Cookies?
Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Exponentially many steps for finding a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game

Savani, Rahul and von Stengel, Bernhard ORCID: 0000-0002-3488-8322 (2004) Exponentially many steps for finding a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game. In: 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2004), 2004-10-17 - 2004-10-19. (Submitted)

Full text not available from this repository.
Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Official URL: http://www.cs.brown.edu/~aris/focs04/
Additional Information: © 2004 the authors
Divisions: Mathematics
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics
Date Deposited: 19 Nov 2008 14:56
Last Modified: 28 Aug 2021 23:29
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/8140

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item