N. Piers Ludlow

The new Cold War and the expansion of the European Community: a Nexus?

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The new Cold War and the Expansion of the European Community – a Nexus?

The dominant narrative of the European Community’s revival during the 1980s is an economic one. It is hence a story which is seen as having little to do with another set of events, happening at exactly the same time and also involving Europe, which together constitute that final upsurge in East-West tension that some have dubbed the ‘new’ or ‘second’ cold war. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, just as had been the case in most of the period since 1954, European integration and the development of the cold war tend to be viewed as phenomena that seemingly operated in parallel, sometimes involving the same actors and the same geographical theatre, and yet strangely never touching nor affecting each other in any significant way. The main purpose of this chapter is to ask whether this clear cut separation of cold war history and European integration history is really sustainable. As historians begin to get to grips with the documentary evidence which is starting to build up for the period in question, will they be justified in maintaining the two separate narratives outlined hitherto? Or is there instead reason to suspect that European integration related and cold war developments during the 1979-85 period were in fact overlapping and intertwined?

The key mechanism employed in the European Community’s successful relaunch during the mid-1980s was an economic project, the single market programme. Analysts disagree about which European leader should be credited for focusing the continent’s energies and ambitions upon this target. John Gillingham credits Mrs Thatcher; Andrew Moravcsik focuses on the role of the member states, and of France, Germany and Britain in particular; while perhaps the dominant strand of literature highlights the role of the new Commission President, Jacques Delors.1

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Honourable mention also goes in some of the scholarly writing to the 1980s manifestation of *le couple franco-allemand*, François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl. And there is even one prominent article which directs attention towards the role played by the alliance between the European Commission and the leaders of European big business forged in the course of the first years of the decade. The Vice President of the European Commission, Etienne Davignon and corporate bosses like Wisse Dekker, the CEO of Philips thus emerge as the surprising heroes in this tale of European revival. And yet for all their disagreement, these authors do collectively identify Western Europe’s stuttering economy as the underlying motive for renewed integration efforts, and advance stories that focus primarily on a number of economic milestones. Prominence is thus given to the launch of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979; the European Court of Justice’s ruling, that same year, on the *Cassis de Dijon* case which established the principle of mutual recognition in European law; Mitterrand’s economic *volte-face* of 1983 which allowed France to remain within the EMS; the resolution in 1984 of the vexed issue of Britain’s contribution to the EC budget; and Lord Cockfield’s 1985 White Paper setting out the 297 pieces of legislation needed to build a functioning single market.

The landmarks of cold war history during this same period are very different. For a start much of the attention of those writing about the East-West conflict during this period is directed at regions other than Western Europe. The key episodes are thus the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the election in the US of a new President, Ronald Reagan, with a very different approach to both arms control issues and relations with the Eastern Bloc; the declining powers of successive Soviet leaders, and a continuation of that string of Third World proxy confrontations between East and West highlighted by Odd Arne Westad in *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*. But even to the extent that cold war

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historians do focus on Western Europe their interests scarcely overlap with those of
the integration specialists. The central controversies are thus those surrounding the
deployment of a new generation of intermediate range nuclear weapons in Western
Europe – an affair that not only divided governments but also provoked an
unprecedented popular mobilization against nuclear weapons; the difficult issue of
how best to place pressure on the Polish regime of General Jaruzelski, especially
after the imposition of martial law in December 1981; and the wider debate
between the United States and its European allies about the wisdom and efficacy of
Reagan’s much more bellicose and confrontational approach to the Eastern bloc.4
Europe’s internal debate about its economic or political unity, or about the best way
of resolving the institutional impasse which had seemingly beset the European
Community of this period is nowhere to be seen. Overall, then, the period of the
second cold war does seem to conform to the pattern I have described – and
deplored – elsewhere of near hermetic separation between the parallel narratives of
Europe in the cold war and European integration history.5

There are, however, a number of reasons to be even more sceptical about
this total separation in the late 1970s and early 1980s than there had been in earlier
periods. These relate to the altered structure of the European Community and the
integration process, to the expansion of EC membership, to the changing pattern of
Transatlantic relations, to the shifting attitudes of communist states towards the EC,
and to the provable interconnections between the cold war and the integration
process immediately before and immediately after the period covered by this
chapter.

The first of these changes springs from the vastly expanded agenda of the
European integration process and from a series of institutional innovations that had
occurred since 1970. For most of the period between the failure of the European
Defence Community in 1954 and the end of the EEC’s transitional period in 1970, it
was undeniably the case that the formal business of European integration had little

LEFFLER, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New
4 L. NUTI, The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–1985 (Abingdon:
Taylor & Francis, 2009).
5 N. P. LUDLOW (ed.): European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973,
direct connection with the cold war. The European Community of the late 1950s and
the whole of the 1960s concerned itself almost entirely with issues of trade and
agriculture, with more occasional detours into monetary affairs, social policy, and
development aid. None of these dossiers had much of a cold war dimension – at
least in the way that it was handled by the EEC. Moreover, the recurrent ambitions
of European leaders during these years to add a mechanism for more general foreign
policy coordination to this range of policy instruments came to naught. Western
Europe in the 1960s thus lacked a clear forum in which to discuss a distinctive
approach to the cold war even had it wanted to. And the divisive issue of whether or
not Britain should be included in any European structure for foreign policy
coordination – and indeed whether it should be allowed to join the EC – continued
to bedevil relations between France and its partners and obstruct the emergence of
any coordinated European stance. East-West issues thus continued to be
channelled either through the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance or through
bilateral exchanges between individual Western states and their Eastern bloc
counterparts.

By the 1980s, however, much had changed. Ever since the early 1970s,
European foreign ministers had begun to meet regularly to discuss foreign policy
issues within the newly created European Political Cooperation (EPC) framework.
Joint prises de position or démarches on cold war issues were thus much more
possible than had been the case in the Community’s early years. The
institutionalised structures of EPC meanwhile helped ensure that regular dialogue
amongst the Nine (and from 1981 the Ten) on key foreign policy issues continued,
even when the primary attention of the full foreign ministers was directed
elsewhere. And the legitimacy of a European attempt to coordinate the foreign
policy positions of its members had been accepted by all, even if the actual

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6 Ibid., 138–140.
7 W. LOTTH, Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963-1969 (Baden-Baden: Nomos
8 N. P. LUDLOW, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist
realisation of a unified stance often proved much harder than the idealists had expected.  

Also important was the emergence of the European Council at the heart of the EC policy process. One of the conclusions that did seem to emerge from a preliminary study of the cold war and European integration during the 1960s and early 1970s was that linkages between the two processes were most likely to be made, if they were made at all, at the very highest level of government where the type of bureaucratic compartmentalisation which affected much of modern government did not occur. Foreign Ministry officials thus tended to be either cold war specialists or integration specialists; prime ministers and presidents, by contrast, were much more likely to be concerned with and knowledgeable about both issues and hence able to make connections and linkages between the two. It was therefore of some significance that from 1975 onwards European Prime Ministers and Presidents had begun to meet regularly within the newly created European Council. In the course of the 1960s by contrast they had seldom gathered, and never to discuss substantive Community business prior to the Hague Summit of December 1969. The remit of the European Council furthermore included that of linking the main Community structures with that of the formally separate EPC framework. Summit meetings became the sole forum in which EC business and EPC business could be reviewed in parallel. In this respect too, Europe of the late 1970s and the 1980s had the structures to discuss European integration and the cold war together that it had not possessed a decade earlier. And even the European Parliament had been affected by this period of change: the 1970s would witness the first regular appearance in Strasbourg of communist MEPs, a development which seemed bound to bring a whiff of cold war tension into what had previously been a forum devoid of a communist presence and hence largely detached from the East-West conflict. This dovetailed with the ongoing debate amongst European parliamentarians about the issue of a European identity and the ever greater importance attached by the

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11 LUDLOW, European Integration and the Cold War, 174–6.
Strasbourg assembly to the issue of democracy, both of which were tendencies that encouraged MEPs to construct an image and a sense of what it meant to be ‘European’ that often played upon the notion of a European ‘other’ embodied by the undemocratic, Communist countries beyond the Iron Curtain which had not undergone the same transformative process experienced by EC member states.\(^\text{12}\)

The whole institutional set up of the post-1975 Community was thus much more open to cold war questions than the early EEC had been.

The expanded membership of the European Community by the 1980s was also of some importance. The significance of Britain’s entry into the EC went beyond the removal of a controversy which had impeded European foreign policy cooperation throughout the 1960s. It also brought into the Community a state accustomed to playing a central role in cold war decision making and prone to consider geopolitical and other issues through very cold war tinted spectacles.\(^\text{13}\)

Thus while the UK may well not have moved effortlessly into the position of European leadership that some British pro-Europeans had expected, its participation in internal Community discussions is almost certain to have increased the emphasis placed on cold war issues. Equally important was the altered role of West Germany. For obvious reasons the Federal Republic had always been acutely sensitive to cold war issues. But for much of the Community’s first decade or so of operation, the Germans had also adopted a very cautious approach to foreign policy in general and to cold war matters in particular.\(^\text{14}\)

The way in which Willy Brandt’s government abandoned this cold war passivity and instead adopted an approach to East-West relations that made clear that the Federal Republic was a subject as well as an object of cold war diplomacy was hence of great significance and is likely to have been accompanied by the emergence of a much stronger German voice in Brussels on any issue that might have cold war ramifications.\(^\text{15}\)

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\(^{15}\) For a way into the rapidly expanding literature on Ostpolitik, see [http://www.ostpolitik.net/ostpolitik/publications/index.html](http://www.ostpolitik.net/ostpolitik/publications/index.html)
Community level activism on cold war issues, is unlikely to have disappeared completely in subsequent periods.

A third source of change was the altered pattern of Transatlantic relations. During the early years of the integration process, the United States had exercised its leadership of the Western bloc primarily through the structures of the Atlantic Alliance and, normally more importantly, through intensive bilateral relations with all of the individual countries of Western Europe. While almost certainly not intended to have this effect, both of these patterns had arguably militated against an intermingling of integration and the cold war. To have used European structures to coordinate positions prior to NATO discussion in the 1950s or 1960s would have been to risk the wrath of both Washington and London and would also have given undue influence to Paris which was widely seen as unreliable or heretical on Atlantic issues. The Fouchet Plan of the 1961 had aroused just this sort of fear, especially once it began to look as if the five EC members other than France might not have the strength to counterbalance de Gaulle’s unconventional foreign policy views. Few European states meanwhile wanted to limit their bilateral conversations with the United States by interposing a layer of obligatory multilateral consultation between their capital and Washington. The intimacy of direct links between each individual European state and the United States had instead been jealously guarded. Even the French, for all their recurrent allusions to ‘une Europe européenne’, were not averse to striking bilateral deals with the United States without consulting their European allies beforehand – witness the outcome of the Azores meeting of 1971.

In the course of the 1970s, however, these two existing axes of Transatlantic dialogue had come to be flanked by two others, both of which were more open to European pre-coordination. The first of these was the regularisation of consultation between Washington and the big three Western European powers, Britain, France and Germany. From the Ford Presidency onwards, US Secretaries of State seem to have sought to involve their counterparts from the European big three into a semi-

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17 For the American records of this meeting see Nixon Presidential Materials Project, NARA, Washington DC (now transferred to the Nixon Presidential Library, California), NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, Box 55.
permanent consultation about matters of global importance, including therefore many East-West issues. By 1975 Kissinger could thus speak of the emergence of ‘a de facto political steering group’ linking the US, Britain, France and Germany.\(^{18}\) This US move seems to have been accompanied by a greater degree of intra-communication between the three European parties to these exchanges. None of them felt obliged, of course, to devise a common European stance before responding to Washington. But there were often good tactical reasons for a concerted response, and patterns of consultation between Paris and Bonn in particular, but also extending to London do seem to have intensified as a result. Likewise, the emergence of G7 as a forum for discussing much more than just economic affairs, may well also have encouraged the many European states involved in global summitry to coordinate their stances before each meeting and to use the multilateral mechanism to air Community concerns and issues at the global level. This is likely to have become even more marked once the European Commission President won the right to be involved in G7 meetings from 1979 onwards.\(^{19}\) It also appears to have been the case that those European Community member states who were big enough to qualify for G7 membership used internal Community mechanisms and the European Council in particular to ensure that the smaller member states who were not directly involved were informed about what had transpired, both in the hope that they might align their positions with those of the leading powers and out of the desire to avoid the development of resentment between the larger and smaller powers. Sir Crispin Tickell, for instance, the Chef de Cabinet of Roy Jenkins and as such the first Commission ‘sherpa’ involved in preparing each of the global summits, quickly developed the habit of briefing the member states permanent representatives in the aftermath of each preparatory meeting.\(^{20}\) Mechanisms of this sort would have led inevitably to a greater degree of interconnection between global and European level agendas, and allowed the

\(^{18}\) Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan (hence forward FPL), NSA Country Files, Box 3, France (6), Kissinger to Ford, Meeting with French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues, Sept. 27, 1975.


\(^{20}\) See for instance Tickell’s hand-written notations referring to such briefings in Roy Jenkins’ *Cabinet* papers, All Souls College, Oxford (viewed with kind permission of Sir Crispin Tickell), File 26, Economic Summit Venice, 22-3 June 1980
discussions of East-West affairs conducted within the G7 to percolate into the European structures also.

A fourth layer of change was connected to the shifting patterns of East-West relations. For most of the Community’s formative decade, the structures of the EEC had been ostracised by the Eastern bloc. 21 Virtually all other countries and international entities sought to establish some direct means of communication and information with the EEC bodies, but the Soviet Union and its allies bucked this trend. The Community’s tendency to ignore East West relations was thus reinforced by the Eastern bloc’s equally strong tendency to ignore the EC. Here too, however, a pattern of change began to emerge in the 1970s. First of all, both individual Eastern European countries, and their collective instance, the CMEA, started to make tentative overtures towards the European Community. 22 These openings produced few concrete results in the short term, but were a sign of movement nonetheless. The question of whether to respond and how to react would inexorably have obliged the EC to give more thought to cold war issues than it had done earlier. 23 Then the Chinese too began to get in on the act, opening diplomatic relations with the EC in 1975 and following this up with a commercial agreement with the European Community signed in 1978. Rivalry between the two centres of communist power, seemed to spur each to increase their links with Western Europe. Again the European response must have included cold war calculations and considerations. 24 And finally the combination of détente and West Germany’s normalisation of its relationship with the Eastern bloc led to a surge in commercial and financial links between Eastern and Western Europe. 25 Most of this was the doing of individual companies, sometimes backed by individual member states, rather than the product of any conscious Community policy. But once intra-bloc trade began to become

23 A detailed study of the European Community’s growing involvement with Eastern Europe from the 1970s onwards is in preparation at the LSE by Angela Romano.
commercially significant, it inevitably became a matter of growing interest and concern to a European Community which was, from the early 1970s onwards, meant to operate a common commercial policy towards all third parties. European integration’s insulation from East-West relations was always likely to fade once these trends got underway.

A fifth and final factor that makes it seem improbable that the Community neither affected nor was affected by the second cold war, is the strong historical evidence pointing to linkages between the integration process and the cold war from the periods preceding and succeeding that covered by this paper. It has thus been well documented that the newly enlarged European Community had a significant collective impact on the CSCE process in the first half of the 1970s. 26 During much the same period, the Federal Republic seems to have used the orthodoxy of its Westpolitik and in particular a strong commitment to European integration as a means of reassuring Western partners who might otherwise have been alarmed by the radicalism of its Ostpolitik. Brandt for instance sought to lessen French fears that his new Eastern policies might presage a drift into neutralism, by impressing upon Pompidou his desire to see a much greater degree of European unity including defence cooperation. 27 And in similar fashion Helmut Kohl’s Germany would use its European credentials to lessen the disruption and concern caused by German unification. 28 German unity and the dramatic ending of the cold war in Europe also had multiple other tangible effects on the integration process, ranging from the short-term boost in the European Commission’s aspirations to become a major foreign policy actor, to the increasing urgency surrounding the internal European debate about border controls, political refugees, and economic migrants. 29 In both the early 1970s and the late 1980s, the interweaving of the cold war and integration narratives does seem to be beyond dispute. As a result it becomes somewhat hard

26 MÖCKLI, European Foreign Policy During the Cold War, 99–139; A. ROMANO, From Détente in Europe to European Détente: How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2009).
to believe that a process of mutual interaction between European integration and the cold war observable both prior to and after the 1979 to 1985 period came to complete halt during the second cold war and the European relance.

Suspicion that there must have been some interplay between the heightened level of cold war tension and the development of European integration during the same years is not of course a satisfactory conclusion in and of itself. Any persuasive argument that the cold war mattered in integration history and that the integration process mattered in cold war history, needs to be able actually to demonstrate interconnections. Concrete instances must be identified where European or American leaders acted differently than they would otherwise have done in their European or cold war decision making because of their interest in, concern for, or anxiety about developments in the other field. On the basis of the current very incomplete pattern of documentary release by Western governments this is not yet possible. Definitive answers to the central question posed by this chapter will thus have to await the gradual emergence over the next five to ten years of the bulk of Western state papers relating to the 1979-85 period. But what by contrast can be done by a piece written before most of these documents have become accessible is to advance a number of hypotheses which those who go on to uncover the evidence can then prove or disprove. The second half of this contribution will thus focus on three such speculative hypotheses.

The first issue that needs to be explored by the new wave of researchers as they gain access to the archives is the degree to which Transatlantic tension and disagreement fed through into European efforts to develop structures, policies and instruments that would lessen their dependence on an American leadership with which they were ever more uncomfortable. That Ronald Reagan’s America and its main European allies diverged in terms of both their analysis of the evolving cold war, and in their economic policies is well known. European leaders such as Schmidt and Giscard at the start of the period, Mitterrand and Kohl later on, looked askance at the US leader’s approach to East-West diplomacy, were dismayed by the undue emphasis on rearmament and confrontation rather than engagement with the Eastern bloc, and were reluctant participants at best in American-led efforts to demonstrate Western condemnation of Soviet actions in Poland, Central America
and elsewhere. They were equally sceptical about Reagan’s early economic policies, complaining in their very first meetings with the newly elected US President about the level of US interest rates and continuing to protest at one aspect or another of US monetary, trade and fiscal policy making throughout most of the 1980s. As Schmidt put it graphically to the US President in May 1981, ‘high [US] interest rates suck into New York City all of the liquidity in the world’; the effect was to heighten economic problems in Europe. And even a leader like Mrs Thatcher who was instinctively happier with the American approach, on both cold war and economic levels, was somewhat constrained in her support by both a British political elite and a general public that were less out of line with the European norm than their Prime Minister. She was also far from immune from intermittent, but strongly felt, disagreements with the US President. These included British frustration at what was seen as somewhat ambivalent American backing during the Falklands War, annoyance at the lack of consultation prior to the US intervention in Grenada, and anger at the high-handed approach towards extra-territoriality adopted by the Reagan administration during the gas pipeline affair, especially given the impact that the US measures had on sorely needed British manufacturing jobs.

Demonstrating that such disagreements actually fed through into European policy decisions is not easy, however. The precedent of the Carter period does admittedly suggest that they might well have done. In the latter half of the 1970s, there appears to be a demonstrable connection between European and a particularly German irritation at the US President’s approach, and especially his tendency to lecture the much more economically literate Schmidt about the need for Germany to act as an economic locomotive for the whole Western system, and the enthusiasm and energy with which the German leader threw himself into the search for a more autonomous European approach to monetary policy – a search which

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30 Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California (henceforward RRPL), NSC Country File, Germany, Box 14, Folder 4, Memcon of Reagan-Schmidt meeting, 21.5.1981
31 On the Thatcher-Reagan rapport, see http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110525 (accessed 6.2.2012); on British public opinion towards the US, RRPL, NSC Country Files, Box 20, Folder United Kingdom (9/1/81-3/31/82) (1/4), London to Washington 5069, 8.3.1982
32 RRPL, NSC Country File, UK, Box 20, Folder 2/6, Louis to State, Tel. 3122, 15.6.1982; ibid. Folder 5/6, Clark Memorandum for President, ‘Your Wednesday, June 23, meeting with UK Prime Minister Thatcher’, 22.6.1982
would culminate in the launch of the EMS in 1979. But the parallels between the Carter and Reagan eras are far from complete. Apart from anything else it is much more straightforward to draw a line of causality between a Transatlantic and American-German dispute which centred on economic policy, and a European response which was also primarily economic, than it is to establish a connection between the rather more general mood of dissatisfaction that built up in Western Europe about Reagan’s America and specific European policy initiatives.

Perhaps the European event most easily linked to European foreign policy discontent with American leadership in the early 1980s is the Genscher-Colombo initiative of 1981. Most analysts (especially in the Anglophone literature) have tended to be rather dismissive of this German-Italian declaration, seeing it as nothing more than empty rhetoric, long on ambition, but desperately short of concrete achievement. It is certainly a little hard to swallow Genscher’s own description of the initiative as the first stage of a three-stage rocket, the other two parts being the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty! But the document’s emphasis on revitalising the European Political Cooperation process would appear to indicate that in the early 1980s at least part of the debate about how to revive and reform the institutions of the European Community was being fuelled by both dissatisfaction with the specific failings of the European institutions and a more generalised concern with Europe’s inability to make itself heard in discussions with an increasingly erratic American superpower. This combination almost certainly also lay behind other political reform efforts of this era, whether the solemn declaration of Stuttgart or the European Parliament’s Draft Treaty on European Union.

Pace Genscher such efforts did not lead directly to the relaunch of the 1980s. For this last to happen, the sense of political discontent felt by frustrated pro-Europeans angered by the seeming inability of Europe to play the global role to which they felt it ought to aspire had to combine with an equally powerful vein of economic unease at the continent’s fading economic competitiveness vis-à-vis Japan.

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34 H. D. GENSCHER, Erinnerungen (Munich: Siedler, 1995), 368.
and a resurgent America. Such unease had been building up amongst Europe’s leaders both political and economic since the mid-1970s at least, but had been made sharper and more acute once the much faster Japanese and US recoveries from global recession underlined that Europe’s economic woes could not simply be attributed to a worldwide economic downturn but were instead a reflection of European structural weaknesses. And it was from the primarily economic seam of European malaise that was mined the ‘big idea’ – the Single Market programme – which the Community needed to revitalise the integration process. But while the economic nature of the 1992 target and the campaign to abolish non-tariff barriers certainly attracted some backers who believed that they were rallying behind a purely economic initiative carried out for purely economic reasons (Mrs Thatcher claimed to be one such with hindsight, although many of her Foreign Office aides question this retrospective claim of naiveté) and may have lulled some potential opponents of a political Europe into a false sense of security, the political desire for more ‘Europe’ never disappeared. On the contrary, the wider coalition which helped energise the integration process in the mid-1980s included many whose interest was as much in Europe’s political regeneration as it was in removing shackles from the continent’s manufacturers or service industries. This was quickly to become apparent in the determination of Bettino Craxi and the majority of other European leaders to accompany economic reform with institutional improvement – hence the Single European Act (SEA). The new Treaty went some way to addressing the unhappiness about the efficacy of Europe’s institutions which Genscher and others had articulated. But while the SEA did make a few token gestures in the direction of improving Europe’s collective capacity to act on the world stage (lessening slightly the artificial divide between the EPC process and the normal Community process, and making a partial move towards recognising the central role of the European Council), it was never likely fully to satisfy those who harboured a more expansive

view of Europe’s political role. The push during the latter half of the 1980s to transform the revival of the European Community core economic business into a much more generalised reinvigoration of European activity including political union which so dismayed and angered Thatcher and her supporters, was largely predictable once the full extent of the coalition that had rallied behind the Single Market idea is appreciated. And this realisation also underlines the extent to which the European Community was heading towards something like the Maastricht Treaty well before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the revolutions of 1989 and German unification.

Once this political impetus behind the mid-1980s revival is identified, the search for linkages between the cold war and the relance becomes much more promising. Definitively proving the full nature of the connections is likely to be difficult, even once we have full archival access. There were so many factors feeding into Europe’s political and economic discontents in the early 1980s, that identifying one single element as the decisive one is likely to prove difficult even for analyses focusing on one single actor, let alone for those that seek to explain the actions of all of those involved in the integration process during the mid-1980s. An emphasis on multi-causality akin to that which now tends to dominate in explanations of the origins of the integration process in the 1940s and 1950s is thus most likely to characterise the future monographs or doctoral theses written on how Europe reinvented itself in the course of the 1980s. But amongst the multiple stands of causality included, room will almost certainly have to be found for the way in which European leaders found themselves at variance with their American counterparts in their analyses of how the cold war was developing and of the best approach to adopt towards the Eastern bloc. The second cold war played its part in Europe’s relaunch,

just as much as the early cold war contributed to the start of the integration process.\textsuperscript{41}

The second major interconnection between the cold war and European integration during this period is the Mediterranean enlargement. It is true admittedly that those researchers who have begun the process of reading the detailed files relating to Greek, Spanish and Portuguese membership whether in the Community archives, those of the member states or those in Athens, Madrid and Lisbon are discovering them to be dominated by the sort of economic nitty-gritty around which all enlargement processes revolve.\textsuperscript{42} There is hence file after file, document after document, devoted to the complex issue of adapting the agricultural support systems of the would-be member states to the realities of the CAP, to the task of aligning tariff rates, and to the delicate issue of accommodating pre-existing commercial links and relationships with the Community’s common external tariff and common commercial policy. Other dossiers no doubt deal with budgetary contributions, institutional changes, and the ever sensitive issue of how the new member states were to be factored into the complex staffing balance of the European institutions themselves. Amidst all of this fascinating detail, there is hence a real danger that the underlying political imperatives that lay at the root of the second enlargement can be partially overlooked. But once due focus is given to the basic political reasons for which Greece, Spain and Portugal turned to Europe – and just as fundamentally the reasons why the Nine felt obliged to respond positively, albeit slowly, to their appeal – the importance of cold war calculations is likely once more to appear.

The more research that is done on the cold war during the 1970s – a current boom area in cold war history – the clearer it becomes just how serious an issue was the stability of Europe’s southern flank. The transition processes of Greece, Portugal and Spain to democracy were vital and fascinating episodes in each

\textsuperscript{41} For a provocative, if overstated exploration of the links between the cold war and the start of the integration process see S. ROSATO, \textit{Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

country’s national history. They were also, however, dramas that had great significance for the whole of the strategically sensitive Mediterranean – an area the geo-political importance of which had only been increased by the contemporaneous crises in the Middle East – and which presented serious challenges to the whole Western Alliance in the cold war. What happened in Greece had evident ramifications for Turkey also, to say nothing of Cyprus, and the whole Western presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Failure in Portugal or Spain meanwhile could have knock-on effects felt in Italy and possibly even France. Henry Kissinger’s alarmist comments about how both NATO and the European Community might ‘unravel’ and turn into a ‘neutralist instrument’ were the communists to come to power in any of the transition states were somewhat over-the-top, but they do act as a reminder of both the delicacy of the situation in Greece, Portugal and Spain and the wider regional implications of the transition process.

All of this meant that none of the transitional processes were purely national events, allowed to progress without outside interference. On the contrary, both the United States and the major European powers were deeply involved from the outset in all three countries. Their methods of exerting influence were moreover very different from one another and yet a further source of Transatlantic controversy, especially perhaps in the case of Portugal. And central to the influence that the European players were able to exert, both individually and in some instances collectively, was the promise that all three countries would, in due course, be allowed to take their place within the European Community. During the 1979 to 1985 period, the European Community thus had to honour such promises. The second enlargement was not in other words just a Community affair, or even a Greek, Spanish or Portuguese story. It was also part of the solution to a genuine cold war crisis.

It will thus be of some significance for researchers to trace how aware national and Community decision-makers remained of this cold war dimension in the

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43 M. DEL PERO ET AL., Democrazie: l’Europa Meridionale e la Fine delle Dittature (Florence: Le Monnier, 2010).
1980s. Was it an aspect of the enlargement story that was largely submerged by the economic, legal and institutional minutiae once the negotiations themselves got underway? Or was it still something upon which the applicants were able to play, most probably in top level encounters rather than in the day to day negotiations? And was the cold war relevance of this particular round of Community expansion something that was exploited in the Transatlantic dialogue? American attitudes towards the growth of the EC had always been determined by the relative priorities that each US administration accorded to the political value of greater European unity, especially in an East-West context, on the one hand, and the potential commercial dangers of yet more Western markets being included in the European preferential area on the other. The Reagan administration was notoriously touchy about the damage to US commercial interests caused by the EC; it was also, however, an administration that attached a huge importance to cold war calculations. European representatives would thus have had a strong incentive to present any commercial losses that the US might suffer as a result of the Mediterranean enlargements as a price worth paying for the stabilisation of what had been a zone of cold war vulnerability. Whether they did so, and if so what effect such arguments had in Washington, are further questions that only detailed archival research will reveal.

A third area of possible interconnection between European integration and the cold war during the first half of the 1980s, and one which will require the range of scholars working on European integration to be widened to include a number of new specialists with different national and linguistic expertises, is the spread of interest in and knowledge about Western Europe’s development in the Eastern half of the continent. Evidence already exists that Mikhail Gorbachev in particular was fascinated by European integration by the later 1980s, seeing it as a trend to which the Eastern bloc had to respond, preferably by ever closer ties between the EC and its Eastern ‘counterpart’, the CMEA. We also know of the speed with which Eastern European dissidents fastened onto the idea of a ‘return to Europe’ during

and immediately after the revolutions of 1989 and the centrality that the goal of EC/EU membership was to play in the subsequent transition processes undergone by the states of Central and Eastern Europe. Much less is known however about how early such interest and knowledge began to spread, either amongst the communist governments or amongst dissident groups. Was this something that happened only at the very end of cold war, propelled by the depth of Eastern Europe’s own crisis, and by the huge contrast between this Eastern stagnation and Western Europe’s much publicised rediscovery of political and economic dynamism after 1985? Or was it instead a process that began earlier, stimulated by the greater trade links which developed between Western and Eastern Europe during the last two decades of the cold war and facilitated by the growing porousness of the Iron Curtain from the 1970s onwards? Few of those who currently work on the integration process are at all qualified to begin to address such issues. But if linkages are to be made between European integration and the gradual unravelling of the cold war system, questions of this sort will need to be asked.

The potential for interconnection between cold war history and European integration history in the 1979 to 1985 period is thus extensive. Prior to the release of most government documents and with serious historical work on this era only just beginning to start, it is much too early to state with any certainty exactly how much interweaving of the integration and cold war stories there was, and the importance of cold war considerations as opposed to entirely unrelated factors in determining the Community’s evolution during this period. Assessing the exact balance to strike on this last question, may indeed remain problematic even once all of the archives are accessible. But it does already seem possible to assert with some confidence that a strong degree of interconnection must have existed. Not even the narrow six member Community of the 1960s had been entirely immune from cold war considerations, focused though it was on a tightly defined policy agenda of commercial liberalisation and the first few common policies. The European Community of the 1980s by contrast dealt with far more issues, had a much wider

array of both policies and policy instruments, had an institutional structure that was more likely to be affected by East-West developments, had much more direct contact with the communist world(s), had a greater role than hitherto in West-West dialogue, and had a membership which had already expanded significantly and was likely to grow still further towards three countries which had all been the objects of considerable interest in the cold war. It would thus seem highly improbable that such a Community did not affect and was not affected by the upsurge of cold war tension that characterised the first half of the 1980s. Establishing quite what this nexus involved, however, is a task likely to keep researchers and scholars occupied for many years to come.