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Negotiations of the »New World«

The Omnipresence of »Global« as a Political Phenomenon

[transcript] Global Studies
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Introduction: ‘It’s Difficult’

What is important to study cannot be measured and that which can be measured is not important to study.

PHILIP CONVERSE (1964: 206)

For this book Philip Converse’s words can be modified: sometimes, what is important, or at least valuable and fruitful to study has not (yet) been identified as worth studying – for instance, the striking omnipresence of the adjective *global* in contemporary discourses.

Something curious has been going on over the past two decades: the adjective *global* has invaded and populated public, political and academic discourses. There is hardly anything, which has not been labelled ‘global’ in one context or another. Late Pope John Paul II was lauded as “the first truly global Pope” (Sells 2014). *The New York Times* (URL) promotes its “new Global Edition” as providing “readers with a 24/7 flow of geopolitical, business, sports and fashion coverage from a distinctly global perspective”. In a randomly chosen edition of the UK’s *The Guardian*, the one from 21 December 2005, the reader learns about the “global ‘war on drugs’”, about the “global collapse” of “global civilisation”, about Renault’s “global motorsport programme”, about a consultancy called “Global Insight” and an NGO called “Global Witness”, about the need to teach “Britain’s global history”, the “global positioning system developed by the US Department of Defense”, the “damaged global confidence” in the Tokyo Stock Exchange, “football’s global village”, and, in three different articles, about “global warming”.

These days, more and more institutional names, official events and conferences run under a label that contains the adjective *global*, such as “The Global Fund”, the “UN Global Compact” and the “Global Alliance for Information and Communication Technologies”. In the academy, more precisely in the social and political sciences, ‘governance’ has become ‘global governance’, ‘civil society’ has become ‘global civil society’, and, of course, ‘the market’ is time and again referred to as the ‘global market’.

In political discourses, US President Barack Obama (2008b) stresses that the world is entering “a new era of global cooperation”, the World Bank
makes clear that “a global crisis needs a global response” (World Bank URL), US President George W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi adjure their two countries’ “bilateral global cooperation” (Bush-Koizumi 2001), UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2009a) has the vision of “a world of shared global rules founded on shared global values”, his predecessor, Tony Blair (2007), sees the ‘war on terror’, including the US-led military intervention in Iraq in 2003, as a “battle for global values”, and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2004) speaks of the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean as a “global catastrophe” that requires a “global response”. More generally, the world is in the midst of a ‘global war on terror’ and a ‘global financial crisis’, faces ‘global warming’ and ‘global poverty’, people are concerned about ‘global health’ and, as for instance the United Nations (URL) suggest, about the ‘global South’ …

… the ‘global South’?

When, how and why did ‘the South’ become ‘global’? And what does this mean? What is a ‘bilateral global cooperation’? Why was the 2004 tsunami for Kofi Annan a ‘global catastrophe’ that required a ‘global response’ whereas the earthquake that struck South Asia in October 2005 and affected some four million people was not ‘global’ and did not ‘ask for a global response’, though it left Annan (2005) “deeply saddened”? And how did UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2008a) manage to use the adjective global 47 times in a single speech?

Actually at home in the political studies and International Relations (IR) discourse, I was intrigued by the seeming omnipresence of the adjective global and its colourful and somewhat paradoxical gestalt. Simultaneously, I was surprised by the fact that the adjective and its striking popularity have attracted but little attention from scholars and commentators. The academic literature is not short of engagements with the notion of ‘the global’. Yet, there is rarely any engagement with the word global. The adjective global is widely used but less widely debated or scrutinised.

“Let us assume that we are reasonably clear about what is meant by ‘global’ and by ‘religion’. But what about ‘civil society’?”, writes Peter Berger (2005: 11) in his study of religion and ‘global civil society’ and, with that, provides an apt example of how lightly the adjective global is usually taken.

Looking across the many uses of global in public, political and academic discourses, the adjective appeared to me to be a “difficult” word, to borrow the language that Raymond Williams (1976) uses in his study of ‘culture’. It triggered my interest. I wanted to explore what this popularity, this (quasi) omnipresence of the adjective global is about. Is it the manifestation of the fact that we are living in a ‘global age’, as Martin Albrow (1996: 80-81)
suggests, and/or the indicator of a ‘global consciousness’? Does this mean that US President George W. Bush had a relatively more pronounced ‘global consciousness’ in 2006 than in the rest of his term – given that he uses the adjective in 2006 more frequently in his public communication than in any other year? And, if so, what does this actually mean? What does the linguistic sign *global* refer to?

**My Argument**

In this book I develop the argument that the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* is more than a linguistic curiosity. I argue it is a political phenomenon and, as such, a valuable, albeit ‘unconventional’, object of study for scholars outside the linguistics discourse. I argue that the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* constitutes the discursive reproduction of a web of meanings that is best labelled ‘new world’. As such, the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* constitutes a distinct dimension of the enduring contestation over the construction of the world. Given the word’s current popularity and unscrutinised existence, as well as the loaded nature of the web of meanings ‘new world’ that it brings out, I argue, this dimension is not just a minor matter but plays an important, hence, research-worthy role in the contemporary symbolic struggle over the world.

My conceptualisation of the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* as the re-production of a web of meanings ‘new world’ is grounded in two central insights that arise from my empirical engagement with the adjective *global*. The first of these two insights is the empirically grounded understanding that the contemporary adjective *global* is closely enmeshed with the talk about (different ideas associated with the word) *globalisation*; I call this talk ‘globalisation’-discourse. As I demonstrate, the contemporary adjective *global* has come to be used in the sense of ‘outcome of globalisation’. This makes the adjective a ‘new word’. What is ‘new’ about the contemporary *global*, I argue, is that it implies ideas that are associated with the word *globalisation*. I develop my argument that the contemporary adjective *global* is best be taken as a ‘new word’ by building on relevant discussions among lexicographers about when a word is appropriately called ‘new’, as well as by drawing on a theory of language and meaning, according to which language and meaning are not natural and referential but conventional and ‘productive’.

The second central insight that arises from my empirical engagement with the contemporary *global* and that underlies my conceptualisation of the omnipresence of *global* as the re-production of a web of meanings ‘new world’ refers to the word *globalisation*. It is the insight that all utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*, can be seen as constituting a discursive re-production of an object that is best labelled ‘new world’. In other
words, my conceptualisation of the omnipresence of global builds on my understanding that what all uses of the word globalisation have in common—despite and in addition to the myriad of meanings that are associated with this word in whichever context it is used—is that they imply the ‘proclamation’ of a ‘new world that came’.

This insight makes what I call ‘globalisation’-discourse different from existing conceptualisations under this label, such as the one by Hay and Smith (2005). Normally, the ‘globalisation’-discourse is conceptualised based on a scholarly preconception of what the word globalisation refers to, such as market integration or the spread of neoliberalism. In contrast, my suggestion that we understand the uses of the word globalisation as a discursive re-production of a web of meanings that is best called ‘new world’ is grounded in an approach that takes the polysemy of the word globalisation seriously. In addition, it builds on an elaboration of the question how and when the concept/s ‘globalisation’ and the neologism globalisation came to be “in the true” (Foucault 1981: 61), i.e. became socially accepted and ‘normal’ tools to grasp the world.

As I discuss in this book, developments, which have come to be addressed with the word globalisation, existed before this neologism became popular at the end of the 1980s and in the course of the 1990s. Given that meaning is not inherent in social reality but conventional, the question arises, why a new word was perceived to be needed and accepted at the end of the 1980s and 1990s, i.e. at that particular moment in time. My answer to this question is that this was because the end of the Cold War was perceived to have brought out a ‘new world’, for which existing conceptual tools were perceived to be inadequate. This ‘new world’ was perceived as having produced a conceptual vacuum. This is apparent in assessments, such as that of IR theorist James N. Rosenau (1990: 5), who argued after the end of the Cold War that observers were left “without any paradigms or theories that adequately explain the course of events”. I argue, it was this perceived vacuum that opened the discursive door and let the concept/s ‘globalisation’ and the neologism globalisation step in to fill it. Consequently, the use of the word globalisation can be conceptualised as re-producing and filling the conceptual space ‘new world’ with meaning.

It is the synthesis of these two insights that allows me to conceptualise the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global as a distinct phenomenon, namely, as a discursive re-production of a web of meanings called ‘new world’. This phenomenon, I argue in this book, is relevant and interesting in two respects.

First, it is a relevant and interesting phenomenon by virtue of its wide spread but ‘untroubled’ existence. I put forward that the influential but unscrutinised existence of global itself justifies paying critical attention to the word. Second, the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global is a relevant and interesting phenomenon because the proclamation of the ‘new world’, which is implied in the web of meanings that it re-produces, indi-
cates an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the process of modernisation. I develop this point by comparing the (modern) proclamation of the ‘new world’ to come with the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came, as well as grounded in a discussion of sociologist Ulrich Beck’s theory (e.g. Beck 2006), according to which contemporary social reality is shaped by two aspects and their interplay.

On the one side, it is shaped by the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the process of modernisation, which is constituted by the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies, the existence of ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’. The reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation brings out a social reality, in which not only modern institutions but also modern principles are challenged, outmoded and, in fact, rendered obsolete through the process of modernisation itself. Modern institutions and principles are radicalised as a side effect of modernisation, its institutions and principles, and the actions shaped by them, where this side effect, however, is not the ‘dark side’ of modernisation but the manifestation of the very success of modernisation.

On the other side, contemporary social reality is shaped by the prevalence of what Beck (2006) calls “the national perspective” and “methodological nationalism”. This second aspect is a political perspective and a scholarly take on the world that looks through and is grounded in “categories […] that take the nation-state as the norm” (ibid. 73). The ‘national perspective’ obscures the view at (the reality of) the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, especially the internal cosmopolitisation of national societies. As I demonstrate in this book, grounded in such an understanding of social reality as being ‘reflexive modern’, the omnipresence of the adjective global is intriguing because its study is a study of historical actualisations of the ‘national perspective’, i.e. of a central aspect of the contemporary reflexive modern world.

But I do not just argue that the omnipresence of global is a relevant and interesting phenomenon. I argue that it is also a political phenomenon, i.e. of interest to scholars, who explore the political world. It is a political phenomenon in that it constitutes a distinct dimension of the symbolic construction of social reality. In general, the omnipresent use of the adjective global is a way of making the social world meaningful. I make this argument by building on a theory of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality, according to which the latter is the product of the former. But there is also something particular about the omnipresent use of global. I argue that it makes meaningful an important temporal category and conceptual space, namely the ‘present’. With that, the omnipresence of global, this discursive re-production of the web of meanings ‘new world’, is a special and noteworthy part of the perpetual contest over understandings of the world. Given that this contest does not just mirror a world that exists outside of itself but brings out (the) social reality (it is talking about), the omnipresent use of the word global constitutes a distinct political phenomenon. Inevitably, the re-produced web of meanings ‘new world’ makes some things pos-
sible and rules out others – this applies to socially binding decisions, i.e. ‘political’ decisions in a narrow sense, and beyond. Consequently, the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* constitutes an object of study for those who are interested in the contemporary political world – albeit, as I explain, it constitutes an ‘unconventional’ object of study at the ‘unconventional’ margins of the political studies and IR scholarship.

**The Nature of my Project**

The aim of this book is to develop the argument outlined above and to conceptualise the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* as a political phenomenon. This is not a straightforward academic exercise. Like the adjective *global*, this exercise, too, is ‘difficult’. However, the challenge it poses does not have anything to do with the argument as such; there is nothing particularly ‘difficult’ about my argument. Rather, the difficulty has something to do with how my argument emerged, i.e. with the nature of the knowledge production process that brought it out.

Normally, a research project in the political studies and IR discourse involves looking at an object of study that already ‘exists’ in a distinct literature and debate. The aim is to contribute to and push forward the respective debate by engaging with the particular object of study in a value-adding way, e.g. by approaching it from an alternative perspective or guided by innovative, theoretically-grounded research questions, or through a method that promises novel insights. As Nobel laureate Albert Szent-Györgyi suggests, “[d]iscovery consists of looking at the same thing as everyone else and thinking something different” (quoted in Li, Wang, Li and Zhao 2007: 214). In the context of such an endeavour, the ‘thing’, i.e. the object of study, is automatically legitimised because it comes out of and is located in a clearly identifiable disciplinary field. It is relatively easy to make the case for its study because the parameters of research are pre-set and the audience, which the research addresses, is pre-defined.

In the case of my interest in the adjective *global*, no such a clearly set, discursively confined research environment existed. My engagement with the adjective *global* is not shaped by linguistic interests and parameters, simply because I am not a linguist. Nor is it about the study of an already ‘discovered’ political studies ‘problem’ from an ‘alternative’ perspective. It does not follow the rationale that is implied in Szent-Györgyi’s understanding of ‘discovery’ as something that flows from an original engagement with something that ‘everyone else’ looks at. The kind of ‘discovery’ in my project is different from such an endeavour because I was not ‘thinking something different’ while ‘looking at the same thing as everyone else’. I came to see something in something that has not really been looked at so far; I came to see a political phenomenon in the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* that is worth investigating as a way to generate
insights into the political world. In other words, I came to see a (new) object of study in the omnipresence of the adjective global.

This does not make my findings more or less original in comparison to other findings, nor does it make my findings more or less a ‘discovery’. Yet, it makes my project different in terms of how the research process unfolded. I did not set out by putting an anchor in a particular scholarly debate as a pre-defined point of reference for my ‘discovery’. My ‘discovery’ of the omnipresence of the adjective global as a political phenomenon evolved gradually, in many respects inductively, and in an interweaved way. In short, I did not start with the aim of dismantling the omnipresence of the adjective global as a political phenomenon. This was because I did not know that this is what it is; that is, I did not start with a research question, such as ‘what kind of a phenomenon is the omnipresence of the adjective global?’

In fact, initially, my focus was not on the linguistic sign global and its omnipresence in and of itself to begin with. Of course, it was not about the word global because a focus on a distinct linguistic sign, such as the adjective global, adds value to and advances the linguistics scholarship; for the scholarship that is dedicated to the study of politics, however, its value is less naturally apparent, if it exists at all. If one is at home in the political studies and IR discourse, the focus on a word is not intuitive and natural (see also Selchow 2016). This does not mean that the study of language is alien to scholars in the field. As we will see in the course of this book, in various ways scholars in political studies and IR take language seriously. Yet, in the study of politics, the analysis of language is normally a means to a distinct disciplinary end that is not about language as such. It is normally a means to gain insight into something ‘behind’ language. For instance, Gunther Hellmann, Christian Weber, Frank Sauer and Sonja Schirmbeck (2007) study the development of German foreign policy between 1986 and 2002 through the analysis of how the use of the ‘key concepts’, which they see manifest in the words Germany, Europe, power, responsibility, self-confidence and pride, has changed over time within elite texts. They make the argument that their language-focused analytical approach, which they call ‘vocabulary analysis’, is a fruitful way of generating novel insights into the issue of German foreign policy and, with that, adds value to existing approaches in this established field of study. Despite the explicit focus on language, their object of study is German foreign policy. The analysis of a handful of chosen words is a methodological means to this end. It is not the linguistic signs and their appearances, which are the centre of interest, but German foreign policy as an established object of study.

At the beginning of my project and reflecting the disciplinary conventions of the political studies and IR scholarship, I had an approach in mind similar to Hellmann et al.’s. Triggered by the increasing number of works in political studies and IR that speak of and set out to analyse ‘global politics’, in the sense of politics in a world of fundamental changes concerning the idea of the international system and traditional statist steering media, I was
interested in analysing collectively-held perceptions of ‘the global’ to see if they play a role in processes of policy formation, and, if so, what kind of role they play. I felt that, although many accounts of ‘globalisation’ in political studies and IR stress that there is an important ideational side to the contemporary ‘global transformations’ (e.g. Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2001; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 2003; Robertson 1990), this ideational side has so far only attracted sporadic systematic attention by scholars in the field. Consequently, I became interested in grasping the extent to which contemporary political imaginations are penetrated by ideas of ‘the global’. It was in this context, inspired by studies, such as the above mentioned one by Hellmann, Weber, Sauer and Schirmbeck (2007), that the omnipresence of the adjective *global* in contemporary discourses moved to the centre of my interest. Initially, I thought of it as the linguistic manifestation of notions of ‘the global’, similar to how the above mentioned Altbrow (1996) seems to understand the adjective. I thought to study the use of the word *global* in order to gain insights into existing notions of ‘the global’. However, what appeared to be a relatively straightforward or ‘conventional’ research endeavour turned into a tautological trap around questions such as, what am I actually looking for when I am setting out to study perceptions of ‘the global’? How do I know ‘the global’ when I see it without just finding what I set out to look for? And, in turn, what am I actually analysing when I am focusing on the adjective *global*? Is it really valid to take the word *global* as a linguistic materialisation of notions of ‘the global’?

Increasingly, I found myself caught-up in tautological dilemmas and felt that, by starting with the presumption that the study of the adjective *global* gives me insights into notions of ‘the global’, I was only finding what I set out to look for. Of course, nothing ever exists *ex nihilo*. As Rob Pope (2005: xv) puts it, “[t]here is always something ‘before the beginning’”, which inevitably guides what one is looking for, hence, somewhat predetermines what one is finding. Yet, inspired by those scholars in political studies and IR, who argue that the task of political research needs to be to generate “unexpected insights” (Torfing 2005: 26), to intervene into “conventional understandings or established practices” (Campbell 2007: 219) and to ‘make strange’ (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989) normalised knowledge, I gradually became less interested in the re-production of established theories through empirical explorations and more interested in a more experimental inductive approach to the ‘global’ political world and to the popularity of the adjective *global*.

Consequently, in the course of my exploration of the notion of ‘the global’ and the adjective *global*, I gradually moved away from my initial research path and started to explore the various questions and subsequent insights that came up while I was pursuing the path of tracking and thinking about the adjective *global*. I sailed into various different directions, within and beyond the disciplinary boundaries of the field of political studies and IR. I brought together different theoretical readings on language, meaning,
the concept ‘discourse’, reflexive modernisation, and social constructivism with empirical insights that I generated by looking at the use of the contemporary adjective *global* in various contexts. It was in the process of these tentacle-like explorations into various different cross-disciplinary directions and debates, allowing for a high degree of ‘spreading loss’, that the ‘unexpected’ insight arose that the omnipresence of the adjective *global* constitutes a political phenomenon because it is the discursive re-production of a web of meanings that is best called ‘new world’.

In this sense, my main argument crystallised on an initially relatively ‘empty’ field and through an exercise that resembles the putting together of a mosaic. It is this mosaic and its individual pieces that I am presenting in this book.

**OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS**

My conceptualisation of the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* as a political phenomenon unfolds in five main steps. In the first step, in Chapters 2 and 3, I problematise the word *global*. Again using Williams’ (1976: 21) words, I add an “extra edge of consciousness” to the contemporary adjective *global* in order to make it ‘strange’ and lift the ‘veil of invisibility’, under which it is covered. I do this by highlighting three noteworthy aspects that constitute the contemporary *global*.

In Chapter 2, I focus on two of these three aspects. I first highlight that the contemporary *global* is extraordinary popular & ‘free’, in the sense of semantically open, and, second, stress that it has what I call a ‘disputedly undisputed’ existence. I show that, taken together, these two aspects of the contemporary *global* form a seeming paradox between a colourful use of the word and a widening of its meanings, on the one side, and a striking easiness, with which it is taken as if it was obvious, on the other side. Both sides of this paradox account for the discomfort that the word regularly triggers in public and scholarly discourses, where its popularity and diverse uses are perceived – and sometimes dismissed – as a meaningless fad or as a symbolic confirmation and reproduction of hegemonic (‘Northern’) discourses. At the same time, however, as I show, these concerns have not led to a heightened sensibility or a commitment to a more reflective use of the adjective. Nor have they led to an increased curiosity about or systematic approaches to the adjective *global*. The contemporary *global* seems to be everywhere and, yet, it is ‘invisible’. It is causing irritation but does not generate systematic and dedicated critical reflection.

An important part of Chapter 2 is a reflection on the nature of language and meaning as something that is conventional and ‘productive’, rather than natural and referential. I refer to Ferdinand de Saussure’s (2000[1916]) language theory and poststructuralist revisions of it (e.g. Derrida 1976; Eagleton 1983; Hall 1997). Furthermore, by presenting findings from an empirical
analysis of the adjective *global* in the post-9/11 rhetoric of US President George W. Bush, I give a sense in Chapter 2 that a systematic and critical look at the word *global* holds the potential of revealing interesting insights into the ‘world making’-practice, which is the use of language.

In Chapter 3, I focus on the third aspect that constitutes the contemporary adjective *global*. This is its enmeshment with the ‘globalisation’-discourse. The term ‘globalisation’-discourse plays an important role in my book and I have a distinct understanding of it that differs from the way in which it is usually used in the political studies and IR scholarship. I dedicate Chapter 4 to the development of my conception of the ‘globalisation’-discourse. In Chapter 3, I use the term without further meta-reflection. For the time being, I use it to refer to the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*. Building on this, I show in Chapter 3 that the adjective *global* is enmeshed with the ‘globalisation’-discourse in two different ways. First, the adjective is used to establish and justify conceptions of the signified that is associated with the word *globalisation*. I argue that since the concept ‘globalisation’ has come to play an influential role, the adjective *global*, too, plays an important part in the production of knowledge about the contemporary world. At the same time, I suggest that the distinct relationship between *global* and the concept ‘globalisation’ means that the word *global* largely disappears in the shadow of the debate about ‘globalisation’. Second, I show that the contemporary adjective *global* actually gains one of its meanings from the ‘globalisation’-discourse, that is, from the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*. This insight is grounded in my analysis of the contemporary use of the adjective *global* in public, political and academic discourses. This analysis shows that, in addition to all the many other meanings that are associated with the adjective, the contemporary *global* is used to signify ‘outcome of globalisation’. Drawing on this second point, I conclude my engagement with the contemporary adjective *global* in the first two chapters of this book by conceptualising *global* as a ‘new word’. What is ‘new’ about it is its close relationship with the ‘globalisation’-discourse, that is, with the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*. To make this point, I refer to lexicographers’ understanding of when a word is appropriately taken as ‘new’.

In Chapter 4, I move away from the adjective *global* and focus on what I mean by the ‘globalisation’-discourse. I extend and substantiate my conception of the ‘globalisation’-discourse as the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*. My main argument in Chapter 4 is that this web of meanings is best called ‘new world’. In other words, I argue in Chapter 4 that – in addition to all kinds of other meanings – the uses of the word *globalisation* bring out an object called ‘new world’. This argument is grounded in my critical engagement with the scholarship on ‘globalisation’ and is an answer to the question why
the concept/s ‘globalisation’ and the neologism *globalisation* became popular at the end of the 1980s and in the course of the 1990s. In order to develop my argument, I start Chapter 4 with a discussion of the concept ‘discourse’, in which I refer to Michel Foucault’s work (e.g. Foucault 1972, 1981). I present ‘discourse’ as an analytic tool that captures the “symbolic meaning systems or orders of knowledge” (Keller 2013: 2), which bring out the world. I stress that discourses “systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault 1972: 49). This relates back to my theoretical excursus on language and meaning in Chapter 2.

In the main part of Chapter 4, I then draw a picture of the ‘life’ of the web of meanings that is re-produced through applications of the word *globalisation*, i.e. I draw a picture of what I call the ‘globalisation’-discourse. I do this by recasting Nick Bisley’s overview of the development of the concept ‘globalisation’ (Bisley 2007). I identify and discuss five facets that characterise the ‘globalisation’-discourse. One of these facets is that the idea ‘new world’ plays an important and, I argue, constitutive role in the life of this discourse. Grounded in my critical exploration of the diverse scholarship that deals with (authors’ various ideas of) ‘globalisation’, I demonstrate that it was the notion that the breakdown of the bipolar bloc system at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s brought about a ‘new world’, which gave birth to the ‘globalisation’-discourse; it gave birth to the accepted use of the neologism *globalisation* and, consequently, to the web of meanings that this use re-produces. I argue that it was the conceptual vacuum, which the breakdown of the Berlin Wall (was perceived to have) brought about, that allowed the neologism *globalisation* to enter the language and enabled idea/s called ‘globalisation’ to come to be “in the true” (Foucault 1981: 61). This insight is the ground on which I label the web of meanings that is re-produced through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*, ‘new world’. In other words, I conclude Chapter 4 with the argument that the use of the word *globalisation*, no matter in which context and in which sense it is used, constitutes a moment in the re-production of a web of meanings that brings out an object called ‘new world’.

In Chapter 5, I focus on the issue of the ‘new world’ and carve out what is distinct and interesting about the fact that the ‘globalisation’-discourse brings out the object ‘new world’. I do this by reflecting on what it means if a ‘new world’ is (implicitly or explicitly) ‘proclaimed’. In order to grasp the characteristics of the proclamation of the ‘new world’, I contrast it with another kind of proclamation of the ‘new world’. This other kind of proclamation of the ‘new world’ is a familiar component of modern politics. It is the proclamation of a ‘new world’ *to come* as a result of progressive, active, confident, and targeted action. It is a kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ that is grounded in the modern fondness (for the striving) for the ‘new’, which is widely taken as a foundational aspect of societal progress and development. It is a familiar feature of political discourses, in which “a new way forward” (Reagan 1985), a “new thinking” (Brown 2008) and “new approaches to
government” (Cameron and Clegg 2010: 7) are promised. In contrast with this (modern) proclamation of the ‘new’ to come, I carve out the characteristics of the kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ that is manifest in the reaction to the post-1989 reality and call it a proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came. I show that the latter implies a passive speaking position of an observer, who is confronted with a ‘new’ reality and whose task it is to grasp this reality, rather than to actively shape it(s future development). I conclude this conceptualisation by framing the proclamation of the ‘newness’ of the world as an aspect of political actors’ struggle to legitimise past and future decisions and actions.

In a second analytical move in Chapter 5, I argue that, while the proclamation of the ‘new world’ to come is a manifestation of the modern, optimistic fondness for innovation, progress and development, the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came is a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. I substantiate this point with reference to sociologist Ulrich Beck’s work (Beck 1994, 2004, 2006). This substantiation forms the core of Chapter 5, in which I lay out my conception of the ‘reflexive modern’ social reality with its two constitutive aspects: the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the process of modernisation, which is constituted by the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies, the existence of ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’, and the prevalence of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’, which is a political perspective on the world that is shaped by and re-produces a world grounded in modern and national categories. I conclude Chapter 5 by pointing out the analytical frame that arises from my Beck-inspired conception of social reality. Notably, through this frame the various conceptions of the ‘newness’ of the world, which are manifest in the re-production of the ‘globalisation’-discourse, are to be seen as ways, in which the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, that is, the ‘internal cosmopolitisation of national societies’, the existence of ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’, are dealt with and negotiated. As such, I argue, their study facilitates insights into the actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ in distinct historical moments.

In Chapter 6, I return to the adjective global and present my main argument. Chapter 6 is divided into three parts. First, I bring together and synthesise the insights that I generated in previous chapters. This allows me to conceptualise the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global as the re-production of a web of meanings that is best labelled ‘new world’. Second, I elaborate on the two aspects that make the phenomenon of the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global relevant and interesting; these are its widespread but ‘untroubled’ existence, as well as, the fact that the proclamation of the ‘new world’, which is implied in the object that the use of the adjective global re-produces, indicates an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the process of modernisation. Building on this, I go a step further. Rather than ‘just’ relevant and interesting, I argue, the omnipresence
of the contemporary adjective *global* is also a *political* phenomenon; I frame the re-production of the web of meanings through utterances, which contain the adjective *global*, as something, the study of which enables insights into the political world. I argue that the omnipresence of *global* is a political phenomenon because it constitutes a dimension of the symbolic construction of social reality, in general, and, in particular, because it makes meaningful an important conceptual space and temporal category, namely the ‘present’. In this sense, I frame the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* as a distinct part of the perpetual contest over the understanding of the world, which does not simply mirror a world that exists ‘outside’ of language but constitutes, in the sense of constructs this world. Constructions of the world make some things possible and imaginable and others impossible – this applies to socially binding decisions, i.e. ‘political’ decisions in a narrow sense, and beyond.

Here, my argument is grounded in a distinct theory of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality, which builds on the post-structuralist premises that I sketch in Chapter 2, and on the concept ‘discourse’ that I introduce in Chapter 4. In Chapter 6, I elaborate on this theory by comparing it with what appear to be similar but are, in fact, significantly different understandings of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality, namely speech act-inspired approaches and social constructivist premises in IR. I choose a comparative approach in this context because it allows me to embed and situate my project in the broader political studies and IR discourse. My theoretical elaborations in Chapter 6 include a reflection on the ‘unconventional’ ideas of ‘politics’ and ‘power’ that are implied in the underlying conception of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality, where politics is seen as “contests over the alternative understandings [of the world] (often implicit) immanent in the representational practices that implicate the actions and objects one recognizes and the various spaces […] within which persons and things take on their identities” (Shapiro 1989: 12) and ‘power’ is a discursive product. I conclude Chapter 6 by introducing the study of the omnipresence of the adjective *global* as an unconventional, experimental and ‘provisional’ scholarly endeavour that demands a certain degree of creativity.

The conceptualisation of the omnipresence of *global* is at the heart of my book; it is its main purpose. Nevertheless, in Chapter 7, I take an initial step into an empirical exploration of the omnipresence of the adjective *global*, understood as the re-production of a web of meanings called ‘new world’. In an exemplary study, I generate insights into the web of meanings ‘new world’ that is re-produced in US President Barack Obama’s 2013 public communication. I find a complex picture of a ‘modern hyper-cosmopolitised’ ‘new world’ that is constituted of ‘pragmatic’ national units in an environment shaped by a market, that appears like a second nature and
brings out a distinct ‘national’. Overall, I discover that the ‘new world’ in Obama’s 2013 Papers leaves little room for radical re-imaginations of the world beyond the modern, while, simultaneously and forcefully, fueling the process of a distinct cosmopolitisation of ‘the national’. I conclude Chapter 7 by positioning my findings as the initial empirical ground for three kinds of future research directions into the study of the omnipresence of the adjective global. One of them is about the rewriting and ‘radicalisation’ of my findings themselves, in an effort to advance the search for and establishment of a language that enables us to capture the reality of the ‘reflexive modern’ world, rather than to re-produce the modern national idea of it.

In the Conclusion of this book, I position my project in the broader context of ‘unconventional’ studies in the social sciences, in general, and the political studies and IR scholarship, in particular.
2 The Contemporary Adjective *Global* I: Popular & Free and Disputedly Undisputed


**GEORGE W. BUSH’S SPOKESWOMAN** *(BUSH 2001)*

The simplest words for the lexicographer are the not very common [words] with just one clear meaning, like *jabber*, *jackal*, *jackass*, *jackdaw* and *jacuzzi*.

**COLLINS COBUILD ENGLISH LANGUAGE DICTIONARY** *(1987: XVIII)*

The adjective *global* has become *de rigueur* in discourses worldwide. Yet, despite its quasi omnipresence, *global* attracts little critical attention. It has somewhat remained off the radar of concern. President Bush’s spokeswoman’s above quoted insight “global means global” is often as far as reflections on the word go.

The aim of Chapter 2 and the subsequent Chapter 3 is to set the ground for taking the contemporary adjective *global* seriously. This is a warranted move, given that the adjective *global* is more often than not treated as if it was clear and ‘innocent’. Using Raymond Williams’ (1976: 21) words, the aim of Chapters 2 and 3 is to add an “extra edge of consciousness” to the word *global*. My aim is to make the contemporary *global* ‘strange’, to put the spotlight on it and to lift the ‘veil of invisibility’, under which it exists.

In this present chapter, I do this by highlighting two of three noteworthy aspects that constitute the contemporary *global*. The first aspect is that the adjective *global* is extraordinary popular and ‘free’, with which I mean that it is semantically open. The second aspect is that it has – somewhat paradoxically – a ‘disputedly undisputed’ existence. I present these two aspects grounded in an empirical exploration of how the adjective *global* is used these days in public, political and academic contexts. I use quotes from various sources to illustrate and support my points. In the course of my discus-
I engage with a theory of language and meaning, according to which language and meaning are not natural and referential but conventional and ‘productive’. This theory will be taken up again in later parts of this book.

In the subsequent Chapter 3, I focus on the third aspect that constitutes the contemporary adjective *global*. This is its enmeshment with what I understand as the ‘globalisation’-discourse. Given the relevance and the complexity of this third aspect, I dedicate a whole chapter to developing it.

**Popular & Free**

There is no question, the adjective *global* is popular these days. As of 1 January 2015, US President Obama had used the word at least once in 18.5% of his Public Papers.\(^1\) By comparison, none of the first 31 US Presidents (George Washington to Herbert Hoover) applied the adjective *global* even once in publicly recorded contexts. Franklin D. Roosevelt was the first to use the word publicly on 7 September 1942,\(^2\) and eventually applied it at least once in 2.6% of his Public Papers. While neither the Universal Declaration of Human Rights nor the United Nations Charter contain the word *global*, contemporary UN-related documents are unimaginable without this adjective. Alone in the *Human Development Report 2014* (URL) it is applied 513 times over 239 pages; and in the *World Development Report 2014* (URL), one of the flagship publications of the World Bank Group, we find *global* 278 times in the main body of the text that comprises 286 pages.\(^3\) Former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2008a) uses the adjective 47 times in a single speech, and the annual number of articles in *The New York Times*, in which the adjective *global* is used at least once, increased between 1980 and 2015 more than fifteenfold (from 476 in 1980 to 7,375 in 2015).

These examples are not isolated cases but mirror a broader trend in the British and American English language. Both the COBUILD American and

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1 Here and in the following when I refer to US Presidential Public Papers I use the collection of documents that is provided by *The American Presidency Project* (URL). The ‘Public Papers’ of the US Presidents include all public messages, statements, speeches, and news conference remarks, as well as documents such as proclamations, executive orders, and similar documents that are published in the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations, as required by law (see *The American Presidency Project* [URL]).

2 “The Nation must have more money to run the war. People must stop spending for luxuries. Our country needs a far greater share of our incomes. For this is a *global* war, and it will cost this Nation nearly $100,000,000,000 in 1943” (Roosevelt 1942; emphasis added).

3 These numbers exclude the use of *global* in the table of content, the bibliographic references, within names such as ‘World Bank Global Findex’, and in the appendix.
the COBUILD British English corpora show the steady rise in the (written) use of the adjective *global* over the past 100 years (Figure 1). And in their 2010 *A Frequency Dictionary of Contemporary American English* Mark Davies and Dee Gardner (2010: 74) list *global* as number 1,223 in the list of the 5,000 most frequently used words in American English with a raw frequency of 31,793 and a relatively good dispersion score of 0.89. In comparison, the adjective does not feature in prominent predecessors of Davies and Gardner’s dictionary, such as Edward L. Thorndike’s 1921 *Teacher’s Word Book* (Thorndike 1921), which lists 10,000 English words and their frequency, its revised and extended version, *The Teacher’s Word Book of 30,000 Words* from 1944 (Thorndike and Lorge 1944), or in Michael West’s 1953 *A general service list of English words* (West 1953).

*Figure 1: Written use of the adjective global in the COBUILD British English corpus (left) and COBUILD American English corpus (URL) (right)*

But the adjective *global* is not just popular these days, it also seems to be perceived as expressing the *zeitgeist*. Global is chic, it is ‘in’, it is the adjective to use. As Duncan Bell (2013: 254) puts it, the contemporary adjective *global* has “an almost shamanic aura” surrounding it. The contemporary naming strategy of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) illustrates this point. The database of the Union of International Associations (URL) reveals that the number of new NGOs with *global* in their name has increased dramatically over the past 15 years. Even more intriguing is that there are existing organisations that have *global*ised their names: for instance, the *Evangelical Missionary Alliance* founded in 1958 changed its name to *Global Connections* in 2000 (URL); the *Australian Baptist Foreign Mission* of 1913 became *Australian Baptist Missionary Society* in 1959 and *Global Inter-Action* (URL) in 2002; *Global Impact* (URL) was founded as *International Service Agencies* in 1956; *Citizens for Global Solutions* started off in 1975 as *Campaign for UN Reform*; and the *International Association on the Political Use of Psychiatry*, which was founded in 1980, was renamed *Global Initiative on Psychiatry* (URL) in 1991 (see also Selchow 2008: 229).

4 In Chapter 3, I will reflect on the peak that we can see in the American English corpus in the 1940s.
Still looking at the zeitgeist-nature of the adjective global, consider also the curious case of the Social Sciences Citation Index database of Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science (URL). The Web of Science, which is a popular source in scientific research, covers content from over 12,000 journals, which reach back to 1900. When one searches for articles that contain global in their titles, the database provides a large number of entries. Of these, 48 fall into the period of 1900-1915. So, what kind of academic articles where published between 1900-1915 with the word global in their titles? The database displays article entries such as “The global Problem” by Isaac Loos, published in American Journal of Sociology in 1915, “Canada. National Economy Principles and Global Economic Relations” from the American Economic Review, published in 1914, and “Geography of Global Commerce and Global Traffic” from a 1914 edition of the Bulletin of the American Geographical Society of New York. The issue becomes curious if one looks at the original (digitised) texts behind the 1900-1915 list of articles that, according to the Web of Science database, have the word global in their titles. It is readily apparent that none of these texts actually contain the word global, either in their titles or in their text bodies. It turns out that the respective articles are English language reviews of books entitled Le problème mondial (Torres 1913), Kanada: Volkswirtschaftliche Grundlagen und weltwirtschaftliche Beziehungen (Fleck 1911), and Geographie des Welthandels und Weltverkehrs (Friedrich 1911). Each of these book titles (in their original language) is used as the title for the respective review article. Given that none of these book titles contains the word global, none of the titles of the review articles actually contains this adjective. Yet, the word appears in the database entry for each article. These database entries are English translations of the titles of the articles. What becomes obvious, then, is that it was the Web of Science database editor’s decision to translate the French word mondial and the German word Welt into the English word global, and to use this adjective in the name of the database entries for the three review articles. Hence, for instance, the database entry for the article with the title “Kanada: Volkswirtschaftliche Grundlagen und weltwirtschaftliche Beziehungen” is “Canada. National Economy Principles and Global Economic Relations”. If the aim of the wording of the database entry is to best capture what the authors of the reviewed books referred to in their use of the words mondial and Welt, one would expect the English word world to be used for the database entries (i.e. ‘Geography of World Commerce and World Traffic’, instead of ‘global commerce’ and ‘global traffic’). In the case of the German titles this is not least because, in contrast to the word global, Welt is not an adjective that modifies a noun – it is a noun itself. In the case of Friedrich’s book, the word Welt (world) is used to form a new word in combination with the word Handel (trade): Welthandel. One can assume that the Web of Science database editor, who creates the names of the database entries by translating the non-English titles of the respective articles, is familiar with the foreign languages they translate. Hence, the use of
the adjective *global* must have been a conscious choice and not one made out of ignorance. It seems to have been a conscious decision to translate the respective book titles for the database entry not only from French and German into English but into a language that the translator seems to have perceived as being adequate, maybe in the sense of ‘contemporary’, i.e. a language in which the word *world* is naturally replaced by *global*. *Global* seems to be the word to use these days.

The above examples illustrate two points. The adjective *global* is more popular these days than ever and it seems to be perceived as capturing the *zeitgeist*.

Furthermore, the contemporary *global* is also used in increasingly diverse contexts. There is hardly anything these days that is not saddled with the word *global* in one context or another. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, late Pope John Paul II is lauded as the “first truly global Pope” (Sells 2014) – in fact, so is one of his successors, Pope Francis I (Franco 2013). For Sam Sifton (2004) the menu of a New York restaurant is “post-global”. University College London (URL) calls itself “London’s Global University”, an Arts Council England-funded project called *Global Local* is all about the “hottest Global music”, and Campbell’s Foodservices (URL) provides a “global soup collection”. For Patrick Diamond, Anthony Giddens and Roger Liddle (2006) “Europe” is (worth being called) *global*, Ulrich Beck, Nathan Sznайдer and Rainer Winter (2003) have discovered “global America”, and Scott Lash, Michael Keith, Jakob Arnoldi and Tyler Rooker (2010) look at “global China”. Lucy Williams (2010) studies “global marriage”, Dennis Altman (2002) has discovered “global sex”, Jean-Francois Bayart (2007) investigates “global subjects”, Saskia Sassen (1991) the “global city”, and Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russel Hochschild (2003) the “global woman”. For many, the recent crisis in the financial sector is most accurately labelled *global*; and the adjective is frequently used to modify the nouns *warming, economy, change, system, market, climate, issue, network, trade, community, positioning, environment*, and is applied in combination with the words *economic, environmental, local, regional, international, financial, increasingly, truly*, all of which Davies and Gardner (2010: 74) identify as the top current collocates of the adjective. There is also “the global North” (e.g. Zincone and Agnew 2000), “the global South” (e.g. United Nations URL) and, in fact, “the global world” (e.g. Greenaway 2012).

So, the contemporary *global* is used *more often* than ever and also used *more widely*. But this is still not all there is to *global*: on top of things, the adjective is today also applied with an array of *different meanings* attached to it.

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5 It is especially the “warm salad of curried chicken, with tiny dumplings flecked with coriander and lemony yogurt sauce” that Sifton finds “post-global”.
A look at the context of the just provided examples illustrates this point. For instance, Heather Sells (2014) explains her assessment of John Paul II as the “first truly global Pope” with the fact that “[h]e visited more than 120 countries – the most ever for a pope – and held audiences with more than 17 million people.” For Massimo Franco (2013: 71), Pope Francis I is the “first global Pope” because through his election

“[t]he Americas have moved from the periphery to the very heart of the Catholic world. Eurocentrism is no more. The creation of a council of eight cardinals taken from all five continents as global advisers […] confirms his intention to fundamentally reshape the government of the Church.”

Whereas Sells uses the adjective global in a geographical sense to refer to the worldwide outreach of Pope John Paul II, for Franco global means ‘not European’ or ‘not Eurocentric’. We see two uses of the adjective global in similar contexts but with different meanings: first, ‘geographically far reaching’ and, second, ‘not Eurocentric’. Or take the following two reactions to the communiqué of the 2009 G20 London Summit (URL) and especially to its clause: “[a] global crisis requires a global solution”. US economist Joseph Stiglitz (2009) bemoans that “[t]his global crisis requires a global response, but, unfortunately, responsibility for responding remains at the national level”. Former Caribbean diplomat Sir Ronald Sanders (2009) is similarly critical about the communiqué and its announcement that “[a] global crisis requires a global solution”. He writes:

“There was not a word of admission that the global crisis was caused by the financial establishment in the G7 countries. […] Instead there was the sanctimonious line: ‘A global crisis requires a global solution’. Well, if that is so, why weren’t countries represented at the meeting in a global way?”

Again, we see two uses of the adjective global in the same context but with different meanings. Stiglitz uses the adjective global in the sense of ‘not national’, whereas Sanders understands it in the sense of ‘inclusive of countries from beyond the boundaries of the club of G20 countries’.

And there are many more meanings of the adjective global than these four. Sometimes global is used to refer to worldwide, sometimes to ‘the North’, sometimes to ‘the West’, sometimes to ‘everybody’, sometimes to ‘universal’, sometimes to ‘including developing countries’, sometimes to ‘the developed world’, sometimes it is used as a synonym for the word international, sometimes it means ‘transnational’, sometimes “international and ethnic inspired”, as in the above mentioned case of Campbell’s “global soup collection” (Campbell’s Foodservice URL). And, sometimes, the adjective global refers to ‘including tourists from Western countries’, ‘unprecedented’ and ‘exceptional’, like when UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2004) called the consequences of the 2004 Boxing Day earthquake in the
Indian Ocean and its subsequent tsunami a “global catastrophe” that requires a “global response”.

As highly specialised geo-scientific studies suggest, the 2004-seaquake in the Indian Ocean made the entire planet vibrate (e.g. Lay 2005). Hence, in this context the adjective global could meaningfully refer to ‘affecting the entire planet’. Yet, Annan’s decision to call the event a “global catastrophe”, and International Crisis Group’s Gareth Evans’ (2005) decision to speak in the same context of a “real global momentum”, do not seem to have been motivated by and refer to the actual planetary impact of the seaquake – they seem to carry a different meaning. After all, the geological insight that the quake actually affected the entire planet was not yet known at the point in time when these two public statements were made.

A look at the context, in which the word was applied, suggests that it was a complex web of perceptions and interpretations, and, prominently, a notion of ‘unprecedentedness’ and ‘exceptionality’ that accounted for the consequences of the tsunami being attributed with the adjective global. It appears these perceptions were due to the degree of the impact of the quake: the tsunami affected 11 countries and, even more significantly, it not only hit locals but also an unusual high number of citizens of Western countries, who spent their holidays in the region. These ‘Westerners’, in turn, used their mobile phones and digital cameras to spread first-hand accounts and pictures all over the world, bringing “the wave of death: chaos in paradise” (The Mirror 2004), almost ‘live and in colour’ into the living-rooms around the globe with an unprecedented immediacy. This, in turn, facilitated and amplified the extraordinary media coverage that accompanied and simultaneously ‘made’ the event. Hence, in the case of the 2004-tsunami the adjective global seems to have been applied because of the high number of victims who were from Europe, Australia and the US, and the subsequent worldwide media attention to which the catastrophe was subject. This interpretation is supported in view of the reactions to other major earthquakes, such as the one that struck China in 2008 and affected more people than any other earthquake between 1980-2008, namely a total of 46 million people (CRED 2010), or the one that struck South Asia in October 2005 and affected some four million people only a few months after the 2004-tsunami. Neither of these were labelled ‘global catastrophes’ or perceived as demanding ‘a global response’. For instance, Annan’s official reaction to the 2005 South Asia disaster was his assurance that it left him “deeply saddened” (Annan 2005).

If we take all of the above together, we notice two things. First, the contemporary word global is like a chameleon that adapts apparently effortlessly to any context in which it appears. Second, and moving on from here, the many different meanings, with which the word is accorded these days, have often not much to do with those that are provided in English language dictionaries, such as the latest The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, edited
by Stevenson and Waite (2011: 605; emphasis in the original). The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines global as

“adj. 1 relating to the whole world; worldwide. 2 relating to or embracing the whole of something, or of a group of things. Computing operating or applying through the whole of a file or program. DERIVATIVES globalist n. & adj. globally adj.”

The 2011 edition of the The Concise Oxford English Dictionary is of course not the only dictionary that features the adjective global. For instance, the 2006 edition of The Concise Oxford American Dictionary (2006: 381) defines the word global as 1. “of or relating to the whole world; worldwide”; 2. “of or relating to the entire earth as a planet”; 3. “relating to or embracing the whole of something, or of a group of things”; 4. “Comput. operating or applying through the whole of a file, program”. And in the 1998 edition of The Chambers Dictionary (1998: 681; emphasis in the original), the adjective global is listed with the meanings:

“spherical; worldwide; affecting, or taking into consideration, the whole world or all peoples; (of products or companies) having a name that is recognized throughout the world (marketing); comprehensive; involving a whole file of data (comput.).”

Looking through the array of existing English dictionaries over time, we see that global has had a relatively long ‘dictionary life’; though, admittedly, it did neither appear in what is often seen as the first monolingual English dictionary, namely Robert Cawdrey’s A Table Alphabeticall of Hard Usual English Words from 1604 (Cawdrey 1966[1604]), nor in Samuel Johnson’s 1755 A Dictionary of the English Language (Johnson 1983[1755]). Both publications feature the word globe, which Cawdrey (1966[1604]: 61) defines as “any thing, very round”. Johnson further lists the adjectives globated, globular and globulous. Globated is defined as “adj. [from globe.] Formed in the shape of a globe; spherical; spheroidal”, globular as “adj. [...] In form of a small sphere; round; spherical”, and globulous as “adj. [...] In form of a small sphere; round” (Johnson 1983[1755]: 428; emphasis in the original). Yet, although not listed in these two famous historical dictionaries, global already appeared in 1901 in the influential A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles. This dictionary is influential because it is the foundation of what is now called the Oxford English Dictionary. In A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles global is listed as deriving from the noun globe; the meaning that is provided for it is “spherical; globular” (as seen in the 1933 reprint, The Oxford English Dictionary 1933: 223). In the 1933 Supplement to the A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles a second meaning of global is added, namely, “pertaining to or embracing the totality of a group of items, categories, or the like” (The Oxford English Dictionary 1933a: 417). And, some forty year later, in the 1972 A Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary (1972), which was edited by
R. W. Burchfield and served to replace the 1933 *Supplement*, the meaning that was added in 1933 was extended to: “pertaining to or embracing the totality of a number of items, categories, etc.; comprehensive, all-inclusive, unified; total; spec. pertaining to or involving the whole world; world-wide; universal” (*A Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary* 1972: 1240; emphasis in the original). In comparison, in the 1964 edition of *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English*, edited by McIntosh, we find the adjective *global* listed under the noun *globe*. It is listed both as an adjective with the meaning “world-wide; embracing the totality of a group of items, categories, etc.”, and as a verb, meaning: “Make (usu. in pass.), or become globular” (*The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English* 1964: 521-2). In the 1976 edition of *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English*, edited by John B. Skyes, *global* is explained as being an adjective with one meaning, namely “[w]orld-wide; pertaining to or embracing the whole of a group of items etc.; total.” Here, it has its own entry, separate from the noun *globe* (*The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English* 1976: 453).

This brief look at various dictionaries shows us three things. First, the adjective *global* has a relatively long dictionary-life, starting at least in 1901. Second, there are different dictionary meanings of *global*. Finally, as already mentioned, it shows us that the many different meanings, which the contemporary chameleon *global* has in different contexts today, such as ‘non-Eurocentric’ or ‘affecting a high number of Westerners’, are not only diverse but also do not necessarily overlap with the meanings we find in dictionaries.

This ‘mismatch’ between the myriad of uses of *global* and the dictionary meanings does, of course, not suggest that the word is used in incorrect ways, or, alternatively, that there is something wrong with past or current dictionaries. Rather, it makes us aware that the contemporary adjective *global* is a word that is shaped by a high degree of semantic openness. Arguably, a high degree of semantic openness reduces the precision of a word and the effectiveness of those communicative exchanges, in which the word is used. As such, the fact that the contemporary *global* is used to convey a vast number of different meanings could well be perceived as problematic. Yet, it would be misguided to say that there was something wrong with its polysemic use.

Meanings are arbitrary, in the sense that there is no meaning naturally attached to a linguistic sign. Which meaning is linked to a linguistic sign is subject to social ratification rather than natural pre-determination. Meanings and, more broadly, language are in constant flux and arise in the context of their actualisation, that is, in the context of the use of them.

“Words can lose or gain meanings relatively easily, due to [their] elasticity; and they do not have to lose an earlier sense to gain a new one”,

“Thirty years ago, who would have thought that we would be ‘surfing’ in our own homes, or that ‘chips’ would be good things to have inside our equipment, or that we would be excited ‘to google this’ and ‘to google that’.” (Davies and Gardner 2010: 1)

And did you know that “in the thirteenth century, ‘girl’ could mean a child of either sex, a ‘youth’ or a ‘maid’, and because of this ambiguity, a boy was usually referred to as a ‘knave girl’” (Room 1986: 127)? Clearly, meanings of words change.

Before having a closer look at the institution of the dictionary, I want to stay with the issue of meaning for a moment. I want to substantiate the claim that meaning is arbitrary and language is flexible. The way to do this is to start with Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure’s structural language philosophy and to end with poststructuralist revisions of this theory.

With his structural language philosophy, de Saussure developed one of the central language philosophical traditions. In this philosophy, de Saussure (2000[1916]) demonstrates that meanings are not naturally inherent in linguistic signs. He uses the metaphor of the chess game in order to illustrate this point and to support his distinct idea about how meaning emanates in language. For de Saussure, the chess pieces (the linguistic signs) do not have an inherent role (meaning). The roles (meanings) of the chess pieces (linguistic signs) evolve from their position within the chess game (system of language). More precisely, in de Saussure’s imagination, roles (meanings) emanate from within their relation to other chess pieces (linguistic signs) within the structure, which holds them together. Consequently, de Saussure argues for a synchronic or static perspective on language and not, as was common for linguists up to his time, for a diachronic or historical approach to language (de Saussure 2000[1916]: 81). His ‘structural linguistics’ investigates language as a structured system of signs that is stable and fixed at any given moment.7

6 The other important tradition is the pragmatic language philosophy that Ludwig Wittgenstein (1952) established. It will play a role in Chapter 6.

7 In comparison, in developing his pragmatic language philosophy, Wittgenstein (1953), too, argues that meaning is not attached to a linguistic sign. Yet, while sharing this premise with de Saussure, he develops a theory that is different from de Saussure’s. Like de Saussure, Wittgenstein compares language to a chess game. He understands meaning as the outcome of moves within a language, i.e. within this chess game. The individual chess piece (the linguistic sign) within this (language) game does not have an inherently fixed role (meaning). Yet, the game is based on fixed rules, according to which each chess piece can be moved (linguistic sign can be used). These rules are known to each player (to each language user). The role of the chess piece (the meaning of the linguistic sign) evolves from within the moving process (through the use of the linguistic sign), an act, which can be called communicative action. Hence, in Wittgenstein’s imagination, it is from within the process of moving of the chess pieces (the use of
The basic premises of de Saussure’s synchronic understanding of language and his notion of linguistic signs and meanings can be summarised as follows: de Saussure distinguishes between ‘language’, which is the system of signs, ‘language faculty’ (original in French langage), which is the general ability to speak, and ‘speech’, which is the individual executive act of using language (original in French parole) (see de Saussure 2000[1916]: 8-17). Since speech depends on the existence of the system of signs, de Saussure argues, it is this system that needs to be of primary interest to linguists. Elaborating on the nature of signs as the components of this language system, he stresses that there is nothing referential about signs; signs are conventional. He draws a clear distinction between a sign (such as the word wall) and an external referent (such as an actual cement construction), and argues that signs do not get their meanings from their relation to an external reality. Rather, meanings evolve from within the language system, that is, they evolve in contrast to other signs.

This understanding is grounded in how de Saussure envisages the nature of linguistic signs. He argues, a sign consists of two components: the ‘signal’ (signifier) and what he calls the ‘signification’ (signified). The signal is to be understood as “the hearer’s psychological impression of a sound, as given to him by the evidence of his sense” (ibid. 66), like the spoken word wall. The signification is the abstract concept that is associated with a specific signal; in other words, it is the meaning of the word, in the sense that it is the mind image (not the actual thing in empirical reality) of a cement construction. Central for de Saussure’s theory is that the two sides of a sign are to be imagined as the two sides of a piece of paper, which cannot be separated from each other. He stresses that the “two elements are intimately linked and each triggers the other” (ibid.). Nevertheless, the relationship between signal and signification is purely arbitrary. There is nothing inherent or natural about the link between a specific signifier (such as the word wall) and a specific signified (such as the mind image of a cement construction). The fact that there are different languages with different signifiers for the ‘same’ signified supports his point well: the signified that is linked to the signifier ‘wall’ in English is linked to the signifier ‘Mauer’ in German – clearly, it is a matter of convention, which signifier is linked to which signified.

Flowing from this insight, de Saussure concludes that meanings are best understood as not being inherent in a sign but as evolving from within the linguistic signs), based on pre-determined rules that the chess pieces (the linguistic signs) get their role (their meaning). Above and beyond and more generally, according to this philosophical tradition linguistic signs become meaningful based on the knowledge of the extra-linguistic context, such as the situation of the user of the sign, the historical context etc. In short, Wittgenstein (1953: 43) postulates: “the meaning of a word is its use in the language”; hence his language philosophy runs under the label pragmatic language philosophy.
process of differentiation from other signs within the stable system of language. In his words,

“a language is a system in which all elements fit together, and in which the value of any one element depends on the simultaneous coexistence of all the others.” (de Saussure 2000[1916]: 113)

Signs are defined negatively in difference to other signs within the language system.

The above theoretically grounds and substantiates two important points: First, it substantiates that linguistic signs and their meanings are not referential, in the sense that they do not arise from a natural relationship with a referent in empirical reality. Rather, meanings evolve from differences to other meanings. Second, the above supports the point that the link between a signifier and a meaning is arbitrary; it is the product of conventions.

Both of these two points are intriguing and foundational. Yet, de Saussure’s linguistic insights do not go far enough in grasping the complexity and flexibility of language and meaning. There is more to language and meaning than de Saussure’s structural, that is, synchronic conception of language captures. Thinkers, who are commonly labelled poststructuralists, such as Jacques Derrida (1976, 1981) and his conception of ‘deconstruction’, elaborate on this argument. By engaging with and by rewriting de Saussure’s initial theory, they develop a much more complex idea of meaning. Along with this more complex idea of meaning comes a less stable notion of language.

To put it in a nutshell, while poststructuralists agree with de Saussure’s basic argument that meanings evolve from difference not from (unconventional, that is, natural) reference, they focus on the question of where this process of differentiation possibly starts and ends within a supposedly closed system of signs – to remind us, de Saussure imagines language as a closed system, in which meaning is generated from within difference. The implications of taking the process of differentiation seriously are that, in order to bring the process of negative definition to an end, there would have to be something over and above the closed and stable sign system, which could serve as a fixed starting point – a meta-sign at which the process of differentiation starts and ends. But what would that be? Given that the idea of a transcendental point of reference is not beyond dispute, de Saussure’s notion of language as a closed and stable system of signs is problematic. This, in turn, questions the notion of his synchronic perspective and brings history (back) in.

Poststructuralists start with the above problem and somewhat radicalise, or, one could say, ‘de-essentialise’ de Saussure’s theory of structural linguistics. They do this by questioning the idea of structure as an essence, and, as it is for instance elaborated in much detail in Belsey (2002), Culler (2008), Campbell (2007), Eagleton (1983) and Hall (1997), by critically en-
gaging with de Saussure’s dualistic concept of signs. They challenge the notion that the two sides of a sign are inseparably linked to each other (‘like a piece of paper’, as de Saussure imagines it). According to poststructuralists, a specific signified (in other words mind image or meaning) is not interlinked with one specific signifier. Furthermore, the meaning of a sign cannot be understood as evolving neatly from a signifier’s difference to one other signifier. Rather, meaning evolves from the differentiation between an indefinite number of signifiers. The signifier ‘wall’ does not get its meaning by distinction from one signifier (let’s say ‘fence’), but it gets its meaning also from its distinction from, for instance, ‘house’ or ‘door’. These signifiers themselves get their meanings from within a web of differences in an infinite regress. As literary theorist Terry Eagleton (1983: 127) puts it,

“meaning is the spin-off of a potentially endless play of signifiers, rather than a concept tied firmly to the tail of a particular signifier.”

Thus, a sign must not be conceptualised as if it was carrying one fixed signified in it (in other words: one fixed mind image or meaning), which could be ‘discovered’ in its difference from another sign. As Derrida (1976: 7) stresses,

“there is not a single signifier that escapes, even if recaptured, the play of signifying references that constitutes language.”

In this light, meaning evolves from within an unlimited and constantly changing constellation of signs, whose meanings refer to each other. Each signifier is constituted by the difference between itself and other signifiers, which themselves are constituted by the difference between themselves and other signifiers, which themselves are constituted by the difference between themselves and other signifiers … ad infinitum. Accordingly, meaning can never be fully grasped. It is a “constant flickering of presence and absence together” (Eagleton 1983: 128), filtering through language like a web-like shadow. As Derrida (1981: 85) stresses, it is structurally impossible to close this web, to bring the process of interlinkages to an end, to draw a border and ‘put on hold’ (the endless re-production of) meaning.8

8 These poststructuralist premises serve as the ground for Derrida’s philosophical programme of deconstructing the binary oppositions, which he and all other poststructuralist thinkers detect as the fundamental structure of (Western) thinking. Jacob Torfing (2005: 11) puts this point as follows: “Derrida argues that Western thinking tends to organize the world in terms of binary hierarchies between the privileged essential inside and an excluded, inferior, and accidental outside […]. He shows that the outside is not merely posing a corruptive and ruinous threat to the inside, but is actually required for the definition of the inside. The inside is
As such, poststructuralist premises make us aware that language and meaning are less stable than de Saussure’s theory suggests. Thus, poststructuralist theories, in general, and Derrida’s theory of ‘deconstruction’, in particular, constitute a turning away from, in Eagleton’s words (1983: 131), the “belief in some ultimate ‘word’, presence, essence, truth or reality, which will act as the foundation of all our thought, language and experience.”

Accordingly, a transcendental ‘ultimate’ reality cannot exist; more precisely, it cannot be thought of and treated as independently and naturally existing because there is nothing that is not constituted through differences.9 Consequently, a transcendental ‘ultimate’ reality cannot exist; more precisely, it cannot be thought of and treated as independently and naturally existing because there is nothing that is not constituted through differences. Consequently, a transcendental ‘ultimate’ reality cannot exist; more precisely, it cannot be thought of and treated as independently and naturally existing because there is nothing that is not constituted through differences. Ultimately, for Derrida (1973: 147), this means that presence can “no longer [be understood] as the absolutely matrical form of being but rather as a ‘determination’ and ‘effect’. [It] is a determination and effect within a system which is no longer that of presence but that of differance.” The term differance is a term created by Derrida. He takes the French word difference and changes one letter; this change of one letter transforms the whole meaning of the word. The change of meaning, however, is only visible in the written word differance, since the pronunciation of difference and differance is the same. This is linked to Derrida’s elaborations on ‘writing’ versus ‘speech’, which is one of the major aspects of his theory. He explains ‘difference’ as follows: “First, differance refers to the (active and passive) movement that consists in deferring by means of delay, delegation, reprieve, referral, detour, postponement, reserving. In this sense, differance is not preceded by the original and indivisible unity of a present possibility that could reserve, like an expenditure that would put off calculatedly for reasons of economy. What defers presence, on the contrary, is the very basis on which presence is announced or desired in what represents it, its sign, its trace […]. Second, the movement of differance, as that which produces different things, that which differentiates, is the common root of all the oppositional concepts that mark our language. […] Third, differance is also the product, if it still can be put this way, of these differences, of the diacriticity that the linguistics generated by Saussure, and all the structural sciences modelled upon it, have recalled is the condition for any signification and any structure.” (Derrida 1981a: 9; for Derrida’s discussion of the relationship between ‘writing’ versus ‘speech’ see further Derrida 1976, 1978).
quently, there is nothing that could stand beyond dispute and social negotiation – and beyond power.\textsuperscript{10}

If we consider just these few theoretical elaborations, language and meaning and the adjective \textit{global} become intriguing indeed. Thanks to de Saussure’s conception of language we see that meaning is the product of language rather than something that is inherent in something that pre-exists externally and then gets picked up in language. Thanks to the poststructuralist revision of de Saussure’s language theory, we become aware that meaning is more like a moving ‘shadow’ than something stable and fixed. Meaning is something that evolves from within the interplay of signifiers, which themselves are interplays of signifiers. Hence, meanings are like complex texts, which refer to other texts and constitute a network of changing relationships (in other words, a web of intertextuality). They change constantly, even if only slightly, from context to context, and from moment to moment – they are never exactly the same but are essentially blurred and ambiguous. Meaning is a web-like shadow that filters through language.

This is how the theory goes. Yet, if we look at the reality of language (use) we realise that language and meaning are, of course, not entirely arbitrary and individual after all. This is aptly captured in Lewis Carroll’s (2001: 223) exchange between Alice and Humpty Dumpty:\textsuperscript{11}

“‘[…] and that shows that there are three hundred and sixty-four days when you might get un-birthday presents –’
‘Certainly,’ said Alice.
‘And only one for birthday presents, you know. There’s glory for you!’
‘I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory’,’ Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. ‘Of course you don’t – till I tell you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knock-down argument for you!’’
‘But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock-down argument’,’ Alice objected.
‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.’
‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different things.’
‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master – that’s all.’”

Humpty Dumpty is, in principle, correct when he suggests that “the question [of meaning] is which is to be master”, that is, who is in the position to ‘tame’ the endless play of meanings. Yet, Humpty Dumpty’s individual use of language is simply not successful in that he does not follow the socially ratified use of language. The way Humpty Dumpty uses the word \textit{glory} does not enable him to communicate with Alice. Instead, he is forced to translate for Alice what he means when he uses the word \textit{glory}. Although, in princi-
ple, meanings are arbitrary and floating, only what is communicated in a way that is connected and adapted to general, socially ratified perceptions of the world is ‘successful’, in the sense that it gets understood. As the earlier mentioned word *conventional* suggests, there is a social dimension to meaning. Although, in theory, they are anything but stable and fixed, linguistic signs appear as if they carried a clear and ‘natural’ meaning – otherwise we would not be able to communicate.

This draws our attention to the obvious but important point that, although signifiers are in principle arbitrary, conventions and rules ‘suggest’ and ‘restrict’ which (shadow) of a meaning is (to be) associated with which signifier. While the use of signs is individual and while a person (or Humpty Dumpty), who uses a sign, has an individual idea of which mind image (in other words, meaning) they would like to be or assume will be associated with the used sign, the production of meaning is a social phenomenon which takes place within and against the backdrop of socially ratified, collective understandings of meanings.

In Chapter 4, I discuss the concept ‘discourse’ and, with that, come back to the issue of the social nature of language and the ‘taming’ of meanings. For now, we take from the above an understanding of the inherent flexibility of language and meaning. This brings me back to the institution of the dictionary and to the phenomenon of lexical meanings, which I already touched on above when I pointed out that the actual uses of the adjective *global* often do not correspond with the meanings that we find in dictionaries.

Linguists distinguish between codified lexical meanings and actual meanings. The latter are meanings of words that are activated in actual discourse, like the many different meanings of the adjective *global* that we saw at the beginning of this chapter. The codified lexical meanings, in comparison, are always only the “context-free, speaker-free, non-referential meanings” of a word (Wavell 1986: 29). These are the meanings that dictionaries provide, like the various meanings of the adjective *global* in *A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles* and in the successors of this seminal dictionary.

The above sketched insights into the theory of language and meaning make it apparent that it is impossible for lexicographers to capture in a dictionary the breadth of actual existing meanings, which – following the above – only ever exist as a shadow that runs through language. At the same time, it makes obvious that every ‘taming’ of a meaning of a word in a dictionary is a practice that intervenes in the “constant flickering of presence and absence” (Eagleton 1983: 128) that is meaning. This makes dictionaries, on the one hand, “mines whose word-gems encapsulates centuries of language, history and cultural traditions; they are store-houses of meanings and uses” (Facchinetti 2012: 1). On the other hand, however, it makes dictionaries publications that are “out of date as soon as they are published” (Gramley and Pätzold 2004: 26), because the language has ‘moved on’. Furthermore, and fundamentally, it makes obvious that dictionaries need to be taken as
edited books that only ever provide an *assembled picture* of a language. Dictionaries are the product of “persistent and inevitable filtering processes”, explains John Willinsky (1994: 13). Given that they never capture the entirety of a language, i.e. given that they only ever provide *selected* lexical meanings, dictionaries are not simply neutral mirrors of a language and of the changes of meanings in this language. On the contrary, they play a central role in the *establishment* and, in fact, production of this language.

For instance, looking at the production and reproduction of Standard English and the extraordinary role of the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) in this respect, Michael Stubbs (1996: 64-66) finds that what has come to be considered as Standard English is the product of the work of a distinct social group and, in fact, of distinct individuals and their personal decisions. He finds that

“There is no doubt that the definitions found in dictionaries display the bases of the particular social group who constructed them.” (ibid. 65)

Willinsky (1994: 13) goes further by pointing to the self-referential character of the entries in the OED:

“It is still easy to mistake what we find in the dictionary for the entirety of the English language, to imagine that the definitions provided in its pages are carefully lifted, via the citation, directly out of the language. To consider the idea is to realize that we know better, not only as print is only one code in the use of an English language that has a long history of authority and resistance, but as the print record of the OED forms its own record of the language’s past and present.”

As the practice of establishing dictionaries goes, the selected picture of a language that dictionaries, such as, in the case of English, most prominently and powerfully the OED, provide is constructed on the basis of both past and, importantly, *written* occurrences of words. The lexical meanings of the words are determined by these occurrences. These selected past and written occurrences are usually listed as ‘citations’ or ‘quotations’.

This makes it apparent then that, for better or worse, dictionaries inevitably reproduce the ‘tamed’ meanings they provide from within a distinct, arguably, elitist historical canon (of written work). Just consider that the most frequently quoted work in the current Second Edition of the OED from 1989 is the Bible and the most frequently quoted single author is William Shakespeare, with around 33,300 quotations (OED Dictionary Facts URL).

The origin of the OED is the already mentioned *A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles; Founded Mainly on the Materials Collected by the Philological Society* that was originally edited by James A. H. Murray and published as a serial magazine over 44 years, between 1884 and 1928. The aim of the *A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles* was to
“present in alphabetical series the words that have formed the English vocabulary from the time of the earliest records down to the present day, with all the relevant facts concerning their form, sense-history, pronunciation, and etymology.” (The Oxford English Dictionary 1933b: v)

The original dictionary contains more than 400,000 words illustrated through around 2 million quotations, which were selected from a pool of “some five million excerpts from English literature of every period amassed by an army of voluntary readers and the editorial staff” (Murray quoted in Wells 1973: 29). In 1933 A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles was reprinted, with a Supplement of around 850 pages. It was published under the title The Oxford English Dictionary (OED). Further Supplements followed, such as the above mentioned one in 1972, and a Second Edition of the OED was published in 1989. Currently, in 2015, a completely reworked version of the OED is in progress, and it is only now that for “the first time material written by Murray and the early editors has been changed since they finished in 1928” (History of the OED ULR). Given the flexibility and historical nature of language, this is remarkable. As this indicates, the construction and promotion of current Standard English through the OED is done by relying on and utilising what Willinsky (2004: 13) calls a “nineteenth century artefact”. He argues:

“This dictionary, in all of its magnificence, could reasonably be considered as the last powerful outreach of an imperial age; it is an icon of learnedness that continues to shape the modern understanding of the word on a global scale. We need to appreciate how the OED has fashioned the English language out of classical allusion and poetic metaphor, scientific discovery and scholarly research, while filling it out with the prose of a working press and publishing trade.” (ibid.)

I reflect on the nature of dictionaries and the distinction between lexical and actual meanings in some detail here because ever so often – and, as we will see later, including in the scholarly literature on ‘globalisation’ – dictionaries are treated (by scholars in political studies and IR) as the unquestionable authority on a particular language and its meanings. As linguist Ernest Weekly (1924) observes,

“almost the only individual to approach the sacred book [dictionary] in the spirit of a doubter is the lexicographer himself.”

Taken together, the above elaborations make us aware that there is something problematic about relying on a dictionary for a supposedly authoritative meaning, i.e. for the meaning of a word, such as the adjective global. To look at a dictionary means to look at decisions of those who were and are in a position to, first, determine which words are to be taken up in a dictionary, and, second, which (written) sources are to be used as the basis for the de-
tection of what would enter a dictionary as the lexical meanings of these selected words. To look at a dictionary, then, is not to look at an a-historical source but to look at a highly self-referential, edited book, in which an endless web of references is ‘tamed’ into distinct lexical meanings.

I come back to these insights into the nature of meanings and dictionaries in Chapters 3 and 6. For now, I want to return to the contemporary word *global*.

It is clear now that the above observation that *global* is used with a vast number of meanings, which are not only at times contradictory in themselves but also often differ from the codified lexical meanings that are provided in current dictionaries, does not indicate incorrect uses of the word nor shortcomings in the dictionaries. It is a manifestation of the fact that *global* is shaped by a relatively high degree of semantic openness. In the “Introduction” to his 2004 *New Words* dictionary Orin Hargraves (2004: vii) explains

> “a new word’s appearance in a dictionary is the beginning of the end of its freedom: while lexicography pays these novel formations the respect of recognizing them as worthy additions to the language, it does so for a price, and that price is the suggestion, if not the insistence, that the new words settle down somewhat in form and meanings and stop flailing about.”

As we saw in the short overview of the ‘dictionary life’ of *global*, the adjective has been accredited with “the respect of being recognised as a worthy addition to the language” already for a while now – at least since 1901 and the *A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles*. Yet, the word remains extraordinarily ‘free’ and continues to ‘flail about’ today. Indeed, as the various examples of its usage, which I provided in this chapter, show, perhaps *global* is today even freer and more prone to ‘flailing about’ than ever. It seems there is a self-reinforcing development in place: the more the adjective *global* is used, the freer it becomes because an inflation of meanings and patterns of use makes it harder to pin it down and ‘tame’ it. “The simplest words for the lexicographer are the not very common [words] with just one clear meaning, like *jabber, jackal, jackass, jackdaw* and *jacuzzi*”, explains John Sinclair, editor-in-chief of the 1987 edition of the *Collins COBUILD English Language Dictionary* (1987: xviii). As we have seen above, *global* is anything but simple.

To conclude, the first noteworthy aspect of the contemporary adjective *global* is that it is popular and free. Above and beyond this, we saw in this section that language and meanings are not natural and referential but flexible and conventional, that there is a difference between lexical and actual meanings, and that dictionaries are exciting historical documents but not the bearer of the meaning of a word – language is too alive to be tamed in a book.
DISPUTEDLY UNDISPUTED

The second aspect that constitutes the contemporary adjective *global* is that there is something paradoxical in how it is used and how it is treated. To reflect this point, I call the contemporary *global* ‘disputedly undisputed’. I suggest, this ‘disputedly undisputed’ existence of the adjective is due to two – for a lack of a better word – ‘extreme’ treatments.

On the one side, as we saw above, *global* is not only widely used but widely used without critical reflection. If we look at the adjective’s application across discourses, including the social scientific scholarship, we notice that *global* is often simply overlooked as a word that might require reflection and explanation. *Global* seems to be ‘invisible’. It is off the radar of scholarly concern.

On the other side, however, *global* and its current popularity is very clearly ‘visible’ to commentators. This is evident in the fact that, not infrequently, (the use of) the adjective is dismissed as a fad and rejected as a linguistic manifestation of the discourses of ‘globality’ and ‘globalisation’.

In the following, I illustrate each of these two points in turn.

Global, the undisputed

We saw above that the contemporary word *global* is shaped by a high degree of semantic openness. We saw that it is used in many different senses. This is most obvious when applied in the same context, such as in the assessment of which Pope is / was the first ‘global’ Pope, or in the debate about a ‘global’ response to the financial crisis. Yet, despite this striking ambiguity, the adjective *global* is, more often than not, treated as if there was no doubt about what it meant. This is manifest in two different ways.

First, there is the predominant practice of using the adjective without problematising it. The case of the journalist from the beginning of this chapter, who problematised the use of *global* in a statement of President Bush’s spokeswoman, is an exception. Just scroll through any of the countless publications that contain the adjective in their title – chances are that the word is applied but not explained. Or, look into recent reference books that aim to capture “the new language of international politics” (Morris URL) and to engage with “terms, concepts, jargon, acronyms and abbreviations used in” the contemporary political debate (Saunier and Meganck 2007), such as *Globalization: The Key Concepts* (Mooney and Evans 2007), *A Dictionary of Globalization* (Wunderlich and Warrier 2007), Roland Robertson and Jan Aart Scholte’s four-volume-comprising *Encyclopedia of Globalization* (2007), and the *Dictionary and Introduction to Global Environmental Governance* (Saunier and Meganck 2007). While these publications feature an array of fixed and semi-fixed phrases that contain the adjective *global*, such as ‘global cities’, ‘global civil society’, ‘global commons’, ‘global consciousness’, ‘global culture’, ‘global division of labour’, and ‘global financial crises’, the adjective in and of itself is not subject to problematisation. It
is not explicitly discussed, let alone has it its own individual entry. As this indicates, global is perceived to be a useful adjective to apply, it is spread throughout these books but it is clearly not perceived and treated as sufficiently problematic to provoke explicit reflections.\textsuperscript{12}

The earlier mentioned World Development Report 2014 (ULR) with its 278 globals on 286 pages does not only constitute another example for this phenomenon – none of the 278 applications of the word is subject to explicit reflection – it is also an example for another, related phenomenon, which illustrates that global is taken as ‘undisputed’. This is the predominant use of the adjective as a pre-modifier.

Adjectives are words that are used to modify a noun. They can be applied as pre-modifiers, such as in the case of ‘the global market’, or as post-modifiers, such as in the phrase ‘the market is global’. In the case of ‘the market is global’, the adjective is explicitly part of the proposition about ‘the market’. In contrast, in its use as a pre-modifier, i.e. ‘the global market’, as it is the case in 275 out of 278 uses of the adjective global in the World Development Report 2014, global ‘is there’ and ‘does’ something to the noun it is applied to, but partially disappears in its co-existence with the noun. In contrast to ‘the market is global’, in the phrase ‘the global market’ the adjective does not invite disputation. It is normalised and taken for granted, as if it was clear.

The second manifestation of my observation that the adjective global is taken as if it was straightforward is its ‘invisibility’ in academic discourses, such as the political studies and IR scholarship. In this body of scholarly work, global is simply not considered worth studying. Of course, as I acknowledged in the Introduction to this book (see also Selchow 2016), the study of distinct linguistic signs, such as the word global, is normally not at the core of the disciplines of political studies and IR. Yet, even in the sub-part of the scholarship that takes (the use of) language and distinct words seriously the adjective global has not been subject to meaningful express exploration. In fact, global is sometimes even positively overlooked. We can see this, for instance, in the debate about the ‘global war on terror/ism’ (GWOT), i.e. the narrative that has shaped political discourses since the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, DC in September 2001.

The GWOT has triggered a considerable number of public discussions about, assessments of and scholarly engagements with the language that constitutes and makes it. The metaphor ‘war’ has been discussed at length, as well as the words terrorism, terror and terrorist.\textsuperscript{13} These discussions even

\textsuperscript{12} As an exception see Neoliberalism: The Key Concepts by Matthew Eagleton-Pierce (2016).

\textsuperscript{13} The ‘war’-metaphor came under critical scrutiny right from the beginning. Benjamin B. Ferencz (2001), former prosecutor at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, was one of the first who argued that the 9/11-attack needs to be understood and treated as a “crime against humanity” rather than as a “declaration of war”. In
led to the Obama-Administration publicly announcing in 2009 that it would no longer use the phrase ‘war on terror/ism’ (Los Angeles Times 2009).\footnote{In actual fact, although the Obama administration made an explicit point in publicly rejecting the expression ‘global war on terror/ism’, it already came under official criticism before. In July 2005 Defence Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld (2005) started to replace the metaphor ‘global war on terror/ism’ with the phrase “global struggle against violent extremism”; and in March 2007 US Democratic staff director Erin Conaton wrote a memo in which she advised her colleagues in charge of the preparation of the US defence authorisation bill to “avoid using colloquialisms,” such as the ‘war on terrorism’ or the ‘long war,’ and not to use the term ‘global war on terrorism’’ (International Herald Tribune 2007).}

Yet, surprisingly, the word *global* has not attracted critical attention in this context. Indeed, it has not even been acknowledged as a noteworthy component of the ‘global war on terror/ism’ narrative in the first place. This is despite the fact that it is clearly a constitutive part of it.\footnote{This is for instance evident in the fact that it is part of the acronym ‘GWOT’. The acronym GWOT appeared in official documents for the first time in a 2002 fact sheet of the US Department of State (URL). See William Safire (2002) for a witty commentary on the acronym, highlighting its inappropriateness for that it can be “pronounced with a rising inflection as ‘Gee-what?’ The image it projects is of a brass hat scratching his head.”}

For instance, Jeffrey Record (2004: 2) examines the features of the ‘global war on terrorism’ for the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and argues that there are “two issues that continue to impede understanding of the GWOT: its incomplete characterisation as a war, and the absence of an agreed upon definition of terrorism” – omitting the ‘issue’ of the adjective *global* as the third issue that ‘impedes understanding of the GWOT’. Richard Jackson (2005) does the same in his study, which expressly aims to provide an analysis of, as he puts it, the “public language” of the ‘war on terrorism’ by investigating how language has been deployed in order to justify critical security studies, various voices criticise the application of the term *war* on the basis that it constitutes a speech act that brings war into being in the first place and that ‘securitis’ terrorism, which means that it frames terrorism as an existential threat, and, consequently, leads to the justification of the suspension of normal politics (see Fierke 2005: 53-55). More generally, it has been widely pointed out that the idea of ‘war’ is faulty in that it implies perceptions of victory, defeat, as well as peace; as even noticed by US President Bush (see Borger 2004), these orthodox perceptions are actually untenable in the case of the ‘war against terrorism’ – so is the clear line between ‘we’ and ‘them’, the enemy, which is implicitly invoked by the ‘war’-metaphor (see Fierke 2005: 54; also Beck 2003). George Soros (2006) calls the ‘war’ metaphor a “false metaphor”, and Robert Higgs (2005) brings the linguistic critique to the point when he states: “‘War on terror’ made no sense: you can’t drop a bomb on an emotion.”
and normalise a “global campaign of counter-terrorism”. He, too, overlooks the adjective *global*.

If we take the above together, *global* is everywhere but somewhat ‘invisible’. It is (apparently) ‘undisputed’ and treated as if it was innocent, straightforward and self-evident.

**Global, the disputed**

Curiously, just as much as the adjective *global* is ‘undisputed’ and treated as if it was innocent and clear, that is, just as much as the word disappears under a ‘cloak of invisibility’, the (phenomenon of its) *general popularity* ever so often causes express irritation. *Global* and its rising popularity are like climate change and income tax – hardly anyone is blasé about it, when asked for their view. At a recent visit of the library at The University of Melbourne a librarian guided me to the library’s dictionary section and asked what I was working on. I explained I was interested in the word *global*, which triggered an immediate outburst of

“uugggh – global?! That’s a new word. It used to be international. But today everything is global ... I don’t like this word.”

There are two grounds on which the adjective *global* is dismissed. First, it is precisely the extensive and unreflective use of the word that causes irritation. As is obvious in the above quoted librarian’s reaction, *global* (due to its popularity) seems to be perceived – and rejected – as a fad.

Second, a look across commentaries suggests that *global* causes irritation and aversion based on the argument that it is part of ‘globe-talk’ (e.g. McGrew 1992a: 470), ‘global babble’ (e.g. Abu-Lughod 1991: 131) or ‘gbaloney’ (e.g. Veseth 2005). Here, commentators usually mean to suggest one of two things: First, they suggest that the adjective *global* is a linguistic ingredient in the discourse of ‘the global’ and ‘globality’. Second, they suggest that the adjective *global* is part of the talk about ‘globalisation’.

The irritation about the adjective, which each assumption causes, is grounded in the perception that the discourses of ‘the global’ and ‘globality’ and, in particular, the talk about ‘globalisation’ are Northern hegemonic and / or neoliberal discourses. Consequently, the adjective *global* and its omnipresence are seen as an instance in the reproduction of the hegemonic dominance of the North and / or of an ‘untamed’ capitalism. Such an understanding of and aversion to *global* is apparent in Indian activist Vandana Shiva’s following quote:

“The notion of ‘global’ facilitates this skewed view of a common future. The construction of the global environment narrows the South’s options while increasing the North’s.” (Shiva 1998: 233)
Taking the above together, there is something paradoxical about the contemporary adjective global. On the one hand, it is used happily without much meta-reflection and is overlooked by even critical scholars who are generally aware of the relevance of language – global is covered by a ‘cloak of invisibility’ as if it was clear and innocent. On the other side, its omnipresence provokes irritation. Here, global gets dismissed as a fad, and is met with suspicion as a supposed linguistic manifestation of the discourse of ‘the global’ and ‘globality’, and the talk about ‘globalisation’. It is this mix of approaches to global that leads me to label the contemporary adjective global ‘disputedly undisputed’.

**Conclusion**

This chapter constitutes the first of two steps, in which I introduce the adjective global and make it ‘strange’ in order to add an ‘extra edge of consciousness’ to our approach to it. With this aim in mind, I presented in this chapter two noteworthy aspects that I identify as constituting the contemporary global. First, global is popular and free, the latter in the sense of semantically open. Second, global leads a ‘disputedly undisputed’ existence.

Together these two aspects form a seeming paradox between a colourful use of the word and a widening of its meanings, on the one side, and a striking easiness, with which it is taken as if it was obvious, on the other side. Both sides of this paradox account for the discomfort that the word regularly triggers in public and scholarly discourses, where its popularity and diverse uses are perceived – and dismissed – as a meaningless fad or as a symbolic confirmation and reproduction of hegemonic (‘Northern’) discourses. At the same time, however, these concerns have not led to a heightened sensibility for or a commitment to a more reflective use of the adjective. Nor have they led to an increased curiosity towards, scholarly suspicion of or systematic approach to the adjective global. The contemporary global seems to be everywhere and, yet, it is ‘invisible’. It is causing irritation but no systematic and dedicated critical reflection.

I want to conclude this chapter by giving a taster for that a systematic and critical look at the word global holds the potential of revealing interesting insights into the ‘world making’-practice, which is the use of language. I want to do this by having a look at the GWOT-discourse. In particular, I want to have a look at how the adjective global is used in the Public Papers of one of the main ‘authors’ of the GWOT-narrative, namely US President George W. Bush. I explicitly choose the GWOT-discourse for my brief exploration of the adjective global ‘in use’ because, as we saw above, the adjective global is usually overlooked in this particular discourse, even by those above mentioned scholars, who set out to study the use of language in the context of the GWOT. This, my brief analysis shows, is unfortunate because a close look at the use of global in Bush’s rhetoric provides the sense
that the adjective is more than a casually applied pre-modifier. It appears to be strategically deployed in a distinct ‘making’ of the world.\textsuperscript{16}

The ‘global war on terror’-narrative captured the US political discourse and shaped discourses around the world after the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 (9/11). It was ‘written’ by US President George W. Bush (2001a), proceeding from his assessment that, with the terrorist attack, an “act of war was declared on the United States of America.”

If one takes a systematic look at the use of the adjective \textit{global} in President Bush’s post-9/11 public communication by determining the words that the adjective \textit{global} most frequently pre-modifies, something intriguing becomes apparent. The ‘global war on terror’ was initially not (called) ‘global’, at least not in the rhetoric of the US Commander in Chief. It was a ‘war’ on global \textit{terror} or global \textit{terrorism}, which Bush launched after 9/11, not a ‘global war’ on terror / terrorism. This is readily apparent in the list of most frequent co-occurrences of the adjective \textit{global}, which I generated from all of President Bush’s 813 Public Papers between 30 January 2001 and 31 December 2006 that contain the word \textit{global} at least once.\textsuperscript{17} As Table 1 and the following selected quotes illustrate, it is the words terrorism, terrorists and terror, as well as the noun reach that are pre-modified with the adjective \textit{global} after 11 September 2001, not the noun war:

“Today I am pleased to issue the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. This strategy outlines the effort our Nation is making to win the war against \textit{global terror}.” (Bush 2003a; emphasis added)

“America will not rest; we will not tire until every terrorist group of \textit{global} reach has been found, has been stopped, and has been defeated.” (Bush 2002b; emphasis added)

“[...] our Nation is just beginning in a great objective, which is to eliminate those terrorist organizations of \textit{global} reach.” (Bush 2002c; emphasis added)

Interestingly, the species ‘global terrorist’ and the phenomenon ‘global terrorism’ did not exist in the public communication of the US Presidents before 9/11. Both were given birth to by President Bush on 11 September 2001. This is apparent if one looks beyond Bush’s Public Papers at the public communication of his Presidential predecessors, such as President Clinton. Neither the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August 1998, nor the attack on the USS Cole on 12 October 2000 in Yemen

\textsuperscript{16} For the following see also Selchow (2008: 238-241).

\textsuperscript{17} I constructed my dataset from the database of US Presidential Public Papers that is provided by \textit{The American Presidency Project} (URL) (see fn1 in this chapter). Furthermore, I used the freeware \textit{AntConc} for my analysis. I will come back to \textit{AntConc} in Chapter 6.
were considered to be attacks by ‘global terrorists’ or to be instances of ‘global terrorism’, although they were committed by the same terrorist network as the attack on 11 September 2001. As a matter of fact, before September 2001 the word terrorist was pre-modified with the adjective global by any US President only once and terrorism only four times, namely in Clinton’s communication (1995a, 1995b, 1996, 1998b, and 1999a). With the 9/11-incident, however, the nouns terrorist and terrorism co-occurred most frequently with global in the President’s communication, replacing the noun economy, which had been the top co-occurrence until then. Again, this trend is illustrated below in Table 1, which shows us co-occurrences with global in the Public Papers of President George W. Bush before and after 11 September 2001.

Table 1: The four words most frequently pre-modified with the adjective global in US President George W. Bush’s Public Papers

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>global economy</td>
<td>global terror</td>
<td>global test</td>
<td>global war</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>global trade</td>
<td>global terrorism</td>
<td>global war</td>
<td>global economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>global climate</td>
<td>global coalition</td>
<td>global economy</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>global warming</td>
<td>global reach</td>
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Table 1 also indicates that the ‘birth’ of the ‘global war’ on terror, as opposed to the war on ‘global terror’, took place sometime between 2002 and 2006. There is a notable shift in the words that were most frequently pre-modified by the adjective global between 2002 and 2006, from terror, via test, to war. So, when and why did this shift take place?

A closer investigation of Bush’s Public Papers provides an answer to this question. In fact, the linguistic shift can be tracked down to a precise date: the 30 September 2004, which was the day when President Bush entered an election campaign discussion with Democrat John F. Kerry in Coral Gables, Florida (Bush-Kerry 2004). It was on this day that Bush’s practice of applying the adjective global mainly to pre-modify the nouns terror and terrorism shifted towards pre-modifying the noun war. What exactly happened?

On close analysis it becomes clear that the shift in Bush’s use of the adjective global was prompted by an answer that John F. Kerry gives during the Presidential Debate to moderator Jim Lehrer’s question:
“What is your position on the whole concept of preemptive war?” (ibid.)

Kerry explains:

“The president always has the right, and always has had the right, for preemptive strike. […] But if and when you do it, Jim, you have to do it in a way that passes the test, that passes the global test where your countrymen, your people understand fully why you’re doing what you’re doing and you can prove to the world that you did it for legitimate reasons.” (ibid.)

Asked for his position, President Bush responds:

“Let me – I’m not exactly sure what you mean, ‘passes the global test,’ you take preemptive action if you pass a global test. My attitude is you take preemptive action in order to protect the American people, that you act in order to make this country secure.” (ibid.; emphasis added)

As a systematic analysis of the deployment of the adjective global shows, from then on, Senator Kerry’s expression ‘global test’ was taken up by President Bush in a total of 62 of his campaign speeches, as well as in two of the President’s Radio Addresses between 1 October and the election day of 2 November 2004. It was also taken up by Vice President Dick Cheney in the Vice Presidential Debate with Senator John Edwards (Cheney-Edwards 2004). ‘Global test’ turned into a key linguistic tool and point of reference in Bush’s effort to distinguish himself from Kerry. As the following quote allows us to assume, the intention of taking up the expression ‘global test’ was to present Senator Kerry as a weak leader who would let America’s security get out of his hands:

“As part of his foreign policy, Senator Kerry has talked about applying a ‘global test.’ […] As far as I can tell, it comes down to this: Before we act to defend ourselves, he thinks we need permission from foreign capitals. […] Senator Kerry’s ‘global test’ is nothing more than an excuse to constrain the actions of our own country in a dangerous world. I believe in strong alliances. I believe in respecting other countries and working with them and seeking their advice. But I will never submit our national security decisions to a veto of a foreign government.” (Bush 2004d)

It was in this context then that Bush’s public use of the adjective global shifted from mainly pre-modifying the nouns terror and terrorism to eventually mainly attributing the adjective global to the noun war. According to Bush’s post-September-2004-rhetoric the US were not fighting anymore a ‘war against global terrorism’ but a ‘global war against terror’ (see Figure 2).
This shift in the use of *global* means that, suddenly, it was not the ‘threat’ that was attributed with the adjective *global* but the American action, namely ‘war’:

“And so long as I’m sitting here in this Oval Office, I will never forget the lessons of September the 11th, and that is that we’re in a *global war* against coldblooded killers.” (Bush 2005c; emphasis added)

“[W]e are now waging a *global war* on terror – from the mountains of Afghanistan to the border regions of Pakistan, to the Horn of Africa, to the islands of the Philippines, to the plains of Iraq.” (Bush 2005a; emphasis added)

*Figure 2: Insights into the use of the adjective global in US President George W. Bush’s Public Papers between 11 September 2001 and 31 December 2006*

At first sight, this may appear to be a minor rhetorical shift. However, given that the word *global* is used by President Bush with the meaning ‘worldwide’ and ‘everywhere around the globe’, the shift in the application of the adjective can be read as indicating a significant shift of perspective and attitude. It can be seen as a distinct symbolic construction of the security environment and the US in it. The notable shift from a perceived ‘global’ *threat* to a perceived ‘global’ *action*, where ‘action’ refers to war and the adjective *global* means ‘worldwide’ and ‘everywhere’, stands for and symbolically supports an offensive, proactive and even preemptive position following the attitude that
“[i]n our time, terrible dangers can arise on a short moment anywhere in the world, and we must be prepared to oppose these dangers everywhere in the world.” (Bush 2005b)

In one of his election campaign speeches Bush explains:

“We are now nearing the first Presidential election since September the 11th, 2001. People of the United States will choose the leader of the free world in the middle of a global war. The choice is not only between two candidates; it’s between two directions in the conduct of the war on terror.” (Bush 2004c)

Following from the above, these “two directions in the conduct of the war on terror”, of which Bush speaks, are the ones that he constructs through the shift in the use of the adjective global: the first one is about defending the US against a ‘global’ threat and the second one is about fighting a ‘global’ war wherever a threat to the US can be found.18

I return to the word global in US Presidential Public Papers in Chapter 7. For the time being, my brief analysis is meant to conclude this chapter by supporting the simple point that it is worth taking the adjective global seriously. Global is not only widespread, polysemic, complex, and ‘disputedly undisputed’ – it also matters as it is obviously used by political actors to symbolically construct a distinct world. In the above sketched case of US President George W. Bush, this is a world, in which a preemptive approach to secure ‘US national security’ is ‘justified’.

18 This supports analyses in security studies, which point out and study the preemptive turn in national security practices (e.g. de Goede 2008; Stockdale 2013).
3 The Contemporary Adjective *Global* II: Enmeshed with the ‘Globalisation’-Discourse

In the previous chapter, I highlighted two noteworthy aspects of the contemporary word *global*: it is a highly popular and free adjective, and it is ‘disputedly undisputed’. In this present chapter, I reflect on a third aspect. I highlight that the contemporary adjective *global* is intimately enmeshed with what I call the ‘globalisation’-discourse. With the term ‘globalisation’-discourse I refer to the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*.

Presenting a selection of different contemporary uses of the adjective *global*, I show that *global* is enmeshed with the ‘globalisation’-discourse in two different ways. First, the adjective is used to establish and justify conceptions of the signified associated with the word *globalisation*. Second, the contemporary adjective *global* gains one of its meanings from the ‘globalisation’-discourse, that is, from the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*.

The chapter is divided into two main parts, in which I elaborate on each of these two points in turn. Drawing on the second point and synthesising the observations from this present Chapter 3 and the previous Chapter 2, I conclude my engagement with the contemporary adjective *global* by conceptualising it as a ‘new word’.

My conceptualisation of the contemporary adjective *global* as ‘new’ serves two kinds of purposes. In general, my labelling of *global* as a ‘new
word’ is a final scholarly move to draw attention to the hitherto overlooked word, i.e. to free it from its predominating environment by establishing it as something to look at in itself, namely as a ‘new word’. In other words, my use of the word new is a strategic move to put the spotlight on the adjective global.

In particular, my conceptualisation of the contemporary adjective global as ‘new’ is to make us aware that there is, indeed, something ‘new’, in the sense of distinct about the contemporary global. What is distinct about it is its close relationship with the ‘globalisation’-discourse, that is, with the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word globalisation. Yet, contrary to existing takes on the word global (e.g. Scholte 2005: 50), I argue the adjective is not to be seen as the natural ‘pedigree’ of the word globalisation, in other words, it is not to be taken as the linguistic sign, from which the word globalisation springs and receives its meanings. Rather, I argue, it is the other way around: what is ‘new’, in the sense of distinct and not yet sufficiently acknowledged about the contemporary adjective global is that it implies the ‘globalisation’-discourse.

GLOBAL AS A TOOL TO ESTABLISH THE SIGNIFIED OF GLOBALISATION

Since the end of the 1980s and in the course of the 1990s, it has come to be a common practice to capture and explain the social world with the help of the word globalisation. Putting it differently, it was in the 1990s that, what I call, the ‘globalisation’-discourse was born. In Chapter 4, I focus in detail on the concept ‘globalisation’-discourse. For now, it is sufficient to understand that when I speak of ‘globalisation’-discourse I refer to the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word globalisation.

A look across scholarly works on ‘globalisation’ makes us aware that the adjective global plays a central role in what I understand to be the ‘globalisation’-discourse. The adjective is used as nothing less than a tool to establish and justify scholarly ideas of ‘globalisation’. This is done in two different ways.

First, and most commonly, the signified of the adjective global is taken as a key feature of what scholars set out to conceptualise as the phenomenon (they call) ‘globalisation’. In other words, scholars establish and justify an understanding of what they call ‘globalisation’ by suggesting that what is distinct about it is that there is something ‘global’ about it.

This is readily apparent in those works, in which scholars set out to develop their conception of the phenomenon that they capture with the word globalisation by asking and answering the (rhetorical) question: “What is global about globalisation?”. Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton (2003: 15), Scholte (2005: 50), Kirchberger (2002), Axford (2000: 239), and An-
yanwu (2000: 2-4) do this. Implied in this question is the claim that whatever the adjective *global* signifies, i.e. whatever its meanings is, is a key characteristic of what these scholars set out to conceptualise with the help of the word *globalisation*. Going a step further, the signified of *global* is actually taken here as the *central feature* that distinguishes the (respective) idea ‘globalisation’ from phenomena that are referred to with other linguistic signs, such as the words *internationalisation* or *transnationalisation*.

In this sense, the adjective *global* serves an important purpose for ‘globalisation’-scholars. Given that the word *globalisation* is a neologism, these scholars are inevitably faced with the task of not only drawing a distinction between the meaning of the word *globalisation* and the signifieds of other, already existing and established words. They also have to make clear what it is that is the ‘new’ that the neologism *globalisation* captures and that is not already captured by existing vocabulary. I discuss the issue of the ‘new’ in more detail in Chapter 4. Here, I want to make us aware that it is precisely the adjective *global* that helps scholars in these instances with nothing less but the establishment of the (supposed) ‘newness’ of whatever the word *globalisation* is applied to refer to.

Let me illustrate the above described scholarly practice with concrete examples. Take, for instance, Jan Aart Scholte (2005: 52) who, in his seminal *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*, cautions that the word *globalisation* “should not merely restate what can be known with other terminology”, and who criticises, “[m]uch if not most existing analysis of globalization is flawed because it is redundant”. In order to avoid this ‘flaw’ himself, Scholte (2005: 50) sets out to show “what, precisely, is ‘global’ about globalisation.” With that, Scholte suggests what makes the signified of the word *globalisation* distinct is that there is something ‘global’ about it. In other words, Scholte suggests that it is the signified of the adjective *global* that makes the phenomenon, which he associates with the word *globalisation*, a ‘new’ phenomenon, i.e. worthy being captured with a neologism, namely *globalisation*.

Alexandre Kirchberger (2002), Barrie Axford (2000: 239) and Chika Anyanwu (2000: 2-4) argue in precisely the same way, and so do David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton (2003: 15). The latter group of authors stress the significance of what they associate with the linguistic sign *global* in and for their conception of the signified of the word *globalisation* by lamenting,

> “there is scant evidence in the existing literature of any attempt to specify precisely what is ‘global’ about globalization.”

By specifying “precisely what is ‘global’ about globalization” themselves, Held et al aim to distinguish their conceptualisation of the meaning of the word *globalisation* from others, such as those building on notions of “accelerating interdependence” (Ohmae 1990), “action at a distance” (Giddens
1990), and “time-space compression” (Harvey 1990). Held et al appreciate these notions but do not consider them as capturing what is ‘global’ about ‘globalisation’, i.e. what makes the meaning of the word globalisation distinct for them (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 2003: 15).

I come back to this scholarly practice in due course. At this point, I want to turn to a second manner, in which the adjective global is used as a tool to establish and justify scholarly ideas of ‘globalisation’. This second manner differs slightly from the first one. It is a less common practice than the one above. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out because it can be found in one of the most influential, in the sense of, often-cited works in the ‘globalisation’-discourse, namely Scholte’s above mentioned Globalization: A Critical Introduction (Scholte 2005).

In this second manner, the scholarly idea ‘globalisation’ is established and justified with reference to the meaning of the linguistic sign globalisation. And the meaning of the linguistic sign globalisation is established and justified with reference to the meaning of the linguistic sign global. More precisely, the word global is taken as the radical of the word globalisation, and the meaning of the word globalisation, which is established in this way with the help of the word global, is taken as equalling the idea ‘globalisation’.

Bringing the above together, we see, for a start, that the adjective global is utilised by scholars to establish and justify their respective conceptions of ‘globalisation’. This observation becomes intriguing, when we now take a closer look at which meanings these scholars actually attach to the word global, that is, to this central tool in their conceptualisation of ‘globalisation’. More precisely, the above observation becomes intriguing when we realise how the meanings of the adjective global, which then serve as the basis for the respective scholarly conceptions of ‘globalisation’, are actually determined.

Let me start with a look at the first group of scholars that I looked at above, namely those commentators, like Held et al, who use the word global to establish an understanding of what they address with the word globalisation by suggesting that what is distinct about ‘globalisation’ is that there is something ‘global’ about it. Curiously, these scholars determine the meaning of the adjective global in a somewhat tautological way. They derive the meaning from a pre-set idea ‘globalisation’. This means they derive it from the very idea of ‘globalisation’ that they actually set out to establish with the help of the word global to begin with. On scrutiny we see that the meaning of the adjective global is derived in these cases from what these scholars consider is specific about the phenomenon they set out to grasp with the word globalisation, and that they intend to establish with the help of the meaning of the adjective global. What might sound abstract is easily illustrated if we look back at the above mentioned scholars and the way they derive their concept of ‘globalisation’.
For instance, for Held and his colleagues what is ‘global’ about the signified of the word globalisation are “its distinctive spatial attributes and the ways these unfold over time” and transform “the organization of human affairs by linking together and expanding human activity across regions and continents” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 2003: 15). For Kirchberger (2002) “what is ‘global’ about ‘globalisation’ is the ideology of ‘globalisation’ that literally spreads everywhere”. For Axford (2000: 241, 243; drawing on McGrew 1992b) what is ‘global’ about the signified of globalisation is the production of “an essential sameness” in the surface appearance of social and political life across the globe” together with “contradictory tendencies towards increasing interconnectedness and greater fragmentation”. And for Anyanwu (2000: 2-4), what is ‘global’ about the signified of the word globalisation is the subsumption of “the cultural and geopolitical differences of people. While globalisation is a form of neo-colonialism where the non-western Other is placed in a deceptive position of artificial competitiveness, it is a system that uses what Robert Stam would call the ‘figurative we’ to subjugate us through what Roland Barthes would call a ‘subjective nominated truth’.”

What we see above is an intriguing scholarly practice, in which the key character of the phenomenon that is captured with the word globalisation, is taken to be that it is ‘global’. The signified of the word global, in turn, is explained as whatever the commentators consider to be the key characteristics of what they pre-imagine as the phenomenon to which they refer with the word globalisation. Hence, the respective understanding of the distinct feature of the phenomenon, to which these scholars refer with the word globalisation, arises out of and is justified based on a tautological move, which has the adjective global at its heart.

Referring back to the discussion in Chapter 2, I suggest it is this kind of use of the word global that partly accounts for and explains the above observed ‘invisibility’ of the adjective. As is apparent in these practices, in a curious way the contemporary word global is locked into the orbit of the reproduction of the web of meanings, labelled ‘globalisation’, through utterances that contain the word globalisation. In this setting, it is the signified of the word globalisation that is at the centre of critical attention. The adjective global, in turn, is utilised in a way that turns it into something like a satellite of this interest. Global is locked into the shadow of ‘globalisation’. The word global is strategically utilised but then ‘disappears’ as a supposedly self-evident and ‘innocent’ linguistic ingredient of the negotiation of the signified/s of the noun globalisation.

The above mentioned second manner, in which the adjective global is used to establish and justify ideas of ‘globalisation’, namely the one that we find in Scholte’s seminal Globalization: A Critical Introduction, is as intriguing as the tautological practice, which I just sketched. Instead of describ-
ing it in the abstract, let me turn to a concrete example straight away to illustrate my point.

As we saw above, in order to establish what Scholte understands ‘globalisation’ to be, he turns to the linguistic level and stresses the importance of a robust definition of the word *globalisation*. He writes,

“[k]nowledge of globalization is substantially a function of how the word is defined. Thus every study of globalization should include a careful and critical examination of the term itself.” (Scholte 2005: 50)

In order to come up to this task, Scholte decides to set the foundation for his definition of the word *globalisation* through what he refers to as “trac[ing] the rise of the vocabulary of globalization in academic and lay thinking” (ibid.).

In doing this, Scholte builds on two premises. First, he pre-assumes that the word *globalisation* is a derivative of the words *globe* and *global*, as well as *globalise* and *globalism*. He claims these words are the natural “pedigree” (ibid.) of the word *globalisation*. Second, Scholte suggests that a fruitful way of ‘trac[ing] the rise of the vocabulary of globalization in academic and lay thinking’ is to look up the etymology of these, for him, interconnected words as it is recorded in a selection of one English and two American-English dictionaries.

This second premise is evident in the fact that, as if it was a natural matter, Scholte starts his ‘tracing’ by consulting the 2003 edition of the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* and the 1989 edition of the *Oxford English Dictionary*, as well as the *Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language* from 1961; he also refers to the insights of two other scholars who appear to have gone through a similar dictionary consultation exercise (Robertson 2001, 1983 and Schreiter 1997).

The first of Scholte’s premises is expressed in his opening explanation:

“Although the term ‘globalization’ was not coined until the second half of the twentieth century, it has a longer pedigree. In the English language, the noun ‘globe’ dates from the fifteenth century (derived from the Latin globus) and began to denote a spherical representation of the earth several hundred years ago (Robertson 2001: 6, 254; MWD 2003). The adjective ‘global’ entered circulation in the late seventeenth century and began to designate ‘planetary scale’ in the late nineteenth century, in addition to its earlier meaning of ‘spherical’ (OED 1989: VI, 582).” (Scholte 2005: 50)

In this text segment, we also see that Scholte picks out ‘planetary scale’ as the meaning of the word *global*. Given that he understands the word *globalisation* to be a derivative of the word *global*, he takes the word *globalisation* to imply ‘planetary scale’, too. Consequently, he takes the condition ‘planetary scale’ as a central component of his definition of the *phenomenon* that he labels with the word *globalisation*. In other words, Scholte derives a con-
stitutive part of what he associates with the word *globalisation* from his definition of the word *globalisation*, which he derives from a meaning of the word *global* that he picks out from a number of codified lexical meanings, which are provided in a selection of dictionaries.

The insights into lexical meanings that I provided in the previous chapter make the strategy, which Scholte follows in order to conceptualise ‘globalisation’, intriguing. We saw above that dictionaries do not provide the meaning of a word. Consequently, “precisely because words change in meaning over time, the meaning of a word cannot be established from its etymology” (Stubbs 2001: 172). Hence, as lexicographer David Crystal (1995: 136) puts it, “[f]ascinating as etymologies are, in debate they can only be a rhetorical cheat”. The meaning ‘of planetary scale’, which Scholte suggests is the meaning of the word *global* and, consequently, is the (natural) characteristic of the phenomenon he associates with the word *globalisation* is, of course, not the meaning of the adjective *global*. As we saw in the previous chapter, there is no ‘the meaning’ of any word that could be naturally derived from a consultation of a dictionary. Hence, Scholte’s way of establishing the (supposedly natural) meaning of the adjective *global* as a means to determine the (supposedly natural) meaning of the noun *globalisation*, in order to present it as the (supposedly natural) feature of the phenomenon, which he associates with the word *globalisation*, is a distinct way of legitimising a scholarly decision by building on the authority of the dictionary and on the etymology of a word.

To be clear, Scholte’s conceptualisation of the phenomenon ‘globalisation’ in his *Globalization: A Critical Introduction* might be valuable in many respects. There is also nothing wrong *per se* with his move to select one codified lexical meaning of the word *global*, namely ‘planetary scale’, and use it as the centre of his definition of the word *globalisation*, and subsequently, as what he understands as the phenomenon ‘globalisation’. Yet, his move needs to be acknowledged as a scholarly *practice*, rather than a neutral and natural depiction of an unquestionable (linguistic) reality; however, the latter is the way, in which he presents it.

My above reflection of the case of *global* in the ‘globalisation’-literature captures one way in which the contemporary adjective *global* is closely enmeshed with the ‘globalisation’-discourse. I illustrated that the adjective *global* is applied in various ways by commentators to establish and justify conceptions of ‘globalisation’, i.e. of the (constructed) object that is the product of the various utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*. In addition to this general insight, we also got a sense from the above that there is something intriguing about how this is done. Like in my brief analysis of the use of *global* in the post-9/11 rhetoric of President George W. Bush at the end of Chapter 2, we get again a sense of the politics of the use of the word *global*, this time in the context of the scholarly (‘globalisation’-) discourse, in which the adjective *global* features as nothing less than a tool
for scholars to establish and justify their individual conceptions of the phenomenon that they associate with the word *globalisation*.

**Global as an ‘Outcome of Globalisation’**

In addition to the above, I identify a second way, in which the contemporary adjective *global* is enmeshed with the ‘globalisation’-discourse. This is that the adjective actually gains one of its meanings from this discourse.

As we saw in the previous chapter, meanings are not naturally attached to a linguistic sign. They are also not fixed entities that could be easily looked up in a dictionary. Meanings arise and are visible in the use of language; they are conventional.

In the previous chapter, we saw that there are countless of meanings attached to the adjective *global*. In the following section, I carve out another of these countless of meanings that is attached to the contemporary adjective *global*. This carving out is grounded in an empirical exploration of the use of the contemporary *global*. With the help of a selection of concrete examples, I show that the contemporary adjective *global* also means ‘outcome of globalisation’. Grounded in this observation, I argue that the adjective gains one of its meaning from the ‘globalisation’-discourse.

Let me start my selection of illustrative examples with a familiar case, namely Jan Aart Scholte’s *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*. As we saw above, Scholte begins his conceptualisation of the signified of the word *globalisation* by referring to etymological insights into the linguistic signs *globalisation* and *global*. He suggests that the word *globalisation* goes back to the adjective *global*, which itself goes back to the noun *globe*. We noticed that what Scholte labels a linguistic ‘tracing’ of the word *globalisation* is actually the establishment of a scholarly claim by utilising a selected lexical meaning of the word *global* (which he takes as the supposed radical of *globalisation*) and by building on the widely perceived authority of dictionaries. Scholte decides to take ‘planetary scale’ as the meaning of the adjective *global* in order to claim that the word *globalisation* refers to ‘planetary scale’. This, then, serves as the ground, on which Scholte argues that the condition ‘planetary scale’ is a key component of the phenomenon that he imagines the word *globalisation* refers to. In other words, as we saw above, Scholte derives a constitutive aspect of his definition of the signified of the word *globalisation* from a meaning of the word *global* that he picks out from a number of codified lexical meanings provided in a selected set of dictionaries. Now, what is intriguing about Scholte’s case is not only that he utilises etymological insights to establish a scholarly concept. At least as intriguing is that, despite the importance he attributes to his theory that *global* means ‘of planetary scale’, he himself does not use the adjective *global* with this meaning. Reading through his body of work and looking carefully at how he uses the adjective *global* brings to light that Scholte’s own applica-
tion of *global* encodes something different from what he claims the adjective ‘really’ encodes (i.e. ‘of planetary scale’). On scrutiny, it becomes apparent that, somewhat curiously, Scholte’s use of the adjective *global* encodes that it is something that is the *outcome of ‘globalisation’*. The following section of his *Globalization: A Critical Introduction* illustrates my point:

“*Talk of ‘globalization’* has become rife among academics, journalists, politicians, business people, advertisers and entertainers. Everyday conversation now includes regular reference to *global* markets, *global* communications, *global* conferences, *global* threats, the *global* environment, and so on.” (Scholte 2005: 51; emphasis added)

Here, Scholte implies that the existence of concepts, which have come to be pre-modified with the adjective *global*, is a manifestation of the “talk of ‘globalization’”. In other words, Scholte uses the adjective *global* here as encapsulating (whatever is the signified of the word) *globalisation*. More precisely, he uses *global* to refer to something that is the ‘outcome of globalisation’.

As soon as we look beyond Scholte, we realise that he is by no means alone in using (as opposed to defining) the adjective *global* in this way. Reviewing all sorts of social and political studies publications shows that this is a common usage of the adjective. For example, Mary Kaldor (2003: 1) sets out to re-conceptualise ‘civil society’ as ‘*global* civil society’ and explains, “[w]hat is new about the concept of civil society since 1989 is *globalisation*”. In other words, what motivates Kaldor to add the adjective *global* to the concept ‘civil society’ is what she associates with the word *globalisation*. In a similar vein, Olaf Cramme and Patrick Diamond (2009: 3; emphasis added) make clear that by “rethinking social justice in the *global* age” they aim to articulate “a modern conception of social justice that remains relevant for an era of rapid *globalisation*.” Similarly, for Anthony Giddens (2007: ix), in his *Europe in the Global Age*, “the *global* age” is an age shaped by “intensifying *globalisation*”, a process “responsible for those changes”, which make the age a “*global* age”. Equally, for Peter Berger (2005: 13), it is the “intense discussion of the phenomenon of *globalisation*” that prompts him to speak of ‘*global* civil society’, rather than just ‘civil society’. John Tomlinson (1999: 32) applies the adjective *global* to the noun *modernity*, i.e. uses the term ‘*global* modernity’, in order to express “the empirical condition” that he refers to with the word *globalisation*. “One clear manifestation of the impact of *globalisation* in the governance of nations can be seen in the emergence of the *global* market […]”, suggest Tadashi and Ashizawa (2001: 16; emphasis added) and, with that, they too use the adjective *global* as encapsulating the signified of *globalisation*. More precisely, in all of these different cases *global* means something like the ‘outcome of globalisation’.
This list of examples from all sorts of contemporary writings could be easily extended, for instance with the earlier mentioned Dennis Altman (2001: 1), who, in his conception of ‘global sex’, aims to ‘connect two of the dominant preoccupations of current social science and popular debate, namely globalization and the preoccupation with sexuality’, and with Brice Cossart’s understanding of ‘global history’ as being partly about “focusing on the history of globalization” (Cossart 2013: 1). The same kind of use of the adjective global is also apparent beyond academic texts. See for instance how former BP manager James Krupka (URL) links the adjective global with the signified of globalisation: “[w]hether it is the global reach and interconnectedness of BP’s business worldwide, […] or the global impact of groups like CRS; globalisation is real”; or look at US President George W. Bush (2006), who uses the expression “in this global world” for the world shaped by “the effects of globalization”:

“I’ll give you an example of the effects of globalization. When India buys more fossil fuels, it causes the price of crude oil to go up, which causes our price of gasoline to go up. That’s an example of globalization. As these new jobs of the 21st century come into being, people are going to hire people with the skill sets. And if our folks don’t have the skill sets, those jobs are going to go somewhere else. That’s one of the effects of the world in which we live. […] A lot of countries, in trying to be competitive in this global world, are doing the same thing to encourage research and development […]”

US President Clinton’s spokesperson, Mike McCurry (Clinton 1998; emphasis added), uses global in a similar way in his account of a conversation between Clinton and French President Jacques Chirac:

“Other subjects they discussed – the situation in the Asia economy, a fascinating discussion about globalization and its impact on domestic economies. There’s a longstanding and vibrant exchange of views between France and the United States about the effects of globalization on our respective economies. And the President […] very much appreciated the opportunity to hear the Prime Minister’s [sic.] thinking and to learn more about his views of how global economies can balance the need for job creation with the provision of benefits that improve the quality of life for the citizens of these global economies.”

Even if we leave the English language and look at the German adjective global, we see a similar use of the word, for instance, in German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s rhetoric (Merkel 2006). Merkel follows the same logic in her use of the adjective when she links the word global with the signified of globalisation in an interview in which she elaborates on her argument that ‘the social market economy requires a regulatory framework’. In this interview, she explains her understanding of the nature of the signified of globalisation in order to conclude that ‘in a global world it is of course not possi-
ble that each country develops its own rules’. Again, the adjective *global* is applied here to encode something that is an outcome of the phenomenon that is associated with the word *globalisation*. And, going back to the English word *global*, to give a final example, this is the same way the adjective is used in Kofi Annan’s report ‘We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century’. Annan writes, “[t]his system [of the post-1945 international order] worked, and made it possible for globalization to emerge. As a result we now live in a *global* world” (Annan 2000; emphasis added).

**CONCLUSION**

My project was triggered by the question what the highly popular use of the adjective *global* in public, political and scholarly discourse implies, if anything interesting at all, and what *global* actually means. My project was shaped by the observation that there is little scholarly engagement with the word *global* in the political studies and IR scholarship and beyond. The word is taken as if it was obvious. In this way, it has become ‘invisible’. Consequently, the aim of this present chapter and the previous chapter was to make the adjective *global* ‘visible’ to begin with, and to bring it onto the scholarly radar. I set out to do this by making the contemporary *global* strange. For this purpose, I highlighted three aspects that I identify as constituting the contemporary adjective *global*. First, in the previous chapter, I suggested *global* is popular and free. Second, I pointed out that it is, in a somewhat paradoxical way, ‘disputedly undisputed’. Finally, in this present chapter, I demonstrated that *global* is closely enmeshed with the ‘globalisation’-discourse, where I understand ‘globalisation’-discourse to be the reproduction of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*.

In the above sections, I developed this latter point by illustrating that *global* is used by commentators as a tool to establish their idea of ‘globalisation’. At the same time, I showed that the contemporary *global* gains one of its meanings from the ‘globalisation’-discourse. This is evident in the fact that *global* is used (though not necessarily defined) these days to denote ‘outcome of globalisation’.

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1 Merkel (2006; emphasis added): “Weil sich durch die Globalisierung die Mobilität und die Reaktionsgeschwindigkeit des Kapitals im Vergleich zur Arbeit massiv erhöht hat. Das ist ein neuer Trend, der auch eine der Ursachen dafür ist, dass die Menschen gar nicht mehr verstehen, was heute eigentlich die Maßstäbe von Erfolg und Misserfolg sind. Denn das, was sie überblicken, ihre Arbeit, ist nur noch ein Teil der Wertschöpfung, während ein großer und zunehmender anderer Teil Bedingungen unterworfen ist, auf die eine einzelne Volkswirtschaft, so auch Deutschland, immer weniger Einfluss nehmen kann. […] In einer globalen Welt ist es natürlich nicht möglich, dass jedes Land seine eigenen Regeln macht.”
Moving on from this observation, I want to finalise my attempt to remove the cloak of invisibility, under which the adjective *global* has been hidden, and conclude this chapter by conceptualising the contemporary *global* as a ‘new word’.

**Global as a ‘new word’**

What makes a word a ‘new word’? Sara Tulloch, editor of *The Oxford Dictionary of New Words: A Popular Guide to Words in the News*, suggests this “is a question which can never be answered satisfactorily, any more than one can answer the question ‘How long is a piece of string?’” (Tulloch 1991: v). There is not one ultimate and objective criterion that makes a word a ‘new word’. The question when it is useful and meaningful to call a word ‘new’ is inevitably a question of context and scholarly reasoning and decision.

Most obviously, a word is reasonably acknowledged as ‘new’ if it constitutes a new lexem, such as the recently invented words *metrosexual* or *crowdsourcing*. Words can also be usefully called ‘new’ if their sense is ‘new’, i.e. if a lexem that used to refer to one thing, e.g. to a male honey bee, has come to be used also to refer to another thing, e.g. to an unmanned aerial vehicle, like in the case of the word *drone*; or if a company/product name is used to refer to the activity of searching the Internet for information, as it is the case with the verb *google*. But there are also infinitely more instances, in which it makes sense to speak of ‘new’ words. Tulloch (1991: v), for instance, applies the following criterion in her *The Oxford Dictionary of New Words*:

> “a new word is any word, phrase, or meaning that came into popular use in English or enjoyed a vogue during the eighties and early nineties. [...] the deciding factor has been whether or not the general public was made aware of the word or sense during the eighties and early nineties.”

Lexicographer Orin Hargraves (2004: viii), in turn, suggests more generally that a word is usefully called ‘new’ if there is “something genuinely innovative about the word hitherto unnoted in dictionaries”. He suggests applying the following criteria in the ‘search’ for ‘new words’:

> “Has the word escaped a relatively narrow field of usage, such as youth slang or trade jargon, to enjoy more general currency? Is the word likely to enjoy continuing cur-

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2 Following Zaloga (in Mehta 2013), the use of the word *drone* to refer to an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) dates back to 1935, when the US used UAVs for gunnery practice. As Zaloga explains, the word *drone* was chosen to refer to these UAVs in reference to the British Royal Navy’s system with the same function that was called DH 82B Queen Bee (see Selchow 2015: 58).
rency, or does it designate a fad or phenomenon that will probably no longer need a word for next year.” (ibid.)

In Chapter 2, we saw that the adjective global has had a long dictionary life. Adding to this, over the course of its life, global has also been explicitly perceived as a ‘new word’ three times. Hence, my move to recognise global as a ‘new word’ is not without precedent. In the three instances, in which the adjective had been acknowledged as ‘new’, this was done on the grounds that global had gained a noteworthy meaning that, using Hargraves’s words from above, had remained “hitherto unnoted in dictionaries” (ibid.). The three instances, in which global was acknowledged as a ‘new word’, were in 1954 and 1955 with regard to the sense of ‘worldwide’ and in 1991 in light of the adjective’s use in environmental discourses.

In 1954 A. M. Macdonald (1954: 94) finds, “[p]erhaps, the most significant of all new words in English is the adjective global: war, strategy, problems of food and other necessities, are no longer regional but world-wide.”

A year later Mary Reifer (1995), too, takes up global as a ‘new word’ in her Dictionary of New Words. The ‘new’ sense that she identifies the adjective global had acquired by 1955 is: “[p]ertaining to a strategic or political view which includes the whole world in its scope” (Reifer 1955: 93). Both instances bring us back to Chapter 2 because they seem to be related to the peak in the use of the word global that is apparent in the COBUILD American English corpus (ref. Figure 1).

Not long after global was treated as ‘new’ in the 1950s, it was also taken up in the revised edition of H. W. Fowler’s popular A Dictionary of Modern English Usage (1965), where it was called a ‘vogue word’. Ernest Gower, the editor of Fowler’s A Dictionary of Modern English Usage, explains a ‘vogue word’ as follows:

“Every now and then a word emerges from obscurity, or even from nothingness or a merely potential and not actual existence, into sudden popularity. It is often, but not necessarily, one that by no means explains itself to the average man, who has to find out its meaning as best he can. His wrestlings with it have usually some effect upon it; it does not mean quite what it ought to, but to make up for that it means some things that it ought not, by the time he has done with it. […] Ready acceptance of vogue words seems to some people the sign of an alert mind; to others it stands for the herd instinct and lack of individuality. […] the second view is here taken. […] Many, it should be added – perhaps most – are vogue words in particular senses only, and are unobjectionable, though liable now to ambiguity, in the senses that belonged to them before they attained their vogue.” (Gower 1965: 684)
Gowers distinguishes between different kinds of ‘vogue words’ and explains that the adjective *global* is one of the “words owing their vogue to the joy of showing that one has acquired them” (ibid. 229). He puts it into one group with words such as *allergic, ambience, ambivalent, and catalyst*, and explains it as follows:

“The original meaning, now archaic, was globular. Towards the end of the 19th c. it acquired a new one: ‘pertaining to or embracing the totality of a number of items, categories, or the like’ (OED Supp.). With that meaning it was a useful word, but there seems to be a curious attraction in it […] that leads to its misuse for aggregate or total, with which it is properly in antithesis. For instance, the compensation paid to the coal industry on nationalization was a global figure representing the estimated value of the industry as a whole, to be apportioned among its constituent units, not an aggregate figure arrived at by adding together the estimated values of the several units. Global, moreover, seeking wider fields, has now established itself unnecessarily but firmly, as a synonym for what we used to call world-wide. Mondial is also available for writers who dislike both words.” (ibid.)

The third ‘discovery’ of *global* as a ‘new word’ after 1954 and 1955 took place in 1991 in the above mentioned *The Oxford Dictionary of New Words: A Popular Guide to Words in the News*, compiled by Sarah Tulloch. *The Oxford Dictionary of New Words* sets out to “provide an informative and readable guide to about two thousand high-profile words and phrases which have been in the news during the past decade” (Tulloch 1991: v). The new meaning of *global* is described here as one that has appeared in “environmental jargon”:

“*global* […] adjective In environmental jargon: relating to or affecting the Earth as an ecological unit. Used especially in: *global consciousness* […]; *global warming* […]” (ibid. 133; emphasis in the original)

In concluding this chapter and my initial engagement with the adjective *global*, I suggest that we understand the contemporary *global* again as a ‘new word’ – for the fourth time after 1954, 1955 and 1991.

My move to call the contemporary *global* a ‘new word’ has two different purposes. On the one side, it is a scholarly decision with the aim of drawing attention to the widely overlooked word *global* and, with that, to free it from its dominating environment by establishing it as something to look at, namely a ‘new word’. It is a final move to free the adjective *global* of the shadow of the word *globalisation* and the concept ‘globalisation’, in which it has come to be ‘locked up’. We saw this in the above provided overview of how the adjective *global* is used by scholars to establish ideas of ‘globalisation’. Given the general nature of proclamations of something as ‘new’, the scholarly decision to call something ‘new’, like “new wars” (Kaldor 2006[1999]), “new terrorism” (Neumann 2009), or, in fact, ‘new
word’, is a strategic move that problematises this respective ‘something’ in contrast to existing perceptions and understandings of it, and, as such, inevitably provokes critical attention.

On the other side, my move to call the contemporary global a ‘new word’ has the purpose of highlighting that there is, indeed, something ‘new’, in the sense of distinct and, using Hargraves’ words from above again, “hitherto unnoted” (Hargraves 2004: viii) about the contemporary global. This is the new meaning, with which the adjective is used these days, namely ‘outcome of globalisation’.

In and of itself, and especially if one is not a linguist, the discovery of the ‘new’ meaning of the contemporary adjective global is not more nor less interesting than the acknowledgment of all the various other meanings the word is used with, which I pointed out in Chapter 2. And yet, it makes the adjective global interesting because it forces us to think about the distinct relationship between global and the ‘globalisation’-discourse, which it implies, and, ultimately, about the nature of the ‘globalisation’-discourse:

Above, we saw that the adjective global is naturally locked into the shadow of ‘globalisation’, i.e. into the shadow of the web of meanings that is re-produced through utterances, which contain the word globalisation. This is because global is taken as the natural “pedigree” of the word globalisation; Scholte’s (2005: 50) use of the word global illustrated this point. We saw that the adjective global is considered as and treated like something that comes from ‘outside’ into the ‘globalisation’-discourse. However, grounded in my above sketched insights into the enmeshment of the adjective global with the ‘globalisation’-discourse, in general, and, in particular, the realisation that the adjective has come to be used these days with the meaning ‘outcome of globalisation’, I argue that, in actual fact, the relationship between the contemporary global and globalisation is best to be thought of the other way around. I argue what is distinct about the contemporary global is that it cannot be thought of anymore as independent of and existing outside the ‘globalisation’-discourse. The contemporary global is inextricably enmeshed with the ‘globalisation’-discourse, i.e. with the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word globalisation.

In this sense, I partly confirm the intuition of those commentators, mentioned in Chapter 2, who criticise the adjective global, grounded in the suspicion that it is part of the talk about ‘globalisation’ and, as such, part of a hegemonic Northern and capitalist discourse. Grounded in my above analysis, I agree with these commentators and confirm that the contemporary global is interlinked inextricably with the ‘globalisation’-discourse. Yet, as I unfold in the following chapters, this means something more complex and intriguing than that the use of the adjective global fosters a Northern neoliberal discourse of open markets. This is because ‘globalisation’, i.e. the web of meanings that is re-produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse, is something more complex than a world shaped by widespread market integration.
As I will argue in the following Chapter 4, the ‘globalisation’-discourse is about the reproduction of a web of meanings called ‘new world’. It is this distinct nature of the ‘globalisation’-discourse that makes it intriguing and that makes the discovered enmeshment of the adjective *global* with the ‘globalisation’-discourse noteworthy.

For now, I conclude my reflection on the word *global* in this present and the previous chapters by introducing the adjective as a ‘new word’ that is inextricably interlinked with the ‘globalisation’-discourse. This insight and the fact that it is a popular and free word, which leads a ‘disputedly undisputed’ shadow existence, while simultaneously serving an important role in the re-production of the web of meanings commonly called ‘globalisation’, leads me to argue that, contrary to what seems to be the widespread conception among the majority of scholars, the contemporary *global* is worthy of being taken seriously. There is something intriguing about this adjective. It is not enough to “assume that we are reasonably clear about what is meant by ‘global’” (Berger 2005: 11).
4 The ‘Globalisation’-Discourse and the ‘New World’

Globalization is an idea whose time has come.
DAVID HELD, ANTHONY McGREW, DAVID GOLDBLATT AND JONATHAN PERRATON (2003: 1)

It is always possible that one might speak the truth in the space of a wild exteriority, but one is ‘in the true’ only by obeying the rules of a discursive ‘policing’ which one has to reactivate in each of one’s discourses.
MICHEL FOUCAULT (1981: 60)

In the previous two chapters, I focused on the contemporary adjective global. I concluded these chapters by conceptualising global as a ‘new word’. What is ‘new’ about the contemporary global and what makes it intriguing, I argued, is that it is inextricably interlinked with the ‘globalisation’-discourse.

This brings me to the issue of the ‘globalisation’-discourse. Above, I explained that I use the term ‘globalisation’-discourse to refer to the reproduction of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word globalisation. This requires explication and substantiation. In this chapter, I focus on what I mean by ‘globalisation’-discourse.

I start by providing a brief reflection on how I use the word discourse. This includes a discussion of what is distinct about my conception ‘globalisation’-discourse, in contrast to other uses of this term, such as in Hay (2008), Hay and Rosamond (2002), Hay and Smith (2005), and Rosamond (1999). Moving on from this and interpreting Nick Bisley’s overview of the development of the concept ‘globalisation’ (Bisley 2007), I sketch a picture of the ‘life’ of what I call the ‘globalisation’-discourse. Following this diachronic sketch, I zoom in to provide a more detailed and nuanced picture of
the ‘globalisation’-discourse. In this context, I identify and discuss five facets that characterise it.

One of these facets is that the idea ‘new world’ plays an important and, I argue, constitutive role in the life of this discourse. It was the notion that the breakdown of the bipolar bloc system at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s brought about a ‘new world’, which gave birth to the ‘globalisation’-discourse. I argue that it was the conceptual vacuum, which this event produced, that allowed the neologism globalisation to enter the language and enabled idea/s called ‘globalisation’ to come to be “in the true” (Foucault 1981: 61).

This latter point serves as the ground for the argument that forms the centre of this chapter. I propose to understand the ‘globalisation’-discourse as the re-production of a web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word globalisation, that is usefully labelled ‘new world’. In other words, I argue that the use of the word globalisation, no matter in which context and in which sense it is used, constitutes the re-production of a web of meanings that brings out an object that is best called ‘new world’.

**Clarification of the Word Discourse**

As Helge Schalk (in Landwehr 2009: 16; my own translation) puts it, “the word discourse has come to be a vogue word, the enigmatic meaning of which makes it almost impossible to define it exhaustively”. Dealing with the word discourse is not made easier by the fact that it is not exclusively an academic concept but also appears in everyday language. In the English language, there is a common understanding of discourse as ‘conversation’. In the German language, the noun Diskurs is usually associated with the idea of a publicly discussed issue, a specific chain of argumentation, or a statement of a politician or other kind of official representative; it is rarely used in everyday language. In French and other Romanic languages, the word discourse is commonly associated with the idea of a lecture, an academic speech, or homily (for the above see Keller 2004).

A prominent use of the word discourse in the political studies and IR scholarship are instances, in which Jürgen Habermas’ concept is denoted. Habermas’ concept ‘discourse’ plays a central role in theories of deliberative politics and democracy (especially Habermas 1992). It is a normative concept, which is linked to a distinct form of communicative action, juxtaposed with ‘ordinary communicative action’. As Martin Nonhoff (2004: 67) explains, in essence, ‘discourse’ is Habermas’ answer to the question of how moral statements need to be legitimised so that they are accepted as ‘good’ and ‘reasonable’ and, consequently, as ‘true’. For Habermas, ‘discourse’ stands for a rational and pre-conditioned way of communicating. It is a process of regulated argumentation that opens the chance of tracing ‘truth’ and the ‘validity’ of statements. It is the institutionally secured spheres and pro-
In talking about the ‘globalisation’-discourse I do not use the word discourse in a Habermasian sense. Rather, I use it in the way, in which it is used in the social scientific scholarship that acknowledges, in one way or other, “that the relationship between human beings and the world are mediated by means of collectively created symbolic meaning systems or orders of knowledge” (Keller 2013: 2). In this vein, I do not refer to an ontological object when I use the word discourse (see Keller quoted in Landwehr 2009: 21). A ‘discourse’ does not exist as such, waiting to be unveiled through (textual) analysis of the right data corpus (see Landwehr 2009: 20). Rather, the word discourse, as it is used here, is to be understood as an analytic tool that is applied by a second order-observer. As Landwehr (ibid.) stresses, to apply the concept ‘discourse’ implies and expresses the presumption that a

1 At the core of this thinking is the assumption that the human communicative competence implies four validity claims (Geltungsansprüche) (see Habermas 1976: 176). These validity claims are implicit in every speech act of communicative action as they are mutually expected by the communicative partners of the speech act. Although the four validity claims are always mutually expected in ordinary communicative action, they are normally not explicit subjects of speech acts. As soon as they do become subject to the discussion, in other words, as soon as the communication becomes problematic in that the validity claims are questioned and the ordinary communicative action gets distorted, the level of ‘discourse’ is entered. ‘Discourses’, accordingly, deal retrospectively (one can say as an interruption of ordinary communicative action) with the question of if and how the specific communicative action can be justified. Habermas distinguishes between two main forms of ‘discourses’: ‘theoretical discourse’ on the one hand, and ‘practical discourse’ on the other hand (see Habermas 1984a: esp. 23). While the ‘theoretical discourse’ is understood as addressing questions of truth (Habermas 1981a: 39), the ‘practical discourse’ addresses social norms (ibid.). Both forms of ‘discourses’ aim to reach an intersubjective consensus based on rational and reflexive argumentation. Like the communicative action, Habermas’ ‘discourses’ too are subject to an (presumed) idealization (see further Habermas 1984a: esp. 23). This idealization is what he conceptualises as the ‘ideal speech situation’ which, to simplify the complexity of the issue, holds that there is equal opportunity for participating in the communication and that power relations that might exist outside the discourse are irrelevant; he speaks of a ‘power free discourse’ (herrschaftsfreier Diskurs) (for a formulation of the four concrete conditions of the ‘ideale Sprechsituation’ see Habermas 1984: 177pp). Given these conditions, Habermas sees it as being guaranteed that, in a ‘power free discourse’, the better argument ‘succeeds’. For this brief overview I relied on my reading of Habermas’ referenced original texts, as well as on Held (1980: espec. 247-350), Nonhoff (2004: 66-70), Strecker and Schaal (2001), and Krallmann and Ziemann (2001: 281-307).
network of meanings disciplines what is thinkable, sayable and doable in a distinct historical moment. In this sense, ‘discourse’ indicates a distinct approach to the social world, rather than constituting a pre-existing object of study.

In the broadest sense, this meaning of the word discourse springs off Michel Foucault’s work and the many discussions and extensions of it that continue to proliferate in the social scientific literature (see, for instance, the many different contributions in Angermüller et al 2014; also in Kerchner and Schneider 2006).

Foucault’s notion ‘discourse’ arises from his investigation of the development of what he calls ‘human sciences’. By ‘human sciences’, he refers to all those sciences that are in one way or other concerned with human beings and their actions. As outlined in The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault (1972: 156) considers these sciences, firstly, as being situated in a specific historical context, and, secondly, as being a conglomerate of ‘statements’ which belong to one specific system. Based on these two general claims he develops his idea ‘discourse’. With the word discourse Foucault refers to, on the one side, concrete historical formations of the production of knowledge and meaning. On the other side, the word refers to specific structures and dynamics that can be described in an abstract way.

As he points out, ‘discourses’ are constituted by linguistic signs. Yet, these signs are not to be understood as simply referring to any kind of referent (objects, subjects, relations etc). Rather, they have a discursive function, which means they ‘produce’ these referents. Producing references does not mean that a material referent is actually ‘produced’ – it means that the linguistic signs within these formations of statements (in other words, within ‘discourses’) ascribe meanings to these referents and with that make them accessible in the first place (see ibid. 74). Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (1982: 86pp) elaborate on this aspect of Foucault’s theory and point out that, consequently, his notion of ‘discourse’ must not be understood as an entity of signs. Rather, discourses are processes, in which the linkage between sequences of signs and referents leads to the actual production of these referents – or, more precisely, to the production of the meanings of these referents. This is what I meant in the previous chapter when I spoke of the ‘object’ that the ‘globalisation’-discourse produces.

Building on this, and in the context of his interest in ‘human sciences’, Foucault intends to show that forms of knowledge are actually productions of discourses and not natural, a priori given entities. Discourses “systematically form the objects of which they speak”, he argues (Foucault 1972: 49). A discourse constitutes

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2 In addition to my reading of the referenced works by Foucault, I build for the above and in the following on Andersen (2003), Dreyfuss and Rabinow (1982), Keller (2004, 2013), Kerchner and Schneider (2006), Landwehr (2009), Nonhoff (2004), and Nullmeier (2001).
“its object and work[s] it to the point of transforming it altogether. So that the problem arises of knowing whether the unity of a discourse is based not so much on the permanence and uniqueness of an object as on the space in which various objects emerge and are continuously transformed.” (ibid. 32)

A closer look at Foucault’s differentiation between ‘statement’ and ‘utterance’, and, what can be called, ‘referent’, helps to further grasp the essence of his understanding of ‘discourse’. ‘Statement’ differs from his idea of ‘utterance’. An ‘utterance’ is a single event, in which linguistic signs are interlinked with each other. In other words, an ‘utterance’ takes place within a single, specific context. A ‘statement’, on the other side, stands, as it were, for a specific function of ‘utterances’. It can be detected in ‘utterances’ (Foucault 1972). This does not mean that one can automatically find a ‘statement’ in every ‘utterance’. Rather, a ‘statement’ (in other words, a specific function of ‘utterance’) evolves when the respective connection of signs (in other words, ‘utterance’) is related to a ‘referent’. Again, as mentioned above and as Foucault explains in The Archaeology of Knowledge, a ‘referent’ must not be misunderstood as a fixed, a priori existing ‘object’ or ‘fact’. Rather, a ‘referent’ is the laws / orders / rules, which permit and restrict the ways in which ‘objects’ and ‘facts’ are related to each other, and, consequently, which ultimately permit and restrict the ways in which ‘objects’ and ‘facts’ are (‘allowed’ to be) understood in the first place. Every ‘utterance’, then, the ‘statement’ of which does not confirm the rules, is automatically questioned, if not automatically rejected.

By taking Gregor Mendel’s theory of hereditary traits as an example, Foucault (1981: 59-60) illustrates the nature of this rejection and the relation between ‘discourse’ and ‘truth’. While Gregor Mendel’s theory of hereditary traits is today a well-accepted and well-established scientific insight, and, indeed, while one can wonder with Foucault (ibid. 60) “how the botanists or biologists of the nineteenth century managed not to see that what Mendel was saying was true”, it was dismissed by biologists for a long time. This was due to the fact that although Mendel “spoke the truth, […] he was not ‘within the true’ of the biological discourse of his time” (ibid. 61).

“It is always possible that one might speak the truth in the space of a wild exteriority, but one is ‘in the true’ only by obeying the rules of a discursive ‘policing’ which one has to reactivate in each of one’s discourses.” (ibid.)

As Niels Akerstrom Andersen (2003: 3) puts it, with this understanding of ‘utterance’ Foucault “challenges individual will and reason by showing how every utterance is an utterance within a specific discourse to which certain rules of acceptability apply”. These rules are being approved, questioned and / or changed at the level of ‘statements’. Yet, as soon as ‘objects’ and

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3 For the following paragraph see Nonhoff (2004: 71-72).
‘facts’ are regularly reproduced within functions of ‘utterances’ (in other words, within ‘statements’) they are more and more readily confirmed. They establish and cement a distinct (view of an) ‘object’. More precisely, they establish a ‘legitimised’ stock of knowledge. These networks of ‘statements’ are what Foucault (1972: 31-39) calls ‘discursive formations’. Within ‘discursive formations’, legitimate knowledge comes into being, develops and becomes established. However, despite the fact that they produce what appears to be a stable constellation, ‘discursive formations’ are, of course, not stable or fixed entities as such. On the one side, as Martin Nonhoff (2004: 72) notes, with reference to Michel Pecheux, it is surprising that the natural unpredictability of the flow of ‘statements’ enables the development of relatively stable structures. On the other side, Foucault recognises this unpredictability as the reason or foundation for social procedures that restrict the ‘unhindered’ use of language. These are, for instance, manifest in the restriction of access to privileged, in the sense of discursively accepted speaking positions, which he describes in The Order of Discourse (1981). These restricting procedures, in turn, help to stabilise the ‘discursive formations.’ They stabilise what is (perceived to be) ‘natural’ and ‘normal’ which, in turn, has disciplining effects because, clearly, “to question the normal and natural is to invite marginalisation, ridicule, condemnation, or even punishment” (Hoffman and Knowles quoted in Nadoll 2000: 16).

The above provides a general account of some of the premises, which underlie the concept ‘discourse’ that has come to be popular in parts of the social sciences. To be clear, there is no single research field on ‘discourse’. These premises have been amended, critically rewritten and translated by scholars into different research programmes, research agendas and methodologies (again, see, for instance, the diverse contributions in Angermüller et al 2014 and Kerchner and Schneider 2006; also Keller et al 2004, 2004a).

In Chapter 6, I come back to these premises and amend them for my own purposes. For the time being, however, the above is sufficient to provide a general sense of the ideas and presumptions that surround my use of the word discourse. On this ground, I return to what I mean by ‘globalisation’-discourse.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, I use the term ‘globalisation’-discourse to refer to the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word globalisation. Referring to the above, this web of meanings that is re-produced through utterances, which contain the word globalisation, does not mirror but is social reality, in the sense that it brings out its ‘object’, namely in this case ‘globalisation’. Putting it the other way around, I conceptualise every use of the word globalisation, no matter in which thematic context, as a contribution to the re-production of a distinct web of meanings, that, for the time being, I call ‘globalisation’.

Despite being generally committed to the above sketched ‘discourse’-concept, in my phraseology that the ‘globalisation’-discourse is the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances which contain
the word *globalisation*, I initially take inspiration from Böke et al (2000). Yet, while they conceptualise the ‘migration’-discourse as a “web of *thematically* linked statements, which are manifest in texts” (ibid. 12; translation my own; emphasis added). I initially conceptualise the ‘globalisation’-discourse not based on any *thematic* commonalities but based on a *linguistic* commonality, namely based on the appearance of the word *globalisation*. With that, my concept ‘globalisation’-discourse also differs from ideas, which those IR scholars hold, who speak explicitly, in one way or other, of ‘globalisation discourses’, such as, Hay (2008), Hay and Marsh (2000), Hay and Rosamond (2002), Hay and Smith (2005), and Rosamond (1999). These scholars grasp distinct thematic debates with the term ‘globalisation discourse’. They identify these debates as ‘globalisation discourses’ based on their pre-set idea of the signified of the word *globalisation*. This is usually an idea of ‘globalisation’ as “heightened economic integration and interdependence” (Hay and Smith 2005: 124).

In comparison, my concept ‘globalisation’-discourse grasps more than that. As we will see in the following sections, my concept takes seriously that the word *globalisation* – just like the adjective *global* – is highly polysemic. *Globalisation* “means different things to different people” (van Aelst and Walgrange 2002: 467). Hence, conceptualising the ‘globalisation’-discourse in the way I do here, allows me to capture all the different uses of the word *globalisation* with all its different meanings, and take these uses as constituting one web of meanings that brings out its object ‘globalisation’. What this object ‘globalisation’ is, then – i.e. what the web of meanings is about that is re-produced through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation* – is not pre-set by me in a definitional move through the application of a pre-set definition, such as ‘heightened economic integration and interdependence’. Rather, it is something to be analytically carved out from a study of these utterances that apply the word *globalisation* and from an analysis of the way they interact in bringing out this ‘object’ ‘globalisation’.

As mentioned above, eventually, at the end of this chapter, I suggest that we label this symbolically produced object ‘globalisation’ with the term ‘new world’. Before reaching this point, however, I provide a sketch of the ‘globalisation’-discourse through a brief diachronic view at its ‘life’, as well as, a more nuanced account of its nature and five facets that I identify as shaping it.

**A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ‘GLOBALISATION’-DISCOURSE**

“Globalization is an idea whose time has come” – this is how David Held and his colleagues open their study *Global Transformations* (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 2003: 1). In his seminal work *Agendas, Al-
ternatives and Public Policies public policy analyst John Kingdon (2003[1984: 1) observes that

“[t]he phrase ‘an idea whose time has come’ captures a fundamental reality about an irresistible movement that sweeps over our politics and society, pushing aside everything that might stand in its path.”

Although Kingdon writes in a different context and well before the neologism globalisation gained ground,4 his claim aptly captures the rise of the popularity of the word globalisation and the birth and rise to prominence of what I call the ‘globalisation’-discourse. As Scholte (2005: 14) puts it, “[i]t is today pretty much impossible to avoid the issue” of ‘globalisation’; it has reached a “status somewhat below that of motherhood and apple pie”, finds Ian Clark (1999: 35).

Nick Bisley (2007: 12-16) provides a short and compelling overview of the life of what he understands as the concept ‘globalisation’. In the following, I reformulate Bisley’s elaborations in a subtle but meaningful way as I read them as providing insights into the life and nature of what I take as the ‘globalisation’-discourse. In particular, when Bisley speaks of ‘understandings of globalisation’, I use expressions such as ‘the use of the word globalisation’ and ‘the signified of the word globalisation’. Arguably, this makes my account sound less smooth. Yet, it is an important measure because it acknowledges that there are various different ideas of social and political phenomena associated with the word globalisation. Referring to what I sketched above, ‘globalisation’ does not exist as such, despite the fact that it is common practice to take it as if it was simply a ‘thing’ ‘out there’. Rather, ‘globalisation’ is the object that is produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse.

To begin with, following Bisley (2007: 11), we find that ideas, which are referred to with the word globalisation, “appeared to flower rather suddenly in the early 1990s” and it is only since then that – I am paraphrasing the above quoted Kingdon – they have ‘swept over our politics and society’, capturing the public, political and academic imagination with “a remarkable forcefulness”, as Bisley (ibid. 12) puts it.

Building on Bisley’s account and re-interpreting it for my purposes here, the ‘globalisation’-discourse can be seen to have developed in five main phases.

In the first phase, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, scholars, such as Anthony Giddens (1990) in sociology, Kenichi Ohmae (1990) in business studies and James N. Rosenau (1990) in International Relations, started to use the word globalisation to argue that the world was experiencing developments, which resulted in distinct socio- and economic-structural transformations. As Bisley (2007: 12) explains, although “earlier work had iden-

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4 Kingdon investigates the question why certain public policy issues make it onto the US policy agenda and others not.
ified developments that we now associate with globalization”, it was this diverse group of scholars at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s that made the point explicit. The ‘globalisation’-discourse, as I understand it, was born. Over the 1990s, the word globalisation became a “talismanic term, a seemingly unavoidable reference point for discussions about our contemporary situation” (Low and Barnett 2000: 54).5

In the second phase of its development, which took place in the first half of the 1990s, the ‘globalisation’-discourse was subject to institutionalisation within the academy. “[I]mportant debates in core areas of concern (for example, integration in economics, sovereignty and the state in IR, and modernity in sociology)” started to take place (Bisley 2007: 13). In this phase, the ‘globalisation’-discourse – the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word globalisation – came to be shaped in particular by economic interpretations of the world. As Bisley (ibid.) puts it, these interpretations “cemented the idea of a truly global economic system that influences the success of the world’s states and societies in the popular imagination”. Furthermore, an understanding that “the social realm is in the midst of a broad-ranging transformation” (ibid.) was reinforced through a handful of works in this institutionalised context, such as the writings by the earlier mentioned Martin Albrow (1996) and the above discussed Scholte (1993). Notably, interpreting Bisley’s insights, it was at

5 This does not mean that the word globalisation was not used before the 1990s. In his Begriffsgeschichte of ‘globalisation’ Bach (2013: 93) finds that the sociologist Paul Meadow uses the word globalisation in a 1951-article on the “new culture pattern” that results from “industrialism” (Meadows 1951: 11). Bach (2013: 94) also points to IR-scholar Trygve Mathisen, who applies the word in his Methodology in the Study of International Relations in 1959, and to Inis Claude’s 1965-use of globalisation in an article, in which Claude characterises the UN as having “tended to reflect the steady globalization of international relations” (Claude 1965: 387). Nick Bisely (2007: 5) refers to George Modelski’s 1972 The Principles of World Politics as “[o]ne of the earliest references to globalization”. And linguist Wolfgang Teubert highlights Theodore Levitt’s use of the word globalisation in a 1983-Harvard Business Review article (Levitt 1983) as a particularly influential, early application of the word (Teubert 2002: 157). As a study of the archive of the Public Papers of the US Presidents shows, the first US President who uses the word globalisation in his Public Papers was Ronald Reagan (1987) in 1987; and a look into the archive of The New York Times reveals that it appeared there for the first time in an article in 1974, was then uses once in 1981, not at all in 1982 and 1983, appeared again once in 1984. Thereafter, it experienced a sudden accelerating popularity, reaching a peak in 2000, in which 453 separate articles uses the word at least once. An examination of The Washington Post provides us with a similar picture, and so does a study of The Times (London) and The Guardian. Each of them shows a similar trend in the use of the word globalisation.
this time that the word *globalisation* moved from the vocabulary of a handful of specialists to the language of a wide-range of scholars, policy-makers, political commentators and the public.

The third phase in the life of the ‘globalisation’-discourse was shaped by two noteworthy developments. To begin with, debates, in which the neologism *globalisation* was used, widened and diversified. Different kinds of scepticism were directed towards various arguments that were advanced with the help of the word *globalisation*; the group of these sceptics include Philip G. Cerny (1997), Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson (1996), and Michael Mann (1997). Furthermore, the re-production of the ‘globalisation’-discourse widened with a shift away from mainly theoretical and conceptual contributions towards political arguments that utilised the word *globalisation*. “[A]ctivists and scholars began to associate [particular signifieds of the word *globalisation*] with malign forces and to question the motivation of those advocating [them]” (Bisley 2007: 15). At the same time, the institutionalisation of the re-production of the ‘globalisation’-discourse moved forward through publications such as *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* by David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton (2003). These publications were sufficiently influential as to ‘tame’ the ‘globalisation’-discourse. They were “particularly successful in solidifying contemporary understandings of globalization”, as Bisley (2007: 15) puts it.

The trend towards more activist contributions to the re-production of the ‘globalisation’-discourse that started in the third phase significantly shaped the fourth phase in the life of the discourse in the early 2000s (see ibid. 16). In this fourth phase, public intellectuals and political activists, such as Joseph Stiglitz and Naomi Klein, entered the re-production of the discourse. They used the word *globalisation* to express concern and critique about various established stances adopted regarding the interpretation of the state of the world. In particular, they voiced concern about the kind of signified of the word *globalisation* that they considered to be responsible for increasing global inequality and its consequence of “no space, no choice, no jobs” (Klein 2000).

The current, fifth state of the ‘globalisation’-discourse is shaped by a situation, in which the various contributions to its re-production are grounded in and committed to fixed positions. Current contributions to the ‘globalisation’-discourse are “less inclined to engage substantively with one another”, observes Bisley (2007: 16). This lack of critical engagement with each other and across different interpretative stances is particularly remarkable because the ‘globalisation’-discourse constitutes an influential aspect of the construction of social reality today.

In general, as John Tomlinson (1999: 2) puts it,
“[t]he idea of ‘globalization’ [...] is an extraordinarily fecund concept in its capacity to generate speculations, hypotheses and powerful social images and metaphors which reach far beyond the bare social facts.”

In particular, the signified of the word globalisation is not only treated as an *explanandum*, i.e. as something that is to be explained, but as an *explanans*, i.e. something that explains all sorts of social phenomena. As such, it is closely inscribed in the production of (knowledge about) the contemporary world.

A prime example of the signified of globalisation, understood as something that is to be explained, can be found in the above mentioned *Global Transformation: Politics, Economics and Culture* by Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton (2003). The authors provide a theoretical and empirical account of the various dimensions of what they associate with the word globalisation, which is a

“process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power.” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 2003: 16)

For an example of an understanding of the signified of globalisation as something that explains something, we can turn to Mary Kaldor’s work on ‘new wars’ (2006[1999]) and her writings on ‘global civil society’ (2003). As mentioned in Chapter 3, Kaldor re-conceptualises ‘war’ and ‘civil society’ because she understands them to have been changed due to ‘globalisation’; as quoted above, she argues “[w]hat is new about the concept of civil society since 1989 is globalization” (ibid. 1). The signified of the word globalisation is taken here as the explanation of changes in ‘war’ and ‘civil society’. Another, very different example, in which the signified of globalisation is imagined as an explanans, is US President George W. Bush’s (2008) understanding of the relationship between energy prices and the economic development of China. Bush describes it as “a very interesting and important relationship made complex by globalization”. In each of these cases it is because of the respective signified of the word globalisation that a social phenomenon, such as ‘war’, ‘civil society’ and the relationship between energy prices and economic development, looks as it looks. As such, these examples demonstrate that the ‘globalisation’-discourse is now closely inscribed in and takes an influential position in relation to the knowledge-production about social reality.
Four Facets of the ‘Globalisation’-Discourse

Above, grounded in an interpretation of Bisley’s history of the concept ‘globalisation’, I sketched a broad overview of the life of the ‘globalisation’-discourse, divided into five main phases. In the following, I zoom in and have a closer look at the discourse’s re-production. My aim is to provide a more nuanced picture of this discourse. I provide an account of the various positions, scholarly practices, as well as, understandings of the signified of the word globalisation that play into the ‘globalisation’-discourse; to remind us, with ‘globalisation’-discourse I mean the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word globalisation.

I suggest there are five facets of the ‘globalisation’-discourse. In this present section, I examine four of these five facets. The subsequent section focuses on the fifth facet, which is the relevance of the idea ‘new world’. This fifth facet is worthy of a deeper discussion; hence, I deal with it in its own section. Overall, though, the identified facets of the ‘globalisation’-discourse are intimately interwoven.

Economic and socio-political ideas of ‘globalisation’

To begin with, the ‘globalisation’-discourse, i.e. the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word globalisation, is shaped by two broad understandings of the signified of the word globalisation. First, the signified of globalisation is understood as an economic phenomenon. Second, it is understood as a socio-political phenomenon (see Bisley 2007: 21-23).

Economic conceptions of the signified of globalisation ascribe particular significance to the integration of markets and to the consequences of such market integration (e.g. Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2000; Wolf 2004). The socio-political conception of the signified of the word globalisation takes it as a process that changes “the fundamental structure of social life by recasting the role that territory plays in organizing social structures, such as political institutions or sovereignty” (Bisley 2007: 23). This process is understood as the result of a “complex interaction of changes in economic, political and cultural relations” (ibid.). The signified of the word globalisation is understood in this conception to be the driving force that changes practices of governance, the nature of statehood and the notion of sovereignty (see further ibid.). Seminal works that fall into this second category are the above-mentioned Held et al (2003), Albrow (1996), Giddens (1990), and Scholte (2005). In addition, and related, in this second category, the word globalisation is also associated with processes that lead to a “sense of cultural fragmentation and dislocation” (Featherstone 1995: 1).
Transference, transformation and transcendence

Adding to the above, Jens Bartelson (2000) helps us to distinguish between three different kinds of conceptions of the signified of globalisation, which play out in the ‘globalisation’-discourse and which, together, constitute the second facet of the ‘globalisation’-discourse. These are: 1. ‘globalisation’ understood as being about transference, 2. ‘globalisation’ understood as being about transformation, and 3. ‘globalisation’ understood as being about transcendence.

In the first conception, the signified of the word globalisation is understood as a process that is shaped by an “intensified transference or exchange of things between preconstituted units” (Bartelson 2000: 184). In other words, it is understood to be a development that is ‘different in degree’ from past developments. The majority of contributions to the ‘globalisation’-discourse, i.e. the majority of uses of the word globalisation, fall into this first category. This is despite the explicit and strong critique that has been directed towards such a conception of ‘globalisation’. Critical voices argue that an understanding of the signified of globalisation as something that merely constitutes a ‘difference in degree’ from past developments makes the use of a neologism redundant. It is not clear, these critics argue, why established nouns, such as internationalisation, liberalisation, universalisation, and westernisation, are not sufficient to capture the world in this sense.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Scholte is one of the critics of such a use of the word globalisation. He argues that it does not “open insights that are not available through pre-existent vocabulary” (Scholte 2005: 54). Going further, he sees such applications of the word globalisation as instances, which turn the word into a buzzword that does not provide any “distinct analytical value-added” (ibid.).

The second of Bartelson’s conceptions refers to a conception of the signified of the word globalisation that implies the idea of “a process of transformation that occurs at the systems level” (Bartelson 2000: 186; emphasis added). The above mentioned work by David Held et al (2003) falls into this category, as does Mary Kaldor’s rethinking of the nature of ‘war’ and ‘civil society’ (Kaldor 2006[1999], 2003). These works are based on an understanding of the signified of the word globalisation as a contemporary process, which implies some sort of transformation of socio-political reality (either then taken and discussed as an explanans or explanandum).

Finally, contributions to the ‘globalisation’-discourse, which fall within Bartelson’s third conception, understand the signified of the word globalisation as a process that accounts for “the transcendence of those distinctions that together condition unit, system and dimension identity. Globalisation is neither inside out nor outside in but rather a process that dissolves the divide between inside and outside.” (Bartelson 2000: 189)
Examples of scholarly conceptions of ‘globalisation’ that fall within this category include Morten Ougaard and Richard Higgott’s use of the word *globalisation* as an effort to conceptualise a ‘global polity’ (2002) and, in general, the various attempts of “pondering postinternationalism”, as they are collected in Heidi H. Hobbs (2000). Sociologist Ulrich Beck’s use of the word *globalisation* also falls into this third category (e.g. Beck 2004a).

In contrast to the first, the latter two categories encode an idea of a world ‘different in kind’ from the past. These latter two conceptions of the signified of the word *globalisation* capture and express the idea that contemporary socio-political reality is subject to essentially innovative and innovating changes. As Bartelson (2009: 92) puts it, understood in these two latter senses,

“the concept of globalisation has had a destabilizing impact upon the entire array of sociopolitical concepts that together constitute the main template of political modernity making their meanings contestable and dissolving the distinctions upon which their coherent usage hitherto has rested.”

‘Globalisation’ as a ‘thing’ ‘out there’

Despite fundamental differences in terms of the above sketched facets of the ‘globalisation’-discourse, the vast majority of contributions to this discourse, i.e. the vast majority of uses of the word *globalisation*, have something fundamental in common; they share a common approach: they take the signified of the word *globalisation* as a material-structural ‘thing’ ‘out there’. This is the third facet that I identify as constituting the ‘globalisation’-discourse.

This third facet is readily apparent in common expressions such as “governing globalization” (e.g. Nayyar 2002; Held and McGrew 2003), “taming globalization” (Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2003), “responding to globalization” (e.g. Hart and Prakash 2000) and “[h]as globalization gone too far?” (Rodrik 1997). These expressions reveal the idea that the signified of the word *globalisation* is something ‘material’ that could be ‘tamed’, ‘governed’ and ‘responded to’, and that is ‘out there’ to be analysed, grasped and investigated. The signified of the word *globalisation* is taken as something that people are confronted with, and, consequently, as something that poses the task for scholars to look at and dismantle it.6 Grounded in this premise, there are two different approaches to the ‘thing’ ‘globalisation’.

6 For some, like Mary Kaldor (2003), this ‘thing’ ‘globalisation’ is the product of social action, and, as such, can be shaped by social actors. For others, like Richard N. Haass, former Director of Policy Planning for the US Department of State, it is something like a second nature: “[G]lobalization is a reality, not a choice. ‘You can run but you can’t hide’” (Haass and Litan 1988: 6).
First, there are those contributors to the ‘globalisation’-discourse, i.e. to the re-production of the web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*, who take the position of a ‘first order’-observer and investigate the socio-political processes that they associate with the word *globalisation*, such as economic integration, cultural fragmentation, changes in governance structures and regimes. These are the many scholars mentioned above, who, despite their diverse research interests and foci, represent the mainstream approach to the signified of the word *globalisation*.

Second, there are contributors to the ‘globalisation’-discourse who set out to grasp first-order-observers’ ideas of the ‘thing’ ‘globalisation’. These commentators are inspired by the conviction that

“[w]hile studies on globalization proliferate, we remain relatively under-informed about discourses of globalization and associated issues of power and knowledge.” (Hay and Rosamond 2002: 147)

They are interested in the “sorts of knowledge about ‘globalization’” at work in policymaking, as Ben Rosamond (1999: 660) puts it. Contributions, which fall into this category, are part of a more general trend in the field of political studies and IR, in which scholars take seriously in the analysis of politics factors such as ideas, world-views and political culture. This trend has been labelled the ‘ideational turn’ (e.g. Blyth 2002; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004; also Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). One of the key premises, on which this ‘ideational turn’ builds, is the conviction that

“it is the ideas that actors hold about the context in which they find themselves rather than the context itself which informs the way in which actors behave” (Hay and Rosamond 2002: 148),

or, as Alexander Wendt (1992: 396) famously put it,

“people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them.”

Through their focus on ‘ideas’ these second kinds of contributions to the ‘globalisation’-discourse constitute a critical counter-weight to the earlier sketched mainstream approaches. And, yet, they share with the mainstream that they, too, start based on a pre-set idea of the signified of the word *globalisation* as a ‘thing’ ‘out there’ – except that they focus on idea/s of the respective ‘thing’.

For instance, as mentioned above, Colin Hay and Ben Rosamond (2002: 147) are interested in “discourses of globalization and associated issues of power and knowledge”. Broadly speaking, they set out to understand

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7 I come back to this theory in Chapter 6.
“[t]he interpretation of the opportunities and constraints associated with globalization and the consequent appeal, in political contexts, to the language of globalization”,

as Colin Hay (2008: 317) puts it in another context (see also Hay 2007; Rosamond 1999; Hay and Marsh 2000). In doing this, these scholars pre-set the signifier of the word *globalisation* to be an economic (hyper)force ‘out there’ (see Hay 2008). Given that this is their preconception of the signified of the word *globalisation*, they critically explore “the interpretation of the opportunities and constraints associated” (ibid.) with the ‘thing’ global economic integration and use the word *globalisation* for this.

Another example of contributions that set out to analyse idea/s of the ‘thing’ ‘globalisation’ are the studies in the edited collection *Metaphors of Globalization* (Kornprobst, Pouliot, Shah and Zaiotti 2008). *Metaphors of Globalization* is one of the few existing collections in the field of political studies and IR that is explicitly dedicated to an ‘ideational approach’ to ‘globalisation’. As Jan Aart Scholte (2008: x) writes in his ‘Foreword’:

“The notion that globalization is (at least partly) an ideational construction is not new, of course. Various scholars in anthropology, sociology and the humanities have always appreciated the global largely in these terms. However, the mainstream of international studies has usually approached globalization with the methodological materialism that underpins most business studies, economics, geography and political science. Although constructivism and poststructuralism have over the past decade acquired notable places in the theoretical repertoire of world politics, ideational analyses thus far played relatively little part in international studies research on globalization.”

*Metaphors of Globalization* sets out to fill this gap, starting on the premise that “globalization exists through metaphors” (Kornprobst, Pouliot, Shah and Zaiotti 2008: 2). On this basis, the contributions in the volume ask “how specific metaphysics of meaning emerge through metaphors, and how they influence understandings of globalization” (ibid. 2008: 4). The formulation of this task, the introductory claim, “[a]s with any aspect of world politics, globalization is *bound up* in metaphors” (Scholte 2008: x; emphasis added), as well as the very title of the book ‘metaphors of globalization’ indicate that here, too, the signified of the word *globalisation* is understood as a particular (pre-set) ‘thing’ ‘out there’ that is wrapped up in metaphors and waits to be investigated.

**The globalisation-‘debate’**

The fourth facet, which I identify as constituting the ‘globalisation’-discourse, was already implied in the above. The word *globalisation* is used by commentators to refer to a wide spectrum of different ‘things’. Yet, despite this diversity, the majority of commentators share the conviction that there is a *debate* about a *well-defined* phenomenon called ‘globalisation’. In
general, this conviction is implied in the very fact that commentators use the neologism *globalisation* to begin with. The use of the word clearly indicates that it is perceived to be useful, which, in turn, indicates the conviction that there is a common denominator that makes the talk about ‘globalisation’, i.e. the use of the word *globalisation*, meaningful as part of a broader debate. In particular, the conviction that there is an identifiable ‘globalisation’-discourse is implied in the talk about a supposedly well-defined field of scholarship and “major new area of academic endeavour” (Scholte 2004: 1), called ‘globalisation studies’ (e.g. Appelbaum and Robinson 2005; Mittelman 2004; Rupert 2005; Scholte 2004; Taylor 2005), as well as in the argument that there was a “globalization debate” (Held et al 2003; also Held and McGrew 2007a; Busch 2000; Jones 2006; Rodrik 1997a). The argument that there was a ‘globalisation debate’ is, for instance, implied in claims that there are “[c]ontroversies about the demise of globalization”, as David Held and Anthony McGrew (2007b: 1) suggest. In their *Globalization Theory* Held and McGrew (2007a: 2) argue that ‘globalisation’ came to face “hard times” in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the towers of the World Trade Center in New York City on 11 September 2001 (9/11). On the one side of what they present as ‘the globalisation debate’, Held and McGrew identify commentators like Justin Rosenberg (2005: 2), who argue that post-9/11 socio-political reality is evidence that “the age of globalisation” is unexpectedly over” (Rosenberg 2005: 2) – it is unexpectedly over for Rosenberg because, as he argues, ‘globalisation’ was never more than a “craze”, the “zeitgeist of the 1990s” anyway. Consequently, it was only a matter of time until the “follies of Globalisation Theory” (Rosenberg 2000) were exposed and the idea ‘globalisation’ was revealed as “the basis for a systematic misinterpretation of real-world events” (Rosenberg 2005: 10). This was finally realised, commentators like Rosenberg argue, in the face of post-9/11 socio-political developments because, as political analyst John Gray (2001: 27) declares, developments in post-9/11-world politics in general and in US (foreign) policy in particular are more of “an exercise in realpolitik in which ideas of global governance of the kind that have lately been fashionable on the left become largely irrelevant.” On the other side of this perceived ‘globalisation debate’, Held and McGrew (2007b: 10) see commentators like themselves, who assert that “obituaries for globalization [...] are [...] somewhat premature.”

On close scrutiny, these ‘globalisation debates’ and ‘controversies’ about the existence of ‘globalisation’ are everything but genuine ‘debates’ or ‘controversies’. This is simply because, as Colin Hay (2007: 723) puts it, “protagonists in the same globalization debate repeatedly talk past one another. They talk about different things” – while all using the same linguistic sign, namely *globalisation*.

Consider the following: if we have a look at some of the claims in this supposed ‘controversy’ about ‘the demise of globalisation’ and set out to assess them by understanding the signified of the word *globalisation* as (an
ideal existence of) global governance regimes and an increasing role of international institutions, we might readily agree that ‘globalisation’ has suffered after 9/11. Important post-9/11-decisions were taken outside the confines of these global regimes and institutions. An obvious example is the way in which the United Nations (UN) was sidelined after 9/11. UN Resolution 1368, which was passed by the Security Council on 12 September 2001, triggered little attention. This was particularly apparent compared to the official statements of US President George W. Bush at that time. In February 2003, the position of the United Nations could have hardly been more summarily dismissed and profoundly weakened than by the US-led military intervention in Iraq, which UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (2004a) explicitly considered as “illegal” and “not in conformity with the UN Charter”. Indeed, in this context, sceptics have a point when they announce the ‘demise’ of ‘globalisation’ based on the fact that—in the face of the 2003-intervention in Iraq—claims, which are posed as indicators for and explanations of ‘globalisation’, have become questionable, such as that the US “military autonomy is decidedly compromised by the web of military commitments and arrangements in which it has become entangled” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 2003: 144). A look at the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United Nations of America (White House 2002), especially its Chapter V (the so-called ‘Bush Doctrine’), which institutionalised a specific approach to the pre-emptive use of force, as well as a look at public statements of representatives of the post-9/11 Bush Administration, such as the following one by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, support sceptics in that they provide evidence for the US administration’s post-9/11 goal to free “the American Gulliver from the ties of multilateralism”, as Michael Cox (2003: 526) puts it, and to move (back) to realpolitik:

“The United States strengthens its national security when it promotes a well-ordered world of sovereign states: a world in which states respect one another’s rights to choose how they want to live; a world in which states do not commit aggression and have governments that can and do control their own territory; a world in which states have governments that are responsible and obey, as it were, the rules of the road. The importance of promoting a well-ordered world of sovereign states was brought home to Americans by 9/11, when terrorists enjoying safe haven in remote Afghanistan exploited ‘globalization’ and the free and open nature of various Western countries to attack us disastrously here at home. Sovereignty means not just a country’s right to command respect for its independence, but also the duty to take responsibility for what occurs on one’s territory, and, in particular, to do what it takes to prevent one's territory from being used as a base for attacks against others.” (Feith quoted in Acharya 2007: 279)

A political world based on power politics becomes also evident in a 2002-speech delivered by then US National Security Advisor and later US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice. In this speech Rice (2002) makes clear:
“when we were attacked on September 11th, it reinforced one of the rediscovered truths about today’s world: robust military power matters in international politics and in security.”

So, if the signified of the word *globalisation* is taken as an undisputed global governance system and thick multilateralism, the evidence of post-9/11 developments (especially the behaviour of the US) supports the claims of those who question it.

At the same time, however, there is solid evidence for the claims of those who consider a “post-mortem” (Rosenberg 2005) of ‘globalisation’ to be too hasty – again, depending on what one considers to be the signified of the word *globalisation*. If one considers it to be the “widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness” (Held and McGrew 2007b: 1) there is evidence that ‘globalisation’ is ‘alive’. Held and McGrew (2007b) demonstrate this in their *Globalization/Anti-Globalization*. More specifically, if one understands the signified of the word *globalisation* as world-wide economic integration, in general, and as the planetary spread of capitalism, in particular, claims that 9/11 brought it to an end do not hold because, as William J. Dobson (2006: 23) observes,

“[t]he global economy offered the first sign that a new, darker day hadn’t dawned. On September 10, the Dow Jones Industrial Average closed at 9,605.51. Once markets reopened on September 17, it took only 40 days for the market to close above that level again. The value of the United States’ monthly exports has continued to rise steadily from $60 billion to more than $75 billion between 2001 and 2005. The value of global trade dipped slightly in 2001 from $8 trillion to $7.8 trillion. Then, once markets found their footing, they came racing back, increasing every subsequent year, topping $12 trillion in 2005. Hard-hit businesses such as the tourist industry bounced back remarkably fast.”

If the word *globalisation* is taken to refer to the notion of an increasing mobility of people and movements across the world, aviation figures support the position that ‘globalisation’ did not ‘die’ after 9/11 (see data appendix in the Global Civil Society Yearbooks URL). As Dobson (2006: 23) finds:

“In 2001, more than 688 million tourists travelled abroad; by 2005, that number had climbed to 808 million—a 17 percent increase in four years.”

And if the signified of the word *globalisation* is understood to be about communicative integration, then the ever growing innovative forms and increasing popularity of web 2.0 and the ‘internet of things’, as well as, examples such as the North Korean case that is provided in Kaldor and Kostovicova’s 2008 study of what they call ‘involuntary pluralism’ in illiberal regimes, support the claim that ‘globalisation’ has not suffered a demise after 9/11 but, rather, that it is a force of (potentially) transforming dynamics
and power – following Kaldor and Kostovicova (2008) even in North Korea, one of the most isolated societies in the world.

Above and beyond this, it is easy to argue that the terrorist attack of 9/11 itself can be regarded as a manifestation of ‘globalisation’, if the signified of *globalisation* is understood to be the structures and means that facilitate the establishment of transnational networks. As Mary Kaldor and Diego Muro (2003) highlight, it was the ability to form a global network, just like (Western) NGOs, that ‘made’ Al Qaeda (see also LaFeber 2002). Further, there is the important role that the contemporary ‘globalised’ media and communication systems played in the 9/11-attack. On the one side, as Kaldor and Muro (2003) argue, terror networks, such as Al Qaeda, fundamentally depend on the internet and satellite TV in order to recruit followers around the world. In a similar vein, Heinz Steinert (2003: 654) speaks of terrorism, such as conducted and fostered by Al Qaeda, as a “CNN-adapted political crime. […] Terrorists force their way into the field of politics through the public sphere”; he calls the TV images of the collapsing towers “the most important and effective ‘product’ of the terrorist attack” (ibid. 653). In fact, the awareness of the extraordinary role of the global media system in and for the attack of 9/11 is evident in a letter written by Osama Bin Laden to Emir Al-Momineen, in which Bin Laden highlights:

“It is obvious that the media in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for the battles.” (Bin Laden ND)

Overall, argues Robert O. Keohane (2002: 81), the September 2001-terrorist attack in itself showed that the “barrier conception of geographical space […] was finally obsolete”. So, if the word *globalisation* is taken to refer to transborder actions and interconnections, ‘globalisation’ is ‘alive’ and played a crucial role in the lead up to and on 11 September 2001. In fact, 9/11 is a manifestation of ‘globalisation.’

In sum, the discussions about the state and nature of the world after 9/11, to which Held and McGrew (2007b) point, are rich and important. Yet, to label them a ‘controversy’ about the demise of a supposedly well-defined issue called ‘globalisation’ is peculiar. This is simply because commentators speak about different phenomena when they use the word *globalisation*.

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8 For reports on how the terror network ISIS uses social media to recruit followers see for instance Callimachi (2015) and Gates and Podder (2015).
This fourth facet of the ‘globalisation’-discourse, the implicit or explicit conviction that there was a ‘globalisation debate’, is interesting in two respects. First, this conviction, or scholarly practice, blocks focused, critical debates about the state and nature of the socio-political world. The word *globalisation* has come to step in-between scholars and the various socio-political phenomena at which they look. This leads to a diversion and fragmentation of debates. The word *globalisation* has come to take the position of a shield, which blocks focused debates about distinct empirical phenomena.9

At the same time, and second, the implicit or explicit conviction that there was a ‘globalisation debate’ is interesting because it brings out the ‘globalisation’-discourse to begin with, i.e. the re-production of the web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*, and which gives it its complex nature. The above account of uses of the word *globalisation* makes us aware that the object ‘globalisation’, which is re-produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*, is highly complex. This is because it is the product of utterances, in which the word *globalisation* is associated with many different, in fact, sometimes *fundamentally* different signifieds. This is a noteworthy observation. It requires us to acknowledge that the ‘globalisation’-discourse must not be mistaken as revolving around a clearly set and confined idea ‘globalisation’. Putting it differently, this observation requires us to acknowledge that it is not helpful to take the ‘globalisation’-discourse as being about a clearly set and confined idea ‘globalisation’, such as market integration or interconnectedness. It is not helpful because it would be a distinct *position* in the ‘globalisation’-discourse itself, rather than a critical take on it that holds a genuine chance of shedding new light on this very discourse. In fact, it would overlook a fundamental characteristic of the ‘globalisation’-discourse.

But if it is not helpful to take the ‘globalisation’-discourse as being about ‘globalisation’ what is the ‘globalisation’-discourse about? How is the object that is re-produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse best understood and labelled? To answer these questions, it is worth considering the fifth facet that I identify as shaping the ‘globalisation’-discourse, i.e. the web of meanings that is re-produced through utterances, in which the word *globalisation* is used.

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9 A similar observation seems to motivate Susan Strange to criticise that the word *globalisation* is “used by a lot of woolly thinkers who lump together all sorts of superficially converging trends in popular tastes for food and drink, clothes, music, sports and entertainment with underlying changes in the provision of financial services and the directions of scientific research, and call it all globalization without trying to distinguish what is important from what is trivial, either in causes or in consequences” (Strange in Busch 2000: 22).
The fifth facet, which I identify as constituting the ‘globalisation’-discourse, is the fact that the idea ‘new world’ plays a relevant role in it.

We have seen above that it was in the 1990s that the neologism *globalisation* became popular. This was despite the fact that many of the phenomena that have come to be captured with the word *globalisation* existed well before the 1990s. As Amartya Sen (2001) observes:

“[g]lobalization is not new […]: Over thousands of years, globalization has progressed through travel, trade, migration, spread of cultural influences and dissemination of knowledge (including of science and technology).”

For instance, if we take the signified of the word *globalisation* to be about worldwide integration, the word *globalisation* could well have been in use since the 16th Century, namely since the 1582-introduction of the Gregorian calendar in Catholic European countries, which was gradually adopted across Europe and then almost worldwide in the 18th century and thereafter. Or, at least, it could have been used since the 19th century, when local time was erased by globally coordinated time in the form of time zones based upon Greenwich, England. Arguably, both developments were significant components in the emergence of what one could call a world culture and led to an unprecedented degree of worldwide integration. Yet, it was not in the 16th century, nor in the 18th nor in the 19th century that the idea of ‘globalisation’ was perceived as “an idea whose time has come” – as the earlier quoted Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton (2003: 1) claim was the case at the end of the 20th century – and that the neologism *globalisation* was invented and became popular. Nor did the word *globalisation* enter discourses in the period between 1870 and 1914, in which many scholars find processes of economic integration similar to the ones of the late 20th century (e.g. Nayyar 1995; Hirst and Thompson 1996, 2002). None of these developments was perceived as a development that required the invention of the new word *globalisation*.

On first sight, one might assume this was because these developments went, if not unnoticed, then, at least, not reflected upon. Yet, evidence suggests that this assumption is misguided. Commentators in the past seem to have perceived developments of integration in remarkably similar ways to the ways contemporaries perceive current developments to which they attribute the word *globalisation*. Just consider how *The Times* in London in 1858 celebrated the first transatlantic telegraph cable in strikingly similar

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10 For sporadic uses of the word *globalisation* before the 1990s refer back to fn 5 in this chapter and Bach’s *Begriffsgeschichte* of ‘globalisation’ (Bach 2013).
words as we read them today about technologies, such as the internet, which are widely understood as “a quintessential icon of globalization” (Capling and Nossal 2001: 444):

“Distance as a ground of uncertainty will [now] be eliminated from the calculation of the statesman and the merchant. […] The distance between Canada and England is annihilated [and] the Atlantic is dried up […] we become in reality as well as in wish one country […] To the ties of a common blood, language, and religion, to the intimate association in business and a complete sympathy on so many subjects, is now added the faculty of instantaneous communication, which must give to all these, tendencies to unity and intensity which they never before could possess.” (The Times quoted in Herod 2009: 68)

So, why was it then in the 1990s that there was the perceived need for a neologism, globalisation, as the vocabulary necessary to grasp the state of the world? Putting it differently and with the earlier quoted Michel Foucault (1981: 61) we can ask what made ‘globalisation’ come to be “in the true” from the 1990s onwards, or what made the word globalisation a socially accepted and ratified way of talking about the world?

As we saw above, answers to these questions, which point to the ‘actual existence’ of ‘globalisation’ ‘out there’, are not completely satisfying. Not only do they merely refer to a single, pre-defined signified of the word globalisation, they also overlook that, as we saw Foucault point out earlier with reference to Gregor Mendel, even if whatever the word globalisation is associated with was a ‘reality’, it does not mean that one is automatically ‘in the true’ in speaking of it.

Without doubt, it is a complex set of factors that made ‘globalisation’ come to be ‘in the true’ and ensured that the neologism globalisation could enter debates as a socially accepted “talismanic term” (Low and Barnett 2000: 54).

In general, it was certainly the above mentioned practice of influential scholarly commentators and their established publication channels, who set out on the ‘natural’ premise that there was a well-defined ‘thing’ ‘globalisation’, a ‘globalisation debate’ and ‘globalisation studies’ that played an important role in the establishment of the ‘globalisation’-discourse.

In particular, I argue, it was the conceptual vacuum that the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent breakdown of the bipolar bloc system produced within the imagination of scholars in political studies and IR, and in the social sciences, more broadly, and, interlinked with this, the notion that there was something ‘new’ about the world that ‘allowed’ the word globalisation to enter the scene.

To the degree the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent breakdown of the bipolar bloc system shook up global power relations, it also shook up scholarly imaginations in political studies and IR. The breakdown of the bipolar bloc system left “observers without any paradigms or
theories that adequately explain the course of events”, assessed IR theorist James N. Rosenau (1990: 5). After 1989, there was a widespread perception that “old truths had lost their validity” (Daase and Kessler 2007: 412), that “basic concepts of political discourses are contested [and that] epistemological or diagnostic considerations need to be reconsidered” (ibid. 420).

“The irruptions in the established order and traditional practices of statecraft have given many of international politics’ customary modes of analysis an air of nostalgia”,

observed David Campbell (1998[1992]: ix). They were perceived as demanding a breakout from the “conceptual jails in which the study of world politics is deemed to be incarcerated”, as Rosenau (1990: 22) put it.

All this was not least because, for specialised scholars the fall of the Berlin Wall came as much of a surprise as it did for many of those, who did not deal professionally with the analysis and prediction of world politics (see Leggewie 1994).

Given the surprise with which the course of events caught large parts of the political studies and IR community, the end of the Cold War called into question nothing less than the very self-understanding of the academic practice of political analysis in general and of the IR scholarship in particular. It called into question the very conceptual and analytical frameworks and toolboxes of experts because these failed to grasp and predict what they were meant to grasp and predict, namely trends, developments and dynamics in international politics.

The fundamental failure of political studies and IR analyses at that time is particularly apparent if one realises that the ‘earthquake of international politics’, as IR theorist Thomas Risse (2003a) perceived the events, was not actually entirely unpredicted. Although it hit IR specialists in 1989 widely by surprise, already in 1982 British historian E. P. Thompson wrote:

“The Cold War road show, which each year enlarges, is now lurching towards its terminus. But in this moment changes have arisen in our continent, of scarcely more than one year’s growth, which signify a challenge to the Cold War itself. These are not ‘political’ changes in the usual sense. They cut through the flesh of politics down to the human bone.” (Quoted in Kaldor 2003: 70)

Thompson’s assessment is not only astonishing in terms of its foresight, it also shows why most of political studies and IR experts failed to properly assess and interpret the historical developments that were unfolding during the 1980s: they simply looked in the ‘wrong place’ and started their assessments based on the ‘wrong’ presumptions about where political changes might appear. While Thompson took seriously developments which were, as he critically reflects, ‘not ‘political’ changes in the usual sense’ in that they took place outside the realm of formal politics, the mainstream of political
studies and IR specialists overlooked them because their traditional conceptual frame constrained their view to the realm of nation-state governments and formal interactions. As Mary Kaldor (2003: 70) puts it, “[t]hose who studied Eastern Europe ‘from above’, who studied economic trends or the composition of politburos, failed to foresee the 1989 revolutions” in that they missed what Thompson observed and predicted, namely

“a détente of peoples rather than states – a movement of peoples which sometimes dislodges states from their blocs and brings them into a new diplomacy of conciliation, which sometimes runs beneath state structures, and which sometimes defies the ideological and security structures of particular states.” (Quoted in Kaldor 2003: 70)

Consequently, the political changes in 1989 prompted a reflection by many political studies and IR specialists on nothing less profound than the guiding categories of their academic discipline. At the same time, the unexpected changes made it ‘normal’ to see the world as a ‘new world’ that was suddenly unfolding in front of their eyes.

In Chapter 5, I zoom in on the idea ‘new world’ and discuss what it means to ‘proclaim’ that the world is ‘new’. At this point, it suffices to highlight that this perceived ‘new world’ stands for the vacuum in the scholarly approach/es to the world that the neologism globalisation (with its many different signifieds) came to fill. In other words, as much as it might have been ‘real’ developments that made ‘globalisation’ come to be “an idea whose time has come” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 2003: 1), as much it was the failure of previously guiding scholarly conceptions in the face of a perceived ‘new world’ that opened the path for the word globalisation to enter the scene as an acceptable term to grasp the world after 1989. It was this vacuum that allowed concept/s of ‘globalisation’ to come to be ‘in the true’ and the neologism globalisation to enter the language.

In this sense, the idea (that there was a) ‘new world’ played a crucial role in the establishment of the neologism globalisation and, consequently in the birth and rise of the ‘globalisation’-discourse. The idea (that there was a) ‘new world’ is constitutive of the ‘globalisation’-discourse.

**Conclusion**

In Chapters 2 and 3, I established the adjective global as a popular, free, complex and, in particular, as a ‘new word’. What is ‘new’ about the contemporary global, I argued in Chapter 3, is that it springs off the ‘globalisation’-discourse. It is interlinked inextricably with the ‘globalisation’-discourse.

In this chapter, I elaborated on the ‘globalisation’-discourse, which I defined as the re-production of the web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word globalisation. In doing this, I referred to Foucault and
sketched some of the presumptions and premises that underlie the way in which I use the word *discourse*. Among them was the understanding that ‘discourses’ bring out their ‘objects’. They produce the world of which they speak. Following from this brief theoretical overview, I stressed the difference between my idea of ‘globalisation’-discourse and other uses of this term, such as by Hay and Smith (2005). Importantly, I stressed that in my conception, the ‘globalisation’-discourse is about the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which have a *linguistic*, rather than a *thematic* commonality. This linguistic commonality is the word *globalisation*. With that, as I explained above, I acknowledge the polysemic nature of the word *globalisation*, i.e. I acknowledge that there are many different signifieds associated with this word *globalisation*, which, together, bring out the object ‘globalisation’, which is the web of meanings that is re-produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse. A look at the life of the ‘globalisation’-discourse and, especially, at the five facets that I identify as constituting this discourse, made us aware of the complex nature of this discourse. More precisely, it made us aware of the complexity of the object ‘globalisation’, which is re-produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*.

As a consequence, it became clear that it is not helpful to take the ‘globalisation’-discourse as being about a clearly set and confined idea ‘globalisation’. I stressed that such a practice would be an instance in the re-production of the ‘globalisation’-discourse, rather than a critical move that holds a genuine chance of shedding new light on the ‘globalisation’-discourse.

Taken together, these observations brought up the questions: What is the ‘globalisation’-discourse actually about? How is the object that is re-produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse best be understood and labelled?

In a separate, final section, I outlined the fifth facet that I identify as constituting the ‘globalisation’-discourse. This is the importance of the idea ‘new world’ in and for this discourse. Triggered by the question why ‘globalisation’ came to be ‘in the true’ at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, I identified the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakdown of the bipolar bloc system as moments that opened the way for the idea/s ‘globalisation’ and the neologism *globalisation* to enter the stage. Given the perceived failure of established theoretical and conceptual tools to predict and grasp the course of events and the ‘earthquake of international politics’ (Risse 2003a) at the end of the 1980s, perceptions of the advent of a ‘new world’ came up. I argued that this idea, the idea that there was a ‘new world’ unfolding produced a vacuum in the political studies and IR scholarship that allowed the idea/s ‘globalisation’ and the neologism *globalisation* to become socially accepted. In this sense, I argued, the idea (that there was a) ‘new world’ is constitutive of the ‘globalisation’-discourse; it made the re-production of the web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*, ‘possible’ to begin with.
Taking the above together, brings out my concluding argument of this chapter and an answer to the questions: What is the ‘globalisation’-discourse about? How is the object that is re-produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse best understood and labelled? Grounded in the above – and especially in the fifth above outlined facet that constitutes the ‘globalisation’-discourse – I propose that the ‘globalisation’-discourse is to be understood as a discourse that re-produces a web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word *globalisation*, that is best labelled ‘new world’. In other words, I conceptualise the use of the word *globalisation*, no matter in which context and in which sense it is used, as a moment in the re-production of a web of meanings that brings out an ‘object’, which I call ‘new world’.
5 The Proclamation of the ‘New World’

And I said – so I said, ‘There’s a new world here.’ After September the 11th, we must take threats seriously.

We live in a world [...] different from the one in which we think.

In the previous chapter, I advocated labelling the ‘object’ that is re-produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse ‘new world’. This move was grounded in the observation that the idea that there was a ‘new world’ is constitutive of the ‘globalisation’-discourse, i.e. of the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word globalisation. I supported my argument by demonstrating that the idea/s ‘globalisation’ came to be ‘in the true’, and the neologism globalisation was able to enter the language, in the face of a post-1989 reality that was perceived as ‘new’, in the sense of no longer graspable with the help of established theoretical and conceptual tools.

In this present chapter, I take another step away from the adjective global and follow a path that arises from the main insight in Chapter 4. I reflect on the issue of the ‘new world’. I carve out what is distinct and interesting about it. To do this, I discuss implicit and explicit proclamations of the ‘new world’.

I make two analytical moves in this present chapter. First, I reflect on what it means when social and political actors ‘proclaim’ (implicitly or explicitly) that there is something ‘new’ about the world or about social and political phenomena. In order to carve out the specificity of this kind of proclamation of the ‘new’, I contrast it with another kind of proclamation of the ‘new’. This other kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ is a familiar component of modern politics. It is the proclamation of a ‘new world’ to come as a result of progressive, active, confident and targeted action. It is a kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ that is grounded in the modern fondness (for the
striving) for the ‘new’, which is perceived as a central, in fact, foundational aspect of societal progress and development. In contrast with this (modern) proclamation of the ‘new’ to come, I carve out the main characteristics of the kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ that is manifest in the above sketched reaction to the post-1989 reality. I call this second kind of proclamation a proclamation of the ‘new’ that came. I point out that this second kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ implies a passive speaking position of an observer, who is confronted with a ‘new’ reality and whose task it is to grasp this reality, rather than to actively shape it and its future development. In contrast with the proclamation of a ‘new world’ to come as a product of an agent’s action, the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came appears to be an objective observation of the world as it is. Yet, despite its supposed ‘naturalness’, it is, of course, also enmeshed in existing discourses. It is as much a political act to proclaim the (supposed) ‘newness’ of the world that came, i.e. that ‘is’, as it is to proclaim the ‘new’ to come. In this sense, in this first analytical move, I frame the proclamation of the ‘newness’ of the world as an aspect of political actors’ struggle to legitimise past and future decisions and actions.

While the proclamation of the ‘new’ to come is a manifestation of the modern and optimistic fondness for innovation, progress and development, I argue that the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came is a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, which is constituted by the “internal cosmopolitisation” (Beck 2006: 2) of national societies, the existence of “global risk” (Beck 1992, 1999, also 2009a), and the “return of uncertainty” (Beck 1994: 8; Bonß 1996). I substantiate this proposition in the second analytical move that I take in this chapter. My conceptualisation of the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came as a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation is grounded in an understanding of social reality that follows sociologist Ulrich Beck (especially 1994, 2004, 2006). According to this understanding, contemporary social reality is shaped by two aspects and their interplay. First, it is shaped by the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the process of modernisation. As just mentioned, this ‘backfiring’ is constituted by the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies, the existence of ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’. Second, social reality is shaped by the prevalence of what Beck (2006) calls “the national perspective” and “methodological nationalism”. This is a political perspective and a scholarly take on the world that is grounded in “nationalstaatlich normierte […] Kategorien des Wirklichkeitsverständnisses” (Beck 2004: 114), that is, “categories in terms of which we understand reality that take the nation-state as the norm” (Beck 2006: 73).¹ The ‘national perspective’² is a perspective that obscures the

¹ I provide the original German quote here in addition to the official English translation of this quote because the English version does not capture fully the sense of the original.
view at social reality; more precisely, it obscures the view at the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, especially the internal cosmopolitisation of national societies, which is, according to Beck, a social reality.

Given the relevance that is accorded to the interplay of the above two aspects in this conception of social reality, I use the term ‘reflexive modern’ to label the nature of contemporary social reality, in general, and national societies, in particular.

To be clear, my understanding of the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came as a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation is a conceptual move. It is not an observation of how social and political actors actually grasp the perceived ‘newness’ of the world, in the sense of how they label and conceptualise it. As we saw in the previous chapter, through the word globalisation the world is grasped in diverse ways and not necessarily consciously and explicitly as being shaped by the ‘internal cosmopolitisation of national societies’, ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’, let alone through the use of this precise vocabulary. Hence, to understand the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came as a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the ‘internal cosmopolitisation of national societies’, ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’ is an interpretation that presupposes the above mentioned Beck-inspired conception of social reality – this presupposition is quasi a “pre-theoretical commitment” (Moore 2004: 75).

Consequently, it is a central task of the second part of this present chapter to outline this distinct conception of the ‘reflexive modern’ social reality, i.e. to elaborate on what I mean when I speak of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the process of modernisation, the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies, the existence of ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’, as well as the prevalence of the ‘national perspective’. In doing this, I conceptualise events, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, as events that make the complexity of the ‘reflexive modern’ world – or, more precisely, the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation – come to the surface and become visible to social and political observers.

Building on these theoretical elaborations, I conclude the second move presented in this chapter by pointing to the analytical frame that arises from such a Beck-inspired conception of social reality. Notably, through this frame the various conceptions of the ‘newness’ of the world, which are manifest in the re-production of the ‘globalisation’-discourse, are to be seen as ways, in which the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, that is, the ‘internal cosmopolitisation of national societies’, the existence of ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’, are dealt with and negotiated. As such,

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To make the text more readable from now on, I use the term ‘national perspective’ to include also scholarly takes on the world that follow ‘methodological nationalism’.
in the vein of my pre-supposed conception of ‘reflexive modern’ social reality, their study facilitates nothing less but insights into the nature of the ‘national perspective’ in distinct historical moments.

**Proclamations of the ‘New World’**

As outlined in the previous chapter, the breakdown of the bipolar bloc system in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 were widely taken to mark the advent of a ‘new’ era. They were regarded as heralding the advent of a ‘new world’ that came. This is manifest in the fact that new concepts were perceived to be necessary and new theories were thought to be required to grasp the world. As outlined in Chapter 4, it was this conviction that a ‘new world’ had come, which opened the path for the idea/s ‘globalisation’ to come to be ‘in the true’ and for the neologism *globalisation* to enter the language as a socially ratified word.

In the previous chapter, I pointed to manifestations of perceptions of the post-1989 world as a ‘new world’ in the scholarly discourse. I referred to various instances, in which scholars expressed the conviction that established theories and concepts were no longer equipped to grasp the post-1989 social reality. But perceptions that there was a ‘new world’ after 1989 were not exclusive to scholarly commentators. We find expressions of the ‘new world’ also beyond academic circles; here, such expressions are even more explicit. Take, for instance, US President George Bush’s public communication in the aftermath of 9 November 1989. Bush (1990a; emphasis added) saw after 1989 an “amazing new world of freedom” arising, explained that “to remain competitive, government must also reflect the new world emerging around us” (Bush 1990b; emphasis added), and cautioned US voters in 1992:

“So when you vote, you’ve got to understand the new world, the world after the cold war.” (Bush 1992; emphasis added)

But the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent breakdown of the bipolar bloc system is not the only relatively recent event that triggered perceptions and public proclamations of the advent of a ‘new world’. The most prominent other event, which had the same effect, was the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York City on 11 September 2001 (9/11). 9/11, too, moved commentators to speak explicitly of a ‘new world’.

“In an instant and without warning on a fine fall morning, the known world had been jerked aside like a mere slide in a projector, and a new world had been rammed into its place”,

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100 | The Negotiation of the “New World”
writes Jonathan Schell (2001; emphasis added) on 12 September 2001 in *The Nation*. The ‘new world’ is also a prominent feature of US President George W. Bush’s Public Papers (for the following see also Selchow 2011 and 2013):

“On the morning of September the 11th, 2001, our Nation awoke to a nightmare attack. Nineteen men armed with box cutters took control of airplanes and turned them into missiles. They used them to kill nearly 3,000 innocent people. We watched the Twin Towers collapse before our eyes, and it became instantly clear that we’d entered a *new world* and a dangerous new war.” (Bush 2006; emphasis added)

“The last choice of any President ought to be to commit troops into combat. We ought to try everything possible before we commit one soul into combat, and that’s why I went to the United Nations. I said, ‘We see a threat. How about you?’ You’ve passed resolutions before – resolution after resolution after resolution. And I said – so I said, ‘There’s a *new world* here.’ After September the 11th, we must take threats seriously.” (Bush 2004; emphasis added)

“The attacks of September the 11th, 2001, [...] revealed the outlines of a *new world*.” (Bush 2005; emphasis added)

“In the *new world* we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.” (Bush 2002; emphasis added)

More generally, after 9/11 the adjective *new* came to be used to modify all sorts of nouns, from *struggle, terrorism* and *threats to war, dangers and enemies*, indicating that there was something different *in kind* about these phenomena. For instance, a 2002 fact sheet of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security on border security concludes, “[t]he *new* threats and opportunities of the 21st century demand a new approach to border management” (US Department of Homeland Security 2002; emphasis added). George W. Bush (2001c) suggests to NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, “[w]e stand shoulder to shoulder in a *new kind* of struggle”, fighting a “*new kind* of war” (Bush 2001d; emphasis added). In other contexts, he reminds addressees that this war was fought against a “*new kind* of enemy” (Bush 2001e; emphasis added) and, as he explains to High School students in Wisconsin, in the face of a “*new kind* of threat”:

“You’re graduating in a time of war, right here in America, but a war that your textbooks really haven’t been able to describe before. It’s a *new kind of* threat to our country.” (Bush 2002b; emphasis added)

In the following section, I reflect on what is implied in this kind of ‘proclamation’ of the ‘new world’. However, in order to carve out its characteristics, I first look at another kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ and draw a
The negotiation of the “New World” contrast with it. This other kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ is about a ‘new world’ to come, rather than about a ‘new’ nature and constitution of the world that came. This other kind of proclamation of the ‘new world’, namely of the ‘new world’ to come, is a familiar feature of past and contemporary political discourses. It is intimately interwoven with modern premises and with a distinct idea of the temporal category ‘future’.

The modern proclamation of the ‘new’ to come

In modernity the ‘new’ is valued for its own sake. It is something that is to be actively, systematically and consciously promoted and reproduced (Leggewie 1996: 4). Both, the striving for the ‘new’ and innovation are seen as the engine of societal development and progress. The ‘new’ and innovation serve as symbols for national power, associated with economic growth and rising living standards. At the same time, however, as Claus Leggewie (ibid.) stresses, it is not transcendentally fixed what the ‘new’ and innovation are. The ‘new’ is and always has been subject to questioning and innovation. It is a historical product.

In his discussion of political creativity, renewal and the ‘new’ Leggewie (1994) refers to Hannah Arendt (1986[1963]) and presents politics as the domain of innovation. He distinguishes between four political agencies of innovation: bureaucracy, movements, leaders (charisma) and intellectuals (Leggewie 1994: 8). Analysing each of these four agencies in their contemporary form and regarding their contemporary potential to (politically) innovate, Leggewie argues that each of them suffers from an epochal exhaustion of their innovating potential (ibid. 11). This does not mean, however, that the ‘new’ in politics has disappeared (ibid. 14). Rather, Leggewie (ibid.) argues, the ‘new’ arises these days less as the result of planned intellectual endeavours and collective action, and more as the product of external, unexpected and incisive events – like the fall of the Berlin Wall or, as I would add, 9/11.

Yet, despite the importance of incisive mega-events relative to the actual innovative power of political agencies today, the striving for the ‘new’ remains to be a central feature of political practices and discourses. It remains highly valued. Doing politics remains to be about (the proclamation of) the explicit striving for the ‘new’ and the commitment to innovate.

One of the most prominent and remarkable historical examples of the striving for the ‘new’ is captured in the narrative of the US as the ‘New World’, which is nothing less than one of the founding “myths that made

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4 With reference to the first World Exhibition, the ‘Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of all Nations’ in 1851 in London, Kendra Briken (2006: 22) points to the important role that the ‘new’ and innovation play in national narratives.
America” (Paul 2014). This ‘New World’-narrative is inscribed in US culture in fundamental ways. Most obviously it is captured in the narrative of Christopher Columbus’ landing on an island in the Caribbean in 1492. Columbus’ landing was officially commemorated for the first time in 1792, when the USA was established. It was glorified in this context as “the greatest event in the history of mankind since the death of our Savior” (de Lancéy quoted in Schuman, Schwartz and d’Arcy 2005: 6). It was further glorified and ‘translated’ into the metaphor ‘Columbia’. “[R]epresenting the new land, the exotic wilderness of North America”, Columbia did not only serve as the feminine “symbolic counterpart to George Washington, who was seen as imposing order and reason upon the land through republican government”, as Cynthia Koch (1996: 32) observes, it also helped to symbolically demarcate the ‘New World’ against the ‘Old World’. The renaming of King’s College in New York City after the American Revolution in 1784 into Columbia College and eventually (in 1912) into Columbia University is just one example of the explicit break with the ‘old’.

The narrative of America as the ‘New World’ is an example of the striving for the ‘new’ to come because it is only symbolically linked to Columbus’ actual travel in 1492. The vision of a ‘new world’ was already in the European mind before Columbus even started his journey and accidentally landed on an island off the coast of what is now Venezuela. The ex post

5 Just think of the name that was chosen for the new nation’s capital: Washington, District of Columbia. In this name the ‘exotic’ and ‘wild’ feminine and the ‘rational’ and ‘reasonable’ masculine are juxtaposed and at the same time symbolically united. A problematic feminization of the ‘New World’ is also apparent in Samuel E. Morison’s Pulitzer Prize-winning Columbus biography from 1942, in which he glorifies Columbus’ landing as a capturing of ‘the pure’ and ‘the untouched’ when he writes, “never again may mortal men hope to recapture the amazement, the wonder, the delight of those October days in 1492 when the New World gracefully yielded her virginity to the conquering Castilians” (quoted in O’Gorman 1961: 44).

6 In various respects it is obvious that Columbus did not actually ‘discover’ the ‘New World’. There is clearly something problematic about the idea that a man is said to have ‘discovered’ a land as ‘new’, which was already inhabited by people with century-old civilisations. As Russell Thornton (1987: xv) stresses in his account of what he calls the “American Indian Holocaust”: “Columbus did not […] discover the ‘New World’. It was already old when he came to it.” The common perception that Columbus ‘discovered’ America as the ‘New World’ makes us aware of the particular, namely European perspective implied in this notion; obviously the ‘discovered’ continent was ‘new’ only from the perspective of the Old World, which, in turn, was ‘old’ only in the face of the ‘new’. But even if we accept the European exploration of the Western hemisphere including Columbus’ landfall on one of the islands in the Caribbean Sea in 1492 and the eventual landing of his men on the coast of what is now called Venezuela in
understanding of his actual landing as the ‘discovery’ of the ‘New World’ was just “the actualization of a fiction, the founding of a world that had its origins in books before it became a concrete and tangible terra firma”, as Roberto Gonzalez Echevarria points out (quoted in Dash 1998: 22). In this sense, it was in retrospect that Columbus’ journey came to be utilised as the opening chapter in a narrative of the ‘new’, that is, of a break with ‘old Europe’ that had already long been imagined as a story of an inexorable “‘progress of civilization’ leading directly from Columbus to Washington” (Koch 1996: 32). As we can see in Michael Berliner’s (1999) (suspect) defence of “Western civilization” as the “objectively superior culture”, the ‘new world’ was already there before it was literally ‘discovered’; it existed independently of Columbus and the ‘discovery’ of America:

“Did Columbus ‘discover’ America? Yes – in every important respect. This does not mean that no human eye had been cast on America before Columbus arrived. It does mean that Columbus brought America to the attention of the civilized world, i.e., to the growing, scientific civilizations of Western Europe. The result, ultimately, was the United States of America.”

In a similar vein, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1941) explains in 1941:

“America has been the New World in all tongues, and to all peoples, not because this continent was a new-found land, but because all those who came here believed they could create upon this continent a new life – a life that should be new in freedom.”

The case of the narrative of America as the ‘New World’ is one of the most prominent and obvious examples for the striving for the ‘new’ to come.7

1498 as a ‘discovery’ of the ‘New World’, it is still not natural that Columbus was accredited with its ‘discovery’. Apart from the fact that forebears of the Native Americans came from the Asian continent and that there are suggestions of an African ‘discovery’ of America some 3,000 years ago (see Cohen URL), Columbus was not even the first European, who explored the Western hemisphere; there were Scandinavian-lead explorations some 500 years before Columbus reached the shore of South America. These Scandinavian explorations led famously to Leif Ericson’s settlement ‘Vinland’ on what is now called Newfoundland (see further Quinn 1977). And, of course, Columbus actually never conceived his ‘discovery’ as the ‘discovery’ of the ‘New World’ to begin with; he thought he arrived in India. Arguably, it was Amerigo Vespucci who ‘discovered’ the ‘discovered’ land as a ‘New World’, in that he realised that this was a continent that was unknown to the ‘Old World’.

7 In the context of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 it was played out by then-US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (2003), who called Germany and France (both countries were opposing a war in Iraq) a “problem” and labelled
However, we do not need to search far to also find contemporary manifestations of the fondness for the ‘new’ and the striving for it. They are manifest in everyday political rhetoric. The proclamation of the ‘new’ to come as the result of the doing of an entrepreneurial agent is a popular and, in fact, essential move in political rhetoric. No matter if ‘conservative’ or ‘progressive’, no one can afford not to allude to the ‘new’ in their fight for political support and the legitimation of their power.

Take, for instance, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2008; emphasis added), who declares that “[w]e have got to have the new thinking that is necessary for the future”. In their 2010 government programmes, Brown’s successors David Cameron and Nick Clegg, too, assure the public that they “are both committed to turning old thinking on its head and developing new approaches to government” (Cameron and Clegg 2010: 7; emphasis added). French President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007) took office as a self-proclaimed inventor of “un nouveau modèle français”. In a 1990 address to the United Nations General Assembly, US President George Bush (1990; emphasis added) stresses that

“It is in our hands […] to press forward to cap a historic movement towards a new world order and a long era of peace. We have a vision of a new partnership of nations that transcends the Cold War.”

In her 2009 government declaration (Regierungserklärung), German Chancellor Angela Merkel (2009) promises that her government would lead Germany on the right path to develop a ‘new strength’. And in their respec-

and dismissed them as “old Europe”, that is, as a Europe which is backwards looking and has no sense of the spirit of the time. The ‘old Europe’-expression was taken up in political discourses since then in various ways. Given the strong public opinion opposing a war in Iraq, in Germany Rumsfeld’s ‘old Europe’-dismissal was immediately taken as a compliment and filled with positive notions; the Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache (URL) elected the German translation (’altes Europa’) as the ‘word of the year’ in 2003. French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin (2003), in his speech to the UN Security Council on 14 February 2003, also referred to it and re-wrote the ‘old Europe’-phrase by using it to remind of the wealth of Europe’s (old) experience: “This message comes to you today from an old country, France, from a continent like mine, Europe, that has known wars, occupation and barbarity”. And UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2009b) took up the phrase in a speech to the US Congress, stressing: “There is no old Europe, no new Europe, there is only your friend Europe.”

At the same time, however, Angela Merkel’s 2009 election campaign ran under the motto ‘Keine Experimente’ (‘No experiments’), which is a slogan that is preserving and conservative, rather than shaped by the promise of innovation and radical renewal. As Ketterer (2007) explains, the ‘Keine Experimente’-slogan is a motto that her conservative party, CDU, already used in the 1957 election cam-
tive Inaugural Addresses US Presidents Barack Obama (2009; emphasis added) announces “a new way forward”, and Ronald Reagan (1985; emphasis added) states that

“[w]e must think anew and move with a new boldness. [...] The time has come for a new American emancipation. [...] From new freedom will spring new opportunities.”

George Bush (1989; emphasis added) commences his term on the basis that “[t]here is new ground to be broken and new action to be taken”; Jimmy Carter (1977; emphasis added) makes clear: “This inauguration ceremony marks a new beginning, a new dedication within our Government, and a new spirit among us all”; and Bill Clinton (1997; emphasis added) stresses:

“We need a new Government for a new century. [...] With a new vision of Government, a new sense of responsibility, a new spirit of community, we will sustain America’s journey. [...] The promise we sought in a new land, we will find again in a land of new promise. In this new land, education will be every citizen’s most prized possession. [...] Yes, let us build our bridge, a bridge wide enough and strong enough for every American to cross over to a blessed land of new promise.”

These examples – especially the repeated proclamations of the ‘new’ in the Inaugural Addresses of the US Presidents – show us that no matter what kind of a political vision is implied, reassurance about a striving for the ‘new’ and the proclamation of the ‘new’ to come are key components of political rhetoric. In fact, the ‘new’ is not only invoked in instances, in which actors promise ‘new deals’, ‘new agendas’, ‘new beginnings’ and ‘new visions’, but also in the context of regressions to the ‘old’. It is not infrequent that references to and conservations of the past are framed as acts of renewal: “Let us renew our determination, our courage, and our strength. And let us renew our faith and our hope”, demands Ronald Reagan in 1981 – and what Jimmy Carter (1977; emphasis added) actually means when he refers to “the new national spirit of unity and trust” is, as he makes clear, “a fresh faith in the old dream.”

The campaign to promote Konrad Adenauer. The CDU won the 1957 elections with an absolute majority. In fact, 1957 was the only time in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) that a party won the absolute majority of votes. With the slogan ‘Keine Experimente’, the CDU campaigned for its re-election by targeting plans of the Social Democrats (SPD), such as the idea for the FRG to leave NATO. The CDU argued in 1957 that a victory of the SPD would lead to a state of uncertainty, which the Federal Republic of Germany could not afford in times of the Cold War; as Adenauer dramatically and famously warned: “Ein Sieg der SPD bedeutet den Untergang Deutschlands” (‘A victory of the SPD would mean the downfall of Germany’); for the above see Ketterer (2007).
If we take the above quoted Brown’s and his successors Cameron and Clegg’s promises of a “new thinking” and acknowledge that, arguably, they had different ideas in mind as to what this ‘new thinking’ would and should look like, we become aware that in these kinds of invocations of the ‘new’ the ‘new’ is valuable in itself, and above and beyond the way, in which it is actually filled with meaning. To promise the ‘new’ is a discursively required and widely shared practice that political actors seem to feel motivated to participate in because, referring back to the above referenced Briken and Leggewie, the ‘new’ is valued for its own sake. It is a modern paradigm, which generates meanings that are then spread through discourse, as Briken (2006: 24) explains. As a central component in and product of the discourse of modernity, the ‘new’ implies and evokes the key modern premises of development and progress. As famously inscribed in and promoted by Joseph A. Schumpeter (1912), innovation and entrepreneurship are considered to play a central part in economic development. With that, the ‘new’ is accredited with the role of the driver of progress. This means, simultaneously, that the ‘new’ is never simply the ‘new’ but always also an ‘improvement’ on the past, that is, on what has been or will be ‘renewed’ (see Briken 2006: 27).

Following from the above, the ‘new’ – as well as the innovator, as the one, who promises and pushes for the ‘new’, who sets out to explore ‘new directions’, is dedicated to ‘new thinking’ and is, like David Cameron and Nick Clegg (2010), “committed to turning old thinking on its head” – is attributed with intrinsic positive value. In their study “Innovation and the Post-Original: On Moral Stances and Reproduction”, Alf Rehn and Sheena Vachhani (2006: 310) find that, given the central role of the idea of innovation and entrepreneurship and the positive value that is attributed to these phenomena within the modern-(economic) discourse, the innovator takes the position of “a heroic figure, one who opposes old regimes and creates a rift in the weave of economic time, ushering in the new”. This positive value and the positive, if not at times, even ecstatic language of the ‘new’ and the entrepreneur is, for instance, apparent in the following extract from a policy paper of the UK Institute for Public Policy Research on “The Entrepreneurial Society” (Gavron, Cowling, Holtham and Westall 1998: i):

“If we can make Britain ‘a country of enterprises’ we will as a consequence advance and progress in new technology and we will reduce unemployment as well as increasing self-employment. A society in which entrepreneurship is valued and encouraged is a dynamic society. Entrepreneurs bring new ideas and new life to old industries, they create new industries, they look at established practices with new eyes, they question everything, they shake up old comfortable habits and customs, they eschew complacency, they make fortunes for themselves and others and they spend them, thus recirculating the money for the good of the economy.”

In political discourses, this intrinsic positive value of the ‘new’ and the innovator means that alternative perspectives and suggestions are rendered
unacceptable a priori. As a consequence, the position of the innovator is discursively legitimised, and critique of and political alternatives to their ‘new’ approaches are discredited. For instance, once Nicolas Sarkozy managed to symbolically capture the role as innovator, he was in a discursive position to demonize “opposition to change” as having never “been so dangerous for France” (Sarkozy 2007).

Yet, as we learn from Leggewie (1964: 4), what the ‘new’ is and should be, does not stand beyond debate, and is itself subject to steady innovation. It is historical and, with that, it is political, subject to power and subject to change.

**Proclaiming the ‘new world’ that came**

The above sketched striving for the ‘new’ and the proclamation of the ‘new’ to come are a familiar component of modern life. They are a valued expression of progress and are perceived as necessary for modern civilisation and development. This lifts the proclaimer of the ‘new’ into a powerful position, loaded with positive value.

The perception that the world is a ‘new world’, i.e. the proclamation of a ‘new world’ that came, differs significantly from the striving for the ‘new’ to come that I sketched above. The acknowledgment that there is a “new world emerging around us” (Bush 1990b), that “[t]here’s a new world here” (Bush 2004), as, for instance, both Presidents Bush proclaim in their respective historical socio-political contexts, is not about a vision for a ‘new world’ to come. It constitutes a statement about the world as it is. It is a statement about the constitution of the world in and of itself. As a consequence, this kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ implies a particular speaking position, one which is different from the ‘modern’ proclamation of the ‘new’ that I sketched above.

This speaking position has a number of features. Most significantly, it is a less active position. The one, who proclaims the ‘new’ that came, takes the position of an ‘observer’, rather than a shaper and innovator in and of this world. The proclamation of the ‘new’ that came renders the proclaimer, the decision maker, as a passive person, merely reacting to a world that is ‘out there’, one with which they are suddenly confronted and that has changed all of the sudden, triggered by incisive events, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall or 9/11, without the person doing anything. The task and challenge that this (supposed) ‘new world’ poses to the observer (due to its ‘newness’) is not so much to shape it but to understand it correctly and to adapt to it. This requires a distinct expertise of analytic skill and, crucially, and in a somewhat self-reinforcing way, the ability and ‘willingness’ to see that the world is ‘new’ to begin with.

Drawing on the above, first of all, there is a sense of ‘objectivity’ insinuated in this proclamation of the ‘newness’ of the world. While the announcement of a ‘new thinking’, a ‘new agenda’ or a ‘new vision’ to be brought forward by an agent is unmistakably a political claim, the proclama-
tion that it is the world ‘out there’ that is (suddenly) ‘new’, appears more ‘innocent’, neutral, and descriptive, that is, it appears to be less politically loaded or, indeed, not politically loaded at all. Consequently, political decisions, which are taken in the face (of a supposedly neutral observation) of a ‘new world’, appear as if they ‘naturally’ flow from, and are ‘naturally’ justified by reference to the very existence of the ‘new’ state of affairs. These political decisions readily take the form of inevitable and natural re-actions, rather than particular political moves and pro-actions.

But, of course, the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came is no more a neutral observation of a world ‘out there’ than the announcement and promise of a ‘new world’ to come. To begin with, and referring to my discussion in Chapter 4, it requires a distinct discursive opening for something to be ‘allowed’ to be seen as ‘new’, i.e. for the claim that something is ‘new’, to be ‘in the true’. In this sense, acknowledging the ‘new’ that came is always already a product of the discursive environment, from within which it is ‘observed’. It is not a context-free observation. Furthermore, as we saw in the brief overview of the various ideas that have come to be associated with the word globalisation, the ‘new world’ is inevitably filled with conceptions that are grounded in both, distinct lived realities and existing webs of meanings.

Pushing this point further, the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came can be seen as a promising strategic move in the constant struggle over the legitimisation of past and future decisions and the presentation of one (understanding of the) world as more ‘real’ than another. The following quote by US President George W. Bush, already extracted above, is an excellent illustration of the potential power and use of the proclamation of the ‘newness’ of the world as a means to legitimise decisions and actions. The quote shows how the supposed ‘newness’ of the world is used to legitimise and ‘naturalise’, in this case ex post, a particular decision, namely the US-led military intervention in Iraq in 2003:

“The last choice of any President ought to be to commit troops into combat. We ought to try everything possible before we commit one soul into combat, and that’s why I went to the United Nations. I said, ‘We see a threat. How about you?’ You’ve passed resolutions before – resolution after resolution after resolution. And I said – so I said, ‘There’s a new world here.’ After September the 11th, we must take threats seriously.” (Bush 2004)

As these words suggest, it is because ‘there is a new world here’ that the decision to intervene militarily in Iraq is presented as justified. Another apt example on the same lines is the following claim, made in the Introduction to the 2002 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS 2002):

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“In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.”

Again, it is the (proclaimed) existence of the ‘new world’ that ‘naturalises’ the decision to adopt an ‘active’ approach to ‘peace and security’. This quote illustrates that the proclamation of the ‘newness’ of the world is a particularly promising move in efforts to legitimise past and future decisions precisely because it camouflages a political move under a cloak of obviousness, innocence and objectivity. In the particular case of the NSS 2002, it ‘naturalises’ a pro-active and, in fact, pre-emptive approach to security.9

In addition, the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came evokes a historical caesura. The ‘observation’ that we are confronted with a ‘new world’, ‘new enemies’, ‘new threats’ and ‘new challenges’, in the sense of new kinds of threats, new kinds of enemies and new kinds of challenges insinuates an ontological uncertainty. This ontological uncertainty implies a state of epistemological uncertainty. It symbolically produces a state, in which – given the supposed ‘newness’ of the world – we have lost the ability to readily understand the very nature of the present. To proclaim that the world, in which we live, has come to be ‘new’, as a result of an event like the fall of the Berlin Wall or 9/11, establishes a historical divide into a ‘before’ and ‘after’, carves historical time neatly and decisively, and defines the relationship between the temporal categories ‘past’ and ‘present’ in a particular way. It implies that experiences of the past no longer hold in the ‘new’ reality, which has supplanted the familiar, the known world. As such, it fuels a notion of and legitimates a state of exception, in which constant adaption to an ‘unknown’ world is necessary. In this ‘new world’, it is no longer just the future that must be predicted but the present itself. This prediction, however, must do without (experiences of) the past because the past is no longer a trustworthy basis for such an endeavour (see further Selchow 2013). This is precisely what is implied in President George W. Bush’s earlier quoted post-9/11 address to US High School students, in which he explains:

“You’re graduating in a time of war, right here in America, but a war that your textbooks really haven’t been able to describe before. It’s a new kind of threat to our country.” (Bush 2002b)

These words insinuate that, in the ‘new (post-9/11) world’, existing textbooks and, by extension, existing analyses have lost their value. The past does not provide the ground for decisions to be taken in the present. It does not provide guidance for action in the ‘new world’. This means, while the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came implies a speaking position that is less active than the one implied in the proclamation of the ‘new’ to come, it

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9 For a discussion of the pre-emptive turn in security practices, see for instance de Goede (2008) and Stockdale (2013).
opens a distinct space for actors to move on in this ‘new world’. It paves the path for potential moves, which are made independent of historical knowledge and past experiences.10

I will pick up these points and refine them in Chapter 6, in which I conceptualise the ‘new world’ as a distinct mode of the temporal category ‘present’ and position it in line with the categories ‘past’ and ‘future’. For now, we take from the above the distinction between the proclamation of the ‘new world’ to come, as an expression of the modern fondness for the striving for the ‘new world’, and the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came. The latter is the kind of ‘new world’ that is implied in the reaction to the breakdown of the bipolar bloc system, which, as I discussed in Chapter 3, allowed ‘globalisation’ to come to be ‘in the true.’

THE PROCLAMATION OF THE ‘NEW WORLD’ AS A MANIFESTATION OF AN ‘AWARENESS’ OF THE REFLEXIVE ‘BACKFIRING’ OF MODERNISATION

In the previous section, I reflected on what it means when social actors ‘proclaim’ that there is something ‘new’ about the world. In this section, I make a move in a different direction. While I stay with the issue of the ‘new world’, I take up a different scholarly position and suggest that we understand the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came as a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the complexity of the ‘reflexive modern’ social world, in general, and, in particular, as a manifestation of the ‘reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation’; the latter being constituted by three aspects: the “internal cosmopolitisation” (Beck 2006: 2) of national societies, the existence of

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10 Taking the above together, it can be argued that the proclamation of a ‘new’ post-9/11 world played a significant role in the construction of 9/11 and the narrative of the ‘global war on terror’. It helped to open the path for the US-led military intervention in Iraq in 2003 and the removal of Saddam Hussein. This interpretation is supported by the observation that plans to remove Saddam Hussein from power were not just developed in the aftermath of and in direct reaction to 9/11. A public letter to President Bill Clinton in 1998 illustrates that the idea has been there before. In this letter, prominent US public commentators, among them Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, demanded “a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power” (Project for the New America 1998). It was not only a change in administration that this plan was followed through. The distinct construction of 9/11 and, as I argue, the construction of the world as ‘new’, that is, as different in kind and demanding radically new moves, opened the possibility for such a move and helped to put the 1998-plan into action.
“global risk” (Beck 1992, 1999, also 2009a), and the “return of uncertainty” (Beck 1994: 8; also Bonß 1996).

To put forward such a suggestion presupposes a particular conception of the world, one which is grounded in an interpretation of sociologist Ulrich Beck’s work. According to this conception, social reality is shaped by (the interplay of) the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the process of modernisation, constituted by the just mentioned ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies, ‘global risk’ and ‘return of uncertainty’, on the one side, and the prevalence of the “national perspective” and “methodological nationalism” (Beck 2006), on the other side.

In what follows, I provide an account of this conception of social reality. I start by elaborating on each of the two aspects that shape social reality. I do this by building on Beck (especially 1994, 2004, 2006), as well as, my own interpretation of his theory, as outlined elsewhere (see Selchow 2015a, 2016a). Having sketched this conception, I then move to elaborate on my claim that the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came is a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ for this kind of social reality.

**Beck’s ‘provisional’ project of rethinking how we think about social reality**

In his rich and extensive scholarship, sociologist Ulrich Beck paints a complex picture of the state and nature of contemporary national societies. Beyond the bounds of his home discipline sociology, it is especially his ‘risk society’-thesis (see Beck 1986, 1992, 1999a, 2009a) that has attracted attention and that has inspired not only scholarly but also public imaginations.

Yet, ‘risk society’ is only one component of Beck’s social theory. It is just one of three theorems that constitute his theory of social reality, the other two being “cosmopolitisation” (especially Beck 2004, 2006) and “individualisation” (e.g. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1994). In this sense, it is unproductive to take Beck as a ‘risk’-scholar, as it has been done by many in the political studies and IR discourse. Such a conception of Beck distracts from what is at the heart of his scholarship and from the key drivers of his intellectual endeavour. Beck is not a ‘risk’-scholar, narrowly understood, and his ‘risk society’-thesis is not a theory of ‘risk’ as such. Rather, it is an attempt to question and deconstruct the usefulness of the modern idea ‘risk’ in its political function and applications. In this sense, the invented German word *Risikogesellschaft* (‘risk society’) is not a term that refers to a society with

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11 The German word *Kosmopolitisierung* in Beck’s work is sometimes translated into English as *cosmopolitanisation* (e.g. Beck 2006; Beck and Sznaider 2006) and sometimes as *cosmopolitisation* (e.g. Beck 2011, 2014). In his most recent work, it is consistently the latter. Both terms mean the same. I use the word *cosmopolitisation*.

12 The following elaborations and interpretation of Beck build on Selchow (2016a).
more ‘risks’, as it is sometimes understood (e.g. Krahmann 2011). On the contrary, the word serves to signal that ‘risk’ and ‘society’ no longer work as concepts to grasp social reality (see Bayerischer Rundfunk 2014).

Beck’s overarching aim and main scholarly passion was to trigger an epistemological shift in sociology, in particular, and in the social sciences, more generally. Most recently, he uses the word *metamorphosis* to capture the kind of change that, he holds, modern societies are subject to, a change that warrants a new approach, in fact, a new epistemology (Beck 2016; also Beck 2015). As Bronner (1995: 68) puts it, Beck’s main conviction is that “[w]e live in a world […] different from the one in which we think.” This striving for a radically different way of approaching and understanding social reality is grounded in Beck’s particular conception of this reality as a ‘new’ reality.

As I put it elsewhere (Selchow 2016a), the ambitious goal to completely rethink how we see and think about society – namely, by moving beyond the (modern) language of ‘development’, ‘change’ and ‘(social) transformation’, and away from the (naturalised) focus on the nation-state as *the* guiding social and political category – accounts for the kind of ‘provisionality’ that shapes Beck’s work. This provisionality is manifest in his writings in two ways. First, it is manifest in the sometimes loose and what appears to be inconsistent use of words and, arguably, even concepts throughout Beck’s texts: is it “cosmopolitanisation” (e.g. Beck 2006) or “cosmopolitisation” (e.g. Beck 2011)? Is there a difference between “imagined cosmopolitan risk communities” (Beck and Grande 2010), “imagined communities of global risk” (Beck 2011) and “cosmopolitan communities of climate risk” (Beck, Blok, Tyfield and Zhang 2013)? And where exactly is the dividing line between his idea of ‘risk’, ‘danger’ and ‘catastrophe’? Beck sometimes uses these words and concepts interchangeably. Second, the provisionality is manifest in his theory itself, which does not always unfold in a strictly consistent way across his various publications. Most obviously, as he himself acknowledges, there are two interpretations of ‘reflexive modernisation’ in his writings, where only one fully captures the essence of his main thesis (see Beck 2013).\footnote{I return to this point in due course.}

And yet, this ‘provisionality’ is not a shortcoming in Beck’s writing. It is something that lies in the nature of the exercise in which he was involved and to which he was committed. The provisionality mirrors “the ambivalent character of the world [Beck] describes”, argues Bronner (1995: 67). “In the state of total change we try to think this change. This is difficult”, Beck explains, self-reflexively adding, “hence, we cannot appear with full confidence”, implying the imperative of constant adjustment and rewriting along the path of discovery and theorisation (Beck 2013; my own translation). In this sense, as I also suggest elsewhere (see Selchow 2016a), Beck’s language use and theory development was, and had to be, about the invention,
testing and rewriting of concepts and frameworks – ‘provisional’, playful, sweeping and somewhat provocative, but at the same time, inviting and open to critique, by virtue of the nature of the task he set himself.

Taking into account these general comments on Beck’s oeuvre, what follows is not a comprehensive account of Beck’s theory but a conception of contemporary social reality that is grounded in a purposeful and selective reading and interpretation of his writings. In this conception, social reality is shaped by two aspects and their interplay. As mentioned above, these two aspects are, on the one side, the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the process of modernisation and, on the other side, the prevalence of the ‘national perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’. In the following, I elaborate on each of these two aspects in turn.

The reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, comprising the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies, ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’

With the term ‘reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation’ I capture three aspects that together shape contemporary social reality: the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies, the existence of ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’. These aspects are intimately interwoven in, both, empirical reality and Beck’s writings. They determine each other but are not of the same order. Yet, in order to reduce complexity, I present each of them side by side, separately from each other, and as if they belonged to the same class of phenomena.

First, in the conception of contemporary social reality that constitutes the ‘pre-theoretical commitment’, which shapes my take on the omnipresence of global, national societies and their institutions are shaped by a process called “cosmopolitisation” (especially Beck 2004, 2006).\(^\text{14}\) The term cosmopolitisation refers to the unfolding enmeshment of lived realities, that is, of cultures and horizons of experience (Erfahrungshorizonte) and horizons of expectation (Erwartungshorizonte). Cosmopolitisation is, as Beck (2006: 19) stresses, a “really existing” process that shapes modern national societies. He invents the German word Wirklichkeitskosmopolitisimus\(^\text{15}\) to stress this important point (Beck 2004: 31). This term is used to make sure that ‘cosmopolitisation’ is not misunderstood as a normative project that social agents choose to advance (or not). Cosmopolitisation is not to be confused with what is usually referred to with the word cosmopolitanism.\(^\text{16}\) The process cosmopolitisation, this enmeshment of lived realities, of cultures, horizons of experience and horizons of expectation, is not a conscious and

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14 The following builds on Selchow (2016a).
15 The word *Wirklichkeit* is to be translated as *reality*.
16 For a short elaboration of the distinction between cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitisation in Beck’s own words, see Beck (2009: 13).
intended process that is triggered and guided by the normative ideals of the (elite) project of cosmopolitanism. Rather, in Beck’s conception, the internal cosmopolitisation of social reality and national societies unfolds and shapes lived realities, societies and institutions, regardless of whether there is an awareness and appreciation of it, and regardless of whether this is wanted and/or intended. The internal cosmopolitisation of national societies unfolds as a side effect of actions.

It is crucial to appreciate the significance of the idea of cosmopolitisation being a side effect because it captures the important point that the internal cosmopolitisation of social reality unfolds in the process of actions and decisions that are actually targeted at other ends – not at a cosmopolitisation of lived reality, in general, and national societies, in particular. What is meant by the internal cosmopolitisation of social reality and national societies is not a process that is voluntarily, let alone, strategically set into gear under the label ‘cosmopolitisation’; rather, it is a process that inevitably, unintentionally and ‘accidentally’ happens to be set into gear by actions of social actors, which go under different labels and which are motivated by different intentions. As Beck puts it, the internal cosmopolitisation of national societies is an

“unwanted [in the sense of unintended] and unobserved [in the sense of unseen] side effect of actions that are not intended as ‘cosmopolitan’ in the normative sense.”
(Beck 2006: 18)

It is

“an unforeseen social effect of actions directed to other ends performed by human beings operating within a network of global interdependence risks.” (ibid. 48)

It is worth taking up Beck’s example of the hiring practice of the German football club 1. FC Bayern München to illustrate this point (ibid. 11). The practice of hiring football players from around the world as a strategic practice undertaken by the managers of the club in order to create a world class football team has the unintended side effect of setting into gear a process of internal cosmopolitisation of Bavaria, because, as Beck (ibid.) puts it, it produces

“a profane cosmopolitan ‘We’ in which the boundaries between internal and external, between the national and the international, have long since been transcended. Bayern Munich symbolizes a cosmopolitan Bavaria that officially cannot and must not exist in Bavaria, but […] exists. Indeed, without this taken-for-granted cosmopolitanism Bayern Munich […] would not exist.”

17 In the original this reads: “Ich lebe in München. Wenn es richtig ist, daß der kosmopolitische Blick die kosmopolitischen Potenzen der Provinz aufdeckt,
The Negotiation of the “New World”

But the idea that the cosmopolitisation of social reality is a side effect also means that even explicitly exclusive actions entail a cosmopolitisation. This makes it an “irreversible” (Beck 2006: 74) and long-term process. As a consequence, as Beck argues,

“consciousness and politics are for that very reason fundamentally ambivalent. But the converse also holds: because consciousness and politics are fundamentally ambivalent, the cosmopolitization of reality is advancing. For example, all ‘opponents of globalization’ share with their ‘opponents’ the global communications media (thereby enhancing their utility for promoting and organizing transnational protest movements).” (ibid. 74)

This means that even actions, which can be seen to have been actively and consciously taken against a reality of enmeshed lives, inevitably fuel the process of the internal cosmopolitisation of social reality and of national societies. Anti-European parties, such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP), constitute another helpful example to illustrate this point (Beck 2014a). They follow an exclusionary and anti-Europe(an integration) doctrine but, in order to be ‘successful’ as anti-EU parties, their representatives sit in the European parliament. In fact, they have to sit in the European parliament in order to succeed. In doing so, they ‘accidentally’ but inevitably fuel the process of the internal cosmopolitisation of social reality and of national societies, as a(n unintended) side effect of their active striving for exclusion. In this sense, the cosmopolitisation of national societies does not necessarily lead to a normatively ‘cosmopolitan’ reality:

“There is no necessary relation between the internal cosmopolitanization of national societies and the emergence of a cosmopolitan consciousness, subject or agent”, writes Beck (2006: 74).

A third and final example not only further illustrates the above point but also builds a bridge between this first and the second aspect that constitutes the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation and shapes contemporary national societies, namely the existence of ‘global risk’. Following the above conception of the internal cosmopolitisation of social reality and of national societies as a side effect of actions that are targeted at other ends, the exclusive, in the sense of explicitly national decisions and actions to increase the German GDP by, for instance, promoting the production of automobiles through German companies, have to be seen as ‘accidentally’ setting into gear the process of the internal cosmopolitisation of Germany. This is because these exclusive, national decisions inevitably link Germany and, say, Tuvalu. They enmesh German (national) lived reality with Tuvaluan (national) lived reality through the (potential) consequences of Germany’s exclusive, national decisions, i.e. consequences such as rising sea levels and the warming of the climate beyond 2ºC due to a (possible) increase in carbon emissions. In this sense, as Beck and Grande (2010: 417) put it, cosmopolitisation is a process that ‘accidentally’ brings the “global other” into the midst of other “global others” – the internal cosmopolitisation of social reality unfolds accidentally and, in this case, as the product of exclusive national actions and decisions.

But there is more to this example than that it further illustrates what has been said above. The issue of ‘unintended consequences’ brings us to the second aspect that shapes contemporary social reality and national societies. This is the existence of what Beck calls “global risk” (Beck 1992, 1999, also 2009a). To understand what is meant by ‘global risk’, it is necessary to start with a brief look at the idea ‘risk’.

‘Risk’ is a child of modernity. It is a modern way of dealing with the uncertainty of the future. Generally speaking, notions of uncertainty and the unknown are central components in socio-political life. The way a society perceives and deals with uncertainty and the unknown, more broadly, how it understands and deals with the future, affects its political action in the present. Perceptions of uncertainty and the unknown impact on the way political decisions are made in that they shape what decisions are perceived socially acceptable, that is, legitimate. As Brian Wynne and Kerstin Dressel (2001) show in their comparative study of German and UK perceptions of and reactions to the (potential) danger of bovine spongiform encephalopathy

18 For the following paragraphs, see Selchow (2014: 69-70); also Loughnan and Selchow (2013: 274-282).
19 In Chapter 6, I elaborate in more detail on the relationship between the temporal categories ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’.
(BSE), which became an issue in Europe in the late 1990s, there are cultural differences in perceptions of uncertainty and the unknown, leading to fundamentally different political decisions. These different political decisions are, however, each perceived as ‘reasonable’ and legitimate in their respective cultural contexts. Over and above this, the criteria for legitimate decisions are not only culturally specific but of course also historical – they are valid at a specific moment but might change over time.

Yet, despite their cultural specificities, what modern societies, like the UK and Germany, share is an approach to uncertainty and the unknown that is ‘active’ and ‘optimistic’; in this respect they stand in contrast to traditional societies. The modern approach to uncertainty and the unknown is ‘active’ in that it is grounded in the idea that humans have their future in their hands. This is one of the significant characteristics of modernity. Modernity is about the active “colonization of the future” (Giddens 1994: 7).

Besides being ‘active’, the modern approach to uncertainty and the unknown is ‘optimistic’ in the sense that it understands the unknown as something that could be known, either by overcoming (lay) ignorance or through further scientific exploration and advanced/advancing knowledge production (Wehling 2010: 265). This is an ‘optimistic’ approach to the unknown and to uncertainty, in the sense that it takes it as something that is not yet known. In this context, ‘risk’ is a prominent modern way of dealing with the unknown and the uncertainty of the future. More precisely, it is a way of dealing with the uncertainty that human actions (or inactions) entail. ‘Risk’ is about assessing the probability of the future occurrence of an unintended

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20 Wynne and Dressel (2001) compare perceptions of what they call “actionable uncertainty” in Britain and Germany as expressed by the respective governments’ chief veterinary officers. They identify in the attitude of the British official “the taken-for-granted UK policy view of effective scientific certainty about the lack of species transferability of the BSE agent, and hence the lack of risk to humans” (ibid. 148). In contrast, the Germans held a very different understanding of the nature of non-knowledge and its role in policy-making. Whereas the UK officials’ “German counterparts saw that the abstract possibility of such species crossing represented a serious, that is, ‘policy-actionable’, scientific uncertainty. The UK policy-scientists frequently talked of the ‘lack of evidence’ for this possibility, hence, the ‘unscientific’ nature of the German position” (ibid.). Wynne and Dressel’s comparative investigation of perceptions of uncertainty and non-knowledge does not only explain the widespread public fury in Britain, claiming that the EU in general and Germany in particular acted ‘irrationally’ when they banned British beef, it also reveals the fundamentally different understandings of the phenomena of non-knowledge and uncertainty and their different role in and impact on policy-decisions: in contrast to the British, the German notion of non-knowledge and its perceived relevance lead to a more pro-active policy formation (ibid. 122).
consequence of an action in the present. An assessment of such kind is undertaken on the basis of past experiences.

Taking these brief points on ‘risk’ together, we see why it makes sense to call the tool ‘risk’ a ‘child of modernity’. ‘Risk’ only makes sense within a modern cultural context, in which we have human agency and in which the future is imagined as able to be shaped by agents, rather than predetermined by a higher force (such as deity). Again, with Anthony Giddens (2002: 24) we can understand ‘risk’ as

“the mobilising dynamic of a society bent on change, that wants to determine its own future rather than leaving it to religion, tradition, or the vagaries of nature.”

This does not mean that the future can ever actually be determined through the logic of ‘risk’ or that uncertainty can actually be overcome. As Gerda Reith (2004: 396) explains, ‘risk’

“cannot make the future predictable or the world certain, [but] it can create the means for acting as though it were.”

Ultimately, ‘risk’ is a fiction; it is an imagination of potential unintended, future consequences of decisions in the present. In Beck’s words, it is “something non-existent, constructed or fictitious” (Beck 1999: 100). In this sense, ‘risk’ “exist[s…] as a feature of knowing, not as an aspect of being” (Reith 2004: 387). Pushing this further, Niklas Luhmann (quoted in ibid. 385-6) explains,

“[t]he outside world itself knows no risks, for it knows neither distinctions, nor expectations, nor evaluations, nor probabilities.”

Having outlined what ‘risk’ is makes it now possible to demonstrate that Beck’s concept ‘global risk’ captures something entirely different from the modern notion ‘risk’. In fact, Beck uses the term ‘global risk’ to question the modern notion ‘risk’. The adjective global in the term ‘global risk’ does not refer to the (geographical) reach of unintended consequences of decisions, but serves as a ‘question mark’ that casts a shadow of doubt over the idea of ‘risk’ as a (modern) technology to be applied ‘naturally’ in dealing with the uncertainty of the world and the unintended, potential consequences of decisions made in the present. It points to “the arrogant assumption of controllability” that underpins the modern notion ‘risk’ (Beck 2009a: 5). Let me unravel this.

To begin with, the term ‘global risk’ refers to a distinct kind of uncertainty, namely to the potential consequences of “industrial, that is, techno-economic decisions and considerations of utility” (Beck 2009a: 98). These

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21 For the following paragraphs, see Selchow (2014: 77-81, 2016a).
decisions must be understood as being grounded in modern institutions and basic modern principles. They have, as Beck (2009a: 98) puts it, their “peaceful origin in the centres of rationality and prosperity with the blessings of the guarantors of law and order.” The concept ‘global risk’ highlights the fact that the potential unintended consequences of these decisions cannot be imagined or dealt with through the modern tool ‘risk’. The technological advancements brought about by industrialisation, the progress of modernisation and the modern sciences require a different handling of the potential unintended consequences of these decisions and, consequently, of how these decisions are made.

This different handling of potential unintended consequences of decisions made in the present is necessary because of three dimensions of such decisions. First, ‘industrial, that is, techno-economic decisions and considerations of utility’ need to be imagined as potentially having consequences that might stand and remain beyond knowledge. Second, these decisions must be imagined as potentially producing Nichtwissen (non-knowledge) (Beck 2009a; see also Wehling 2006, 2010, 2012). Third, and finally, they need to be imagined as potentially producing unintended consequences that are “socially delimited in space and time” (Beck and Grande 2010: 418) – all of which we see supported in empirical cases, such as the accident in the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant on 26 April 1986, or climate change as an unintended consequence of past industrialisation and past decisions that lead to CO2 emissions.

Taken together, all this means that ‘techno-economic decisions’ can no longer be grounded in an assessment of their potential unintended consequences that is shaped by a national container-thinking and based on the modern belief in progress through scientific knowledge production. On the contrary, as Beck stresses, potential consequences of ‘techno-economic decisions and considerations of utility’, i.e. ‘global risks’, need to be understood as “a result of more knowledge” (Beck 2009, 5; emphasis added), as opposed to something that could be ‘tamed’ and dealt with through more (modern scientific) knowledge production. In this sense, they are to be understood as the ‘fruits’, that is, the very success of the process of modernisation, and not as the dark side effects of it, something that could be dealt with based on the same premises that informed and legitimised the actions and decisions that produced them in the first place. For instance, as I put it elsewhere (Selchow 2014: 79), ‘global risks’ are the outcome of our very understanding of the low toxicity, low reactivity and low flammability of Chloro-fluorocarbons (CFCs) that made these gases attractive for use in refrigerators, or of our ability to genetically modify organisms, or of the scientific sophistication that enables us to enrich uranium, or of our achievements that make it possible to be mobile and travel the globe by plane. In this vein, “[c]limate change, for example, is a product of successful industrialization which systematically disregards its consequences for nature and humanity”, as Beck (2009: 8; emphasis added) puts it.
The above is just a small but significant shift in the understanding of the potential consequences of ‘industrial, techno-economic decisions and considerations of utility’, i.e. ‘global risks’. It implies that these ‘risks’ cannot be conceptualised as the (as yet ‘untamed’) shortcomings of the process of modernisation and industrialisation. Rather, they have to be acknowledged as the very realisation, indeed, the triumph and success of modernisation and industrialisation. In this sense, what is imagined as ‘global risk’ is different in kind from the modern imagination ‘risk’. Ultimately, it is exactly this distinct different in kind-nature of what is imagined under the label ‘global risk’ that justifies conceptualising ‘global risks’ as having a fundamental impact on modern national societies. ‘Global risks’ produce a social reality that is subject to a ‘borderless’ necessity to cooperate (Kooperationszwang), as well as an interrelation of responsibility (Verantwortungszusammenhang) (Beck and Grande 2010: 417), whether or not this is acknowledged by actors.22

This brings us back to the above sketched reality of cosmopolitisation, in which the ‘global other’ is implicated in the decisions and actions of other ‘global others’. My elaboration on ‘global risk’ now advances our understanding of cosmopolitisation, as it makes us aware that the internal cosmopolitisation of national societies is actually best understood as a product of ‘global risk’. This also helps us now to better understand the above provided quote, in which Beck describes cosmopolitisation as an “unforeseen social effect of actions directed to other ends performed by human beings operating within a network of global interdependence risks.” (Beck 2006: 48; emphasis added)

What he calls ‘global interdependence risks’ here are, in essence, what I described above as ‘global risks’.23 Furthermore, my brief reflection on ‘global risk’ makes us aware that, as I mentioned at the beginning of this section, the three aspects that constitute the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation – the internal cosmopolitisation of national societies, the existence of global risks, and the return of uncertainty – are not only difficult to separate from each other, as they are intimately enmeshed, but that they are also not necessarily of the same order. However, as suggested above, for my purposes here, a ‘compartmentalised’ view at them is sufficient and ‘acceptable’ in order to provide a picture of the presupposed conception of social reality that informs my move of taking the proclamation of the ‘newness’ of the

22 Again, it is worth reminding us that ‘risk’ is not about actual unintended consequences but the imagination of possible future consequences, which serves as the ground for decisions.

23 This is an example of the earlier mentioned challenge that Beck does not always use language coherently across his writings.
world as a manifestation of the ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation.

To finalise this picture, I now turn to the third aspect that constitutes the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, which is the ‘return of uncertainty’. Generally speaking, the term ‘return of uncertainty’ refers to the dubiousness of the above sketched ‘optimistic’ modern approach to uncertainty and the unknown. In the vein of my elaborations above, it implies that non-knowledge can no longer simply be understood as something that could be unlocked through (further) scientific knowledge production (see in detail Wehling 2010: 260-262). It can no longer simply be taken as

“the given ‘primitive or native state’ […] from which the scientific endeavor departs to replace it, sooner or later, with complete and reliable knowledge.” (Böschen, Kastenhofer, Rust, Soentgen and Wehling 2010: 785)

In this sense, the expression ‘return of uncertainty’ refers to the fact that scientific knowledge produces non-knowledge (which was also already indicated in my reflection on ‘global risk’ above).

We will see in more detail in my elaboration on the ‘national perspective’, below, that the word *return* does not suggest that there was ever a time when ‘uncertainty’ had vanished. Rather, the word indicates that, as suggested above, the modern optimistic narrative of scientific progress and the belief in advanced and advancing knowledge production, which is encapsulated in the notion ‘risk’, enabled and enables an approach to the world and the potential unintended consequences of actions and decisions in the present, *as if* uncertainty could be ‘tamed’, and *as if* it had ‘vanished’ (at least for the purposes of making (national) ‘techno-economic decisions’). As cited above, Beck (2009a: 5) calls this an “arrogant assumption of controllability.”

Moving further, the fact that scientific knowledge produces non-knowledge does not simply refer to the common adage that the more we know the more we realise we do not know, that is, the more we are aware of known unknowns. Rather, it captures the idea that increasing scientific knowledge production leads to an increase in ‘unknown unknowns’, that is, things that we do not know we do not know – and, furthermore, that it (potentially) leads to things that we are actually not able to know. In other words, scientific knowledge produces non-knowledge and uncertainty that would not exist without scientific knowledge production and, on top of things, that might remain beyond human grasp (Wehling 2010: 266-7; also especially Beck 1992).²⁴

To this point, I have captured one aspect of the ‘return of uncertainty’. But there is more to it. As I also explain elsewhere (see Selchow 2016a), the

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²⁴ The word *might* is important here. The claim is not *that* it remains beyond human grasp but that it *might*. 
term ‘return of uncertainty’ also points to and captures an inherent uncertainty, which is due to the ‘ambivalence’, as Beck (2006: 74; also Beck 2013) calls it, that arises between contemporary horizons of experience (Erfahrungshorizonte) and horizons of expectation (Erwartungshorizonte), on the one side, and modern principles and institutions, on the other. Again, this is closely enmeshed with the two aspects discussed above, namely the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ and ‘global risk’. It can best be explained with reference to what is meant by “reflexive modernisation” (e.g. Beck 1994; also Beck, Bonß and Lau 2003).

As mentioned in the first part of this section, there are two interpretations of the theory ‘reflexive modernisation’ in Beck’s work. The dominant interpretation, which was developed by Beck and his colleagues in the 10-year-collaborative research programme “Reflexive Moderne” at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (1999-2009), is less radical than the more marginal one, as Beck (2013) himself suggests. At the heart of both interpretations is the distinction between the basic principles of modernity, on the one side, and basic modern institutions, such as the nation-state, family etc, on the other side. Basic principles of modernity are, for instance, freedom, market dependence, rationality, progress, statehood, the obligation to give reasons, as well as principles of equality. In a nutshell, the first, less radical interpretation of reflexive modernisation holds that the radicalisation of these basic modern principles, which has taken place in the course of industrial modernisation, produces side effects, which lead to a crisis of modern institutions. These side effects are, for instance, actually (in contrast to potentially) occurring unintended consequences of ‘industrial’ or ‘techno-economic decisions and considerations of utility’, which have not been accounted for in the ‘risk’ assessments that guided past decisions. A good example of this sort of side effect is climate change as an actually occurring, unintended consequence of past ‘techno-economic decisions’. New kinds of family constellations that arise from advances in reproductive health or in the context of new communication technologies also fall into this category (e.g. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2013); this latter example shows that these side effects are, of course, not necessarily negative, or, better, that they are not necessarily ‘catastrophic’.

Overall, these side effects can be grasped as a ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. They confront modern institutions with the progress of modernisation itself. Consequently, these institutions no longer measure up to social reality, where the central point is that this social reality is the very product of modernity’s own radicalised principles. This is where the adjective reflexive comes in.

In this first interpretation of ‘reflexive modernisation’, institutions are variable. They take different forms at different times, in response to various aspects of modernisation that ‘backfires’. In the scholarship, this has been translated into ideas about new governance constellations and new governance experiments (see Grande 2013).
The second interpretation of ‘reflexive modernisation’ builds on the first one but goes further. In this interpretation, it is not only the institutions that are set as variable but also the basic modern principles. This interpretation holds that, through rapid contemporary developments, a process of change is set into gear, which takes on a life of its own and generates a social reality that is qualitatively ‘new’, precisely because it is not only modern institutions that are challenged by modernity’s ‘backfiring’ but also basic modern principles. “Modernity in this sense is a sub-political ‘revolutionary system’ without a revolutionary program or goal”, explains Beck (1995: 41). In this process of reflexive modernisation, both, modern institutions and modern principles are confronted with the consequences of the progress of modernisation itself, which ‘reflexively’ overturns its own foundations, its institutions and principles. This means that lived reality – the horizons of experience and horizons of expectation – no longer correlates with the institutions of modern national societies or with their principles. As a consequence, contemporary individuals enter a “Nicht-Koordinatensystem ihrer Erfahrungen”, as Beck (2013) puts it, ‘a non-coordinate system of their experiences’, which lies outside existing categories. This implies an ‘inherent uncertainty’ that shapes social reality. One of the consequences of this is what Beck and Lau (2004; see also Beck and Grande 2010) capture with the word ‘politicisation’. ‘Reflexive modernisation’ implies a ‘politicisation’ in the sense that even things that used to be perceived as anthropological constants, such as aspects of reproductive health, are now in the realm of choice and decisions, i.e. are ‘political’.

The prevalence of the ‘national perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’

The previous section sketched one side of the Beck-grounded conception of social reality that serves as the presupposition for my suggestion that the proclamation of the ‘newness’ of the world constitutes a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. I outlined what I mean by the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, which includes the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies, the existence of ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’.

In this present section, I turn to the second aspect. This is the prevalence of “the national perspective” and “methodological nationalism” (especially Beck 2006). More precisely, it is the prevalence of the tradition of ‘the national perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’.25

The prevalence of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’ is more straightforwardly explained than the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. The ‘national perspective’26 is a way of

25 For the following paragraphs, see Selchow (2016a, 2015a).
26 Refer back to fn 2 in this chapter.
looking at the world that is grounded in “the equation of the nation-state with national society”, as Beck (2006: 48) puts it – “one of the most powerful convictions concerning society and politics” (ibid. 24). In a nutshell, the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ is the tradition that brings out a view on the world that is blind to the reality of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, including the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies. Simultaneously, it re-produces “the categories in terms of which we understand reality that take the nation-state as the norm” (ibid. 73). The ‘national perspective’ is grounded in modern conceptions of the world that do not acknowledge the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. It does not acknowledge the above sketched nature of contemporary reality, which is shaped by the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies, the existence of ‘global risks’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’.

Consequently, the ‘national perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’ produce an ideational and conceptual layer that makes possible the establishment of institutions, which are not only ‘inadequate’ in the face of the nature of the social reality that is shaped by the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation but which actually produce ‘ambivalence’.

“The national outlook [perspective], together with its associated grammar, is becoming false. It fails to grasp that political, economic and cultural actions and their (intended and unintended) consequences know no borders, indeed, it is completely blind to the fact that, even when nationalism is reignited by the collision with globality, this can only be conceptualized” (ibid. 18)

as an ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of societies, and as the result of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. In short, referring back to the above quoted Stephen Bronner, in the conceptualisation of the world, which I present here, the social reality in which modernisation reflexively ‘backfires’ is the world, in which we live, and the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’ shapes the world, in which we, i.e. social and political actors and scholars, think.

The ‘reflexive modern’ social reality of ‘both/and’

To this point in this subsection of the present chapter, I have sketched the two aspects that shape social reality in the conception that underlies my argument that the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came is a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. These are, on the one hand, the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, constituted by the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies, the existence of ‘global risk’, and the ‘return of uncertainty’, and, on the other hand, the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’. To be precise, it is actually the interplay of these two aspects that shapes social reality. Even more precisely, their interplay brings out historical actualisations of each of these two aspects, which shape social reality.
In order to indicate the significance of the interplay of the above two aspects for the nature of social reality, it is worth giving it a distinct name: ‘reflexive modern’. Hence, according to the above sketched conceptualisation, social reality and national societies are best labelled ‘reflexive modern’.

Moving forward from here, and following Beck further, the interplay of the two aspects – reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation and the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ – and, consequently, the path of societies are not to be imagined as leading into a particular direction. Putting it the other way around, it would be misguided and, in fact, an analytical strategy shaped by ‘methodological nationalism’ to presuppose that the ‘development’ of ‘reflexive modern’ societies follows a distinct trajectory, against which it could be assessed (especially Beck 2016). In general, the ‘development’ of ‘reflexive modern’ societies should not be seen as linear. In particular, as mentioned, it should not be seen as a process that leads to a (normative) cosmopolitan consciousness, or cosmopolitan subjects or actors (e.g. Beck 2004: 115). Reality might or might not ‘develop’, or as Beck recently put it, “metamorphose” (Beck 2016) into a normative cosmopolitan reality; or, societies might or might not ‘metamorphose’ into an explicitly exclusive and ‘national’ state, leaving perspectives deeply shaped by an expressly exclusive actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’. In any case, none of these developments can be seen as either/or-developments (entweder-oder). Social reality, as it is conceptualised above, needs to be treated as a both/and-place (sowohl-als-auch), where the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies does not constitute the opposite of the ‘national’ reality, and ‘the cosmopolitised’ is not to be understood as the opposite of ‘the national’ (e.g. Beck 2016; also Beck and Lau 2004). Rather, one is an integral part of the other – as we saw in the above mentioned example of UKIP. In this respect, the internal cosmopolitisation of national societies is to be understood as an integral part of the redefinition of ‘the national’ (Beck 2004: 15), and of distinct actualisations of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’. As such, similar to imaginations of the world as, for instance, advanced by IR scholars, such as James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (1989) and David Campbell (1998[1992]), the conceptualised ‘reflexive modern’ social reality is one that can no longer be grasped through comfortable (modern) dichotomies of inside/outside, national/international, political/non-political, etc. Yet, the either/or is not simply obsolete and deconstructed in Beck’s conception of the ‘reflexive modern’ world but replaced with a both/and. This both/and is the historical product of the interplay of the two above sketched aspects, namely of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation and the tradition of the ‘national perspective’.

Discussing the difference between this conceptualisation of the world and postmodern conceptions, Beck, Bonß and Lau (2003) stress that there are many aspects, in which both overlap, but that, at their core, “[p]ostmodernists are interested in deconstruction without reconstruction, second modernity [the word they use for the above sketched conception of
social reality] is about deconstruction and reconstruction.” This makes this Beck-inspired conception of social reality so productive. It is not ‘just’ a deconstruction of the modern (imagination of the) world, but replaces it with a fundamentally different conception, in which the deconstruction of modern dichotomies is ‘built in’. The problem with grasping this newly conceptualised world, however, is that there is no established language yet that we could use to do so.

The proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came as a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation

In the first section of this chapter, I suggested that the proclamation of the ‘new world’ to come is a manifestation of the modern fondness for innovation, progress and development. I proposed that, by contrast, the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came is a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the complexity of the ‘reflexive modern’ world and, in particular, the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. My elaborations above give meaning to this proposition. I suggest, events, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall or the terrorist attack of 9/11, are moments, in which this complexity and the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation surface, that is, in which they become visible, almost unmissable for social and political observers. As I stressed above, the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation shapes contemporary social reality with or without these events. What is interesting about these events, however, is that, in them this unfolding “really existing” (Beck 2006: 19) reality ‘bubbles up’, in the sense that the fundamental shortcomings of existing (modern) institutions and principles and of existing ‘national perspective’-narratives becomes readily apparent to observers. It is this, I argue, that is evident in the fact that there is the proclamation of the ‘newness’ of the world, which, as we saw above in the context of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, encapsulates the perception that existing concepts are no longer adequate to grasp the supposedly ‘new’ world. Putting it the other way around, given my presupposed conception of social reality as being a ‘reflexive modern’ world, this explicit ‘awareness’ of the shortcomings in existing conceptions of the world, which is evident in the proclamation that there is something ‘new’ about the world, can be conceptualised as an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation.

To be clear, I use the word awareness in inverted commas to signal that I do not mean to suggest that there is/was a conscious recognition of this reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, in particular, or the ‘reflexive modern’ social reality, in general. As I suggested above, it is a conceptual move that I take the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came as an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation; it is grounded in the above sketched distinct conception of social reality that presupposes this move.

Following this presupposed idea of social reality, there is something exciting about the recognition of the proclamation that there was something
‘new’ about the world as an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. What makes it exciting is that this insight provides the ground to explore empirically distinct historical actualisations of one of the two aspects that brings out social reality, namely the tradition of the ‘national perspective’. In other words, grounded in my theorisation above, the study of the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came, i.e. the study of how the (supposed) ‘new world’ that came is imagined, how it is symbolically dealt with and negotiated, to what extent it is shaking up existing (modern) conceptions of un-certainty, ‘risk’, inside/outside, agency, as well as institutions and guiding principles etc, enables nothing less than insights into the historical actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’. Given that the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ is a central aspect which, in its interplay with the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, brings out the ‘reflexive modern’ social reality, its analysis can only be a valuable endeavour toward an understanding of nothing less than a crucial aspect of contemporary social reality.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I picked up the argument from Chapter 4 that the ‘object’, which is re-produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse, can be called ‘new world’. The aim of this present chapter was to elaborate on the issue ‘new world’ by shedding light on proclamations of the ‘new world’. In doing this, I firstly reflected on what it means to (implicitly or explicitly) ‘proclaim’ the ‘new world’, i.e. to suggest that there was something ‘new’ about the world. I distinguished between two kinds of ‘proclamations’ of the ‘new’. First, the proclamation of the ‘new’ to come and, second, the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came. The latter proclamation is the one that is implied in the ‘globalisation’-discourse.

In comparing these two proclamations, I conceptualised the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came as a distinct dimension of political actors’ struggle to legitimise past and future decisions and actions. I also highlighted the distinct speaking position that such a proclamation implies. In this kind of proclamation, the speaking position is a more ‘passive’ position than the one implied in the proclamation of the ‘new world’ to come. While it insinuates a kind of ‘objectivity’, it is, however, not less politically loaded than the proclamation of the world to come. Furthermore, I suggested that, while the proclamation of the ‘new’ to come is a manifestation of the modern and optimistic fondness for the striving for innovation, progress and development, the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came is a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation.

In a second move, I elaborated on the conception of social reality that underpins my claim that the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came is a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. This conception is grounded in Ulrich Beck’s work. According to this con-
First, it is shaped by the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the process of modernisation. This ‘backfiring’ is constituted by the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies, the existence of ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’. I explored it by looking at each of these three aspects in turn and at their inextricable enmeshment. Of particular importance was that the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation (including the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies) is an ‘irreversible’ process, a reality that, generally speaking, is the success of the process of modernisation. At the same time, it is its ‘accidental’ side effect, in that it is the product of decisions and actions targeted at other ends. Furthermore, I highlighted that the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation is a phenomenon, a process that brings with it a fundamental ‘uncertainty’. This uncertainty is grounded in the fact that it is not only modern institutions that are confronted with a ‘radicalisation’ of modernity, but also modern principles, which are overturned.

Second, social reality is shaped by the prevalence of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’. This is a political perspective and a particular scholarly take on the world that obscures the view at the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, especially at the social reality of the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies.

I stressed that it is the interplay of these two aspects, i.e. the historical actualisation of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation and the tradition of the ‘national perspective’, that shapes contemporary social reality. I labelled this reality ‘reflexive modern’, which is a reality that cannot be grasped through the (modern) dichotomies of inside/outside, national/international, national/cosmopolitan. In fact, it is a reality that cannot be captured with familiar concepts such as ‘development’, ‘progress’ or ‘transformation’. I stressed that the interplay of the two aspects – reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation and the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ – and, consequently, the path of societies are not to be imagined as leading into a particular direction, on a distinct trajectory or, importantly, proceeding in a linear way. The familiar either/or-logic (‘entweder-oder’) does not grasp the ‘reflexive modern’ world. This world is a both/and-place (‘sowohl-als-auch’), in which, for instance, the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies does not constitute the opposite of the ‘national’ reality, and ‘the cosmopolitised’ is not to be understood as the opposite of ‘the national’. Rather, one is an integral part of the other, and of distinct actualisations of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’.

Grounded in this conception of social reality, I grasped the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came as a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. I stressed that this was not an observation of how social and political actors actually grasp the perceived ‘newness’ of the world, in the sense of how they label and conceptualise it. Rather, it is a conceptual move, which I took, that presupposes the above...
sketched conception of social reality as ‘reflexive modern’. In this context, I explained that events, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall or the terrorist attacks of 9/11 are moments, in which the complexity of the ‘reflexive modern’ world surfaces and becomes visible to social and political observers. This visibility is manifest in the talk about the ‘new world’ that came. In these events, the fundamental shortcomings of existing (modern) institutions and principles and existing ‘national perspective’-narratives becomes readily apparent to observers. In this sense, the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came is a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, where I use the word ‘awareness’ not to refer to a conscious recognition of this reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. It is an, in fact, it is the empirical question, precisely how the reflexive modern reality is symbolically dealt with and filled with meaning in these proclamations of the ‘new’ that came, and, in particular, how the actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ looks, e.g. how much or how little the distinct ‘awareness’ of the ‘reflexive modern’ reality is actually shaking up the tradition of the ‘national perspective’, that is, existing (modern) conceptions of un-certainty, ‘risk’, inside/outside, agency, as well as institutions and guiding principles.

Bringing the above together, this present chapter framed the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came as an interesting phenomenon in two respects. First, it is an interesting phenomenon in that it is a distinct way, in which political actors legitimise past and present decisions and actions. For instance, George W. Bush’s quote from the very beginning of this chapter shows how the proclamation of, i.e. the reference to the supposedly ‘new world’ is used to legitimise nothing less than a preemptive national security-approach, in this specific case, translated into the US-led military intervention in Iraq in 2003. Second, the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came is an interesting phenomenon in that its analysis enables insights into nothing less than the distinct historical actualisations of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’, i.e. one of the two aspects that brings out social reality. It enables the generation of insights into how the ‘reflexive modern’ world is imagined, how it is symbolically dealt with and negotiated, to what extent it is shaking up the tradition of the ‘national perspective’, and what possibilities are implied in these imaginations.

Yet, to conclude this present chapter and, at the same time, pave the way to the next chapter, it is to point out that as much as such as an analysis of the actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ is valuable, as much it is challenging and, in fact, ‘uncomfortable’. It is uncomfortable because it takes place in a both/and-world. Consequently, it is not only uncomfortable because, as Nina Degele (2010: 177; my own translation) puts it, “serious social scientists do not like the idea of ‘both/and’”, but because

27 “And I said – so I said, ‘There’s a new world here.’ After September the 11th, we must take threats seriously.” (Bush 2004)
there is no clear, pre-established language that could be used to capture the both/and-world (see also Selchow 2016a). This brings us back to the point about the inherent ‘provisionality’ of Beck’s scholarly endeavour that I highlighted earlier in this chapter. Inevitably, a scholarly project that builds on a conception of the world, as it is sketched above, must embrace and accept a form of ‘provisionality’ and, not least, demands a good degree of tolerance for (linguistic) experimentation.
6 The Omnipresence of *Global* as a Political Phenomenon and ‘Unconventional’ Object of Study

Constructions of reality and codes of intelligibility out of which they are produced provide both conditions of possibility and limits on possibility; that is, they make it possible to act in the world while simultaneously defining the ‘horizon of the taken-for-granted’ (Hall 1988: 44) that marks the boundaries of common sense and acceptable knowledge.

**JUTTA WELDES ET AL** (1999: 17)

In this chapter, I return to the adjective *global*. The aim of the chapter is to develop the central argument of this book. I argue that the omnipresence of the adjective *global* is a political phenomenon. It is a re-production of a web of meanings called ‘new world’. As such, the omnipresence of the adjective *global* constitutes an object worthy of study by scholars in the political studies and IR discourses – or, as we will see, at least by scholars at the margins of these discourses.

My strategy in developing my argument is twofold. On the one hand, I bring together and re-assemble the insights that I generated in the previous chapters and theoretically synthesise them. The previous four chapters provide the ground that enables me to conceptualise the omnipresence of the adjective *global* as a re-production of the web of meanings ‘new world’. On the other hand, I broaden my perspective and bring in a distinct theory of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality. This allows me to conceptualise the omnipresence of *global* as a political phenomenon.

The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part is about the synthesis of the previous chapters and my conceptualisation of the omnipresence of *global* as a re-production of a web of meanings ‘new world’.
Two insights, which I developed in the previous chapters, are particularly important in that they provide the ground for this conceptual move.

The first insight is the empirically grounded understanding that the contemporary adjective *global* is closely enmeshed with the talk about ‘globalisation.’ I developed this understanding in Chapter 3 when I demonstrated that the contemporary *global* has come to be used in the sense of ‘outcome of globalisation’. This insight allowed me to conceptualise *global* as a ‘new word’; as I argued at the end of Chapter 3, what is ‘new’ about the contemporary adjective *global* is that it implies ‘globalisation’.

The second central insight that provides the ground for my conceptionalisation of the omnipresence of *global* as a re-production of a web of meanings ‘new world’ is the realisation that all utterances, in which the word *globalisation* is applied, can be seen as constituting a discursive re-production of an object that is best labelled ‘new world’; I developed this argument in Chapter 4.

Bringing these two insights together allows me to conclude in the first part of this chapter that the use of the word *global*, like the use of the word *globalisation*, constitutes a re-production of a web of meanings ‘new world’ is the realisation that all utterances, in which the word *globalisation* is applied, can be seen as constituting a discursive re-production of an object that is best labelled ‘new world’; I developed this argument in Chapter 4.

In the second main part of this chapter, I go beyond the synthesis of insights that I developed in previous chapters. I take my conceptualisation of the phenomenon of the omnipresence of the adjective *global* a step further and argue that the omnipresence of *global* is not only a relevant and interesting phenomenon but also a political phenomenon; this makes it an – albeit ‘unconventional’ – object of study for those, who are interested in the political world.

My conceptualisation of the omnipresence of the adjective *global* as a political phenomenon is a theoretical exercise. It is grounded in a distinct theory of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality. I introduce this theory by extending and refining the discussion of the concept ‘discourse’, which I presented in Chapter 4, as well as, my excursus on language and meaning in Chapter 2. In particular, I reflect on the ideas of ‘politics’ and ‘power’, which are implied in this conception of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality. It is these distinct ideas of ‘politics’ and ‘power’ that make the phenomenon of the omnipresence of *global* a political phenomenon.

Part of my theoretical elaboration is a juxtaposition of my conception of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality with similar
but, nonetheless, meaningfully different theories, which are well established in political practice and the political studies and IR scholarship. I do this in order to be able to situate the political phenomenon of the omnipresence of the adjective global in the broader scholarly discourse. More precisely, I do this to situate it at the ‘unconventional’ margins of the political studies and IR scholarship.

Finally, in the third main part of this chapter, I outline what it means to approach empirically the omnipresence of the adjective global as an ‘unconventional’ object of study. I introduce the empirical study of the phenomenon of the omnipresence of global as an ‘unconventional’, experimental, interpretative and ‘provisional’ endeavour.

SYNTHESIS: THE OMNIPRESENCE OF THE CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL AS A PHENOMENON THAT BRINGS OUT THE ‘NEW WORLD’

The adjective global has been around for some time. Yet, there is something special about the contemporary global. It is not only an ever more popular word, it is also a ‘new word’. Today global has a “hitherto unnoted” (Hargraves 2004: viii) meaning, which, as I argued in Chapter 3, is sufficiently significant as to acknowledge the contemporary adjective as ‘new’.

It is not the first time in its life that global has been ‘discovered’ as a ‘new word’. As I observed in Chapter 3, the first time global became a ‘new word’ was in 1954, the second time in 1955, and the third time in 1991. The ‘new’ meaning, which justifies taking the adjective global in 2016 once again as ‘new’ is ‘outcome of globalisation’. This ‘new’ meaning becomes apparent when we look at the many actual uses of the word today. What many of them share is that the adjective refers to an attribute of something that has this attribute because of something that is called ‘globalisation’ – this is despite of and in addition to the various other meanings that are attached to global in the diverse contexts, in which the adjective is used today. In Chapter 3, I provided a selection of examples from across discourses that illustrate this point, such as Kofi Annan’s claim:

“This system worked, and made it possible for globalization to emerge. As a result we now live in a global world.” (Annan 2000)

To propose acknowledging the contemporary global as a ‘new word’ is not to suggest that the ‘new’ meaning of the word is the meaning of it, or, for that matter, that social actors, such as Kofi Annan, apply the word with the intention of meaning ‘outcome of globalisation’. As discussed in Chapter 2, words do not carry one clear and fixed meaning. Linguistic signs constantly lose and gain meanings. They are like chameleons which adjust to their environment and take on different meanings. In fact, meanings themselves are
not static but only ever constitute a shadow that runs through language. Meaning is a “constant flickering of presence and absence together”, explains Terry Eagleton (1983: 128). There is never any ‘the meaning’ of a word to begin with – this also applies to the adjective global. In this sense, highlighting the ‘new’ meaning of the contemporary global – that is apparent, once one looks at contemporary uses of the word, guided by the question what they have in common – is a scholarly move to highlight a particularly noteworthy ‘new’ meaning, and not a claim about the meaning of global, let alone, about what social actors intend to mean when they use the word global.

The ‘new’ meaning of the contemporary global is noteworthy, hence, worth being acknowledged as ‘new’ and significant, not only because it has been “hitherto unnoted in dictionaries”, which, as I suggested in Chapter 2, lexicographer Hargraves (2004: viii) identifies as a criterion that justifies taking a word as ‘new’, but also because this ‘new’ meaning points to the distinct enmeshment of the contemporary adjective global with the talk about ‘globalisation’. Acknowledging the ‘new’ meaning of the contemporary global makes us aware that global can hardly be thought of independently from ‘globalisation’ any longer – at least not when it comes to public, political, and social and political scientific applications of the adjective. It is this distinct relationship between global and ‘globalisation’ that is interesting.

In Chapter 3, I showed that it is not a novel move to acknowledge that there is a link between the adjective global and the idea ‘globalisation’. The idea that there is a relationship between both is often implied or even made explicit in scholarly approaches to ideas of ‘globalisation’. As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, it is not uncommon for ‘globalisation’-scholars to develop their conception of ‘globalisation’ with reference to a supposed link between ‘globalisation’ and the adjective global. In these instances, whatever is associated with the word global is taken as foundational for whatever is associated with the word globalisation. In fact, as seen in Scholte (2005), the meaning of the word globalisation is sometimes even explicitly derived from what is understood to be an ‘etymological tracing’ that goes back to the supposed ‘true’ meaning of the adjective global. However, I mean something different when I point to the link between ‘globalisation’ and global than these scholars do. My empirical exploration of actual uses of the contemporary adjective global (including by Scholte) brought me into a position to understand that the contemporary global gets its meaning from ‘globalisation’; global encapsulates ‘globalisation’, rather than the other way around.

This insight into the contemporary relationship between the word global and the idea/s ‘globalisation’ is intriguing once we look at the talk about ‘globalisation’ not through a predetermined idea of what ‘globalisation’ ‘is’, hence, through an understanding of it as a distinct thematic issue (such as market integration), but acknowledge the polysemy of the word globalisa-
tion and take utterances, which contain this word, as a re-production of a distinct web of meanings, in other words, as a ‘discourse’ that produces the object it speaks of. Starting from such an alternative position, which, as I sketched in Chapter 4, asks what kind of web of meanings is actually reproduced through uses of the word globalisation, brings to light the ‘new world’.

I discussed in Chapter 4 that what I label the ‘globalisation’-discourse was born in the face of the breakdown of the bipolar bloc system at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. I argued that the ‘globalisation’-discourse is a manifestation of the fact that there was a widespread conviction that the (perceived) ‘new’ reality needed new concepts to grasp it.

“The irruptions in the established order and traditional practices of statecraft have given many of international politics’ customary modes of analysis an air of nostalgia”,

observed David Campbell (1998[1992]: ix). They were perceived as demanding a breakout from the “conceptual jails in which the study of world politics is deemed to be incarcerated”, argued the earlier quoted Rosenau (1990: 22). In one way or other, existing concepts, theories and categories were perceived by many as no longer being fully adequate to capture the ‘new’ social reality. It was in this context that a concept called ‘globalisation’ stepped in, being praised and naturalised by some as “an idea whose time has come” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 2003: 1).

As I pointed out in Chapter 4, it is undisputable that many of the developments, which have come to be captured with the word globalisation, are not ‘new’ but have existed before the word globalisation entered public, political and, importantly, scholarly debates. The earlier quoted Amartya Sen (2001) is one of many scholars, who make us aware of this fact. Yet, it was only at the end of the 1980s and in the course of the 1990s that the neologism globalisation came up and that the concept ‘globalisation’ fully captured discourses.1 As I suggested in Chapter 4, Michel Foucault provides us with a useful language to grasp this phenomenon; with Foucault we can say that at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s ‘globalisation’ came to be “in the true” (Foucault 1981: 60), meaning that it became socially acceptable to speak of a thing called ‘globalisation’, to assume and proclaim that ‘globalisation’ was a truth.2 Hence, amending Held et al’s quote

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1 Refer back to Chapter 4, fn 5.
2 Of course, this does not mean that there was and is an agreement about how this ‘truth’ ‘globalisation’ looks. My overview of the life of the ‘globalisation’-discourse in Chapter 4 illustrates the many different takes on the ‘truth’ ‘globalisation’.
from above, it was not that ‘globalisation’ was an idea whose time had come after the end of the Cold War because of a distinct socio-political reality that was ‘globalisation’, but that the time had come for a new concept to grasp the world of the 1990s – and that idea/s of ‘globalisation’ and the word globalisation were apparently perceived as appropriate to serve this purpose.

The difference between the suggestion that the time had come for ‘the’ concept ‘globalisation’ because of an external reality and the suggestion that the time had come for a new concept (which happened to be ‘globalisation’) because of a perceived external reality is only slight but significant, in that the second assessment acknowledges that there is nothing inherent in empirical reality that prescribes the use of the word globalisation and the application of a particular concept ‘globalisation’ to grasp this reality. The claim “globalisation is an idea whose time has come” is a claim not a commonsensical observation of empirical reality. While there might be good reasons to address the contemporary world and its distinct developments with a neologism, such as globalisation, the crucial point is that this is not inscribed in social reality as such. There needs to be the space for such a move to be accepted and acceptable. To refer back to Foucault’s quote above:

“It is always possible that one might speak the truth in the space of a wild exteriority, but one is ‘in the true’ only by obeying the rules of a discursive ‘policing’ which one has to reactivate in each of one’s discourses” (Foucault 1981: 60)

As I discussed in Chapter 4, in the case of the neologism globalisation and (the various ideas captured in) conceptions called ‘globalisation’, the space that allowed them to be ‘in the true’, i.e. to enter discourses and to become a “talismanic term, a seemingly unavoidable reference point for discussions about our contemporary situation” (Low and Barnett 2000: 54), was the conceptual vacuum that the breakdown of the bipolar bloc system and the end of the Cold War constituted in the eyes of many commentators. It was the perception that there was a ‘brave new’ (post-Cold War) world that made it possible for a new term, namely globalisation, and the various idea/s ‘globalisation’ to become centre-stage in attempts to make the social world meaningful, i.e. that made it acceptable to claim that ‘globalisation’ was ‘an idea whose time had come’.

Grounded in the above insights, I argued in Chapter 4 that the idea of a ‘new world’ is at the heart of the talk about ‘globalisation’. Turning this insight around, I argued that what all uses of the word globalisation share is that they make claims about a (supposedly) ‘new world’ – whether or not this is explicitly intended by the sign users and whether or not sign users are aware of it. This insight motivated me to suggest in Chapter 4 that the web of meanings that is re-produced through utterances, which contain the word globalisation, is best called ‘new world’. Putting it differently, I suggested that utterances, which contain the word globalisation, form the ‘globalisation’-discourse, which is the re-production of a web of meanings, in other
words, the re-production of an object, which is “systematically form[ed]” (Foucault 1972: 49) in the use of language, that is best labelled ‘new world’.

This brings me back to the adjective global. The above developed ground allows me now to conceptualise the omnipresence of the adjective global as a distinct phenomenon. Echoing my take on the ‘globalisation’-discourse, I understand utterances, which contain the word global, as a ‘discourse’, i.e. as the re-production of a distinct web of meanings. Given the particular relationship between the contemporary adjective global and the ‘globalisation’-discourse, which I described above and conceptualised in Chapter 4, this web of meanings can be called ‘new world’. In other words, this web is the same object that is re-produced in utterances, which contain the world globalisation. In short, synthesising the insights that I generated in the previous chapters, I am now in a position to argue that the omnipresence of the contemporary word global constitutes the re-production of the object ‘new world’, a distinct web of meanings.

Having established this conception of the omnipresence of global, I now go a step further. Still synthesising insights from previous chapters, I suggest that this re-production of the web of meanings called ‘new world’ is worthy of being acknowledged as a phenomenon that is ‘relevant’ and ‘interesting’. It is relevant and interesting in two different ways. First, it is relevant and interesting by virtue of its wide spread but ‘untroubled’ existence, which I sketched out in Chapter 2 when I reflected on the popular and ‘free’ nature of the contemporary adjective global. The contemporary global has become an important, in the sense of ‘normal’, aspect of contemporary approaches to the world. My overview in Chapter 2 of the various enthusiastic uses of global these days, such as in high profile publications like the Human Development Report 2014, where it is applied 513 times across 239 pages, or in the World Development Report 2014, in which it appears 278 times across 286 pages, made this apparent. The relevance of global is further apparent in the observation that the adjective plays a central role in the conceptualisation of ideas of ‘globalisation’, which, in turn, are an influential component of the contemporary knowledge production; I elaborated on this point in Chapter 3. Furthermore, if we look back at the conclusion of Chapter 2, which explored the use of the adjective global in US President George W. Bush’s public post-9/11 communication, we see that political practitioners even seem to use the adjective global strategically. As I discussed in Chapter 2, what is remarkable about this wide-spread, enthusiastic and ‘normalised’ use of global is that it happens off the radar of critical engagement and scrutiny. I believe that already this ‘influential’ but ‘unnoticed’ existence of the contemporary global, captured in Chapters 2 and 3, justifies scholarly attention and a critical take on the phenomenon of the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global.

Second, the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global, understood as a re-production of an object called ‘new world’, is worthy of being acknowledged as a relevant and interesting phenomenon because the proc-
lamination of the ‘new world’, which is implied in the object that the discourse brings out, can be seen as indicating an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the process of modernisation. I developed this point in Chapter 5 by distinguishing between the proclamation of a ‘new world’ to come and the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came. The proclamation of a ‘new world’ to come is grounded in the modern fondness (for the striving) for the ‘new’ as a central, in fact, foundational aspect of societal progress and development. In Chapter 5, I provided a set of examples to illustrate what I mean by ‘new world’ to come, such as Barack Obama’s (2009) promise of a “a new way forward”. I then stressed that the idea of the ‘new world’ that is implied in the use of the words globalisation and global differs from the (modern) idea of the ‘new world’ to come. As I elaborated in Chapter 5, it is about a ‘new world’ that came. This ‘new world’ that came, in comparison to the ‘new world’ to come, implies a passive speaking position of an observer, who is confronted with a ‘new’ reality ‘out there’, a reality that does not match established conceptions and understandings.

As I explained in Chapter 5, the fact that I take the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came as a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation is grounded in a distinct understanding of the social world. This is an understanding of social reality that is informed by the work of sociologist Ulrich Beck. According to such an understanding, contemporary social reality is shaped by two aspects and their interplay. On the one side, it is the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the process of modernisation. On the other side, this is the prevalence of the tradition of what Beck (2006) calls “the national perspective” and “methodological nationalism”. The term ‘reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation’ captures three aspects that together shape contemporary social reality: the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies, the existence of ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’. I explained each of these aspects in detail in Chapter 5. In sum, the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation brings out a social reality, in which not only modern institutions but also modern principles are challenged, outmoded and, in fact, rendered obsolete through the process of modernisation itself. They are radicalised as a side effect of modernisation, its institutions and principles, and the actions shaped by them. Importantly, this side effect is not the dark side of modernisation but the manifestation of the very success of modernisation. The second aspect of the ‘reflexive modern’ world, the tradition of the ‘national perspective’, is a political perspective and a scholarly take on the world that is grounded in “categories […] that take the nation-state as the norm” (Beck 2006: 73). It obscures the look at (the reality of) the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, especially the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies, which is, as I stressed in Chapter 5, a social reality.

Grounded in such an understanding of the world, the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global, understood as a discursive re-production of an object called ‘new world’, is to be seen as a manifestation of an
The omnipresence of *global* as a political phenomenon

‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. This is simply because it implies a questioning of the (modern) world (grounded in a traditional actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’) as we know it.

I made clear in Chapter 5 that this conceptual move is, indeed, a conceptual move and not an observation of how social and political actors actually grasp the perceived ‘newness’ of the world, in the sense of how they label and conceptualise it. My engagement with the adjective *global* in Chapter 2 brought out that the world is grasped in diverse ways through utterances, which contain the adjective *global* – as we saw, the adjective is used with a myriad of different meanings. Hence, when I use the word ‘awareness’ I do not mean to suggest that the ‘new world’ that came is consciously and explicitly ‘grasped’ as being shaped by the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies, ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’. When I take the phenomenon of the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* as a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, I make a conceptual move, which presupposes the above mentioned Beck-inspired conception of social reality; as I put it in Chapter 5, it is grounded in a ‘pre-theoretical commitment’ to a conception of the world as being ‘reflexive modern’.

It is in such a ‘reflexive modern’ world that the omnipresence of the adjective *global* becomes a relevant and interesting phenomenon that is worthy of scholarly attention because, as something that implies an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, its study is always a study of an actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’, which, as I explained in Chapter 5, constitutes a central aspect of social reality.

**The Symbolic Production of the World, and the ‘New World’ as a Distinct Mode of the Present**

In the previous section, I conceptualised the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* as a discursive re-production of a web of meanings called ‘new world’ and presented it as a relevant and interesting phenomenon that is worthy of being acknowledged by scholars. I did this by synthesising various insights that I generated over the course of the previous chapters.

In this second main part of this chapter, I move a step further; I go beyond synthesising previous insights. I argue that, in addition to it being relevant and interesting, the re-production of the web of meanings through utterances, which contain the adjective *global*, is a political phenomenon, i.e. it is something the study of which enables insights into the political world. I propose that the omnipresence of *global* can be seen as a political phenomenon because it constitutes a dimension of the symbolic construction of social
reality, in general, and, in particular, because it makes meaningful an important conceptual space and temporal category, namely the ‘present’. In this sense, I argue, the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global is a particular and noteworthy part of the perpetual contestation over the meaning of the world, which does not simply mirror a world that exists ‘outside’ of language but constitutes, in the sense of symbolically produces, this world. Symbolic productions of the world make some things possible, in the sense of imaginable, and others impossible, i.e. unimaginable – this relates to socially binding decisions, like ‘political’ decisions in a narrow sense, and beyond.

I substantiate my argument that the omnipresence of global is a political phenomenon in two steps. I start by returning to the discussion of the concept ‘discourse’ that I presented in Chapter 4, as well as to my excursus on language and meaning in Chapter 2. I extend and refine some of the insights from these previous chapters and carve out what I mean when I say that the omnipresence of global is a dimension of the symbolic production of social reality. This includes a reflection on the ideas of ‘politics’ and ‘power’ that are implied in such a conception of the world. To be clear, substantiating that the omnipresence of the adjective global is not just a relevant and interesting but also a political phenomenon, because it is a dimension of the contestation over the meaning of the world, is a theoretical exercise. Contrary to the above mentioned two aspects that make the omnipresence of global a relevant and interesting phenomenon, it is not grounded in something that is distinct about the word global or about the object that is brought out by utterances with the word global. Rather, it is grounded in a particular theory of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality. I already touched on this theory in previous chapters because it informs the concept ‘discourse’ that I introduced in Chapter 4, as well as, the work of the scholars to whom I referred in Chapter 2 in my discussion of poststructuralist understandings of language and meaning.

The aim of this following section is to highlight the hallmarks of this theory of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality. I do this by embedding these hallmarks into the context of other understandings of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality that are in some respect similar to this theory but differ in other respects fundamentally. This is, for instance, the theoretical ground, on which the scholarship builds that looks at how words ‘do’ things, as well as, the theoretical foundations of the IR social constructivist literature. I provide this excursus on these seemingly similar but meaningfully different approaches to clarify my own ground and its theoretical specificities. It also helps me to situate the understanding of the world, which informs my conception of the omnipresence of global, in the broader scholarship. Such a strategy seems to be particularly appropriate as the idea of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality that I follow here is marginalised in the mainstream of the political studies and IR scholarship. Consequently, as I point out, as an
object of study, the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* is a phenomenon of interest to scholars at the margins of academic explorations of the political world; paraphrasing David Campbell (1998[1992]: ix), it is a phenomenon of interest for an “unconventional analysis”.

This first step in this second part of this chapter is of general nature. I frame the omnipresence of the adjective *global* as a dimension of the contest over the meaning of the world. It is then followed by a more particular second step. Here, I take up insights from my discussion of the proclamation of the ‘new world’ in Chapter 5 and frame the ‘new world’, i.e. the object that is re-produced through utterances, which contain the word *global*, as a special dimension of the contest over the meaning of the world. I argue that it is special because the ‘new world’ constitutes a mode of the temporal category ‘present’. The aim of the second step in this part of the present chapter is to put forward that historical appearances of the ‘new world’, i.e. distinct actualisations of the object that is re-produced through utterances, which contain the word *global*, constitute ways, in which the conceptual space ‘present’ is filled with meaning.

**The symbolic production of reality**

Social reality does not exist ‘as such’ and ‘out there’. It is produced, in the sense that it is made meaningful. Language is an important dimension of this production of social reality. In Chapter 2, we saw that the practice of making the world meaningful through language is not straightforward because language and meaning are not straightforward. The excursus on Ferdinand de Saussure’s philosophy of structural linguists showed that meaning is the product of differences between signs rather than natural references to an external world. This means that it is misguided to consider language as a tool that objectively mirrors a reality external to itself. But this is not all. De Saussure and, ultimately, the various poststructuralist thinkers to whom I referred in Chapter 2, make us aware that it is not only that meanings are not naturally inscribed in the world, they are also not simply inherent in words. Meaning is the product of endless plays of signifiers. As such, language must not be understood

“as a transparent, reflective form of communication, but as a situated, interpretable phenomenon that serves to construct social reality.” (Ainsworth and Hardy 2004: 155)

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3 Of course, language is not the only dimension of the construction of social reality. Linguistic interventions play an important role but so do all sorts of practices. It is only my specific interest in the word *global* in this project that makes me stress and focus exclusively on the role of *language* in the social production of the world.
This brings me back to Foucault (1972: 49) and his explanation that language and texts “systematically form the objects of which they speak.” Rather than mirroring the world, language and texts produce the world. In this sense, as Jutta Weldes et al (1999: 16) put it, language and texts have “concrete and significant, material effects. They allocate social capacities and resources and make practices possible.” There is an intimately interwoven relationship between language and politics.

The relationship between language and politics has been subject to diverse debates and theorisations. Aristotle in his *Ars Rhetorica* (1959[350 B.C.E]) famously points to the persuasive nature of language and the significance of rhetoric for the conduct of politics, which has inspired much research on rhetoric, persuasion and propaganda. Jürgen Habermas and Hannah Arendt, each in their own ways, stress that the nature of human existence, politics and language are interlinked in fundamental ways. Habermas’ entire social theory, significant parts of which have found their way into the political studies and IR scholarship on (deliberative) democracy, is based on a communication paradigm; and Arendt (1958: 4, 25-6, 175) points out that one of the guiding concepts in political theory and philosophy, namely Aristotle’s *zoon politikon,*

“can [only] be fully understood if one adds his second famous definition of man as a *zoon logon ekhon* (‘a living being capable of speech’).”

Accordingly, she concludes,

“wherever the relevance of speech is at stake, matters become political by definition, for speech is what makes man a political being.” (ibid. 3)

Arendt’s colleague Hans-Georg Gadamer (1976: 59) argues in a similar way when he writes,

“Aristotle established the classical definition of the nature of man, according to which man is the living being who has logos. In the tradition of the West, this definition became canonical in a form which stated that man is the animal rationale, the rational being, distinguished from all other animals by his capacity for thought. Thus it rendered the Greek word logos as reason or thought. In truth, however, the primary meaning of this word is language. [...] To men alone is the logos given [...], so that they can make manifest to each other what is useful and harmful, and therefore also what is right and wrong. [...] Man, as an individual, has logos. He can think and he can speak. He can make what is not present manifest through his speaking, so that another person sees it before him.”

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4 Refer back to Chapter 4, fn 1.
Political linguist Heiko Girnth (2002: 1) stresses the role of language as a means of politics, in fact, he stresses that language is not just any kind of means of politics but the very condition of the possibility of politics. This is because unless physical force is used, politics is about symbolic action. Political goals have to be explained and opponents’ visions have to be criticized and deconstructed in an attempt to secure public approval (Bergsdorf 1991: 19). This is done through persuasion, argumentation and an appeal to the audience’s emotions. It is done through the use of some and the avoidance of other words.

The theory that language ‘does’ something is well established not only in the scholarship but also in political practice. “[W]ords have consequences as much as actions do”, acknowledges US President Bill Clinton (quoted in Washington Post 2010). An understanding of the ‘doing’ of language is also apparent in the following exchange between a journalist and US President George W. Bush’s spokesman Scott McClellan at a press conference about the abuses of prisoners in US-led prisons in Iraq and in the Guantanamo Bay detention camp:

“Journalist: You call it a war. They’re prisoners of war. Why do you make a distinction, which has led to so many abuses by not abiding by the rule of law?

Scott McClellan: Well, I don’t know, when you say ‘so many’, what exactly you’re referring to.” (Bush 2004f)

The above exchange is not so much about (the fate of) ‘prisoners of war’ but about language. It is about what something is called or not called; it is about the expression ‘so many’ and the question of what a sign user, namely the journalist, means when they use it. Linguists such as Joseph Klein (1991) and Martin Wengeler (2005) provide comprehensive accounts of the various forms of this kind of ‘self-reflection’ on language in daily political practice. With self-reflection they mean the explicit problematisation of language, such as in instances in which the supposed or actual linguistic (in)competency of sign users are questioned, or in instances in which there are explicit disputes about single words and their meanings, such as is seen above in the question “what do you mean by ‘so many’?”

The theory that language matters and that it ‘does’ something is apparent in political practice in two respects. First, practitioners are aware that the use of a specific word in a specific situation implies actual consequences. This is expressed in the above provided quote by President Clinton. It is most ob-

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5 The critique of George W. Bush as being unable to pronounce foreign countries and names, and like the (alleged) lack of English skills of former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, with reference to which his political opponents aimed to discredit his (foreign) policy competency, are also prominent examples of this kind of self-reflection on or problematisation of language in political practice.
viously manifest in the many instances, in which words that are associated with (international) law are explicitly applied or avoided. For example, in 1956, then British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden was eager to stress to the House of Commons: “We are not at war with Egypt. We are in an armed conflict” (Eden 1956). In recent public debates in Germany, government representatives avoid using and explicitly reject the term Kampfeinsatz (combat mission), as well as, Krieg (war), when it comes to the engagement of the German Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr), for instance recently, in Afghanistan. Similar examples include the application or avoidance of the word genocide in various contexts, or, the use or avoidance of the term prisoners of war for specific detainees in the debate about the US detention camp in Guantanamo Bay – we saw this in the above quoted exchange between the journalist and President Bush’s spokesperson.

Second, the relevance of the theory that language ‘does’ something in political practice is also apparent in instances, in which the ‘right’ choice of language seems to be perceived as having a positive impact and even ‘producing’ the social world by naming it. An obvious example is the practice of code-naming military operations, such as ‘Cast Lead’, the name of the

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6 This debate is deeply embedded in post-1945 German history and culture and relates to debates about the role of the German Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr). According to the German Grundgesetz (Art. 87a) the role of the Bundeswehr is a defensive one only. Before 1990 the only active exercise, in which the Bundeswehr was allowed to be involved, was related to disaster control operations. With the end of the Cold War and Germany’s (re)unification, debates about the role of the Bundeswehr came up. In 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the idea of the Bundeswehr as ‘defending’ German borders needs to be reconsidered and understood more broadly than it used to be; the idea of ‘defence’ now also includes the reaction to crises and the prevention of conflicts elsewhere in the world in order to preserve Germany’s security. This ruling has made the question of what is the task of the Bundeswehr a highly politically charged issue.

7 The 2002 ‘Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo’ (Bush 2002e) explicates the US policy under President Bush: “The United States is treating and will continue to treat all of the individuals detained at Guantanamo humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949. The President has determined that the Geneva Convention applies to the Taliban detainees, but not to the al-Qaida detainees. Al-Qaida is not a state party to the Geneva Convention; it is a foreign terrorist group. As such, its members are not entitled to POW status. Although we never recognized the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government, Afghanistan is a party to the Convention, and the President has determined that the Taliban are covered by the Convention. Under the terms of the Geneva Convention, however, the Taliban detainees do not qualify as POWs. Therefore, neither the Taliban nor al-Qaida detainees are entitled to POW status.”
2008/9 strike of the Israel Defence Forces in the Gaza Strip, which refers to a children’s Chanukah song (Ronen 2008). Codenames are usually chosen with a view to boost public relations and support, as it was the case when the 1989 US invasion of Panama was code-named ‘Just Cause’ and when the 2001 US military build-up to the ‘war on terror’ ran under the label ‘Enduring Freedom’, after its initial name, ‘Infinite Justice’, was reconsidered in order to avoid outrage by Muslims. The name change was officially announced on 24 September 2001 when the US Administration realised that in the Islamic faith ‘infinite justice’ is only to be provided by God (BBC 2001). The linguistic move by the US military during the 1991 Gulf War to replace the term ‘body bags’ with the euphemism ‘human remains pouches’ in order to avoid associations with (the trauma of) the Vietnam War (see Freedberg 2003) is another prominent example that hints to an underlying theory, according to which words ‘do’ something – even beyond being acts with concrete (legal) implications; so is the case of the labelling of the Berlin Wall, which, in official East German (GDR) political jargon, was not simply called ‘wall’ but antifaschistischer Schutzwand (‘antifascist protection rampart’). This encoded the founding narrative and guiding ideology of the GDR as a socialist and explicitly anti-fascist society that, within this narrative, required protection from a fascist capitalist ‘outside’.8 US President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s public endeavour in 1942 to find an appropriate name for the 1939–1945 war is another example along these lines:

“So I am looking for a word – as I said to the newspapermen a little while ago – I want a name for the war. I haven’t had any very good suggestions. Most of them are too long. My own thought is that perhaps there is one word that we could use for this war, the word ‘survival’. The Survival War.” (Roosevelt 1942)9

This endeavour, like the previous example, makes apparent that the sign users, such as Roosevelt, seem to hold a theory according to which, as feminist

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8 In contrast, in West Germany, the border, which was erected by the GDR, was usually called innerdeutsche Grenze (internal German border) in order to indicate that the separation of the Soviet zone from the three zones initially occupied by the Western Allies was not officially acknowledged and that Germany was still one and not two countries. This is also why, by default, it is a political statement if one chooses to speak of the re-unification (Wiedervereinigung) of Germany or the unification (Vereinigung) of Germany in 1990. While the former implies that something came together again which was always there but was artificially separated, the latter suggests that there is a new Germany as a result of two Germanys coming together.

9 As we know, the name Survival War did not take hold. However, as Reynolds (2003) discusses in detail, even World War II, which became the common label in the West, was not used worldwide.
Theorist Dale Spender (quoted in Bhatia 2005: 9) puts it in a different context,

“[t]hose who name the world have the privilege of highlighting their own experiences – and thereby identify what they consider important.”

The notion that choices of the ‘right’ words make a difference beyond having actual legal implications is further apparent in attempts by political actors to actively ‘occupy’ and ‘capture’ linguistic signs with specific meanings and associations. A recent attempt was US President Barack Obama’s move to ‘capture’ the term change for the purposes of his 2007-8 Presidential nomination campaign.

As Martin Wengeler (2005) points out, the belief that words could be ‘occupied’ with specific meanings has its origin in leftist thoughts. It builds on Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony as outlined in his famous Prison Notebooks (1991[1929-35], 1996, 2007) but it was also taken up by conservative and right wing groups. Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch explained the success of the Nazis in resurrecting wide parts of former socialist discipleship in Germany in the 1930s with the fact that the Nazis managed to ‘occupy’ for their purposes critical concepts, such as Nation (nation), Seele (soul), Reich, Einheit (unity). For Bloch it was the task of the Left to ‘re-occupy’ these terms in order to be able to reach the “soul of the people” (Wengeler 2005: 181). The German student movement of the 1960s argued in a similar way and built on Herbert Marcuse, who claimed that political linguistics was “one of the most effective ‘secret weapons’” of the political establishment (ibid.). And in the 1970s, the belief in the ‘power of words’ went so far that Germany’s conservative party, CDU, after its defeat in the general elections, officially established a so-called Projektgruppe Semantik (‘project group for semantics’), the task of which was to develop strategies to ‘occupy’ terms with meanings according to the CDU’s party line (Wengeler 2005; also Klein 1991). Given the insights into the complexity of meaning, which I provided in Chapter 2, the idea that words could be easily ‘occupied’ with specific meanings is, of course, misguided. Mean-

10 Historian David Reynolds (2003: 29) stresses in a similar vein, “[t]he labels we apply […] are as important as the events themselves. Sometimes these concepts are developed retrospectively; often they are taken from the vocabulary of the time. But the labels are rarely neutral, either in their political bias or their analytical implications.” This point is backed up when we consider that in the Soviet Union the Second World War was officially called The Great Patriotic War, which gives the historical event a completely different meaning in that it “linked the conflict with the struggle against Napoleon (‘The Patriotic War’)” (ibid. 14).

11 For the following, including fn 13 in this chapter, see Wengeler (2005: 181).

12 The ‘study group’ existed from 1973-77.
ings are inevitably products of social processes and less one-dimensional and functional than the assumption behind the Projektgruppe Semantik and similar endeavours seems to suggest. As became clear above, words are not containers that could be readily filled.\textsuperscript{13}

Moving now from political practice back to the study of politics (understood in the broadest sense), the theory that language ‘does’ something has come to inform a diverse and growing body of works, which build on the philosophy of speech acts, developed by J. L. Austin (1962, 1971, 2013) and John Searle (1969).

As Krallmann and Ziemann (2001: 74) note, J. L. Austin was the first philosopher who argued for a theory of linguistic action. Building on pragmatic language philosophy, or, as it is also called, the ‘ordinary language philosophy’ of Ludwig Wittgenstein (especially 1953),\textsuperscript{14} Austin was the first who explicitly developed the theory that language has a performative potential. Suggesting that “[w]hat we need, perhaps, is a more general theory of speech-acts” (Austin 1971: 20), he set out to develop this theory by distinguishing between constative and performative utterances. The function of constative utterances is to use language in order to say something; the function of performative utterances, in comparison, is to use language in order to do something:

“if a person makes an utterance of this [performative] sort we should say that he is doing something rather than merely saying something. […] When I say ‘I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth’ I do not describe the christening ceremony, I actually perform the christening and when I say ‘I do’ […], I am not reporting on a marriage, I am indulging in it.” (Austin 2013: 22)

Building on this, Austin argues that the context, in which the use of language as a performative act is embedded, needs to be acknowledged as critical for its success. Surely, as he makes clear, marrying is not “simply saying a few words”, rather, “the words have to be said in the appropriate circumstances” (ibid.). Wrong circumstances, such as a missing convention, make the intended performative act misfire:

“Suppose that, living in a country like our own, we wish to divorce our wife. We may try standing her in front of us squarely in the room and saying, in a voice loud enough for all to hear, ‘I divorce you’. Now this procedure is not accepted. We shall not thereby have succeeded in divorcing our wife […]. This is a case where the convention, we should say, does not exist or is not accepted.” (ibid. 23)

\textsuperscript{13} Jürgen Habermas (1979) was among those who made this point clear in the public debate about the usefulness of the CDU’s ‘project group for semantics’ (see Wengeler 2005; Klein 1991).
\textsuperscript{14} Refer back to Chapter 2, fn 7.
Austin’s emphasis on the pragmatic and performative dimension of (the use of) language turns away from the idea that utterances are only about making statements about ‘facts’. In other words, it turns away from perceptions according to which the use of language is only about truthful or untruthful propositions about an independently existing reality. This becomes apparent in his explanation that a performative utterance is an utterance, “which looks like a statement and grammatically […] would be classed as a statement, which is not non-sensical, and yet it is not true or false. […] They will be perfectly straightforward utterances, with ordinary verbs in the first person singular present indicative active, and yet we shall see at once that they couldn’t possibly be true or false.” (ibid. 22)

Rather than being either ‘true’ or ‘false’, performative utterances may be ‘unsatisfactory’ and ‘unhappy’ or, as he calls it, they may be “infelicities” in that they “fail to come off in special ways” due to the fact that “certain rules, transparently simple rules, are broken” (ibid. 23), of which the above noted missing conventional context is one – for instance, when trying to divorce somebody by standing in front of this person and saying ‘I divorce you’. In this sense, performative utterances are about the ‘right way’ of using language; they are either ‘successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’ but they are never ‘true’ or ‘false’.15

The notion of the performative dimension of language has found its way into social and political scientific discourses, for instance, through Jürgen Habermas’ work on ‘communicative action’ (e.g. Habermas 1981a, 1981b).16 It was also taken up by Nicholas Onuf (1985, 1998), who intro-

15 In his posthumously published How to Do Things with Words (1962), Austin stresses the performative nature of language in that he revises his initial taxonomy of speech acts. In How to Do Things with Words Austin moves away from the dual distinction between constative and performative acts because he realises that, in fact, constativa have a performative function too. This conceptual shift is not of relevance for our purposes here, for which we just need to understand the basic premises of speech act theory. However, to give an idea of the direction into which Austin moves: In How to Do Things with Words he shifts his attention away from the dual distinction between constative and performative acts to the three dimensions or forms of action, which he recognises as being inherent in every utterance. These are the locutionary act, the illocutionary act and the perlocutionary act (Austin 1962: esp. 94-119). He understands the locutionary act as the actual performance of an utterance. The concept of the illocutionary act, “such as informing, ordering, warning, undertaking” (ibid. 108), refers to the conventional force of an utterance. The perlocutionary act is about the actual effect of an utterance on those who are addressed.

16 Refer back to fn 1 in Chapter 4.
duce it into the study of international law. Onuf’s aim is to criticised legal positivism. Based on the insight that “saying is doing” (Onuf 1998: 59), he uses speech act theory to establish a “typology of rules” in order to “show that the international order is a legal order”, which, as he argues, is a statement that could not be defended if one looks from the perspective of legal positivism (ibid. 386).

Another prominent instance, in which speech act theory has entered the study of politics and the IR scholarship, is the concept ‘securitisation’, which was developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Joop de Wilde (1998). The securitisation scholarship has come to be labelled Copenhagen School. Building on Austin’s pragmatic premises, scholars of the Copenhagen School set out to reconceptualise ‘security’ by moving away from considering it as something objectively measurable and as an issue that is solely linked to the military sector. This is how the issue of security has been commonly treated in the mainstream IR scholarship (see Williams 2008). Instead, the main argument of the Copenhagen School is that “security is a particular type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998: vii). Security is not to be understood “just as the use of force” (ibid. 19). Rather, Copenhagen School scholars argue that security is to be understood as a speech act. It is this speech act that they label ‘securitisation’. As Ole Wæver (1995: 55) puts it, for securitisation scholars “security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act.”

“Security is [...] a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat.” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998: 24)

The central claim of securitisation scholars is that this speech act lifts issues beyond the sphere of ‘normal politics’ into the sphere of ‘security’.

“Traditionally, by saying ‘security’, a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development.” (ibid. 21)

Hence, by saying something, namely ‘security’, something is done, namely an issue is described as, or one could say, is transformed into something “posing an existential threat” (ibid.). Through this (symbolic) transformation, that is, through this securitisation-speech act, the respective issue

17 In addition to the military, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde suggest four sectors, in which security is a crucial component: the environmental sector, the economic sector, the societal sector, and the political sector.
gets pushed to the far end of a spectrum, which, as the Copenhagen School scholars explain, consists of the following three main stages:

“nonpoliticized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any way made an issue of public debate and decision)[,] politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) [and] securitized.” (ibid. 24)

Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (ibid. 23) describe this securitisation-move as an “extreme form of politicization” because it enables political actors to break rules of political conduct and procedures. Importantly, it legitimises the use of force or the prohibition of debates about a ‘securitised’ issue in public or academic discourses.

The securitisation-speech act is conceptualised as consisting of “three components (or steps): existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules” (ibid. 26). Yet, as Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (ibid. 25) stress, just saying ‘security’ does not yet count as a successful act of securitising an issue.

“A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization – this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such.” (ibid.)

This brings in the context of the securitising-speech act, which is something also Austin stresses. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (ibid. 32) explain that to grasp a successful securitisation-speech act does not only require “to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results” but also “not at least, under what conditions (i.e., what explains when securitization is successful)” (ibid.). In this sense, the securitisation-speech act is more than the act of using the word security and of calling and presenting an issue as an ‘existential threat’; it also requires the acceptance of the issue as a ‘security’ issue by the respective addressees (ibid. 25). In short, as Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (ibid. 32) argue, the success of a securitising-speech act depends on two criteria: a) “internal, linguistic-grammatical” criteria and b) “external, contextual and social” conditions.18

18 In utilising pragmatic language philosophical premises and Austin’s concept of speech acts, the notion of ‘securitisation’ highlights the normative dimension of ‘security’-debates. The acknowledgment that empirical reality (in the particular case of ‘securitisation’ this means ‘existential threats’) is not objectively ‘out there’ – in other words, that it is not just innocently perceived and reacted to by political actors – but that political actors are actively involved in creating it through the use of language, i.e. speech acts, highlights “the responsibility of
‘Securitisation’ has come to be a popular concept in the political studies and IR scholarship. A growing number of empirical case studies look at the ‘securitisation’ of a variety of socio-political issues, prominently the environment (e.g. Ney 1999; Litfin 1999) and migration (e.g. Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002; Huysmans 1995, 2002a), but also HIV/AIDS (e.g. Peterson 2002/3; Elbe 2006), as well as less obvious issues, such as the ‘securitisation of Africa’ through the UK Blair Government, analysed by Rita Abrahamsen (2005).

In her study, Abrahamsen argues that the British approach to Africa under UK Prime Minister Tony Blair has changed significantly after the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001. She argues, the continent has been subject to securitisation. This process of securitisation has taken place through the UK government’s explicit linking of the trope of global interdependency, on the one side, with the “interpretation of poverty and underdevelopment as dangerous” (Abrahamsen 2005: 62), on the other side. Following on from this, Abrahamsen (ibid. 55) argues, the British approach to Africa under Blair has been “part of an ongoing securitization of the continent” after 9/11. This ‘ongoing securitisation’ is manifest, she argues, in public statements of the British government, such as Blair’s cognition that “we are realising how fragile are our frontiers in the face of the world’s new challenges” (quoted in ibid. 65), Jack Straw’s claim that “we care about Africa because it is no longer possible to neglect the world’s problems without running the risk of eventually suffering the consequences” (ibid.), and Chris Mullin’s claim that there are “sound practical reasons why we cannot afford to ignore the state of Africa. The most immediate of these is terrorism” (quoted in ibid. 67). Abrahamsen (ibid. 56) argues that although the UK engagement in Africa is “less visibly militarized than U.S. policies”, it has come to be shaped by a discourse of “risk/fear/security” rather than “development/humanitarianism”. This shift of discourse, she concludes, may lead to a ‘demonisation’ of the continent, justifying a tightening of immigration and asylum laws in the UK, and, more generally, may result in policies which have “very little to offer in terms of solving Africa’s development problems” (ibid. 74). It is this discursive shift that Abrahamsen takes as an indicator for that there is “an ongoing securitization of the continent” (ibid. 55) unfolding.

On close scrutiny, there is something curious about Abrahamsen’s study. While she provides a valuable interpretation of the official UK discourse talking security, the responsibility of actors as well as of analysts who choose to frame an issue as a security issue. They cannot hide behind the claim that anything in itself constitutes a security issue” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998: 34). The use of “the security label”, as Ole Wæver (1995: 65) puts it, is then a “political choice”. As such, it provokes us to question “with some force whether it is a good idea to make [an] issue a security issue – to transfer it to the agenda of panic politics” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998: 34).
towards Africa, she actually does not really study ‘securitisation’. This is not least because the dimension of the ‘acceptance’ of a securitising-speech act is left unexplored in her study. Abrahamsen’s study unveils a distinct kind of naming and, perhaps, framing of ‘Africa’ and offers insights into how UK representatives, such as the above quoted Blair, Straw and Mullin, symbolically address and grasp ‘Africa’. It leaves out, however, the question whether this reference to ‘Africa’ with security-terminology is actually a successful securitisation-move. Following the theory of ‘securitisation’, it would be a successful securitisation-speech act if the addressees of the securitisation-move, such as the British public, accepted it as a securitising-move. This, however, is not part of Abrahamsen’s examination.

I mention Abrahamsen’s study not only to indicate that empirical analyses of ‘securitisation’ are challenging endeavours that have to go beyond the analysis of the linguistic level and have to take into account perceptions and attitudes on the side of those who are addressed. I mention it because it points to another way, in which the relationship between language, meaning and social reality is treated in the study of politics. It seems to me that, rather than following a pragmatic speech act-approach, Abrahamsen’s study uncovers the symbolic legitimation of political decisions in a particular case, more generally. With that, it seems to me, she is close(r) to another kind of established literature, which takes seriously that language ‘does’ something, than to the pragmatic speech act-scholars. This other literature is the scholarship that follows, in the broadest sense, an approach called critical discourse analysis.

There is a comprehensive literature that looks critically at the linguistic legitimation of past and present (future-oriented) political decisions. This is done in various different ways. Particularly popular are approaches that follow, in one way or other, a tradition called critical discourse analysis. Norman Fairclough (1992, 1995, 2015) is one of the scholars who set the foundations for this kind of theory and study of language and politics. In contrast to the concept ‘discourse’, that I sketched in Chapter 4, the word discourse is used by Fairclough to refer to the use of language as a particular aspect of social life that stands in a dialectical relationship with other parts of social life (Fairclough 2015: 7). Language is seen as a social practice that is embedded in a broader social context. The focus of critical discourse analyses is on unveiling in written or spoken texts “contradictions between what [the discourse] is claimed and expected to be and what it actually is” (ibid. 9). The analysis focuses on explaining “how such contradictions are caused by

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19 With reference to David Harvey (1996), Fairclough (2015: 7) lists five other elements that form social life: “power; social relations; material practices; institutions (and rituals); beliefs (values and desires)”. He (ibid.) explains that these “elements are distinct, but dialectically related – […] for example […] discourse is a form of power, a mode of forming beliefs/values/desires, an institution, a mode of social relating, and a material practice.”
and are a part of [...] the wider social reality, which they exist within” (ibid.). The aim is to understand “how language contributes to the domination of some people by others as a step towards social emancipation” (ibid. 46). As the adjective critical suggests, critical discourse analysis is a

“normative critique of discourse, leading to explanatory critique of relations between discourse and other social elements of the existing social reality, as a basis for action to change reality for the better.” (ibid. 48; emphasis in the original)

This brings me to the end of my excursus on ways in which language is taken seriously by scholars and political practitioners and in which it is taken as something that does something. The purpose of my excursus is to point to the fact that, in general, theories according to which language ‘does’ something are a well-established ‘ingredient’ both of political practice and the scholarship. At the same time, it helps me to distinguish from these theories the idea of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality that informs my conception of the omnipresence of the adjective global as a political phenomenon. As sketched above, according to this theory language, meaning and texts “systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault 1972: 49) and have “concrete and significant, material effects. They allocate social capacities and resources and make practices possible” (Weldes et. al. 1999: 16). My excursus on the widespread understanding that language, in one way or other, does something helps me to point to the specificity of this theory.

The many examples, which I presented above, make apparent that the conception that language and meaning do not simply mirror, or as Stuart Hall (1997: 15) puts it, “reflect” social reality but somehow construct this social reality, is well and widely established. Yet, despite this general similarity, the above sketched theories according to which language does something differ significantly from the theory of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality that informs my conception of the omnipresence of the adjective global as a political phenomenon. Importantly, in the above sketched approaches the use of language is seen as doing something “intentionally”, to use Hall’s (1997: 15) words again. There is an idea implied in the above sketched approaches that clearly confined actors do something to, i.e. construct and shape a world ‘outside’ (of themselves). It is in this respect that the theory of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality, which informs my conceptualisation of the omnipresence of the word global as a political phenomenon, differs; it is more radical. Rather than just presuming that actors do something through the use of language, my theoretical assumption is that social reality (‘unintentionally’) emerges from within language and meaning. This includes the social actors, who ‘construct’ the world; they, too, ‘emerge’ from within language and meaning. This means nothing less but that language and meaning, as manifest in texts, fundamentally open and close pathways as they produce social

“[c]onstructions of reality and codes of intelligibility out of which they are produced provide both conditions of possibility and limits on possibility; that is, they make it possible to act in the world while simultaneously defining the ‘horizon of the taken-for-granted’ (Hall 1988: 44) that marks the boundaries of common sense and acceptable knowledge.”

This symbolic production of social reality through language and meaning is not only ‘not intentional’ (in Hall’s sense above). It is also highly complex, provisional and historical. Given that, as I pointed out in Chapter 2, language and meaning are a “constant flickering of presence and absence together” (Eagleton 1983: 128) social reality, including (the identities of) social actors, are principally in flux; they are anything but naturally stable. Consequently, any symbolic production of reality must be regarded only ever as a production of a possibility of reality rather than of reality per se.

This is where ‘politics’ comes in. Implied in this theory of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality is a distinct idea of ‘politics’ and ‘power’, where the latter is not held by stable actors but reproduced within the web of meanings that is social reality.

I come back to this point and elaborate on it in due course. However, before doing this, I want to conduct a second excursus on a scholarly approach that has similarities with the theory of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality that informs my conception of the omnipresence of global as a political phenomenon but that differs in its foundation. This is the theory of social constructivism. Again, I embark on this excursus in order to clarify the hallmarks of the theoretical premises that inform my own conception. At the same time, it is a way of situating the omnipresence of the adjective global as a political phenomenon and object of study in the broader political studies and IR scholarship.

The social constructivist approach entered the political studies and especially the IR scholarship in the context of the wider post-positivist turn. This post-positivist turn is grounded in the assumption that “social reality does not fall from heaven but that human agents construct and reproduce it through their daily practices”, as IR scholar Thomas Risse (2007a: 128) puts it with reference to Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s seminal work The Social Construction of Reality (1967). Although the oppositional labels

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20 As stressed at the beginning of this section, social facts and identities emerge from within language and practices. Yet, in the context of this project, I only stress the issue of language.
‘positivism’ (understood as ‘pro-science’) and ‘post-positivism’ (understood as ‘anti-science’) are still used in the debate about the nature of the disciplined knowledge production in political studies and IR, the scholarship has come to be shaped by broader recent developments in the philosophy of social science (Kurki and Wight 2007). This has lead to a basic rejection of the idea of positivism as a valid, let alone as the only account of science. Milja Kurki and Colin Wight (2007: 23-25) point out that the idea of ‘positivism’ has been largely replaced by what has come to be called ‘scientific realism’. Scientific realism, in turn, is based on the premise that

“what makes a body of knowledge scientific is not its mode of generation, but its content. Contra a positivist account of science, a body of knowledge is not declared scientific because it has followed a particular set of procedures based upon empirical ‘facts’ but, rather, because it constructs explanations of those facts in terms of entities and processes that are unknown and potentially unobservable.” (ibid. 24)

This general turning-away from the idea of ‘positivism’ and the growing, relative ease with ‘post-positivist’ accounts is apparent in Thomas Risse’s hypothetical question:

“[i]f ‘post-positivism’ means, 1) a healthy scepticism toward a ‘covering law’ approach to social science irrespective of time and space and instead a strive toward middle-range theorizing; 2) an emphasis on interpretive understanding as an intrinsic, albeit not exclusive, part of any causal explanations; and 3) the recognition that social scientists are part of the social world which they try to analyse […] – is anybody still a ‘positivist’ then […]?” (Risse 2007a: 127)

Today, “it has simply become too difficult not to be a constructivist”, argues Niels Akerstrom Andersen (2003: ix). This philosophical ‘open-mindedness’ has lead to a growing body of literature in political studies and IR, which runs under the label ‘social constructivism’. Alexander Wendt (e.g. 1992, 1994, 1999) is the most prominent representative of this scholarship, famously arguing that

“people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them. States act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not.” (Wendt 1992: 396-7)

With the acknowledgement of the mutually constructing relationship between actors and structure, social constructivists have moved ideational aspects into the spotlight of their political analyses. Notions such as the ‘collective identity’ of political actors, e.g. states, have come to be considered as relevant components that guide the action of political agents – especially when it comes to foreign policy (e.g. Hellmann 2006; Risse 2007b; Weller 1999; Wendt 1994, 1999). Closely related to the concept of collective iden-
tity, and sometimes even used synonymously, are the concept ‘political culture’ (Duffield 1998, 1999) and the idea of so-called ‘role perceptions’ of state actors (Kirste and Maull 1996). Together, these three concepts – political culture, role perceptions and collective identity – share reference to the collectively shared ideas and world-views, which are considered to underlie and, to some degree, direct policy making, and especially foreign policy making.

In the study of international politics this conceptual shift constitutes a significant development. The growing number of works, which acknowledge the significance of collective identity, political culture and role perceptions in and for policy / foreign policy, move away from the idea that policy making is guided by national interests, which are objectively predetermined either (from a realist perspective) through the conditions ‘dictated’ by the international environment or (from a liberal perspective) as the outcome of the demands and processes of the formation of coalitions within the social environment (see in more detail Risse 2007b: 49). Rather than assuming that interests and preferences are objectively and extrinsically predetermined, these interests and preferences themselves are exposed as socially constructed and, as such, are moved onto the radar of critical exploration. 21

21 This brings in again the breakdown of the bipolar bloc system at the end of the 1980, which I identified as the discursive ‘door opener’ for the concept ‘globalisation’ to come to be ‘in the true’. Again, it was this event and especially the question of German foreign policy after the end of the Cold War and after the unification of both Germanys in 1990, which played a distinct role in triggering the above sketched shift away from traditional (especially realist) approaches in policy analysis (see Risse 2007b; Baumann and Hellmann 2001; Duffield 1998, 1999). Based on realist presumptions, German post-Cold War foreign policy was expected to alter significantly in the face of the power political changes, which followed from the breakdown of the bloc system. A new(ly) powerful Germany was expected to adjust its strategic interests and (power political) behaviour accordingly. Yet, post-1990 German foreign policy did not change significantly – at least not as dramatically as realist premises made analysts predict. German foreign political decisions, such as the rejection of the 1994 NATO-request to actively enhance the UN-authorised flight ban over Bosnia, which came only months after the historic decision of the German constitutional court, according to which German armed forces could join collective military actions under UN auspices, left those political analysts puzzled who built on ‘traditional’ approaches – at least it left them without explanation (see Duffield 1999). It was this obvious inability of traditional (realist) approaches to fully capture, in this case, German foreign policy behaviour, which caused some to turn to ideational aspects, to the concepts of collective identity and political culture, in order to explain and understand policy / foreign policy behaviour and, not least, to detect and predict policy change. In the German case, for instance, a significant body of literature became devoted to considering Germany’s collective self-perception as
This brings me back to the theory of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality, which informs my conception of the omnipresence of *global* as a political phenomenon. While the social constructivist approach shares with this theory the idea that social reality ‘does not fall from heaven’ but is constructed, it remains committed to traditional premises regarding the very constitution of social reality. Theorists, such as Emanuel Adler (1997), Maja Zehfuss (2002), Karin Fierke (2007), as well as the already mentioned Kurki and Wight (2007) elaborate on this point. The latter identify social constructivism as a “via media, or middle ground, between rationalism and reflectivism” (Kurki and Wight 2007: 25). It is a ‘via media’ because ideational factors, like collective identities and political culture, are considered to be independent variables. They are not questioned and de-constructed themselves. In short, social constructivist approaches are committed to and reproduce an essentialist understanding of the world. Despite a belief in a socially constructed nature of socio-political reality and the stress of ideational aspects (such as collective identity and world-views) as crucial components in the analysis of world politics, the presumption that there is an essence of socio-political reality is not questioned as such – or at least it is not explicitly taken into account and built into the scholarly production of knowledge.

This is where the theory of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality, which informs my conception of the omnipresence of *global* as a political phenomenon, differs from these accounts. And this difference accounts for the fact that it finds itself positioned at the ‘unconventional’ margins of the political studies and IR scholarship.

While studies, which take the productive nature of language seriously, like the speech act-inspired securitisation scholarship and (parts of) the studies that follow social constructivist premises, are rising in popularity and have settled into the mainstream,22 “unconventional” studies, as David a *Zivilmacht* (civil power) as a crucial variable determining its policy / foreign policy behaviour (see further Kirste and Maull 1996; Maull 1993). For an empirical study see also Hellmann, Weber, Sauer and Schirmbeck (2007), which I mentioned in the Introduction of this book.

22 This ‘rise’ is to be seen in relative terms. Overall, the focus on language, even in the pragmatic sense, is (still) relatively unpopular in the political studies discourse and IR. For the IR scholarship, Karin Fierke (2002: 351) finds, “[t]he question of language […] has been marginalized, given assumptions that dealing with language is equivalent to being uninterested in research”. Joseph Klein (1991) observes that the majority of scholars in political studies and IR either remains assuming that language is a neutral tool, which captures an externally existing empirical reality (in this sense language is not considered to be worthy of investigation in itself), or thinks that one cannot be sure that political actors ‘really mean’ what they say but that they might use language in order to obscure
Campbell (1998[1992]: ix) calls them, which fall outside an essentialist outlook on the world, continue to be faced with profound scepticism on the part of the mainstream scholarship. Michael H. Lessnoff’s decision to explicitly exclude, among others, Michel Foucault, Richard Rorty and Jacques Derrida, from his introductory book *Political Philosophers of the Twentieth Century* (1999) on the basis that “none of them seems […] to have said anything about politics that is both original and significant – in so far as their writings are comprehensible at all” (Lessnoff quoted in Finlayson and Valentine 2002: 2), might be an extreme form of this ‘scepticism’, but in its basic sentiment it is symptomatic for the nature of the contemporary mainstream in political studies and IR. As Milja Kurki and Colin Wight (2007: 23) detect, “the mainstream has been reluctant to take the knowledge claims of ['unconventional'] scholars seriously, because they challenge the very status of the ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions upon which the mainstream depends.”

Richard J. Bernstein (1983) calls this rejection the “Cartesian Anxiety”, which David Campbell (2007: 211) explains as

“the fear that, given the demise of objectivity, we are unable to make judgements that have been central to the understanding of modern life, namely distinguishing between true and false, good and bad.”

To replace the idea of ‘objective reality’ (essence) with ‘textuality’ (discourse) and to focus on the symbolic systems through which the distinctions that guide life are made, as it is in one way or other at the heart of ‘unconventional’ approaches, and, subsequently, to challenge the “cognitive validity, empirical objectivity, and universalist and rationalist claims of idealist, realist, and neorealist schools alike” (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989: ix), is (still) unthinkable and unacceptable for the majority of scholars in the field.

Yet, despite the fact that, as Peeter Selg (2010) observes, “due to current power relations (in terms of institutional resources, careers, funding, prestige, status, discipline’s public relevance and ‘impact factors’)” it seems that ‘unconventional’ approaches will remain at the margins of the political studies and IR scholarship, these margins have been steadily colonised by more and more scholarly contributions. These contributions bring along nothing less than a distinct idea of ‘politics’ and ‘power’. Implied in the non-essentialist outlook of these approaches is a widening of what is to be grasped as ‘politics’. As IR scholar R. B. J. Walker (2000: 23) puts it, “[t]he most challenging political problems of our time […] arise primarily from a need to re-imagine what we mean by politics.” But the implied notion of ‘politics’ is not only broader; it is also different from existing ones that their ‘actual intentions’ (consequently, the use of language is not considered as ‘hard fact”).
shape the mainstream scholarship in the field. It differs, for instance, even from those understandings of politics, which are already relatively broad, like Adrian Leftwich’s idea, according to which:

“[p]olitics consists of all the activities, within and between societies, whereby the human species goes about obtaining, using, producing and distributing resources in the course of the production and reproduction of its social and biological life. These activities are not isolated from other features of social life. […] Politics is therefore a defining characteristic of all human groups, and always has been.” (Leftwich 1983: 11)

The notion of politics that is implied in an ‘unconventional’, non-essentialist theory of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality, which informs my conception of the omnipresence of global as a political phenomenon, goes beyond the one quoted above, in that it implies that “there is nothing given about the elements and forms of the political, the mode in which politics appears” (Finlayson and Valentine 2002: 4). Rather, “[e]veryday life is [seen as] ideological in an ontological sense; that which we know and which seems true depends on our sense of what is real” (Gregory 1988: xxi). Consequently, as David Rochefort and Roger W. Cobbs (1994) make clear, politics is the perpetual struggle over alternative realities, manifested in and through symbolic webs of meanings – such as the one re-produced in utterances, which contain the adjective global.

Finally, along with an ‘unconventional’ idea of politics comes an equally ‘unconventional’ idea of power. This idea is well captured by Michel Foucault (1984: 92-3) in his The History of Sexuality:

“[P]ower must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies. Power’s condition of possibility, […] must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point, in a unique source of sovereignty from which secondary and descendent forms would emanate; it is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable. The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next […]. Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere.”
This kind of ‘unconventional’ idea of power implies that power is not simply in the hand of a particular, ‘powerful’ person, let alone a state, as it is often presumed in the mainstream of the political studies and IR scholarship. Rather, in ‘unconventional’ approaches, a powerful person is understood to be a product of discourses, which produce distinct (‘powerful’) identities / speaking positions.23 Myriam Dunn and Victor Mauer (2006) illustrate empirically this point in regard to the US President in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York City in September 2001.

Taking the above together, politics is the

“contests over the alternative understandings (often implicit) immanent in the representational practices that implicate the actions and objects one recognizes and the various spaces […] within which persons and things take on their identities.” (Shapiro 1989: 12)

This brings me back to the adjective global. It is this theoretical ground and its idea of ‘politics’ and ‘power’ that make the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global not only a relevant and interesting but also a political phenomenon. Utterances, which contain the adjective global, constitute a dimension of the symbolic production of social reality, that is, they constitute a dimension of the perpetual contestation over the understanding of the social world, which, following the above sketched theoretical premises, is politics.

**Preliminary summary**

To this point in this chapter, I have substantiated my argument that the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global is not just a relevant and interesting but also a political phenomenon. I have stressed in the introduction to this section that this is a theoretical argument. Contrary to the two aspects that make the phenomenon relevant and interesting, its political nature is not grounded in the word global itself or in the object, which uses of the word global bring out. Rather, it is grounded in a distinct, ‘unconventional’ and non-essentialist theory of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality. I carved out the hallmarks of this theory by referring to rele-

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23 This also reveals the distinction between ‘unconventional’ approaches and the premises that inform classical transcendental takes; in his elaboration on ‘discourse theory’, Jacob Torfing (2005: 10) explains that in the case of the former, “[f]irst, the conditions of possibility are not invariable and ahistorical as Kant suggests, but subject to political struggles and historical transformation. […] Second, [it] does not see the conditions of possibility as an inherent feature of the human mind, but takes them to be a structural feature of contingently constructed discourses.”
vant theorists, such as Stuart Hall, and through an excursus on popular approaches in the political studies and IR scholarship that follow an apparently similar theory of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality but differ in their essentialist foundation. In juxtaposing these popular approaches with the theory that informs my conception of the omnipresence of the adjective *global* as a political phenomenon, I was able to position my project in the broader political studies and IR scholarship. I put forward that the political phenomenon of the omnipresence of *global* is an ‘unconventional’ object of study at the margins of the political studies and IR scholarship.

Building on this general conception of the omnipresence of *global* as a political phenomenon, I now move a step further and add a nuance to it. I suggest there is something special about the omnipresence of the adjective *global*, understood as a dimension of the perpetual contestation over the meaning of social reality. What is special about the omnipresence of *global* is that the object ‘new world’, which it re-produces, is a mode of the temporal category ‘present’. This means that historical appearances of the ‘new world’, i.e. distinct actualisations of the object that is re-produced through uses of the word *global*, constitute ways, in which the conceptual space ‘present’ is filled with meaning. In what follows, I illustrate the relevance of this point. I do this by highlighting the prominent role that the conceptual spaces ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ play in the organisation of social and political life.

**The ‘new world’ as a distinct mode of the present**

Together with the past and the future, the present constitutes a central category that guides social life. Grounded in a linear idea of time, divided into past (the realm of memory and experience), present and future (the realm of expectation), the present is the realm from within which decisions are made.\(^{24}\)

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\(^{24}\) The familiar threefold distinction between past, present and future is not a universal idea. As Hartmut Rosa (2001, 2001a, 2001b) elaborates, the idea of time is culturally specific and historically contingent. In fact, it is not only the relationship between the categories present, past, and future that is historical but the very categories as well; they are variable (Rosa 2001a: 618). The respective conception of time determines whether there are three main temporal categories to begin with. In a conception of time that distinguishes between ‘now’ and ‘not-now’, past and future merge (Rosa 2001b: 677). The same applies to a cyclic idea of time. Here, too, the past (memory) and the future (expectation) are almost congruent. It is only in the context of a linear conception of time, in which time is seen as flowing from the past via the present to the future, that the past (the realm of memory and experience) and the future (the realm of expectation) are separated from each other and from the present. It is only in this context that the three-
“Every perception of reality and time takes place in the present. Action, too, is always ever present action, even though it is shaped by the past and directed at the future.” (Rosa 2001: 210; my own translation)

As Rosa indicates above, the present is intimately enmeshed with the past and the future. In general,

“[t]hrough memory and expectation the unity of past, present and future is constituted in every present anew. The existence of past and future presents, futures and pasts remains untouched by this. Certain is that the present present will appear in the future memory as the past.” (ibid. 211; my own translation)

In particular, the past, as memory and experience, determines the present and present decisions made for a(n imagined) future; just as the future, namely expectations, determines the present. The constructed (present) ‘content’ of the remembered past and of the expected future shapes present action. In this sense, the past and future serve as coordinates for the now; they serve as a trigger for a pluralisation of presents (see further Rosa 2001). This is because “[p]ast and future […] are horizons of the present; they appear as past and future of the present” (ibid. 211; my own translation).

At the same time, the relationship between past, present and future, as well as, the way in which the past and the future are made meaningful, is grounded in the present. For instance, the technology of ‘risk’, which I discussed in Chapter 5, is a strategy to fill with meaning an ‘open’ future from within the present. Through ‘risk’, the future is ‘colonised’ (from with)in the present, grounded in the (present) memory of past experiences. The past, too, is the product of the present in that it is constructed from within the present. This is because, in a linear notion of time, the past and the future cannot be directly accessed. There is no direct access to the future because it is the realm of the potential. There is also no direct access to the past because what has passed inevitably needs to be remembered and ‘communicated’; the past does not exist in a repository, where it could be accessed from a fold distinction between past, present and future fully appears (ibid.). But even in the linear conception of time, there are different understandings of these temporal categories and of what is the relationship between them. For instance, the future is either imagined as something that is ‘closed’, the form of which is derived from religious or philosophical assumptions, or as something that is ‘open’, i.e. uncertain and the product of human action (see ibid.; for the above see also in general Rosa 2001, 2001a). The latter is the kind of modern idea of time and future that I mentioned in the context of my excursus on ‘risk’ in Chapter 5. There, I quoted Anthony Giddens (1994: 7) explaining that modernity is about the active “colonization of the future”, and that ‘risk’ is “the mobilising dynamic of a society bent on change, that wants to determine its own future rather than leaving it to religion, tradition, or the vagaries of nature” (Giddens 2002: 24).
present position, by going ‘back in time’ (see Rosa 2001, 2001a, 2001b).

As Christian Lotz (2001: 660) points out with reference to Edmund Husserl, the notion that one could go ‘back in time’ is misleading. One can only ever understand something as having passed; in practice, time is always only experienced in memory and in the present. What has passed needs to be remembered, and remembering is a distinct way of constructing the past from within the present. In this respect, both, the past and the future are conceptual spaces, which are ‘filled’ from within the present. It is ‘memory’ that constructs the past from within the present, and ‘expectations’ that construct the future – also from within the present (see Rosa 2001b: 677).

At the same time, however, the past (memory and experiences) and the future (expectations) shape the present. In short, past and future are only ever present pasts and present futures. They are the products of the present. First, the present shapes how the temporal categories ‘past’ and ‘future’ are imagined in relation to the present. Second, the present shapes how the conceptual spaces ‘past’ and ‘future’ are ‘filled’ with meaning. At the same time, both of these aspects play back into the present.

There is a comprehensive scholarship, which deals with the (present) ‘filling’ of the conceptual spaces past and future, and their interplay with the present. In particular, the ‘filling’ of the (present) past, more precisely, the collective ‘filling’ of the present past, has attracted significant scholarly attention. It runs under the labels ‘memory studies’, “politics of memory” (Hodgkin and Radstone 2003), and “politics of the past” (e.g. Munasinghe 2005). Grounded in an understanding that there is a social dimension of memory, i.e. that there is a ‘collective memory’, scholars analyse

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25 Again, this is not natural and universal, refer back to fn 24 in this present chapter.

26 As Rosa (2001: 211; my own translation) adds, in addition to being the position, from which the conceptual spaces past and future are filled with meaning, the present impacts on the future in that the “present action and experience […] determines […] the possible content of future memory – then, as a memory of a past present.”

27 Astrid Erll (2003: 156-6) provides a catalogue of aspects, which explain the striking rise of the interest in (collective) constructions of the past at the end of the 1980s. One of them are the profound changes regarding the media of memory and the possibility of the generation of large sets of data. Another aspect is the gradual diminishing of witnesses of the ‘big catastrophes’ of the 20th century, prominently, the Second World War and the Holocaust. It has brought up questions about what it means to rely solely on modi of memory other than the accounts of historical witnesses. Furthermore, Erll points to a general tendency at the end of the 20th century to ‘look back’.

28 The concept ‘collective memory’ goes back to Maurice Halbwachs (1925, 1950), who stresses the social dimension of memory. Halbwachs argues that memory is not solely an individual, cognitive phenomenon, but that it is social and collective in that individuals are part of groups and these groups’ collective memory.
“[c]ontests over the meaning of the past [as] contests over the meaning of the present and over ways of taking the past forward” (Hodgkin and Radstone 2003: 1). Of interest are the “strategic, political, and ethical consequences” (ibid.) of the collectively memorised past.

For instance, Ruth Wittlinger and Steffi Boothroyd (2010) discuss Germany’s “‘usable’ past” in its post-unification present. They unveil a change in German collective memory of the past of the Third Reich from being “polarized before the fall of the Wall […] to a past that is much more accommodating and allows an easier identification with the German nation. A more institutionalized and internationalized approach to the Nazi past, which incorporates the memory of German suffering, is increasingly complemented by a focus on positive aspects of German history, like the successes of the Bonn Republic, the peaceful East German revolution of 1989, and unification in 1990.” (ibid. 489)

In a related study, Wittlinger and Larose (2007) show how the distinct present past of the Nazi era at the beginning of the millennium impacted on various (foreign) policy moves under the Schröder Administration. In a different context, Dario R. Paez and James Hou-Fu Liu (2009) unveil how collective memory of past conflicts affects present conflicts through “aggressive forms of in-group favoritism, a duty of retaliation, [and] generalized hatred”, which makes “the current situation appear as a repetition of previous violent conflicts” (ibid. 105). Richard S. Esbenshade (1995) provides an ac-

Halbwachs’ notion of ‘collective memory’ was prominently refined and extended by Aleida Assmann (1999) and Jan Assmann (1992, 1995). They develop a theory, which distinguishes between “communicative memory” and “cultural memory”. Assmann’s and Assmann’s concept ‘communicative memory’ refers to the kind of collective memory that “includes those varieties of collective memory that are based exclusively on everyday communications” (Assmann 1995: 126). The concept ‘cultural memory’, in contrast, refers to a kind of collective memory that is grounded in highly symbolic and fixed points in the past. As Jan Assmann (ibid. 128-9) explains, “[j]ust as the communicative memory is characterized by its proximity to the everyday, cultural memory is characterized by its distance from the everyday. Distance from the everyday (transcendence) marks its temporal horizon. Cultural memory has its fixed point; its horizon does not change with the passing of time. These fixed points are fateful events of the past, whose memory is maintained through cultural formation (texts, rites, monuments) and institutional communication (recitation, practice, observance)”. While everybody is involved in ‘communicative memory’, which is shaped by “a high degree of non-specialization, reciprocity of roles, thematic instability, and disorganization” (ibid. 126), ‘cultural memory’, as suggested above, is grounded in ‘fixed points’ and, as such, depends on and ‘demands’ expert interpretation. With this distinction, Assmann and Assmann enable a nuanced approach to the issue of collective and political identity (see further Erll 2003: 173).
count of the contest over and impact of memory in national narratives constructed in Central Eastern Europe after the end of the Communist era; and Jelena Subotić (2013: 306) illustrates “the way in which hegemonic state narratives of the past influence contemporary human rights policies in the western Balkans.”

Another example of the enmeshment of the (present) past with the present (as the basis for imagining and approaching the future) is the everyday linguistic feature of analogies. In analogies something complex and (potentially) ‘unfamiliar’ is explained through a comparison with something from the past. Using Daase and Kessler’s words, analogies “represent codes for secured knowledge” (Daase and Kessler 2007: 420); they provide “certainty where uncertainty reigns” (Fry 1991: 13) by grasping the world through reference to something familiar, namely something ‘from the past’. Yet, analogies are, of course, not universal and ahistorical. Which analogy is considered useful in which context is a product of the present. The inauguration

29 Referring back to Chapter 5, the case of Christopher Columbus’ ‘discovery’ of the ‘New World’ and the way this narrative is inscribed in US culture is, of course, another prime example of the impact of a distinctly memorised (present) past on the present and the future. In this context, Thomas J. Schlereth (1992) not only shows the influence of the memory of Columbus on US collective identity in various historical presents, he also demonstrates that there are various historical present ‘fillings’ of the past of Christopher Columbus’ ‘discovery’ of the ‘New World’. Each of them serves a distinct purpose in establishing the respective present from within which they are imagined. Columbus “has been interpreted and reinterpreted as we have constructed and reconstructed our own national character”, finds Schlereth (ibid. 937). In fact, as I mentioned in Chapter 5, Columbus has actually not even always been a part of the American past, of American collective memory to begin with. He only entered it in 1792. As Schlereth (ibid.; emphasis in the original) explains: “[Columbus] was ignored in the colonial era. […] Americans first discovered the discoverer during their quest for independence and nationhood; successive generations molded Columbus into a multipurpose American hero, a national symbol to be used variously in the quest for a collective identity. This process in the public (rather than the professional) American history of Columbus can be traced over three chronological periods: first, Columbus as a feminine, classical deity, Columbia, an allegorical figure symbolizing liberty and progress; second, the masculine, fifteenth-century European, Columbus, who sanctioned nineteenth-century American Manifest Destiny and western expansionism; and third, Columbus as the major symbol of Columbianism, a late nineteenth century form of patriotic Americanism that involved cultural and political hegemony and various ethnic and religious identities.”

30 With reference to Yuen Foong Khong (1992: 10), Milo Jones (2004) highlights the relevance of analogies in politics. He explains that “analogies assist policy-makers by performing three diagnostic tasks: they 1) help define the nature of the situation confronting the policy-maker; 2) help assess the stakes; and 3) pro-
of US President Barack Obama in 2009 was a concert of analogies in that it provided historical references from Lincoln to the invocation of the spirit of Martin Luther King. Amnesty International’s Irene Khan’s (2005) comparison of the US detention camp in Guantanamo Bay with the gulags of the Stalinist era is another prime example of an analogy, and so is the link between the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 and the 1941 Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor. This analogy was institutionalised through the Executive Summary of The 9/11 Commission Report (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004), which starts with the following paragraph:

“More than 2,600 people died at the World Trade Centre; 125 died at the Pentagon; 256 died on the four planes. The death toll surpassed that at Pearl Harbor in December 1941.”

Following David Hoogland Noon (2004: 339), we realise that the ‘war on terror’ discourse or, as he aptly calls it, ‘Operation Enduring Analogy’ in essential ways “capitalizes on post-Cold War historical memory” in that

“The ‘liberation’ of Kabul or Baghdad has been likened (albeit awkwardly) to the liberation of Paris or the capture of Berlin; the accumulating disarray in Iraq and Afghanistan is optimistically compared with the slow postwar reconstruction of Germany and Japan; the unusual bond between Bush and Tony Blair is regularly measured against that gold standard of Anglo-American relations, the Roosevelt-Churchill alliance; and during the buildup to the war in Iraq, critics of the impending war were chastened by forceful warnings about ‘appeasement’, Neville Chamberlain, and the ineffectual League of Nations.”

Above and beyond this, the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 itself, or better the abbreviation of it, ‘9/11’, is widely used as an analogy, seen for instance in the context of the November 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai, when Indian film-maker Kunal Kohli stressed that one of the targets, the Taj Mahal hotel,

“is not just a hotel, it is a symbol of Mumbai and for that to be attacked is no less than the World Trade Centre being attacked in New York. It is truly our 9/11.” (BBC 2008)
We can get a sense of the cultural specificity and complexity of analogies when we consider that any kind of analogy using the Third Reich in general and the Holocaust in particular is tabooed in Germany to a degree that the disregard of this norm by public figures immediately and inevitably leads to public condemnation and calls for their resignation. This also shows that analogies are ultimately a product of the historical present.\(^{32}\)

In contrast to the scholarship on the constructed present pasts and their influence on the present, the study of the ‘politics of the future’, or ‘politics of expectation’ is less institutionalised.\(^{33}\) This is despite the fact that in a

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32 Another tool through which the (present) memorised past is brought into and shapes the present are ‘frames’. In the social sciences, the concept ‘frame’ is associated with Erving Goffman’s (1975) work on “the organization of experience”, as well as with the literature on social movements and collective action, where it goes back to sociologists such as Maurice Halbwachs (1925, 1950) and his above mentioned work on collective memory. Outside the social sciences, ‘frame’ is a concept used in the study of semantics (e.g. Fillmore 2006), as well as in the cognitive sciences, especially in research on artificial intelligence. Marvin Minsky (1997[1974]) is one of the prominent developers of the concept in this latter field, where it is linked to several related concepts, such as ‘scripts’, ‘schemes’ and ‘scenarios’ (see further Donati 2001; Ziem 2005); these latter concepts have been taken up by scholars in other fields such as corpus linguistics (e.g. Fraas 2000, 2003). In the context of the cognitive sciences, the concept ‘frame’ was developed in an attempt to understand the process of cognition. As Minsky (1997[1974]: 109) explains, “the essence of the theory [is]: when one encounters a new situation […] one selects from memory a structure called a frame. This is a remembered framework to be adapted to fit reality by changing details as necessary.” Erving Goffman (1975: 10) defines ‘frames’ as follows: “I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organization, which govern events […] and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements, as I am able to identify.” In this sense, the concept ‘frame’ refers to quasi-memorised structures that are applied to make sense of the world. At the same time, they restrict what is visible and determine how something is visible. Like analogies, ‘frames’ are not simply individual cognitive phenomena; they are social and cultural products. Following this theory, cognition is always already socio-culturally shaped in that it is embedded in and the outcome of collectively ratified knowledge. Hence, when it comes to collective memory, in one way or other, only those things can be ‘remembered’ in those particular ways, for which there is a collective frame, i.e. what is already socially ratified as acceptable to remember.

33 There is something like ‘future studies’ in the academy (see Dunmire 2011: 31). Yet, in contrast to ‘memory studies’, the label ‘future studies’ does not cover works that critically engage with the present construction of the future. Rather, the literature in ‘future studies’ sets out to predict (possible) future developments.
modern linear conception of time, it is the (open) future that serves as the dominant horizon of the present (see Rosa 2001: 678).  

The significance of the future in modern life and for the present is manifest in what I discussed in Chapter 5, namely the fondness for the striving for the ‘new’, in which the entrepreneur and the one, who makes everything ‘new’, are attributed with intrinsic positive value. This fondness for the ‘new’ to come shapes the present and policies in the present profoundly. In this sense, one could say that, in one way, all policy analysis is (implicitly) an analysis of the ‘filling’ of the future because modern politics is essentially future-oriented. Yet, only a portion of analyses explicitly start on the premise that

“[a]s the site of the possible and potential, the future represents a contested rhetorical domain through which partisans attempt to wield ideological and political power” (Dunmire 2011: 1),

and explicitly investigate the distinct political practice of the ‘filling’ of the conceptual space future. Patricia L. Dunmire’s (2011) study of the “projection of the future” under the post-9/11 Bush Administration is one of a few of such analyses. It unveils the “politics, rhetoric, and ideology of projecting the future” (ibid. 27) in the case of the Bush Administration’s post-9/11 national security discourse and discusses its impact on present policy decisions. The kinds of studies that deal with perceptions of uncertainty, such as Wynne and Dressler (2001) to which I referred in Chapter 5, also fall into this category. In a way that is similar to Wynne and Dressler’s study, Stefan Böschen, Karen Kastenhofer, Luitgard Marschall, Ina Rust, Jens Soentgen and Peter Wehling (2006: 296) explore the controversy over genetically modified organisms and find,

“while a more empiricist-oriented British (Anglo-Saxon) institutional culture only accepts robust evidence (e.g. specific causal models) as justifying environmental protection, the general public in continental European countries (particularly Germany)

In this respect, the contributions to ‘future studies’ are exercises in the construction of the present future themselves, rather than studies of it.

34 With reference to Fraser (1975: 303), Patricia L. Dunmire (2011: 7) stresses the relevance of the future by pointing out that “children […] express expectations for the future and make references to the future earlier in their development than they recount memories of the past.” Quoting Masini (1999: 36), Dunmire (2011: 8) argues, “people become human the minute they begin to think about the future, the moment they try to plan for the future.”

35 It is probably precisely this intrinsic positive value that means that there are more studies about the imagination of the (present) past than the critical study of the ‘politics of expectation’.
is more willing to act on the grounds of uncertainty or even ‘merely’ presumed non-knowledge in a precautionary approach.’

The authors demonstrate how the present future is collectively filled with meaning and how this plays back into present decisions. Furthermore, they unveil the present re-production of distinct understandings of the relationship between the temporal categories present and future, namely one in which the future is (imagined) as more or less ‘determinable’ and predictable from within the present. Again, this is interesting because it is not natural. As discussed in Chapter 5, the comparison between the UK and Germany demonstrates the cultural nature of this ‘filling’ and its profound implications for present decisions.

Taking all of the above together, we see the relevance of the temporal category and conceptual space ‘present’ and the enmeshment of the past, present and future, where the present is the realm from within which the past and future are made meaningful; they are made meaningful in that they are ‘filled’ with sense and in that their relationship with the present is imagined.

It is this relevance of the present that makes the object ‘new world’, which is re-produced in uses of the adjective *global*, special. The ‘new world’ constitutes a distinct filling of the present; it is the present, the ‘now’ that is rendered ‘new’ and suddenly confronts social actors. As I already indicated in Chapter 5, such an idea of a ‘new world’ that *came* implies a distinct imagination of the role of the (temporal categories) past and future. In principle, it establishes a break with the past in that it quarantines experiences as something that no longer ‘naturally’ holds as the basis for present decisions. Simultaneously, it brings into question the nature of the future as a readily determinable horizon of expectation that provides guidance for present actions. I developed this point in Chapter 5, in which I conceptualised the notion of the ‘new world’ that *came* as an indication of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, including the ‘return of uncertainty’. This implies an idea of the future as ‘open’ but not necessarily easily ‘predictable’, at least not predictable in a ‘traditional’ modern way.

It is in this sense that the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* not only constitutes a political phenomenon because it is a part of the contest over the meaning of the world but because it takes a special position in this contest. It takes a special position because its object, the ‘new world’, fills nothing less but the ‘present’ with meaning.

**Approaching the Omnipresence of Global as an ‘Unconventional’ Object of Study**

In the previous second main part of this chapter, I conceptualised the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* as a political phenomenon. This conceptualisation is grounded in an ‘unconventional’ theory of the rela-
tionship between language, meaning and social reality. According to this theory, the omnipresence of *global* constitutes a dimension of the perpetual contest over the meaning of the world; it brings out the world. Furthermore, I argued that it is not just any dimension of the contest over the world; the omnipresence of *global* ‘fills’ nothing less with meaning than the present. Consequently, the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* is of interest not necessarily to linguists but to scholars, who have an interest in the political world. Inevitably, though, it constitutes an ‘unconventional’ object of study.

In this third and final main part of this chapter, I reflect on this latter point. I reflect on how to approach the omnipresence of *global* as an ‘unconventional’ object of study. The aim is not to provide a methodological blueprint for its empirical exploration. As a matter of fact, the provision of such a blueprint would be contradictory to the ‘unconventional’ theoretical premises that I outlined above. Rather, I sketch the general nature of the approach to the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global*, provide basic guiding questions for such a research endeavour and introduce two techniques, namely concordances and collocations, or co-occurrences, which are fruitful tools for the way into the field.

At the outset, it is worth reiterating that the study of the omnipresence of *global* is a study of the phenomenon of the omnipresence of *global* in and of itself and not of something ‘behind’ it. The study of the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* is not a way of gaining better insight into an already established object of study in political studies and IR, such as foreign policy behaviour, the design of security policies or one of the above mentioned ideational factors that have come to play a role in the study of (international) politics these days, such as role perceptions. This is not to say that, in one way or other, the empirical exploration of the omnipresence of *global* might not generate insights into established objects of study and contribute to the literature on established disciplinary research questions. However, from the outset, it can only be understood and designed as an exploration of an obviously widespread contemporary dimension of the contested symbolic production of social reality. Due to the lack of an already established and delineated framework and a well-trodden ground to walk on, this means that the study of the omnipresence of *global* demands some creativity and, referring back to my elaboration on Ulrich Beck in Chapter 5, a willingness to endure a degree of ‘provisionality’.

I proceed in three steps in this chapter and move from the general to the particular. First, I point out the basics that inform the empirical approach to an ‘unconventional’ object of study, such as the omnipresence of *global*. Second, I suggest that there is something distinct about the omnipresence of the adjective *global* as an ‘unconventional’ object of study; I suggest it is ‘unconventional’ and experimental in two ways. Finally, I introduce two tools that are helpful in generating initial insights into the exploration of the
omnipresence of *global*; these are concordances and collocations, or co-occurrences.

**In general: ‘Like bike riding’**

The theoretical premises that I elaborated in the previous part of this chapter and that make the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* a political phenomenon and an ‘unconventional’ object of study, demand a distinct approach to its empirical exploration. Using Campbell’s (2007: 206) words, it demands an approach that puts “the issues of interpretation and representation, power and knowledge […] at the forefront of concerns”, that acknowledges that

“[r]ather than conceiving of a world of discrete variables with discrete effects, […] there are constructions and versions that may be adopted, responded to or undermined.” (Potter 1997: 147-8)

As Matthias Jung (1994) elaborates, it demands an approach that is informed by the conviction that there is something “suspect”, or, using Torfing’s (2005: 27) words, “absurd” about the ‘conventional’ ideal of a deductive approach, which starts strictly on the basis of a theory that is transformed into a consistent and decontextualised method, and is eventually verified based on empirical findings. Instead of verifying a pre-set hypothesis, studying an ‘unconventional’ object of study, like the omnipresence of *global*, is about the evaluation and carving out of the specificity of what is typical about the respective socio-political phenomenon (Wagner 2005: 68). This means that the study of the omnipresence of *global* is an “intervention[…] in conventional understandings or established practices” (Campbell 2007: 219), and not an endeavour that sets out to detect causal explanations and ‘real causes’, as it is, in one way or another, at the heart of the mainstream scholarship in political studies and IR.

In addition, I suggest, the study of an ‘unconventional’ object of study, such as the omnipresence of the adjective *global*, is shaped by three of the criteria that Ulrich Franke and Ulrich Roos (2013) identify for their ‘social scientific reconstruction’-approach. These are the recognition of the principle of fallibility (ibid. 23), a principle openness for a pluralism of methods (ibid. 22) and a “willingness on the side of the researchers to lay open the rules that guide their professional action” (ibid. 23; my own translation). To explore the omnipresence of the adjective *global* is to ‘de-naturalise’ alleged natural orders and perceptions; it is to ‘make them strange’ (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989). Using Jonathan Potter’s (1997: 147) words, it is an approach that resembles a “craft skill, more like bike riding […] than following the recipe for a mild chicken rogan josh.” Inevitably, this makes it an experimental endeavour that requires a degree of creativity and openness.

To sum up, in general, the exploration of the omnipresence of the adjective *global* as an ‘unconventional’ object of study involves the study of the
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contest over the meaning of social reality. It is about exploring the possibilities that are opened and closed in the re-production of the web of meanings that comes out of the utterances that contain the adjective *global* – where, as implied in the ethos of the above theoretical premises, ‘possibilities’ are not so much about concrete policies but about broader issues, such as identities, speaking positions, as well as about what is normal and common sensical to begin with. In principle, studying the omnipresence of *global* is about the exploration of ‘interpretative dispositions’, to pick up Doty’s words from above.

In particular: ‘Unconventional’ and experimental in two ways

The above section provided a general sense of how an approach to the omnipresence of *global* as an ‘unconventional’ object of study looks and what such a study is generally about. I now move from the general to what I identify as particular about the study of the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global*, i.e. the discursive re-production of the web of meanings ‘new world’.

As stressed above, the study of the omnipresence of *global* is a study of the omnipresence of the word *global* as a distinct phenomenon. It is not about studying the use of the adjective *global* to gain a better understanding of something ‘behind it’, i.e. it is not a strategic way to gain insight into another, already established object of interest in political studies and IR. But what is it then about? What is one to look at and what is one to look for if one explores the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global*? As discussed in the Introduction of this book, no matter how inductive and interpretative an approach aspires to be, “[t]here is always something ‘before the beginning’” (Pope 2005: xv). So, what is it in the case of the omnipresence of *global*?

There are two aspects to the study of the omnipresence of the word *global*, understood as a political phenomenon. First, to study the omnipresence of *global* is to study the phenomenon of the omnipresence of *global* in and of itself. Second, to study the omnipresence of *global* is to study the object ‘new world’ that it re-produces. The concrete and individual design of such a two-fold study is open to scholarly imagination and interest. This is the case not least because the exploration of the phenomenon of the omnipresence of *global* is as yet an untrodden path; any capturing of the occurrence of the phenomenon, as well as, any study of the object it re-produces adds to our understanding of this object of study. The study of the omnipresence of *global* could be designed with a diachronic or synchronic outlook, the corpus that it builds on could be thematically assembled, or arranged in terms of a particular historical or political or cultural or institutional context and setting, such as the UN discourse or the Public Papers of the US Presidents, which I select for my own empirical exploration in Chapter 7. However, independent of the research design, the generation of the corpus is straightforward. The phenomenon of the omnipresence of the word
global is manifest in the occurrences of the word global, i.e. wherever the adjective global is, is the object of study.

The first aspect of the study of the omnipresence of global identified above involves capturing the political phenomenon itself. This means it is about mapping where the phenomenon can be found and how it unfolds. In concrete terms, it is a study of where the adjective global appears. There are three basic questions that guide entry into the field: Where does the phenomenon appear? Where does it not appear? With which thematic discourses is it enmeshed? Again, depending on scholarly creativity and interest, the phenomenon could be traced and captured comparatively, in a diachronic or synchronic way, and in a distinct institutional, cultural, political or historical context. Once in the field, subsequent questions emerge inductively.

The second aspect of the study of the omnipresence of global involves the analysis of the object ‘new world’ that this phenomenon re-produces. In general, it is a study of how this object looks. In particular, and following the theoretical elaborations in the previous section, it is a study of the ‘interpretive dispositions’ that this object ‘new world’ implies, and the possibilities that these dispositions open and close. In contrast to the first aspect, this second aspect is about meanings; it is about more than ‘just’ the appearance of the adjective global. In the previous part of this chapter, I explained that what is special about the object ‘new world’ is that it fills the conceptual space ‘present’ with meaning and that it constitutes an actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’. This insight brings along a set of general questions that guide entry into the field of the exploration of the object ‘new world’: How is the temporal category ‘past’ constructed? How is the temporal category ‘future’ constructed? What kind of an idea of ‘uncertainty’ is constructed? What is the relationship between past, present and future? How are consequences of actions and decisions constructed? What kind of an idea of agency is constructed? How ‘modern’ or ‘beyond modern’ is the ‘new world’? How much space does it open to go beyond modern principles and institutions, and to fundamentally reimagine the world?

Again, given the theoretical premises sketched above that inform the approach to an ‘unconventional’ object of study, such as the omnipresence of global, all these questions are guiding questions and not ‘traditional’ research. The aim is not to answer these questions but to be guided by them into the field. They are stepping stones in the endeavour to capture the political phenomenon of the omnipresence of the adjective global. They provide an initial orientation in the field and facilitate initial steps that generate further, corpus-driven questions from within the analytical process.

The above means that the empirical study of the omnipresence of the adjective global, i.e. the re-production of a web of meanings called ‘new world’ through utterances, which contain the adjective global, is ‘unconventional’ and experimental in a twofold sense.

First, it is ‘unconventional’ and experimental in a way that all analyses of the symbolic re-production of social reality – by nature of the theoretical
premises that inform them – are. As I elaborated above, these studies are neither about following a pre-set recipe nor about the application of a decontextualised method. Given that they do not set out to test a pre-set hypothesis, which is grounded in an established theory, but aim to make things ‘strange’ and intervene into conventional knowledge (production), they are inevitably less clearly anchored in an existing scholarly environment than ‘conventional’ studies. In my reflection on the nature of the research project that brought out this book, which I outlined in the Introduction, I reflected on challenges of such an ‘unanchored’ approach.

Second, the empirical study of the omnipresence of global is also ‘unconventional’ and experimental, in fact, has to be somewhat ‘provisional’ because of the nature of the object that the uses of the adjective global bring out, namely the ‘new world’. As I demonstrated in Chapter 5, the omnipresence of global indicates an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. More specifically, the object ‘new world’ that utterances with global bring out is an actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’. This makes the study of the omnipresence of global fundamentally experimental and provisional simply because there is no established language yet for grasping the generated insights. I made this point clear when I discussed the nature of Ulrich Beck’s ‘provisional’ project of rethinking how we think about social reality. I stressed the inherent ambivalence of his project, which is the result of the ambivalent character of the ‘reflexive modern’ world that Beck set out to grasp (see also Bronner 1995: 67). This world is a both/and-world, as opposed to an either/or-world. While this insight is theoretically manageable, it poses challenges when it comes to empirical explorations because of a lack of ‘ratified’ language to grasp it; for instance, a language that reproduces the idea of linearity and ‘either/or’ is not adequate (any longer) (see Selchow 2016a). For sure, it requires a degree of experimentalism and provisionality. As Beck (2013) puts it, “[i]n the state of total change we try to think this change. This is difficult. Hence, we cannot appear with full confidence.”

This brings me to the final step in this last main part of this chapter: I introduce two analytical tools that are fruitful in taking initial steps into the empirical field of the exploration of the omnipresence of global.

**Concordances and collocations, or co-occurrences**

To study the omnipresence of global is to focus on the word global without conducting a linguistic analysis. The study of the omnipresence of global is a study of the symbolic production of the world. As I suggested above, it is an unconventional, experimental and provisional study that demands a degree of creativity. It is an interpretative and inductive endeavour. Yet, there are two techniques in linguistics, more precisely in corpus linguistics, that form helpful tools for the first steps into the field: concordances and collocations, or co-occurrences. These techniques are helpful because they allow the generation of initial insights into the meanings that are associated with
the adjective *global* in a corpus. With that they help generating initial insights into the object ‘new world’, which is re-produced in uses of the word *global*. In concluding this subsection, I elaborate on this point and introduce these techniques, while stressing that they can only provide initial triggers and initial insights. In contrast to ‘conventional’ studies of the use of language in politics and, for that matter, in contrast to my brief analysis of President George W. Bush’s use of *global*, which I presented in Chapter 2, the study of the omnipresence of the word *global* is a study of the reproduction of a distinct object ‘new world’. Its goal is not to detect strategic uses of the word or to find out what a supposedly extra-discursive social actor means when they use the adjective *global*. It is about the web of meanings ‘new world’ that the adjective brings along wherever it is applied.

In Chapter 2, I showed that meanings are not attached to a linguistic sign. Meanings are arbitrary and a constant flickering of presence and absence together. Yet, despite this essential flexibility, meanings are actually relatively stable. As we saw in Chapter 2, only in theory can Humpty Dumpty use the word *glorious* to mean ‘a nice knock-down argument’. In practice, Alice does not understand him if he does. While meanings are essentially arbitrary, they are also social and conventional; they are ‘made possible’ and ‘tamed’ by what I referred to with the word *discourse* in Chapter 4; not everything is sayable. As Claudia Fraas (1996, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2003) suggests, this means that because words and their encoded web of meanings are only used and only ‘survive’ (over time) if they relate and are adaptable to socially accepted meanings, it is possible to ‘sift out’ collectively shared meanings through an analysis of how words are used in texts. Putting it differently, linguistic signs, such as *global*, can be approached as ‘focal points’, in which collective meanings crystallise. In order to empirically ‘sift out’ these collectively shared meanings one needs to look at a word, such as the adjective *global*, within a large number of texts. Such a systematic analysis enables scholars to detect socially ratified meanings instead of only those meanings which are held by individual sign users and text producers (Fraas 2001). It is the examination of the broader intertextual context that enables the discovery of the wider collective meanings that are encoded in a particular word. In other words, it is this intertextual context, in which the web of references is manifest that enables the detection of and ‘sifting out’ of socially ratified meanings.36

This kind of approach to language is at home in corpus linguistics, which is a way of studying language that does not look “at what is theoretically possible in a language, [but at] the actual language used in naturally occurring texts” (Biber, Conrad and Reppe 1998: 1). The basic idea is to look at a corpus of texts in order to see “how words form meaningful units. By exploring corpora we begin to see how meaning is created in language,”

36 This is what I did to understand that the contemporary *global* encapsulates ‘globalisation’.
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explains Pernilla Danielsson of the Centre for Corpus Research at the University of Birmingham (URL).

Fraas’ study of the German word Wald (forest) is a concrete example of such an analysis and gives also an idea of the methodological techniques that are helpful in such an endeavour, namely concordances, or ‘key word in context’ (KWIC), and collocations, or co-occurrences. Looking for collocates, or co-occurrences, is a way of determining, which words appear particularly frequently in a defined distance to a word of interest, such as global. As Michael Stubbs (1996: 172; emphasis in the original) puts it,

“[t]he main concept is that words occur in characteristic collocations, which show the associations and connotations they have, and therefore the assumptions which they embody.”

Collocations stand for sequences of words, which appear together more frequently than statistical possibility suggests, such as ‘good morning’ or ‘climate change’ or ‘global warming’. Stubbs’ definition is: “collocation’ is frequent co-occurrence” (Stubbs 2002: 29). Based on the assumption that there is an equal probability that each word in a language co-occurs with any other word within this language, it can be determined to what extent individual word combinations occur more frequently than chance suggests. This computation then shows not only how words are used in specific texts and by individual sign users, but, as long as the analysis uses a corpus of a large number of texts, it also enables scholars to reveal patterns in the collective, socially ratified uses of words. In Chapter 2, I referred to a co-

37 This above sketched capturing of socially ratified meanings distinguishes corpus linguistic approaches from the ones that are inspired by the methodological genre of Begriffsgeschichte (conceptual history) – developed by German historian Reinhart Koselleck (1972, 1982, 1985) and taken up by the earlier referenced Bach (2013) in his analysis of the concept ‘globalisation’ – and related methodological strategies and research programmes, such as the so-called ‘Cambridge School’ (around Quentin Skinner [e.g. 1989] and the work of James Farr [e.g. 1989] and Terence Ball [e.g. 1988]). Notably, corpus linguistic approaches are also distinct in that they do not focus on elite texts.

38 For Fraas (1998), this strategy is particularly fruitful for detecting the meanings that are encoded in ‘abstract terms’. The concept ‘abstract terms’ refers to those linguistic features, which, as the name suggests, refer to abstract, ideal conceptions about the world as such, about life and about social processes; ‘freedom’, ‘justice’, ‘equality’, ‘identity’ but also terms such as ‘love’ and ‘family’ fall into this category. Fraas (ibid. 256-7) highlights five characteristics of ‘abstract terms’: First, they are disputable regarding what it is to which they precisely refer. In different situations, ‘abstract terms’ can refer to very different phenomena. Second, they are disputable regarding their intention. This means that it is not clear which characteristics the object of reference needs to hold in order to be re-
occurrence analysis of the adjective *global*; in their study of a corpus of American English, Davies and Gardner (2010: 74) find that the adjective *global* particularly frequently co-occurs with *warming*, *economy*, *change*, *system*, *market*, *climate*, *issue*, *network*, *trade*, *community*, *positioning*, *environment*, and with the words *economic*, *environmental*, *local*, *regional*, *international*, *financial*, *increasingly*, *truly*.

To calculate collocations, or co-occurrences, the assistance of a computer programme is needed. One of these programmes is the freeware *AntConc*, which I used for my analysis of the use of the word *global* in President George W. Bush’s Public Papers at the end of Chapter 2.

In addition to providing collocations, or co-occurrences, *AntConc* also provides the second technique that is helpful in approaching the omnipresence of *global*, namely, concordances. Concordances are lists that present a distinct word in the context, in which it appears, as a “first stage in an analysis” (Stubbs 2002: 62). As Stubbs (1996: xviii) finds,

“[t]his provides a convenient layout for studying how a speaker or writer uses certain words and phrases, and whether there are particular patterns in his or her use of language.”

To reiterate a point from above, the study of the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* is not a linguistic endeavour, or a corpus linguistic analysis. The goal is not to gain statistical insights into the use of the word *global* as part of an endeavour to learn something about the English language. The research interest is in the omnipresence of the adjective *global* as a political phenomenon, i.e. as something that re-produces an object ‘new world’, which is part of the contest over the meaning of the world. This means that the above introduced techniques can only be a first step into the field. As we saw in Chapter 2 in the context of the analysis of Bush’s use of the adjective *global* in the GWOT-discourse, they can help to make patterns visible, which would not be visible without computation – especially if the text corpus is large. As Stubbs (2002: 62) finds, “computer assistance is necessary to allow the human linguist [or, for that matter, the analyst of the omnipresence of *global*] to see the wood for the trees”. The realisation that there was a shift in the use of the adjective *global* in the corpus of Bush’s Public Papers from ‘global terror’ to ‘global war’, and that this shift

ferred to with the respective abstract term. Third, ‘abstract terms’ often encode values. The fourth characteristic that Fraas points out is that ‘abstract terms’ are particularly often part of expert languages. Although terms such as ‘family’, ‘justice’, and ‘identity’ are commonly applied in everyday language, in collective interpretations they also refer to expert discourses, such as sociology, law and psychology. Finally, ‘abstract terms’ can build up prestige. The application of an ‘abstract term’ often indicates a particular degree of education, class or it simply encodes a sense of the *zeitgeist*. 
took place on 30 September 2004 as a consequence of the debate with John F. Kerry (see Figure 2), would not have been visible without the help of concordances and the analysis of co-occurrences. Yet, adopting Fairclough’s assessment of the usefulness of corpus linguistics for critical discourse analysis, these techniques are only “best regarded as part of the preparation from which the real work of analysis and critique can begin” (Fairclough 2015: 21). They help to deal with the corpus, bring to the fore patterns, which would otherwise be invisible and can trigger ideas for the interpretation and assessment. However, they do not constitute findings as such. Regardless of whether quantitative techniques are used, the study of the omnipresence of the adjective *global*, understood as a political phenomenon in the symbolic contest over the meaning of the world, is an interpretative endeavour that is ‘unconventional’, ‘experimental’ and ‘provisional’; as a matter of fact, given its theoretical ground, it is somewhat ‘uncomfortable’, relative to established ‘conventional’ studies in political studies and IR.

**Conclusion**

It is hard to imagine public, political, and social and political scientific discourses today without the adjective *global*. The word is (quasi) omnipresent. But it is not only that *global* is more popular than ever today (up to the point where a politician uses it 47 times in a single public address [Brown 2008a]), the spectrum of its meanings has also expanded remarkably (up to the point where a journalist in an established newspaper describes a restaurant menu as “post-global” [Sifton 2004]). The contemporary *global* is highly polysemic and used with a remarkable variety of meanings, ranging from ‘not national’ and ‘not just Northern’, to ‘exclusively Northern’, ‘worldwide’, ‘ethnically-inspired’ and ‘contemporary’. *Global* has turned into a key linguistic tool, with the help of which social actors grasp the contemporary world.

Yet, while being used enthusiastically, the word *global* and its omnipresence have not triggered a heightened sense of interest, let alone, suspicion among social and political actors and scholars. *Global* is rarely perceived as a “difficult” word, to paraphrase Raymond Williams (1976). As discussed in Chapter 2, occasionally *global* is criticised or dismissed as a fad or labelled as a crucial and problematic ingredient in hegemonic (Northern) discourses; yet, comprehensive engagements with the adjective, which are grounded in systematic critical scrutiny are hard to find.

My project arose at the intersection of the observation that the adjective *global* has come to be omnipresent in public, political and scholarly discourses and the astonishment about the fact that this linguistic development has so far attracted only little attention. I was keen to explore whether there was anything of interest in the omnipresence of the contemporary *global* for scholars beyond the disciplinary realm of linguistics. Is the omnipresence of
global more than a linguistic curiosity? Does it matter? What do actors do when they use the adjective global?

Synthesising the insights that I generated over the course of the previous chapters, in this chapter I provided the answer to these questions. I argued that the omnipresence of the contemporary ‘new word’ global constitutes a discursive re-production of a web of meanings called ‘new world’. With that, the omnipresence of the adjective global is more than a linguistic curiosity; it is a political phenomenon and an ‘unconventional’ object of study. The omnipresence of the adjective global can be seen and studied as an established, in the sense of ‘normal’ and widespread, dimension of the negotiation, the perpetual contest over the meaning of the world. As such, it can be seen as a common dimension of the symbolic production of the world. It is to be acknowledged as ‘political’ because the discursively re-produced ‘new world’ opens and closes possibilities; it brings out subjects and makes some things imaginable and other unimaginable. Particularly intriguing is that it ‘fills’ the influential conceptual space ‘present’ with meaning and implies an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. As such, the study of the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global is always also a study of the actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’, a central aspect of contemporary ‘reflexive modern’ social reality.
7 For Example: The Web of Meanings ‘New World’ in US President Obama’s Public Papers 2013

But there are things we can do right now to accelerate the resurgence of American manufacturing. […] Last year, my administration created our first manufacturing innovation institute. We put it in Youngstown, Ohio, which had been really hard hit when manufacturing started going overseas. And so you had a once-shuttered warehouse, it’s now a state-of-the-art lab where new workers are mastering what’s called 3-D printing, which has the potential to revolutionize the way we make everything. That’s the future. […] And I’m calling on Congress to help us set up 15 institutes: global centers of high-tech jobs and advanced manufacturing around the country.

BARACK OBAMA (2013f)

Over the course of the previous chapters, I conceptualised the omnipresence of the adjective global as a discursive re-production of a web of meanings ‘new world’; I framed it as both a political phenomenon and an ‘unconventional’ object of study. In this present chapter, I present an exemplary exploration of this ‘unconventional’ object of study. I explore the web of meanings ‘new world’ as it is re-produced in US President Barack Obama’s Public Papers of 2013.¹ I chose Obama’s public communication because of my

¹ As I explained in Chapter 2, the Public Papers of the US Presidents include all public messages, statements, speeches, and news conference remarks, as well as documents such as proclamations, executive orders, and similar documents that
general interest in US politics and culture and because the President of the USA is a particularly powerful actor in the contest over the meaning of the world, where ‘powerful’ and ‘actor’ are to be understood in the ‘unconventional’ sense that I sketched in Chapter 6.

My choice of selecting a corpus comprising all Public Papers from the year 2013 is not a theory-driven choice but motivated by research practical considerations. I am interested in taking a synchronic, in-depth approach to a distinct case. A corpus of appearances of the word global in Obama’s public communication over the course of one year is well suited for such an endeavour simply because it is still manageable in the context of an interpretive and detailed exploration.

Inevitably, my exploration of the web of meanings ‘new world’ in Obama’s 2013 Public Papers is a narrow study; as we saw in Chapter 6, ‘unconventional’ studies are by nature ‘narrow’. However, in my concluding outlook, I broaden the perspective. I position my study as the empirical starting point for analyses that could move into three different research directions.

Before embarking on my analysis, it is worth reiterating two interlinked points that I outlined in Chapters 4 and 6.

First, it is important to keep in mind that, in contrast to ‘conventional’ research endeavours, the study of the omnipresence of global understood as a discursive re-production of a web of meanings called ‘new world’ is not about the critical study of the strategic use of language. Nor is it about the study of what a social actor, in this case US President Obama, thinks, means (by global), holds as his worldview, or, as it were, imagines how a scholarly predefined thing ‘new world’ looks. The study of the omnipresence of global is about the exploration of a discursive web of meanings that is brought into play and that is re-produced through the use of the adjective global. As I stressed in Chapter 4 with reference to Keller (in Landwehr 2009: 21) and Landwehr (2009: 20), ‘discourse’, or, for that matter, the web of meanings ‘new world’, is an analytical concept rather than an ontological object that exists in texts and waits to be unveiled through the right choice of data. It is an analytical concept that presumes the understanding of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality, which I sketched in Chapter 6.

For the study of the re-production of the web of meanings ‘new world’ this means that the compilation of a dataset does not face the ‘conventional’ concern of being representative of a predefined idea of the web of meanings ‘new world’. In other words, my (‘random’) choice of a 2013-corpus is not problematic.\(^2\)

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\(^2\) In contrast, see Gerhards’ (2004) approach to ‘discourse’ in a comparative content analytical study of the debate about abortion in the public discourses in Germany and the US.
The second aspect that is worthy of reiteration is that the study of the omnipresence of *global* as a re-production of a web of meanings called ‘new world’ is not about the study of causalities – it is not about ‘why’-questions. Being an ‘unconventional’ object of study, the exploration of the omnipresence of *global* constitutes a scholarly exercise, the aim of which is to ‘make strange’ (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989) the normalised symbolic production of the world. In this sense, it is about ‘how’-concerns. It is about the exploration of a discursive web of meanings, which is brought into play and is reproduced through the use of the adjective *global*, and which constitutes a distinct dimension of the contest over the meaning of the world. It is about the exploration of a discursive web of meanings that re-produces “interpretive dispositions which create certain possibilities and preclude others” (Doty 1993: 298); it is this production that is the focus of analysis. As I pointed out in Chapter 6, what is particularly interesting about the omnipresence of the adjective *global* is that the web of meanings, which it brings out, fills the conceptual space ‘present’ with meaning. Furthermore, as I argued in Chapter 5, it constitutes an actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’. How precisely this actualisation looks is a/the empirical question.

**CORPUS AND RESEARCH STRATEGY**

The theory that I developed in this book is that the omnipresence of the adjective *global* is a discursive re-production of the web of meanings ‘new world’; whenever the word *global* is used this web of meanings is reproduced. Consequently, the appearance of the adjective *global* in a text signals this re-production; it signals the web of meanings ‘new world’. As I suggested in the previous chapter, this makes the compilation of a data corpus relatively straightforward. Capturing the re-production of the web of meanings ‘new world’ requires capturing and analysing the appearance of the word *global*.

In order to establish the data corpus for my example analysis, I used the database The American Presidency Project (URL) and compiled all of US President Obama’s Public Papers from 2013 that contain the adjective *global* at least once. I transformed these documents into simple text files in order to be able to process them with the computer programme AntConc. The dataset comprised 158 documents with a total of 333 appearances of *global*. A concordance approach helped me to find out that 37 of these 333 appearances
es were in the context of set names, such as ‘Global Fund To Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria’ (Obama 2013a), ‘U.S. Global Change Research Program’ (Obama 2013b) and ‘President’s Committee on Global Entrepreneurship’ (Obama 2013c). I did not consider these particular uses of the adjective, which left me with a dataset of 296 appearances of global.

To get an initial sense of my database, I compiled two additional databases. The first contained all Presidential Public Papers from the first appearance of the word global in one of Roosevelt’s Papers until 31 December 2015. The second database comprised all Public Papers of President Obama from 7 January 2009 to 31 December 2015 with the word global. This second database consists of around 1,360 documents with around twice as many uses of the word global. I set up each of the additional databases to get an initial sense of my 2013-database and the word global in it as an indication of the web of meanings ‘new world’.

In the initial stage of my analysis, I gained three general insights. First, through a comparison of the number of documents, which contain global over time, I realised that the web of meanings ‘new world’ intervenes more steadily in Obama’s Public Papers than in any other Presidential Papers before (see Figure 3).

*Figure 3: Percentage of Public Papers of US Presidents that contain the adjective global at least once (4 March 1933 – 31 December 2015)*

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4 Again, I used The American Presidency Project (URL) for each of these databases.
Second, through a calculation of the annual percentage of Public Papers that contain *global* at least once, relative to the total number of Obama’s Public Papers (illustrated in Figure 4), I learned that the spread of the web of meanings ‘new world’ in the 2013-corpus falls around the annual average of 18%.

*Figure 4: Percentage of Obama’s Public Papers that contain the adjective global at least once (7 January 2009 – 31 December 2015)*

Third, through a look at the words, with which the adjective *global* co-occurs, more precisely, which the adjective pre-modifies in all of Obama’s Public Papers, I realised that there is a relatively homogenous picture across the years. In each year, *economy* is the word that is most frequently pre-modified with the adjective *global*, with other ‘economic’ terminology, such as *market/s, marketplace* and *financial*, also ranking relatively highly. I learned that there is nothing extraordinary about my 2013-corpus in this respect. These initial insights gave me a general feeling for my chosen corpus.

In the systematic empirical exploration of my 2013-database, I proceeded in the two steps that I sketched out in Chapter 6. The aim of the first step was to capture the phenomenon of the re-production of the ‘new world’, which unfolds through utterances that contain the adjective *global*. Where can it be found and how does it unfold? This first step focused on the appearance of the word *global* in the corpus as a whole. My unit of analysis was each document as a whole. Through a process of inductive and circular coding, I categorised the documents according to broad themes. My coding
exercise brought out a catalogue of eight categories, which turned out to be related to text genres rather than themes narrowly understood. This catalogue helped me to understand, into which broad thematic discourses and contexts the re-production of the web of meanings called ‘new world’ intervenes in Obama’s 2013 Public Papers.

The aim of the second and main step of my empirical exploration of the 2013-database was to generate insights into the nature of the web of meanings ‘new world’, more specifically. I sought to determine what the reproduced object ‘new world’ looks like and, ultimately, what ‘interpretive dispositions’ it holds, and which possibilities it opens and closes. Rather than each document as a whole, the unit of analysis in this second step was each single utterance, more precisely, each sentence, in which the adjective global appeared. In some instances, I extended the unit of analysis to the paragraph, in which the adjective global appeared. These were instances, in which the sentences were too short to enable me to detect the meanings of the reproduced web of meanings ‘new world’, or in which particularly valuable insights could be gained through this strategy.

In Chapters 5 and 6, I established that the web of meanings ‘new world’ fills the conceptual space ‘present’ with meaning and constitutes an actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’. These theoretical assumptions guided my interpretation in the second step of my analysis; in Chapter 6, I translated them into the general questions: How is the temporal category ‘past’ constructed? How is the temporal category ‘future’ constructed? What kind of an idea of ‘uncertainty’ is constructed? What is the relationship between past, present and future? How are consequences of actions and decisions constructed? What kind of an idea of agency is constructed? How much space does the re-produced web of meanings ‘new world’ open to go beyond modern principles and institutions and to fundamentally reimagine the world?

As per the theoretical premises that I outlined in Chapter 6 and that I partly summarised above in this present chapter, the study of the re-production of the web of meanings ‘new world’ in Obama’s 2013 Public Papers is a scholarly reconstruction of a particular dimension of the (constructed) world. This is reflected in the language I use for presenting my findings below. I describe (my findings of) the web of meanings ‘new world’ as a reality and not as something that is ‘intuitively’ and ‘actively’ constructed by Obama in the texts; for instance, I write ‘the ‘new world’ is xyz’ instead of ‘the ‘new world’ is presented as xyz’.

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The web of meanings ‘new world’ intervenes in contexts as diverse as addresses to a distinct domestic audience, such as at US colleges and US companies, memoranda, joint statements with foreign leaders, State of the Union Addresses and speeches addressed at audiences abroad. In particular, as Figure 5 illustrates, it intervenes in the context of joint statements with foreign leaders, concrete addresses to a distinct domestic audience, as well as the acknowledgement (of achievements) of individual Americans.⁶

Figure 5: The spread of the web of meanings ‘new world’ across the corpus of documents

So, how does the web of meanings ‘new world’ concretely look? Which possibilities does it open or close? What kind of actualisation of the tradition

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⁶ Examples for the latter category are the “Statement by the President on the Resignation of Steven Chu as Secretary of Energy” (Obama 2013h) and the “Remarks on the Nomination of Ernest J. Moniz To Be Secretary of Energy, Gina McCarthy To Be Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and Sylvia Mathews Burwell To Be Director of the Office of Management” (Obama 2013m).
of the ‘national perspective’ do we see? Does it open spaces to reimagine the world beyond modern principles and institutions?

In Chapter 6, we saw that exploring the ‘unconventional’ object of study of the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* is inevitably an interpretative exercise that is a “craft skill, more like bike riding [...] than following the recipe for a mild chicken rogan josh” (Potter 1997: 147). Hence, before presenting the digested outcome of my analysis as a whole, I decided to present a sample interpretation of a sample text extract. The aim of presenting my interpretation of a sample extract is simply to make transparent how I went about my interpretation, i.e. to give but a general sense of the nature of and steps in my interpretative, ‘bike riding’ exercise.

**Sample extract and interpretation**

“And I’m calling on Congress to help us set up 15 institutes: *global* centers of high-tech jobs and advanced manufacturing around the country.” (Obama 2013f; emphasis added)

Given the developed theoretical premises, the exploration of the web of meanings ‘new world’ focuses on the adjective *global*; the strategy is to explore the context, in which the word appears, in order to grasp the web of meanings ‘new world’ that, according to the theory that I developed in this book, is re-produced through utterances that contain the adjective *global*. As an indication of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, the appearance of the word *global* constitutes, *in principle*, an opening of conventional (modern) constructions of the world; as such, it holds the possibility of generating insights into actualisations of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ (ref Chapters 5 and 6). How precisely this opening looks in a distinct case, i.e. what it makes imaginable and desirable and what it favours, or what it rules out as unimaginable and undesirable, as well as, how precisely the actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ looks in this ‘new world’, is a/the empirical question to be tackled in the study of the omnipresence of *global*.

Keeping these theoretical points in mind, I turn to the sample extract above. A first close reading of it brings out three observations. First, the challenges that the US is facing are manageable through established traditional state institutions; in fact, there is a concrete and measurable answer to whatever challenges there are: what is needed is the establishment of “15 institutes [...] around the country” by the Obama Administration. Second, “high-tech jobs and advanced manufacturing” are desirable achievements. Third, decisions in the present and for the future are closely interwoven with the past; this is implied in the expression “advanced manufacturing”, where the word *advanced* implies that there is something ‘old’ that is to be advanced, and where the word *manufacturing*, e.g. as opposed to *production*, is a language that refers to the notion of an industrial setting of a distinct time in the past.
Keeping these three initial observations in mind, I extend my analytical gaze beyond the single sentence, in which the adjective global is used, and look at the paragraph, in which this sentence and the word global are embedded.

Extended sample extract and interpretation

“But there are things we can do right now to accelerate the resurgence of American manufacturing. […] Last year, my administration created our first manufacturing innovation institute. We put it in Youngstown, Ohio, which had been really hard hit when manufacturing started going overseas. And so you had a once-shuttered warehouse, it’s now a state-of-the art lab where new workers are mastering what’s called 3-D printing, which has the potential to revolutionize the way we make everything. That’s the future. […] And I’m calling on Congress to help us set up 15 institutes: global centers of high-tech jobs and advanced manufacturing around the country.” (Obama 2013f; emphasis added)

A close reading of this extended text extract around the word global brings out additional observations. These additional observations broaden the picture and make it more nuanced. The branching of the web of meanings ‘new world’ starts to become apparent. What comes to the fore is a ‘new world’, in which perceived contemporary challenges are to be managed through the innovation of the past. Challenges are to be managed through the adjustment of what has been proven; they are to be managed by building on past experience. The expression “resurgence of American manufacturing” indicates this; it is also implied in the fact that “new workers” have replaced ‘old workers’ in the “once-shuttered warehouse” of the past, which has now been transformed into a “state-of-the art lab”. A belief in progress is driving decisions in the ‘new world’. This is apparent not only in the fact that the goal of building “high-tech jobs” is desirable but also in the glorification of the technology of

“3-D printing, which has the potential to revolutionize the way we make everything. That’s the future.” (ibid.)

These observations allow me now to take another interpretative step forward. I detect three main points. First, the web of meanings ‘new world’ reproduces a strictly modern understanding of time, in which the decisions in the present are about the innovative adjustment of the past in a linear outlook on a (better) future to come. Second, decisions are strictly national decisions, where the national and its institutions are in full control of the future. It is the national, “all around the country”, that is to be built up, grounded in past, again, distinctly national experiences and through concrete and measurable steps, such as the set up of 15 high tech hubs. At the same time, ‘the national’ is subject to and ‘threatened’ by extra-national, nebulous forces. These come, like a second nature, from outside. They are not driven
by identified and identifiable agents; their impact on the national just happens, as “when manufacturing started going overseas”. This is a ‘new world’, then, in which ‘the national’ is re-produced as something distinctly confined. It becomes what it is via natural (external) forces that threaten (jobs in) the inside. Third, in addition to being a re-production of the modern notion of time, the ‘new world’ is also a reproduction of modern principles, such as progress and innovation. This suggests that ‘global risks’ do not exist in the ‘new world’. A technology like 3-D printing constitutes an innovative transformation of past technologies. While being innovative, new and potentially “revolutionising”, this technology is nevertheless something familiar; it is the innovative transformation of what has been there in the past. The reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, an ‘awareness’ of which is implied in the use of the adjective global, does not play a role in this ‘new world’; potential unintended consequences – such as ‘global risks’ associated with the new technology 3-D printing – do not play a role. They are discursively ‘blocked out’ through a normalised reliance on modern conceptions and principles.

Findings: The ‘new world’ in Obama’s 2013 papers

My above interpretation of a concrete sample extract gives a general sense of how my interpretative exercise of exploring the web of meanings ‘new world’ unfolded. At the same time, it also already captures important insights into the ‘new world’ that is re-produced in Obama’s 2013 Public Papers. I now move to present a synthesis of my findings of the analysis of all 296 appearances of the adjective global in the corpus as a whole. This extends the initial observations above and brings out an intriguing picture.

The ‘new world’ that is re-produced in Obama’s 2013 Public Papers is a complex and fascinating web of meanings. At its heart is an actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ that is best labelled, modern and ‘hyper cosmopolitised’. For lack of a better term, the expression ‘modern and ‘hyper cosmopolitised’ is to capture the two central aspects that, in their interplay with each other, shape Obama’s ‘new world’. This is a ‘new world’ that essentially relies on and re-produces modern (market) principles and institutions, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, constitutes a distinct national reality that fuels its own ‘internal (hyper) cosmopolitisation’.

What is intriguing is that one leads to the other and vice versa.

To begin with, in the ‘new world’ that is re-produced in Obama’s 2013 Public Papers ‘the national’ as a unique and distinctly value-loaded unit is dissolved. Places, which are commonly taken as distinct, like “Calcutta or Cleveland” (Obama 2013g), are the same in the ‘new world’. ‘The national’ loses its uniqueness and its distinct value. With this dissolution, a central traditional aspect of ‘the national’, which accounts for its exclusive nature, disappears. The idea of ‘the national’, as it is at the heart of traditional actualisations of the ‘national perspective’, is demystified in the ‘new world’. This demystification and dissolution of ‘the national’ as a unique unit is due
to a distinct ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ that is triggered by the market. In the ‘new world’, which is re-produced in Obama’s 2013 Papers, the market constitutes a second nature that intervenes from the outside and dissolves ‘the national’ as a distinct value-loaded unit. It is the market that makes places like ‘Calcutta and Cleveland’ the same. It accounts for an ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of the US national; more generally, it accounts for a homogenisation of ‘the nationals’.

The kind of dissolution and demystification of ‘the national’ through the distinct ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ that comes along with the market is remarkable and intriguing in itself. What makes it even more remarkable and intriguing, however, is that the demystification of ‘the national’ does not mean that ‘the national’ disappears altogether in the ‘new world’. National units, such as the US, neither disappear nor do they actually lose their exclusiveness as such. The contrary is the case. The ‘new world’ in Obama’s 2013 Papers is a world that is constituted by strictly confined and exclusive national units. It is a highly compartmentalised ‘new world’ that is reproduced in the 2013 Papers. In other words, on the one hand, ‘the national’ loses its uniqueness and distinct national value; on the other hand, however, the ‘new world’ is constituted of exclusive national units.

So how do these demystified national units then look that make up the ‘new world’? To begin with, they are, what one could call, ‘pragmatic’ units. The national units in the ‘new world’ are the product of the potentially threatening market environment that surrounds and brings out these units. They are the product of this nebulous second nature ‘out there’ that might intervene into the national, triggering “manufacturing [...] going overseas” (Obama 2013f). It is a ‘pragmatic’ national and a ‘pragmatic’ market-driven exclusiveness that informs the national units in the ‘new world’, in fact, that brings them out to begin with. This means that although places lose their (national) distinctiveness in the ‘new world’ they do not dissolve into one homogenous whole. The ‘new world’ consists of a set of, in principle, homogenous but strictly autonomous units. The ‘pragmatic’ national units of the ‘new world’ are autonomous units in that they each struggle for survival in the face of the second nature of the market. They gain their shape and existence as units in an individual struggle for survival in the market. In the ‘new world’ the national units form players in a competitive game, in which it is, for instance, a goal to “put our country on a path to win the global race for clean energy jobs” (Obama 2013h), to succeed and, in fact, survive in “the global race for jobs and industries” (Obama 2013i), and to generally “keep our edge and stay ahead in the global race” by figuring out “how to fix our broken immigration system, to welcome that infusion of newness while still maintaining the enduring strength of our laws” (Obama 2013j). In this sense, the ‘new world’ is shaped by an intriguing fueling of national exclusiveness and compartmentalisation, in which ‘the national’ loses its national uniqueness, while, simultaneously, turning into a ‘pragmatic’ exclusive unit. This makes the ‘new world’ a strictly international system. Yet, it
is an international system with homogenous units, which come into being not because of an ‘inherent’ national uniqueness or in the face of an existential threat posed by other national units, but in the course of the struggle with each for survival in the second nature that is the market.

Applying the language and concepts from Chapter 5, the above findings motivate me to conceptualise the ‘new world’ that is re-produced in Obama’s 2013 Public Papers as a ‘hyper cosmopolitised’ reality. In Chapter 5, I established that national societies are always inevitably subject to an ‘internal cosmopolitisation’, which brings out distinct national realities with distinct actualisations of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’. In the case of Obama’s ‘new world’ this distinct national reality is ‘hyper cosmopolitised’. For lack of a better term, I use the expression ‘hyper cosmopolitised’ to highlight that this reality is not only a product of the process of the reality of its ‘internal cosmopolitisation’, which the market brings along, but that it also fuels its own ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ in a distinct and ‘essential’ way. National societies, these ‘pragmatic’ national units in the ‘new world’ fuel their own ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ because, as seen in the quote above, as ‘pragmatic’ exclusive national units in the market they need ‘immigration’ in order to “stay ahead in the global race” (Obama 2013j). In other words, the exclusive ‘pragmatic’ national units in the ‘new world’ depend for their very survival on their opening towards ‘others’. In fact, it is this opening that brings out their distinct exclusive existence to begin with. What we then see is a distinct actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’: it is a ‘hyper cosmopolitised’ one.

And there is more to the ‘new world’ in Obama’s Papers. While being shaped by a ‘hyper cosmopolitised’ actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’, the ‘new world’ is simultaneously shaped by a reliance on and re-production of modern institutions and principles. More precisely, it is shaped by the reliance on and reproduction of particular modern institutions and principles, namely market institutions and principles. As we saw above, important modern political principles, such as the idea of ‘the national’ as it is at the heart of ‘traditional’ actualisations of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’, are questioned and partly disappear in the ‘new world’, yet, modern market institutions and principles are unquestioned. They essentially shape the ‘hyper cosmopolitised’ reality. In fact, it is exactly these particular modern market institutions and principles that produce the ‘hyper cosmopolitised’ ‘pragmatic’ national units to begin with. In this respect, the modern market principles are nothing less of fundamentally inscribed in the ‘hyper cosmopolitised’ national. In short, a ‘new world’ is reproduced in Obama’s 2013 Public Papers, in which modern political principles associated with a ‘traditional’ actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ do not play a guiding role (anymore) in producing ‘the national’ but are replaced by another set of, again, modern institutions and principles, namely the institutions and principles of the market.
This distinct actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ favours and brings out two kinds of political actors. On the one side, the reproduced ‘new world’ favours non-governmental and private political actors. In fact, these actors take a more favorable position in the ‘new world’ than state actors. While state actors are good for “diplomatic initiatives”, “international and nongovernmental organizations and the private sector” are there to strive for “partnerships and enhanced coordination” (Obama 2013l). On the other side, it is responsible individuals, who are desirable and favoured in the ‘new world’. They are favoured because it is individual actors and their personal talent that attract ‘market attention’ and, with that, essentially contribute to the survival of the ‘pragmatic’ national unit in the ‘new world’.

“You know, in a global economy where the best jobs follow talent […] we need to do everything we can to encourage that same kind of passion, make it easier for more young people to blaze a new trail.” (Obama 2013g)

Taken together, the above presented insights into the ‘new world’ that is reproduced in Obama’s 2013 Public Papers bring out a complex and intriguing web of meanings, which holds a mix of openings and closings of possibilities.

To begin with, we see a radical move away from central modern political principles associated with ‘the national’, as it is at the heart of ‘traditional’ actualisations of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’. This holds the possibility of an opening to a radical reimagining of the international world. Yet, simultaneously, this radical opening is discursively ‘tamed’ through the emergence of exclusive ‘pragmatic’ national units that compete with each other and struggle for survival in the context of a market that surrounds it like a second nature. For manifestations of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, such as climate change, this means that they cannot be seen as anything but ordinary problems that are to be solved by potent national agents, grounded in the same practices and principles that brought out these manifestations of the ‘backfiring’ of modernisation in the first place. They are to be solved as part of a race among ‘pragmatic’ national units that is there to be won. Furthermore, the ‘new world’ is a world that essentially builds on modern institutions and principles, namely market institutions and principles. These are inscribed in and are re-produced through the ‘pragmatic’ national units that it brings out, as well as in the political subjects that this ‘new world’ holds as desirable. The re-produced ‘new world’ is shaped by a modern linear notion of time, in which the present is intimately enmeshed with the past and looks optimistically at a ‘shapable’ future. This means that the desirable attributes that political actors need to hold are not different in kind from the past. This is because the market, this second nature out there, is not different in kind; it is different in degree. Consequently, the ‘new world’ requires and favours adjustment of the old,
as well as innovation and an advancement from the past. Radically different steps or attributes of actors are not required and desirable. Attributes, which used to be valued in the past, such as “talent and hard work” (Obama 2013k), are also valued and desirable in the ‘new world’.

In this sense, the ‘new world’ in Obama’s 2013 Papers leaves little room for radical moves and fundamental re-imaginations of the world and the international system beyond the premises of modernity. In one way, modern national (“zombie” [Beck in Grefe 2000]) institutions and principles are normalised and re-produced. They are accredited with agency and are ‘in full control’ in an extra-national environment of the market that, as a second nature, intervenes from the outside. With that, behaviours and institutions that fuel the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation are normalised and symbolically favoured. In such a re-produced ‘new world’ ‘global risks’ do not exist. In fact, in a world with ‘pragmatic’ national units, which are grounded in modern market institutions and principles, ‘global risks’ cannot exist and cannot inform present decisions as this would threaten nothing less but the very existence of these units. The kind of hyper ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ that shapes the ‘new world’ and brings out a ‘hyper cosmopolitised’ national reality essentially opens up the ‘pragmatic’ national units towards ‘others’, however, without opening room for going beyond a national exclusiveness. In the case of the ‘new world’ in Obama’s 2013 Papers, the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ fuels the exclusiveness of the national units.

And yet, the ‘new world’ also holds the possibility of openings. The political subject that is desirable and favoured in the ‘new world’ does not only bring along ‘old’ attitudes but, as we saw above, also needs to be ‘passionate’ about its role in the market. It is expected “to blaze a new trail” (Obama 2013g). It is this individual ‘passion’ that secures the national unit’s place in the market and, with that, ensures its survival. This means, in turn, that while the ‘new world’ is intimately inscribed and locked in a trajectory from the past to the future, which re-produces experiences and favors tested (modern) behaviour and attributes, the idea that ‘passion’ plays a notable role for the survival of the ‘pragmatic’ national units in the market holds the seed of radical openings – in short, openings in the ‘new world’ lie in the distinct subject that is the product of the modern ‘hyper cosmopolitised’ ‘new world’.

CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK

In this chapter, I presented the findings of an exemplary exploration of the re-production of the web of meanings ‘new world’ in Obama’s public communication in 2013. The analysis brings out a complex picture of a ‘modern ‘hyper cosmopolitised’ ‘new world’. Particularly interesting in the ‘new world’ is the dissolution of ‘the national’ as a unique entity and the emer-
gence of ‘pragmatic’, homogenous national units, which are the product of an environment shaped by a market that constitutes a second nature. Furthermore, we saw that the re-produced ‘new world’ relies on and reproduces modern (market) institutions and principles, while simultaneously constituting a distinct national reality that fuels its own ‘internal (hyper) cosmopolitisation’. Intriguingly, each of these aspects fuels the other.

Within the confines of this book, my study of the re-production of the web of meanings ‘new world’ through the use of the adjective global in President Obama’s 2013 communication is intended to serve an exemplary purpose only. It is only intended to provide an initial empirical ground for future research, which may proceed in one of three kinds of directions.

First, my study can serve as the ground for those kinds of studies which, in a way that is similar to my endeavour above, focus on a particular corpus of texts and, with that, broaden our understanding of the omnipresence of the adjective global by adding concrete insights into its empirical existence across political, cultural and institutional fields. As suggested in Chapter 6, additional synchronic but also diachronic studies are imaginable, and comparative studies as well as single cases could be included in this branch of future research.

Second, my findings could serve as the empirical ground for studies that focus explicitly on the discursive re-production of the world and investigate the interplay of the ‘new world’ with other webs of meanings. My, albeit, general grasp of the thematic contexts, in which the re-production of the web of meanings ‘new world’ intervenes in Obama’s Papers, that I presented at the beginning of my analysis, could serve as a basis for such an endeavour. Here, the task would be to connect the ‘new world’ with the other webs of meanings, with which it correlates in a particular text corpus.

The third research direction, in which my study may lead, proceeds deeper into the nature of the empirical exploration of the omnipresence of global as a re-production of the web of meanings ‘new world’. My study can serve as the foundation for future scholarly radicalisations of my own findings. As suggested in Chapter 6, the empirical study of the phenomenon of the omnipresence of global is not only an ‘unconventional’, experimental, and interpretative endeavour but also a ‘provisional’ exercise. It is ‘provisional’ because of the nature of the object ‘new world’, which the adjective global brings out. Referring back to Chapter 5, as an actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’, there is no established language, as yet, to readily grasp the web of meanings ‘new world’. I highlighted this point in general in Chapter 5 when I discussed the ‘provisional’ nature of Ulrich Beck’s project of rethinking how we think about social reality. Given that the reflexive modern world is a both/and-world (as opposed to an either/or-world), the challenge is to grasp linguistically phenomena, such as the reproduction of the web of meanings ‘new world’ and the distinct actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ that it brings out, without ‘taming’ insights through conventional language. While the lack of an ade-
quate, ‘ratified’ ‘reflexive modern’ language, which does not reproduce the notions of linearity and ‘either/or’, is not theoretically problematic, it does tame the potential of empirical insights and inevitably makes them ‘provisional’. We see this in my empirical endeavour above, which does not radically go beyond our existing vocabulary. Yet, as argued in Chapter 5 (see also Selchow 2016a), this is not a shortcoming but an inevitable aspect of such research, which demands a constant rewriting and (linguistic) ‘radicalisation’, with the aim of eventually establishing a ‘reflexive modern’ language, i.e. a language that, paraphrasing the earlier quoted Bronner (1995: 68), is able to capture the world, in which we live, rather than re-producing “the [‘national’] one in which we think.”
I argued in this book that the (quasi) omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* is more than a linguistic curiosity. It is a political phenomenon and, as such, a valuable, albeit ‘unconventional’ object of study for scholars outside the linguistics discourse. I argued that the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global* constitutes the discursive re-production of a web of meanings that is best labelled ‘new world’. As such, it constitutes a distinct dimension of the enduring contestation over the meaning of the world. Given the word’s current popularity and unscrutinised existence, and given the nature of the web of meanings ‘new world’ that it brings out, this dimension is not just a minor matter but plays an important, hence, research-worthy role in the contemporary symbolic struggle over the meaning of the world.

This book presented my exploration of what was behind the curious omnipresence of the adjective *global* in contemporary public, political and academic discourses. It sketched a research endeavour that is not ‘conventional’. At home in the political studies and IR discourse, my curiosity for the adjective *global* forced me to start on a blank field, without being able to set an anchor into a predefined research environment and without being able to talk to a clearly confined audience. This was because my exploration of the omnipresence of the adjective *global* could not start conventionally on a pre-set idea of what the word *global* means, without contributing to the very phenomenon that I set out to explore. This, meant that my exploration of the omnipresence of *global* was a risky endeavour. At the outset, I did not only not know what I would find, as probably should always be the case in academic knowledge production, but I also did not know whether or not the exploration of the omnipresence of *global* would bring out insights that would be valuable for the political studies and IR scholarship to begin with.

In this sense, the study presented in this book does not only provide insights into the curious omnipresence of the contemporary adjective *global*.Uncertain times demand an unconventional analysis.

**DAVID CAMPBELL** (1998[1992]: IX)
It also constitutes a contribution to the ‘unconventional’ scholarship at the margins of the political studies and IR discourse. It contributes to this scholarship in that it is a case of an exploration of an ‘unconventional unconventional’ path.

“Uncertain times demand an unconventional analysis,” this is the suggestion with which David Campbell ([1992]1998: ix) opens his seminal ‘unconventional’ study of US foreign policy, identity and danger, threats and security. Indeed, more and more scholars in political studies, IR and beyond position themselves at the margins of their disciplines and express the need to find new ways of dismantling and grasping the complexity of contemporary times – like sociologist Ulrich Beck (2006: 74), who calls “for new thinkers outside the academic guild”, who extend the “rails on which standard academic […] inquiry runs into new regions”. What strikes me as a fruitful step in regard to explorations of ‘new regions’ is not only to find and apply ‘unconventional’ approaches to pre-existing problems and objects of study but to follow an ‘unconventional unconventional’ path and take the risk of searching for ‘new’ (politically loaded) objects of study. An example of such an object is the omnipresence of the adjective global, which I brought to life in this book as a political phenomenon, the study of which enables novel scholarly interventions into “conventional understandings or established practices” (Campbell 2007: 219).
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»Das Buch [ist] nicht nur eine genaue Analyse des geplanten Abkommens, sondern auch der Rolle und Funktion des EU-Binnenmarktes und damit eine implizite Kritik an so mancher Abstrusität des TTIP-Widerstandes, die man nur dringend zur Lektüre empfehlen kann.«


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