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## **BIRTH ORDER AND COLLEGE MAJOR IN SWEDEN**

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### **ABSTRACT**

Previous research on birth order has consistently shown that later-borns have lower educational attainment than first-borns, however it is not known whether there are birth order patterns in college major. Given empirical evidence that parents disproportionately invest in first-born children, there are likely to be birth order patterns attributable to differences in both opportunities and preferences, related to ability, human capital specialization through parent-child transfers of knowledge, and personality. Birth order patterns in college major specialization may shed light on these explanatory mechanisms, and may also account for long-term birth order differences in educational and labour market outcomes. Using Swedish population register data and sibling fixed effects we find large birth order differences in university applications. First-borns are more likely to apply to, and graduate from, medicine and engineering programs at university, while later-borns are more likely to study journalism and business programs, and to attend art school. We also find that these birth order patterns are stronger in high SES families, and that differences in college major explain approximately half of the within-family birth order differences in long-term earnings. These results indicate that early life experiences and parental investment shapes sibling differences in ability, preferences, and ambitions even within the shared environment of the family.

## INTRODUCTION

Life begins in the family. Parental socioeconomic background and investment, as well as genetic inheritance, plays an enormous role in shaping opportunity structures, and therefore the educational and socioeconomic trajectories that are followed in life. Siblings share fifty percent of one another's genes, and they also typically live in the same home and grow up in the same neighbourhood. Despite these similar endowments, there is a great deal of variance in sibling outcomes (Björklund and Jäntti 2012). Part of this sibling divergence is attributable to different experiences within the family. While parents report that they treat their children very similarly, sibling reports, corroborated by independent observers, suggest that there are substantial differences (Reiss et al. 2009). One consistent marker of sibling differences within the family is birth order. Studies have shown that later-born siblings perform worse than first-borns, and these differences are attributable to the social environment within the family rather than any biological differences between siblings (Kristensen and Bjerkedal 2007; Barclay 2015a). Parental investment may be one of these social environment factors. For example, mothers are less likely to seek pre-natal care for later-borns than first-borns, and are also less likely to breastfeed later-borns (Buckles and Kolka 2014). In Sweden, parents take more parental leave for first-born children than later-borns (Sundström and Duvander 1999), and parents in the United States with two children have been found to spend up to 30 minutes more quality time per day with first-borns than with second-borns of the same age (Price 2008).

This evidence of differential treatment by birth order would suggest that variation in parental investment translates into measurable differences between siblings in the long run. Indeed, studies that have compared siblings within the same family have consistently shown that

later-born siblings have a lower grade point average in school, a lower likelihood of making educational transitions, lower completed educational attainment, and a lower IQ (Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 2005; Kantarevic and Mechoulan 2006; Bjerkedal et al. 2007; Härkönen 2014; Barclay 2015a; Barclay 2015b; Rohrer, Egloff and Schmukle 2015). The clear and substantial birth order patterns identified by previous research are a consequence of inequitable resource distribution within the family (Hertwig, Davis, and Sulloway 2002). Disadvantage early in the life course has the potential to accumulate over time, leading to clear and measurable differences in socioeconomic and health outcomes later in life (Phillips and Shonkoff 2000). Beyond the family, cumulative advantage processes are a key dimension of the production of inequalities in society as a whole (Merton 1968; DiPrete and Eirich 2006 Willson, Shuey, and Elder 2007), and a wealth of research has shown that it is not only absolute differences in access to resources that matters, but that relative differences are critical even when the absolute level of resource availability is high (Marmot 2004). Using the microcosm of the family to study these inequality generating processes provides an excellent opportunity to isolate the effect of relative advantage net of shared genetics, the shared contextual environment, and, furthermore, to do so from the very beginning of the lifecourse.

Although the negative relationship between birth order and educational attainment has been observed consistently, the long-term advantages attributable to spending longer in the education system are not necessarily clear without a consideration of college major. College major has an important impact on future earnings, with those in the United States choosing natural science and business majors earning greater amounts, even after adjusting for individual ability (Arcidiacono 2004). In Norway, the earnings gap between the most and least lucrative college majors is roughly equivalent to the college wage premium (Kirkeboen, Leuven, and Mogstad 2016). As will be reviewed in the following sections, past research

suggests that college major is likely to vary by birth order, but this has not been tested empirically before. In this study we use a unique data resource to examine the relationship between birth order and college major, as well as college graduation data. With data on both applications and graduation we have information on initial preferences as well as the eventual pathway taken, the latter of which will be influenced by experience and academic performance within the tertiary education system. In addition to examining how the specific subject-major varies by birth order, we also examine whether first-borns are more likely to choose majors with higher expected earnings and higher occupational prestige, and whether later-borns are more likely to choose majors that carry greater risks in terms of future career progression, as measured by variance in expected earnings. Finally, we also examine the extent to which college major mediates long-term differences in earnings by birth order between siblings.

### *Educational Choices*

The average difference in educational attainment between a first and a second-born sibling at age 30 in Sweden is approximately one third of a year, and between a first and a third-born sibling, a little less than half a year (Barclay 2015a). A number of theories have been proposed to explain why later-born children should do worse than their older siblings. Two theories that have attracted particular scientific attention are the resource dilution hypothesis (Blake 1981), and the confluence hypothesis (Zajonc 1976). While both theories state that later-born children should perform less well than their older siblings, the resource dilution hypothesis argues that relative to later-born children in the same family, earlier born children have a cumulative advantage in terms of access to finite parental resources, such as financial resources, but more particularly, quality time. The confluence hypothesis argues that earlier

born children outperform their younger siblings because the average degree of intellectual stimulation within the household decreases as more infants enter the household, and that this intellectual stimulation is key for cognitive development. Both the resource dilution hypothesis and the confluence hypothesis predict greater cognitive ability for first-borns. In Western Europe and the United States there is a negative relationship between birth order and cognitive ability (Bjerkedal et al. 2007; Barclay 2015b; Rohrer et al. 2015), and that advantage suggests that earlier born siblings should have higher grades in high school and therefore should be more likely to be accepted to, and graduate from, STEM subjects than later-borns. If first-borns are more likely to study subjects at university that lead to advantageous career trajectories, this would serve to increase the divergence in the post-university socioeconomic trajectories that first and later-borns tend to follow.

However, net of cognitive ability, past work also suggests that later-borns are more likely to choose study pathways that are more risky and offer greater opportunities to express creativity. Such pathways may also be characterized by a greater payoff in the event of success. In *Born to Rebel*, Frank Sulloway (1996) argued that competition for parental investment amongst children causes siblings to adapt their behaviour and develop a personality that would allow them to occupy particular niches within the family. Following Adler (1928), Sulloway (1996) argued that first-borns and only children are likely to be more conservative due to the period of time when they were the only child within the home and where they were the sole focus of parental care. This, he argued, leads first-borns to identify with power and authority, and to become more conservative and socially dominant than their later-born siblings. Later-born children, finding that they are disadvantaged from the very beginning in terms of size and strength, are naturally more inclined to develop a personality that is questioning of authority. Furthermore, in the scramble for parental investment, later-

borns are forced to become more creative, original and follow risks in order to attract that investment. Applied to the question of how a college major is chosen, Sulloway's work suggests that later-born siblings would be more likely to choose creative subjects at university, as well as university majors associated with greater variation in expected earnings. Furthermore, by virtue of identifying more closely with the parents, first-borns might have stronger preferences for following the same educational and occupational trajectory as them.

While academic psychology journals are replete with studies on the relationship between birth order and personality, creativity, and risk-taking, relatively few of these studies have used the methodological gold standard for this avenue of research, which is the within-family sibling comparison. Studies that compare siblings across different families have been criticized on the grounds that the reported correlations are spurious due to confounding by unobserved factors that differ between families (Rodgers 2001a). The few studies on birth order and personality that have used a sibling comparison approach report that first-borns are more conscientious (Paulhus, Trapnell, and Chen 1999; Beer and Horn 2000, Healey and Ellis 2007), and score higher on neuroticism (Cole 2013), while later-borns score higher on extraversion (Dixon et al. 2008), and openness to experience (Healey and Ellis 2007). Other studies using within-family designs have found that first-born siblings have higher educational aspirations than later-borns (Bu 2014). However, it should be noted that the samples used in these studies on birth order and personality are typically both small and non-representative, and some studies using within-family comparisons have found no personality differences by birth order (Rohrer et al. 2015). Furthermore, although the application of Sulloway's ideas to the selection of college major does have some face validity, on greater reflection it is not clear that we should assume that creativity and college major are necessarily closely aligned, as all subjects offer opportunities to innovate in some way.

Studies investigating the relationship between personality and vocational choices show that individuals tend to choose occupations that match their personality, and that they are more satisfied, and achieve more, when they do so (Holland 1996). A positive match is characterized by a correspondence between the skills and temperament of an individual, and the demands of the occupational environment (Holland 1985). This approach has also been extended to the choice of college major, finding that a positive match between personality and college major is linked to greater achievement, and lower dropout rates (Allen and Robbins 2008). Although there is some variation, studies on the relationship between the Big Five personality traits and college major tend to yield relatively consistent results. Those who study natural sciences and applied sciences, such as engineering, score higher on conscientiousness and lower on openness to experience than humanities, arts, and social science majors (Kline and Lapham 1992, Van der Molen, Schmidt, and Kruisman 2007). Social science majors demonstrate higher scores on extraversion than humanities or natural science majors, but lower scores on extraversion than business or arts majors (Corulla and Coghill 1991; Harris 1993; De Fruyt and Mervielde 1996), while medical students also score high on extraversion (Lievens et al. 2002). Although each of these studies were based on a sample of college students who had already decided upon a major, which allows for the possibility that personality is influenced by the experience of studying a certain major, similar results for the relationship between the Big Five traits and preference for college major were found amongst high school students planning to apply to university (Balsamo, Lauriola, and Saggino 2012).

Overall, research on the relationship between birth order and personality, and personality and college major (Balsamo et al. 2012), suggests that first-borns should be more likely than later-



borns to study natural and applied sciences, while later-borns should be more likely to study arts, business, and social sciences, and medicine: Studies demonstrating that first-borns have greater cognitive ability and better grades in high school than later-born siblings (Bjerkedal et al. 2007; Barclay 2015b) would suggest that first-borns would be more likely to be accepted to study natural and applied sciences, though this approach would predict that first-borns would be more likely to study medicine than later-borns. Research indicating that first-borns are more ambitious than later-born siblings (Bu 2014), suggests that first-borns might be more likely to apply to college majors that lead to professional careers. Theories predicting that first-borns should be more conservative (Adler 1928; Sulloway 1996) also suggest that first-borns may be more likely to apply to majors that are linked to a stable professional career, such as medicine, or law, and majors associated with lower potential volatility in future earnings. Given Sulloway's (1996) predictions concerning the degree to which first-borns are likely to identify with parents relative to later-borns, we also examine whether first-borns are more likely to choose the same degree and field of study that their parents pursued.

### *Human Capital and Occupational Specialization*

Although most theories concerning how a first-born advantage emerges imply that this advantage transpires unintentionally, parenting strategies may also be consciously, or subconsciously, biased towards the first-born. One reason for this is a cultural legacy of primogeniture, where undivided bequests were given to the first-born son in many societies. While legal primogeniture is obsolete in modern European societies, vestiges of this cultural practice may linger in contemporary parental behavior. Assuming such a parental strategy existed, it would be most rational to invest in the child best endowed in terms of skills and abilities. A recent study using US data shows that high SES parents target investment in the

highest achieving child, though this is less true for low SES parents (Grätz and Torche 2016). Given previous literature showing how first-borns tend to be the best-endowed children, a parental investment strategy that focuses on one child will exacerbate the advantages for first-borns. Another motive that has been suggested for primogeniture is that parents may favor the first-born because they have a larger generational overlap with them (Silles 2010). This greater overlap means that parents can help and monitor the career of the first-born, and also have a chance to reap the benefits of that investment before they die.

Parents not only invest time and money into their children, but also transfer specific skills. There is a strong tendency for children to take up the same occupations as their parents, which explains social reproduction (Jonsson et al. 2009). One reason for this is that they may have a comparative advantage in those occupations in terms of occupation specific skills as a result of absorbing information and knowledge from the parents about their occupations as they grow up (Laband and Lentz 1983). Although we know little of birth order effects on such specialization, we could expect a link if the parents favour the first-born. First, the cumulative advantage in academic skills that first-borns may already have makes them a target for investments in such occupation specific skills. Second, generational overlap may make it easier to help the first-born and for them to reap the benefits of such help. Third, if investment in skills is more productive the younger a child is (Heckman 2000), the first-born will have an absolute advantage over his or her siblings since only they were able to get undivided parental attention at the youngest ages.

#### *Contextual Factors: Swedish Educational System*

Education in Sweden is state funded at all levels, and tertiary education is free for Swedish

citizens (Halldén 2008; Höskoleverket 2012). In Sweden family resources are therefore less important for the transition to tertiary education than in other contexts, such as the United States. The Swedish education system is divided into three sections: (1) 9 years of compulsory schooling (*grundskolan*); (2) three additional years of secondary school (*gymnasium*); and, (3) the tertiary section (Halldén, 2008). Tertiary education in Sweden today consists of two parts. The first is a traditional university education, with degrees at the Bachelors (*kandidatexamen*), Magister (*magisterexamen*), Masters, Licentiate, and Doctoral levels. The second part is a vocational tertiary education (*Högre yrkesutbildning/Högskolor*) (Halldén 2008). Students in tertiary education are eligible for financial support from the Swedish state for living costs in the form of study grants and student loans with low interest rates (Höskoleverket 2012), minimising the need for reliance on family resources for maintenance. In 2012 approximately 33% of the Swedish population had undergone post-secondary education, which was slightly higher than the OECD average (Höskoleverket 2012).

## **DATA**

In this paper we use Swedish administrative register data to address birth order effects on educational choices. To study the influence of birth order we link children and parents via the multigenerational register (Statistics Sweden, 2010), which holds information on parents for individuals born in 1932 and later. Using information on birth year and month, and parents' identity, we construct birth order. We define a sibling group as a set of individuals that share a biological mother and a father. The multigenerational register also allows us to match other

parental characteristics such as mother's age at the time of birth of the individual, as well as the socio-economic characteristics of the parents.

### *Tertiary Choice Data – Applications and Graduations*

For the educational choice, we use a unique data source that contains individuals' applications for university in Sweden, where all admission to university is centralized. With the central 'applicants and admission register', we have complete information on all aspects of the choice, i.e., the *programs* included and their rank within the individual application, and whether the applicant was admitted. A program is a predetermined line of study that will lead to a degree in a specific area, if successful. This is very different from the US system, for example, where liberal arts BA degrees cover a much broader range of subjects. Not all tertiary studies are organized as programs; one can instead choose to study specific *courses*, which lasts for one semester, and which can be combined into a degree (under some formal rules). Most areas allow both modes of study, but professional degrees (e.g., to become a physician) are limited to program study. While we also have access to course applications in the 'applicants and admission register', it is less clear what degree these individual course studies will eventually lead to. We have thus concentrated on program applications, even though this creates a selection of the more dedicated or focused students. Since we will miss out the least ambitious choices, which is more likely to happen for later-borns according to our expectations, our estimates will therefore tend to be conservative.

For the analyses of programs, we analyze cohorts born between 1982 and 1990, resulting in an effective sample size of 146,107 (see Tables A3 and A4). All families where at least two siblings have applied to a university program are included in our analysis. The application

data exists for the years 2001-2012, which means that every cohort has at least three years where we can observe any application (assuming graduation from upper-secondary school at age 19). Since one can re-apply infinite times, we construct two choice variables: (a) the highest ranked program in the first of the applications we can observe, and (b) the last observed program among those programs the applicant got admitted to. The first is likely to capture more pure (and perhaps less informed) preferences, whereas the second captures both learning because of tertiary studies and adjustment to one's realistic chances, as well as a tighter link to what education the individual is likely to end up pursuing. In this sense, these variables are the endpoints of a continuum of possible ways to measure choice. We then record the program as coded to the nomenclature SUN2000 (The Swedish version of the international ISCED-97, Statistics Sweden, 2000) and code this to an aggregate classification with 17 categories, as shown in Table A3. This coding first places similar educations in terms of field of study in the same category, but also sorts educations by length, prestige and admission requirements. For example, the scheme separates between short and long teaching programs, which captures differences between, for example, pre-school and upper-secondary school teachers, and short and long engineering programs. Long engineering refers to 'civilingenjör' (Master in engineering), which is 4.5 years of study with a theoretical focus and which is preparatory for research, while short engineering refer to 'högskoleingenjör', (i.e., bachelor of science of engineering), which is 3 years of study and features less mathematics and a more practical focus in the curriculum

Based on the education code in SUN2000, we can also match the program to conditions of graduates in the labor market. We use this to compute expected outcomes, that is, those conditions that the pursuit of the program on average will lead to historically. This is important in order to grasp the consequences of a specific choice in terms of measurable

inequality. Here we measure expected mean level of full-time earnings<sup>1</sup>, the variance of expected earnings<sup>2</sup>, expected occupational prestige<sup>3</sup> and a measure of the expected level of non-employment<sup>4</sup>. The expected earnings variance and expected level of non-employment are intended to measure educational risk. We base the expected outcomes on the actual labour market performance of individuals' aged 30-32 in the years 2009-2012, and for the earnings measures we control for gender, immigration, birth year and the presence of children in the household.

In order to test parent-child transfer of education specific preferences, we construct measures for whether the educational choice matches with any of parents' field of education (using data from the population wide education register). The SUN2000 separates between level and field, the former contains 3 digits, and the latter 3 digits and also a letter. We construct a measure of matching degree, in which both level and field should match on 3 digits, and two measures of matching fields on 3 and 2 digit levels. We use annual data on parents' education from 1990 to 2012 in order to record any match (this will also capture if parents themselves upgrade their education).

This data is also linked to school registers containing previous school grades, and one control variable will be the grade point average (GPA) from upper-secondary school (transformed to

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<sup>1</sup> Earnings data comes from population level tax records. We truncate the annual earnings to above SEK 120,000 in 2003 prices, i.e., more than 10,000 SEK per month (or some USD 1400 or GBP 833 per month, assuming typical exchange rates of 7 SEK per USD and 12 SEK per GBP) to capture full time earnings. Due to wide ranging collective bargaining with minimum wages, individuals' earnings this low do not have employment for the full year.

<sup>2</sup> The earnings risk per SUN code is calculated as  $R = \sum \left( \frac{x - \bar{x}}{\bar{x}} \right)^2 / n$  following Berkhout, Hartog et al. 2010, Eq 7.). This is similar to the coefficient of variation, i.e., variance relative to average level of earnings. We use full earnings distribution here (in log form with the addition of a small constant to include zeroes) in order to capture variations related to under- and unemployment.

<sup>3</sup> This data is based on the population level occupation register (Statistics Sweden 2004), where occupations are coded to 3-digit ISCO-88(com). We have matched the ISCO codes to the Treiman scale (SIOPS, see Treiman 1977) using keys provided by Ganzeboom (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996).

<sup>4</sup> Given the fixed wage structure discussed in footnote 1, we compute non-employment as annual earnings below 120,000. This measure captures the proportion of non-employed for each degree.

z-scores). Given that previous research has shown that first- and earlier-born siblings have higher cognitive ability scores than later-born siblings, we want to examine the extent to which choice of college major by birth order is contingent upon differences in ability. Although GPA does not perfectly capture cognitive ability, it does capture general academic ability and performance, which is arguably more important for continued academic progress to university and choice of college major than an abstracted measure of cognitive ability.

One caveat with the choice data is that applications for some specific high prestige art schools are missing (they control their own admission based on tests rather than grades and are therefore absent from the central administration system). We can however capture art school students in graduation data, and create a graduation dataset for the birth cohorts 1960-1987. This dataset is identical to the application data as outlined above, except that information on GPA is missing, and that we also capture degrees taken as courses, not only as programs.

We also use the 1960-1987 birth cohorts to examine the extent to which college major mediates birth order differences in earnings in adulthood. We use data from employers to measure monthly wages at age 30, standardized to reflect fulltime employment and adjusted for inflation. The latest point for which we have data is 2012, and so for those aged less than 30 in 2012 (i.e. cohorts 1983-1987), we measure earnings as close to 30 as possible, and also adjust for age at measurement in our analyses. The wage data (Statistics Sweden 2013) has only partial coverage in the private sector for firms with less than 500 employees, where a sample is used. In these cases, we first search across years to find valid records, and if this is unsuccessful, we impute the missing based on wages regressed on annual earnings and detailed education codes. By searching across years, we find most individuals, and only impute wages for 11 percent of the analytical sample. The correlation between wage

predictions and actual wages is .76. We also adjust for the imputation with a dummy variable in our analyses.

### *Generic Coding*

Because we use family fixed effects, information on parents' characteristics become redundant, even though the data are very rich in such measures. In order to assess effect heterogeneity due to social standing, we code social class origin using the EGP on the basis of censuses (1980, 1985 and 1990; EGP is coded on the basis of occupation codes), and divide individuals into a high and low class (leaving children of farmers and entrepreneurs out of this comparison). For this educational choice data the size of the EGP I class is very big (simply because the service class is over-represented in further education and the data is conditional on an application for university). Table A5 shows the probability of being included in the analytical sample by social class in the family of origin and family size. As a result we separate between EGP I and EGP II, III, VI and VII.

## **METHODS**

For the study of educational choice, one would ideally analyse the aggregated choice scheme with a multinomial logit model. It is however essential for birth order effects to be established within the family (Rodgers 2001b), which the standard multinomial model disallows. We have attempted an estimator which implements fixed effects into the multinomial model, but without success as the likelihood function will not converge.<sup>5</sup> We therefore give priority to

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<sup>5</sup> The femlogit estimator in stata, see Pforr (2014) and Chamberlain (1980).



the fixed effects, and use a more crude estimator in the form of independent linear probability models (LPM), where each program is coded as a separate 0/1 outcome.

We thus use linear fixed effects models for all outcomes, including both binary and continuous outcomes. We prefer LPM over non-linear models such as the logit specification, because only the former allows direct comparisons of coefficients across models and groups (Mood 2010), and that is a specific aim of our study. Average marginal effects from logit models are comparable, but are then close to identical to unstandardized coefficients from LPM, so little is won (see also Angrist and Pischke 2009:103-107). The LPM is a consistent estimator even for binary outcomes (Angrist and Pischke 2009:47,51), our data is very large, and with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, the often cited inference problem due to heteroskedastic residuals in the LPM is mitigated. In all models, we use cluster-robust standard errors using the shared sibling group ID as the cluster group. Stock and Watson (2008) showed that simple heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are inconsistent in fixed effect models, which is what we use, but that cluster-robust standard errors work with these models, and are also robust for heteroskedasticity (Stock and Watson 2008).

All model specifications include a control for mother's age at birth (one year dummies) and the individuals' birth year (also one year dummies).<sup>6</sup>

## **RESULTS**

### *College Major*

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<sup>6</sup> Although maternal age and year of birth are very high correlated within each family, our results for birth order are consistent either with both variables included in the models, or without the inclusion of one or the other variable.

The results for applications to a specific college major can be seen in Table 1, based on within-family sibling comparison models. Table 1 shows the probability of applying to each of the college majors, with, and without, adjusting for high school GPA. Note that the numbers of fifth- and sixth-order siblings are small, even in this population data. As can be seen, later-born siblings are more likely to apply to teacher programs, art programs, business programs, journalism programs, and short-health programs that provide training for nurses. First-borns are more likely than later-borns to apply to law programs, life sciences programs, the more prestigious long engineering programs, as well as health-related professional programs that provide medical training. For the most part these results are not conditional on academic ability, though when we adjust for GPA, the birth order differences in applications to teacher programs largely disappear. Interestingly, most of these differences in application probabilities by birth order increase, or decrease, monotonically by birth order, and it is not a simple distinction between first-borns and all other later-born siblings.

\*\*\* Table 1 Approximately Here \*\*\*

In general, the estimated coefficients show that the differences by birth order are large and substantial, particularly when considered in light of the baseline probability of applying to these programs (see mean of the outcome in the bottom row of Table 1). Figure 1 illustrates these differences for selected programs based on the results from Tables 1 and 3. We cap the y-scale at a relative probability of 150% to maintain readability. For example, second-borns are 2.0 percentage points less likely to apply to medical training programs than first-borns,

and fifth-borns are 5.8 percentage point less likely. Given that the baseline probability of applying to medical training programs is 7.4%, this is a 27% difference in relative terms between the first and second-borns, and a 78% difference between first and fifth-borns. The difference between first and third-borns is approximately equivalent to the gender difference in applying to medical programs that is estimated in Table 1, and equivalent to 75% of one standard deviation in high school GPA according to the estimate for GPA in the model for applying to medical training programs, which is a very substantial difference. In relative terms second-borns and third-borns are respectively 11% and 16% more likely to apply to business programs than first-borns. Furthermore, in relative terms, second-borns are 16% more likely than first-borns to apply to journalism programs, while third-borns and fourth-borns are respectively 40% and 60% more likely to do so.

\*\*\* Figure 1 Approximately Here \*\*\*

The results in Table 2 are based upon the proportion of our sample that was admitted to university, and focuses on the last program that these applicants were admitted to. Approximately 37% of university applicants in our sample got admitted to a program other than their first choice. Here we see that there are some differences in the birth order patterns. After adjusting for GPA, later-borns remain significantly more likely to apply for business programs, and significantly less likely to apply for engineering and medical programs, but are now also more likely to apply for social and behavioural science programs. Furthermore, they are no longer significantly more likely to apply to journalism programs, and the strength of the birth order patterns are somewhat attenuated overall. The difference between the patterns

for the first application to university, and the final program to which they are admitted are likely to reflect some kind of a learning process within the family between the first and last application, whereby first-borns, parents, and later-borns revise their expectations in response to the first round of university admission decisions.

\*\*\* Table 2 Approximately Here \*\*\*

The results in Table 3 show the results for first choice applications to specific college majors where we stratify our analyses by the social class of origin of the applicants and control for GPA. The results without controlling for GPA are shown in the Appendix in Table A6. We choose to focus on university applications from individuals in the upper and lower ends of the EGP class scheme so as to highlight any social class differences in university applications by birth order. As Table 3 shows, the effects that we described in Table 1 are largely concentrated amongst those from a high EGP background. For individuals from low EGP backgrounds, the only birth order effects that persist are the lower probabilities for later-borns of applying to long engineering and professional health related programs that provide medical training, and the higher probability of applying to business programs. Amongst individuals from high EGP backgrounds, we see that later-borns are more likely to apply to arts, journalism, business, and short health programs, and first-borns are more likely to apply to long engineering, life sciences, and professional health related programs. Furthermore, the size of the estimated coefficients for the differences by birth order are similar to those estimated across applicants from all social class backgrounds shown in Table 1 after controlling for GPA.

\*\*\* Table 3 Approximately Here \*\*\*

Although our results show that later-borns are significantly more likely to apply to art programs, prestigious private art schools in Sweden have a separate admission process, and applications to those colleges are not captured in the application data that we have used thus far. However, we can capture these differences by examining birth order differences in graduation from an art school or with an art degree from earlier birth cohorts, born 1960-1987. The results, shown in Table A7 in the appendices, show that the results from the analyses presented above in Tables 1-3 do provide an accurate portrayal of birth order differences in proclivity towards the creative arts. Considering the average rate of of art school degrees of 0.009 (0.9 percent), third-borns are 33% more likely than first-borns to graduate from an art school. Within the wider definition of art degrees more generally, including art degrees from non-specialized schools, the gradient is even stronger in relative terms. As with our previous analyses of the choice data, we also find that the birth order gradient is clear amongst siblings from high social class families, but there are no meaningful differences by birth order amongst siblings from low social class families.

Table 4 shows the estimates from models that examine how choice differences are associated with later inequality. In other words, we examine whether there are birth order differences in applications and admission to programs that have, for example, greater expected earnings potential, or are expected to lead to different levels of occupational prestige. As Table 4 shows, the choice differences are associated with later inequality by birth order. Relative to

first-borns, the expected earnings of second-borns, based on the college programs that they apply to, are 2.3% lower, and are 3.1% lower for third-borns. After adjusting for high school GPA, measured at age 16, we see that the pattern persists, but the estimated coefficients are slightly smaller: relative to first-borns, the expected earnings of second-borns are 1.7% lower, and are 2.2% lower for third-borns. Table 4 also shows the estimates from models that examine expected earnings risk (*variation*) by birth order. We find neither substantial nor significant birth order effects amongst first choice applications. Table 4 shows that later-born siblings also choose college majors that are expected to lead to lower occupational prestige than first-borns, and this pattern also persists and is statistically significant after adjusting for high school GPA. To make a comparison between the estimates for birth order and high school GPA on expected occupational prestige, the difference between a first and a second-born is equivalent to 32% of one standard deviation of high school GPA, and the difference between a first and a third-born is equivalent to 45% of one standard deviation. Later-borns siblings are also more likely than first-borns to apply to college majors that have a higher risk of unemployment. The results are generally very similar for the last program to which applicants are admitted.

\*\*\* Table 4 Approximately Here \*\*\*

Table 5 repeats the analyses presented in Table 4, but focuses on first choice applications and stratifies by social class. In a similar pattern to the results seen in Table 3, we find that the birth order effects are largely concentrated amongst those from a high EGP social class background, while birth order effects are weaker amongst siblings from families with a low

EGP social class. Amongst siblings from a high socioeconomic status background, first-borns are substantially more likely to apply to college majors that have higher expected earnings. The same applies to siblings from a low SES background, but the differences are smaller. Models examining earnings risk again show no birth order pattern. In terms of occupational prestige, birth order effects are much stronger amongst siblings from high SES families. Amongst siblings from low SES families, there are only small differences in expected occupational prestige by birth order after controlling for GPA. Finally, we find that there are birth order differences in the expected likelihood of unemployment in terms of the college majors that siblings apply to in high SES families, but not in low SES families.

\*\*\* Table 5 Approximately Here \*\*\*

Table 6 shows the results from analyses examining birth order effects on human capital specialization. For the first choices made in university applications, it can be seen that later-borns are slightly less likely to follow in their parents' footsteps, but this pattern is very weak and is not statistically significant. This is true for both the first choice tertiary program, as well as the last program to which they were admitted. Although the point estimates suggest that later-borns are slightly less likely to apply or be admitted to the same program as their parents, almost none of these differences are statistically significant after controlling for GPA. We also examine whether the choice of the same degree or the field as the parents varies by social class of origin, and those results are shown in the appendices in Table A8. Those results show that in high social class family's first-borns are slightly more likely to choose the same degree or field of the parents, but that controlling for GPA heavily attenuates even these small

differences. There are essentially no differences by birth order amongst siblings from low social class families.

\*\*\* Table 6 Approximately Here \*\*\*

Although the findings presented above indicate that there are clear birth order differences in preferences, admission, and graduation by college major, the extent to which these differences mediate long-term birth order differences in earnings remains unclear. Table 7 shows the results from models examining birth order differences in log earnings around age 30 for cohorts born 1960-1987, and how field of study mediates these differences, as measured by our 17 category field variable. Column 1 of Table 7 shows that second-borns have earnings 2.3% lower than first-borns at age 30, while third- to fifth-borns have earnings that are approximately 3.6% lower than first-borns. These differences are even greater amongst individuals from low social class backgrounds. Adjusting for field of study, shown in column 2 of Table 7, reduces these birth order differences substantially, by around 50-60% in the pooled sample and high social class families, and by around 30-40% in low social class families. We also estimate these models controlling for field of study to a very high degree of specificity, and those results, shown in Table A9, are very similar to those shown in Table 7.

\*\*\* Table 7 Approximately Here \*\*\*



A consistent finding in this study is that birth order effects are stronger amongst siblings from high SES backgrounds. However, as Table A5 shows, siblings from lower SES backgrounds are, relative to the population, underrepresented amongst university applicants and attendees. It is therefore possible that the weak birth order effects that we observe in lower SES families are non-representative of general birth order effects in low SES families. However, we have also run additional analyses, shown in Table A10, that indicate that birth order effects are substantially weaker in low SES than in high SES families even when looking at long-term earnings and occupational attainment in the entire population, where selection into the sample does not play the same role.

We have also conducted several other sensitivity checks, summarised in Table A11. One of these relates to differences in the birth order pattern across sibling group sizes. Although we have operationalised birth order as a categorical variable, our analyses pool across family sizes, and might therefore obscure a birth order pattern where the key distinctions relate to first-, middle-, and last-born differences. To evaluate this possibility we have estimated additional models for all the analyses shown above stratified by family size. Those results are consistent with the patterns that we have presented above, and are available upon request. Given that Table A5 shows that the probability of being included in our analyses varies very little by family size, and previous research has shown that family size has little if any causal effect on final educational attainment in the Nordic region (e.g. Black, Devereux and Salvanes 2005), we feel that it is relatively unlikely that sibling group size moderates our results.

## **DISCUSSION**

Although previous studies have shown that first-borns spend longer in the educational system, no previous research has examined whether there are horizontal differences in educational pathways by birth order. This study has shown that when comparing siblings within the same family, first-borns are more likely to study more prestigious college majors, college majors with greater expected earnings, and college majors associated with greater expected occupational prestige. What's more, those differences persist net of previous academic performance, as measured by high school GPA, and they explain a substantial proportion of the birth order differences in long-term earnings between siblings. It is important to note that the Swedish education system provides free tertiary education, so it is not that later-borns are unable to pursue medical training due to, for example, the draining of family financial resources available for education. Given the setting that our data is drawn from, we expect that these results could be even more pronounced in a context such as the United States where tuition fees are high. High tuition fees might reduce the opportunities for later-borns to attend college more generally, and to pursue expensive graduate degrees, such as medicine, more particularly.

We also found clear differences in the birth order patterns by socioeconomic status, as the effects were substantially stronger amongst siblings from high SES families than amongst siblings from low SES families. This finding is somewhat counterintuitive. One potential explanation for our findings is that parents in the highest SES families, at least in the US, reinforce advantage to a greater extent for high ability children than lower ability children through additional investment and cognitive stimulation (Grätz and Torche 2016). First-borns have exclusive access to parent investment and attention when they are born. This gives them an early headstart, and due to the compound interest that accrues to early advances in language and cognitive development (Stanovich 1986; Sénéchal and LeFevre 2002; Heckman

2006), they are more likely to be seen as having high ability when they are children, which parents will then reinforce further. Empirical research from the United States using time-use data suggests that over the ages 4-13 in two-child families in the United States, a first-born will have approximately 2,230 more hours of quality time with parents than a second-born will (Price 2008). Such variation, estimated as a 40% difference, is likely to be very difficult for a second-born to catch up on. In general, high socioeconomic status parents have been found to spend more quality-time with their children than low socioeconomic status parents (Guryan, Hurst and Kearney 2008). A Matthew effect where gains accrue faster to those who already have much could explain the SES differences in social class attainment and occupational prestige by birth order.

Although these early life advantages are likely to have a positive effect on academic achievement, we find that grades in high school do not fully mediate the relationship between birth order and applications to arts, engineering, medicine, journalism, or business programs. Recent research using a within-family comparison design has reported that first-borns have greater educational *aspirations* than later-born siblings (Bu 2014). If first-borns are more ambitious than later-borns, this could contribute to the explanation for why they tend to apply to college majors with greater expected earnings, and college majors that lead to professional careers. This greater ambition could also explain why birth order effects are generally stronger for first choice applications than they are for the last admitted program, as first-borns might overestimate their abilities, or have parents who overestimate their abilities. This higher level of ambition might be a consequence of greater parental investment and support, which might be particularly true in high SES families (Grätz and Torche 2016). Parents and later-born siblings are also likely to learn from observing the first application of the first-born, and adjust their own expectations accordingly, leading birth order effects to be weaker for the last

admitted program.

Another explanation for the SES differences in college major applications may be related to the insurance function of private socioeconomic resources (Pfeffer and Hällsten 2012), where those from more privileged backgrounds feel that they are better able to take risks because they have a private safety net. Individuals raised in low SES families may feel less comfortable about pursuing subjects such as journalism, or art, as a university education for many low SES individuals is a potential ticket for upwards social mobility. This may be why we observe that the birth order differences in pursuing engineering, or medicine, are clear in both high and low SES families, while birth order differences in studying journalism and graduating with art degrees are only clear amongst siblings from high SES families. Alternatively, this variation could be explained by differences in culture by social class of origin. Parents in low SES families may see clear value in pursuing traditional, and more vocational, subjects such as engineering or medicine, but might be far more critical of their children if they suggested that they would pursue less traditional university programs, and there is empirical evidence for such sorting in the United States (Goyette and Mullen 2006).

The results from our analyses of the likelihood of studying the same subject as the parents by birth order relate to Sulloway's sibling niche differentiation model as well theories about human capital specialization. We found only limited evidence that first-borns are more likely than later-borns to end up pursuing the same university degree as their parents, though there was slightly greater support for this pattern in high social class families than in low social class families. This pattern of results is inconsistent with Sulloway's assertion that birth order affects the degree of alignment with parents, as his sibling niche differentiation model would suggest that first-borns from families of all social classes would be more likely to follow the

parents than later-borns.

While this study has many strengths, there are some limitations. Although the use of siblings fixed effects adjusts for all shared time-invariant factors within the family, and reduces residual confounding to a great degree, not all factors that vary between siblings are adjusted for. To a certain extent, of course, that is a crucial part of our assumption about the way that birth order shapes the experience within the family, but some factors such as parental income may change over time, and have a different impact on parental investment on children at different ages. Although we do not control for changes to parental income or occupation over time, other studies that have controlled for time-varying parental income and social class have found that these controls make very little difference to within-family estimates for birth order (Barclay and Myrskylä 2016). Our analysis may also have been limited by the unavailability of other variables. For example, the specific registers that we have access to do not contain information on birth weight. Previous studies have shown that first-borns have lower birth weight than later-borns (Magnus, Berg, and Bjerkedal 1985), and that birth weight is positively related to cognitive ability, educational attainment, and earnings (Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 2007). However, it can be argued that a lower birth weight is a consequence of birth order rather than a confounder variable, and that it is not therefore necessarily to adjust for it to identify the causal effect of birth order on later life outcomes. Either way, the lack of control for birth weight means that we are probably obtaining a conservative estimate of birth order on the later life outcomes that we address in this study. Furthermore, it was not possible for us to test whether personality factors mediated the relationship between birth order and educational choices as we did not have any information on personality available for the birth cohorts that we study. Neither did we have information on a direct measure of IQ. However, we were able to adjust for ability in the form of high school grades, which is more relevant to

our study as it is a direct measure of academic ability, and grades also shape opportunity structures for future academic progression.

Although this study has been focused on within-family differences in educational trajectories by birth order, our results may also provide insights into the production of inequalities across different families. Previous studies have shown that variation in school quality accounts for relatively little variation in academic performance (Coleman et al. 1966), and that most socioeconomic differences in performance are produced within the family, beginning well before first school attendance. Furthermore, recent research on the technology of skills formation has shown that the marginal returns to investment in children diminish rapidly with increasing age (Heckman 2006; Knudsen et al 2006). Previous research has shown that parental socioeconomic status is associated with different time investments in children (Guryan, Hurst and Kearney 2008), as well as substantial differences in the degree to which children are encouraged to learn and develop through exposure to vocabulary, books, and other interactive stimuli (Mol and Bus 2011; Cartmill et al. 2013; Weisleder and Fernald 2013). If birth order can be seen as a proxy for time spent with the parents, and particularly so during the very first years of life, then our results suggest that parent-child relations and parental exposure for the child have very far reaching consequences, in line with, for example, Coleman's (1988) arguments for social capital effects. This implies that the documented variation in time spent with children by parental socioeconomic status (Guryan, Hurst and Kearney 2008) is even more consequential than previously realized. Our results indicate that greater parental exposure leads to more ambitious choices and better labor market outcomes. Furthermore, the differences in parental exposure, as well as the timing of parental investments indicate why it is so difficult for second and later-born siblings to catch up on the first-born, as they never have exclusive access to the same level of resources. Between-family socioeconomic differences in parental exposure and investment dwarf

within-family differences in parental exposure and investment by birth order. Given that the relatively small differences that we observe within-families produce such substantial differences, we can speculate that the mechanisms underlying birth order effects may also play an important role in the production of inequality across families.

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


Figure 1. Relative probabilities of choosing a selected set of programs in first choice, for entire sample and by social class.

Note: the data points show the relative probability of applying to each program based upon estimated birth order differences as well as the baseline probability of applying to any of these programs. Data points that are hollow indicate no statistically significant differences, while filled data points indicate statistically significant differences from the reference category (birth order 1).

Table 1. First Choice of Tertiary Program, with and without control for upper-secondary GPA.

	Teacher long	Teacher short	Arts	Humanities	Social and behavioral sci.	Journalism and information	Business	Law	Life sciences, environment	Physics, Maths, Statistics	Computing	Long engineering	Short Engineering	Professions, health related	Short health	Social services	Security
<i>No GPA control</i>																	
Female	0.036***	0.012***	0.001	0.008***	0.022***	0.000	-0.019***	0.021***	0.012***	-0.003***	-0.047***	-0.144***	-0.106***	0.041***	0.112***	0.056***	-0.004***
Birth order: 2	0.012***	0.002	0.003**	0.001	0.002	0.008**	0.018***	-0.008**	-0.006**	-0.002	0.000	-0.037***	-0.001	-0.020***	0.022***	0.005	0.001
Birth order: 3	0.019**	0.004	0.004	0.001	0.006	0.020***	0.026**	-0.008	-0.010**	-0.003	0.002	-0.058***	-0.004	-0.040***	0.030***	0.010	0.000
Birth order: 4	0.021	0.004	0.009*	0.004	0.010	0.030***	0.024	-0.009	-0.006	-0.004	0.004	-0.067***	-0.015	-0.042***	0.034*	0.004	-0.001
Birth order: 5	0.040*	0.007	0.010	0.006	-0.002	0.021	0.034	-0.006	-0.012	-0.011	0.002	-0.052**	-0.035*	-0.058***	0.053*	0.003	-0.001
Birth order: 6	0.040	-0.019	0.035*	0.014	-0.006	0.015	0.066	-0.025	0.000	-0.018	0.030	-0.037	-0.045	-0.043	0.014	-0.020	-0.002
Birth order (linear)	0.010**	0.002	0.003*	0.001	0.002	0.008***	0.014***	-0.006*	-0.005**	-0.002	0.001	-0.031***	-0.002	-0.018***	0.018***	0.004	0.000
# Individuals	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107
# Parent FE	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518
Adjusted R2	0.006	0.004	0.000	0.001	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.022	0.057	0.042	0.007	0.032	0.017	0.003
Mean of Y	0.093	0.013	0.011	0.019	0.052	0.050	0.162	0.056	0.024	0.010	0.027	0.140	0.075	0.074	0.139	0.052	0.002
<i>GPA control</i>																	
Female	0.050***	0.016***	0.002*	0.009***	0.022***	0.004*	-0.019***	0.011***	0.013***	-0.003***	-0.042***	-0.168***	-0.100***	0.024***	0.124***	0.063***	-0.003***
Birth order: 2	0.007*	0.001	0.003*	0.001	0.002	0.007**	0.018***	-0.004	-0.006**	-0.001	-0.002	-0.029***	-0.003	-0.014***	0.018***	0.003	0.000
Birth order: 3	0.011	0.002	0.004	0.001	0.006	0.018***	0.027**	-0.002	-0.010**	-0.003	-0.001	-0.044***	-0.008	-0.030***	0.023**	0.006	0.000
Birth order: 4	0.011	0.002	0.009*	0.003	0.010	0.027***	0.024	-0.002	-0.006	-0.003	0.001	-0.050***	-0.019*	-0.030**	0.025	0.000	-0.001
Birth order: 5	0.028	0.004	0.010	0.006	-0.002	0.018	0.035	0.002	-0.012	-0.010	-0.003	-0.032	-0.040*	-0.044**	0.043	-0.002	-0.001
Birth order: 6	0.025	-0.023*	0.035*	0.013	-0.006	0.011	0.067	-0.014	0.000	-0.017	0.024	-0.010	-0.052	-0.024	0.001	-0.027	-0.002
GPA (z-score)	-0.043***	-0.011***	-0.001*	-0.001	0	-0.011***	0.003	0.031***	-0.001	0.002***	-0.016***	0.077***	-0.021***	0.052***	-0.038***	-0.020***	-0.001***
Birth order (linear)	0.006	0.001	0.003*	0.001	0.002	0.007**	0.015***	-0.003	-0.005**	-0.001	-0.001	-0.023***	-0.005	-0.013***	0.014***	0.002	0.000
# Individuals	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107	146,107
# Parent FE	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518	69,518
Adjusted R2	0.018	0.009	0.000	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.012	0.002	0.001	0.027	0.084	0.045	0.029	0.038	0.021	0.003
Mean of Y	0.093	0.013	0.011	0.019	0.052	0.050	0.162	0.056	0.024	0.010	0.027	0.140	0.075	0.074	0.139	0.052	0.002

Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies. Models are separate linear probability regressions for applications to the described the program (coded 0/1).

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Table 2. Last Admitted Tertiary Program, with and without control for upper-secondary GPA.

	Teacher long	Teacher short	Arts	Humanities	Social and behavioral sci.	Journalism and information	Business	Law	Life sciences, environment	Physics, Maths, Statistics	Computing	Long engineering	Short Engineering	Professions, health related	Short health	Social services	Security	
<i>No GPA control</i>																		
Female	0.057***	0.018***	0.000	0.007***	0.020***	0.004*	0.000	0.013***	0.010***	-0.003**	-0.050***	-0.129***	-0.135***	0.024***	0.123***	0.044***	-0.002***	
Birth order: 2	0.010*	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.010**	0.006	0.016**	-0.004	-0.009***	0.001	0.000	-0.028***	-0.005	-0.017***	0.013**	0.002	0.000	
Birth order: 3	0.013	0.005	0.002	0.002	0.021**	0.012*	0.033**	-0.005	-0.017***	0.000	0.004	-0.041***	-0.013	-0.032***	0.015	0.003	-0.001	
Birth order: 4	0.011	0.010	0.001	0.002	0.035**	0.017	0.035*	0.002	-0.026**	0.003	-0.004	-0.048**	-0.020	-0.040***	0.013	0.009	-0.002	
Birth order: 5	0.035	0.028*	0.008	0.013	0.015	0.011	0.019	0.001	-0.017	0.000	0.006	-0.049*	-0.029	-0.051**	0.004	0.008	-0.003	
Birth order: 6	0.077	0.019	0.013	0.005	-0.013	0.060	0.050	0.044	-0.020	-0.027	0.028	-0.070	-0.067	-0.047	-0.042	-0.006	-0.002	
Birth order (linear)	0.008	0.003	0.001	0.002	0.009**	0.006*	0.015**	-0.002	-0.008***	0.001	0.000	-0.023***	-0.006	-0.016***	0.009*	0.002	0.000	
# Individuals	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	
# Parent FE	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	
Adjusted R2	0.011	0.006	0.000	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.022	0.046	0.052	0.005	0.037	0.015	0.002	
Mean of Y	0.111	0.018	0.006	0.020	0.061	0.042	0.168	0.036	0.026	0.014	0.033	0.141	0.106	0.050	0.130	0.037	0.001	
<i>GPA control</i>																		
Female	0.075***	0.022***	0.000	0.008***	0.022***	0.007***	-0.003	0.004**	0.012***	-0.003**	-0.045***	-0.154***	-0.129***	0.011***	0.131***	0.044***	-0.002***	
Birth order: 2	0.003	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.009*	0.005	0.017***	-0.001	-0.010***	0.001	-0.002	-0.019***	-0.007	-0.013***	0.011*	0.002	0.000	
Birth order: 3	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.020**	0.010	0.035***	-0.001	-0.017***	0.001	0.000	-0.027**	-0.016	-0.025***	0.011	0.003	-0.001	
Birth order: 4	-0.002	0.007	0.000	0.001	0.034**	0.016	0.038*	0.008	-0.026***	0.003	-0.008	-0.031*	-0.024	-0.031**	0.008	0.009	-0.002	
Birth order: 5	0.021	0.025	0.008	0.012	0.014	0.009	0.022	0.007	-0.018	0.000	0.002	-0.030	-0.034	-0.040**	-0.002	0.007	-0.003	
Birth order: 6	0.059	0.015	0.012	0.003	-0.015	0.057	0.053	0.052	-0.021	-0.027	0.023	-0.046	-0.073	-0.035	-0.050	-0.007	-0.003	
GPA (z-score)	-0.063***	-0.015***	-0.001*	-0.005***	-0.005**	-0.010***	0.011***	0.028***	-0.004***	0.001	-0.019***	0.086***	-0.020***	0.045***	-0.025***	-0.001	-0.001**	
Birth order (linear)	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.009**	0.005	0.016**	0.000	-0.009***	0.001	-0.001	-0.016***	-0.008	-0.012***	0.007	0.002	0.000	
# Individuals	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	94,825	
# Parent FE	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	45,471	
Adjusted R2	0.031	0.013	0.001	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.013	0.003	0.000	0.027	0.078	0.054	0.027	0.039	0.015	0.002	
Mean of Y	0.111	0.018	0.006	0.020	0.061	0.042	0.168	0.036	0.026	0.014	0.033	0.141	0.106	0.050	0.130	0.037	0.001	

Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies. Models are separate linear probability regressions for applications to the described the program (coded 0/1).

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Table 3. First Choice of Tertiary Program by Social Class (EGP) with upper-secondary GPA control.

	Teacher long	Teacher short	Arts	Humanities	Social and behavioral sci.	Journalism and information	Business	Law	Life sciences, environment	Physics, Maths, Statistics	Computing	Long engineering	Short Engineering	Professions, health related	Short health	Social services	Security
<i>High EGP</i>																	
Female	0.042***	0.011***	0.003*	0.009***	0.023***	0.008***	-0.016***	0.012***	0.013***	-0.003**	-0.036***	-0.182***	-0.078***	0.030***	0.114***	0.053***	-0.003***
Birth order: 2	0.008*	0.001	0.004*	0.001	0.001	0.009**	0.018**	-0.004	-0.006**	-0.001	-0.002	-0.029***	-0.003	-0.015***	0.017***	0.003	0.000
Birth order: 3	0.012	0.002	0.008*	0.003	0.005	0.022***	0.027*	-0.006	-0.011*	-0.003	-0.006	-0.048***	-0.007	-0.032***	0.027**	0.009	-0.001
Birth order: 4	0.005	-0.001	0.013*	0.010	0.010	0.032**	0.017	-0.003	-0.008	-0.004	-0.008	-0.051**	-0.011	-0.032*	0.020	0.013	-0.002
Birth order: 5	0.006	0.001	0.010	0.011	-0.003	0.023	0.064*	0.002	-0.013	-0.008	-0.008	-0.025	-0.042	-0.057*	0.023	0.019	-0.001
Birth order: 6	0.019	-0.011	0.066	-0.017	-0.027	-0.009	0.121*	-0.024	-0.007	-0.019	0.007	-0.048	-0.041	-0.019	0.041	-0.030	-0.003
GPA (z-score)	-0.043***	-0.008***	-0.001	-0.002	0	-0.013***	-0.001	0.030***	-0.003**	0.002***	-0.016***	0.087***	-0.023***	0.056***	-0.044***	-0.020***	-0.001***
Birth order (linear)	0.006	0.001	0.004*	0.001	0.001	0.009**	0.015**	-0.003	-0.005*	-0.001	-0.003	-0.025***	-0.003	-0.015***	0.014**	0.004	0.000
# Individuals	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198
# Parent FE	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893
Adjusted R2	0.018	0.008	0.001	0.001	0.004	0.004	0.001	0.010	0.003	0.001	0.024	0.088	0.036	0.031	0.040	0.021	0.003
Mean of Y	0.078	0.009	0.012	0.020	0.055	0.049	0.172	0.063	0.023	0.012	0.026	0.167	0.068	0.086	0.119	0.040	0.002
<i>Low EGP</i>																	
Female	0.063***	0.022***	0.001	0.008***	0.018***	-0.006	-0.024***	0.009**	0.014***	-0.005**	-0.056***	-0.148***	-0.133***	0.016***	0.142***	0.081***	-0.003***
Birth order: 2	-0.001	0.005	0.001	0.002	0.005	0.002	0.016*	-0.010*	-0.006	-0.001	-0.001	-0.023***	-0.005	-0.010*	0.021**	0.005	0.000
Birth order: 3	-0.005	0.008	-0.003	-0.003	0.013	0.010	0.028*	-0.004	-0.011	0.000	0.006	-0.031**	-0.009	-0.028**	0.023	0.004	0.001
Birth order: 4	-0.001	0.012	-0.004	-0.001	0.015	0.018	0.031	-0.008	-0.007	-0.003	0.009	-0.036*	-0.038*	-0.022	0.036	-0.002	0.001
Birth order: 5	0.031	0.013	0.001	-0.004	0.009	-0.002	0.027	-0.003	-0.011	-0.012	-0.001	-0.026	-0.046	-0.031	0.060	-0.004	-0.001
Birth order: 6	0.013	-0.018	0.014	0.023	0.025	0.014	0.050	-0.039	0.000	-0.027	0.033	0.028	-0.046	-0.009	-0.033	-0.027	-0.002
GPA (z-score)	-0.045***	-0.015***	-0.002*	0	0	-0.005*	0.007*	0.033***	0.001	0.002*	-0.017***	0.060***	-0.015***	0.047***	-0.030***	-0.020***	-0.001
Birth order (linear)	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.004	0.013*	-0.005	-0.004	-0.001	0.001	-0.016**	-0.007	-0.010*	0.015*	0.002	0.000
# Individuals	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060
# Parent FE	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514
Adjusted R2	0.019	0.012	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.017	0.003	0.002	0.036	0.082	0.062	0.029	0.040	0.024	0.003
Mean of Y	0.119	0.020	0.010	0.018	0.049	0.054	0.141	0.045	0.023	0.009	0.030	0.097	0.084	0.056	0.172	0.072	0.002

Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies. Models are separate linear probability regressions for applications to the described the program (coded 0/1). \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Table 4. Expected outcomes of First Choice of Tertiary Program and Last admitted program

	First Choice of Tertiary Program				Last admitted program			
	Expected full time earnings <sup>a</sup>	Earnings risk <sup>b</sup>	Expected occupational prestige <sup>c</sup>	Expected level of non-employment <sup>d</sup>	Expected full time earnings <sup>a</sup>	Earnings risk <sup>b</sup>	Expected occupational prestige <sup>c</sup>	Expected level of non-employment <sup>d</sup>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>No GPA control</i>								
Female	-0.060***	-0.011***	0.752***	0.001	-0.059***	-0.016***	0.253***	-0.005***
Birth order: 2	-0.023***	-0.001	-1.043***	0.004***	-0.016***	-0.003*	-0.875***	-0.001
Birth order: 3	-0.031***	-0.002	-1.519***	0.006*	-0.018***	-0.006*	-1.310***	-0.003
Birth order: 4	-0.037***	-0.004	-1.859***	0.008	-0.017**	-0.009*	-1.445***	-0.007
Birth order: 5	-0.036***	-0.010*	-1.825***	-0.003	-0.023*	-0.014	-1.803**	-0.011
Birth order: 6	-0.027	-0.004	-0.946	0.015	0.006	-0.039**	-0.417	-0.031
Birth order (linear)	-0.018***	-0.001	-0.850***	0.003**	-0.012***	-0.003*	-0.719***	-0.001
# Individuals	139,490	139,553	139,563	139,616	87,936	88,083	88,100	88,238
# Parent FE	69,349	69,353	69,353	69,358	42,222	42,292	42,299	42,366
Adjusted R2	0.105	0.012	0.026	0.023	0.103	0.014	0.029	0.014
Mean of Y	5.676	0.074	52.951	0.130	5.667	0.087	52.250	0.148
<i>GPA control</i>								
Female	-0.075***	-0.011***	0.005	0.003***	-0.071***	-0.018***	-0.364***	-0.007***
Birth order: 2	-0.017***	-0.001	-0.765***	0.004**	-0.011***	-0.002	-0.653***	0.000
Birth order: 3	-0.022***	-0.002	-1.089***	0.005	-0.012**	-0.005	-0.976***	-0.002
Birth order: 4	-0.027***	-0.003	-1.335***	0.007	-0.009	-0.007	-1.015**	-0.006
Birth order: 5	-0.023**	-0.010*	-1.197*	-0.004	-0.015	-0.012	-1.364*	-0.010
Birth order: 6	-0.012	-0.003	-0.196	0.013	0.018	-0.036**	0.197	-0.030
GPA (z-score)	0.048***	0.001**	2.411***	-0.004***	0.041***	0.009***	2.103***	0.005***
Birth order (linear)	-0.013***	-0.001	-0.614***	0.003*	-0.008***	-0.002	-0.531***	-0.001
# Individuals	139,490	139,553	139,563	139,616	87,936	88,083	88,100	88,238
# Parent FE	69,349	69,353	69,353	69,358	42,222	42,292	42,299	42,366
Adjusted R2	0.164	0.012	0.071	0.024	0.150	0.018	0.068	0.015
Mean of Y	5.676	0.074	52.951	0.130	5.667	0.087	52.250	0.148

Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies. <sup>a</sup> in log units <sup>b</sup> Risk calculated on full earnings distribution (see text for details) <sup>c</sup> SIOPS is scaled 20-78, <sup>d</sup> scaled 0/1. The expected outcomes are based on highest ranked alternative in the first tertiary choice, and defined for specific program (not the scheme of clustered programs). \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Table 5. Expected outcomes of First Choice of Tertiary Program by Social Class (EGP)

	Expected earnings <sup>a</sup>		Earnings risk <sup>b</sup>		Expected occupational prestige <sup>c</sup>		Expected level of non-employment <sup>d</sup>	
	EGP high (1)	EGP low (2)	EGP high (3)	EGP low (4)	EGP high (5)	EGP low (6)	EGP high (7)	EGP low (8)
<i>No GPA control</i>								
Female	-0.056***	-0.066***	-0.010***	-0.012***	0.848***	0.565***	0.002*	0.000
Birth order: 2	-0.024***	-0.019***	-0.001	-0.001	-1.145***	-0.847***	0.004**	0.003
Birth order: 3	-0.035***	-0.022***	-0.002	-0.003	-1.807***	-1.092**	0.009**	0.001
Birth order: 4	-0.039***	-0.029***	-0.003	-0.005	-2.115***	-1.075*	0.013*	0.001
Birth order: 5	-0.031*	-0.029*	-0.014*	-0.013*	-2.409**	-0.818	0.000	-0.015
Birth order: 6	-0.028	-0.006	-0.012	-0.008	-2.632	1.249	0.020	-0.004
Birth order (linear)	-0.020***	-0.013***	-0.001	-0.002	-1.002***	-0.560***	0.004**	0.001
# Individuals	84,119	43,121	84,155	43,142	84,159	43,152	84,187	43,169
# Parent FE	41,798	21,456	41,800	21,457	41,799	21,459	41,801	21,461
Adjusted R2	0.107	0.105	0.012	0.012	0.028	0.025	0.027	0.016
Mean of Y	5.691	5.652	0.076	0.071	53.494	52.145	0.131	0.129
<i>GPA control</i>								
Female	-0.072***	-0.079***	-0.010***	-0.013***	0.012	-0.050	0.004***	0.000
Birth order: 2	-0.017***	-0.015***	-0.001	-0.001	-0.806***	-0.649***	0.004*	0.003
Birth order: 3	-0.024***	-0.015**	-0.002	-0.003	-1.265***	-0.767*	0.008*	0.001
Birth order: 4	-0.026***	-0.023**	-0.002	-0.005	-1.433**	-0.756	0.011*	0.001
Birth order: 5	-0.019	-0.016	-0.014*	-0.013*	-1.793*	-0.190	-0.001	-0.016
Birth order: 6	-0.013	0.006	-0.012	-0.008	-1.838	1.869	0.018	-0.005
GPA (z-score)	0.051***	0.042***	0.001	0.002**	2.621***	2.048***	-0.005***	-0.002
Birth order (linear)	-0.014***	-0.010***	-0.001	-0.001	-0.702***	-0.397*	0.004*	0.001
# Individuals	84,119	43,121	84,155	43,142	84,159	43,152	84,187	43,169
# Parent FE	41,798	21,456	41,800	21,457	41,799	21,459	41,801	21,461
Adjusted R2	0.172	0.154	0.012	0.012	0.077	0.061	0.029	0.016
Mean of Y	5.691	5.652	0.076	0.071	53.494	52.145	0.131	0.129

Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies. <sup>a</sup> in log units, <sup>b</sup> Risk calculated on full earnings distribution (see text for details), <sup>c</sup> SIOPS is scaled 20-78, <sup>d</sup> scaled 0/1. The expected outcomes are based on highest ranked alternative in the first tertiary choice. \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Table 6. Choice of Same Degree or Field as Parents

	First Choice of Tertiary Program			Last admitted program		
	Degree (1)	Field of study, 3 digit (2)	Field of study, 2 digit (3)	Degree (4)	Field of study, 3 digit (5)	Field of study, 2 digit (6)
<i>No GPA control</i>						
Female	0.005***	-0.003	-0.021***	0.009***	0.001	-0.019***
Birth order: 2	-0.003*	-0.006*	-0.008*	-0.005*	-0.008	-0.012*
Birth order: 3	-0.003	-0.005	-0.011	-0.008	-0.007	-0.017
Birth order: 4	-0.002	-0.006	-0.015	-0.010	-0.009	-0.024
Birth order: 5	-0.009	-0.009	-0.031	-0.018	-0.017	-0.061*
Birth order: 6	-0.014	-0.028	-0.040	-0.017	-0.021	-0.057
Birth order (linear)	-0.002	-0.004	-0.007	-0.004	-0.006	-0.011
# Individuals	146,107	146,107	146,107	94,825	94,825	94,825
# Parent FE	69,518	69,518	69,518	45,471	45,471	45,471
Adjusted R2	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.002	0.000	0.002
Mean of Y	0.022	0.066	0.177	0.032	0.102	0.268
<i>GPA control</i>						
Female	0.004***	-0.003	-0.024***	0.008***	-0.001	-0.023***
Birth order: 2	-0.003	-0.006*	-0.007	-0.004	-0.007	-0.011
Birth order: 3	-0.003	-0.005	-0.010	-0.008	-0.006	-0.015
Birth order: 4	-0.002	-0.006	-0.013	-0.009	-0.008	-0.022
Birth order: 5	-0.008	-0.008	-0.029	-0.017	-0.015	-0.058
Birth order: 6	-0.013	-0.028	-0.037	-0.015	-0.019	-0.053
GPA (z-score)	0.002*	0.001	0.008***	0.004***	0.006**	0.014***
Birth order (linear)	-0.002	-0.004	-0.006	-0.004	-0.005	-0.01
# Individuals	146,107	146,107	146,107	94,825	94,825	94,825
# Parent FE	69,518	69,518	69,518	45,471	45,471	45,471
Adjusted R2	0.001	0.000	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002
Mean of Y	0.022	0.066	0.177	0.032	0.102	0.268

Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies. \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001



Table 7. Mediation of Birth Order Effects on Tertiary Graduates Wages by Field of Study.

	All		EGP high		EGP low	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-0.158***	-0.073***	-0.156***	-0.075***	-0.160***	-0.067***
Birth order: 2	-0.023***	-0.011***	-0.021***	-0.009***	-0.025***	-0.016***
Birth order: 3	-0.036***	-0.019***	-0.033***	-0.013**	-0.043***	-0.029***
Birth order: 4	-0.037***	-0.016**	-0.032***	-0.007	-0.048***	-0.032***
Birth order: 5	-0.036***	-0.012	-0.037*	-0.005	-0.049**	-0.030*
Birth order: 6	-0.003	0.022	0.011	0.04	-0.044	-0.018
Field of Study (17 categories)		Yes		Yes		Yes
Birth order (linear)	-0.018***	-0.009***	-0.017***	-0.006**	-0.020***	-0.013***
# Individuals	269,004	269,004	162,599	162,599	78,212	78,212
# Parent FE	130,118	130,118	78,146	78,146	38,339	38,339
Adjusted R2	0.15	0.313	0.144	0.305	0.164	0.335

Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies. The outcome is monthly wages standardized to full time, as collected from the 'wage structure' data as close to age 30 as possible, and after tertiary graduation. This data has partial coverage in the private sector for firms with less than 500 employees. Missing values has been imputed based on wage predictions based on annual earnings and information on detailed education codes. The correlation between wage predictions and actual wages is .76. All regressions controls for an imputation dummy.

Table A1. Descriptive Statistics for Educational Choice Sample.

	Mean	SD	min	max	count
Female	0.555	(0.497)	0	1	146,107
Birth order: 1	0.386				
Birth order: 2	0.439	(0.496)	0	1	146,107
Birth order: 3	0.139	(0.346)	0	1	146,107
Birth order: 4	0.029	(0.168)	0	1	146,107
Birth order: 5	0.006	(0.075)	0	1	146,107
Birth order: 6	0.001	(0.033)	0	1	146,107
GPA (z-score)	0.500	(0.876)	-4.2479	2	146,107
Expected outcomes, First Choice					
Expected earnings	5.676	(0.149)	4.8507	6	139,490
Earnings risk	0.074	(0.061)	0	1	139,553
Expected occupational prestige (SIOPS)	52.951	(8.402)	20	78	139,563
Expected level of non-employment	0.130	(0.102)	0	1	139,616
Expected outcomes, Last Admitted Program					
Expected earnings	5.667	(0.138)	4.8507	6	87,936
Earnings risk	0.087	(0.089)	0	1	88,083
Expected occupational prestige (SIOPS)	52.250	(7.598)	20	78	88,100
Expected level of non-employment	0.148	(0.128)	0	1	88,238
Match with Parents Education in First Choice					
Degree	0.022	(0.146)	0	1	146,107
Field of study, 3 digit	0.066	(0.247)	0	1	146,107
Field of study, 2 digit	0.177	(0.381)	0	1	146,107
Match with Parents Education in First Choice Last admitted program					
Degree	0.032	(0.175)	0	1	94,825
Field of study, 3 digit	0.102	(0.302)	0	1	94,825
Field of study, 2 digit	0.268	(0.442)	0	1	94,825

Table A2. Descriptive Statistics for Educational Graduation Sample.

	Mean	SD	min	max	count
Female	0.585	(0.492)	0	1	280,731
Birth order: 1	0.400				
Birth order: 2	0.411	(0.492)	0	1	280,731
Birth order: 3	0.152	(0.358)	0	1	280,731
Birth order: 4	0.030	(0.171)	0	1	280,731
Birth order: 5	0.006	(0.074)	0	1	280,731
Birth order: 6	0.001	(0.035)	0	1	280,731
Outcomes					
Ln monthly wage	10.114	(0.277)	4.2435	13	269,004
Graduating from art school	0.009	(0.094)	0	1	280,731
Graduating with art degree	0.016	(0.124)	0	1	280,731

Table A3. Coding of Choice Scheme with Expected Outcomes.

Choice scheme	No. first choices in sample	Admission rate	GPA among the last admitted <sup>a</sup>	Average of expected earnings <sup>b</sup>	Earnings risk <sup>c</sup>	Average of expected occupational prestige <sup>d</sup>	SD of expected occupational prestige <sup>d</sup>	Average of expected level of non-employment (0/1)
Teacher long	13,577	0.168	0.241	5.590	0.012	57.1	8.56	0.022
Teacher short	1,936	0.180	0.063	5.521	0.044	51.5	5.29	0.146
Arts	1,637	0.150	0.528	5.484	0.182	44.6	12.11	0.346
Humanities	2,835	0.213	0.441	5.446	0.182	46.8	13.76	0.388
Social and behavioral sci.	7,601	0.146	0.518	5.586	0.144	48.8	12.95	0.262
Journalism and information	7,370	0.142	0.442	5.582	0.094	47.9	11.36	0.210
Business	23,692	0.142	0.643	5.709	0.091	48.5	10.21	0.150
Law	8,225	0.106	1.150	5.813	0.057	63.6	11.72	0.090
Life sciences, environment	3,531	0.173	0.587	5.566	0.122	51.6	13.34	0.243
Physics, Maths, Statistics	1,532	0.181	0.677	5.585	0.226	52.9	16.52	0.367
Computing	4,002	0.193	0.056	5.692	0.101	49.4	9.99	0.152
Long engineering	20,409	0.174	1.008	5.802	0.087	55.6	11.98	0.124
Short Engineering	10,895	0.221	0.389	5.724	0.137	50.3	11.30	0.179
Professions, health related	10,764	0.061	1.387	5.865	0.059	69.6	8.28	0.091
Short health	20,285	0.118	0.548	5.544	0.061	47.0	7.35	0.137
Social services	7,531	0.077	0.581	5.563	0.063	49.4	7.94	0.121
Security	285	0.160	0.317	5.718	0.019	48.3	6.37	0.031
Total	146,107	0.145	0.604	5.666	0.085	52.2	10.18	0.146

<sup>a</sup> GPA is unconditional z-scores within graduation years <sup>b</sup> Earnings are in log form, truncated to values above 120,000 (see text) and residualized for year, age, gender immigration status, gender and presence of children in the household, and the interaction of gender and children, <sup>c</sup> same as <sup>b</sup>, but not truncated; risk is measured as variance relative to level of earnings (see text), <sup>d</sup> SIOPS-scores.

Table A4. Case selection.

No. cases after selection on...	Admission, born 1982-1990		Graduation, born 1960-87	
	No. Individuals	No. Families	No. Individuals	No. Families
Cohort cut	1,219,701	683,740	3,968,192	1,754,225
Relevant set sizes (>1 siblings)	577,092	264,266	2,292,647	992,460
Non-emigrated	568,526	260,479	2,259,276	978,508
Alive until age 30	561,226	257,458	2,224,415	966,294
GPA, upper-secondary school	362,383	169,877		
Tertiary program choice file	148,724	70,945		
Tertiary graduation file			284,749	134,046
Social background (EGP)	147,491	70,399	282,361	132,926
Remove large set sizes (>6)	146,107	69,853	280,731	132,340

Note: each step except the first also applies a set size cut so that >1 siblings must remain in the data. Any deviations from the last figure to the estimated model are due to further internal missing on outcomes.

Table A5. Probability of being in the analytic choice sample by family size and EGP.

EGP	Family size					Total
	2	3	4	5	6	
I	0.36	0.43	0.44	0.43	0.43	0.39
II	0.23	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.25
IIIa	0.14	0.17	0.15	0.19	0.20	0.15
IVab	0.18	0.22	0.22	0.25	0.26	0.20
IVcd	0.18	0.25	0.22	0.23	0.31	0.22
VI	0.11	0.14	0.15	0.16	0.18	0.13
VII	0.11	0.14	0.17	0.21	0.21	0.15
IIIb	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.12
Total	0.25	0.30	0.28	0.27	0.27	0.27

Note: the data displays the probability that a family is observed with a least two children in the analytic sample. The baseline data consist of data after cuts for birth cohorts, set sizes, early deaths and outmigration. The factors that drive the selection is thus whether we observed GPA from upper-secondary school (i.e., if they graduate) and whether or not they apply for tertiary programs (with family size constraints re-applied).

Table A6. First Choice of Tertiary Program by Social Class (EGP).

	Teacher long	Teacher short	Arts	Humanities	Social and behavioral sci.	Journalism and information	Business	Law	Life sciences, environment	Physics, Maths, Statistics	Computing	Long engineering	Short Engineering	Professions, health related	Short health	Social services	Security
<i>High EGP</i>																	
Female	0.028***	0.009***	0.002*	0.009***	0.023***	0.004	-0.016***	0.021***	0.012***	-0.002*	-0.041***	-0.153***	-0.086***	0.048***	0.100***	0.047***	-0.003***
Birth order: 2	0.014***	0.002	0.004*	0.001	0.001	0.011***	0.018**	-0.008*	-0.006*	-0.002	0.000	-0.040***	0.000	-0.023***	0.023***	0.006*	0.000
Birth order: 3	0.021*	0.004	0.009*	0.004	0.005	0.025***	0.027*	-0.013	-0.010*	-0.004	-0.003	-0.067***	-0.002	-0.044***	0.036***	0.013*	-0.001
Birth order: 4	0.016	0.001	0.013*	0.010	0.010	0.035**	0.017	-0.010	-0.007	-0.004	-0.004	-0.074***	-0.005	-0.047**	0.032	0.018	-0.002
Birth order: 5	0.017	0.002	0.010	0.012	-0.003	0.026	0.064*	-0.005	-0.013	-0.009	-0.004	-0.046	-0.036	-0.071**	0.033	0.023	0.000
Birth order: 6	0.033	-0.008	0.066	-0.016	-0.027	-0.004	0.121*	-0.034	-0.006	-0.020	0.013	-0.076	-0.033	-0.037	0.055	-0.024	-0.002
Birth order (linear)	0.011**	0.002	0.004**	0.002	0.001	0.011***	0.015**	-0.007	-0.005*	-0.002	-0.001	-0.035***	-0.001	-0.021***	0.019***	0.006*	0.000
# Individuals	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198	88,198
# Parent FE	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893	41,893
Adjusted R2	0.004	0.004	0.001	0.001	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.019	0.058	0.032	0.009	0.031	0.016	0.003
Mean of Y	0.078	0.009	0.012	0.020	0.055	0.049	0.172	0.063	0.023	0.012	0.026	0.167	0.068	0.086	0.119	0.040	0.002
<i>Low EGP</i>																	
Female	0.049***	0.018***	0.001	0.008***	0.018***	-0.007*	-0.022***	0.019***	0.014***	-0.004**	-0.061***	-0.130***	-0.138***	0.030***	0.133***	0.075***	-0.003***
Birth order: 2	0.003	0.006*	0.001	0.002	0.005	0.003	0.016*	-0.013**	-0.006	-0.001	0.001	-0.029***	-0.004	-0.014**	0.023**	0.007	0.000
Birth order: 3	0.002	0.011	-0.003	-0.003	0.013	0.011	0.027	-0.009	-0.011	0.000	0.009	-0.040***	-0.007	-0.035***	0.027	0.008	0.001
Birth order: 4	0.006	0.014	-0.004	-0.001	0.015	0.019	0.030	-0.013	-0.007	-0.003	0.011	-0.046**	-0.036*	-0.029	0.041	0.002	0.001
Birth order: 5	0.045	0.017	0.002	-0.004	0.009	-0.001	0.025	-0.013	-0.012	-0.013	0.005	-0.044	-0.041	-0.046	0.069	0.002	0.000
Birth order: 6	0.028	-0.013	0.015	0.023	0.025	0.015	0.048	-0.050	0.000	-0.028	0.039	0.008	-0.041	-0.025	-0.023	-0.020	-0.002
Birth order (linear)	0.003	0.005*	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.004	0.013*	-0.008	-0.004	-0.001	0.003	-0.021***	-0.006	-0.013**	0.017*	0.004	0.000
# Individuals	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060	45,060
# Parent FE	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514	21,514
Adjusted R2	0.009	0.006	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.003	0.001	0.031	0.059	0.061	0.006	0.036	0.021	0.003
Mean of Y	0.119	0.020	0.010	0.018	0.049	0.054	0.141	0.045	0.023	0.009	0.030	0.097	0.084	0.056	0.172	0.072	0.002

Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies. Models are separate linear probability regressions for applications to the described the program (coded 0/1). \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Table A7. Birth order effects on art school graduation.

	Graduating from art school	Graduating with art degree	Graduating from art school		Graduating with art degree	
			High EGP	Low EGP	High EGP	Low EGP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	0.002***	0.003***	0.002***	0.001	0.005***	0
Birth order: 2	0.002**	0.005***	0.002*	0.002	0.006***	0.003*
Birth order: 3	0.003*	0.007***	0.003	0.002	0.009***	0.003
Birth order: 4	0.004	0.009**	0.005	0.004	0.014***	0.002
Birth order: 5	0.005	0.012*	0.009	0.005	0.021*	0.006
Birth order: 6	0.017	0.022**	0.029	0.007	0.026	0.016
Birth order (linear)	0.002**	0.004***	0.002*	0.001	0.005***	0.002
# Individuals	280,731	280,731	170,502	81,056	170,502	81,056
# Parent FE	130,608	130,608	78,491	38,450	78,491	38,450
Adjusted R2	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001
Mean of Y	0.009	0.016	0.01	0.006	0.018	0.011

Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies. Source data is graduation register until 2012, cohorts born 1960-1987.



Table A8. Choice of Same Degree or Field as Parents by Social Class (EGP)

	First Choice of Tertiary Program						Last admitted program					
	Degree		Field of study, 3 digit		Field of study, 2 digit		Degree		Field of study, 3 digit		Field of study, 2 digit	
	High EGP	Low EGP	High EGP	Low EGP	High EGP	Low EGP	High EGP	Low EGP	High EGP	Low EGP	High EGP	Low EGP
<i>No GPA control</i>												
Female	0.006***	0.004***	-0.003	-0.001	-0.017***	-0.028***	0.010***	0.008***	-0.001	0.008	-0.015**	-0.028***
Birth order: 2	-0.005*	-0.001	-0.007	-0.006	-0.011*	-0.002	-0.008*	0.000	-0.005	-0.013	-0.010	-0.018
Birth order: 3	-0.005	-0.002	-0.007	-0.007	-0.019	-0.001	-0.014	0.000	-0.007	-0.012	-0.024	-0.013
Birth order: 4	-0.005	0.001	-0.009	-0.006	-0.029	0.001	-0.017	0.001	-0.008	-0.013	-0.038	-0.017
Birth order: 5	-0.023	0.001	-0.017	-0.016	-0.069*	-0.001	-0.040	0.004	-0.027	-0.021	-0.125**	-0.030
Birth order: 6	-0.040	-0.002	0.001	-0.033	-0.058	-0.011	-0.062*	0.020	0.049	-0.039	-0.103	-0.027
Birth order (linear)	-0.004	-0.001	-0.005	-0.004	-0.011*	-0.001	-0.007*	0.000	-0.004	-0.008	-0.012	-0.011
# Individuals	88,198	45,060	88,198	45,060	88,198	45,060	59,562	27,536	59,562	27,536	59,562	27,536
# Parent FE	41,893	21,514	41,893	21,514	41,893	21,514	28,533	13,232	28,533	13,232	28,533	13,232
Adjusted R2	0.001	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.004	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.003
Mean of Y	0.033	0.005	0.082	0.040	0.204	0.137	0.045	0.010	0.119	0.072	0.297	0.220
<i>GPA control</i>												
Female	0.005**	0.005***	-0.004	0.000	-0.021***	-0.030***	0.008**	0.009***	-0.003	0.007	-0.019***	-0.033***
Birth order: 2	-0.005	-0.001	-0.006	-0.006	-0.010	-0.002	-0.007	0.000	-0.004	-0.012	-0.008	-0.017
Birth order: 3	-0.004	-0.002	-0.007	-0.007	-0.017	0.000	-0.012	0.000	-0.006	-0.011	-0.022	-0.012
Birth order: 4	-0.004	0.001	-0.008	-0.006	-0.026	0.002	-0.015	0.001	-0.006	-0.013	-0.034	-0.015
Birth order: 5	-0.022	0.000	-0.016	-0.016	-0.066	0.001	-0.039	0.004	-0.026	-0.020	-0.122*	-0.025
Birth order: 6	-0.039	-0.003	0.002	-0.034	-0.055	-0.008	-0.060	0.020	0.052	-0.038	-0.098	-0.024
GPA (z-score)	0.004***	-0.001*	0.003	-0.002	0.010***	0.007*	0.007***	-0.001	0.006*	0.006	0.013***	0.018***
Birth order (linear)	-0.004	-0.001	-0.005	-0.004	-0.009	-0.001	-0.007	0.000	-0.004	-0.008	-0.01	-0.011
# Individuals	88,198	45,060	88,198	45,060	88,198	45,060	59,562	27,536	59,562	27,536	59,562	27,536
# Parent FE	41,893	21,514	41,893	21,514	41,893	21,514	28,533	13,232	28,533	13,232	28,533	13,232
Adjusted R2	0.001	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.004	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.004
Mean of Y	0.033	0.005	0.082	0.040	0.204	0.137	0.045	0.010	0.119	0.072	0.297	0.220

Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies. \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Table A9. Mediation of Birth Order Effects on Tertiary Graduates Wages by Field of Study Measured with High Specificity.

	All		EGP high		EGP low	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-0.158***	-0.057***	-0.156***	-0.057***	-0.160***	-0.056***
Birth order: 2	-0.023***	-0.008***	-0.021***	-0.006**	-0.025***	-0.013***
Birth order: 3	-0.036***	-0.015***	-0.033***	-0.009*	-0.043***	-0.025***
Birth order: 4	-0.037***	-0.011*	-0.032***	-0.001	-0.048***	-0.028***
Birth order: 5	-0.036***	-0.004	-0.037*	0.005	-0.049**	-0.021
Birth order: 6	-0.003	0.023	0.011	0.041	-0.044	-0.014
Linearized education value <sup>a</sup>		0.830***		0.861***		0.780***
Birth order (linear)	-0.018***	-0.006***	-0.017***	-0.004	-0.020***	-0.011***
# Individuals	269,004	269,004	162,599	162,599	78,212	78,212
# Parent FE	130,118	130,118	78,146	78,146	38,339	38,339
Adjusted R2	0.15	0.352	0.144	0.345	0.164	0.366

Note: All models control for birth year and maternal age dummies. The outcome is monthly wages standardized to full time, as collected from the 'wage structure' data as close to age 30 as possible, and after tertiary graduation. This data has partial coverage in the private sector for firms with less than 500 employees. Missing values has been imputed based on wage predictions based on annual earnings and information on detailed education codes. The correlation between wage predictions and actual wages is .76. All regressions controls for an imputation dummy. <sup>a</sup> This is measure is the predicted wages for specific levels and fields with high resolution (513 categories), net of birth order and relevant controls (see Björklund and Sundström 2006).

Table A10. Labor market outcomes in 1990 census.

	Upper service class occupation (0/1) <sup>a</sup>					Occupational prestige (SIOPS)				
	All (1)	All (2)	All (3)	High EGP (4)	Low EGP (5)	All (6)	All (7)	All (8)	High EGP (9)	Low EGP (10)
Female	-0.063***	-0.069***	-0.047***	-0.146***	-0.034***	-1.176***	-1.337***	-2.067***	-1.566***	-1.584***
Birth order: 2	-0.032***	-0.032***	-0.014***	-0.049***	-0.021***	-1.300***	-1.294***	-0.596***	-1.421***	-1.132***
Birth order: 3	-0.044***	-0.044***	-0.019***	-0.071***	-0.028***	-1.970***	-1.961***	-0.920***	-2.280***	-1.673***
Birth order: 4	-0.048***	-0.047***	-0.021***	-0.079***	-0.032***	-2.306***	-2.291***	-1.076***	-2.963***	-1.983***
Birth order: 5	-0.053***	-0.052***	-0.024***	-0.095***	-0.033***	-2.613***	-2.589***	-1.233***	-3.541***	-2.294***
Birth order: 6	-0.053***	-0.051***	-0.023***	-0.091***	-0.032***	-2.473***	-2.429***	-1.039***	-3.973***	-1.913***
Microclass same as any parent		-0.093***						-2.479***		
Linearized education FE (Up. serv.)			0.895***							
Linearized education FE (SIOPS)								0.854***		
Birth year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Maternal age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# Individuals	948,106	948,106	948,034	211,146	430,846	943,643	943,643	943,571	209,846	429,182
# Parent FE	402,862	402,862	402,861	93,400	181,174	402,776	402,776	402,775	93,365	181,141
Adjusted R2	0.014	0.023	0.25	0.04	0.007	0.01	0.015	0.233	0.02	0.011
Mean of Y	0.137	0.137	0.137	0.283	0.078	42.046	42.046	42.046	48.302	39.168

Note: <sup>a</sup> Upper service class = EGP I. \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Table A11. Sensitivity analyses

	Educational choice		
	Choice of degree category	Expected outcomes	Choice of same degree or field as parents
Gender	F stronger gradient in teacher long/short, M stronger gradient in long engineering M negative gradient for law, F n.s. gradient F negative gradient for professions, M n.s. gradient	Stronger gradient for M than F in expected earnings and SIOPS	No gender difference, except last admission field two digit inheritance, where F has gradient, not M
Set size	The gradient become very noisy for larger set sizes due to much smaller sample	Gradients are similar, but less significant for larger set sizes due to much smaller sample	Gradients are noisy across set sizes due varying sample sizes
Remove birth year	No substantial difference	No substantial difference	No substantial difference

Note: 'gradient' refers to birth order gradient, M = Male, F = Female.