Kentaro Fujikawa

Drifting between accommodation and repression: explaining Indonesia’s policies toward its separatists

Article (Accepted version)
(Refereed)

Original citation:
Fujikawa, Kentaro (2017) Drifting between accommodation and repression: explaining Indonesia’s policies toward its separatists. The Pacific Review. ISSN 0951-2748
DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2017.1293713

© 2017 Informa UK Limited

This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/69388/
Available in LSE Research Online: March 2017

LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.

This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it.
Drifting between Accommodation and Repression:
Explaining Indonesia’s Policies toward Its Separatists

corresponding author: Kentaro Fujikawa
affiliation: London School of Economics and Political Science
postal address: AG1 Coopers Court
10-14 Maplin Street, London E3 4SX
United Kingdom
e-mail address: k.fujikawa@lse.ac.uk
Abstract

A central government facing separatist activities adopts various policies to respond to them. In some cases, the government represses them harshly, while in other cases, it tries to accommodate the separatists’ demands. We currently have two strands in the literature to understand which policies are implemented by the government: the reputation theory and the cost-benefit calculation model. However, neither of them is sufficient to explain Indonesia’s policies toward its separatists in Aceh and Papua following democratization. Indonesia’s policies toward separatists have been drifting between accommodation and repression. To understand these policy shifts, this paper emphasizes the importance of the inner workings of the central government, introducing two variables: the preferences of national leaders and the existence of veto players. This paper demonstrates that these perspectives are essential in order to fully explain the Indonesian government’s policies toward its separatists.

keywords:
separatism, reputation, conflict resolution, Aceh, Papua
1 Introduction

Resolving wars of self-determination has become a critical task for international society as conflicts, such as those in ex-Yugoslavia and Chechnya have attracted attention from all over the world. While scholars generally suggest that wars of self-determination are very difficult to settle (Walter 2009), some of these wars have ended peacefully, as central governments have offered substantial concessions to separatists. In other cases, however, states repress separatists harshly without accommodation.

We currently have two strands in the literature to explain these diverse government responses: the reputation theory and the cost-benefit calculation model. According to the reputation theory, multi-ethnic states are unlikely to concede to separatists because concession prompts other ethnic groups to demand the same status. States with a small number of ethnic groups are more likely to accommodate separatists than multi-ethnic states (Toft 2003; Walter 2006, 2009). In contrast, the cost-benefit calculation model expects concessions to take place if the cost of war is high (Wittman, 1979; Mason, Weingarten and Fett, 1999; Zartman 2000; Bapat, 2005).

In this regard, Indonesia’s policies toward its separatists are puzzling. From 1999 to 2001, President Wahid tried hard to accommodate separatist demands in Aceh and Papua. Between 2001 and 2004, President Megawati was unwilling to concede much to the separatists. And then, President Yudhoyono peacefully ended separatist warfare in Aceh in 2005 by significant concession, while he was not enthusiastic about settling Papuan separatism. It seems that Indonesia’s policies toward its separatists have been drifting between accommodation and repression. The reputation theory lacks explanatory power in this case because this theory generally predicts that multi-ethnic
states, such as Indonesia, do not concede to separatists. Indonesian policies do not match the cost-benefit calculation model, either. Yudhoyono sought peace talks with the Acehnese even before the tsunami in December, 2004, when the cost from the Aceh war was probably at its lowest since 1999. How can we explain these differing policies?

To understand the different policies of the successive presidents of Indonesia, this paper emphasizes the importance of the inner workings of central government. It introduces two variables to explain governmental policy shifts: the preferences of national leaders and the existence of veto players. Firstly, by carefully reanalyzing the results of Walter’s (2009, Chapter 3) experiment on reputation building, this paper contends that there are two types of people by nature: one who acts based on the short-term cost-benefit calculation, and one who acts based on the long-term cost-benefit calculation. Their preferences are different. The former tends to accommodate separatists if the cost from separatist warfare is high. In contrast, committing to reputation building, the latter tends to fight separatists without accommodation, fearing concession will lead to greater demands from other ethnic groups. This paper assumes that among politicians, the preference of national leaders, such as the president or prime minister, affects policies on separatists the most.

Secondly, this paper incorporates the idea of veto players, who can prevent policies from changing. The national leader’s preferences do not always directly and entirely dominate policy course. Because a central government is not a unitary actor, veto players might exist inside central government (Tsebelis 2002), preventing the national leader from enforcing their preferred policies. This paper demonstrates that considering the preference of national leaders and the existence of veto players is imperative to fully explaining the policy shifts of the Indonesian government.
This paper proceeds as follows; after introducing the reputation theory and the cost-benefit calculation model in more detail, it develops the main argument. Then, it provides background information on Indonesian political institutions and the separatist movements. From then on, Indonesia’s policies toward Aceh and Papua are scrutinized. A conclusion follows.

2 Revisiting the Debate

The Reputation Theory and the Cost-Benefit Calculation Model

According to the reputation theory, multi-ethnic states are unlikely to concede to separatists because concession prompts other ethnic groups to demand the same status. Toft (2003) argues that multi-ethnic states fight against separatists, fearing accommodation might set a precedent. Walter (2006, 2009) develops the reputation theory in the context of wars of self-determination. According to Walter, if states offer accommodation to separatists, other ethnic groups might also demand the same privileges. In contrast, if such demands are harshly resisted, potential separatists are deterred. Thus, states must take the incentive to deter potential challengers by disguising themselves as tough fighters. In particular, when many ethnic groups coexist in one country, politicians have a strong incentive to build a reputation for not conceding to separatists. That is why governments in multi-ethnic countries adamantly refuse concessions to separatists. Yet, there have been statistical analyses skeptical about the reputation theory, too (Nilsson 2010; Forsberg 2013).

The cost-benefit calculation model is another influential model for understanding how wars end (Wittman, 1979; Mason, Weingarten and Fett, 1999; Zartman 2000; Bapat, 2005). This model suggests that a central government
accommodates separatists, as long as the cost from separatist warfare is high, even in a multi-ethnic country. In other words, while the reputation theory is more concerned about the long-term cost-benefit calculation, a cost-benefit calculation model is concerned about the short-term cost-benefit calculation.

Incorporating the Internal Workings of Governments

These two theories generally assume that a central government is a unitary actor. Instead, this paper develops its argument incorporating the internal workings of central governments, thus presenting a more nuanced theory than the two above. Firstly, based on the close analysis of Walter’s (2009, Chapter 3) laboratory experiment, this paper argues that there are two types of people by nature in the world. One type only considers the short-term cost by continuing separatist warfare, while the other type is more worried about the long-term cost by conceding to separatists.

Walter’s (2009, 41-65) chapter on laboratory experiments (coauthored with Dustin Tingley) does support this argument rather than the reputation theory. Walter’s experiment is based on the chain store model (42). Simply put, some were assigned the role of a central government which loses more by fighting against separatists in the short term. Participants could choose whether to fight against separatists or not, but based on the long-term cost-benefit calculation, they were expected to always fight to deter new separatists from entrance. However, some of those assigned this role chose not to fight in these situations, apparently only considering the short-term benefits (60-63). Walter had to conclude that ‘the laboratory experiments confirm important parts of the reputation theory, but also reveal where human beings are likely to deviate from existing expectations about rational behavior’ (65). More precisely, this laboratory
experiment suggested that there were two types of participants. Some participants acted as the reputation theory predicts. In contrast, other participants were only considering the short-term cost and benefit.

Thus, it appears that two types of people exist by nature. They have different preferences. For the sake of convenience, this paper terms those considering the long-term cost and benefit as hardliners and those considering the short-term cost and benefit as softliners. This is because those intending to deter other potential separatist challengers would not agree to settle the warfare, while those focusing on only short-term costs might settle a warfare if that war is costly. In other words, hardliners repress separatists without accommodation, as the reputation theory predicts. In contrast, softliners tend to accommodate separatists, as the cost-benefit calculation model predicts, but even softliners do not have incentives to concede much to demands from weak separatists.

Indeed, these types correspond not only to the two rational choice theories but also to the two arguments regarding the effects of offering autonomy. Some argue that accommodation of separatists’ demands only strengthens their capability and willingness to secede. Cornell (2002) finds that the institutionalization of territorial autonomy increases both the willingness and the capacity to act for separatism. Hardline politicians agree with Cornell. This is another reason hardliners prefer repressing separatist movements without accommodation.

Others argue that granting autonomy can help end separatism. Segmental autonomy is one of the characteristics of Lijphart’s (1977) consociational democracy. Horowitz (2000, 628) also suggests that autonomy does not jeopardize the unity of a state if regional elites have incentives to stay in the undivided state. Softline politicians
agree with Lijphart and Horowitz, believing separatists are likely to remain in the country if significant autonomy is granted. In sum, softliners and hardliners have different causal beliefs, namely, different ‘beliefs about cause-effect relationships’ (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 10).

The distinction between softliners and hardliners implies that the type of policy-maker strongly affects conflict outcomes. Among many politicians, the preference of national leaders affects policies the most. The executive branch usually negotiates and concludes peace treaties with rebels. Moreover, the national leader is likely to exercise considerable influence over policies dealing with separatists, because it is usually an important part of their agenda.

However, national leaders cannot always dominate the decision-making process. If there is a veto player inside the government (Tsebelis 2002), it is impossible for national leaders to implement their preferred policies without the consent of the veto player. If the executive is to reach and maintain a peace agreement, it is necessary for them to rein in those against peace, including veto players.

Thus, this paper argues that two additional factors are necessary to explain government policies toward separatists. The first factor is whether the leader of the central government is a softliner or a hardliner. The second factor is whether there is a veto player opposed to the policies of the national leader. The government cannot enforce its policies without the consent of the veto player.

**Methodology**

This paper examines the Indonesian government’s policies toward Aceh and Papua following democratization. Policies by Wahid, Megawati and Yudhoyono are
This paper employs the most similar systems design, dealing with government decision-making within a single state, toward two similar separatist movements in Aceh and Papua. Each separatist group fought a desperate war for decades, in mountainous areas, without any real possibility of liberating the region. During the New Order, Suharto cracked down on both separatist groups, with significant human rights violations. Yet, unlike East Timor, neither region had gained enough international support for their independence cause. They consist of very suitable cases for comparative politics. This makes it easy to determine whether the two crucial variables in this thesis, namely, the preference of the leadership and the existence of veto players, can indeed explain the policy shifts of central government.

This paper distinguishes the preferences of national leaders mainly from their remarks or policies before being elected or just after being elected. It does so in order to avoid induction from their policies during their term. Even so, their past remarks might have reflected their strategic settings rather than their original preferences (Frieden 1999). Still, Walter’s (2009) experiment has demonstrated, as this paper has revealed, that one type of participant had a different preference from the other. It is likely that national leaders are also divided into these two types. In addition, in this particular case, there are reasons to believe that Wahid and Yudhoyono had different preferences from Megawati. For example, in January 1999, the Habibie administration reversed its policy over East Timor, eventually leading to its separation from Indonesia. At that time, both Wahid and Megawati were in opposition, but while Megawati was fiercely against the separation of East Timor, Wahid argued that a referendum was the best way to handle this issue (Kompas, 1999a). Likewise, during the Megawati administration, while Yudhoyono, as a cabinet minister, tried hard to keep the peace process going, Megawati
was almost indifferent to it. These episodes illustrate the importance of individuals (Byman and Pollack 2001).

Finally, this paper divides conflict cost into military, political and international cost. Military cost refers to the cost directly derived from warfare. Political cost is political pressure from the locals to end conflicts. International cost refers to pressure from international society to end conflicts. Analysis of each administration is preceded by a subsection qualitatively assessing the military, political, and international cost each administration incurred from the conflicts of Aceh and Papua respectively.

3 Background to the Conflicts in Aceh and Papua

The TNI as an Informal Veto Player

In the context of Indonesia’s policies toward Aceh and Papua, there is one potential veto player: the Indonesian national military (TNI). The TNI still retains political influence in the form of ‘the veto power for defending the national unity’ (Honna 2009, 227). The TNI is an informal veto player in that it does not have the right institutionally to veto government policies. It is not impossible for presidents to rein in the TNI by intervening in its personnel rotation or by pressurising the military with backing from public opinion.

The TNI has generally been against accommodation. The TNI’s current ideological basis is Indonesian national unity (NKRI), ‘a non-negotiable, absolute value’ for the TNI (Honna 2009, 238). In addition, the TNI had political interests in the conflicts continuing in Aceh and Papua. Ending separatist wars would not only lead to the loss of political influence (ICG 2001a, 14), but also leave the TNI under stronger pressure for military reform.
The TNI had an economic interest in conflicts, too. In Aceh, it operated many informal and even illegal businesses, including the drug trade (Kingsbury and McCulloch 2006). Likewise, in Papua, Perlez and Bonner (2005) reveal that Freeport, a multi-national company mining copper and gold in Papua, contributed more than $20 million to the military and the police between 1998 and 2004. Overall, the TNI had every reason to oppose accommodative policies toward Aceh and Papua.

Background to the Conflicts in Aceh and Papua

The Free Aceh Movement’s (GAM) rebellion began in Aceh in 1976, aiming for the independence of Aceh. Its leader, Hasan di Tiro, espoused Acehnese nationalism, emphasizing its history and believing that Aceh had the legal right to independence (Aspinall 2009, Chapter 3). GAM relied on the rhetoric of how natural resources in Aceh were exploited by Jakarta to capture the support from local people for independence (Sulistiyanto 2001, 439-440; Ross 2005, 53). Yet, the first rebellion was easily crushed by the Indonesian military. When GAM started another rebellion in 1989, the military engaged in counterinsurgency operations, making the province a Military Operations Area (DOM) and committing massive human rights violations (Aspinall 2009, 111-112).

When Habibie became president in 1998 and started democratization, the Acehnese demanded justice. The media began to report the massive human rights violations perpetrated by the military during DOM. Urban Acehnese, who had not known much about the atrocities until then, started to insist on punishing the perpetrators (Aspinall 2009, 127). Habibie initially tried to respond to the Acehnese demands. Yet, as GAM came back to Aceh, the TNI restrengthened its operations in
1999 (Sukma 2004, 12-13). Massacres, tortures, and shootings of civilians by the TNI or police force subsequently took place, which only strengthened Acehnese grievances against Jakarta (Miller 2009, 30-31). According to an opinion poll by a Medan-based newspaper, 56 percent of Acehnese already preferred to hold an independence referendum in June 1999 (Miller 2009, 37).

Unlike Aceh, the Netherlands did not transfer the authority to govern Papua to Indonesia when Indonesia got independence. Yet, in 1962, the Netherlands and Indonesia reached the New York Agreement,\(^3\) according to which Papuans would exercise the right to self-determination ‘in accordance with international practice’ (Article XVIII, d). However, the ‘Act of Free Choice’, held in 1969 as the exercise of Papua’s right to self-determination, was deeply flawed. Unlike international practice, it was a consultation with Papuan representatives forced to unanimously agree with incorporation into Indonesia under threat from the Indonesian military (Saltford 2000; ICG 2006a, 3). In 1965, the Free Papua Movement (OPM) started separatist warfare, but Indonesian operations to crush the OPM entailed gross human rights violations (Chauvel and Bhakti 2004, 22-24).

When democratization took place, Habibie initially tried to solve the Papuan issue via dialogue. In February, 1999, Habibie met representatives of Papuans demanding independence. After that, however, police started to pressure pro-independence activists by detention and arrest (HRW 2000). Meanwhile, the government enacted Law 45/1999 to divide the Papuan province into three, although it was not implemented because of strong opposition from Papuans (McGibbon 2004, 10-11).

**4 From Accommodation to Repression: the Wahid Administration**
Separatist Movements: the Military, Political, and International Cost

In October 1999, Wahid rose to the presidency. Although it was the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) led by Megawati that won the People's Representative Council (DPR) elections in June, 1999, some Islamic factions were opposed to a female president. As a result of the complex bargaining process, Wahid became the new President of Indonesia with Megawati as Vice-President.

How severe was the cost of the Aceh conflict during the Wahid period? The military cost and political pressure in Aceh were initially significant, but the latter virtually disappeared when the government closed the political space. GAM was regaining its strength as Habibie withdrew non-organic troops.\(^4\) Two years later, in 2001, GAM was estimated to have influence over around 80 percent of Aceh’s villages (ICG 2001a, 5). Politically, in October and November 1999, huge rallies calling for a referendum on independence took place in various locations, mobilizing tens of thousands of people or more in each rally (Aspinall 2009, 131) with its peak in Banda Aceh where 500,000 people took part (Miller 2009, 66). However, freedom of speech and assembly began to be restricted in 2000 and the TNI repressed another rally in November, 2000. Internationally, the pressure to end the conflict started to increase as the war intensified. For example, in May, 2001, the ambassador of the United States went to Aceh to declare his support for negotiation (Kompas, 2001).

In Papua, pressure to resolve the issues mainly took the form of political protests, while military pressure was negligible and only Pacific countries paid any attention to the conflict. Without modern weapons, the OPM had been far from threatening Indonesian sovereignty (ICG 2006a, 4). Politically, on various occasions between 1998 and 2000, Papuans showed their determination to achieve independence, but political
freedom to express pro-independence opinions was restricted by the end of 2000 (ICG 2001b, 22). International pressure to end the Papuan conflict was limited, although the communique of the Pacific Islands Forum in 2000 showed its concern with the conflict (Thirty-First Pacific Islands Forum 2000).

*Wahid’s Changing Policies toward Aceh and Papua*

Abdurrahman Wahid was ‘a man with a philosophical commitment to the peaceful resolution of communal conflict’ (Aspinall and Crouch 2003, 8-9). Even before the Habibie administration offered the East Timorese the opportunity for independence in January, 1999, Wahid privately told Jamsheed Marker, Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in East Timor, that he was not opposed to the independence of East Timor (Marker 2003, 113). When the government announced its policy change regarding East Timor, Wahid publicly supported a referendum (*Kompas*, 1999a). Concerning Aceh, too, Wahid agreed with the idea of holding a referendum on independence before being elected (Aspinall and Crouch 2003, 9). Considering Wahid was a softliner, this explains his initial accommodative policies. In addition, Wahid initially had the power to rein in the TNI. He himself was elected democratically for the first time in more than 40 years and his cabinet included members from most of the political parties. In contrast, the TNI was still suffering from its loss of international reputation during the East Timor referendum (Mietzner 2006, 19).

Wahid implemented accommodative policies toward Aceh, although the independence referendum never took place. Facing pressure from the DPR, he had to clarify that he would not tolerate any movement toward the independence of Aceh (*Kompas*, 1999b). Yet, Wahid promised to investigate past human rights abuses. 24
low-ranking officers were prosecuted with regard to the killing of ulama Bantaqiah and his 52 students (Miller 2009, 69). He also withdrew non-organic troops.

Crucially, Wahid was the first president to initiate peace talks with GAM. When the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC), a newly-formed NGO in Geneva, offered mediation, both Wahid and GAM decided to participate in the dialogue. They reached a cease-fire agreement in May, 2000, despite the opposition from the TNI and some civilian politicians. The number of victims from violence lessened initially, but violence escalated again around the end of August (Miller 2009, 77-82; Aspinall and Crouch 2003, 14-18). The violence was mostly perpetrated by the TNI and the police, although GAM also violated the cease-fire (Aspinall and Crouch 2003, 18).

Wahid also offered concessions to Papuans initially. Wahid agreed to change the name of the province from Irian Jaya to Papua (Kompas 2000). He also permitted Papuans to raise the Morning Star flag, the national flag of independence of West Papua (Chauvel and Bhakti 2004, 27). In addition, Wahid contributed 1 billion rupiah toward the second Papuan Congress (Jakarta Post 2000), which declared West Papua had been sovereign since 1961 and which delegated the representative power to the Papuan Presidium Council (The Second Papuan People’s Congress, 2000).

However, Wahid’s capacity to implement his policies soon plummeted. Wahid failed to tackle issues such as the banking system, national debt, corruption and ethnic violence. In April, 2000, Wahid dismissed two ministers, criticizing their nepotism and corruption without showing sufficient evidence. He was also criticized for being contradictory and erratic (ICG, 2001c, 3-6). In August, at the session of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), he was forced to delegate his daily tasks to Vice-President Megawati. As Megawati allied with the TNI, Wahid lost the power to

As Wahid’s power and legitimacy weakened, the initial accommodative policies were replaced by repression. In August 2000, violence widely resumed in Aceh, despite Wahid’s commitment to a cease-fire. The Army Chief of Staff, Major General Endriartono Sutarto declared in November, 2000, ‘the TNI can itself decide whether its presence is still required in Aceh’ (quoted in Miller 2009, 83). While both parties reached another agreement in January 2001, as Wahid tried to survive politically, his interest in Aceh was lost. Hardliners, such as the TNI, started to dominate decision-making on Aceh. From January that year, no further substantial agreements with GAM were reached. General Yudhoyono, serving as the coordinating minister for political, social and security affairs, proposed ‘Comprehensive Measures to Resolve the Aceh Problem’, emphasizing non-military solutions, but these were ineffective against a background of violence (Aspinall and Crouch 2003, 21-22). Wahid had the political will to resolve the conflict peacefully, but he could not contain the TNI.

Wahid’s policies in Papua were soon overturned as his authority declined rapidly. The MPR session in August 2000 rejected the change to the provincial name and the flying of the Papuan flag (Chauvel and Bhakti 2004, 29). The MPR demanded that Wahid ‘take any necessary measures against the separatist activities’ (Xinhua General News Service, 2000). By the end of 2000, the flying of Papuan flags was banned and the Presidium leaders were arrested. It appears that Wahid sought to release the leaders in vain (ICG 2001b, 20), which suggests how weak his position in the government had become. Wahid’s accommodative policies were replaced by repression.
While Wahid’s peace initiative largely failed, the DPR had been discussing special autonomy laws. The law on Aceh and Papua passed the DPR in August and November, 2001 respectively. These special autonomy laws had many accommodative provisions. Unlike the general decentralization scheme in Indonesia, these laws gave strong powers to the provincial governments. Each provincial government gained 70-80 percent of revenues from natural resources. The Aceh law stipulated Islamic law, cultural institutions such as *Wali Nanggroe*, and direct elections of governors and district heads. Under the Papuan law, as a cultural institution, the Papuan People’s Assembly (MRP) would be established and have vast authority for protecting indigenous Papuans. Among other functions, the MRP would approve gubernatorial candidates and partition of the province (McGibbon 2004).

Overall, while Wahid was able to implement his accommodative policies initially, he lost the power to do so from August 2000. His initial accommodative policies reflected his softline attitude and the high political and military cost in Aceh and Papua. He implemented some reforms in Aceh and Papua, but the administration’s policies shifted from accommodation to repression, such as the overt military approach and arrest of separatist leaders, as power shifted within government. In other words, Wahid lost the power to control the TNI.

**5 Without Accommodation: the Megawati Administration**

*Separatist Activities: the Military, Political, and International Cost*

During the Megawati administration between 2001 and 2004, in Aceh, military and international pressure persisted, while political pressure to end the conflict disappeared because of repression (McGibbon 2004, 41, 51). As the TNI increased its force, GAM
lost ascendancy. In January, 2002, GAM admitted that areas under its control had declined to 30-40 percent of Aceh (ICG 2002, 2). The political space in Aceh was virtually closed during the Megawati period. When martial law was declared in 2003, even human rights activists were interrogated or charged with subversion (Saraswati 2003b). International attention toward the Aceh conflict increased as the war intensified. In July, 2002, a senior official of the United States claimed that its military aid might not be resumed if the military operation in Aceh continued (Jakarta Post 2002). When martial law was imposed in Aceh, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan showed his concern, while the United States and Australia called on Indonesia to resume negotiations (Saraswati 2003a).

In contrast, in Papua, military pressure from the OPM and international pressure remained low. In addition, even pressure to solve the Papuan issue from the local political sphere had fallen. The murder of Theys Eluay, the independence leader and the Presidium chairman, was ‘a major blow to the Presidium’ (ICG 2006a, 7). Moreover, the presidential instruction to divide Papua caused a conflict between Papuan elites (Chauvel and Bhakti 2004, 39-41).

**Megawati’s Repressive Policies**

Megawati was a hardliner. When Megawati became president after the impeachment of Wahid, she declared six national goals, among which to maintain national unity was the top priority (Miller 2009, 105). Megawati ‘defined herself as the guardian of the nationalist legacy bestowed upon Indonesia by her father, Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno’ (McGibbon 2004, 43). She had also been against the independence of East Timor in the past (Kompas, 1999a). Vice President Hamzah Haz and Home Affairs
Minister Hari Sabarno were also skeptical about regional autonomy (Miller 2009, 103). Overall, the Megawati administration was dominated by hardliners.

In addition, Megawati had no will to rein in the TNI, an informal veto player. Three reasons were behind this. Firstly, she did not trust civilian leaders who supported her ascent to the presidency, because they had once prevented her from becoming President in 1999. Lacking confidence in civilian leaders, she wanted to secure military support (Mietzner 2006, 34-35). Secondly, she might have learned from Wahid’s fall that trying to interfere in the TNI would risk her political life (Honna 2009, 240). Finally, as a staunch nationalist, Megawati should have shared her ideology with the TNI emphasizing NKRI.

Nevertheless, the administration sought new peace talks against three backgrounds: the militarily strengthened government position vis-à-vis GAM as a result of military operations, the enactment of the special autonomy law, and international pressure to resolve the conflict via negotiation (Aspinall and Crouch 2003, 26-27, Miller 2009, 115; HDC 2003, 13). Jakarta apparently believed ‘[a demoralized GAM could] engage in serious negotiations on the government’s terms’ (Aspinall and Crouch 2003, 26).

The Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement (CoHA) was reached in December 2002. This was essentially a cease-fire agreement aimed at confidence building. The agreement was to be monitored by a Joint Security Committee (JSC), which included international monitors. The deployment of international monitors was a significant concession by central government (Aspinall and Crouch 2003, 33). However, because discussion on substantial issues was postponed, no new concessions from the government were on the agenda.
The CoHA soon collapsed. Although violence lessened significantly in the first two months after the CoHA was signed, gradually both GAM and the TNI started to violate the agreement. Although GAM was not necessarily sincere in abiding by the CoHA (Schulze 2004, 49-54), it was the TNI that actively undermined the peace process. Firstly, demilitarization of GAM was supposed to coincide with a ‘phased relocation of TNI forces which [would] reformulate their mandate from a strike force to a defensive force’ (Article 3.b); HDC 2002). However, General Ryamizard Ryacudu insisted that whether he increased his troops in Aceh or not was his own business (Kompas, 2003). Indeed, the TNI increased their number of soldiers from 22,000 in February to 26,000 in April (Siboro 2003; Jakarta Post 2003b).

Secondly and more importantly, the TNI seemed to even coordinate demonstrations against the JSC covertly. On March 3, 2002 a JSC office in Central Aceh was attacked by a mob insisting GAM was their enemy. The attack was not prevented by the TNI or the police. In fact, it was believed that members from the Army Strategic Reserve Command participated in the protest (Aspinall and Crouch 2003, 41; Jakarta Post, 2003a). Besides, in that area, rumor had it that the TNI trained and gave weapons to Javanese transmigrants to form a militia (Miller 2009, 123). Similar attacks ensued, which forced the JSC to withdraw to Banda Aceh.

When the Megawati administration saw a breakdown of peace, it was easily convinced that no more dialogue was necessary. During the next negotiations in May, GAM conceded significantly so that the peace process would not collapse. However, the administration demanded that GAM accept the special autonomy law entirely (Aspinall and Crouch 2003, 44). GAM could not accept such demands tantamount to surrender (Unidjaja, 2003). The peace talks collapsed, and martial law was declared in Aceh the
following day. The immediate imposition and the swift operation suggest that the government attended the peace talks in May to satisfy international audiences with no intention of continuing the peace process (Miller 2009, 124; Aspinall and Crouch 2003, 45). The peace process came to an end without any concrete offer of further autonomy by the Megawati administration.

Even the special autonomy law was only partially implemented in Aceh. Although revenue-sharing arrangements and Islamic Law were implemented, many other provisions were not. Although the provincial government and legislature were largely to blame for the slow implementation, the central government did not actively seek implementation, either. Indeed, implementing regulations for Islamic Law, which were supported by the central government and the TNI, were quickly issued despite its difficulty of enforcement (McGibbon 2004, 29-34). It suggests that if Jakarta had put pressure on them, the provincial institutions would have implemented other provisions as well. The Megawati administration tried to limit accommodation toward the Acehnese as much as possible.

Megawati’s Papuan policies were no more accommodative than her policies toward Aceh. Firstly, Theys Eluay, a Papuan independence movement leader, was murdered in November, 2001. He was killed by a Special Force Command (Kopassus) soldier (ICG 2003, 6), but the answer to the question as to whether higher-ranking officers were involved was not sought (Chauvel and Bhakti 2004, 34). Kopassus officers involved in the assassination were tried and sentenced, but only given light sentences of up to 42 months (Jakarta Post 2003c). General Ryamizard Ryacudu even praised these officers as ‘heroes’ (Cooney 2003). The government’s management of the assassination was far from satisfactory for Papuans.
Secondly, special autonomy was significantly undermined because of the unwillingness of Jakarta and the incapability of the local administration in Papua. Some of the provisions, such as revenue-sharing and the affirmative action of native Papuans, were implemented (McGibbon 2004, 34-38). However, the MRP was not established, despite its central role in the Papuan special autonomy law. The law required that the MRP be established within two years and the Papuan Parliament quickly drafted the regulation for the establishment of the MRP, but the central government was unwilling to approve it (ICG 2006b, 2).

Finally, the Megawati administration partitioned the province of Papua to undermine separatism. Megawati’s Presidential instruction (Inpres 1/2003) demanded the implementation of the Law 45/1999 on the division of the Papuan province ‘to bring government closer to the people and facilitate economic development’ (ICG 2003, 7). However, Chauvel and Bhakti (2004, 39) point out that ‘the weight of the argument, in the internal government documents, is that partition will undermine the independence movement’. Indeed, the partition was ordered without the approval of the MRP and the Papuan parliament, which was necessary under the special autonomy law (ICG 2003, 7).

Megawati’s policies were fundamentally repressive. Although it is true that she implemented some provisions of the special autonomy law, including revenue-sharing, these were promised before she became president. In fact, she did not implement other provisions regulated by the law. The CoHA was the only accommodative policy the Megawati administration was actively involved in. However, the CoHA was only possible because of international pressure and the central government’s expectation that GAM would acquiesce to special autonomy, a concession the central government had
already offered. During the CoHA process, the Megawati administration never offered any specific new concessions to GAM so that it could end the conflict honorably. Then, Megawati was easily convinced that dialogue was ineffective when the TNI was actively undermining the cease-fire. In May, 2003, by issuing martial law, the administration showed its willingness to crush GAM militarily without further accommodation. Megawati also tried to undermine the Papuan separatist movement without new concessions. As in Aceh, she did not implement the special autonomy law fully. Overall, the Megawati administration, led by a hardliner, was not accommodative to the separatists.

6 Accommodative Policies: the Yudhoyono Administration

Separatist Activities: the Military, Political, and International Cost

Yudhoyono, defeating Megawati, became the new President of Indonesia in October 2004. In Aceh, while the political space remained closed, GAM was still not eliminated, although it was substantially weakened by the TNI’s operations under martial law (Aspinall 2009, 230). Meanwhile, international society started to pay attention to Aceh again following the tsunami in December, 2004. Increased international attention and support for reconstruction helped facilitate dialogue (Aspinall 2005, 20; Mietzner 2012, 100-103). The conflict in Aceh ended peacefully in 2005.

In Papua, political space to advocate independence was restricted but still open, although the Papuan voice continued to suffer from the divide-and-rule strategy. In 2010, ‘a Consultation of MRP and Indigenous Papuans’ demanded international mediation and an independence referendum (ICG 2010a). Likewise, the Papua Peace Conference in 2011 stressed that Papuan negotiators with the central government should be
independence-minded (ICG 2011). Yet not only the division of the province but also further division of administrative units on a sub-provincial level had divided Papuans (ICG 2010a, 2).

Military and international pressure remained low in Papua. Sporadic violence still took place, but it was far from threatening Indonesian sovereignty (ICG, 2010b; 2011; 2012). Internationally, support for the Papuans did not increase significantly at the governmental level (ICG 2006a, 7-8), though the situation has started to change more recently (Webb-Gannon and Elmslie 2014). Between 2004 and 2014, the Pacific Islands Forum mentioned the Papuan conflict in its communiqués only twice, in 2006 and 2007.

**Yudhoyono’s Accommodative Policies toward Aceh and Papua**

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had been regarded as a softliner. Serving as a cabinet minister during the Wahid and Megawati administrations, Yudhoyono had emphasized a non-military approach to Aceh (Aspinall and Crouch 2003). During the presidential election campaign, Yudhoyono emphasized the peaceful resolution of separatist conflicts, telling Papuan leaders that he would fully implement the special autonomy law (ICG 2006b, 4). New Vice President Jusuf Kalla had also been involved in solving conflicts in Maluku and Central Sulawesi (Mietzner 2012, 98). Kalla had tried to reopen negotiations with GAM after martial law was imposed (Aspinall 2005, 18; Morfit 2007, 120; Patria, Suud and Meuko 2005, 85). The new administration was led by softliners (Schulze 2005, 24).

In addition, unlike Wahid, Yudhoyono was able to control a potential veto player: hardliners in the TNI. Yudhoyono (2014, 281) himself attributes one of the reasons the peace agreement in Aceh was successful to the support from the TNI and the police. He
succeeded in replacing senior military figures opposed to peace. General Ryamizard Ryacudu, who was suspected to have actively undermined the CoHA, lost his position as Army Chief of Staff in February 2005, without being given a new position. Yudhoyono also terminated the careers of other conservative figures in the TNI (Mietzner 2006, 49-50). General Sutarto, trusted by Yudhoyono, made it clear that TNI officers were not allowed to object to Yudhoyono’s policies (Morfit 2007, 131-132; Mietzner 2012, 99). When the peace agreement was signed, Sutarto flew to Banda Aceh to show the TNI’s support of it (Tanuredjo 2005).

Yudhoyono’s ability to contain opposition to peace in the TNI derived from two sources. Firstly, he had strong legitimacy. Yudhoyono won the direct presidential election, gaining more than 60 percent of votes in the second round. Secondly, Yudhoyono’s background as the TNI General helped him. Yudhoyono recalled, ‘I knew my audience’ (Morfit 2007, 132). He knew that the majority of the TNI, particularly the young, were ‘moderates’ (Morfit 2007, 132). Understanding the TNI’s economic interest in warfare, Yudhoyono’s government also distributed funds totalling around US$50 million to the TNI as it withdrew from Aceh, and let them be involved in the development industry in Aceh after the end of the conflict (Mietzner 2012, 106). Moreover, Yudhoyono was ‘generally more highly respected by the TNI than his civilian counterparts’ (Miller 2009, 160).

In addition, Vice President Jusuf Kalla played a crucial role in conflict resolution in Aceh (Schulze 2005, 24; Al Qurtuby 2015, 139). Kalla was a softliner who ‘made calculations in terms of the costs and benefits of continuing the war’ (Awaluddin 2008, 26), according to Hamil Awaluddin, the chief negotiator on the government side. Kalla’s continuous search for contact with GAM after the collapse of the CoHA process
eventually led to the new peace negotiations in 2005 (Patria, Suud and Meuko, 2005, 85). Kalla backed up the negotiations in Jakarta, publicly defended them, and supervised the government side (Aspinall 2005, 35-37). He even claimed, ‘I read all the books on the history of Aceh’ (an interview with Jusuf Kalla 2008, 83), showing his seriousness.

The new peace process started in January, 2005. Although the tsunami in December 2004 did help the reaching of a compromise, the central government and GAM had confirmed their participation in peace negotiations convened by Martti Ahtisaari, a former president of Finland and an internationally-known mediator, before the tsunami (Aspinall 2005, 19). This suggests it is impossible to solely attribute the end of the conflict in Aceh to the tsunami (Morfit 2007, 117-118).

During the peace talks, both parties made significant concessions. On the one hand, the Yudhoyono administration allowed the creation of local political parties in Aceh. In Indonesia, a political party has to have a nation-wide organization. Indonesian elites believed that the regulation was necessary to prevent the disintegration of the multi-ethnic country (Aspinall 2005, 38). Therefore, the government initially resisted the demand for local political parties in Aceh (Aspinall 2005, 37-42), but it eventually agreed to create ‘the political and legal conditions for the establishment of local political parties in Aceh in consultation with Parliament’ (1.2.1; United Nations Peacemaker 2005). Mietzner (2012, 99) illustrates the significance of this concession as follows: ‘this was an offer no other Indonesian government had ever made to any other dissenting group in post-independence history’. Indonesia also offered several other concessions to Aceh, including an amnesty granted to GAM combatants, in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), a comprehensive peace agreement reached in
August, 2005. Indonesia offered a range of accommodations to let GAM change into a political force.

On the other hand, GAM dropped its claim for independence. Three reasons were behind this. Firstly, the tsunami was certainly an important factor. Malik Mahmoud, GAM’s ‘Prime Minister’, recalls, ‘After the tsunami the situation is different. Now it is better for Aceh that we no longer strive for independence’ (Merikallio 2006, 87). Secondly, the TNI’s operations had already weakened GAM (Schulze 2005 23-24). Thirdly, ambassadors from countries such as the US, Japan, Australia and Malaysia pressurized GAM negotiators to accept the territorial integrity of Indonesia (Kingsbury 2006, 34). Nevertheless, GAM would not have signed the peace agreement if the government had not agreed with the idea of local political parties. Even in the final round of the peace negotiations in July 2005, GAM was prepared not to sign a peace agreement unless the issue of local political parties was solved satisfactorily (Kingsbury 2006, Chapter 10). The conflict would not have ended peacefully without the significant concessions from the Indonesian government.

The implementation of MoU was largely successful. Although some of the provisions in the MoU were weakened during the DPR discussion (Miller 2009, 166-167), local parties were allowed to contest provincial and district parliamentary elections. An ex-GAM member won the governorship in 2006. The Aceh Party, founded by ex-GAM members, won almost half of the seats in the provincial legislature in 2009 (Simanjuntak, 2009). The gubernatorial election in 2012 resulted in the victory of another ex-GAM candidate (Simanjuntak and Afrida, 2012). The conflict in Aceh is unlikely to resume in the near future.

In contrast, while Yudhoyono’s policies toward Papua were also more
accommodative than Megawati’s, Yudhoyono did not invest as much energy in Papuan policies as in Aceh. Yudhoyono did establish the MRP in 2004 (*Kompas* 2004), but the MRP’s power later declined ‘to the point that no one sees it as an institution that effectively addresses any of the kinds of violence’ (ICG 2012, 15). The central government actively undermined its authority. For example, the gubernatorial election in West Irian Jaya was held in 2006 before the MRP approved this new province and its candidates (ICG 2006b, 10-15). In 2009, Jakarta curtly rejected the MRP’s decision that only indigenous Papuans should become district heads as another form of affirmative action. The central government disputed its legality, but the real reason for the rejection might have been its suspicion that the MRP was supporting independence (ICG 2010a, 1-4).

Instead, the Yudhoyono administration tried to accommodate Papuans by accelerating its development (ICG 2012; *Kompas* 2012; Yudhoyono 2014, 740-741). The Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua (UP4B) was established in 2011 to ensure the development of Papua with special autonomy funds (Somba 2012; ICG 2012, 23). While UP4B initially tried to help solve the political problems Papua faced, it was soon forced to focus on development because of pressure from conservatives (ICG 2012, 24).

Meanwhile, Farid Husain, who participated in the Aceh peace process as the Deputy Minister for People’s Welfare, tried to discuss the issue with various groups, including the OPM, with the endorsement of Yudhoyono since 2011 (ICG 2012, 25). Nevertheless, Yudhoyono ‘[had] since [Husain’s appointment] shown little interest in his labours’ (25), and Yudhoyono even proclaimed there was no room for separatist activities within the freedom of opinion (*Kompas* 2012). As Yudhoyono did not actively
seek negotiations with separatists, they tried to internationalize the issue. However, it did not lead Yudhoyono to consider negotiations. Instead, Yudhoyono (2014, 703-708) boasted of how he effectively undermined international support for Papuans.

The analysis above reveals that the extent of accommodation Yudhoyono offered to the Papuans, was much less than the one offered to the Acehnese. The Jakarta Post (2013) points out, ‘strangely, the Yudhoyono administration has never taken the Aceh way into account when dealing with Papua, despite the fact that two provinces have many similarities’. What accounts for this difference?

It seems that it is because the cost from the Papuan conflict was much lower than the cost from the Aceh conflict. Yudhoyono remarked in an interview with Morfit (2007, 125) that ‘conflict [in Aceh] had gone on too long; there were too many victims on both sides. And it was expensive, costing us about $130 million per year in security operations’. In contrast, Yudhoyono claimed, amid escalating violence in Papua in 2012, ‘the recent incidents in Papua can be considered small-scale’ and ‘far too minor if we compare them to the violence in the Middle East’ (Somba and Saragih 2012). It is against the background of small political, military, and international costs that Yudhoyono did not invest his powers in resolving the issues in Papua. Yudhoyono was acting as the cost-benefit calculation model predicts. In sum, the Yudhoyono Administration’s policies toward separatists can be fully explained only when considering the preference of the president and the relationship between Yudhoyono and the TNI.

8 Conclusion

Indonesia’s policies toward its separatists have been drifting between accommodation
and repression. Wahid and Yudhoyono approached secessionist regions with accommodation, but Megawati favored repression. Fluctuation of Indonesia’s policies toward Aceh and Papua must be explained from a more complex perspective than the reputation theory or the cost-benefit calculation model. During the Wahid administration, the softline president initially implemented accommodative policies toward the two regions. Yet, as his power weakened, he lost the initiative, and the hardline TNI strengthened its influence over government policies. When Megawati became president, she behaved as the reputation theory predicts, because she was a hardliner. Hence, repression remained the central policy during her term without significant concession. The TNI, also hardliners, had no reason to oppose Megawati’s hardline policies. Finally, as a softliner, Yudhoyono brought peace to Aceh through accommodative policies, successfully controlling the TNI. Yudhoyono did not invest his energy in solving the Papuan conflict because the war was not costly. Yudhoyono behaved as the cost-benefit calculation model predicts.

To reiterate, this paper has argued that leadership preference and the existence of veto players are crucial in understanding Indonesian policies toward separatists. Firstly, there are two types of leaders: hardliners and softliners. Believing accommodation sets a precedent, hardliners prefer repression. In contrast, softliners believe sufficient accommodation can win the hearts and minds of separatists. The level of accommodation offered by softliners is proportional to the cost of the conflict. Hence, hardliners behave as the reputation theory predicts, while softliners behave as the cost-benefit calculation model predicts. Secondly, national leaders cannot implement their policies if veto players object to them. Softliners must be capable of containing hardline voices against accommodation if they are to bring peace. In sum, this paper
sheds light on the importance of the internal decision-making process of government.

This paper is not without limitation. Firstly, this paper assumes policies toward separatists are largely determined by the executives. However, the legislative body can enact accommodative laws independently from the executive as is clear from the example of the special autonomy laws. What kind of role the legislature can play in conflict resolution is an important question. Secondly, accommodation does not guarantee the end of conflicts as separatists might reject the accommodation as being insufficient. Thirdly, in order to confirm this framework is useful, case studies on other multi-ethnic states should be conducted.

What kind of implication does this paper have toward conflict resolution in Papua? So far, Joko Widodo’s approach to the conflict in Papua indicates he is a softliner, releasing political prisoners and trying to make access to the province by foreign journalists easier. Also, since Joko Widodo came to the presidency in late 2014, international attention to Papua has arisen sharply. The forum communiqué at the Pacific Islands Forum in 2015 mentioned the issue of Papua for the first time since 2007 (Forty-Sixth Pacific Islands Forum 2015). In 2015, the Melanesian Spearhead Group, a regional block in Melanesia, accorded an Observer Membership to the United Liberation Movement for West Papua, a group led by a Papuan independence leader, Benny Wenda (20th MSG Leaders Summit 2015). Jeremy Corbyn, the UK Labour Party leader, also supports Papuans’ right to independence (Davidson, 2016). Although whether the emphasis on the right to self-determination will continue in the 21st century is unclear (Griffiths 2014), these international pressures might eventually become another ‘pebble in the shoe’ for Indonesia (Alatas 2006). At that point, it is likely that Widodo will try in earnest to solve the conflict, but the question as to whether he will
become a second Wahid or a second Yudhoyono remains to be seen.

1 The two exit interview responses suggest this (Walter 2009, 61-62). Indeed, Figure 3.8 in Walter (61) suggests that a substantial number of the participants regularly avoided fighting (60).

2 For comparative analyses of the TNI with other Southeast Asian countries’ military forces, see Beeson, Bellamy, and Hughes (2006) and Heiduk (2011).


4 Organic troops refer to troops originally stationed in the local area and non-organic troops refer to those not originally stationed there.
References


http://www.hdcentre.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Our_work/Peacemaking/Aceh_Indonesia/Supporting_documents/Aceh-internal-review-HD-Centre.pdf#search='aceh+initiative+internal+review'.


Jakarta/Brussels: ICG.


Sulistiyanto, Priyambudi. 2001. ‘Whither Aceh?’ *Third World Quarterly* 22 (3):


York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


