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Introduction: writing a supranational history of the EEC

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Writing a supranational history of the EEC

The first four years of the European Community’s existence were conspicuously successful. Between 1958 and 1962, the six founding member states demonstrated an ability to implement and even go beyond their original treaty bargain which surprised and delighted those who negotiated the Treaty of Rome.¹ The new institutions appeared to function. By 1962 the European Commission had seemingly overcome its teething problems and had shown itself to be a fertile source of policy proposals and a skilful advocate of Community advance.² The early track record of the Council of Ministers, meanwhile, had underlined that even without the generalised use of majority voting that was due to begin in 1966 wide-ranging consensus could be effectively and rapidly built between six governmental representatives. The European Court of Justice seemed intent on continuing that process of forming a far-reaching body of European jurisprudence that had been the hall-mark of its operation within


the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).³ And even the European Parliamentary Assembly – the Cinderella institution in terms of power and influence under the original treaty-rules – had shown an energy and a commitment to both its own development and the wider advance of European integration that made it unlikely that its comparative powerlessness would continue indefinitely. Its 1962 decision to call itself the ‘European Parliament’ rather than its treaty-given name – and the way in which this altered title was generally accepted by all but the French – said much about both its ambition and the chances of some of its aspirations being realised.⁴

The emergence of common policies was also further advanced than many had expected. The clearest example of initial expectations being exceeded was the 1960 decision taken by the Six to ‘accelerate’ the timetable for creating a customs union set out in the Treaty of Rome.⁵ This meant that both the establishment of tariff-free trade amongst the Six and the creation of a uniform tariff towards the outside world were likely to be completed substantially before the January 1, 1970 deadline originally agreed. Similar encouragement could be drawn from the way in which the Six had by 1961 managed to agree on all of those problematical tariff positions left undefined in the original Treaty – the so-called ‘List G’.⁶ But perhaps still more striking for those

³ Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer, ‘Der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften als Integrationsfaktor’ in Ernst von Caemmerer, Probleme des Europäischen Rechts (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1966);
Stuart Scheingold, The Rule of Law in European Integration. The Path of the Schuman Plan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965)
⁴ Le Monde, 1-2.4.1962
observing the EEC’s early steps was the way in which a European agricultural policy did appear likely to emerge. The 1950s discussions about agricultural cooperation on a European scale had seemingly shown that the evident desire of several European countries to promote European agricultural integration co-existed with a formidable and possibly insurmountable range of obstacles.\(^7\) There had thus been many who had believed that those articles of the Treaty of Rome stipulating that the new body should have a European agricultural policy would remain as purely paper pledges. However, the landmark decisions of January 1962, defining the basic shape and manner of operation of the common agricultural policy (CAP), indicated that within the EEC progress towards a ‘green Europe’ might be smoother and quicker than the 1950s precedent had appeared to suggest.\(^8\) In particular, the way in which an effective pro-CAP alliance between the French, the Dutch and the European Commission had been able to overcome the hesitations of the West Germans and Italians, established a pattern of advance that if repeated might see a working agricultural policy established simultaneously with the planned customs union. Little wonder then, that when looking back at this initial surge of institutional and policy success, the European Commissioner Robert Marjolin should describe the 1958-1962 period as ‘the honeymoon years’.\(^9\)

International reactions to the early integration process had also been highly encouraging. That the United States government had been supportive should perhaps


\(^9\) Marjolin, *Le Travail d’une Vie*, p.304
not have come as a total surprise. Ever since 1947 Washington had championed the
idea of European unity, primarily for cold war reasons. Nevertheless, the closeness
and warmth of the rapport built up between Walter Hallstein’s European Commission
and the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations was both remarkable and, in the
context of a superpower dominated world, extremely valuable. The wave of US
academics who descended upon the Brussels of the late 1950s and early 1960s to
describe in immensely (and excessively) favourable terms the process of
transformation underway was also indicative of positive US sentiments towards the
eyearly EEC. And US goodwill was more than matched by the almost unseemly rush
amongst other Western-leaning countries to establish ties with the nascent
Community. Within two years of the EEC’s establishment, Greece, Turkey, Israel
and Lebanon had all begun negotiations with the Community with a view to
establishing some type of privileged relationship, while countless other countries had
set up representative offices and missions in Brussels so as to be able better to observe
and influence the process underway amongst the Six. In 1961 outside attention had
become even more flattering, if potentially disruptive, with requests for membership
submitted by Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway. Not all of those involved with
the Brussels experiment were entirely pleased that such applications had arrived at so

10 Geir Lundestad, *Empire by Integration: the United States and European Integration 1945-1997*

1993)

12 See Jonathan P.J. White, ‘Theory Guiding Practice: the Neofunctionalists and the Hallstein EEC
Commission’, *Journal of European Integration History*, vol. 9, no. 1, 2003, pp.111-131

13 Alan S. Milward & Anne Deighton (eds.), *Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European
early a stage of the Community’s development, but it was undeniable that, as Sicco Mansholt, another of the first Commissioners, put it, ‘we can view the British, Danish and Irish membership applications as proof of the success of our Community’.  

Such success was all the more notable, and welcome, for coming at a time when other political developments seemed only to confirm Europe’s reduced status in global affairs. For the French the 1958 to 1962 period was dominated by the latter stages of the Algerian trauma: the collapse of the IV Republic in 1958, precipitated primarily by events in North Africa, was followed by the fraught attempts to extricate France from the bloody colonial war and by the wave of bitterness and internal strife that this ‘retreat’ provoked – bitterness encapsulated most prominently by the multiple attempts to assassinate General de Gaulle. For Germany, meanwhile, the repeated crises over Berlin in 1958-9 and then again in 1961 only served to underline its vulnerability as a front-line state in the cold war, its dependency on the goodwill of its alliance partners, and its fear of being the victim of a settlement struck behind its back by the US and the Soviet Union. The building of the Wall in 1961 did bring a stability of sorts, but only by quite literally setting in stone the postwar division of the country. And, for all of Europe, the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962 seemed to epitomise the continent’s relative powerlessness. During the confrontation all of the Six had risked annihilation and yet had none had had either privileged information about or any influence over the course of American policy. Instead, they had been mere spectators as the US President determined the Western response to the most

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dangerous crisis of the cold war.\footnote{Maurice Vaïsse (ed.), \textit{L’Europe et la crise de Cuba} (Paris: Plon, 1993)} For countries that had grown accustomed to considering themselves as at the centre of world affairs, this was a difficult state of affairs to accept. Against such a gloomy backdrop, European integration was not merely a welcome success story, but also a process which might, in the medium term at least, begin to redress the imbalance of power that had existed since 1945.

Despite four years of successful operation, however, the Community of 1962 had not yet advanced far towards answering the two crucial questions, implicit in, but unanswered by, the Treaty of Rome. The first of these was that of ‘what the Community should do’: in other words, which policy areas the integration process should the Six initially concentrate on. The second was that of ‘how the Community should operate’. This centred on the institutional make-up of the EEC. On neither did the Treaty of Rome provide a complete answer. In terms of the EEC’s policy agenda, the Rome Treaty was very much a ‘traité cadre’ – a framework document that provided the mechanisms for cooperation but left up to later decision-makers the choice of what policies should flank the basic customs union. Agriculture, transport and social policy were all referred to briefly as possible areas of common activity, but for none were the details or the timetable of progress spelt out. And on institutional matters the Treaty text was equally open. Some of its provisions and some of its vocabulary seemed to suggest a direct line of descent from the avowedly federal Schuman Plan of 1950. There was thus plenty of scope for those eager to see the rapid establishment of a fully united Europe to press ahead with their ambitions. But other aspects of the Treaty seemed, by contrast, to show the extent to which Europe’s leaders had retreated from the federalist mechanisms of the early 1950s. In both powers and name, the European Commission was hence very different from the High
Authority of the ECSC. Likewise, the EEC Council of Ministers had a centrality within the institutional make-up which underlined how far it had come since being a belated Benelux addition to French ideas in 1950.

To these two initial unanswered questions a third had then been added by the approach of the British, Irish, Danes and Norwegians in 1961, namely that of ‘who should participate in the Community’. Here too the EEC’s founding charter offered little precise guidance. There was a treaty article – number 237 – which set out the mechanism by which a membership application might be received. The treaty preamble furthermore spoke of the Community being open to all European states. But no details were given as to when these applications might occur, what criteria, if any, should be used to decide which applications were acceptable, and how the EEC might avoid its internal progress being seriously disrupted by the eagerness of new states to join the process. The ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘whom’ of early integration were all equally undefined.

At the very beginning of the integration process this degree of ambiguity had been a positive asset. The openness with regard to the Community’s agenda had allowed each member state to hope that its preferred areas of joint activity would flourish whereas those cooperative ideas with which it had little sympathy would remain on the drawing board. The Italians had thus envisaged a Community with a much greater ‘social policy’ dimension than the Germans; the French and the Dutch had thought in terms of a much more extensive (and expensive) agricultural policy than had the Germans or the Italians. In similar fashion, the multiple institutional aspirations compatible with the basic treaty text had allowed the widest possible range of pro-Europeans to support the setting up of the EEC. Within the broad coalition that had rallied behind the Treaty of Rome were committed federalists, certain that only a
truly united Europe would suffice and confident that this would be the eventual outcome of the integration process, and partisans of a much more cautious intergovernmental approach. Many of the latter had just as much faith that the institutional balance created by the Treaty of Rome would evolve in ‘their’ direction as had the federalists. And even the uncertainty over the exact membership of the EEC had allowed the co-existence within the early Community of many of those who had been most enthusiastic about the British-led plans for an eighteen-member European free trade area alongside partisans of a smaller, tighter and exclusively continental grouping.\textsuperscript{18} The ability of so many different strands of opinion to cohere together behind the institutions of the Community was one of the key reasons that the Six had all been able to attain the necessary parliamentary backing to ratify the Treaty of Rome.

As the Community developed, however, it was inevitable that some of those who held these divergent beliefs would begin to realise that their hopes were likely to be frustrated. A Community that existed could not hope to be all things to all people in quite the same way as one that had yet to emerge. And, as this happened, the latent disagreements about the policy agenda, the institutional balance and the membership of the EEC were bound to come out into the open. After May 1958 this was all the more likely to happen because of General de Gaulle’s return to power in France. On all three of the crucial questions, the new French leader was suspected of having radically different views from the majority of his European counterparts. He was also known to aspire to a world role for Europe which differed markedly from that of the

prevailing Atlanticist consensus. His re-emergence as Prime Minister and then President of France – the country that had hitherto exercised the greatest influence, both positive and negative, over the integration process – was therefore a source of significant concern across Europe.

For his first four years in power, de Gaulle had, however, confounded those who had predicted an immediate clash. Rather than rejecting his predecessors’ European commitments, he had instead reformed the French economy, thereby allowing the country to honour its Treaty commitments much more completely than the leaders of IV Republic France themselves had expected to do. And far from casting off all supranational shackles and proclaiming France’s total freedom from external constraints, he had actually pushed energetically for a common agricultural policy that was as binding on Community member states as was possible and which gave considerable powers of initiative and oversight to the European Commission. Gaullist France seemed as committed to the Community game as any of its partners.

There were, admittedly, periodic rhetorical outbursts that gave rise to some concern. The most celebrated of these – that of May 15, 1962 – prompted several ministers to resign from the French government. And there were those who

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believed that the French President’s ambition to create a political Europe to place alongside the economic Europe being constructed in Brussels was no more than a Machiavellian ploy to subvert the integration process.\textsuperscript{24} But even on this issue, the fact that de Gaulle allowed the Fouchet Plan to be blocked by two states as small as Holland and Belgium could have been construed as a sign of playing by the European rules rather than trying to tear them up.\textsuperscript{25} Whether through the weakness that arose from leading a coalition government, a total concentration on Algeria, or a disinclination to upset a process from which his country drew tangible benefits, the General seemed unwilling to turn his verbal sallies into an assault on the realities of integration as practised in Brussels. The Gaullist challenge appeared to be no more than a paper-tiger.

All of this changed dramatically in January 1963. The French veto of British membership – announced in the famous press conference of January 14 - marked the moment when de Gaulle’s divergences of view from his Community partners ceased simply being theoretical and became an immediate danger. At the same time, the veto also marked the transition from Marjolin’s ‘honeymoon years’ to the ‘time of crises’.\textsuperscript{26} And it is on these crises – and the Community’s painful recovery from each of them – that this book is intended to focus. It is hence a study of the most traumatic period in the EEC’s early development rather than its most successful.

In part this focus reflects a belief that it is at moments of crisis that the nature of a political system like the early EEC can best be perceived. During the 1958-1962


\textsuperscript{26} Marjolin, *Le travail d’une vie*, pp.322-353
period the Community’s forward momentum was so irresistible that even many of those who harboured doubts about the integration process chose to remain silent. Similarly, with success following on from success, the effort that had gone into each was at times all but concealed. In the later period, by contrast, not only did the divisions that the pursuit of greater integration caused emerge more clearly, but the efforts needed to push that process forward became that much more evident and hence easier to analyse. Both the dynamics driving supranational Europe onwards and the forces holding it back are as result easier to dissect at a time when they were closely balanced than during one where only the pressures for integration were clearly apparent.

The concentration on the years of crisis is also, however, a result of the fact that the clash between de Gaulle and his partners over the nature of the Community is frequently referred to by EC/EU experts, but seldom understood. Several of the episodes which this book will assess in detail – like the empty chair crisis or the Luxembourg compromise of January 1966 – have assumed near mythical importance in the version of history most often referred to in Community circles and amongst those academics who work on the current EU.27 They have become seen as the key moments when the Community dream went awry, a process of downfall that only the equally mythical rebirth of the 1980s was able to undo. And yet such assertions are nearly always made without the benefit of any detailed study of the later 1960s themselves. The myth has thus long-since ceased to bear much resemblance to historical reality.

Thanks to the fact that most Western European archives exercise a thirty year rule and hence release hitherto secret papers after three decades have elapsed, the myth is now ripe for correction. Rather than relying on the well-rehearsed account which describes the way in which de Gaulle was able to strip the Community of virtually all of its dynamism, thereby condemning it, from the mid-1960s until the mid-1980s, to nearly two decades of frustration, this study will use archival documents to demonstrate that the reality of the Community’s development during the 1963-9 period is both more complicated and more important than the standard history would suggest. For not only did de Gaulle not ‘win’, but the period in question also witnessed the emergence and consolidation of an institutional system that would function throughout the next decades. Indeed, significant features of it are still with us today. Revealing what happened to the EEC in the course of the 1960s is thus more than a matter of simple historical interest. Instead it is a vital part of understanding how the Community system was created and, therefore, why crucial parts of it function as they do at present. Such comprehension is necessary for any one seeking to analyse the current system, let alone those who seek to reform its future operation. A better understanding of how the EC/EU emerged may, in other words, make at least a small contribution to the debate currently underway about where it should go.

The task of demythologising the recent past by means of newly released archival documents is of course a familiar one to any contemporary historian. Where this book will diverge from the norm, however, is in its attempt at the archival reconstruction of a supranational system. Most contemporary history remains resolutely national in its approach. Multiple archives are often employed, but they tend to be those of different government ministries, different private interest groups,
or different individuals, all acting within the same national sphere. And this has remained true of the majority of efforts so far devoted to the origins and early development of European integration. A range of books and articles thus explore German industry and the integration process, Italy and early European agricultural integration, or France and the plans for European political union. Similarly, the rich profusion of edited volumes devoted to the postwar emergence of European unity, tend to be organised around chapters on the Netherlands, Italy, France, Britain, Denmark and so on.

There have admittedly been some historians who have attempted to transcend the purely national framework. Alan Milward’s important studies on the pre-1958 development of European integration did deploy a wide range of different countries’ records, albeit grouped most often in national case-studies rather than combined

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together to form a single, continuous strand of pan-European analysis. Likewise a number of American scholars have sought to take a multi-country approach to recent European history. In this fashion they have been following the example set by those like Marc Trachtenberg who have tried to trace the evolution of the cold war in Europe using archives in a variety of European countries. And there have been a series of Italian historians who have turned the inadequacies of their own national archives into a spur for writing truly multinational history. There has also been a sizeable sub-genre dedicated to bilateral relationships in postwar Western Europe. That between France and Germany has understandably been the most


Few of these studies, however, have really come to terms with the fact that, from 1958 onwards, national actors within a European context shared some of their power with supranational institutions and exercised their influence collectively as well as singly. This means that the development of the EEC cannot be understood purely by lining up in parallel revelations from the study of France, Germany, and every other EEC member state. Instead the interplay between each national policy as well as the extra input of the Community institutions themselves need to be added to the historical analysis.

This is not, of course, the same as asserting that national actions or national interest ceased to be relevant in Community Europe and that all could be understood merely by scrutinising the policy and motives of the European Commission. To do this would be to repeat the mistakes of a generation of over-enthusiastic US political scientists whose better judgement was swept away in their excitement at, and fascination in, the operation of early supranational Europe – and who then had time to
repent at their leisure once the experiment seemingly diverged from their expectations from the late 1960s onwards.\textsuperscript{35} For this reason, the gradual emergence of a serious historical literature on the early European institutions, while very useful and overdue, cannot of itself plug the gap.\textsuperscript{36} Nor can the fascinating official history of the ECSC suffice, given the way in which that body ceased to be the principal locus of the integration process from 1958 onwards.\textsuperscript{37}

Rather it is to argue that the European Community of the 1960s – much as the European Union of today – was a hybrid system in which national interest was very much alive but was worked out in a setting where compromise with other competing national interests was essential and where the views and influence of supranational actors like the European Commission or the European Court of Justice were also of importance in determining the eventual outcome. As a result, the historian seeking to understand the way in which the system functioned must be prepared to work in as


multinational and supranational a setting as the politicians and civil servants who populated Community Brussels of the 1960s.

In practice this means using the historical archives of both the European institutions themselves and those of the individual member states. The methodology used in this book is therefore to start with scrutiny of the supranational records (especially the detailed records of Council discussions held in the Council of Ministers archive in Brussels) in order to establish how collective European decisions were taken, before then going back to the principal member states so as to determine why each national delegation acted as they did. The various national archives themselves also of course contain much information about what happened in Brussels. Each delegation, after all, tended to report back to their national capital, setting out what had happened and making their predictions about where discussions à Six were likely to go next. These national accounts thus form a useful complement to the official Council minutes and the Commission records of debates amongst the permanent representatives. But in most cases they lack either the level of detail or the neutrality of the Council records in particular. Where the national records come into their own, by contrast, is in their coverage of internal policy debate within each member state and of the bilateral diplomacy away from Brussels that happened in parallel to the multilateral discussions within the EEC institutions. Since both of these often mattered greatly, the national collections of the French, the Germans, the Italians and the Dutch are crucial archival components of the research that has gone into this book.

In an ideal world, all of the supranational and national collections in the early Community would have been used to write the history of the early EEC. Sadly, however, the records of Belgium proved inaccessible, whereas the Italian papers seen
were obtained only through the generosity of a friend and fellow-researcher. This book hence draws primarily on the archives of the European Council of Ministers (held in Brussels), those of the European Commission, (also in Brussels although duplicated in part in Florence), the papers of the Quai d’Orsay, the Service Général de Coordination Interministérielle (SGCI) and President Pompidou in France, those of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Auswärtiges Amt and the Bundeskanzleramt in West Germany. In addition a small number of private collections have been used, notably the papers of Emile Noël, the long-standing Executive Secretary (later Secretary General) of the European Commission, which are preserved in Florence, and those of Maurice Couve de Murville, the French foreign minister for most of the period studied, held at Sciences Po in Paris. Also vital have been the published collections of French and still more German foreign policy documents. And, to provide a useful outside viewpoint, a number of British and American documents have also been employed. The British were not only directly interested in Community membership for much of the period surveyed, but were also by far the best collectors and recorders of diplomatic gossip in Europe. The files of the Public Record Office in London thus abound in stories told in confidence to British representatives by countless politicians and officials from amongst the Six. Similarly, the published collection of American documents on Western Europe demonstrate the way in which some Europeans, notably from Germany and from the Commission, were often more candid in setting out their hopes, fears and motivations to their transatlantic allies than they were to their European partners.

Naturally any study put together using so wide a variety of national and supranational sources will lack some of the detail achievable in more narrowly targeted research projects. Those wanting an in depth explanation of how the
European policy of Kurt Georg Kiesinger differed from that of Ludwig Erhard, or a lengthy analysis of the influence of internal strife within the Democrazia cristiana on the Italian approach to de Gaulle, will have to look elsewhere. Likewise the decision to study all of the key controversies within the EEC between 1963 and 1969 rather than concentrating just on the evolution of the CAP or on the Community’s approach to the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations means that a certain amount of precise information has had to be left out. But the comprehensive approach does begin to capture the way in which policy was actually made in EEC of the 1960s, with multiple national and supranational preoccupations colliding on a panoply of different issues, in such a fashion that a Belgian gain at Germany’s expense in one field was more often than not matched by a Belgian concession or ‘side-payment’ to Germany elsewhere. Only a broad approach can therefore hope to describe and understand the full range of interplay between the multiple actors within the Community system.

Furthermore, a comprehensive approach also proves to be the most revealing way of analysing the institutional evolution of the EEC in particular. Many of those writing about the way in which the Community’s structures have developed over time seem to imply that institutional controversies have been the Leitmotiv of the EEC. It sounds at times, indeed, as if the recent Convention on the future development of the EU had been sitting in permanent session ever since January 1958. In fact, however, institutional issues have tended to be approached in a much more pragmatic fashion by most of those involved in the Community process. What individual states and

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38 The only previous historical study to have made use of as many national and Community archival sources was focused solely on the emergence of one sectoral policy (albeit the most important). Knudsen, ‘Defining the Policies of the Common Agricultural Policy’. There are one or two further PhDs in the pipe-line in Florence that also try to trace a single policy area using a broad range of national and supranational archives.
individual statesmen have been primarily concerned about, more often than not, has been the way in which a particular policy might work and hence affect the national interests tied up in the Community’s operation. As a result, the exact power of the Commission, or the relationship between the permanent representatives and some of the ad hoc committees that proliferated around the Council structure, mattered much less than the ability of the institutions to carry out the tasks that the member states wanted them to do. The study of the way in which the EEC worked has thus never been possible to separate entirely from the study of what the EEC was intended to do. On the contrary, the interweaving of the controversies about the agenda and the institutional balance of the Community will be one of the recurrent themes of the pages that follow.

Over all then this book is intended as an experiment in the writing of supranational history.39 Many of the ideas contained within it and some of the overall judgements made will doubtless be challenged over time. And it is certainly not intended to displace entirely the national and traditional international histories that currently predominate, any more than the existence of a European level of governance has replaced either national politics or traditional international diplomacy. But it does reflect a belief that, just as the circumstances of the post-1945 world obliged the ruling elites of Western Europe to devise radically new forms of cooperation in order to prosper, so too the existence of those new cooperative structures forces some at least of the historians of Western Europe to adapt in their turn. The building of supranational Europe deserves a supranational history rather than the simple multiplication of national histories.

39 The first use of this term, to my knowledge, was by Johnny Laursen, ‘Towards a Supranational History? Introduction’, Journal of European Integration History, (2002), pp.5-10