Exponentially many steps for finding a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game

Savani, Rahul and von Stengel, Bernhard ORCID: 0000-0002-3488-8322 (2004) Exponentially many steps for finding a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game. In: 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2004), 2004-10-17 - 2004-10-19, Rome, Italy. (Submitted)

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Official URL:	http://www.cs.brown.edu/~aris/focs04/
Additional Information:	© 2004 the authors
Divisions:	Mathematics
Subjects:	Q Science > QA Mathematics
Date Deposited:	19 Nov 2008 14:56
Last Modified:	15 Sep 2023 08:21
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/8140

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