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Real scrutiny or smoke and mirrors: the determinants and role of resolutions of national parliaments in European Union affairs

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Accepted Version

Real Scrutiny or Smoke and Mirrors: The Determinants and Role of Resolutions of National Parliaments in European Union Affairs

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Abstract

The role of national parliaments in scrutinizing their governments in European Union affairs has been at the forefront of debates on democratic accountability in the EU for the past decade. Resolutions are the legislative instruments most clearly associated with government control. This article finds that party political strategies, and especially the different constraints and incentives for mainstream/government parties and issue entrepreneurs on Europe, are the most important factors determining the activity of national parliaments in the form of resolutions on EU affairs. Issue Entrepreneurs are parties which are Eurosceptic and for which Europe is salient. Motions initiated by issue entrepreneurs are numerous but limited to criticizing the government and contain little technical detail, while the resolutions of mainstream government parties mostly support the government's position. Resolutions and motions in EU affairs are thus rather used as an instrument of 'position taking' than as a form of government control, but could still help to foster accountability by bringing EU issues and government policy to the citizens' attention.

Keywords: Euroscepticism, Issue Entrepreneurs, National Parliaments, Parliamentary Scrutiny, Resolutions

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Introduction

Can national parliaments help to solve the accountability deficit in the European Union? Besides plenary debates and oral and written questions, resolutions are the most important tool of parliaments in European Union (EU) affairs, and they are seen as the instrument most clearly targeted at government control. This form activity is especially pertinent given that the transfer of powers from the national to the European level has weakened the power of national parliaments. This process is termed 'de-parliamentarisation' (Maurer and Wessels, 2001; Moravcsik, 1994). Analysing the factors driving parliamentary activity in the form of resolutions on EU affairs is an important step in the evaluation of the overall contribution of national parliaments to democratic accountability in the EU.

The main argument of this article is that party political strategies, and especially the different constraints and incentives for mainstream/government parties and issue entrepreneurs (Eurosceptic parties for which Europe is salient)

are very important factors determining the activity of national parliaments in EU affairs. The strategies impact both 'resolutions' adopted by the parliaments as well as 'motions' - statements of party groups which are not agreed upon by the parliaments. However, different strategic incentives and constraints of both mainstream parties and issue entrepreneurs make it unlikely that both motions and resolutions are used to actively control the government. Instead, they are more likely to be employed as instruments for position taking.

The activity of national parliaments in EU affairs is responsive to public opinion on the EU, to which different types of parties react in opposite ways. Government parties are responsible for the majority of successful resolutions. The resolutions initiated by these parties are generally very supportive of the government's position and so cannot be regarded as 'critical' scrutiny. By contrast, issue entrepreneurs are a driving force with regard to the activity in the form of motions. 'Issue entrepreneurs' are parties that are far removed from the mainstream of the parliament on their EU position (Hobolt and De Vries, 2015: 3). In particular, more motions are initiated by issue entrepreneurs if the public is Eurosceptic. This article also shows that motions initiated by issue

entrepreneurs generally have longer preambles and shorter operational parts, arguably indicating that these parties pay more attention to general political points instead of technical scrutiny.

The findings of the article thus show that political parties use resolutions in EU affairs rather as instruments for position taking than for scrutiny of the government. It might thus be necessary to rethink the extent to which national parliaments individually or collectively can increase democratic accountability in the European Union by controlling their governments.

Resolutions and the Different Parliamentary Functions in EU Affairs

In the last two decades, the role of national parliaments in EU affairs has received increased attention by practitioners and academics alike in the context of a perceived loss of power of national parliaments due to European integration which arguably could not be fully compensated by an increase in power of the European Parliament (Maurer and Wessels, 2001; Moravcsik,

1994). To counteract this tendency, European Affairs Committees (EACs) have been established in all member states.

For the most part, the academic literature has focused on compiling elaborate rankings of the formal powers of national parliaments (Maurer and Wessels, 2001; Karlas, 2011; Winzen, 2012) and on analysing the determinants of variation in these formal powers (Raunio, 2005; Winzen, 2013). Only rather recently has a literature emerged that focuses on the actual activity of national parliaments in the form of debates and resolutions (e.g. Auel and Raunio, 2014; Auel et al., 2015; Rauh, 2015; Wendler, 2014).

Parliamentary activities in EU affairs broadly correspond to two categories of functions of parliaments (Raunio and De Wilde, 2015: 3). Based on the work of Packerham (1973), Norton divided the functions of parliament as citizen- and government-related (1993). Generally, the function of government control is seen as 'scrutiny' in the stricter sense and it is also this function that received the most scholarly attention (Raunio and De Wilde, 2015: 4). Of all forms of parliamentary activity in EU affairs, the literature sees resolutions as the clearest embodiment of 'scrutiny' in the sense of government control (Auel,

Rozenberg and Tacea, 2015: 291; Finke and Dannwolf, 2013: 739). Resolutions and motions are directed at the government and often have a rather technical language. By contrast, parliamentary debates and oral questions are usually seen as more related to the communication function given their higher public visibility to voters (Auel et al., 2015: 291; Raunio, 2011: 306).

However I argue that one cannot expect that motions and resolutions are necessarily used for 'scrutiny' in the sense of government control given the strategic incentives and constraints faced by different types of parties in initiating them. Resolutions and motions are more likely to be used as instruments for position taking, as explained in the next section. Additional theoretical elaborations can be found in the Online appendix.

Resolutions as Instruments for Position Taking

Party political strategies are likely to determine the quantity and content of parliamentary activity in EU affairs and consequently the extent to which

national parliaments can help to foster democratic accountability in the EU. The most important distinction which can be made between different parties with regard to their strategies in EU affairs is the one between mainstream parties and issue entrepreneurs, which are faced with different incentives and constraints for becoming active. Overall, both motions and resolutions by issue entrepreneurs and government parties are more likely to be used as instruments for position taking rather than for government control. Issue entrepreneurs have a strong incentive to criticize the government's policy and to relate it to a general criticism of the EU as such in the light of public Euroscepticism. By contrast, it is in the interest of government parties to defend the government's position publicly without emphasizing technical detail.

Parties which lose out in the political process are likely to introduce and champion new issues to change the dynamics of competition in the political system (Carmines and Stimson, 1986). In recent decades, the most important issues of this kind have been European integration and immigration (Van de Wardt et al., 2014: 987). Importantly, issue entrepreneurs have a larger 'framing distance' towards all other parties compared to mainstream parties (Van der

Wardt, 2015: 841). Their positions on the issue in question are therefore very different from the political mainstream. In the case of parliamentary engagement in EU affairs, this means that the chances of motions by issue entrepreneurs being accepted by parliament are very low since they are opposition parties without a realistic prospect of joining the government in the overwhelming majority of cases.¹

Therefore, it is likely that the objective of their motions is not to influence the government's position and, indirectly, policy at the European level. Rather, issue entrepreneurs can be expected to draw attention to their particular position on a topic related to European Affairs. If they are more active on the topic of Europe, voters might come to regard them as more competent on the issue (Budge, 2015: 767). Moreover, issue entrepreneurs might want to expose – from their perspective – controversial or unpopular positions of the government on the matter, or to highlight and deepen divisions within mainstream parties by using Europe as a 'wedge issue' (Van de Wardt et al., 2014: 986). Parties which adopt an issue entrepreneurial strategy have a lot of

electoral benefit from being perceived as active in EU affairs but face very little cost.

Therefore, it is hypothesized that parties that are issue entrepreneurs initiate more motions on Europe. However, given that they are opposition parties, these motions are likely to be mostly unsuccessful. Because of their negative position on the EU, their motions are also likely to be very critical. The focus of these motions is rather to communicate the issue entrepreneur's position to voters and to expose divisions within mainstream parties rather than actual government control.

If parties do not care deeply about Europe or are generally accommodating of it but are faced with a Eurosceptic electorate, Members of Parliament (MPs) might not want to be perceived as active in EU affairs by issuing resolutions. This is because they face potentially high costs by investing time and resources in an issue on which they are likely to have a different position compared to their voters if the latter are Eurosceptic, given that elites tend to be more pro-European than citizens in most European countries (Hooghe, 2003: 296). Moreover, in contrast to issue entrepreneurs, mainstream

parties are frequently divided on EU affairs (Gabel and Scheve, 2007: 38). Hence, they have relatively little to gain from investing time and resources in European affairs with regard to electoral benefits, and run the risk of issue entrepreneurs exposing their dividedness on the issue or highlighting how the elite position is at odds with the preferences of the electorate. When mainstream parties do issue resolutions, their main purpose might be to show support for the government and to strengthen its negotiation position at the European level. These resolutions are generally very likely to be approved by parliament. Again, the main purpose of their resolutions is not scrutiny in the narrow sense of the term, but rather strategic support for the government and of communicating its position. This leads to the following hypotheses:

H1a: Parties that are issue entrepreneurs issue more resolutions on Europe than mainstream parties.

H1b: The resolutions initiated by issue entrepreneurs are on average more critical towards the government than the resolutions of mainstream parties.

The precise incentives and constraints of parties to become active in EU affairs are likely to be shaped by public opinion. Eurosceptic voters expect their agents to be more assertive. By contrast, when there is a permissive consensus in favour of the EU, MPs might have fewer incentives to invest their time and resources in scrutiny. This might also hold true for the number of resolutions issued per month. Moreover, it can be hypothesized that the resolutions tend to be more critical if the public is Eurosceptic.

Public Euroscepticism is likely to influence the activity of both issue entrepreneurs and government parties. Research has demonstrated that parties' positions on EU affairs are relevant to the choices of voters – there is 'issue voting' with regard to EU affairs even though it is conditional on the salience of the topic and the structure of partisan conflict (De Vries, 2007: 379). Governments react to public opinion both in the form of promises and actions

(Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2012: 323). When public Euroscepticism is strong, issue entrepreneurs are likely to become more active in EU affairs and initiate motions more frequently in order to show the electorate that they are in line with their more Eurosceptic preferences. On the other hand, government and mainstream parties are likely to issue fewer resolutions when faced with public Euroscepticism, since they overwhelmingly hold pro-European positions.

H2a: Issue entrepreneurs initiate more resolutions on EU affairs if the public is Eurosceptic, while mainstream parties issue fewer resolutions.

H2b: Parties issue more critical resolutions towards the government if the public is Eurosceptic.

With regard to the content of resolutions, it is hypothesized that issue entrepreneurs will focus more on general criticism of the European Union instead of actual scrutiny in the form of detailed policy suggestions. It is in their interest to focus more on these general points as they generate more public

attention. Moreover, these parties often might not have a well-developed platform on technical EU policies. As a proxy for the relationship between general statements and actual policy prescriptions, the ratio between the preamble and the operational part of motions and resolutions is employed, as explained in more technical detail in the Online appendix.

H3: Resolutions initiated by issue entrepreneurs will have a lower ratio of the operational part to the preamble.

Data and Method

I have chosen the following countries as cases for the analysis: Austria, Germany, France, Spain and the UK. The 'new' member states which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 were excluded given the fact that their scrutiny systems were still significantly in flux in the period of analysis. Likewise, the party systems in these countries have long been characterized by periods of instability and volatility (Bakke and Sitter, 2005). The exclusion of these

countries certainly limits the generalizability of the findings to some extent. Nevertheless, the countries analysed in this article represent an excellent institutional spread and a high variation regarding the key independent variables of the study, most notably public Euroscepticism and the existence of strong Eurosceptic parties.

In contrast to other parliamentary activities such as questions or debates, defining what constitutes a motion or a resolution is not straightforward. *Black's Law Dictionary* defines a resolution as 'The determination or decision, in regard to its opinion or intention, of a deliberative or legislative body (...)' (Black's Law Dictionary, 2014). The exact form a resolution takes differs between parliaments. However, generally they are the most direct and formal way in which parliament or a party group (or even a group of MPs) can express their opinion on an EU legal act and/or the government's treatment of and position on the latter. While 'resolutions' are thus agreed on by parliaments, statements by party groups that did not gain majority support are referred to as 'motions' in this article.

Which documents are counted as resolutions and motions is an important decision that has to be the result of careful consideration. For the purpose of this article, I include only instruments that are potentially binding, and had the potential to directly influence the position of the government. All resolutions and motions from the relevant categories have been collected for the time period studied here.²

Three properties of parliamentary motions and resolutions in EU affairs are analysed in this article as dependent variables. As a first step, their quantity is examined, i.e. the number of resolutions according to the above definition in a given month. As a second step, the content or 'quality' of these statements is analysed. More specifically, the extent to which the resolutions are critical or supportive of the government is investigated. For this purpose, the motions and resolutions were hand-coded by two coders on a scale from -2 (very critical) to 2 (very supportive).³ As a third step, the relative length of the preamble and the operational part of a document is used as a proxy for how detailed the mandate is for the government is analysed. This measure was inspired by the work of Huber and Shipan who use the relative length of legal documents as a proxy for

the level of discretion a bureaucratic agent has in the implementation of legislation (Huber and Shipan, 2002: 73).

As predictor variables, the issue entrepreneurship score of the parties was included. It is operationalized as following (Hobolt and De Vries, 2012: 256): The difference of the mean party position on Europe of all parties in parliament and the party position of each respective party is multiplied by the EU salience score of each party. ⁴ The position and salience scores are taken from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. Popular Euroscepticism is operationalized as the number of respondents stating their country's membership to the European Union was 'a bad thing' minus those stating that it was 'a good thing' in the Eurobarometer survey (Eurobarometer, 2012).

As control variables, the left/right position for all parties in parliament was included, as well as the extent to which parties are internally divided on Europe, also based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015). I also include the strength of formal scrutiny powers based on Winzen (2012) and whether a country held the Council presidency in a given month. Moreover, I

control for the seat share of a party as a proxy for the resources it can apply to drafting and issuing resolutions.

Missing values were filled in using linear interpolation. There are overall 3641 non-missing month/party observations for 1977 individual motions/resolutions covering the time period the mid/late 1990s until 2012. Resolutions are frequently sponsored jointly by more than one party. In these cases, I count the resolutions separately for each party. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table A2 in the Online appendix.

Results and Analysis

The unit of analysis for the quantity of resolutions is the number of resolutions per party per month. A multilevel count model was applied to assess the overall number of resolutions by month (Models 1, 3 and 5). A negative binominal model was chosen over a Poisson model since the overall variance of the resolutions is significantly larger than their mean (Rabe-Hesketh

and Skrondal, 2012: 696). In order to analyse the valence of the resolutions, the mean of the valence scores for all resolutions issued in one month was used as the dependent variable for a multilevel linear regression (Models 2, 4 and 6). To account for autocorrelation, I include a lagged dependent variable in all models (Becks and Katz, 1995) as well as a monthly time trend variable. All models in this article use random intercepts for the different countries and parties, but the results also hold for fixed effects models (see the Online appendix for this specification and additional robustness checks). Table 1 shows the results of the analysis.

[TABLE 1]

When analysing unsuccessful motions and successful resolutions together, it becomes clear that issue entrepreneurs are indeed prone to more activity in the form of resolutions, as the results of Model 1 show. The coefficient for the effect of issue entrepreneurship score on the number of resolutions is significant at the 0.01 level and in the expected direction (0.15),

confirming Hypothesis 1a. Substantially, on average an opposition party with a very high issue entrepreneurship score of ten (such as the Austrian Freedom Party) initiates 2.3 resolutions per month, compared to 0.27 resolutions for a mainstream opposition party with an issue entrepreneurship score of -4 (for example, the French Parti Socialiste) at an Euroscepticism score of 0.

The average monthly valence of all resolutions issued by a party in a given month decreases by 4% for a one-unit increase on the issue entrepreneurship score (Model 2). Resolutions initiated by issue entrepreneurs are thus more critical than those initiated by pro-European parties, confirming Hypothesis 1b. Not surprisingly, government participation has the opposite effect. On average, the monthly valence of all resolutions initiated by a governing party in a given month is 1.33 points higher than for an opposition party. The formal powers of a parliament seem to have a positive effect on the number of resolutions being issued, as does the seat share of a party.

An interesting interaction effect with the issue entrepreneurship score of a party and public Euroscepticism can be observed, confirming Hypothesis 2a. When the issue entrepreneurship score of a party is high, Euroscepticism seems

to have an increasingly positive effect on the number of resolutions, i.e. the higher the issue entrepreneurship score of a party, the more resolutions will be issued when the public is Eurosceptic. As shown in Figure 1, for parties with a low issue entrepreneurship score (i.e. parties that are pro-European and for which the EU is not a salient topic) an increase in public Euroscepticism is associated with fewer motions on EU affairs being issued. Thus, for a party with an issue entrepreneurship score of -4 (e.g. the Parti Socialiste) a one-unit increase in public Euroscepticism is associated with approximately 1.5 resolution less being issued per month. By contrast, for a party with a high issue entrepreneurship score of 10 (such as the FPÖ), an increase in public Euroscepticism is associated with 4 additional resolutions for a one-unit increase in public Euroscepticism. MPs might want to signal to their Eurosceptic voters that they take the task of scrutinizing the government on EU affairs seriously.

[FIGURE 1]

As explained above, it is important to distinguish between those resolutions which were actually agreed on by parliament and those which were initiated by a party group but not actually adopted ('motions'). When only analysing the resolutions that parliament agreed on it becomes clear that public Euroscepticism is associated with fewer resolutions being issued. However, the issue entrepreneurship score of a party and its interaction with public Euroscepticism does not have a significant effect (Model 3, Figure 2). By contrast, the government status of a party seems to have a significant and positive effect on the number of resolutions, as does their share of seats in the legislature. On average, a government party issues around three times more resolutions per month than an opposition party. It becomes clear that for the number of resolutions actually agreed on by parliament, the government status of a party is the most important determinant. Large government parties with a high seat share tend to issue more successful resolutions, most likely given their more extensive resources.

[FIGURE 2]

It is interesting to note that successful resolutions are significantly more positive if a country has the Council Presidency – potentially, parties supporting the government want to strengthen its position and priorities during this time (Model 4). Moreover, the formal powers of a parliament seem to play a role in influencing the valence of successful resolutions. Parties in parliaments with stronger formal powers tend to issue resolutions that are more supportive of the government. A potential explanation for this could be that strong coordination processes behind closed doors mean that lines of conflict are resolved before they become public. Alternatively, strong scrutiny powers could lead the government to anticipate potential criticism by the parliament more seriously, so that it received more positive resolutions from the party groups

A different picture emerges when analysing only the motions that were not successful in the legislature. As Model 5 shows, the coefficient for the issue entrepreneurship score is significant (0.14) and positive at the 0.01 level. The effect for government participation is negative, whereas the effect for the formal

powers of parliaments is positive. Again, an interaction effect with public Euroscepticism can be observed, confirming Hypothesis 2a. As for the substantive effect sizes, for a party with an issue entrepreneurship score of -4 (Parti Socialiste), a one-unit increase in Euroscepticism is associated with around 1 resolution less per month being issued, while it is associated with an increase of approximately 2 resolutions for a party with an issue entrepreneurship score of around 10, such as the FPO (Figure 3). It becomes clear that government parties issue significantly fewer unsuccessful motions. Strong formal powers and holding the Council Presidency are also associated with a larger number of motions being issued.

[FIGURE 3]

For unsuccessful resolutions, the issue entrepreneurship score of a party has a small but significant impact on the average monthly valence: a one unit increase on the issue entrepreneurship score leads is associated with a decrease

in the average monthly valence of 3% (Model 6). As in Model 2, the coefficient is positive for government status.

Finally, the extent to which the ratio of the preamble to the main operational part of a motion differs between parties was analysed (Model 7). The log-transformed ratio of the length of the preamble of a motion and its operational part is specified as the dependent variable for a multilevel linear regression. Issue entrepreneurs initiate motions with longer preambles and shorter operational parts – potentially because they bring up more general, politicized points that are usually placed in the preamble and they are less concerned with actual ‘technical’ scrutiny, which takes place in the operational part. A one-unit increase in the issue entrepreneurship score is associated with the ratio of preamble and operational part to being 5 % smaller for unsuccessful motions, confirming Hypothesis 3. Examples of motions by issue entrepreneurs and mainstream parties that demonstrate the different structures of the documents are reproduced in the Online appendix together with additional elaborations.

Discussion and Conclusion

This article suggests that the use of resolutions and motions by national parliaments in EU affairs is complex and overall not focused on the actual control of the government. Rather, resolutions and motions can rather be seen as instruments for position taking. The presence of issue entrepreneurs and, generally, the position of parties on European integration play an important role in determining parliamentary activity.

However, there is a significant difference between resolutions agreed upon by parliament and motions that did not gain majority support. The successful resolutions are initiated by large government parties in the vast majority of cases. By contrast, when analysing the motions which failed to reach a majority in parliament separately, it became clear that issue entrepreneur parties are overwhelmingly responsible for these documents. Issue entrepreneurs are generally very critical of the government's position. Moreover, interaction effects between the presence of issue entrepreneurs and public Euroscepticism can be observed. For issue entrepreneurs, public

Euroscepticism leads to more resolutions being initiated, while the opposite is the case for mainstream parties.

However, as the analysis of their structure and content shows, motions initiated by issue entrepreneurs are mostly concerned with general, politicized and Eurosceptic statements. The operational parts of the documents are mostly short and contain little detail. Therefore, it might be argued that there is little substantive scrutiny, i.e. parliaments might fail to make an impact on the 'bread and butter' issues of EU politics which they could otherwise influence.

It seems that motions and resolutions are actually rather used as instruments of position taking – supporting the government in the case of government parties, criticising the government in the case of issue entrepreneurs – rather than a form of actual government control, which was what they are intended for. This might limit the extent to which the activity of national parliaments can increase democratic accountability in the European Union. However, they still have the potential to draw citizens' attention to EU issues and make them aware of government policy.

As mentioned above, the patterns of resolutions in domestic affairs might be different given the more complex strategic situation opposition and government parties are faced with in a multilevel system, as well as the respective issue dynamics in different policy areas. Future studies could thus compare resolutions in European and domestic matters as well as in different issue areas.

Notes

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1. The cases of BZO and FPO as exceptions to this rule are discussed in more detail on pp. 11-12 of the Online appendix (Figures A1 and A2).
 2. See Table A1 on p. 1 of the Online appendix for the different instruments and the criteria for selecting them.
 3. The inter-coder reliability score Krippendorff's α reaches 0.687 when a five category Lickert-type scale is used. When the scale is collapsed to three categories from -1 to 1, α reaches 0.910. The Online appendix contains more details on the coding scheme (pp. 4-6).
 4. See pp. 7-8 of the Online appendix for more details on the operationalization of the IVs.

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Tables and Figures




Figure 1. Marginal Effect of Euroscepticism on the Number of all Resolutions depending on the Issue Entrepreneurship Score.




Figure 2. Marginal Effects of Euroscepticism on the Number of Successful Resolutions depending on the Issue Entrepreneurship Score.




Figure 3. Marginal Effect of Euroscepticism on the Number of Unsuccessful Motions) depending on the Issue Entrepreneurship Score.

Table 1. Results of the Regression Analysis

	(1) All	(2) Sentiment All	(3) Successful	(4) Sentiment Successful	(5) Unsuccessful	(6) Sentiment Unsuccessful	(7) Ratio
Issue Entrepreneur	0.15*** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.14*** (0.03)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.02)
Internal Dissent	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.17 (0.15)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.16* (0.10)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Left Right	- 0.06*** (0.02)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.08** (0.02)
Formal Rights	0.87*** (0.32)	0.39** (0.18)	0.59 (0.45)	1.67*** (0.20)	0.94** (0.39)	0.18 (0.17)	0.35* (0.21)
Government	-0.13 (0.10)	1.33*** (0.15)	1.06*** (0.17)	-0.06 (0.20)	-1.46*** (0.13)	0.40*** (0.15)	-0.10 (0.20)
Presidency	0.05 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.13)	-1.02*** (0.27)	1.77*** (0.55)	0.36** (0.14)	0.11 (0.09)	0.27* (0.16)
Seat Share	0.99*** (0.36)	0.98* (0.50)	2.99*** (0.83)	0.55 (0.44)	0.40 (0.42)	0.32 (0.36)	0.04 (0.30)
Euroscepticism	-0.16 (0.91)	0.40 (0.40)	-2.66* (1.57)	-0.47 (0.42)	0.19 (1.05)	0.06 (0.32)	0.37 (0.47)
Euroscepticism x Issue Entrepreneur	0.58*** (0.10)		0.11 (0.23)		0.58*** (0.12)		
Euroscepticism x Internal Dissent	-0.05		0.23		-0.15		

	(0.24)		(0.41)		(0.27)		
Month	0.00***	-0.00	0.01**	0.00	0.00***	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Lag All	0.14***						
	(0.03)						
Lag Sentiment All		0.22***					
		(0.05)					
Lag Successful			0.13***				
			(0.05)				
Lag Sentiment Successful				-0.01			
				(0.06)			
Lag Unsuccessful					0.10**		
					(0.04)		
Lag Sentiment Unsuccessful						0.50***	
						(0.06)	
Lag Ratio							0.03
							(0.04)
Constant	-	-0.76	-8.01***	-2.32***	-5.24***	-0.46	-0.63
	4.76***						
	(0.66)	(0.59)	(1.03)	(0.87)	(0.81)	(0.48)	(0.64)
Observations	3611	435	3611	158	3611	234	572
Countries	5	5	5	5	4	4	4
Parties	26	20	26	14	26	14	16

Note: Models 1, 3 and 5 multilevel negative binomial regression. Models 2, 4, 6 and 7: multilevel linear regression. Random intercepts for countries and parties. ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1.