Ideology and Civilian Victimization in Civil War

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Abstract

Why do some groups fighting in civil wars target civilians more than others? We propose an explanation that challenges the current focus on material and organizational factors and instead brings back and emphasizes the role of ideology. We argue that the ideological frameworks of armed groups, whether state or non-state, condition their decisions about targeting, in some cases setting normative constraints on action even if such choice involves higher costs and risks. We examine these hypotheses using a mixed-method approach that combines a statistical analysis of newly constructed disaggregated data set on all fatalities in Northern Ireland’s conflict between 1969 and 2005 with a comparative historical study of the interaction between key ideologies and the armed groups that adopted them.

Keywords: ideology; civilian victimization; civil war
On Sunday, August 10, 2014, in the city of Mayadin in Deir Al Zor province of Syria, the militants from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil) crucified two men from the Al Sheitaat tribe for “dealing with apostates,” followed by two others in neighbouring Al Bulel for blasphemy.¹ In subsequent days, Isil, which earlier took over two large oil fields in the province, executed 700 members of the Al Sheitaat, mostly civilians, by shooting or beheading them.² Fighting in the same war for apparently similar goals of taking control of territory en route to building a state, a few dozen miles north from Isil capital Al-Raqqah, the Kurdish forces - People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) - have largely adhered to strict targeting norms by focusing their war on combatants.³ Differences in patterns of violence are endemic across fighting groups in civil wars in various parts of the world,⁴ and about 40 per cent of states and rebels exercise restraint in their violence against civilians.⁵ What accounts for this variation?

There has been a proliferation of theories that aim to solve this puzzle. Studies derived from the “economic turn” in the study of civil war⁶ and the “organizational turn”⁷ argue that civilian victimization is determined by material factors and the organization of armed groups. Another influential account stresses the armed groups’ control of

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¹ Gulf News 2014.
² Reuters 2014.
³ Human Rights Watch 2015.
⁴ Humphreys and Weinstein 2006.
⁵ Stanton 2009.
⁶ Collier and Hoeffler 1998.
territory as an explanation for levels and types of violence. A visible thread connecting these different strands of research is the role they attribute to ideology, which ranges from a nuanced downplaying to an outright rejection of it as a mere rhetorical device. Such de-ideologization has not been unique to civil war studies. It has been part of the larger trend in social sciences that misperceived the advent of a post-ideological world at the end of the Cold War. Yet, few studies of civil war violence that discard the role of ideology systematically account for it.

In this article, we seek to address these theoretical and empirical gaps. Drawing on historical sociology, qualitative comparative work on civil wars, and nascent political science literature that aims to correct the lacuna in research on civil wars by reaffirming the importance, if not centrality, of political and ideological factors, we theorize that armed group ideology is a critical factor explaining the variation in civilian victimization across groups. We conceptualize ideology as a “shared framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess that provides both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment should be structured”. We argue that in the context of civil wars the targeting patterns of belligerents are conditioned by their ideologies which simplify, shape, and crystallize salient or latent social cleavages and thus identify who and what is a “legitimate target” given their actual or potential opposition to the belligerents’ cause. Furthermore, ideology affects targeting patterns through filtering the belligerents’ strategy set, because the interpretation of the environment and its remolded “ideal state” image enable some options and discard others. Finally, ideologies can also shape

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8 Kalyvas 2006.

9 Balcells 2010; 2011; Sanin and Wood 2014; Staniland 2015; Thaler 2012.

the economic, strategic, and organizational choices of belligerents rather than being separate from or endogenous to them.

We examine the hypothesis that group ideology explains civilian victimization using a mixed-method approach. We combine a statistical analysis of a sub-national and group-level dataset of fatalities in Northern Ireland’s conflict between 1969 and 2005 constructed by us from existing sources, with a brief comparative historical study of the interaction between key ideologies and armed groups that adopted them. We find that fighting group ideologies are the most robust predictors of civilian victimization, controlling for other factors. Armed groups with Unionist ideology were consistently more likely to target civilians and engage in cross-ethnic attacks on civilians, while Republican armed groups were significantly more likely to target combatants. These results survive multiple robustness checks. We trace these targeting differences to path-dependent norms, recruitment patterns, and relations with the British armed forces during the conflict.

This article contributes to our knowledge of civil war violence in three domains. First, our research advances a theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between ideology and civilian victimization. Humphreys and Weinstein implicitly bring ideology back into political science analysis of violence against civilians in civil wars, yet as a factor dependent on the resource endowments of armed groups and not as an autonomous factor. Moreover, their conceptualization and measurement of ideology is indirect, broad, and dichotomous: it is understood as combatants’ perceptions of collective goals versus private goals. Yet, the nature and specific elements of these goals – that is, features of different ideologies, which are likely to have different effects – remain unspecified and unexplored. Finally, as Humphreys and

\[\text{Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Weinstein 2007.}\]
Weinstein acknowledge, given their model's assumptions, their argument is not likely to explain cases where civilian victimization is a conscious group strategy or where leaders order civilian abuse even if it may run against the aggregate interests of individual members of their group.

Second, we show empirically the autonomous effect of group ideology on civilian victimization in civil wars while systematically accounting for alternative explanations. For example, while Thaler argues that ideology shapes the use of selective versus indiscriminate violence, his findings are limited given his qualitative analysis of only two groups in two different contexts¹² – Frelimo in Mozambique and the MPLA in Angola, and because such analysis does not systematically account for other factors. We rectify this by examining the targeting behavior of fifteen different armed groups fighting in the same civil war and by explicitly and simultaneously controlling for their various characteristics. Thus, our research also contributes to promoting micro-level analyses for understanding the underpinnings of civil war violence.¹³

Finally, this article significantly advances the debates on patterns of violence in the conflict in Northern Ireland, which is one of the most studied from an area studies perspective but which is as yet poorly integrated into the comparative study of civil war. Our contribution here is twofold. First, a number of studies have argued that ideological differences are important factors in decoding the patterns of violence in this conflict; others have disputed this; some studies have not been immune to ideological biases themselves.¹⁴ However, their research designs – centered on broad qualitative explorations and bivariate correlations that do not systematically account

¹² Thaler 2012.
¹⁴ For a variety of views, see Bruce 1997; Drake 1998; O’Duffy 1995; O’Leary 2005; White 1997.
for potential confounders – are in effect descriptive rather than explanatory: they do not allow assessing the independent effects of different factors. Our study presents a story arrived at through a research design that evaluates the role of different factors in a systematic and explicit fashion. Second, it is based on a novel dataset that combines the strengths of all existing sources of data on the fatalities in the Northern Ireland conflict and includes original components that code the characteristics of armed groups and localities of civilian victimization.

**THEORIES OF CIVILIAN VICTIMIZATION**

A fundamental assumption in the study of intra-state conflict is that the support of the general population for a belligerent party is critical to the success of that party.\(^\text{15}\) Therefore, if insurgents enjoy support from the population, they are expected to be less likely to engage in civilian victimization. In addition, if enemy forces perceive that local populations support their rival, they can raise the costs of such support by punishing civilians.\(^\text{16}\) Overall, armed groups are less likely to target co-ethnic civilians or their ideological home communities, especially when these serve as their recruitment base.\(^\text{17}\)

Recent research brings more nuances to the question of allegiances and draws attention to factors previously ignored in large-N studies of civil wars – political and ethnic cleavages. Direct violence against civilians in conventional civil wars can be explained by the degree of pre-war political mobilization and competition: individuals

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\(^{15}\) See Lawrence 1920; Mao 1961; Mason 1996; Migdal 1974, Scott et al. 1970; for recent studies, see Valentino et al. 2004; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Downes 2006.

\(^{16}\) Valentino et al. 2004.

\(^{17}\) Stanton 2015.
who are mobilized for an armed group are targeted by opposing groups because they are seen as assets for their rivals.\textsuperscript{18} In addition, ethnic affiliation can be key to targeting because it can serve as a shortcut to identifying groups of suspected enemy supporters when affiliations are not known for certain.\textsuperscript{19} Third, the influential study by Kalyvas postulated that the scale of indiscriminate violence in civil wars depends on the degree of control that a belligerent exercises over territory: the less territorial control there is, the more likely it is that there will be “indirect” indiscriminate targeting resulting in higher levels of civilian victimization.\textsuperscript{20} Fourth, the belligerents’ capabilities can also affect patterns of violence against civilians, with weak or weakening capacity of belligerents resulting in more collateral damage caused by the groups’ operations and through deliberate strategies of victimizing civilians to close the “capability gap.”\textsuperscript{21} However, capabilities derive partly from material sources, and depending on the source, armed groups may be more or less prone to target civilians. Groups which secure external funding – such as natural resource rents or foreign sponsorship – may be more likely to target civilians than groups that rely on the local populations for material support.\textsuperscript{22} Yet, different forms of external funding – e.g., foreign aid or lootable resources – may have different effects.\textsuperscript{23} The number of donors and their

\textsuperscript{18} Balcells 2010.

\textsuperscript{19} Fjelde and Hultman 2014.

\textsuperscript{20} Kalyvas 2006; see also Balcells 2010.

\textsuperscript{21} Wood, 2010; 2014; see also Hultman 2012.

\textsuperscript{22} Azam and Hoeffler 2002; Weinstein 2007; Wood 2010.

\textsuperscript{23} Wood 2010; Salehyan et al. 2014.
characteristics can matter, too.\textsuperscript{24} A similar logic may apply to governments, not just insurgents: larger resources, such as overseas development aid, may increase the capacity of governments to defeat insurgents.\textsuperscript{25}

Finally, violence against civilians can also depend on the organizational characteristics of combatants: material incentives in recruitment, ethnic heterogeneity, and lack of disciplinary mechanisms within warring groups can entail higher civilian abuse.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{Why Ideology Matters}

Much of the civil war scholarship in political science and economics at the end of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century and the first decade of the 21\textsuperscript{st} assumes rational self-seeking motivations of leaders, recruits, and groups in initiating, joining, or conducting civil war, thus either relegating ideas and other-regarding preferences to a role of explaining residual variation or discarding them altogether. Why this assumption took hold can probably be traced to five factors. First, it was a reaction to the often unsystematic examination of ideological explanations in much of the historical and qualitative literature on civil wars, where the importance of ideology is taken as a convention. Second, it followed a seeming de-ideologization of the international system in the wake of the fall of communism and a seeming triumph of liberal democracy. Third, and related to the previous, it reflected a shifting of the focus from “ideological Che Guevaras in favor of the predatory Charles Taylors”.\textsuperscript{27} This paradigm shifting in turn reflected actual

\textsuperscript{24} Salehyan et al. 2014.

\textsuperscript{25} Azam and Hoeffler 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003.

\textsuperscript{26} Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; for intellectual precursors of this idea, see Machiavelli 2005: 51; Mao 1961: 93.

\textsuperscript{27} Kalyvas and Balcells 2010, 420.
changes: the fall of communism, the shattering of Marxist ideologies and end of the Cold War undermined the core foundations of secular revolutionary movements, and ended the abundant material support from the Superpowers, which in turn induced other forms of raising funds that advantaged the Charles Taylor types.\textsuperscript{28} Fourth, the prevailing assumption of self-seeking motivations as the core explanation for human behavior mirrored mainstream beliefs in economics, which heavily influenced political science research.\textsuperscript{29} Finally, such assumptions were partly reinforced by a lack of disaggregated data as well as poor conceptualization, weak design, and doubtful proxies. Many studies that emphasized micro-level foundations in fact used suboptimal country-level proxies.\textsuperscript{30}

However, a recent study by Sanín and Wood suggests that ideology can matter in civil wars in general, noting that ideologies may constrain the group from violence altogether or may justify violent over nonviolent strategies.\textsuperscript{31} Regarding the conflict onset, for example, the combination of nationalism - an ideology of ‘political self-rule’\textsuperscript{32} – and democratization can make newly democratizing states prone to inter-state violence and civil war.\textsuperscript{33} Evidence from India and Pakistan also suggests that patterns of militia–state relations depend heavily on ruling elites’ ideological projects.\textsuperscript{34} Revolutionary beliefs constitute a critical component of robust insurgency\textsuperscript{35} because

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\textsuperscript{28} Przeworski 1991, 100; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010, 421.

\textsuperscript{29} Sanín and Wood 2014.

\textsuperscript{30} For nuanced critiques, see Buhaug et al. 2008; Cederman and Gleditsch 2009.

\textsuperscript{31} Sanín and Wood 2014.

\textsuperscript{32} Wimmer 2013, 23.

\textsuperscript{33} Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Snyder 2000; Wimmer 2013.

\textsuperscript{34} Staniland 2015.

\textsuperscript{35} Kalyvas and Balcells 2010, 420.
\end{flushleft}
cognitive frames and ideologies can arouse “passionate ideological commitments among combatants, both domestically and internationally” and spur armed mobilization. For instance, survey evidence from Colombia shows that recruits who joined for ideological reasons are less likely to defect and more likely to switch sides or demobilize if they perceive their group as deviating from its ideological principles. By boosting combat morale, ideology can be a force multiplier, increasing the combat capacity of the group. Ideology can also be crucial in determining the allegiances of civilians and their role in the production of violence. Civil wars can be more protracted when rebels recruit from and fight on behalf of excluded ethnic groups because in such cases rebels have stronger collective solidarity and higher risk tolerance. Finally, in terrorism research, ideology is identified as one of the key factors in target selection.

We argue that ideology is also an overlooked factor in accounting for different patterns of targeting in civil war. First, the ideologies generated or adopted by armed groups are likely to create threat perceptions that determine decisions about who friends and foes are and, thus, who legitimate targets potentially are in violent conflict. Ideology frames the preferences and beliefs of belligerents, shapes debates about the nature of community, and identifies obstacles to the realization of the belligerents’ vision of the

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36 Hironaka 2005, 123.
37 Costalli and Ruggeri 2015.
38 Oppenheim et al. 2015.
39 Taber, 2002.
40 Staniland 2015; Sanín and Wood 2014.
41 Wucherpfennig et al. 2012.
42 Asal et al. 2008; Drake 1998; Sánchez-Cuenca and De la Calle 2009.
desirable state of affairs.\textsuperscript{43} In civil wars, the targeting by armed groups is likely to reflect salient or latent political cleavages within the community, and the more so, the higher is the extent to which these cleavages have been crystallized in ideologies. While geographic areas can mark ethnic or political constituency territories,\textsuperscript{44} focusing on them may not reveal important differences in who exactly is targeted by armed groups. It is not likely to be any civilian who will be subject to violence within a given area but rather the civilians of a particular social group who are associated in the eyes of the perpetrating belligerent with a particular enemy. Contrary to assumptions of many existing studies, we hold that in civil wars the conceptual clustering of civilians into homogenous groups of “civilian population” or “local population” is misplaced, even within a given geographic or constituency area. If the salient and mobilized cleavages are ethnic or religious, for example, then we should expect these to be reflected in patterns of violence regardless of geography. We surmise that an armed group is more (less) likely to victimize a civilian if the civilian is a member of the group which the armed group identifies as hostile (supportive) to its cause.

Yet, an armed group’s treatment of civilians of a specific group as opponents or of civilians in general as irrelevant actors is not likely to automatically lead to their targeting by the armed group. We differ from the analyses of Balcells, and Fjelde and Hultman\textsuperscript{45} in arguing that belligerents’ ideology affects their targeting patterns also by filtering their strategy set and that some types of violence are excluded from a belligerent’s repertoire of violence not because they would not have strategic benefit or may incur punitive costs but because their use would undermine the group’s

\textsuperscript{43} Sanín and Wood 2014.

\textsuperscript{44} Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Fjelde and Hultman 2014.

\textsuperscript{45} Balcells 2010 and Fjelde and Hultman 2014.
ideological commitments, particularly its identity and values as a certain kind of ideological or moral force. Targeting civilians or engaging in rape may be proscribed by the belligerent because its ideology includes a claim to better represent and govern civilians than its adversaries. More fundamentally, its ideology may constrain the group from civilian violence altogether and justify nonviolent over violent strategies.\textsuperscript{46} However, since ideological commitments are norms, with some prescribing restraint while others sanction non-restraint and excess, different ideologies decrease and others increase the likelihood of civilian victimization.\textsuperscript{47} This applies to victimization both of civilians in general and of civilians of a specific group seen as opponents.

The next logical question is: which ideologies are more and which are less conducive to civilian victimization? While this can ultimately be an empirical question, the prospects of building an \textit{ex ante} taxonomy of ideologies by their likelihood of entailing civilian victimization is complicated. As Drake argues in the case of terrorist organizations, the targeting patterns might differ not only between groups with different ideologies, but also between organizations with apparently similar ones, such as the communist groups in Europe between 1970s and 1990s, because “ideology and strategy have been adapted to local conditions.”\textsuperscript{48} Similarly, conceptualizing them in broad categories, such as “religious ideologies” or “groups with a democratic ideology”,\textsuperscript{49} is likely to be misguided as it is plausible that while one religious ideology prescribes targeting of civilians, another strongly proscribes it. \textit{Therefore, to understand its effect on civilian victimization we may need an understanding of what the}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{46}Sanín and Wood 2014.
  \item \textsuperscript{47}Asal et al. 2015.
  \item \textsuperscript{48}Drake 1998, 70-71.
  \item \textsuperscript{49}Asal et al. 2015.
\end{itemize}
armed group’s ideology is in a particular conflict context, and how it orders the worlds of the belligerents and shapes the normative environment in which violence is enacted. Furthermore, the extent to which ideological differences explain variation in group institutions, perceptions of and responses to strategic incentives, and processes of mobilization is yet under-explored.\textsuperscript{50} Such differences are often treated as exogenous with little effort to assess their possibly ideological origins.\textsuperscript{51} This is an important question, the answering of which can help avoid attributing violence against civilians to epiphenomenal factors. For instance, recruitment and discipline may depend on prior ideological commitment or the ideological projects of belligerents. Groups can choose to organize around common goals, to form ethnically homogenous units, and to set in place disciplinary structures due to their ideological commitments. For example, studies of Islamist violence find that religious sectarianism underpins organizational structures of armed Islamist groups,\textsuperscript{52} as well as providing strategic guidance about how and where it is legitimate to fight jihad.\textsuperscript{53}

**EXPLAINING CIVILIAN VICTIMIZATION: RESEARCH DESIGN**

Given the complex nature and dynamics of civil wars, understanding the patterns of civilian victimization is complicated by the difficulty of obtaining accurate micro-level data on victims, characteristics of the perpetrators, and the locations where the victimization took place. In this article, we use an original dataset that combines micro-level evidence on all killings in Northern Ireland’s civil war and on fifteen

\textsuperscript{50} Blattman and Miguel 2010.

\textsuperscript{51} Sanín and Wood 2014.

\textsuperscript{52} Juergensmeyer 2003.

\textsuperscript{53} Hegghammer 2013.
organizations responsible for them. Examining the patterns of violence against civilians across multiple groups of perpetrators within the same civil war – as opposed to studying the behavior of different groups in different contexts – has an advantage of helping isolate the effects of group-level factors from country- or international-level institutional, political, and social differences that potentially affect civilian victimization patterns. In line with our theoretical reasoning, focusing the analysis on the sub-national level also helps to see the meaning and impact of ideology, if any, in context.

**Northern Ireland’s “Long War”**

Three reasons make the case of Northern Ireland’s ‘Long War” a fertile ground for studying the causes of civilian victimization in civil wars. First, the conflict involved a range of different fighting factions that exhibited different capabilities, sources of funding, organizational structures, etc. Second, there was a significant variation in civilian victimization patterns across armed blocs, specific organizations, time, and location. Finally, the availability of wide-ranging data sources on fatalities of the Northern Ireland conflict from three different sources enables a systematic micro-level analysis of the covariates of civilian targeting.

The targeting patterns of armed groups in Northern Ireland have been subject to considerable debate. The focus has been on the extent to which major Loyalist and

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54 One might wonder whether the Northern Ireland conflict constituted a civil war. See Supplementary Material.

55 McKeown 2009; Sutton 2001; McKittrick et al. 2001.

56 For helpful summaries of the history of the conflict, see Hayes and McAllister 2001 and O’Leary and McGarry 1993.
Republican armed groups were ideological in their use of violence against the Catholic and Protestant communities, respectively. On the one hand, White contends that the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s (PIRA) attacks reveal a pattern of non-sectarian targeting of its key strategic adversary – security forces, while the Loyalist paramilitaries were sectarian in their victim selection.\(^{57}\) Focusing on PIRA violence, O’Leary argues that IRA violence “has been primarily strategic, aimed at its official legitimate targets, rather than sectarian”.\(^{58}\) However, according to Bruce, since the majority of local security force personnel were Protestants, their targeting by PIRA should be seen as sectarian as well.\(^{59}\) O’Duffy finds that instrumental, tactical and strategic choices related to ethno-national goals rather than affective factors governed the targeting patterns by both Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries.\(^{60}\) Drake largely builds on the previous accounts to argue for an explicit role of ideology as a primary factor motivating target selection for terrorist groups in Northern Ireland and beyond.\(^{61}\)

Several problems complicate drawing conclusions from these studies. First, since their methodologies are based mostly on correlations, they do not allow accounting systematically for the role of other group-level factors. Second, the violence of state forces as well as by smaller paramilitary groups is largely absent from systematic incorporation into these studies. Yet, since state forces are belligerents and adopt

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\(^{57}\) White 1997.

\(^{58}\) O’Leary 2005, 239.

\(^{59}\) Bruce 1997.

\(^{60}\) O’Duffy 1995, 743.

\(^{61}\) Drake 1998.
coercive strategies similar to those of non-state actors,\textsuperscript{62} we do not see an \textit{a priori} reason for excluding them from the analysis. Third, there is little systematic disaggregation by organization within each camp, despite their significant differences. Fourth, by framing the issue around the term “sectarianism” many studies seem to suggest the prevalence of ideological factors, but the role of ideology in explaining varying levels of civilian victimization remains under-theorized and under-investigated empirically. Finally, while some studies take precaution to avoid this,\textsuperscript{63} in effect the term “sectarianism” is often applied loosely, to denote perpetration of any violence across ethnic or religious divides whatever the intention. However, such violence may not necessarily be deliberate or selective and may result from a motivation entirely different from aiming to inflict damage onto a member of a rival ethnic group, such as when acts of economic sabotage or other attacks cause collateral damage.

The Data: Fatalities, Organizations, and Constituencies

Our dataset, constructed between 2008 and 2015, has three components. The first component contains data on all 3,702 fatalities in the Northern Ireland conflict between 1969 and 2005 and is created from the merger of three existing sources by McKeown, Sutton, and McKittrick et al.\textsuperscript{64} While the first two are datasets, the latter provides detailed qualitative information on all fatalities, which we used for coding new variables. Since we systematically checked and corrected inconsistencies, our dataset combines the strengths of these separate sources, reduces their weaknesses

\textsuperscript{62} Tilly 2004.

\textsuperscript{63} For example Drake 1998, 68-69.

\textsuperscript{64} McKeown 2009; Sutton 2001; McKittrick et al. 2001.
through streamlining and superior coding, and adds new variables.\textsuperscript{65} Our dataset allows us to go beyond counts of casualties conventionally resorted to in existing studies due to the lack of micro-level data and analyze the covariates of targeting at the individual victim level.

The second component contains details on fifteen organizations responsible for killings during the conflict. This allows us to analyze evidence on two levels: the more specific fighting group level and the broader level by fighting blocs – loyalist, republican, and state forces. The group-level variables, including the organization’s base territories, co-ethnic areas, capabilities, external resources, structure, and ideology, were coded through an extensive study and triangulation of a large array of government, media, and academic sources.

Finally, the third component is made up of variables on eighteen Northern Ireland parliamentary constituencies,\textsuperscript{66} such as their population size, religious breakdown, electoral support for Unionist and Nationalist parties, military presence, and so on, that date back to 1969 and are coded from a variety of census and electoral data. This component allows exploring sub-national variation in civilian victimization, particularly in combination with the characteristics of armed groups.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{65} See Supplementary Material.

\textsuperscript{66} The choice of this sub-national level is dictated by the limitation in McKeown 2009 dataset, which locates the fatalities using these parliamentary constituencies.

\textsuperscript{67} See Supplementary Material.
Our unit of analysis is an armed group. In a departure from much of the existing literature, we include in this definition the state security forces - British Army, Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR).\textsuperscript{68}

Throughout the analysis we distinguish six periods of the conflict defined by key shaping policies or events: from the onset of mass violence in summer 1969 to the end of 1971; from Bloody Sunday in January 1972 until the introduction of the policies of Ulsterization, "normalization" and "criminalization" in late 1975; 1976 to the Republican hunger strikes in 1981; 1982 to the end of 1989 when the British government admitted that the PIRA could not be defeated militarily; 1990 to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA); and post-1998 until the end of 2005 when PIRA and other major groups declared the end of their armed campaigns and confirmed decommissioning of their weapons and the “end of the war.”

\textbf{Patterns of Violence}

Figure 1 shows that there was a significant variation in civilian victimization between different armed blocs and time periods, with Republican paramilitaries responsible for the largest number of casualties overall and Loyalist paramilitaries responsible for the largest number of civilian casualties. State forces were responsible for fewer civilian killings compared with the Loyalist and Republican armed blocs and were more likely than Loyalist paramilitaries to target combatants.

\textsuperscript{68} Formed in 1970, the UDR was merged with the Royal Irish Rangers to form the Royal Irish Regiment (RIR) in 1992.
Equally important is to determine who targeted whom. Figure 2 relates targeting by the three armed blocs to the victimized noncombatants’ religious background. It suggests four key patterns.

First, in each period Loyalist paramilitaries targeted considerably more Catholic civilians. Similarly, Republican paramilitaries were more likely to target Protestant civilians, but proportions by civilians’ ethno-religious background are not as stark. Second, state forces targeted disproportionately more Catholic civilians. Overall, these patterns do not change significantly when we narrow the analysis down to the case of volitional violence, the “incidents where the victim’s death was clearly envisaged and deliberately procured.”

However, the majority of Loyalist paramilitaries’ targets were volitional throughout the conflict, with the same proportions as in the case of violence.

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McKeown 2009, 11.
in general. Roughly the same holds for state forces and less so for Republican paramilitaries.

Figure 2. Civilian Casualties across Armed Blocs over Time, by Victims’ Religion

All Violence

Volitional Violence

Figure 3 shows the spatial distribution in civilian casualties and suggests considerable variation across different areas, armed blocs, and ethno-religious groups. However, as Humphreys and Weinstein note, “it is unsatisfactory to account for variation in the abuse of civilians simply by saying that the CDF acted one way while the RUF acted another. At best, this is description not explanation.”70 The question is: what characteristics of armed groups and their environment made some more disposed than others to victimize civilians?

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70 Humphreys and Weinstein 2007, 434.
Figure 3. Civilian Casualties by Perpetrating Armed Blocs and Locations, by Victims’ Religion

Measuring Civilian Victimization and Ideology

We operationalize civilian victimization as lethal violence against anyone who is not an active belligerent. Clearly, victimization is not confined to killing but can include a
repertoire of violent acts and abusive behavior, from ethnic cleansing and mass repression to search and seizure policies and systematic harassment. We take lethal violence as a form of victimization that is one of the most indicative of the perpetrators’ ideological predispositions and which is also unambiguous.

Our dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether a victim is a civilian. In civil wars and insurgencies it is typical that some individuals straddle the divide between combatant and non-combatant, for example seasonal fighters, or the so-called “weekend warriors.” In addition, often “non-combatant” is understood as being synonymous with “civilian,” yet the two concepts differ. In our main analysis, we adopt a conservative definition and code non-combatant victims as “civilian” if they were not former paramilitaries, alleged informers, ex-security service personnel, and armed group-associated politicians.

To test the hypothesis on the role of ideology in civilian victimization, we code two variables indicating whether an armed group’s ideology embraced Republicanism or Unionism. While specific organizations in each camp combined different ideological precepts, early on these two ideologies emerged as key threads connecting armed groups within camps. Irish Republicanism came to dominate Catholic nationalism. Unionist/Loyalist armed groups amalgamated the two main ideologies within the Protestant community, British Unionism and Ulster Loyalism, but differed in the emphasis they put on each. Given their composition and stance within the conflict, state forces can also be argued to have adhered to Unionism.

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71 ICRC 2015.

72 In robustness checks, we adopt a non-conservative definition.

73 Todd 1987.
We expect that Republicanism and Unionism will be strong predictors of civilian victimization, controlling for other factors, and that they are likely to differ in whether they predisposed armed groups to the victimization of civilians in general and of civilians of Catholic and Protestant background in particular. We conjecture that in practice, from the early phase of the conflict, Republican and Unionist ideologies differed sharply on the emphasis they put on the subaltern status of Irish people across communities, inclusiveness for different communities in Northern Ireland, and non-sectarianism. This predisposed armed groups embracing the former ideology to focus on targeting combatants and be restrained in violence against civilians. We explore the sources of these ideological differences in the later sections.

Control Variables

To account for the hypothesis that fighting groups are less likely to victimize civilians in geographic areas where they have their key bases, we construct a dichotomous measure of *Home* for each armed group.\(^74\) *Co-ethnic Area* indicates whether the constituency had majority population that was co-ethnic with a given armed group and accounts for the geographic dimension of cleavages. Our measure of territorial control – *Dominance* – is constructed in the same way as a measure developed by Humphreys and Weinstein (2007). It indicates the estimated size of each armed group relative to the estimated total size of opposing groups in each constituency.* Size* is a proxy for the capabilities and is based on the estimated average active membership of each group during the course of the conflict and is converted onto a logarithmic scale. A dichotomous measure of *Experience* drawn from existing assessments indicates whether group members on average had military experience.

\(^74\) For all sources and measurement, see Supplementary Material.
While lootable resources that are linked to conflicts elsewhere were absent in the case of the Northern Ireland conflict, during its course some armed groups received sizeable material support from external sponsors. While the nature and size of it is difficult to establish, *External Support* indicates whether there is consistent evidence from across various sources that the group received such support from outside the UK. As in some other civil wars, groups fighting in Northern Ireland raised funds through organized crime. It is plausible that such behavior affected civilian victimization. Our measure of *Crime Rents* for each group is based on reported evidence of links to four forms of organized crime – robberies, racketeering, drug trade, and counterfeiting – by first building dichotomous measures for each and then combining them in a single variable ranging from 0 to 4. Finally, we code two dichotomous measures of internal characteristics of armed groups drawn from existing sources – *Coherent Structure* and *Discipline*.75

**Qualitative Study**

To complement our quantitative analysis and identify causal processes that potentially linked ideologies to the violence against civilians, we undertake a brief historical study of reproduction, development and effects of Republican and Unionist ideologies. Beyond a few solid historical studies of individual ideological traditions, there is paucity of systematic research on this topic, defying solid conclusions about their effects on the dynamics of violence in the conflict. To probe and reconstruct potential links, we draw on existing secondary literature, survey evidence, government documents, and memoirs as well as theoretical literature. Given the exploratory nature

75 In the Northern Ireland conflict, groups were invariably homogenous in their ethnic make-up, so an ethnic homogeneity variable would not add any value.
of our qualitative analysis and the space limitations, we report only the findings and these findings are schematic and tentative, but, we hope, insightful and indicative nevertheless.

**Empirical Analysis**

To test the hypotheses on civilian victimization, we estimate multivariate logistic regression models. First, we evaluate the relationships between each explanatory variable and civilian victimization after controlling for all other variables, except group ideology, as well as for the period and location effects (Table 1, models 1 and 4). This allows exploring the potential role of each factor when ideology is not accounted for, and comparing these patterns to those found in the existing literature. Subsequent models (2-3, 5-6) control for the potential effect of group ideology. We estimate separate models with Republicanism and Unionism because, given their strong correlation, estimating their effects in the same model can bias estimates and result in extremely large odds ratios. Since our variables are somewhat correlated given the relatively small number of armed groups, we are careful not to attribute much to the exact size of odds ratio as they may not be sufficiently reliable. Still, we look at the overall substantive and statistical significance of each effect in comparison to those of other variables. Finally, to examine whether different group ideologies are associated with victimizing civilians of different ethno-religious backgrounds, we estimate separate models with dependent variables that indicate the civilian victims’ belonging to different ethno-religious groups (Table 2).
### Table 1. Multivariate Results with Clustering by Year, All Civilians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of Violence:</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Volitional Civilian</td>
<td>Volitional Civilian</td>
<td>Volitional Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable:</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allegiances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home</td>
<td>0.540 (0.230)</td>
<td>0.529 (0.225)</td>
<td>0.519 (0.222)</td>
<td>0.407 (0.236)</td>
<td>0.390 (0.233)</td>
<td>0.387 (0.232)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleavages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ethnic Area</td>
<td>0.476*** (0.107)</td>
<td>0.458*** (0.105)</td>
<td>0.455*** (0.105)</td>
<td>0.434*** (0.136)</td>
<td>0.413*** (0.131)</td>
<td>0.413*** (0.131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominance</td>
<td>1.027 (0.031)</td>
<td>1.028 (0.031)</td>
<td>1.030 (0.031)</td>
<td>1.057 (0.039)</td>
<td>1.060 (0.040)</td>
<td>1.060 (0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>1.173 (0.207)</td>
<td>0.547*** (0.116)</td>
<td>0.812 (0.139)</td>
<td>1.358 (0.236)</td>
<td>0.585*** (0.115)</td>
<td>0.942 (0.136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>3.270*** (1.469)</td>
<td>0.803 (0.454)</td>
<td>0.849 (0.416)</td>
<td>4.025* (2.992)</td>
<td>0.729 (0.368)</td>
<td>1.167 (0.476)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Support</td>
<td>13.603*** (10.634)</td>
<td>6.396 (7.900)</td>
<td>2.705 (2.819)</td>
<td>9.119** (8.223)</td>
<td>1.484 (1.078)</td>
<td>1.118 (0.733)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Rents</td>
<td>0.463** (0.173)</td>
<td>0.709 (0.437)</td>
<td>0.566 (0.267)</td>
<td>0.603 (0.252)</td>
<td>1.588 (0.590)</td>
<td>0.870 (0.250)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coherent Structure</td>
<td>0.563 (0.252)</td>
<td>0.575 (0.384)</td>
<td>0.587 (0.327)</td>
<td>0.841 (0.428)</td>
<td>1.394 (0.513)</td>
<td>1.015 (0.339)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discipline</td>
<td>0.056*** (0.016)</td>
<td>1.180 (0.874)</td>
<td>0.865 (0.398)</td>
<td>0.030*** (0.002)</td>
<td>1.412 (0.904)</td>
<td>0.638 (0.302)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicanism</td>
<td>0.069*** (0.053)</td>
<td>0.032*** (0.021)</td>
<td>0.069*** (0.053)</td>
<td>0.032*** (0.021)</td>
<td>13.588*** (7.003)</td>
<td>18.709*** (9.278)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.201 (5.367)</td>
<td>927.199*** (2,055.438)</td>
<td>25.599* (48.797)</td>
<td>0.258 (0.467)</td>
<td>57.889*** (80.745)</td>
<td>1.110 (1.243)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>3,340</td>
<td>3,340</td>
<td>3,340</td>
<td>2,951</td>
<td>2,951</td>
<td>2,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Correctly Predicted</td>
<td>71.19</td>
<td>71.17</td>
<td>71.19</td>
<td>77.11</td>
<td>77.14</td>
<td>77.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area under ROC Curve</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All models are estimated using logistic regression. Reported in cells are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses. All models weight observations by the number of killings by each armed group, allow for clustering by year, and control for period and location. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 levels, respectively.

In both sets of specifications in Table 1 and 2, we estimate models for all violence and separately for volitional violence for a more fine-grained analysis. In all models, we weight observations by the number of killings by each armed group. To account for waves of violence, we allow for the possibility of correlation across killings in a given year.\(^{76}\) Our models exhibit good fit: the percent correctly predicted stays mostly well

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\(^{76}\) In the case of Northern Ireland conflict the latter is more applicable as victimization was more likely to be clustered in time than space, possibly due to the relatively small size of the country and the
above 70 and areas under the ROC curve fall either between 0.70-0.80, exhibiting fair fit, or 0.80-0.90, showing good fit.\textsuperscript{77}

Consistent with our expectations, we find a substantively and statistically strong relationship between group ideology and civilian victimization. Republicanism is associated with a smaller likelihood of civilian victimization, compared to the other two armed blocs. Unionism, on the other hand, is associated with larger odds of civilian victimization, controlling for other factors, compared to Republican groups and the state forces. The relationship between group ideology and civilian victimization emerges, along with Co-ethnic Area, as the only consistently strong relationship. These differences are starker when we consider only volitional violence.

When we disaggregate civilians by religious background (Table 2), we find evidence of proneness to cross-ethnic targeting on both sides. Having a Republican ideology significantly increases the odds of victimizing a Protestant civilian, and reduces the group’s odds of victimizing a Catholic civilian. Conversely, if a victimized civilian was a Catholic, the odds that the perpetrator armed group had a Unionist ideology increase significantly. At the same time, Unionist groups were not more or less likely to victimize Protestant civilians. These differences are more pronounced when we consider only volitional violence. Overall, the comparison of the size of odds ratios for Unionism and Republicanism – for example, 2.839 in Model 2 and 12.745 in Model 3 – suggests that Unionist groups were more disposed to cross-ethnic civilian targeting.

\textsuperscript{77} Zhou et al. 2009.
### Table 2. Multivariate Results with Clustering by Year, Civilians by Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model:</th>
<th>Type of Violence:</th>
<th>Dependent Variable:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Catholic Civilian</td>
<td>Catholic Civilian</td>
<td>Protestant Civilian</td>
<td>Catholic Civilian</td>
<td>Protestant Civilian</td>
<td>Catholic Civilian</td>
<td>Protestant Civilian</td>
<td>Catholic Civilian</td>
<td>Protestant Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allegiances</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>0.869</td>
<td>0.803</td>
<td>0.853</td>
<td>0.868</td>
<td>0.491</td>
<td>1.002</td>
<td>0.485</td>
<td>1.005</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.366)</td>
<td>(0.453)</td>
<td>(0.362)</td>
<td>(0.457)</td>
<td>(0.307)</td>
<td>(0.704)</td>
<td>(0.306)</td>
<td>(0.705)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cleavages</td>
<td>Co-ethnic Area</td>
<td>0.621*</td>
<td>1.693</td>
<td>0.620*</td>
<td>1.680</td>
<td>0.658</td>
<td>1.524</td>
<td>0.659</td>
<td>1.518</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
<td>(0.678)</td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
<td>(0.672)</td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
<td>(0.634)</td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
<td>(0.631)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Dominance</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>1.030</td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td>1.029</td>
<td>1.021</td>
<td>1.029</td>
<td>1.021</td>
<td>1.028</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>Size</td>
<td>0.784</td>
<td>0.731*</td>
<td>1.206</td>
<td>0.600***</td>
<td>0.736*</td>
<td>0.808</td>
<td>1.718</td>
<td>0.681**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>0.907</td>
<td>1.455</td>
<td>0.884</td>
<td>1.714</td>
<td>0.871</td>
<td>2.396**</td>
<td>0.810</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>External Support</td>
<td>6.84**</td>
<td>0.891</td>
<td>2.917</td>
<td>1.092</td>
<td>5.213**</td>
<td>0.484</td>
<td>3.446</td>
<td>0.543</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(5.624)</td>
<td>(0.772)</td>
<td>(2.173)</td>
<td>(1.068)</td>
<td>(4.180)</td>
<td>(0.423)</td>
<td>(3.035)</td>
<td>(0.507)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.582</td>
<td>1.024</td>
<td>0.457***</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>0.748</td>
<td>1.356</td>
<td>0.430**</td>
<td>1.599</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Coherent Structure</td>
<td>0.489*</td>
<td>1.046</td>
<td>0.508**</td>
<td>1.018</td>
<td>0.565</td>
<td>1.738</td>
<td>0.429**</td>
<td>1.854</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.94)</td>
<td>(0.445)</td>
<td>(0.166)</td>
<td>(0.494)</td>
<td>(0.227)</td>
<td>(0.716)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td>(0.788)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.556</td>
<td>1.657</td>
<td>0.352***</td>
<td>2.494**</td>
<td>0.589</td>
<td>1.380</td>
<td>0.287**</td>
<td>1.630</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discipline</td>
<td>0.258</td>
<td>0.699</td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.951)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.463)</td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td>(0.626)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Republicanism</td>
<td>0.64**</td>
<td>2.839**</td>
<td>12.745***</td>
<td>0.476</td>
<td>0.033***</td>
<td>3.000**</td>
<td>0.418*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(1.393)</td>
<td>(5.079)</td>
<td>(0.221)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(4.457)</td>
<td>(0.191)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24.694**</td>
<td>1.107</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>5.286</td>
<td>7.964*</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.166*</td>
<td>0.596</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(36.479)</td>
<td>(1.403)</td>
<td>(0.569)</td>
<td>(7.121)</td>
<td>(9.032)</td>
<td>(0.254)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
<td>(0.984)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>% Correctly</td>
<td>3.225</td>
<td>3.204</td>
<td>3.225</td>
<td>3.204</td>
<td>2.892</td>
<td>2.871</td>
<td>2.871</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>87.08</td>
<td>81.09</td>
<td>87.08</td>
<td>81.09</td>
<td>90.70</td>
<td>83.60</td>
<td>90.70</td>
<td>83.60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predicted Area under ROC</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All models are estimated using logistic regression. Reported in cells are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses. All models weight observations by the number of killings by each armed group, allow for clustering by year, and control for period and location. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 levels, respectively.

The results also help cast light on the role of other factors, all of which, except Co-Ethnic Area, find little or mixed empirical support. When ideology is not accounted for, we find that Experience, External Support, Discipline, and Crime Rents are associated with victimizing a civilian, albeit not always in hypothesized ways. These effects find little support once we include ideology as a factor. However, we find consistently strong empirical support for the hypothesis that fighting groups were less
likely to victimize civilians in geographic areas where they had more co-ethnics among the members of the local community. When civilians are disaggregated by their ethno-religious background, the effect of Co-ethnic Area is no longer statistically significant. There is also some indication that larger groups were less likely to kill civilians. We do not find any support in our data for the role of other factors.

**Robustness Checks**

One of the key concerns may be that our results on the importance of ideology depend on the measurement of the dependent variable. Specifically, while RUC and UDR members were combatants, it is possible that their targeting by Republican paramilitaries had to do not (only) with their status as security force members, but, given the predominantly Protestant composition of these forces (around 93 per cent in the case of the RUC), with the ethnic identity of most of them.\(^78\) We address this concern by re-estimating our core model with dependent variables *Civilian*\(^2\) and *Protestant Civilian*\(^2\), which regard victims who were serving in RUC and UDR as civilians.

The main results survive this test well (Table 3). In the case of general civilian victimization (columns 1-2), the odds ratios somewhat increase for *Republicanism* and decrease for *Unionism*, but otherwise the results are essentially unchanged. In the case of Protestant civilian victimization (columns 3-4), two changes take place. First, while odds ratio for *Republicanism* increases significantly, it stays below *Unionism* in the case of victimizing Catholic civilians (i.e., 5.577 in Table 3, column 3 vs. 12.745 in Table 2, column 3). Second, the odds ratio for *Unionism* is significantly below 1 and is

\(^{78}\) Bruce 1997.
statistically significant, suggesting that Unionist groups were significantly less likely to target RUC and UDR.

Since the state forces consisted of predominantly Protestant personnel and were significantly less violent as the conflict developed, coding only the paramilitaries as carriers of ideology can create an upward bias, making Unionism seem more associated with civilian victimization. To rectify this, we replicate the main results with Unionism2 which includes the state forces as carriers of Unionist ideology (column 5). The results change in the opposite direction than hypothesized – the odds of victimizing civilians when the group is Unionist actually increase.

Next we examine whether the effect of ideology on patterns of targeting changed after the introduction of Ulsterization, "normalization" and "criminalization" policies in 1975 (columns 6-7). Indeed, the results change, but partially, and the direction of effects stays the same.

The results also remain largely unchanged when we re-estimate the baseline model after controlling for the degree of parity between Catholic and Protestant populations (columns 1-2); focus only on Northern Ireland regions (the “murder triangle”) where Kalyvas has claimed that a large number of killings were motivated by personal animosities (columns 3-4); conceptualize the dependent variable in broader Noncombatant terms that includes former paramilitaries, alleged informers, politicians and ex-security service persons as well as civilians (columns 5-6); focus on civilians killed in attacks where sectarian motives could be reasonably established.

---

79 See Supplementary Material, Table 2.

80 Ballcels 2010; 2011.

81 Kalyvas 2006.

82 McKeown 2009.
(columns 7-8); adopt alternative periodization based on exact dates (columns 9-10); substitute Home with a variable Home2 constructed to reflect electoral support to Unionist and Nationalist parties in the 1970 Westminster elections (columns 11-12); and substitute Home with a variable Home3, where none of the constituencies in Northern Ireland are coded as a home for BA, RUC, and UDR (columns 13-14).

Table 3. Robustness Checks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of Violence:</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable:</td>
<td>Civilian2</td>
<td>Civilian2</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>Civilian2</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allegiances</td>
<td></td>
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<td>0.328***</td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td>(0.874)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>(0.082)</td>
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<td>(132.795)</td>
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<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.76</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All models are estimated using logistic regression. Reported in cells are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses. All models weight observations by the number of killings by each armed group, allow for clustering by year, and control for period and location. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 levels, respectively.
UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF IDEOLOGY

Irish Republicanism and Unionism ostensibly have many commonalities, with a spectrum of subsets of radical, moderate, secular and religious elements within each. Both emerged in the early modern period of European history, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, during struggles over the nature of the state and government characterized by the shift from monarchical to more limited or republican forms of government. Both also make fundamental claims that the principles of religious and civil liberties for all are sacrosanct. The fundamental ideological claims mirror the other and appear inclusive. However, if they are similar, how can we account for their different associations with the violence against civilians? We trace these differences to the interplay between three factors informed by the ideological commitments in practice – path dependency in norms, recruitment patterns, and alliance with the state.

Path-Dependent Norms

While emerging in the same context, the positions of Republicanism and Unionism in the context of struggle between indigenous and settler-colonist peoples entailed a number of differences. Rooted in the civic ideology of the French Revolution, and founded by mainly Protestant elite members, Republicanism also subsumed the elements of nineteenth century nationalism. It emphasized the subaltern status of all Irish people, thus stressing inclusiveness of different communities in Ireland and with its anti-colonialist strand focused its energies against imperial control. These tenets entailed disinclination towards violence against members of the community that would make the imagined community of free Ireland. From their crystallization under the Fenian Movement and the Irish Republican Brotherhood in the mid-nineteenth
century, these norms can be tracked during the Irish War of Independence.\textsuperscript{83} Regarding themselves heirs to the previous Republican activists, pursuing similar goals, and recruiting from a similar pool of recruits, Republican armed groups during 1970s were likely to be constrained by a path-dependent institutional culture of focusing on combatants who represented the imperial power and by an ethos of non-sectarianism.\textsuperscript{84} Republican paramilitary leaders also had to take into account the views of their key constituency, which was averse to the use of violence for political ends at the start of the conflict. In a 1968 survey, only 13 percent of Catholic respondents agreed with a statement that it “would be right to take any measures necessary in order to end partition and bring Ulster into the Republic.”\textsuperscript{85}

With roots in the Orange Order, Loyalism and Unionism emerged as anti-Catholic colonist ideologies in seventeenth century Ireland.\textsuperscript{86} They crystallized defensive attitudes that characterized settler identity among Protestant communities in the northern plantations of Ireland. Subsequently, they became founding principles for the partition of Ireland in 1921 and the creation of a new province of Northern Ireland within the UK.\textsuperscript{87} Having inherited these beliefs, Loyalist paramilitary ideological discourse from 1960s on emphasized that “Ulster Loyalists live in a state of eternal siege” and that Northern Ireland Protestants regard Catholics as an ideological foe - “uncommitted citizens, intent on the destruction of Northern Ireland.”\textsuperscript{88} In the same

\textsuperscript{83} See Regan 2013.
\textsuperscript{84} Hughes 2013.
\textsuperscript{85} Rose 1968.
\textsuperscript{86} Brewer and Higgins 1998.
\textsuperscript{87} Brewer and Higgins 1998, 87; Lustick 1993.
\textsuperscript{88} New Ulster Political Research Group 1987.
1968 survey, 89 51 percent of Protestant respondents agreed with the statement that it “would be right to take any measures necessary in order to keep Northern Ireland a Protestant country.” Against this background, it is likely that the Loyalist paramilitaries felt less restrained than Republicans in their targeting strategy.

Recruitment Patterns

The cornerstone of the Unionist ideology – defending the Union with Britain – allowed its supporters to join not only the paramilitaries but also the local state forces. This possibly resulted in qualitatively different groups of recruits. Bruce argues that Loyalist paramilitaries recruited from a less competent pool than Republicans because capable Protestants joined the local RUC and UDR forces. 90 However, it may not have been - or may not have been only - the question of competence: our statistical analysis shows that the experience of members does not explain armed groups’ targeting patterns once ideology is accounted for. Building on Bruce’s reasoning as well as our evidence, it seems more likely that Loyalist paramilitary groups attracted recruits who were more radical and sectarian in their ideological stances.

The specific type of recruitment and socialization many Republican recruits ended up undergoing also probably had a profound impact on their targeting patterns. Given its treatment of the Republican movement as an insurgency, the British state applied internment without trial selectively: during the use of internment from August 1971 until December 1975, out of 1,981 people detained 1,874 were Catholic/Republican. 91 In its publications in the early 1970s, PIRA concentrated its ideological socialization effort

89 Rose 1968.

90 Bruce 1997.

91 CAIN 2015a.
on two major elements: non-sectarianism and appealing to the key role of Irish Protestants in the United Irishmen (the foundational movement of Irish Republicanism), and armed struggle against British colonialism. The principles of inclusiveness were deliberated upon, developed and passed through the Republican networks created by internment. Thus, ironically, the policy of internment facilitated the process of socialization and ideological indoctrination for PIRA and other Republicans, the specific mode of which enabled the latter to contain civilian victimization. In contrast, moderating Loyalist leaders, such as the iconic leaders of UVF and UDA Gusty Spence and John McMichael, did not have the opportunity provided by the internment policy to reorient their groups in a more restrained and less sectarian ideological direction.

State Collusion

When ideological projects of the state and a paramilitary group overlap, collusion between them is a likely outcome. The affinity of Unionism with the ideological project and political stance of the British state - favoring the Union and viewing Republicans as the adversary – implied a natural alliance. By now, there is a rich body of evidence that testifies to a deep collusion that emerged between Loyalist paramilitary groups and the state security forces from early 1970s. The Nelson Case (1992) and others revealed that leading Loyalist paramilitaries were working undercover as state agents. According to official UK government enquiries, key security institutions in the state, in particular RUC Special Branch and the section of British Military Intelligence known as the Force Research Unit or Field Reconnaissance

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92 Hughes 2013.
93 Staniland 2015.
Unit (FRU) systematically colluded with the main Loyalist armed group (UDA), providing it with secret intelligence information about Republican activists, using the state undercover agents to manage targeting, and had a “culture” of illegality.\(^94\) A UK Security Service report of 1985 assessed that 85% of the UDA’s ‘intelligence’ originated from sources within the security forces.\(^95\) RUC and UDR members were active within Loyalist paramilitary units that conducted sectarian killings from early 1970s.\(^96\)

It may be puzzling that despite having necessary information and opportunity to be more selective, and having guidance from competent employees of state security institutions, Loyalist paramilitaries were not restrained in their violence against civilians. However, the support from the state forces as well as the initial superiority of Unionism’s political position in Northern Ireland may have fostered a lack of restraint among Loyalist paramilitary elites and recruits and failed to incentivize the refashioning of their ideology in a non-sectarian direction. Their development of politically astute non-sectarian strategies was weak, instead making their groups more porous for infiltration by ultra-radicals.

Given the systematic nature of this collusion and the fact that states often contract out violence against civilians to militias,\(^97\) could civilian victimization by Loyalist armed groups also be a result of strategic outsourcing of violence by elements within the state to pro-government militias to achieve ideological and political ends? Modern military theories of insurgency and counterinsurgency see the local populations as pivotal elements in a strategic game between belligerents, and their allegiance or compliance


\(^95\) de Silva 2012.

\(^96\) See Cadwallader 2013, particularly on the “Glennane gang.”

\(^97\) Raleigh 2012.
are seen by some as usually determined by force. The “outsourcing” of civilian victimization to Loyalist groups could be seen as the state’s attempt to raise the costs of Catholics’ support for insurgency and to achieve allegiance or compliance. There remains a paucity of systematic evidence, and these are ultimately questions for future research.

Alternative Explanation: Political and strategic choices, not ideology

It might be objected that civilian victimization in the Northern Ireland conflict reflected the strategic choices of warring factions, not their ideologies. The thesis holds that civilian victimization aims to either raise the costs to civilians of supporting an armed group or to pressure the enemy into concessions by victimizing its population base. Bruce and Fay argue that Loyalist targeting of Catholics fits this “strategic logic” of counterinsurgency - pressuring Republicans by victimizing Catholic civilians. Stanton sees restraint, too, in instrumental rather than ideological terms: governments or insurgents avoid targeting civilians to win domestic or international support by demonstrating respect for international humanitarian law. Despite its omission – domestic or international support can be secured by governments and paramilitaries from sources that do not care for international humanitarian law – it can be argued that the armed groups were more or less restrained mainly for instrumental reasons. The evidence we have does not support this view. First, with the amount of information available to Loyalists through state collusion, it would have been more

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98 Kilcullen 2010; Lyall 2009.

99 Bruce 2009; Fay 1999.

100 Stanton 2009.

101 Salehyan et al. 2014.
logical to target Republican paramilitaries directly. Second, Republican paramilitaries targeted mostly combatants despite the facts that these were high risk, costly activities – at the minimum, the combatant targets can be armed (even when off-duty) and trained and, therefore, easily reciprocate by violence. If they were operating within the strategic calculus outlined above, then Republican paramilitaries should have targeted mostly civilians, as they were much easier targets and that could have been a tangible strategic way of pressuring Unionists and the British government. Republicans were denounced by the British state and Unionists as terrorists in any event, and they received support from different international sources, so theoretically they had little to lose in the propaganda war, except in so far as such tactics would be self-undermining from their own ideological position.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

In this article, we have theorized and empirically examined the role of group ideology in explaining patterns of civilian victimization across belligerents. Employing an original micro-level dataset that allows sub-national and armed group-level statistical analysis, we found that the ideologies of armed groups in Northern Ireland's civil war consistently predicted their targeting patterns, in line with some previous qualitative accounts on armed blocs or specific paramilitary organizations.\(^{102}\) These results survive a battery of robustness checks. We offer preliminary evidence that suggests that the path dependencies in norms, the recruitment patterns, and the relations with the state forces can explain why group ideology was associated with targeting patterns.

Furthermore, our results lend empirical support to our conjecture that, in some cases, other organizational characteristics – such as capability, external support, and

\(^{102}\) O'Duffy 1995; O'Leary 2005; White 1997.
discipline – may be endogenous to the warring factions’ ideologies. While we do not claim that this travels across all cases of civil wars, we do take it as an important signal that ideology should be treated much more seriously than it has been in mainstream civil war literature in political science and economics. Ignoring group ideology or downplaying its role risks creating a dangerously incomplete or skewed account. Naturally, our findings may have limitations. First, based on our logic that killings are probably the most critical indicators of victimization as well as following Downes and Balcells, we operationalized civilian victimization in terms of fatalities. Our model may not explain – or at least not as well – situations where the repertoire of victimization includes a wider array of violent acts, although, all else being equal, we do not see why ideology should not matter in such instances. Second, like Humphreys and Weinstein, we examined our hypotheses based on evidence from one civil war, which may have had features that made ideology a prominent factor in civilian victimization, such as the fact that the conflict we study took place in a developed industrialized democracy and exhibited typical characteristics of ethnic civil wars. These features of the Northern Ireland conflict possibly may limit the realm within which our story on the role of ideology holds. Finally, our location variables are measured on constituency rather than a lower level, such as wards. Unfortunately, such fine-grained systematic data that stretch back to the beginning of the Northern Ireland conflict is very difficult to assemble, especially given several sub-national boundary changes that took place during the conflict.

103 Downes 2006 and Balcells 2010.

104 Humphreys and Weinstein 2006.

105 The efforts of Loyle et al. 2014 to assemble such data hold promise for future studies.
Nevertheless, the gist of this article's findings implies significant re-conceptualization is required in the efforts to understand and resolve civil wars and we suggest important avenues for future research. First, we suggest that prevention of civilian victimization requires a closer look at ideological frameworks of warring factions in a civil war. The impact of ideology on civilian victimization can be part of a broader, global pattern. If ideologies can spread through diffusion, their effect on violence against civilians may also travel across borders. This is all the more critical because the globalization of technology and information flows can enhance the diffusion of ideologies, regardless of their normative stances, as demonstrated by the Islamic State's astute propaganda machine. While the principles displayed by Kurdish forces in Syria can serve as a blueprint for some armed groups in other conflicts, Isil's al-Qaeda-inspired approach, including the principles it has displayed in Deir Al Zor and elsewhere, can undoubtedly further inspire and be emulated by others. Second, the repertoire of violence used may be a strong factor in the post-conflict political legitimacy of belligerents. Sinn Féin has had electoral success, whereas Loyalist paramilitary efforts to engage in democratic politics have been very modest. This suggests that belligerents' ideologies and the practice of civilian victimization can undermine the legitimacy required to make the transition to party politics after conflict ends.
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Supplementary Material

Ideology and Civilian Victimization in Civil War

Contents

Northern Ireland Conflict as a Case of Civil War ................................................................. 48
Merging Datasets on Fatalities ............................................................................................... 49
Variables and Sources .......................................................................................................... 51
Table 1. Summary Statistics ............................................................................................... 58
Table 2 Additional Robustness Checks ............................................................................... 59
References .......................................................................................................................... 61
Northern Ireland Conflict as a Case of Civil War

One might wonder whether the Northern Ireland conflict constituted a civil war. If we were to use the earlier Correlates of War (COW) Project\textsuperscript{106} threshold of 1,000 conflict-related deaths per year, it certainly wasn’t: the total fatality count for the whole conflict reached 3,702, but its most violent year, 1972, saw 502 fatalities, according to our estimates. However, a number of studies have demonstrated the disadvantages of using this threshold in coding different types of conflict.\textsuperscript{107} Later versions of the COW project no longer use it, instead requiring wars to have resulted in at least 1,000 deaths. Several studies have included Northern Ireland as a case of civil war despite varying criteria. Some see it as an ambiguous case.\textsuperscript{108} It falls within the joint Uppsala Conflict Data Program and International Peace Research Institute (UCDP/PRIO) program criteria for civil wars.\textsuperscript{109} Kalyvas does not use a casualty threshold at all and conceptualizes a civil war as “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities.”\textsuperscript{110} Taking these accounts together, we maintain that what Northern Ireland experienced in 1969-2005 was in fact a civil war.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{106} Singer and Small 1994.
\item \textsuperscript{107} Sambanis 2004; Gleditsch et al. 2002.
\item \textsuperscript{108} Sambanis 2004.
\item \textsuperscript{109} Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2001: 629-644; see also Gleditsch et al. 2002: 618-619.
\item \textsuperscript{110} Kalyvas 2006: 5.
\end{itemize}
MERGING DATASETS ON FATALITIES

For the analysis in this paper, three sources of data were merged - McKeown (2009), Sutton (2001), and McKittrick et al. (2001). The first two are publicly available online. The first one is an well-structured existing dataset in Excel format. It was used for coding most variables. The second reports fatalities in chronological order online with short textual information about each. Its unique strength is that it provides the exact date of death. The third source is an extensive book containing detailed descriptive information on most fatalities, and is arguably the most reliable of the three. We drew on existing variables in the first, and used the second and third sources for three purposes: complement the first in terms of observations, help with inconsistencies across the sources, and code new variables, such as employment status and occupation, which are not contained in McKeown (2009) and Sutton (2001).

While their many observations overlap, some observations are unique to each source. During the course of merger, we also discovered a number of inconsistencies across the three sources. These concern mostly names, gender, dates (years), victim’s status, specific organization responsible, motivation, etc. When one of the sources reported a data point that contradicted those in the other two sources, we relied on the latter for (re)coding a value. If all three differed, we preferred McKittrick et al. 2001. In some cases (around a hundred), other online sources, particularly newspaper articles, were consulted for clarification.

Some problems were more consequential than others. For example, McKeown (2009) reports Robert Bates (Protestant male, killed in 1997 by non-specified loyalist group) as a non-combatant. However, this is disputable because, despite the fact that he was killed shortly after leaving prison, Robert Bates was one of the notorious members of
the infamous “Shankill Butchers” gang, responsible for a number of abductions of innocent Catholic civilians, their subsequent brutal torture and killing. Another case is for instance the coding of gender: around 10 percent of victims coded as female (n=372) in McKeown (2009) were in fact males.

One of the key drawbacks in McKeown dataset that was also solved using McKittrick et al. data is a large number of fatalities with insufficiently specified responsible group. In the case of non-specified republican killings, there are 109 such observations; for non-specified loyalist killings, 364. Using McKittrick et al. (2001), Sutton (2001) and other sources, we were able to bring these numbers down to 35 and 33, respectively.

McKittrick et al. (2001) was also used to code two new employment-related variables for victims - employment (n=3710, with 1210 unknown values) and occupation (n=3710, with 1387 unknown values).
VARIABLES AND SOURCES

After the merger of the three sources on fatalities, we coded details on fifteen organizations responsible for killings during the conflict (the second component of our dataset) and on eighteen Northern Ireland parliamentary constituencies (the third component). The second component contains group-level variables, including the organization’s base territories, capabilities, external resources, structure, and ideology. The third component includes constituency-level population size, religious breakdown, electoral support for Unionist and Nationalist parties, and military presence that date back to 1969 and are coded from a variety of census and electoral data. The values for variables were derived and triangulated from a variety of sources. As the number and borders of sub-national constituencies in Northern Ireland have changed over time, we took great care in converting evidence by utilizing information and maps of wards, local government districts, and parliamentary constituencies. To account for the hypothesis that fighting groups are less likely to victimize civilians in geographic areas where they have their key bases, we construct a dichotomous measure of Home for each armed group. For Loyalist and Republican paramilitary groups it takes the value of 1 if the killing was carried out in a constituency from which they originated and where they had their strongholds. The same does not apply for state forces, however, because for the latter having more bases in a particular area is likely to indicate the opposite: in Northern Ireland, they were likely to be more present in areas where they lacked support (Republican areas), and less present in areas where they had more support. To construct this measure for state forces, we draw their deployment data – location and number of barracks, stations, and camps. For the British Army, Home takes the value of 0 except for Great Britain and for Northern Ireland constituencies of East Antrim and Strangford where there were no BA or
UDR/RIR barracks, which we take to indicate as no need for BA/RIR presence and hence higher support for them (both were predominantly Protestant constituencies in 1971 – 77.6% and 88.3%, respectively). We code this variable as 0 in the case of UDR if the location has at least one BA or UDR/RIR barrack, and 1 if otherwise. We code 1 for RUC if there were less than five RUC (police) stations in a constituency,\textsuperscript{iii} which we take to indicate smaller need and higher support for RUC.

To account for the geographic dimension of cleavages, we construct a dichotomous measure of Co-ethnic Area for each armed group in each constituency. It takes the value of 1 if the constituency’s population was at least 60 percent of the ethno-religious identity of the fighting group in 1971 and 0 if otherwise. Given the predominantly Protestant composition of state forces, for them we code Co-ethnic Area as 1 if the constituency is 60+ percent Protestant and 0 if otherwise.

To account for territorial control, we construct a measure of Dominance that is similar to the one developed by Humphreys and Weinstein (2007). It indicates the estimated size of each armed group relative to the estimated total size of opposing groups in each constituency. We first estimated the average size of each armed group in each of the 18 constituencies. For the paramilitary groups, we divided each group’s total average size by the number of its base territories and then placed the resulting quotient in each constituency where the paramilitary group had a base. For the state forces – BA, UDR/RIR and RUC – we estimated their average sizes in each of the 18 locations by dividing their total average size by the total number of barracks and multiplying the number of barracks in each of the 18 locations by the resulting average barrack size

\textsuperscript{iii} One standard deviation below the mean 8. The maximum is 20 and minimum 0. The number of RUC stations and population size in a constituency are not correlated, so a per capita measure of RUC stations does not add value.
(e.g., 57 in the case of RUC). Next, we summed up the estimated size of each armed
camp in each constituency. Finally, we divided the estimated size of each armed group
in each constituency by the estimated summed sizes of opposing camps and converted
the results onto a logarithmic scale to avoid skew. For locations outside Northern
Ireland, all dominance measures were set to zero except for the British Army in Great
Britain.

To proxy for the capabilities, Size is based on the estimated average active membership
of each group during the course of the conflict and is converted onto a logarithmic
scale. The second aspect of armed groups’ capability concerns their recruits’ level of
military experience, which can affect targeting patterns. In the absence of systematic
data on this, we draw a dichotomous measure of Experience from existing assessments
to indicate whether group members on average had military experience.

While lootable resources that are linked to conflicts elsewhere were absent in the case
of the Northern Ireland conflict, during its course some armed groups received
sizeable material support from external sponsors. The Provisional IRA reportedly
received assistance from the Republic of Ireland, Libya, Iran, Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), and diaspora groups in the United States. The Official IRA
allegedly secured help from USSR, North Korea, and East Germany. Loyalist groups,
such as UDA and UVF, also obtained material resources from outside, most notably
from Canada and South Africa as well as from Scotland and allegedly through
colluding with, infiltrating and being infiltrated by state forces.112 The nature and size
of such support is difficult to establish consistently. External Support for each armed
group indicates whether there is evidence from across various sources that the group
has received such support. Since all groups received support from outside Northern

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Ireland in one way or another and, therefore, estimating a model with a dichotomous variable on this that lacks variation will not be useful, here we focus on external support from outside the UK.

As in some other civil wars, groups fighting in Northern Ireland raised funds through another form of securing external resources – organized crime. It is plausible that such behavior affected civilian victimization. Our measure of Crime Rents for each group is based on reported evidence of links to four forms of organized crime – robberies, racketeering, drug trade, and counterfeiting – by first building dichotomous measures for each and then combining them in a single variable ranging from 0 to 4.

We code two dichotomous measures of internal characteristics of armed groups – Coherent Structure and Discipline. There was significant variation among different groups in this regard. While some groups like the Republican INLA or Loyalist RHC had loose organizational structures and weak discipline, others, such as the Provisional IRA became tightly organized a few years into the conflict, and by 1975, into a highly effective cellular structure and had strong intra-organizational policing (Operation Banner 2006).

The list of sources is below.


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REFERENCES


