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This article is intended to serve as a 'critical introduction' to the thought of George Herbert Mead. It attempts to place his work within his wider social philosophy — the theory and practice of Pragmatic-Liberalism. It is hoped that the article will stimulate further analysis of Mead's ideas.

The work of G. H. Mead still remains important today because of its wide influence on sociology and social psychology, and, through Pragmatism, on social welfare and liberal politics. However the aim of this article is mainly limited to placing Mead's basic ideas — society, mind and self — within the context of his social philosophy, Pragmatism. More specifically, the article will attempt to show that Mead saw the development of the 'social self' as the crucial instrument for the unification of the theory and practice of Pragmatism in all social activities — particularly, social research, education, sociology and social welfare. It is only when these other concerns are taken into account that one can assess what Mead was trying to describe, explain and accomplish in his brilliant characterisation of the social self (and his social psychology). A rigid separation must not, and indeed cannot, be made between Mead's notion of the self and the rest of his social psychology; between his social psychology and his social philosophy; and between his social philosophy and his social reform activities. All are informed by the philosophy and practice of Pragmatism. It is because of the failure to understand this point that writers have often found it difficult to place Mead and his work in a specific discipline and which has led to a concentration on the self alone. The result has been an inadequate understanding of Mead's important work and influence and an often very misleading view of his idea of the self.

For the purposes of the development of a 'marxist psychology' or 'social psychology' Mead's idea of the self is significant because of his concern to produce a 'socialised' conception of the individual personality — the attempt to demonstrate how the self takes the 'attitude of the other' through the existence of a 'generalised other' or social conscience. A major difficulty in this view lies in the nature of the society and that part of it — the 'social' — that enters the self. The

tendency in Mead is to equate the 'social' with the 'rational', and thereby not only reduce the conflict present in society, but also remove inner conflict, doubt and 'irrationality' within the self. In addition the society is largely perceived in cultural terms and, therefore, the deep structural divisions in society are overlooked. This follows the pragmatic conception of reform which seeks to make social changes through a cultural socialisation, particularly through education, while largely retaining existing class and institutional arrangements.

The following sections of the article are an attempt to reconstruct the basic concepts in Mead's work in order to enable one to situate his thought within bourgeois liberalism, and to provide the elements for a more polemical reading of these concepts, and the practices they legitimate. After having made some assessment of the contemporary relevance of Mead's work, the following section discusses the importance of the Self as one of Mead's crucial concepts. The next section goes into some of the intellectual influences on his work, particularly Pragmatism and evolutionary thought. Leading from this comes a section concerned with the relationship between Mead's ideas about social reform and his conception of scientific knowledge. These different aspects of Mead's work are drawn together in his social psychology, which is discussed in the penultimate section prior to the conclusion.

Mead's Contemporary Relevance

In the mid 1960s the writings of George Herbert Mead began to arouse considerable interest, particularly among the younger generation of sociologists and social psychologists. His work (and to a lesser extent the writings of W. I. Thomas, John Dewey, and Charles H. Cooley) formed the basis for the social psychology of Symbolic Interactionism which came into prominence at that time. This social psychology stresses a view of the individual as having a developing personality which is created in an interaction with others. The individual is able to define situations by attaching meaning to actions and exchange meanings with other actors. The individual has the ability to reflect on past actions and choose between possible lines of future action. In short the individual actor can assess the consequences of actions through communication with others and anticipate their likely reactions. Human behaviour therefore, is significantly different from the behaviour of animals. To understand human behaviour not only overt behaviour must be explained: covert activity must also be taken into account, since the human individual is capable of internal reflection, the ascription of meaning to situations, and communication through a shared language. Above all, for Symbolic Interactionism, human behaviour is social — it takes place through the giving and receiving of socially understood gestures, the employment of common symbolic meanings, and participation in ongoing social processes.

Symbolic Interactionism has been seen by its adherents (Stone, 1970, Manis, 1972) to be very different from the conventional theoretical perspective and methodological practices in sociology. They objected,

in particular, to the conception of the individual in terms either derived from purely psychological models of behaviour or as an over-socialised or conforming member of society. The main charge was laid against the dominant functionalist explanations in sociology in which the individual tended to be reduced to a single or a collection of roles. Instead of the individual being able to take roles actively and to try them out in a social process, roles were given functioning units of an over-arching social system. When an individual did not conform, such behaviour was regarded as abnormal — as lying outside the common value system. The behaviour lacked intrinsic meaning and, therefore, must be the result of *psychological maladjustment* or undersocialisation.

Another important difference was on the question of the conception of science and scientific practice. The mainstream of sociology is positivistic: the reliance on quantification, the use of the analytic method, the search for 'objective causality' and the adoption of an a-historical approach, are its essential features. It also has a deeper philosophical quest for a peculiar kind of certainty, rather than truth. Part of this quest is the belief that societies are structurally functioning wholes with a single moral order.

During the 1960s in association with the rise of Symbolic Interactionism there was a rapid growth in the Sociology of Deviance. The study of deviant subcultures was informed by a rather different tradition and perspective from the conceptual groundings of positivistic sociology. The Sociology of Deviance sets out to investigate the very area which an explanation of society as a functionally integrated whole with a consensual normative system finds difficult to account for — the existence of deviant subcultures with other definitions of morality. Most of the work on subcultures has been carried out in America, where the perspective has been defined as Naturalism (Roberts, 1975). The research practice that has been employed has been largely associated with various strategies of 'participant observation'. Naturalism was pioneered by Robert Park and his colleagues at Chicago in the 1920s and 30s, was less prominent during the 1940s and early 1950s (when the work of Parsons and Merton was predominant), and was the focus of renewed attention, particularly with reference to crime and deviance, in the late 1950s and 1960s.

The naturalistic perspective of the new Sociology of Deviance derived primarily from the Symbolic Interactionist social psychology of G. H. Mead. Research was not so much an objective study but an interchange of meanings or interaction through a common language between the participant observer and the subject. Action, in this view, is based on the giving and taking of meaning within an evolving social situation; actors work out their courses of action according to reflection which takes into account the wishes and likely reactions of others. The use of participant observation in the study of subcultures changes the focus

of research practice away from 'objectivity' and quantification to an engagement in 'empathetic understanding' — a sympathetic attitude arising from the researcher being part of the social world of the subject. The researcher is able to take the perspective of the subject and to employ qualitative interpretation. In using participant observation to study subcultures the Sociology of Deviance is often closer to the ethnographic methodology of the anthropologist rather than the 'scientific' procedures of the traditional sociologist. However, participant observation has never fully confronted the positive method in a rigorously ethnographic or qualitative manner, rather it has formed a sort of sociological subculture of its own — a more humanistic and empathetic strand of the mainstream. Most participant observers have combined observation with other more objective techniques (including surveys and statistics) to form a repertoire of methods.

Key lines of thought in Mead were elaborated in the new Sociology of Deviance by such writers as Becker (1963), Matza (1969) and Lemert (1967). Mead's notion of the self (and the idea of role-taking) was extended into the term *career*. The individual was portrayed, in the new work, as going through certain turning points which denoted changes in self-identity. Another central theme in Deviancy Theory, also drawn from a certain reading of Mead, is that it is not so much the quality of the act (of deviance) or quality of the individual (the deviant), which is important for an understanding of deviance, but the reaction of the social group. Actions and actors are *labelled* by others as deviant. Mead's notion of the 'definitions of others' is developed into a processual analysis of labelling involving an interaction between social groups which has consequences for deviant identities. Unfortunately, apart from one article in which Mead describes the labelling effects of 'punitive justice' for the individual — which forms the basis of the social reaction idea — he does not generally differentiate between the types and the relative authority of 'generalised others'. Often the generalised other is merely the representative of (or in fact is) society or the 'social'.

Deviancy theorists argue that not only do groups define other groups as deviant but that social reaction can *create* deviance through labelling and produce further deviance by confirming a deviant identity. Some theorists take this idea further and argue that a process of deviancy amplification sets in, whereby the deviant or deviant group is caught in a spiral of reaction and counter-action with the definers and controllers of deviance. Through this process the subculture becomes more closed, the definers become more organised and sensitised to the 'problem', and deviant identities are confirmed. By pointing to the fact that both deviants and agencies of social control take part in the creation and sustaining of deviance, the naïve view that crime occurs and then social control is enforced is found to be grossly inadequate.

Although the Sociology of Deviance made an important contribution to an understanding of the social processes involved in the creation of

deviance, it suffered from a number of crucial defects which stem directly from the Meadian tradition. Symbolic Interactionism provided the Sociology of Deviance with what Mills has called a 'social psychology for liberals', who are involved in the understanding and treatment of social pathology (or social problems). Mead's adaptive model of action, his concern for *gradual* and *piecemeal change* within limited circumstances, the emphasis on the restraining or socialising generalised other acting on the self-interest of the individual, comprise the pragmatic-liberal formula for social reformist intervention. These themes reoccur in the new liberalism of the 1960s. With the aid of Mead, not only could a new form of 'social individuality' be expressed (in reply to the 'functional conformist') but also a new critique could be made against the dominant ideological consensus (both in social theory and in the 'real' world of active politics).

While there were more radical elements within it (and the potential for a deeper political analysis), the theoretical critique offered by the Sociology of Deviance was generally limited to a *liberal reformism*. The practical and political implications of the labelling or social reaction perspective were clear — if the actions of the social control agencies help to create deviance by labelling and exclusion, then deviance and crime could be reduced by 'dewinding' the spiral process. By the *decriminalising* of some offences and the provision of alternatives to incarceration of others (e.g. the legalisation of pot, the provision for intermediate treatment for juvenile offenders under 'the Children and Young Persons Act' 1969), the offender would be less likely to take on a deviant identity (and commit further infraction) or be defined as 'fully deviant' by social control agencies. Criticism by labelling theorists, as Alvin Gouldner has pointed out, is largely aimed at the lower levels of social control (usually against the local police, social welfare agencies etc.) rather than against the central organisation of law, social control, and social policy at the level of the State and its subordinate institutions.

This serious weakness arises from the inability to fully confront the questions of *power* and *authority*. Some groups have a greater power to enforce labels on others — to impose definitions on situations, define which actions are deviant, and mould deviant identities. This is not simply a matter concerning the discretion or arbitrariness of the local police or welfare officers 'on the ground' in interaction with deviants, it is also a more fundamental question relating to the authority and power vested in such officers as members of State apparatuses of control. It is the organisation policy and basic objectives of control agencies in capitalist societies that requires consideration.

Thus the Sociology of Deviance and its practices in America has represented a revival of liberal Pragmatism. Typically, despite its critique of official agencies it did not bring into question the fundamental structure of the society. Even at the height of campus radicalism, Vietnam demonstrations, and Black Power, during the mid 1960s,

Deviancy Theory either ignored such groups or could only deal with them very inadequately. It tended to focus on those people engaged in 'victimless crime': prostitution, drugs, homosexuality, etc. rather than with political radicals who had an alternative 'value system' and an explicit political philosophy.

Beneath much of the work in the Sociology of Deviance lies an implicit pluralistic conception of American society — a feature also of the work of Mead and Chicago Sociology. There is a range of distinct cultural worlds in society but, paradoxically they all centre around a common moral consensus. These worlds in Deviancy Theory, are never allowed to be fully oppositional to the present ordering of society — in fact one of the strengths and major insights of the naturalistic perspective was to show that there were continuities between deviance and convention. Deviants were not alien, or abnormal — they had their own integrity and were simply treated differently. In fact deviant behaviour, including a great deal of mental illness, was rational meaningful behaviour from the perspective of the deviant and could be rendered explicable, through interpretation and empathy to the rest of us. Again, there is the similar emphasis on the necessity of communication to bring '*outside*' groups *into* 'society' that is found in Mead and Pragmatism generally. In addition there is the same moral ethic to produce a new 'cultural tolerance' or diversity, reduce conflict, and establish a new community — while leaving the structural bases of intolerance and injustice untouched.

In recent years there has been an emergence of Marxist theories of crime (Taylor, et al 1973), which have retained much of what is valuable in the labelling approach while rejecting its liberal reformism. The labelling perspective reminds us that there is no such thing as crime here, and prevention there; but a relation between the two, crime-and-control. It reminds us that crime and deviance are not simply 'natural' or given, but are social and historical constructions. Finally, it demonstrates that for crimes to be recognised, labelled and responded to as crimes, there must be a society whose rules norms and laws have been transgressed and control institutions which enforce the rules and punish the offender. While accepting that the social order is continually constructed and sustained through complex small-scale interactions, a wider view is also necessary: the larger role of legal and other apparatuses and their historical development in the production and reproduction of the social formation requires examination.

A detailed critique of the crime-and-control strategies is a vital concern for Marxists, but such a task cannot be undertaken here. Our aim for the present is to disentangle the strands in the Meadian theoretical constructs as a preliminary step towards that critique.

The Self in Context

The discovery of the 'emergent self', by Mead, was part of an intense interest at the turn of the century in the individual and social past of human beings. Freud's delvings into the unconscious, the child study movement, the discovery of 'delinquency' and 'adolescence', anthropological studies of primitive peoples, the sociological investigations into the family patterns of immigrant peasants, all were part of the fascination with Man's historical nature and the archaeology of his 'secret self'. Mead's concept of the self not only tries to account for its historical development but also its future path. It is also an intellectual tool with which to fashion practical changes in social life.

The recovery of the secret self was seen, in America, not only as something desirable in itself but as a means of bringing about far-reaching social changes as well; for as people like Jane Addams and John Dewey believed, the inner self represented above all a fund of natural affection and sociability. Man was a social being before he had been taught to think only of himself. The drawing-out of spontaneous selfhood, especially in children, became the primary means, therefore, of a socialising democracy" (Lasch 1965).

The main difficulty or contradiction in the reformism of the Liberal-Pragmatists lay in their wish to liberate creative energies while, at the same time, calling for the social adjustment of individuals. The drawing-out of 'spontaneous selfhood' could easily become the 'prime means' of social control. The investigation of the human personality, the 'new social work' of the settlement house, the progressive education of the experimental school could lead and indeed has led, to a new form of social discipline to replace, or supplement, older means of control through institutionalised violence.

It was Mead's emphasis on the social character of the self that separates his thinking from a biologically-based psychology; Mead saw his work as a social behaviourism — it was radically different from associationism, parallelism or behaviourism. For Mead the individual was a self-conscious, reflective, creative, and social being. In addition, the self had a natural history — an evolution — which was becoming part of a social process. The self had emerged from its biological base and was achieving, or had achieved, a fully social foundation. The self was becoming more social. It is only by taking Mead's work as a whole that his argument for the 'social self' becomes clear. At the very least, the idea of the self must be seen in terms of its relation or interdependence with other key terms that Mead uses — mind, society, act, generalised other, etc.

Mead's idea of the self (and his wider social psychology) can be seen as part of an attempt to provide a bridge between a number of issues or problems that arise at different 'levels' but are concerned with the same difficulty. These issues or problems stem from the basic dichotomy of mind/matter or subject/ object — Mead wished to place this dichotomy in a more fundamental reality (than purely at the level of an abstract

consciousness) — the active solution of socially-defined problems. These dichotomies can only usefully be seen as arising out of, or resolvable, in thought and practice in social situations. The two activities which were closest to the Pragmatists' own lives and which represented, for them, the fullest approximation of the issue of thought and practice, were, on the one hand, the intellectual pursuit of knowledge, and, on the other, their wish for involvement in practical problems of social reform. They wished to avoid the privilege of 'intellectualism' of a university life (or university education); knowledge had to be socially useful rather than the embodiment of 'civilised' values (beauty, honour, duty, respect). But equally, they sought to overcome a short-sighted involvement in reform which dealt with problems without being informed by a 'full' social knowledge. These two activities — the pursuit of knowledge and social reform — could be reconciled through the unity of thought and practice.

The Pragmatist pursuit of an interrelation of unity of thought and practice entailed a greater relation between differing social activities or institutions: education, research, reform and politics. It is thus central to their view of scientific knowledge and its role in social change. Before examining Mead's conception of science and scientific practice and his social reform activities, the context of his social philosophy and its basis in Evolutionary Thought must be understood.

Pragmatism & Evolutionary Thought

Mead's ideas were intended to be part of the practical philosophy of *Pragmatism*. The Pragmatists — Mead, Dewey and Addams — shared an evolutionary view of human history. However, this conception was evolutionary in a specific sense; it was not an evolution simply through changes in abstract philosophical ideas or through the predetermined control of human life by the environment. Human evolution had taken place through a *relation* between human life and the environment. In addition, it is also an evolution in the relationships between people — an evolution in social relations. Human evolution, unlike evolution in the animal world, takes place through changes in social processes. Mead believed that a crucial point had been reached in the social evolution of society, mind and self — they had become more interrelated. With the beginning of the twentieth century a new era in social relationships had dawned.

As human society had emerged so had the personality. Human history had not begun with the self fully formed, but with the human capacity for cooperation and sociability. The development of the self had now reached a crucial point which represented a more fundamental juncture in human progress — a break with the past.

The human mind had evolved to a more social state; it had become

aware of *its-self*. There was also the increasing realisation of the interests of others and their definitions of social situations. The self was becoming more social by the incorporation of the generalised other. Human beings were becoming aware of their capacity and potential to make lasting social changes through the application of practical intelligence. Pragmatism was taken as reflecting this new moment in social evolution, since it attempted to unite philosophical reflection with the practice of day to day life. It was seen as trying to produce a practical philosophy aimed at the solution of immediate social problems. The model for this reformist problem-solving (the reform of situation) requires a theoretical foundation in a new conception of human nature which will allow reforms to take place, and a socialised conscience which will keep them in check.

Social Background & Intellectual Influences

George Herbert Mead was born in 1863 of a reformist family. He studied at Oberlin College Seminary, reputed for its active radicalism in matters of the rights of blacks and women (1), and where his father had taught. Although he rebelled against its Christian piety, a mixture of New England Congregationalist ethics and Progressivism remained with him throughout his life. After leaving the college, Mead taught for a while, and then attended Harvard where he was influenced by Royce and James. Mead read widely, particularly works on Evolutionary theory and Pragmatism; then, following the path of other intellectuals of his generation, he went to study in Germany. While there, he became familiar with the work of Wilhelm Wundt, who was at Leipzig, and G. Stanley Hall, then working in Berlin.

These diverse influences were brought together by Mead to form a unique brand of social psychology. Mead followed James' critical analysis of the traditional problem of the subject-object/mind-matter dichotomy. He accepted James' argument that these dichotomies may not be as much expressions of ultimate realities as the drawing upon more basic realities. Instead of states of consciousness being simply abstract or metaphysical, the mind is in a direct relation to the objective world. But, unlike James, Mead did not start from an analysis of pure experience (and then make distinctions between subject and object) but, by using Watsonian behaviourism, began with the analysis of observable behaviour and the empirical world. Mead then developed his own view of a dynamic social process (comprising of social acts). He was able to show that the society, mind, and self were constituent parts of a social evolutionary process. In this way Mead could avoid 'mentalism' (the introspective view of experience as a state of consciousness) and behaviourism (an analysis restricted to observable or overt behaviour).

The work of Wundt was particularly influential on Mead since it provided the link between these differing perspectives. Wundt's ideas

were characterised by a 'psycho-physical parallelism' — an attempt to consider both the introspection of known states of consciousness and the external behaviour. Mead's achievement was to fuse these aspects together through the application of a developmental process rather than retain both aspects as separate (with differing purposes and distinct sets of elements). From Wundt, Mead took the vital concept of *gesture*. Through this idea the parallelism between what takes place through the body and what is going on in the mind could be demonstrated and the relation between them understood. Gestures are the means of communication in the animal world — they denote the kind of action that is to take place; they are signs for future action given by individual creatures, which are commonly understood by its fellows. Gestures allow collective action and an animal community to be formed and sustained. In human behaviour, gestures are taken a further step and become the basis for a shared *language*. Human beings act through the creation of significant symbols which are mutually understood and have inherent meaning for others. Language, while being integrated and grounded in a system of logical rules, allows for very diverse patterns of human behaviour. By applying Wundt's 'psycho-physical parallelism', Mead was able to provide a unified view of the self as a continuing relation between the action undertaken in the world and the inner thought that guided it (Martindale, 1961).

Mead was also impressed by his contact with German thought in another important manner. He believed that the German Idealists, especially the Romantics, in the early part of the 19th century had provided useful arguments against individualistic doctrines (which regarded the individual as a passive recipient of the effects of the physical environment). The Romantics' stress on a conception of the individual within a societal context was particularly important. They also argued for a social evolution in which the environment was, to some extent, the result of the active efforts of the individual being. However, Mead regarded the Romantic view of social evolution as having a metaphysical cast. It therefore required the work of Darwin to give it an empirical and scientific basis. For Mead, the individual had a *biological* foundation and a situation in *social* evolution.

While teaching at the University of Michigan Mead became a friend of Charles Horton Cooley. It was Cooley's ideas on the nature of the self (in conjunction with James' thoughts on the subject) that led Mead to form his own distinctive view of the self. Mead considered that Cooley's conception was not sufficiently couched in social terms. Also while at Michigan, Mead became a close associate of John Dewey who was to become the leading figure in Pragmatism. Later Dewey left for the new University of Chicago, and subsequently invited Mead to work with him in the Department of Philosophy. Dewey regarded Mead as having the 'most original mind in philosophy in America of the (last) generation'. Mead's influence on Dewey rivalled, if not surpassed, that of James; certainly Dewey must have incorporated many of

Mead's ideas that came from their frequent long conversations over many years of friendship. However, whereas Dewey wrote a great number of books and papers and achieved prominence as a reformer and a Pragmatist, Mead did not have a book published in his lifetime. He was forty when his first important article, apart from a number of reviews and minor articles, appeared. His main work was published after his death in 1931, and was largely assembled from the lectures he had given to his students and pieced together from their notes.

Pragmatism also contained a 'secular ethic' — an altruism without an explicit belief in God — which stressed the duty of the individual to engage in activities beneficial to the community. This imperative, especially to be found in Dewey, appealed to the strong current of Congregationalism that had remained with Mead from his youth. It is related to the Pragmatist concern to establish a 'unification' or 'wholeness' in society. This is partly derived from Dewey's Hegelianism, but more immediately from Royce's notion of the 'Blessed Community'; from the organic conception within evolutionary thought; and from his activities in social reform e.g. the plea for 'community' fostered by the 'settlement movement'.⁽²⁾ However, Mead was not interested in constructing 'grand schemas' along the lines of Herbert Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy.

The Pragmatists were intent upon overthrowing old absolutes and outworn dogmas. Such ideas were now irrelevant when considered alongside the approaching prospect of society. The ideologies of the right — Social Darwinism and the left — revolutionary socialism, were the reflections of a disappearing social order. They were conflicting ideological views of the society — on the one side there was a belief in the 'survival of the fittest' and on the other the desire for a forced egalitarianism. For the Pragmatists, these contradictory systems of thought were inflexible; they could not account for shifting social circumstances and were socially destructive. They believed that social action, including research, should be experimental and open-ended. It should not be guided by rigid dogma or pre-judge its outcome. This more cautious approach to social action would help to find a middle way between old differences and disputes. In particular, Pragmatism argued against the prevailing current of Social Darwinism which stated (following Herbert Spencer ⁽³⁾) that Man was subject to the constraining laws of nature. To interfere with these laws, through social reform, would delay progress by stimulating the over-preponderance of the 'unfit'. Pragmatism firmly believed that Man had a positive role to play in shaping human destiny.

However, despite the assertions of Pragmatists regarding the necessity for open-ended inquiry, the end or aim of their own social practice was pre-given. The Pragmatists had a hope, or sense of possibility, that an ideal democratic society would be established. Modification in their inquiry took place for a reason. It did not simply occur in an open-ended fashion (and they would reject the use of chance or intuition).

Decisions had to be taken for a reason — decisions tended to be taken to facilitate social action that coincided with desired outcomes. The acceptable ends of social action had to be made to correspond to the aims of a liberal politics (the resolution of social conflict and the eradication of competing ideologies), and the liberal conception of a future society — the democratic community. Thus Pragmatism, or 'pragmatic practice', was a mixture of the uncertainty of experiment and the confidence of the inevitable. The broad outlines of the goal were known and agreed upon, but the concrete means were not. Hence the approach was step by step as the rules for democratic procedure — through participation and communication — were worked out.

Therefore, it became important for Mead to show how society was best able to proceed towards achieving these aims. His thought is preoccupied with establishing the bases upon which human cooperation and communication rest, and can be developed: with developing the *social* nature of the self to combat *self*-ishness. For him, a middle way had to be found to defeat the autocratic power of the 'robber barons' and their conservative views based on Social Darwinism and the demands of the working classes and their socialist doctrine.

Mead's work can be seen as a fundamental reconstruction of *evolutionary ideas* into a pragmatic mode of thought and action. The starting point of this reworking is, therefore, the writings of Charles Darwin on evolution.

Mead modified and extended Darwin's ideas on the transformations of species to apply to the changing nature of social forms through social processes.

... he regarded Darwin as having provided the empirical underpinning for the ..(earlier).. revolutionary but inadequate Romantic notions of evolution ... (their importance lay in the stress upon social evolution — the placing of the individual within a social context and making the environment, in some subtle sense, dependent upon the acting organism) ... The corpus of biological writing allows the pragmatist to challenge mechanical conceptions of actions and the world, and to restate problems of autonomy, freedom, and innovation in evolutionary and social rather than mechanistic and individualistic terms. (Strauss, 1964)

However Mead's pragmatic belief in the importance of reason leads him to take a rather different path to other illustrious followers of Darwin,

Mead's pragmatic devotion to reason prevents him from going the way of intellectual descendants of Darwin — Freud, Macdougall, Veblen, and Le Bon among others — who stressed irrational and non-rational determinants of human behaviour. Darwin's work itself, insofar as it deals with man's psychology,

is given an elaborate recasting by Mead. Darwin's treatment of expressive gestures is revised in the light of human communication: and biological evolution emerges in the topmost species as something new and different — a true emergent. (ibid)

For Mead (and other Pragmatists of his generation) the question whether "a Darwinian or Lamarckian hypothesis is to be accepted is not really of such great importance". The importance of evolutionary thought was the "recognition that the process takes now one form and now another, according to the conditions under which it is going on. That is the essential thing" (Mead, 1964a). The Lamarckian view is not challenged — Mead simply accepts what he regards as Darwin's view, "that selection under the struggle for existence would pick out the organ which is necessary for survival — the recognition that the process will determine the form according to the conditions".

Mead makes a distinction between the idea of process running through all life, now taking one form now another, and the form itself. The form is secondary to the life-process in that forms are the expressions of the life process of evolution. This conception was a rejoinder to the view that the life-process was simply expressed in forms — the form was given, "it was there in order that there might be life" (Mead, 1964b). Mead argues that the form is dependent upon the conditions under which the life-process is carried out and developed. At the social level, therefore, Mead places 'process' first and 'structures' second in importance. Institutions and social structures were ever-changing — they were part, or expressions of the life-process of social evolution, but they were not fixed or given.

The pragmatic conception, underpinned by evolutionary thought viewed the mind as in a struggle for control over the environment to enable the organism to survive. The organism lived by moving, changing, and adapting through a relationship to the environment. A processual-adaptive arrangement existed between the organism and the environment — the environment was both imposing and imposed upon. The mind was active or instrumental — the process was not given or unchanging, but was acted upon by action that was guided by the mental effort of the organism. Human beings had a degree of choice in establishing rules of conduct. Habits were still constraining but not totally addictive; instincts were modifiable impulses rather than sources of fixed drives towards inevitable behavioural outcomes. In short human behaviour was adaptive and creative — it was pragmatic.

Social Reform and Scientific Knowledge

The liberal politics of reform of situation was grounded in a biological-adjustment model of action, which saw individual behaviour as based upon impulses which could be channelled into socially constructive behaviour. Moral equivalents (James) had to be found through which, for example, the 'spirit of youth' (Addams) could find a socially acceptable outlet, e.g. in theatre groups, hobbies, etc. The idea of

socialised conscience as an integral part of the individual's character is central to this scheme. For, the socialised conscience not only introduces society into the inner life of the individual but is also the source of rationality (which diverts the potential for irrational behaviour of biologically-based impulses). The socialised conscience is, in effect, society's representative to a debate within the personality: the self is the forum for an inner parliament.

In positing the idea of modifiable impulses, Pragmatists saw a danger in seeming to support radical reformers or revolutionaries who believed that because human nature was not fixed or given, immediate and drastic social changes could be made. Pragmatists resolved this difficulty by arguing that while impulses could be socially channelled (and given social meaning), social change was constrained by the conservatism of habit and tradition. Thus social institutions could not simply be changed in a progressive manner. By denying the existence of fixed instincts and positing modifiable impulses, biological determinism was avoided; by defining a socially-based rational mind which was strongly dependent on social education, and by introducing a conservatism through custom and tradition, social reform was allied to a social evolutionary model. Social progress would only be achieved through gradual social adjustment and reform of situation. In this way human nature was left plastic enough to allow for social reform but the self kept tight enough to allow only those reforms that corresponded to implicit liberal values. Through the incision of the socialised conscience, a liberal-democratic conception of society entered the self in the guise of the *social* and the *rational*. In addition the biological adjustment model of action that was produced supported a practical liberal politics of step-by-step reform of situation.

Mead took part in a variety of social reform activities. He collaborated with Jane Addams (the leader of Hull House Settlement in Chicago) in the development of settlement houses there. He was actively involved in the Experimental School at the University — started by J. Dewey — and edited *The Elementary School Teacher*. As a long time member of the City Club of Chicago, he chaired its committee on Public Education, wrote a report on the importance of vocational training, and campaigned for the participation of workers in city planning.

Mead, Dewey and Addams were intent on establishing a new Community based on the model of the rural community (which was to some extent an idealisation of their own background and childhood, or of America's past) within the city. Greater communication and cooperation would bind the urban population together and help to overcome social conflicts and problems.

Mead shared Dewey and Addams's belief in the need to open avenues of communication so that the interests of the immigrant could be channelled into making a major contribution to the development of a new community in the midst of modern city life. The education of the child,

the immigrant and the worker, was necessary to produce an informed citizenry who could identify with, and participate in, the political process. They would realise that their interests were being represented and served and that such participation was necessary for the good of all. The liberal-Pragmatists believed that education should be more than simply learning the three 'Rs' or the acquiring of facts. It should be a fully *social* education to make people more aware of the factors affecting their lives and to make people more actively involved in social life. At its simplest Mead and his colleagues were concerned to promote a greater sociability between the very diverse groups to be found in the urban environment.

The concern to relate thought and action — the basic endeavour of Pragmatism — raises the important question of the role of the scientist and the nature of *scientific knowledge*. In addition, for Mead, a significant point in social evolution had been reached which made this question doubly important: the realisation that human intelligence could actively participate in social evolution in a self-conscious manner.

Again, Mead's position is broadly similar to Dewey's; both view investigation as a practice carried out through questioning and discovery — an open-ended search for unknown answers. But this search is never in a vacuum, it is always in relation to what is known and an attempt to achieve some purpose. The aim of scientific research, both in the social and natural sciences, is the resolution of antagonisms or solution of problems. All research, Mead argues, has to appeal for its justification to practical problems, and seek solutions through observation and experiment. To the experimental method, Mead added a fundamental evolutionary perspective — the 'problematical' or adjustment model of action as applied to research and a conception of the research as a continuous interaction of its constituent parts in a process. In addition there is a sense of wholeness; research is related to an outside social totality — although to some extent it may seem to have a unity of its own, it cannot be separated from its social context.

Mead's conception of investigation was not of a straightforward observational fact-gathering enterprise (or Empiricism) or the establishment of constraining systems of dogma (or Social Darwinism). The aim was not to know the social totality in all its facets, but merely to relate specific problems as they occur, or are selected, to the 'whole' for validation. By the gradual change or adjustment of immediate circumstances, problems are resolved and the social totality is slowly altered.

Mead makes a direct comparison between the scientist and the administrator or businessman who takes day to day decisions which have a considerable impact on social life. He argues that research also has immediate effects and implications for the social situation and possible wider ramifications eventually for other situations and the social whole. Changes must be cautious or experimental rather than drastic or large scale:

The scientist's attitude is that of a man in a going concern which requires at various points readjustments and reconstructions. The success of the readjustments and reconstructions is found in the triumph over the difficulty, as evidenced by the fact that the concern continues to operate. He finds his tests in the parts of the whole which still operate.

However, Mead adds,

This does not imply that readjustments cannot be called for later at these very points to which he now appeals for confirmation of the success of his solutions of the immediate problems before him. (Mead, 1964c)

Mead claims that work in experimental science is guided by the mind and always takes place through social experience, "... in the thought of the scientist, the supposition of his mind and his self always invokes other minds and selves as presuppositions and as standing upon the same level of existence and evidence". (Mead, 1964d)

The experimental scientist was not concerned with the building of abstract generalisations from 'facts' or large theoretical systems; such endeavours result in a body of metaphysical ideas or a rigid dogma, both of which are not adaptable to changing conditions. In his essay "The Nature of Scientific Knowledge", Mead argues that the succession of theoretical systems produced by the various scientific disciplines must be understood as part of a real or underlying process that was taking place in social institutions. The real continuity that exists is not so much between the various systems, but between the role of the scientists involved and the problems they sought to explain.

Mead argues that a new age is dawning in which revolutions — in thought and action — would no longer occur. Revolutions in social ideas had occurred in the past because grand systems of thought or ideologies had been erected. These had had some relation to the social world and did reflect the state of knowledge at the time, but had become outdated and 'irrelevant' because they could not be adequately modified according to experience and reflection. A stage was reached when a system was manifestly inadequate to explain society and had to be replaced; at this point a revolution in ideas takes place and a new system is erected.(4)

Mead contends that this succession of systems, each following the other by revolutionary replacement, is itself breaking down. Progress in thought was an expression of the nature of social relationships and how human beings saw themselves — changes in the nature of the society, mind and self would affect the composition and character of social ideas. Mead argued that social *thought* was becoming more related to *practice* and experience. It was only through involvement in social

processes through the practical seeking of solutions to problems that thought could be ever-changing, vigorous and useful to society. Thought must keep pace with change instead of being the brake on social progress. This did not mean that thought must always follow changes in social circumstances but that intelligence (5) must be applied in a self-reflective manner. The direct application of intelligence through experience would bring beneficial results for everyone. Once it was fully realised in philosophy and science that human evolution was social and not mystically (or metaphysically), environmentally, or inner determined (within the individual) then, through social participation and communication, thought and action would be unified and social evolution ensured and enhanced. Scientific knowledge was above all social knowledge; intelligence a problem solving activity, truth synonymous with the solution of a problem, and science the evolutionary process made self-conscious.

C. Wright Mills in a very perceptive critique of Pragmatism argues that the 'thorns in the political flesh' of liberalism were Social Darwinism and Instinctivist Psychology. Liberals wished to give mind and rationality a place in nature and, therefore, in psychological explanation. They wanted to see 'human nature as modifiable through the reconstruction of the social environment'. The problem for such liberals, was how a 'substantive rationality' could be established while at the same time denying the political implications of historical individualism. They believed that a substantive rationality would prevail if the capacities for intelligence (the active working upon the social environment) were developed among the population — hence the centrality of education in their thinking. Above all the Pragmatists sought to give a *social* explanation of the human mind, activity, events and institutions. The difficulty for Mead and Dewey lay in providing a social theory that could be linked to, or implied, a practical intelligence or substantive rationality. If this could be achieved then their social and political views would have a legitimate basis — there would be support for a liberal politics of 'reform of situation'. *Education* had a crucial role to play in facilitating step by step changes in social circumstances — the school and the settlement house were to be a meeting place where the bond between the *social* and the *rational* was to be forged. This bond or link took many different forms; between science and value, between the religious world and the economic system, and between an inner intellectual endeavour and an outer social action (or between hand and brain).

The Social Psychology — Society, Mind, Self and Act

For Mead, social psychology is the discipline that

studies the activity or behaviour of the individual as it lies within the social process; the behaviour of an individual can be understood only in terms of the behaviour of the whole social group of which he is a member, since his

individual acts are involved in larger social acts, which go beyond himself and which implicate other members of that group (Mead, 1934).

Mead argues that his (social) evolutionary theory of society (and the development of the mind and self) is different from an individualistic theory (or a contract theory of the state),

The latter theory takes individuals and their individual experiencing — individual minds and selves — as logically prior to the social process in which they are involved, and explains the existence of that social process in terms of them; whereas the former takes the social process of experience or behaviour as logically prior to the individuals and their individual experiencing which are involved in it, and explains their existence in terms of that social process. (Mead, 1964e)

For Mead, society is based upon mutual cooperation and has certain features of animal 'society'. Analysis of society must begin with the investigation of overt behaviour which is objective, and therefore, observable. But, unlike Watsonian behaviourism, Mead also included covert activity which made human behaviour different from that of animals. Human behaviour is social and can only be understood from the perspective of social process. The self, in Mead's formulation, is interwoven with the notions society, mind and act. The true sequence of Mead's thinking is *society*, self and mind, rather than *Mind, Self and Society*, since it is from assumptions regarding society that his argument begins.

In his discussion of *society* Mead's prime aim is to establish what is distinctly human, so that a clear difference between human and animal society can be made. Human cooperation and association cannot be simply explained with reference to biological or physiological factors. The characteristic that is unique to human beings is intention and the ability to assess the possible intentions of others. The individual is able to understand and guide its own behaviour upon the expectation of others' behaviour in the future. The idea of gesture, mentioned earlier, is a key concept for differentiating between human and animal behaviour. In particular, because it enables Mead to tackle the question of instincts. Mead prefers the term 'impulse' to instinct; impulses are capacities or energies that are socially moulded rather than destructive urges that have to be repressed, or simply diverted, by society. Through the use of the term impulse Mead is able to root sociability deep in the character of the individual.

Animal gestures do not have conscious intention or meaning. There is no conscious hesitation or consideration of the response to give in a situation; each organism adjusts according to its instincts. Mead argues

that human behaviour is social in another additional sense, namely because the individual incorporates the responses of others, and so responses are shared. There is a process of interaction through symbols — a conversation of gestures — through which participants in a social situation can engage in meaningful activity.

The ability of the individual to act in relation to inner responses, or intention, presupposes a mental activity or *mind*. The mind is not abstract or given but the result of social processes and develops with the self. The organism in the environment adapts or adjusts, and this activity, Mead argues, must include a selection and perception of alternative lines of behaviour. The individual organism is therefore able to affect the environment, to some extent, by its own perception and response.

Again, there is an important difference between animals and humans—animals act more directly in innate or habitual ways, humans have the power of reflective thinking. Human beings can hesitate and through imagination can assess the possible outcomes of the various paths open to them. It is this ability to reflect and assess—to inhibit or delay action — which is the important role of the mind in human beings.

Human behaviour is organised around the construction of a problem to be solved. It is a social construction in the sense that it takes account of the definitions or symbolic gestures provided by others. The individual by operating through the mind is able to see himself from the view of the generalised other — the individual is therefore able to act socially because of an awareness of a common system of definitions (symbols and meanings).

We have already discussed Mead's account of the emergence of the *self* as a wider product of social evolution. The existence of the self is also implied by the ability of the individual to respond to his/her own gestures. Essentially the individual can act socially towards him/herself as well as towards others. He/she may praise, blame, or encourage him/herself. The human being may, therefore, become the object of its own actions. The self is also formed, crucially, through the definitions given it by others. The individual is able to take the role of others to itself. Further, the self develops within pre-existing social processes — society is logically prior to the emergence and development of the self.

Mead begins his analysis with the emergence of the self in the child. It is when the individual is a child that the self initially develops. Firstly the child imitates adults, but the behaviour at this stage has no intrinsic meaning. Secondly, the child begins to play certain roles, but has no unified conception of itself. Thirdly, the child completes its idea of self by being able to take on a number of roles simultaneously and organise them into a system. This is analogous to the playing of childhood games — such games, themselves, hold an important place

in the development of the self. In game playing the child begins to acquire a general system of attitudes — a generalised other, which is derived from society and provides for consistency from situation to situation. It becomes possible for the individual to stand back from immediate surroundings and others. Even when other people are absent it is still possible for the individual to behave with regard to their expectations. The generalised other is not only important for self-control it also locates the wider functions of social control.

The self is a process that has two related parts, the 'I' and the 'Me'. The 'I' is the disorganised and spontaneous part of the individual. It is the undirected and impulsive aspect of human experience. The 'Me' is the controlling, directing part of the individual and in any situation is composed of the incorporated generalised other which is relevant. The 'Me' is the social aspect of the person — the representation of society through the organisation of attitudes, expectations and meanings derived from the group. In simple terms, the 'I' is the source of creativity and novelty through impulses, the 'Me' controls and directs behaviour into socially responsible forms. The outcome of this inner interaction is the *act*.

Mead argues that human beings act instead of react. The *act* includes overt and covert behaviour and also many of the traditional categories that have been used to explain human behaviour — emotion, perception, imagination and reason. However these traditional categories are part of the ongoing act, they are not separate, discrete or singular explanations. The act is an ongoing, flexible and unfolding plan and action. The beginning of the act is an impulse and the end is the release of the impulse. The impulse disturbs the equilibrium between the organism and the environment. It is random until given meaning and channelled to an appropriate goal set by a problem (or the response of others in interaction). Mead outlines various kinds of acts, for example, the blocked act, and incomplete act, and the retrospective act. In each case he tries to explain human action in terms of the ongoing social process.

Mead and other Pragmatists believed that by taking the role or attitude of the other, social understanding and social harmony would be enhanced. However, the Pragmatist view, despite its concern for sociability and community, is not as egalitarian as it first appears. Role-taking does not imply an actual change in roles or social position; it is an imaginary exercise. It has the practical effect of reducing conflict through greater understanding. Mead was anxious to dispel the impression that role-taking would produce complete equality — there would still be leaders and led, rich and poor. However, he also wished to avoid a structural analysis of society in terms of social classes (or social institutions) since this would imply a conflictual view of social relations and a fixity in social forms.

Mead's work contains an implicit liberal pluralism; for instance, class

relations become differentiated into a number of separate types and/or become merely another 'type' of relation (i.e. similar to other types of 'economic relation' such as buyer and seller). Each relationship is part of the general pattern of society in a similar manner. Although some types of relationship are more important than others, they are merely aspects of the greater whole. According to Mead, each relationship is 'socially functional' and each individual a 'socially functional' member of a group. In the 'Ideal Society' a 'functional differentiation' would still exist according to individual abilities and tasks. However, through greater social participation old ideological conflicts (and the social disruption they produced) would disappear. Mead believed that the future 'Ideal Society' would be produced by a combination of the 'economic society' with the 'religious community',

What we call the ideal of a human society is approached in some sense by the economic society on the one side and by the universal religions on the other side, but it is not by any means fully realised. Those abstractions can be put together in a single community of the democratic type. As democracy now exists, there is not this development of communication so that individuals can put themselves into the attitudes of those whom they affect. (Mead, 1964f)

The self had an important part to play in achieving the Ideal Society. It was to be the liberal-democratic world in miniature.

Conclusions

Pragmatism sought to provide a theoretical practice that avoided the revolutionary view of the necessity for fundamental socio-structural changes. While its concern to unite thought and practice has, on the surface, a parallel with a central theme in Marxism (especially in Marx's early work e.g. *Theses on Feuerbach*) the basis of this concern is, in fact, quite different. The major difference between the two formulations of the relation between thought and practice lies in the philosophical conceptions of social change that underpins them. Pragmatism rests upon an *evolutionary naturalism*.

In Mead, the 'social evolution' of human society is traced through the development of sociability — a closer association between the society and the self. Man is becoming more *social* and, at the same time, more able to change the social and physical world. However, this view remains in a liberal reformist mould. Against the conservative, the Pragmatist argues that human nature is flexible rather than fixed; against the socialist, the Pragmatist argues that it is difficult to change social institutions permanently because of the resistance of culture and tradition. Change must therefore take place through a gradual cultural reform — a general 'socialising' or 'socialisation' through education, social welfare and the politics of 'communication and participation'. In Marx's work there is a similar emphasis on the *social*

nature of individuality (Man as a 'species being') and Man's increasing ability to shape the physical world. In addition there is also the influence of evolutionary thought, although in a more limited way. It is more evident in the work of Engels and early Marxists — Kautsky, Plekhanov. In the latter writers, their 'Darwinism' is derived from thinkers such as Haeckel, rather than Darwin himself, and is characterised by a monistic conception — the construction of cosmic syntheses or world views which attempt to explain everything 'from the most elementary level right up to the level of human history' (Coletti, 1975, McLellan, 1973).

In Pragmatism the 'social' is conceived largely in terms of a cultural pluralism rather than, as in a Marxist approach, a structural analysis of social classes and institutions. Further, social evolution is seen, by Pragmatists, as a result of a developing social consciousness — or as an interrelation between the society and the self. While Mead stresses that society occurs before the self, he also makes clear that this consciousness is not an abstract general conscience. He tries to avoid reductive individualistic, and collective metaphysical explanations of society and its social evolution. The chief weakness of Pragmatist conception of thought and practice is that it tends to be seen as simply an interaction between society and the self to the detriment of the application of the mind on the material world. By trying to prevent a lapse into environmentalism — Man as having to adapt to the environment or die (and its Social Darwinist implications — that those individuals who survive and prosper are endowed with greater 'fitness') — the crucial ability to shape the physical environment is underplayed. However, we would argue that it is not simply the mental and physical effort of action (or labour), by the individual or collective, which is important but the interrelation between the social organisation of action (work) and the physical or material world on which it is based.

What is lacking in the social evolutionary view of society and the adaptive conception of action in Pragmatism, is any sustained analysis of the dialectical or contradictory nature of the relation between thought and practice. By trying to demonstrate their unity, their disunity tends to become purely secondary. In Pragmatism the need to establish gradual and 'rational' progress through *adjustment* (both in the individual act and in social evolution) reduces the inherent contradictions between the generation and the application of knowledge through practical experience. It is this model of the social — as a rational model of communication, participation and compromise — which enters the self through the generalised other and produces a lessening of internal conflict in the individual (and a self based on rational debate).

In short the Pragmatist version of human history has social consciousness (the relation between society and the self) as its motor rather than the practical experience of social individuals working within social institutions. It lacks an analysis of the changing *structure* of social life — the changing nature of class formations and relations of prod-

uction. To make its analysis adequate, in these terms, would require a complete transformation of Pragmatism. The outcome would be an approach much closer to a historical (and dialectical) materialism of Marxist analysis.

The study of Pragmatism — and Mead's work — still remains important. A Marxist analysis of liberal-social democratic ideology must include (at least in the American context) an examination of the influence of Pragmatist thought and practice. The ideas of Dewey and Mead have had a lasting effect on a number of social practices. The influence of Dewey's 'progressivism' on education is well known, and, perhaps to a lesser extent, Mead's contribution to sociology. However, what is needed is a much fuller analysis of Pragmatism as an ideology, especially since it achieved prominence at a critical moment in American history — the transition period to monopoly capitalism. The part played by Pragmatism in aiding this transition has not been fully recognised.

To understand the full extent of the influence of Pragmatism would require:— work on its intellectual origins in Pierce, James, and Royce (and the sources of their thought); the reasons for its modification of Social Darwinism and the particular manner in which alterations were made; the examination of the Pragmatists as a social group; and Pragmatism as a 'practical rationale' (an ideology) through which they pursued their interests. Further, the study of Pragmatism would require an examination of the social practices, apart from sociology, philosophy and education, where its influences are not so immediately recognised, yet might be just as pervasive and vital, for instance, in social welfare. In addition, Pragmatism's role in managerial ideology, both in social administration (the identification and control of social problems) and industrial relations policy (the adjustment of the worker to the industrial system, e.g. the Human Relations School) have been relatively ignored.

Pragmatism provided the rising middle-classes (particularly those in new or expanding sectors — universities, social administration, middle-management in companies, professions) with a practical philosophy to fit the new roles which were opening up in an increasingly diverse and developing economy. It also provided a source of stability and control. Despite its proponents being associated with the reform movement (or indeed because of it), which included Progressives, Socialists, and Liberals, it can be argued that Pragmatism gave a channel for the de-radicalisation of protest (in civil rights, industry, women's suffrage, and social reform campaigns) at the turn of the century. It helped the institutionalisation of protest through a philosophy based on enhancing communication, participation. By promoting 'inter-mediary institutions' of welfare and education (coupled with a call for social responsibility in business) to 'socialise' the immigrant, the young, and the worker, 'pragmatic' thought and practice became not simply a means of reform, but a prerequisite for social control. A full account of

Pragmatism would have to include the major part it has played in the establishment and furtherance of liberal social-democratic politics.

Mead's work is still important in another way — other than as part of Pragmatist Ideology. His thought — especially the idea of the self as a social construction is useful as part of the debate within Marxism on the nature of individuality and consciousness.(6) Mead's work also serves as an instructive comparison with which to view other influential thinkers, particularly Freud (e.g. on the differing conceptions of 'instinct', 'sublimation', 'conscience', and the 'social'). The great difficulty in attempting to compare Mead with other thinkers arises from the use of interpretation — the extent to which interpretations are 'accurate', the degree to which concepts can be legitimately drawn from their theoretical contexts, and the usefulness of the conclusions drawn from comparisons which may be severely limited or qualified. However, despite these restrictions, such comparisons have to be made to enable new thought to be generated. (8)

NOTES

(1) Oberlin, founded by a Congregationalist reformer John J. Shiphard in 1833, had a distinguished tradition of reform. It was one of the first white colleges to allow blacks to enter as students and was also well known for its role as a 'station' on the 'Underground Railroad' to freedom for black slaves. In 1841 Oberlin became the first co-educational college to grant a degree to women. In addition it was noted for its views on temperance and the Anti-Saloon League was founded there;

"For half a century (Oberlin) had triumphantly combined orthodoxy in religion with radicalism in politics and social relationships, and (it was) where a lively social conscience was a prerequisite to graduation." (Commager, 1968)

(2) The settlement house and the school provided a meeting place where an 'identification' or a 'taking the role of the other' was to be achieved between the settlement worker and the immigrant, and the educator and the child. The settlement house, in particular, was regarded as a democratic forum where businessmen, politicians, intellectuals, reformers, ministers, and the uneducated worker or immigrant could meet, on equal terms, to debate in a reasonable manner on all important social questions. From the settlement house the value of community would be fostered and eventually a new Community would become a reality. The settlement house would become the 'Cathedral of the Slum'.

(3) Spencer argued that Man was subject to the inexorable unfolding of natural laws. Human progress could, therefore, only be due to this long natural process rather than ill-advised schemes for reform. Grand schemes, to better the lot of the poor, could either result in the 'fit', or creators of wealth would have their energies drained by having to support greater numbers of dependents. A crisis occurs in which many die. Progress is delayed because natural laws have been flouted.

(4) This theme has been explored in detail by Thomas S. Kuhn (1962).

(5) By intelligence Mead meant (in a similar, but extended, conception to Dewey's) an activity that was not simply to know the world, but to undertake to tell us what we may expect to happen when we act in such and such a fashion.

(6) Further analysis could concentrate on some of Mead's concepts which I have not been able to discuss, or only mention briefly, due to lack of space —

e.g. time, language, symbol, subject-object relations. The concept of time is particularly important especially in the analysis of work — as a significant aspect of routine, 'objectification', 'alienation' etc.

(7) Other comparisons could be usefully made between Mead, and Jean Piaget (e.g. the importance of game playing by the child), and Alfred Schutz (e.g. the analysis of 'signs', 'meanings', 'symbols', and 'subject-object' relations).

(8) The closest point of comparison is perhaps, between Mead's 'generalised other' and Freud's 'super-ego'. Some attempts have been made to 'integrate the thought of Mead and Freud. Perhaps the most notable (and successful) attempt, in sociology, has been — GERTH and MILLS (1953).

A number of other writers have drawn on both writers but also demonstrate other influences, see MATZA (1969), and BERGER and LUCKMANN (1966).

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