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Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors

Alonso, Ricardo and Câmara, Odilon (2016) Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors. Journal of Economic Theory, 165. pp. 672-706. ISSN 1095-7235

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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.07.006

Abstract

In a world in which rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness of an experiment (public signal). We characterize the set of distributions of posterior beliefs that can be induced by an experiment, and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a sender to benefit from persuasion. We then provide sufficient conditions for the sender to benefit from persuasion for almost every pair of prior beliefs, even when there is no value of persuasion under a common prior. Our main condition is that the receiver's action depends on his beliefs only through his expectation of some random variable.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-econom...
Additional Information: © 2016 Elsevier
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Sets: Departments > Management
Date Deposited: 04 Oct 2016 14:24
Last Modified: 21 Sep 2017 14:38
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/67950

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