A Crisis of Religious Diversity: Debating Integration in the Post-Immigration Europe

M. Scalvini

1London School of Economics and Political Sciences (LSE)
Abstract. The growing cultural complexity in the face of new immigration waves influences the public understanding of religious diversity. The two central questions of this article are: ‘how much religious difference and of what kind is compatible within Europe?’ and secondly, ‘to what extent Muslim diversity can be integrated into Europe?’ This article makes an intervention in these questions and explores the extent to which discourses on religious diversity imply boundary making and aim at limiting religious freedom of Muslims. Empirically, I scrutinize press coverage between 2009 and 2010, the years in which the minarets ban entered the socio-political arena of the European public debate. The methodology adopts a social network analysis to uncover semantic macro-structures and elicit common discourses in the press of France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. Successively, discourse analysis of relevant samples is applied to examine textual strategies used to legitimate inclusion or exclusion of religious difference.

Keywords: public debate, religion, diversity, integration, Islam, Muslim, media, press, discourse, method-mix, network analysis, semantics, critical discourse analysis, Italy, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Europe

1. Introduction

On 29 November 2009, the Swiss voted by a majority of 57.5 percent to add a provision to their Federal Constitution that bans the construction of new minarets (Moeckli, 2011: 774). Before the vote, only four minarets were present in the country and environmental legislation prohibited them from broadcasting a call to prayer (Lentin and Titley, 2012: 128). Nonetheless, according to the proponents of the referendum, the prohibition of minarets would preserve Switzerland’s cultural and political order (Fraudiger, 2008: 1).

The campaign for the ban was conceived as a contentious issue designed to exploit anti-immigrant discontent and address the public presence of Islam in terms of fear, distrust and hostility (Lentin and Titley, 2012). Despite criticism from the government and religious institutions in Switzerland, the outcome of the referendum was interpreted as a symptom of a general cultural and social insecurity of a large part of Swiss voters towards immigration (Mayer, 2011: 12), and above all, an expression of the problems of co-existence between the Swiss majority and its Muslim minority (Christmann and Danaci, 2012: 154-155).
The vote sparked negative reactions throughout Europe, the ban was seen by cultural elites as deplorable sign of prejudice and intolerance towards a religious minority (Mayer, 2011: 12). At the same time, several political leaders questioned the actual merits of diversity rejecting ostentatious signs that political-religious Muslim groups want to impose (Scalvini, 2013: 11). However, both debates reveal that both the cultural and political elites are struggling to recognize the reality of an increasingly post-immigration Europe – where not only religious and cultural diversity play a much larger role than in the near-past, but it ignores the difference between those recently arrived migrants and those national citizens of immigrant origin.

In recent years, there has been an intense public and policy debate about immigrant integration across Europe. Specifically, there has been a growing preoccupation with possible dangers to social cohesion represented by growing cultural, religious and ethnic diversity. However, many of these conflicts do not concern newcomers but descendants of immigrants, who are national citizens. Thus, my concern is to understand precisely for whom religious diversity is still such a problem today in Europe.

This paper aims to bring a sense of clarity and coherence to what has become very complex shift in the reality of integration and offer some critical insights into the discourse of diversity. Hence, the two central questions of this article are: ‘how much religious difference and of what kind is compatible within Europe?’ and secondly, ‘to what extent Muslim diversity can be included into Europe?’ This article makes an intervention in these questions and explores the extent to which discourses on religious diversity imply boundary making and aim at limiting religious freedom of Muslims.

I am convinced that this debate is an important example that reveals that not only is the recognition of diversity always under siege, but also that the fear of minorities continues to dominate the lexicon of the political debate. As Christopher Caldwell wrote to attack multicultural integration: “If you understand how immigration, Islam and native European culture interact in any Western European country, you can predict roughly how they will interact in any other” (Caldwell, 2009: 19). Consequently, this article is an account and an exploration of the limits and problems that relate to the respect for religious differences and how the rejection of these issues occurs.

In the present study, I scrutinize press coverage between 2009 and 2010, the years in which the minarets ban entered the socio-political arena of the European public debate. The methodology adopts a social network analysis to uncover semantic macro-structures and elicit common discourses in the press of France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. Successively, discourse analysis of
relevant samples is applied to examine textual strategies used to legitimate inclusion or exclusion of religious difference.

The article is organized in four sections. First, I give a general overview of the extent to which national narratives can constraint cultural pluralism. Second, I provide a review of the methodology, explaining the combination of network analysis with critical discourse analysis. Third, I present and discuss the similarity and variations in national press coverage. Fourth, I examine and explain the textual practices adopted to legitimate inclusion or exclusion. In conclusion, findings are summarized and some observations concerning the politics of religious diversity is offered.

2. The National Constraints to a Post-Immigration Society

The increased presence of Muslim provokes consequences for both the cultural and religious traditions of the nation. Veils at schools, ‘burqas’ in the streets, mosques in cities and minarets are the manifest visibility of Muslims’ religious diversity (Göle, 2002: 173). But why has taken on a crucial role in public debates among other religions? Firstly, Muslims’ requests for political recognition of their religious diversity question an established sense of borders and loyalties to the cultural traditions and values of the Christian majority (Allievi, 2008; Croft, 2012). Secondly, Muslim immigrants confront European populations that are mainly secular and hence skeptical of religious arguments adopted in public (Cesari, 2004: 176). Islam is perceived as a non-European religion and religious practice, which must be accommodated within pre-existing normative understandings and institutional arrangements between states and Christian churches (Bonjour and Lettinga, 2012: 261). In this national context, the past, the present and the future of national discourses are important ordering criteria of this public debate on Muslims.

However, Muslims are now demanding religious and cultural rights as a consequence of their permanent settlement. Paradoxically, in this debate the question of religious diversity is based on a total misunderstanding of an increasingly post-migration society, where new identities struggle to be included within the cultural confines of national communities. This problematic is also reflected in the debate among intellectuals and scholars. For instance, in the media studies there is a large empirical literature, which demonstrates a persisting reproduction and often acceptance of negative social representations of Muslims across the media (Beker, 2006; Poole, 2002). But this literature does not dispose of an adequate conceptual range of instruments to grasp and understand the theoretical and conceptual problems concerning religious pluralism and citizenship. Overall, this problem is strongly present.
In social sciences (cfr. Allievi, 2008), which still need to really come to terms with religion and its persistent and perhaps increased attention in social experience. This aspect is crucial as the largest and most controversial debates concerning multiculturalism are about religious rights and not ethnic or linguistic diversity (Koopmans, 2013: 165).

In political sciences, some important and insightful studies provided contributions from a theoretical perspective, several scholars argue that citizenship regulations and the understanding of nationhood strongly influence the relationship between majority and minority religious groups (Brubaker 1992; Favell 1998). Empirically, research investigated important aspects that make up and structure a public debate. For instance, Cinalli and Giugni (2013) examine the content of newspaper articles from 1999 to 2008, while van der Brug et al. (2015) focus upon ‘relevant events’ between 2001 and 2009 to analyze political debates on Islam through broadsheets in seven Western European countries (cfr also Helbling, 2013). While these studies have provided an important theoretical and empirical contribution to identify explanatory variables, they do not offer a systematic study on the discursive strategies applied by the press, further they focus only on the debate related to Muslim immigrants and ignore the questions of how to deal with religious rules and customs of Muslim citizens such as descendants of immigrants.

Linguistically, these discourses are articulated and conveyed in narratives on the origin, continuity, and transformation of the nation (Wodak et al., 2009). Specifically, textual articulation defines who does and, crucially also, who does not belong to the national community. While, the political dimension of exclusion is explicit in discursive practice when the national Self is crystallized against an outer group. Therefore, I argue that also discourses of religious diversity might be conveyed in narratives reflecting established national constructions of citizenship. Islam representation is not only a stereotypical caricature of what is unfamiliar and excluded, but also an opposite in the sense of national self-categorization. As a consequence, the dispute over how much religious difference is acceptable points to the different traits and values that Muslims are seen to embody.

This framework aims to investigate the ways in which discourses on religious diversity crosscut national narratives and function either to destabilize or provide avenues towards pluralism and citizenship. Accordingly, the next section provides a method to explore a large collection of text sources and to analyze them with the combination of network analysis and discourse analysis.
3. A Network Based Approach to Discourse Analysis

The present study focuses upon the public debate on religious diversity in France, Germany, Italy and the UK in the aftermath of the Swiss referendum. The comparative approach has two dimensions. The first dimension concerns the extent to which the media of different countries draws on similar discourses. The second dimension focuses on the extent to which these discourses are inclusive or exclusionary.

The study is also a demonstration of how network analysis can be incorporated as a methodology in qualitative content analysis. The interplay of quantitative and qualitative analysis of the network structure (Drieger, 2013) of the debate supports the interpretation of the discursive practice. In this way, the corpus is explored using a social constructionist variant of network analysis, which can be described as a method for identifying, analyzing and reporting systematic patterns of text (Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira, 2008; Veltri, 2012). This method is particularly fruitful to explore macro-semantic structures (Van Dijk, 1980) in a deductive manner and maintaining a theoretical complexity to the empirical study of discourses (Drieger, 2013: 5).

Data Collection

I decided to rely only on quality newspapers because they are expected to cover political debate in a comprehensive way. The sample includes articles from The Telegraph (UK), The Guardian (UK), Corriere della Sera (IT), La Repubblica (IT), Le Figaro (FR), Le Monde (FR), Süddeutsche Zeitung (DE) and Die Welt (DE) as well as their Sunday editions. The Telegraph, Le Figaro and Die Welt have a conservative political orientation and have traditionally encouraged immigration restriction. Conversely, The Guardian, La Repubblica and Süddeutsche Zeitung have liberal/progressive political perspectives, and have largely been supportive of immigration and multicultural integration.

Using Factiva, I conducted a search of broadsheet newspaper articles published in the aftermath of the referendum, namely in the period between 29 November 2009 and 28 May 2010. The keywords ‘relig*’ and ‘diversity’ were used in the search. Thus, I included in the dataset those articles that mentioned both of these two terms. The search initially identified 277 newspaper articles. The sample was pre-reviewed to identify those insightful articles and exclude those that made only passing reference to religious diversity. Finally, 192 articles were subsequently selected for an analysis of semantic networks and discourses.
Procedure of Analysis

The goal of this semantic network analysis is to develop a taxonomy of concepts and their semantic relationships by combining syntactic and statistical information (Bordag, 2008). In doing so, I managed the datasets via an automated text mining Python script. The output for each country was stored into a CSV file. To avoid unnecessary noise, I excluded any meta-textual information such as source, section, length, and author. I preserved only the text body, headline and the source. The corpus was then computed through word pairs and co-occurrences in a vector model space via Python syntactic/semantic libraries (Natural Language Toolkit and CLIPS/pattern). Consequently, I interpreted and classified adjacency pairs to avoid any semantic ambiguity. I also translated the non-English adjacency pairs in English and joined the four vectors by respecting word frequency and cosine similarity.

I processed then the vector model to extract the network node coordinates through the Python NLT network module. I finally visualized and explored the map of the semantic relationships via Gephi an open source software for network analysis. The map allowed me to identify and compare the semantic associations through an algorithm for modularity classification. The outcome was then elicited to reveal latent discourses. In the last step of the analysis, I paid close attention to textual practice in a sample of texts, which reported a high index of association (I>0.6 and p<0.05) within the semantic clusters. This process of identification allowed me to sample representative segments of discourses and address a critical discourse analysis.

An implicit limitation of this method is to explain only the characteristic large-scale statistical structures observed across press. There are certainly many aspects of semantic structure not captured in the network representation of a semantic model, for instance the ambiguity of meanings, the existence of different kinds of semantic relations, or the precise nature of the relations between word meanings and concepts in different languages. For this reason, the network semantic analysis is complemented by discourse analysis in order to develop a qualitative investigation of the textual strategies used within the press to legitimate inclusion or exclusion of religious difference.

To summarize the above steps, the goal of the above methodology is to combine social network analysis and discourse analysis by computing the statistic distribution of semantic similarity. Successively, the semantic network is plotted to identify latent discourses and semantic relationships within clusters and countries. The outcome offers a better picture of the
debate in terms of how discourses, held in different national public debate, are similar and complementary.

4. Identifying the Discourses in the Debate

In figure 1, I propose a two-layer network map where the grey nodes represent semantic groups or concepts defined by co-occurrences and similarity. The links in this conceptual layer denote the association between concepts (light gray) and countries (dark grey). The white nodes represent the layer of discourses, and the links with concepts and countries represent the semantic relationships that characterize the debate. This network map (Fig. 1) suggests that three major discourses have been disseminated to the readership in the aftermath of the Swiss referendum. These discourses can be summarized in the following way:

1. The liberal discourse promotes diversity of values, beliefs and identities (nodes: ‘respect’, ‘rights’, ‘multiculturalism’). This discourse is strongly committed to the nodes of ‘participation’ and ‘responsibility’. This link reveals an idea of society based on ‘solidarity’ and ‘respect’ of ethnic/religious communities. Hence, this discourse implies ‘recognition’ and ‘tolerance’ of religious diversity through the universal values of reason and tolerance. However, the node codified as ‘universalism’ can be polysemic. Here universalism might refer to a kind of universal pluralism in which prevails the idea of a cosmopolitan society but it could also define a normative horizon of integration, which find in liberal norms and values the universal and superior bonds of society. As a consequence, this ambiguity can imply a low ‘tolerance’ for those Islamic practices perceived as illiberal.

2. The nationalist discourse points to the national community (nodes: unity, continuity, history, nation, polity). Co-existence with Islam is possible and negotiable, so long as a communitarian identity does not prevail. In this discourse, there is a close relationship between the core node and the concepts of ‘history’, ‘nation’, ‘unity’, which provide the main assumptions about the national culture (nodes ‘traditions’, ‘continuity’, ‘heritage’). Hence, this discourse requires Muslims to assimilate to the particular cultural and political characteristics of the national community in order to preserve its ‘continuity’ and ‘unity’.

3. The exclusionist discourse assumes that Islam and Muslim culture are ‘illiberal’ and based on a ‘radical’ interpretation of religion. Muslim social and political institutions are thus regarded as opposed to ‘Western’ civilization and Islam is considered an undesirable religion. Therefore, in this
discourse can be distinguished by an ethnocentric vision and a supposed 'superiority' of Western culture. It should be noted that this discourse not necessarily embraces conservatism but also liberal philosophies. Intriguingly, the map (fig. 1) reveals two links between the core node and 'feminism' and 'gay'. Presumably, these discourses are conveyed via inter-discursivity to depict Islam as misogynist and patriarchal.

The cross-national comparison of the country-nodes suggests the presence of specific national patterns. For instance, the French node is closer to the nationalist discourse and prioritizes 'secularism', 'republicanism' and 'values' nodes. The French debate also reflects a significant degree of connection to the exclusionist discourse through the nodes of 'identity' and 'communitarianism'. Instead, the German node is close to the exclusionist discourse, though the link through the concept of 'intolerance' might be read...
as a concern for racism. Germany is also linked to the pluralist discourse through ‘religion’ and to the nationalist discourse via the ‘identity’ node. The position of the Italian node reflects the polarization of the Italian debate between the exclusionist discourse (connecting nodes: expulsion, immigrants) and the pluralist discourse (nodes: respect and solidarity). The British node is connected to both the pluralist discourse through the ‘community’ node and the nationalist discourse through ‘loyalty’.

These national patterns seem to be highly interconnected with established discourses on the nation. Briefly, in France any forms of communitarism based on ethnic, linguistic or religious identities are contrasted by Republican and Secular discourses (Jennings, 2000). In Germany, public debate avoids any references in negative terms of religious diversity because of the legacy of racist aberrations under Nazism. However, after reunification, a concern for the Leitkultur [the German leading culture] discourse seems to orient the present debate on immigration (Stehle, 2012: 168). In Italy, Catholic organizations and Unions have promoted the recognition of cultural pluralism, which has been favored by the lack of nationalistic discourses in the post-WWII public debate, however at the local level, forces like the Lega Nord have pursued a radical anti-Islamic agenda polarizing the public debate (Scalvini, 2011). In the UK, the experience of a “multiracial empire” (Hansen, 2000: viii) gives importance to minority groups by offering “social and political influence to members of ethno-cultural minorities” (Bertossi, 2007: 4). Therefore, inter-discursivity could explain the national patterns identified in Figure 1.

This realization, however, leads just to a partial understanding of how established discourses at the national scale operate to legitimate or delegitimize religious diversity. The semantic network in Figure 1 does not map onto the different newspapers, their partisan commitments, and therefore how their discursive strategies relate to traditional right-left political debates in these countries. Therefore, I quantified the ways that newspapers orientate towards each discursive strategy. The outcome in Figure 2 shows that there is a correlation between newspaper political orientation and adopted discursive strategy, the center-left press is more inclined to draws on a liberal-pluralist discourse while the center-right press has a higher prevalence of semantic association with the exclusionist discourse. However, in Figure 3 it can been seen that the associations related to the nationalist discourse have almost an equivalent distribution between the two political stances. For this reason, it is necessary a more detailed exploration of these semantic associations and their correlation to the political spectrum.
In Figure 4, I propose a one-layer network map, where modularity resolution has been optimized to emphasize the political polarization of the press coverage. In Figure 4, the nodes represent the semantic associations between newspaper political commitment and concepts. Dark-grey nodes (top area) are those related to conservative newspapers, while white nodes (bottom area) are associated to progressive broadsheets. Light-grey nodes (central area) are related to both political wings, in other words they do not have a
specific partisan commitment. The edges represent connectivity between nodes, a higher connectivity among nodes related to conservative press reveals a predominance in public debate. This leadership is indirectly confirmed by intertextuality, the nodes of the progressive press are very often linked to nodes of the opposite side. This particular configuration of edges shows that conservative press shapes the public debate, while the progressive side mainly reacts to arguments and discourses coming from the center-right broadsheets.

A closer analysis of nodes suggests that conservative press (top nodes) focuses on ‘Islam’ as different ‘culture’ and ‘religion.’ Such ‘diversity’ is opposed to a specific identity, which belongs to ‘Christianity’, ‘Europe’, and the ‘West’. This connotation of the European identity is characterized by ‘national values’, ‘faith’, ‘tolerance’, and ‘reason’, while ‘Mosque’ or ‘Imam’ are regarded as a ‘problem’ or a source of ‘conflict’, ‘tension’, ‘violence’ and ‘fear’. Therefore, the debate within the conservative press tends to have distinct elements of both the exclusionist and nationalist discourses. On the other hand, a substantial part of this debate draws also on nodes like ‘dialogue’, ‘tolerance’ and ‘respect’, which relate to a liberal/pluralist discourse.

As showed in Figure 3, the Semantic Map (Fig. 4) confirms that progressive broadsheets (bottom area) are more committed towards a liberal/pluralist discourse. The main nodes ‘Muslims’, ‘community’, ‘social’ reveal that the coverage is more about social cohesion rather than visible aspects of diversity like culture and religious identity. Specifically, ‘immigration’ and ‘policy’, ‘participation’, play a substantial role in setting the goals of the process of integration of Muslims. However, some nodes like ‘man’, ‘woman’, ‘gay’ reveal some of the ambiguity within the liberal/pluralist discourse because it identifies Islam as misogynist and patriarchal, therefore Muslims need to be educated to the liberal norms and values the universal and superior bonds of our progressive society. This aspect can be also declined as an exclusionist discourse when radically patronizes Muslim women and imposes a ban to the headscarf. The overlapping area (light-grey nodes) mirrors the concepts of the nationalist discourse, ‘government’, ‘state’, ‘nation’ and ‘citizen’ are the major concepts defining the national political community.
The outcome of the present network semantic analysis has defined the boundary of the debate on religious diversity in the afterwards of the Swiss referendum by analyzing the press coverage of four European countries. Three common discourses have been identified in Figure 1. The pluralist discourse is inclusive and presupposes that diversity can be realized renouncing the divisiveness caused by forms of national identity and loyalty. Debate becomes more conflictual when we enter the nationalist and exclusivist discourses. They express a highly national conception of political community, where Islam and Muslim culture are questioned. The nationalist discourse presupposes homogeneity and seeks to maintain social cohesion through a common identity and related values and beliefs, whereas the exclusionary discourse aims to limit or exclude Muslim religious diversity.
This realization, however, leads just to a partial understanding of how established discourses at the national scale operate to legitimate or delegitimize religious diversity. The semantic network in Figure 4 focuses on newspaper partisan commitments, and therefore how their discursive strategies relate to traditional right-left political debates. Conservative press expresses preoccupation about the raising cultural and religious diversity setting factual and symbolic limits to national membership and cultural belonging. On the other hand, progressive broadsheets are more concentrated in promoting social cohesion and pursuing the goals of inclusion and integration. However, the semantic map have also identified overlapping nodes and intra-connected edges that reflect both the degree of intertextuality and interdiscoursivity of the press coverage.

5. Discourse Legitimation and Textual Practice

This level of analysis is aimed at analyzing the textual strategies adopted to legitimate inclusion or exclusion in the discourses on religious diversity. In order to assess the textual strategy, I focused on 1) the argumentative features of the text; and 2) the lexical units and syntactic devices employed in the presentation of self and other (Wodak et al., 2009). For reason of feasibility, I selected the most representative excerpts within the sample.

The Liberal-Pluralist Discursive Strategy

The pluralist discourse emphasizes the moral responsibility of the national polity to include other religious traditions. This discourse is strongly committed to participation and gives highly importance to the *topoi* of culture and history. In the sample is possible to identify a vocabulary evoking Europe’s tradition of tolerance and reason and the related principles of coexistence between different religious groups. The *topos* of history aims linguistically to create a context of continuity throughout the history of Europe. Here, continuity refers to linking history to a common political present and future (Wodak et al., 2009: 30) by establishing chronological and causal relations with the past. In the following excerpt, this strategy can be observed:

Excerpt 1

“The European tolerance was .. a mode of coexistence between Catholics and Protestants, later Jews. Only in a second step, freedoms and public use of reason developed from the religious tolerance became the basis of modern constitutional states. Our democratic freedoms derived directly from the freedom of religion” [SDDZ, 12 December 2009]
Here the historical dimension of Europe is evoked through parallelism between religious wars and the present, hence tolerance, coexistence and reason, which underpin the democratic values of modern Europe originated by the religious freedom. In Excerpt 2, the topos of culture is used to remind readers that tolerance is always under attack; therefore, it is a moral imperative to use the universal reason to maintain this cultural inheritance:

Excerpt 2

“a common challenge is fostering tolerance and religious freedom everywhere”

“we must confront the cultural roots, using common elements as the reason and the logos”

(11: Corriere della Sera, 30 November 2009)

Excerpt 2 repeats the adjective ‘common’ in order to accentuate unifying shared features such as ‘reason’ and ‘logos’. The topos of culture responds to the necessity to accentuate cohesion; on the other hand, it implies a one-sided European heritage, which is assigned entirely positive attributes from the values of the Enlightenment, and systematically excludes intolerance and totalitarianism from this selective narrative.

In excerpt 2 and 3, the topos of culture is also elaborated through the deictic personal pronoun ‘we’ is the form of ‘person for country’ is also a metonymic form of ‘we’. Specifically, in excerpt 3, the personal pronoun ‘we’ and the possessive adjective ‘our’ refers to the ‘national body’, those elements are the linguistic devices defining the in-group:

Excerpt 3

“We need not only to identify our values, and to live by them, but also to acknowledge the basis for them. (UK: The Telegraph, 27 December 2009)

The synecdoche reference to the ‘we’-group is frequently linked to the ‘they’-group. The opposition ‘we/them’ reflects linguistically an ambiguous asymmetrical relationship because it expresses a hierarchy: ‘we’ is the subject and ‘them’ is the complement. In this way, personification of the groups is used to invite to cohesiveness, readers are addressed as a united and cohesive group sharing the same values. But it also implies two separate groups with different set of values. For this reason, Muslims [‘them’] are solicited to reflect upon their values and support these values even when they find themselves opposed to their religious or cultural identity (Esposito and Kalin, 2011: 7). This strategy is evident in Excerpt 4:

Excerpt 4

Muslims in Europe should be proud of our identity that is enriched by the universal values of our religion. (FR: Le Monde, 5 December 2009)
This excerpt articulates the wish that Muslims ‘should’ recognize themselves as European; the modal expression ‘should’ indicates an obligation rather than a choice (Costelloe, 2014: 325). The modal signals that the whole argumentation is conjectural. Rather than being grounded on factual observations, the argument is supported by a verb expressing a feeling of what is due to the in-group. In this way, the out-group is called to express its pride for supporting the in-group’s culture. In this way, the immediate equality between the two cultures appears highly improbable. This specific excerpt reveals how “universal” present a polysemic ambiguity. In the liberal-pluralist discourse, universal should refer to a kind of pluralism in which prevails the idea of a cosmopolitan society. Instead, universal in Excerpt 4 defines a normative limit to pluralism, which find in liberal norms and values the superior bonds of society.

A very distinctive feature of the pluralist discourse is the ‘paternalistic we,’ the synecdochal pronoun ‘we’ is adopted to be speaker-inclusive, but which actually excludes the speaker (Wodak et al., 2009: 46) and refers solely to a moral aspiration to universalism, which emanates from the supposed uniqueness culture of the majority group. In excerpt 5, ‘we’ is also supported by the imperative modal verb ‘must’, as a consequence the ‘we’-group patronize education to develop critical thinking in the out-group through a topos of advantage (Reisigl and Wodak, 2005: 226) which is in the form of a pro bono publico (for the public good) and in the form of a pro vitis eorum (for the benefit of Muslim fellows):

Excerpt 5

We must make every effort to ensure that this education enables new generations to have an understanding of Islam that ensures their balance and social development, education that enables them to have a critical look at all the traditions and customs that are aggregated to Islam and who, in addition to it being foreign, often constitute negations. (FR: Le Monde, 5 December 2009)

In excerpt 5 there is a two-fold usage of the modal, a deontic construction combining the understanding of what is Islam (modal base) with education about what is preferable (ordering source), and an epistemic modality combining knowledge about what the in-group is committed to (modal base) with the liberal culture that the in-group considers more or less ignored in the out-group (ordering source). This construction reflects the ambiguity of the polysemic nature of the ‘universalism’ node (fig. 1). In excerpt 5, the use of the modal encodes a patronizing strategy, which determines who can and who cannot judge a particular form of diversity fits in a universal category, in turn, this power reproduces a hierarchy of acceptable and unacceptable cultures.
The authority to name and categorize groups reflect also the ability to categorize the subject ['we'] as the “legitimator” of the group membership and accordingly the authority to disregard the out-group. In doing so, the subject has the role to define and elaborate the categories of social membership (Costelloe, 2014: 333). However, in excerpt 6 it can be identified a different linguistic device: the generalizing ‘we’ synecdoche *pars pro toto*. In other words, a secular sub-group is called to represent the entirety of Muslims. In the following extract, the use the personal pronoun ’we’ simultaneously position the Muslim out-group as being member of both the in-group:

**Excerpt 6**

*We, republican Muslims and hence secular, as French citizens we love France not by chance. We like France because it is a humanistic democracy, reason why Muslims joined the army to make the ultimate sacrifice. We also love France because women can fight for their rights. And of course, we like secularism because it allows everyone to believe in what they want, or not to believe. We admire the 1905 law separating state and faith so that no one can ever decide what view is superior to another one.* (FR: Le Figaro, 22 December 2009)

A self-declared group of ‘republican Muslims’ published this text in the conservative newspaper Le Figaro. Here, the deictic reference to the pronoun ‘we’ express the self-identification of the authors with the values of the French republic. The pronoun ‘we’ also becomes a particular icon standing for a complete set of characteristics expected from the in-group to consider Muslims properly recognized as French. Additionally, the repetition of the personal pronoun ‘we’ reinforces the presumption of shared values and emphasizes the adherence to the national identity. Repetition also indicates an ‘intensifying’ strategy which is used to provoke emotivism.

In excerpt 6 different tropes are used more or less explicitly to construct sameness within both groups. However, the most intriguing and worrying aspect of this interplay between groups reminds Fanon’s analysis in *Pou noir, masques blancs* (Black Skin, White Masks, 1952) about the feeling of dependency and inadequacy that the colonized experience in the colonizers’ world. Therefore, a critical aspect of the analysis of the liberal discourse should point to differences with the European Civilizing mission embedded in colonialism.

Overall, the liberal pluralist discourse is driven by an attempt to include Muslims and Islam in Europe, linguistically this goal is created through a constructive strategy linked primarily to *topoi* of a shared past and a collective present and future. At the same time, this discourse also asks for and expects from Muslims to demonstrate their willingness to integration.
The Nationalistic Discoursive Strategy

This discourse is characterized by a lexicon that invokes an in-group status of superiority than can be considered as archetypal forms of “self-glorification” and “self-presentation” (van Dijk, 2006: 370). National identification aims at preserving a continuity principle of accepted and internalized social representations of the ethno-national in-group’s worldview (Reisigl and Wodak, 2005: 226). As a consequence, dissimilarity or variation is perceived as undesirable. For illustrating this discourse, I chose Nikolas Sarkozy’s editorial, published on 8 December in both Le Monde and the Guardian (two progressive newspapers), because shifts of ‘we’-position, generalizing-synecdochal and metonymic references are explicative and suggestive.

In this editorial, the former French President defends the Swiss vote, because it does not discriminate against the freedoms of religious practice or conscience. According to Sarkozy, it is understandable for European people to worry about their national identity and demand that Muslims accept the historical values of the nation-states where they now live. Therefore, according to Sarkozy, Muslims are newcomers not included within the political borders of the national membership and cultural belonging. Muslim religious diversity is seen as in conflict with the funding elements of the French republic, thus this nationalist discourse completely ignores the rights of those who are national citizens such as descendants of immigrants or those converted to Islam.

Sarkozy’s main argument is based on national continuity (Wodak et al, 2009: 40) through a *topos* of identity. People are described as afraid of losing their identity (line 30). For example, Sarkozy advocates that people’s fear cannot be ignored or undervalued (lines: 31-32). In his view, the Swiss people felt their identity was being threatened by immigration (lines 32-33). As a consequence, Sarkozy argues that the rights of religious minorities do not and must not override or change the secular identity that the national majority accepts culturally. Therefore, according to Sarkozy religious minorities such as Muslims are not national and might menace the identity of nationals.

A further strategy adopted by Sarkozy is to focus Muslim’s responsibilities towards the ‘we’-group. In line 35, “national identity” reflects the value of nationalism as a secular characterisation of both self-determination and respect of the individual and personality. While the metonymic use of “tribalism” and “sectarianism” is associated to Muslim communities.
Tactically, these metonymies are opposed to the ‘we’-group. In line 49, “our country” is a metonymy adopted to linguistically represent nationals.

Excerpt 7
[49] But I also want to tell them that in our country, where Christian
[50] civilisation has left a lasting mark, where republican values are part of
[51] our national identity, anything that could be regarded as a challenge to
[52] those values would scupper the creation of the kind of French Islam that,
[53] without undermining any of its core beliefs, shares our social and civic
[54] contract.

Successively, he also refers to “our national identity,” and explicitly remarks that these metonymies are denoted by Christian heritage and republican values (lines 49-50). However, this construction is not exclusive, according to Sarkozy, Muslims are responsible of political belonging, and of the creation of a French version of Islam. Here there are similarities with excerpt 5 on “Republican Muslims.” Muslims have thus the moral obligation to recognise and accept “our [French] social and civic contract” (lines 53-54). In other words, Muslims must respect the rules of French society without asking for any special accommodation. The goal is to assimilate Muslims in the political and cultural roots of France and create a “French Islam” (line 53).

Excerpt 8
[55] Whatever our beliefs, we must avoid provoking others and must realise
[56] how lucky we are to inhabit a free country. We must practice religion
[57] discreetly – not through any lack of faith, but out of fraternal respect
[58] for those whose beliefs we do not share, but with whom we want to live.

It is worth noting the we-reference shift in this editorial. In excerpt 7, Sarkozy does not address directly Muslims: “I want also to tell them that in our country” (line 49); rather, he is ‘telling’ to the French people about Muslims. In excerpt 8, Sarkozy conveys the synecdochal speaker-inclusive ‘we’ to include Muslims in the ‘we’-group. But this shift is also characterised by a normative modal construction, he repeats ‘We must’ three times between line 55-54. This linguistic device is not just a rhetorical strategy but it reveals a context of tutelage, the verb must introduce specific normative directives: “we must”… “avoid”, “realise”, and “practice”. In doing so, Sarkozy adopts a ‘paternalistic we.’ This synecdochal ‘we’ in excerpt 8 excludes the speaker and refers solely to “Muslims”.

Overall, the main stake of this discourse pursues assimilation of Muslims rather than integration. Consequently, Muslims must change or adapt to become integrated in the nation. For understanding this discursive strategy, a sense of national continuity is crucial because it is thornily linked up with the
question of national identity, and which values are necessary to define political membership. However, this discourse perpetuates a wrong assumption, namely Muslims can become citizens only if they renounce to the conflictual aspects of their cultural, religious and ethnic diversity. But many of these conflicts do not concern newcomers but descendants of immigrants, who are national citizens.

The Exclusionist Discursive Strategy

This discourse emphasizes Islam as incompatible with Western and European values, it presupposes the impossibility to assimilate Muslims. As a consequence, Muslim social and political institutions are regarded illegitimate and religious diversity is represented as an issue threatening social cohesion. This discourse of exclusion is linguistically based on several textual strategies. Extract 9 emphasis a sense of loss, which is expressed primarily through a *topos* of culture:

**Excerpt 9**

The broader problem is that there has been the loss of a common narrative, a story which underpins our national life. In the past, this was provided by the Judaeo-Christian tradition, derived from the Bible. (UK: The Telegraph, 27 December 2009)

The source of national life is set back to the Judeo-Christian traditions provided by the Bible, but this culture is perceived as lost. These specific traditions play a role in defining who belongs to the national polity, at the same time the antithetical narrative can be used to exclude Muslims. It is interesting to observe the different use of this *topos* made in the pluralist discourse, creating a sense of continuity with the present to seek similarity. In the present discourse, the loss of a common narrative is an attempt to dismiss religious diversity. Extract 10 explicitly claims that religious diversity is a cause of disruption which brings confusion and moral disorder:

**Excerpt 10**

What a miasma of moral confusion we are succumbing to - all for the sake of avoiding a question that must be asked: how does a liberal society cope with a minority in whose name acts of violence are carried out in its midst? (UK: Sunday Telegraph, 29 November 2009)

In Excerpt 10, “miasma” is used metonymically to describe the uncertainty of the present. In the second sentence of the sample, the exclusionist argument is introduced by a rhetorical question, while the synecdochal reference to the minority out-group is linked with derogatory attributions and ascriptions of negative features such as violence.
The radicalism of this discourse is explicit in an editorial entitled “New Rules for Immigration” written in the Corriere della Sera by Giovanni Sartori, a well known political theorist and emeritus professor at Columbia University. The editorial predicts a negative future for Italy and Europe because Islam is incompatible with Western societies. In excerpt 11.1, an anecdotal fallacy based on historical and geographical topos is adopted to justify and make immutable ethnical and political differences:

Excerpt 11.1
The question then is if you tell us the story of cases, from 630 d.C. onwards, integration of Muslims, or at least of their successful incorporation of ethical and political (in the values of the political system), in non-Islamic societies. The answer is depressing: no (IT: Corriere della Sera, 20 December 2009).

Sartori persists in this strategy of discrediting Islam through trivialization by means of personalization and metonymization. In excerpt 11.2, it can be found a derogatory attribution of “invasive” and a negatively connoted metaphor of “inflaming”:

Excerpt 11.2
Islam is … an invasive theocratic monotheism that after a long stagnation has awakened and is increasingly inflaming. (IT: Corriere della Sera, 20 December 2009).

Further, Sartori emphasizes a topos of comparison (locus minoris) with other immigrant groups:

Excerpt 11.3
Chinese, Japanese, and Indians are integrated without problems in the West while maintaining their respective cultural and religious identities. (IT: Corriere della Sera, 20 December 2009).

In excerpt 11.3, it is interesting to observe the depersonalization of immigrants by national categories to erase religious differences and the use of the passive which implies their lack of agency in the process of integration. Sartori commits also a fallacy in this comparison, he mixes up national and religious identities, as a large part of Indian are Muslim then his argument is fallacious.

Muslism are depicted as a minority representing an explicit threat: “The illusion to integrate Muslims is a giant risk to avoid, a risk not to risk it”. The word ‘risk’ is repeated three times in order to give more emotional emphasis to the threat. The consequence is that “Muslims should not be able to become Italian citizens.” But the the validity of the argument is independent of the truth or falsity of the premise, then Sartori commits a new logical fallacy. In
fact, several Muslims are Italians because they converted to Islam, or have
tained citizenship through naturalisation.

Additionally, this argument is expressed through a normative-deontic
modal “should not be able”. The use of the passive tense denotes a lack of
agency but it is interesting to identify the hidden agent: ‘by us’. Thus this
sentence could be rephrased as ‘We should not let Muslims to become Italian
citizens.’ The representation of Muslim newcomers as a threat implicitly
activates an exclusionary discourse, which aims justifying and legitimizing
expulsion or strong regulation of minority rights. This discourse of exclusion
becomes highly problematic when diversity is considered non-negotiable or
very dependent on the traditions marking the in-group.

In large part of this debate, there is no attempt to neglect Muslims and their
religious freedom. In the liberal discourse, I have found explicit emphasis of
similarity and sameness as well as emphasis of integration and social
cohesion. Whereas I have classified an assimilative emphasis in the
nationalist discourse, which stresses differences and accentuates identity to
preserve the continuity of shared values and beliefs. The last discourse is
characterized by an exclusionary emphasis, in which differences are pointed
out as a threat when incompatible with the dominant values, norms, and
beliefs of a society. Therefore, nationalist and exclusionary discourses imply a
regulation of the processes of integration through a limitation, or at least
diminution, of religious diversity.

6. Conclusion

The goal of this paper was to analyse the discourses related to the intense
public and policy debate about Muslim integration across Europe.
Specifically, voters as well as politicians are expressing a growing
preoccupation with possible dangers that growing cultural, religious and
ethnic diversity represent for national unity and social cohesion. For this
reason, I explored press coverage between 2009 and 2010, the years in which
the minarets ban entered the socio-political arena of the European public
debate. The main goal of the methodology was to understand how religious
diversity was problematized through a social network analysis, which allowed
me to uncover semantic associations and elicit common discourses in the
press of France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. Successively, I applied
discourse analysis to relevant samples in order to examine textual strategies
used to legitimate inclusion or exclusion of religious difference.
The most substantial finding confirms an alignment of news coverage within the four countries. Three common discourses with different degrees of tolerance have been identified: 1) Liberal-Pluralist; 2) Nationalist; 3) Exclusionist. However, the comparison suggests that at the national level these discourses prioritize specific patterns, which reflect both the particular history of each country and the partisan commitment of the press. This finding is also confirmed by inter-discoursivity, which provides an effective analytical tool to assess the ways in which discourses crosscut established national narratives and function either to destabilize or provide avenues towards pluralism. Further, at the intertextual level the network semantic map revealed that conservative press had a role of leadership in this debate, while progressive broadsheets mainly reacted to arguments and discourses coming from the opposite political side.

Discourse analysis investigated the textual devices and linguistic strategies employed in the representation of pluralism and tolerance through discursive practice. In the pluralist discourse diversity is posed in terms of similarity and sameness as well as inclusion. At the same time, the emphasis on social cohesion sets out an expectation from Muslims to demonstrate their willingness to integration. In the nationalist discourse the question is more about the degrees of diversity that can be integrated into the national community, the implicit limits of tolerance symbolize the boundary of the national polity. While in the exclusionary discourse, national identity and difference are assumed to be binary constructions. In this construction, diversity can be interpreted as a threat when incompatible with the dominant values, norms, and beliefs of the majority. Although these three discourses are somewhat different, they relate as they concern about Muslim religious diversity as a kind of difference that might jeopardize social bonds.

Paradoxically, in this debate the question of religious diversity is based on a total misunderstanding of an increasingly post-migration society, where new identities struggle to be included within the cultural confines of national communities. The explored discourses perpetuate a wrong assumption, namely Muslims are no included in the perimeter of the national community, they can become citizens only if they renounce to the conflictual aspects of their cultural, religious and ethnic diversity. But many of these conflicts, as the recent shootings in Paris and Brussels prove, do not concern newcomers but descendants of immigrants, who are national citizens.
Acknowledgment

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Notes on contributor

I am a module lecturer at LSE Enterprise. My research interest is in how meaning is created and communicated through the media and interpersonal relations. My two current projects focus on minorities and public health. I use emerging computational methods to combine quantitative with qualitative research, and interpret, analyze and present narratives and data. Before joining LSE, I worked as a consultant for several international organizations (UNESCO, UN, OSCE, G8/G20).
Addendum

Table 1 – Composition of the Dataset

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