regional and global axes of conflict’ component, below).

Our wider set of countries are chosen with the same three experiential categories in mind, but will add two additional categories to include: (4) countries which experienced major war, avoiding state collapse and engaged in post war reconstruction for at least three decades; and (5) countries which have avoided significant episodes of violent conflict and war where states have remained intact, despite poor performance in relation to growth, welfare and the standards of ‘good governance’ promoted by the international agencies (Table 4).

Table 4: Wider Set of Secondary Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Case Studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major war and collapse with reconstruction over at least ten years</td>
<td>Lebanon, Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major war, collapse and future is uncertain</td>
<td>Somalia, Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prolonged warfare but state did not collapse</td>
<td>Sri Lanka, Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major war, no collapse reconstruction over at least 3 decades</td>
<td>Nigeria, Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries that have experienced neither war nor collapse (despite the odds)</td>
<td>Tanzania, Ecuador</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category 4 gives us perspective over time in terms of reconstruction after war, while Category 5 can act as a ‘control group’, and together with the larger number of examples we should be able to more credibly discuss ‘why’ state collapse occurred in some places and not in others. Having this wider set of comparators will allow us to continue to examine processes of state collapse, its avoidance and reconstruction along a continuum, which proved so fruitful in Phase 1 of our work. These ten countries are also chosen with a view to allowing us through comparative analysis of the whole set, or paired comparisons within the
set, or geographical subsets,\textsuperscript{12} to analyse other issues of policy relevance: geopolitical and demographic importance (Nigeria/Indonesia); resource abundance and state management (Nigeria/Indonesia); and processes of secession where war has led or may lead to the formation of new states (Indonesia/Ethiopia/Somalia \textit{vis} East Timor/Eritrea/Somaliland). The wider set allows us to place our concern with processes of state collapse and reconstruction in a wider comparative framework, setting Sub-Saharan African countries in comparison with countries in Asia and Latin America (the importance of which was demonstrated during our Phase 1 work).

\textbf{Cities and Fragile States: Conflict, War and Reconstruction}

The second component of the programme involves a systematic comparative study of the relationship between cities and states, while also locating cities within regional and global contexts. It focuses on the role of cities in war and the impact of conflict on cities. This component of the research is also concerned with the contribution of cities to state resilience where the collapse of fragile states has been avoided, as well as to reconstruction and peace-building in the wake of war and to state-making more generally. This element of the research is important because of the growing number of people that are concentrated in cities and because cities have distinct dynamics in processes of collapse, war and reconstruction. Consequently, these processes have to be understood as much at the city as at the national level.

\textit{Our Conception of the City}

Cities are understood beyond local government, as jurisdictional, legal, socio-cultural, economic, and spatial entities larger than neighbourhoods but smaller than national and sub-national states.\textsuperscript{13} However, the relationship between metropolitan and other tiers of governance is central to our analysis, recognising that national state building and urban autonomy historically have been in dynamic tension.\textsuperscript{14} In the context of development this tension found new expression in programmes of decentralisation: the loss of the privileged status of the national state as the only actor in the international arena. The focus on decentralisation has tended to overshadow the importance of intergovernmental relations. By contrast our premise is that the critical focus should be on coordination between different tiers and spheres of government and that effective decentralisation is only possible in the context of a strong national state. As such, the ‘cities and states’ section of the research will explore the nature and impact of metropolitan autonomy from national states under conditions of conflict and its consequences for peace, reconstruction and democracy. This will firmly link this second component of the research programme to that on development as state making.

The study of cities as spatial entities is also crucial to our project. This is because the rapid pace of urbanisation throughout the developing world opens the door to a whole new set of governance challenges. Furthermore, the centrality of cities in contemporary warfare is now indisputable. Cities have always had a place in war, for example as locations of protection,

\textsuperscript{12} Methodologically, we can more easily examine the role of international factors by looking at a geographical subset defined as a region that interacts with global forces.


 siege or attack. However, in recent years the vulnerability of cities as objects of war and targets of terrorist attack has become abundantly clear. While this has been investigated in the context of industrialised countries, few systematically comparative studies have been undertaken in respect of the large urban centres of the developing world. This is despite the fact that the majority of wars are fought in impoverished countries with often devastating and transformative impacts on their urban spaces.\(^{15}\) While in the twentieth century armed conflicts in developing countries were heavily fought in the rural areas,\(^{16}\) it is becoming increasingly clear that now it is the cities of such countries that have become sites of what we call ‘urban wars of the twenty-first century’. A focus on cities and conflict should not serve to neglect rural areas. On the contrary, rural and urban processes across regions and within national polities are inextricably connected. Here it would be as important to understand the impact of war on, for instance, Luanda, in terms of attacks and the city’s exponential growth as a result of people moving in from surrounding rural areas, as to understand how Kinshasa has seemingly been insulated itself from the conflicts raging around it. Nevertheless, a focus on cities is necessary precisely in order to show how cities absorb much of the impact and fallout from contemporary conflict and war, both directly and indirectly and that this has consequences for development as state making.

It is possible to regard cities simply as contested terrains upon which competing nations, interests or coalitions of power and influence compete for resources and wage their wars. However, cities are also important in their own right, as economic, social and political spaces. Even in the absence of war and armed conflict, cities are frequently host to acute poverty, visible inequality and appalling living environments, both in the developed and the developing world. Indeed, they can be and have been described as sites of dystopia containing “all that is bad, all that is unjust, all that is iniquitous”.\(^{17}\) Certainly over the past two decades, many cities around the world have become increasingly characterised by rising forms of violence, insecurity, and illegality – the essence of state fragility. As sites of high crime and insecurity, which are rapidly becoming associated with or indeed paradigmatic of a broader form of ‘twenty-first century urban warfare’, cities themselves have become new theatres of war. It is in urban spaces that terror is conducted with greatest visibility and where new forms of violence are emerging along a hazy boundary between criminal and political violence. Residents withdraw into fortified spaces with consequences for citizenship and state building processes. Thus, this element of the research on cities links to our broader focus on development as state making and the particular and related concern with security subsystems.

### Framework for Analysing Cities and Fragile States

The framework for analysing cities broadly parallels that for development as state making, focusing on the security, administrative and political subsystems as well as the socio-spatial systems of cities. We propose that under conditions of equilibrium states can most effectively perform their social reproduction and development functions in the context of cities. For example, the provision of public goods might have greater reach given the concentration of

\(^{15}\) Hills does look at war in developing country cities, but almost entirely from the perspective of military doctrine (Future War in Cities: Rethinking a Liberal Dilemma, London: Cass, 2004); while Graham’s collection looks at cities and terrorism but without a specific developmental focus and without a consideration of the relationship between cities and state-making (Cities, War and Terrorism, Towards an Urban Geopolitics, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003).

\(^{16}\) See, for example, Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973.

\(^{17}\) Malcolm Miles et al.(eds), The City Cultures Reader, London: Routledge, 2003, p.287. Such a vision is of course at the heart of Tönnies’ foundational sociology of the city.
urban populations. Urban centres are also widely recognised as sites in which social goods are more likely to flourish. Whether this proposition pertains under conditions of war and conflict is less clear, let alone whether the benefits of urbanisation might extend from the metropolitan to the national level in the context of the avoidance of collapse, reconstruction and conflict management. These issues will be a critical focus of our analysis.

Cities are often the engines of national economic growth. However, recent analysis has demonstrated that cities can be linked into regional and global economies in ways that eclipse or bypass national states – perhaps a definitional characteristic of state fragility. In developing countries economic activity across ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ economies is more likely and more important than in rich countries and cities are often host to expanding populations deriving livelihoods from informal economies. Critical to our understanding of state making, therefore, is the ability of cities to absorb, manage and govern informality, from the survivalist sector through to large-scale criminal networks. The following proposition will be explored (see Table 5):

Where cities succeed and where informal urban economies are integrated into national economies, this may render national states less fragile: that is where considerable proportions of economic activities are located in quadrant B. However if informality remains independent of national or local state regulation and where urban informal economies are linked directly into illicit international or regional markets, then urban informal economies might increase the fragility of national states: that is where a high proportion of economic activities fall into quadrant D.

Table 5: Simple Model of the Urban Economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urban Formal Economy</th>
<th>Urban Informal Economy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Markets</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Markets</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While there is evidence to suggest that conflict fuels certain kinds of informal economic activity, it is not clear to what extent war impacts on urban economies more generally. Moreover, we understand little about their actual or potential integration into or separation from national economies. For example, to what extent does economic activity in the capital city Kabul or the commercial border city of Herat fuel the national economy of Afghanistan? These are issues we will explore.

We aim to study processes of state collapse and reconstruction as they play themselves out in cities. We will consider the contribution (or otherwise) of cities both to state collapse and state making and reconstruction. Cities will also be studied in terms of their regional location, for example, with regard to their rural hinterlands, their position straddling national borders or along international axes of conflict. As such, cities will be considered not simply as a microcosm of the national-state, but as sites of particular economic, social, administrative, legal and political processes unique to the urban sphere. Critical to the analysis will be how urban processes link with those at the national, regional and global levels.
The Political Economy and Political Sociology of Cities and Fragile States

While the overarching questions we ask about the processes of state collapse, its avoidance and state reconstruction at the national level will be taken up within our city studies, the particularities of violent conflict in the cities and the institutional responses of those who inhabit its spaces give rise to an important further set of research questions:

- What are the common characteristics of cities that have experienced urban warfare (as strategic targets, siege cities or sites of displacement of urban inhabitants themselves or rural inhabitants seeking refuge)?
- What are the differences between instances of war-induced violence and crime-induced violence in cities, and what can be learnt from them?
- What has been the impact of urban conflict on the ways in which the local state is organised and relates to urban citizens; and is there a case for considering cities and their reconstruction after war independently from the nation states in which they are lodged?
- What has been the impact of conflict on urban economies and how able are local or national states to manage informal economic activities within and beyond national borders to avoid the collapse of fragile states?
- What are the characteristics of cities that have become sites of reconciliation and peace building and how do cities that have directly experienced urban warfare differ from cities that have not been directly involved in conflict or in the post-war reconstruction processes?
- Why have some cities undergone reconstruction in a segregated manner (e.g. Beirut), while others have promoted inter-mixing between erstwhile enemies (e.g., Sarajevo), and with what consequences in terms of security, growth and welfare?
- What processes of reform, state organisation and citizens’ action have been most successful in periods of reconstruction in terms of achieving security, growth and welfare; how are these similar to or different from those identified at the national level and do they contribute to processes at the national level?
- What role have interventions from the international community played in processes of decline into urban warfare and the collapse of city governments, as well as processes of reconstruction?

The historical, political economy and institutional analyses that we will employ in the study of national states will be adapted to the study of cities. Additionally, perspectives and methodologies drawn from political sociology and anthropology will be integrated into this element of the research. In our city studies we can consider the socio-spatial dimensions of conflict and peace building such as the impact of density, urban design and the use of various kinds of public space by different social groups. Economic analysis at the level of the city should allow us to delve more deeply into the changing formal and informal economies of the countries we are studying. We aim to capture the particular characteristics of processes of state collapse and reconstruction in cities in the wake of war by organising the comparative research around three themes: (a) cities, nations and governance; (b) reconstruction and the social fabric of the city; and (c) violence, crime and city futures.
Our choice of city case studies

We aim to study twelve cities. Four of these (Kigali, Kinshasa, Kabul and Bogotá) are cities drawn from case study countries covering three of the core categories and core countries in which we will study development as state making (Table 6). The remaining eight cities (Ahmedabad, Beirut, Dar es Salaam, Guayaquil, Luanda, Manila, Nairobi and Srinagar/Jafna) are chosen either from the wider set of secondary case study countries (five) or because they highlight critical dimensions of cities in conflict (Table 7). All these cities, barring Ahmedabad and Nairobi, exist within wider polities that have experienced significant periods of war. Together the cities will be studied according to the analytical framework outlined below.

Table 6: Four Cities in Six Core Case Studies - Countries that experienced war

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Case Studies</th>
<th>Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major war and collapse with reconstruction over at least ten years</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Kigali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major war, collapse and future is uncertain</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Kabul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prolonged warfare but state did not collapse</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Bogota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Wider Set of City Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Case Studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cities in fragile states that have not experienced war</td>
<td>Guayaquil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major war, urban breakdown with reconstruction over at least ten years or where future is uncertain</td>
<td>Luanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prolonged warfare but city did not collapse</td>
<td>Srinagar/Jafna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City divided by national war</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban conflict but state did not collapse</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ahmedabad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We will address the overarching questions we ask about the processes of state collapse and reconstruction at the national level in our city studies, but we have organised our choice of
cities around additional themes related to cities, states and conflict, ensuring that at least four cities fit into each theme (Table 8). Within this framework the research will explore the impact of war on the administrative, legal and political systems of cities. A specific understanding of urban security systems will be sought and we will consider whether they are adequate to the tasks arising from urban warfare.

**Cities, Nations and Governance**

There are two countervailing forces undermining the ability of nation states to respond to the problems of social, political and economic organisation of their citizens. First, there is a popular appeal for “local autonomy and urban self-management”, and from the perspective of international development Bollens has pointed out that “the disintegration of many states is compelling international aid organisations …to increasingly look at sub-state regions and urban areas as more appropriate scales of involvement”. Second, it has equally been argued that overbearing central state control can reduce the potential of cities as instruments of public policy, thereby diminishing “the opportunity for widespread participation in public decision making”. Under this theme we review the impact of conflict on the administrative, legal and political sub-systems of cities and how urban governance and politics intersect with our overall conception and analysis of the state. We also explore cities as sites and instruments of citizenship and public policy that can prevent or contribute to state collapse.

Table 8: Analysis of Cities and Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities, nations and governance</th>
<th>Nairobi, Kenya</th>
<th>Srinagar, Kashmir/Jafna, Sri Lanka*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beirut, Lebanon</td>
<td>Bogota, Colombia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar es Salaam, Tanzania</td>
<td>Guayaquil, Ecuador</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reconstructing and repairing the social fabric of the city.</th>
<th>Kabul, Afghanistan</th>
<th>Luanda, Angola</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beirut, Lebanon</td>
<td>Kigali, Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violence, crime and city futures</th>
<th>Manila, Philippines</th>
<th>Nairobi, Kenya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ahmedabad, India</td>
<td>Bogota, Colombia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinshasa, DRC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* A choice is to be made between these two cities.

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The critical focus of this section will be the socio-spatial and politico-spatial dynamics of cities and how these feed into intergovernmental relations, regional and international networks and give rise either to ‘urban nationalism’, in other words the impulse towards city autonomy, or an alternative impulse towards a broader state building project. Here attention will be paid to cities as administrative and legal systems and sources of revenue. The impact of conflict and war on these arenas and processes will be central to the analysis, as will processes of peace building at the city scale and their impact on citizenship and governance. In this section of the research we ask under what conditions different types of governing coalitions in cities emerge, consolidate, become hegemonic or transform. Debates between urban regime theorists and their critics provide a complementary and parallel analytical terrain to coalition analysis.\(^{21}\) Similarly this aspect of the city level analysis particularly chimes with the notions of institutional multiplicity, state capacity and influencing employed in the ‘development as state making’ component of the Crisis States research, discussed above.

Conclusions will be drawn as to whether or not cities affected by conflict exist against or within nations. In considering these issues attention will be paid to coalitions of interest not only within cities but also beyond them, given that transnational, regional and national networks act upon and engage with local actors within the context of urban spaces. These issues will be considered both in analytical terms and in relation to governance practice. Areas of particular policy relevance relate to issues of democracy promotion (for example, in terms of support to the state at different levels as well as support to civil society organisations and the private sector), public sector reconstruction and reform.

Reconstruction and repairing the social fabric of the city

This theme is concerned with urban reconstruction and the resurgence of urban societies after periods of war and terror into new “bodies politic”.\(^{22}\) It has a dual focus. The first is on physical reconstruction and development including the provision of infrastructure and services.\(^{23}\) The extent to which this might serve (or not) to promote urban security, growth and welfare will be considered. Under this theme we start from the premise that the recovery of cities can lead to the creation of new spaces of social, economic and political potential,\(^{24}\) and can contribute to peace building and state making. We will investigate under what conditions this is most likely to occur.

The second focus is closely related and concerns reparation of the social fabric of the city. The challenges posed by displacement, disruption and competition for resources for people living in war-affected urban centres are extreme. Under conditions of instability and volatility, investment in informal institutions, social networks and personal ties becomes particularly important. However, as with formal institutions informal ties and bonds are likely to be frayed and fragile if not completely destroyed by conflict.\(^{25}\) It is important, therefore, to

\(^{21}\) Reference to urban regime theory will also enhance the overall comparative approach given its extensive use in cross-national research (Mickey Lauria (ed.), Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory, Regulating Urban Politics in a Global Economy, Thousand Oaks and London: Sage, 1997).


understand the nature and extent of reliance on reciprocal social relations within families, kinship groups and neighbourhoods, including the gender and generational dynamics involved. Further, the salience and reach within and beyond cities of ethnic groupings, warlords, mafias and syndicates needs to be better understood, alongside their significance as sources of informal social protection, livelihood opportunity and political patronage. The research will question whether informal institutions promoting security, growth and welfare at the local and city level do so at the expense of security, growth and welfare at the national level. Here we will seek to unravel the ways in which the social fabric has been reconstructed.

These two focus areas and the way they intersect (for example, building peace through reconstruction) will be studied in the context of selective city and sub-metropolitan case studies, which will be paired or grouped for comparative purposes. The practical relevance of this area of the research relates to better understanding the socio-economic and politico-spatial impact of reconstruction initiatives; developing appropriate ways of engaging in reconstruction and peace-building at the city level; and assessing whether investment in cities and urbanism is an investment in the politics of peace.

**Violence, Crime and Urban Futures**

Numerous studies have noted the widespread changing patterns of urban spatial organisation as a result of rising forms of violence, insecurity, and illegality, to the extent that such trends in cities of fragile developing countries have been described as constituting a glimpse of a wider urban future. In many ways, the effects are in fact often comparable to the consequences of warfare on cities – indeed, in many cases they are linked to the consequences of warfare – and it is potentially rewarding to think of such trends in a broadly comparative perspective.

Just as warfare often leads to the erosion of the social and infrastructural fabric of cities, in the face of endemic violence and high levels of crime, urban dwellers – rich and poor alike – often create defensible spaces such as gated communities, engage in practices that advance the privatisation of security, and foster new forms of socio-spatial governance based on territorial segregation and exclusion. In a variety of ways, such practices lead to new conceptions of what constitutes a city, eroding notions of citizenship, transforming cities from open spaces of free circulation to more fractured and fragmented archipelago-like localities, thereby fundamentally changing the character of urban social life and constraining local government and service delivery. At the same time, such processes give rise to new opportunities and alternative forms of socio-economic organisation. Certainly, cities are increasingly crucial nodes for the organisation of informal economic activities, including


particularly those associated with illegal enterprises. These can also have significant ramifications for the nature of urban governance and political life, as can indeed the fact that cities are more generally frequently critical sites of protest and unrest, which can also act as catalysts for social and political change.

These trends will be explored in the context of what might be termed ‘fragile cities’, or even ‘insurgent cities’, i.e. characterised by high levels of violence, the presence of gangs, drug syndicates, trafficking or organised crime, territorial segregation, and difficult urban governance. The policy relevance of this component of the research will be to identify the aspects of city life that fuel insurgency, political discontent and social disengagement, their impact, and that of the social forms they span, on urban governance and the implications for urban planning, management and governance. These issues will be considered in relation to the insights obtained from studies of war-affected cities to determine the similarities and differences between such processes in different contexts, and to eventually contemplate which are fundamental to urban violence and which are more directly related to warfare.

**Cities and development as state making**

These three sub-themes relate directly to the core research questions of the ‘development as state-making’ component of research. The exploration of the role of cities in relation to nations and governance will inform our understanding of patterns of state collapse and contribute to the identification of critical causes of breakdown and survival, including why some states experience prolonged warfare and others do not. The consideration of the reconstruction and repairing of the social fabric of the city will allow us to understand more fundamentally what processes of urban governance and local state organisation are most successful in terms of achieving long-term security, growth and welfare, as well as examining at the micro-level what are the impacts of interventions by the international community in processes both of decline into war and state collapse, the avoidance of such collapse, as well as processes of reconstruction. Finally, by focusing on questions of violence, crime, and urban futures we will enhance our understanding of how, why, and when non-state actors emerge to challenge the local state, their local, national, regional and international connections, and when their emergence leads to significant conflict and when it does not.

**Regional and Global Axes of Conflict**

The third component of our research will look at regional and global axes of conflict that affect processes of state collapse and reconstruction in nation states and cities alike. This research will build on insights generated from the global level work undertaken during Phase 1, but will be more tightly integrated with our comparative studies of fragile states, war, state collapse and reconstruction at the country and city levels. The questions to be addressed here will also be addressed by teams involved in the country and city studies. In Phase 1, attention to work at the global level allowed us to be responsive to major changes in the international situation and to shape and guide our research agenda accordingly. This component of Phase 2 will allow us to continue to develop the Crisis States Research Centre’s work in this way.

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28 These furthermore have to be understood within the context of broader regional economic processes.
We are planning to undertake work around four central issues at the regional and global levels: (a) The impact of economic reforms prescribed by international agencies on processes of state collapse and reconstruction; (b) The regional dimensions of war and peace; (c) International dimensions of politics and organised crime; and (d) The impact of the international security architecture on processes of collapse and reconstruction. While all four of these issue areas will be studied within our comparative cases, understanding trends and their policy implications also requires separate attention and investigation at regional and global levels of inquiry.

**Economic reforms and their impact on state collapse and reconstruction**

In Phase 1 we began an examination of the political impact of economic liberalisation policies involving state downsizing, privatisation and trade liberalisation in the countries we were studying. Our work in the Andean region, in South Africa and Sierra Leone and in Uganda and Zimbabwe pointed to the significant and widely varying impact of these policies on processes of state collapse, on possibilities for peace and reconstruction and on the parameters of political organising in a wide range of countries.

In Phase 2 we will examine the sequencing of reforms in relation to moments of extreme stress and state collapse in the countries we are studying to identify whether, for instance, structural adjustment reforms played any role in the unravelling of states in Africa, or had little or no impact on these processes. In addition to sequencing, other important factors include the pace and magnitude of the reforms, and the extent to which they were accepted by local actors. We will be concerned with specific issues like the prescriptions for state spending, particularly on defence, to evaluate whether they are consistent with prescriptions particularly related to post-war conditions like those around disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation (DDR). We will also consider the privatisation of social and welfare functions of the state, and the resultant impact on education, health and other sectors in response to particular crises like the HIV/AIDS epidemic. We will ask whether liberal trade policy has positively, negatively or neutrally affected the consolidation of revenue raising functions under conditions of state reconstruction.

These issues are often debated in a dogmatic and absolutist fashion by the proponents and the opponents of economic liberalisation. The former claim that liberalisation is an unqualified good and the latter insist that it is an unqualified bad. On the basis of our research in Phase 1, we believe that the actual results have been mixed and that the impact of liberalisation, whether positive or negative for different countries and for different groups within a country, depends on a range of variables. In Phase 2 we will explore these observations more systematically, with the view to discerning patterns and trends. We have a normative bias in favour of social justice and pro-poor policies, but our approach will be analytically open-minded and objective.

**Regional Dimensions of War and Peace**

We will be concerned here with three key issues: the ways in which warfare and processes of collapse take on regional dynamics – the so-called ‘contagion effect’ of domestic conflict; conversely, the ways in which war termination in one country can spur peace processes in neighbouring countries; and the proposals for addressing problems of security and development through regional associations.
There is widespread evidence that processes of war and state collapse in the developing world transcend the boundaries of cities and nation-states; this is a consequence of weak states, porous borders, and war alliances forged among state and non-state actors at the regional level. For example, it is impossible to understand the dynamics of war in northern Uganda without looking at violent conflict in southern Sudan. Understanding the dynamics of warfare and the possibilities for peace and reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of Congo requires an inquiry into the role played by Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, among others. These regional dimensions of conflict appear to be very difficult for international actors and ‘donor’ agencies to address and therefore in country programmes and interventions they are often ignored or marginalized. We would propose that a good understanding of the regional dimensions of conflict is crucial both to peace making endeavours and to designing policy in countries emerging out of war.

A key analytical concept in this regard is that of a ‘regional security complex’, a term coined by Barry Buzan and defined as:

> a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another.\(^{29}\)

A second key concept is that of ‘regionalism’, a process whereby state and non-state actors link their activities in formal and informal ways at the regional level because of geographical proximity and expected gains.\(^{30}\) For all but the most powerful states and their targets, the regional level is more important than the global level in terms of conflict and security.

When regional issues are addressed it is habitually through a blanket and uncritical endorsement of regional associations like the African Union or South African Development Community (SADC). There is also an inappropriate tendency among major donors to advocate the adoption of European models of political and economic integration in the very different circumstances of regions in the South.\(^{31}\) More recently, international agencies have been supporting the establishment of security regimes at the regional level. However, initial research in Phase 1 of our programme has already made a strong argument suggesting that regional security associations built by members with vastly differing political and security norms are unlikely to be effective. Our findings also indicate that the strength or weakness of member states, and their views on surrendering a measure of sovereignty to the regional organisation, are important variables in determining the viability of the organisation. The critical question from a comparative perspective is why some regional organisations are substantially more effective than others in terms of conflict prevention and resolution. We want to build on this work in Phase 2 and assess the impact, whether positive, negative or neutral, of international efforts to promote regional security solutions.

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Politics and organized crime

Late state builders act in an environment where, on the one hand, there is a growing set of international standards and regulations (that do not depend on national states), and on the other illegal markets (of drugs, of people, of precious stones, and of weapons) play a central role in the global economy. We intend to study the political dimensions (more exactly, the political economy of) this tension, whose immediate consequences are the criminalisation of politics and the politicisation of crime.

The criminalisation of politics appears basically in four forms. First, vast sectors of the world population are associated with illegal economic activities, so the expression of their demands and grievances appear associated to a citizen-less form of politics (demands without entitlements). This is the case of the powerful coca grower movements in Bolivia and Colombia. But this may be only the rather spectacular expression of a broader set of phenomena: for example, the survival strategies through petty illegality of displaced people. Second, deregulated legality plus highly (and transnationally) regulated illegality has offered windows of opportunity to criminal organisations to penetrate the state, and actually affect the trajectory of state building, which is not historically new. Third, there has been an increasing blending of rent seeking and war (though not in the form described by Collier).

On the one hand, the very magnitude of illegal markets empowers “violent entrepreneurs” enough so as to allow them to transform their economic into political power. On the other hand, regulation is the political issue par excellence, and so the specific forms of regulation that create illegality (globally) are contested (nationally) by various actors, including of course some of the violent entrepreneurs themselves. In Phase 1 we carried out an initial study of these issues in the Colombian context, and in Phase 2 we will pursue this work at the global and regional levels.

International security architecture and processes of collapse, war and reconstruction

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has emerged as the dominant power in the international community. We believe it is crucial to assess the positive and negative dimensions of US actions on the international stage in relation to the processes of war, collapse and reconstruction, which we are studying. This will be set in the context of an analysis of the changing international security architecture and an emergent alternative centre of security policy in the European Union. In Phase 1 we undertook a small amount of work on questions related to US policy in Colombia and implications of its war on drugs, the war in Iraq, and examined the US-led ‘war against terrorism’ in the context of our work on Afghanistan. The influence of the US within a changing international security architecture and its unrivalled international position justify specific attention in our study of global and regional axes of conflict. There are three areas we wish to investigate.

First, we want to examine the impact of US pressures on countries to write and pass ‘anti-terrorism’ legislation and how this sits with prescriptions advanced by other major powers. Such legislation usually involves constraints on certain liberties, often in contradiction to prescriptions for democratisation that are simultaneously being promoted among developing

countries. We will assess whether the US promotion of such legislation is having a tangible impact on democratisation processes, particularly in fragile states and those emerging from war and whether alternative positions advanced, for instance in Europe might fare better.

Second, we would like to investigate the impact of US policy and action on norms and norm setting in the developing world. For instance, the doctrine of pre-emptive action challenges previous norms relating to the law against war and the definition of just war. US approaches to arrests and detention in both war arenas, as well as its wider fight against terrorism, breaks from international norms governing the treatment and rights of prisoners. Is the US exceptional in these regards, or are developing countries following suit?

Finally, we are interested in assessing the US role in conflicts at the national and regional level, which may be positive, negative or neutral, and how this may compare with the role of other major actors, particularly from within the European Union. On the positive side, the US appears to be putting pressure on India, Pakistan and key players in Kashmir to come to a peace agreement. The US has pressed hard on rival factions in Sudan to come to a peace agreement and succeeded in shifting Libyan policies. On the negative side, policies in Iraq, Iran and North Korea seem to be exacerbating tensions. Lastly, US policies of neglect in yet other cases may have a deleterious impact on aid flows. Our initial impression is that the impact of US interventions depends very much on whether they are designed primarily to support or to coerce local actors in the countries concerned.

We would also ask questions like whether the United States is weakening the United Nations’ international system of conflict management. In polemical debates the critics of the US and the UK argue that the invasion of Iraq without a Security Council mandate did serious if not irrevocable damage to the peacemaking responsibility of the UN. The US, on the other hand, insists that the UN has never been an effective forum for conflict management and resolution. This is a matter of grave importance that warrants serious research attention.
Modified Case Study Selection for Phase 2 Crisis States Work

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<th>2nd country studies</th>
<th>Cities &amp; Nation *Survival in war ** against odds</th>
<th>Cities in Reconstruction</th>
<th>City Futures</th>
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<tr>
<td>Major war and collapse with reconstruction over at least ten years</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Gulu*</td>
<td>Kampala</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
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<td>Major war, collapse and future is uncertain</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Herat*</td>
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<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<td>Prolonged warfare but state did not collapse</td>
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<td>Bogota*</td>
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<td>Countries that have experienced neither war nor collapse (despite the odds)</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Dar Es Salaam**</td>
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<td>Srinagar*</td>
<td>Ahmedabad</td>
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