Suárez, Mauricio (2006) Experimental realism defended: how inference to the most likely cause might be sound. Technical Report 01/06. Contingency And Dissent in Science Project, CPNSS, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
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On a purely epistemic understanding of experimental realism, manipulation affords a particularly robust kind of causal warrant, which is – like any other warrant – defeasible. I defend a version of Nancy Cartwright’s inference to the most likely cause, and I conclude that this minimally epistemic version of experimental realism is a coherent, adequate and plausible epistemology for science.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||Copyright © Mauricio Suárez 2006. LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk>) of the LSE Research Online website.|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Philosophy of science, realism, new experimentalism, causal inference, NOA|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Sets:||Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)|
|Identification Number:||Technical Report 01/06|
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