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Domestic politics and the formation of international environmental agreements

Marchiori, Carmen, Dietz, Simon and Tavoni, Alessandro (2017) Domestic politics and the formation of international environmental agreements. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 81. pp. 115-131. ISSN 0095-0696

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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.jeem.2016.09.009

Abstract

We investigate the effect of domestic politics on international environmental policy by incorporating into a classic stage game of coalition formation the phenomenon of lobbying by special-interest groups. In doing so, we contribute to the theory of international environmental agreements, which has overwhelmingly assumed that governments make decisions based on a single set of public-interest motivations. Our results suggest that lobbying on emissions may affect the size of the stable coalition in counterintuitive ways. In particular, a powerful business lobby may increase the government's incentives to sign an agreement, by providing it with strong bargaining power with respect to that lobby at the emission stage. This would result in lower total emissions when the number of countries involved is not too large. We also show that things change radically when lobbying bears directly on the membership decisions, suggesting that both the object and timing of lobbying matter for the way in which membership decisions, emissions and welfare are affected.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-enviro...
Additional Information: © 2016 Elsevier B.V. © CC BY 4.0
Divisions: Grantham Research Institute
Subjects: G Geography. Anthropology. Recreation > GE Environmental Sciences
H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Q Science > QA Mathematics
JEL classification: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods
K - Law and Economics > K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law > K33 - International Law
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q54 - Climate; Natural Disasters
Sets: Research centres and groups > Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment
Collections > Economists Online
Date Deposited: 03 Oct 2016 13:27
Last Modified: 20 Jul 2019 02:25
Projects: ES/K006576/1
Funders: Economic and Social Research Council
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/67923

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