Whose side are you on? Exploring the role of perspective taking on third-party’s reactions to workplace deviance
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Abstract

We introduce perspective taking as an antecedent of third-party reactions to different forms of workplace deviance. Varying the perspective taken by third-parties (perpetrator; other’s perspective) and the type of workplace deviance (moderate organizational deviance; severe interpersonal deviance), we show that third-parties who take the perpetrator’s perspective perceive the incident as less of a moral violation, make less internal, and more external attributions for the perpetrator’s behavior, which in turn reduces endorsement of punishment. Findings were consistent across the four studies and not affected by the target (organization or individual) or the severity of the deviance. The mediation analysis was supported by the instrumental variable method (Studies 1 and 2) and the concurrent double randomization design (Studies 3a and 3b).

**Keywords:** Workplace aggression, perspective taking, attribution, self-serving bias, bystander, observers, experimental mediation, instrumental variable method
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Workplace deviance—one of a number of terms that refer to negative behavior initiated by an employee and directed toward another person within an organization (e.g., gossiping, interpersonal harassment) or the organization itself (e.g., reduced effort, embezzlement; Bennet & Robinson, 2000; Hershcovis, 2011)—is receiving increasing attention in the scientific literature. This interest is not surprising due to the pervasive nature of this behavior, as well as the negative effect it can have on both employees and organizations (Porath & Pearson, 2010). Although researchers have developed an understanding of the individual and situational factors that predict whether individuals will engage in workplace deviance (e.g., Barling, Dupré, & Kelloway, 2009) as well as the associated consequences (e.g., Aquino & Thau, 2009), comparatively less attention has been devoted to investigating third parties’ reactions to the deviant behavior of others. However, given that the majority of incidents of workplace mistreatment occur in the presence of others (Glomb, 2002), understanding third-party reactions to such deviant acts is particularly important, as the reactions of these individuals can have significant implications for the perpetrator as well as the victim (Bowes-Sperry & O’Leary-Kelly, 2005). For example, third parties could provide advice and social support to the victim, or even decide to intervene to stop the perpetrator (O’Reilly & Aquino, 2011).

Bridging research in social psychology, which shows that taking the perspective of the perpetrator of unethical actions is associated with biased perceptions of the perpetrator’s and victim’s behavior (Kearns & Fincham, 2005; Skorinko, Laurent, Bountress, Nyein, & Kuckuck, 2014), with organizational research on the factors affecting third-party reactions to the negative behavior of others (Folger et al., 2005; Skarlicki & Kulik, 2004), the current research provides several contributions.
First, we introduce perspective taking as an antecedent of third-party judgments about the deviant behavior of others—such as perceptions of moral violation and attributions of blame—which in turn influence the extent to which third-parties endorse punishment of the perpetrator. When observing deviant behavior, people rarely remain neutral and instead tend to side with either the victim or the perpetrator. Current models of third-party reactions assume that individuals will tend to react negatively toward perpetrators (e.g., O’Reilly & Aquino, 2011). However, in the current study, we propose that perspective taking will influence third-party reactions such that those who take the perspective of the perpetrator will tend to react positively toward the perpetrator.

Second, we empirically test and extend several components of O’Reilly and Aquino’s (2011) theoretical model of third-party reactions to witnessed mistreatment. The model describes a general framework for understanding how individuals react to the negative behavior of others; and yet as of today not much has been done to empirically test the various paths introduced in the model.

Third, our findings have implications for managing deviance in the workplace. Results show that putting oneself in the place of the perpetrator of deviance leads to less negative perceptions of moral violation and to attributions that highlight external rather than internal causes as a way to downplay the perpetrator’s blameworthiness. We also suggest and find that interventions that foster perspective taking of the victim may generate stronger opposition to workplace deviance. If perpetrators were made aware of the potential costs associated with third-party reactions to their deviant behavior, they may be less inclined to engage in deviant behavior at work.

**Perspective Taking within the Framework of Third-Party Reactions to Injustice**

Throughout the paper we adopt O’Reilly and Aquino’s (2011) definition of a third-party as an individual who hears or learns about an incident of deviance at work without
having experienced it first-hand (see also Skarlicki & Kulik, 2004). A third-party could be a colleague, customer, or member of the general public.

Theoretical approaches to understanding third-party’s reactions to injustice tend to be based on Folger’s (2001) deontic model of justice (e.g., O’Reilly & Aquino, 2011). This model posits that when witnessing mistreatment, third-parties can experience an evolutionary-based negative emotional reaction to the violation of their moral assumptions about how people should be treated. Once these assumptions are violated, third-parties may act to restore justice; for example, through an act of retributive justice meant to punish the offender (Lotz, Okimoto, Schlösser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011; Reich & Hershcovis, 2015).

Drawing on Folger’s (2001) deontic model, O’Reilly and Aquino (2011) developed a model of third-party reactions to mistreatment at work in which they introduce an additional element that may explain stronger reactions to mistreatment: the extent to which morality is central to an individual’s self-identity (see also Mitchell, Vogel, & Folger, 2013). In particular, the more observers consider themselves to be moral persons, the more strongly they are affected by the witnessed mistreatment, and the more likely they are to perceive that a moral violation has occurred. This ignites moral anger, which then fuels a series of justice cognitions pertaining to the severity of harm, attributions of blame, and the victim’s deservingness of harm. Such cognitions ultimately lead to the observers’ reactions, such as punishing the perpetrator, helping the victim, or doing nothing.

According to O’Reilly and Aquino (2011), when observing mistreatment, individuals experience two types of reactions: an automatic and nonconscious perception that a moral violation has occurred, or intuition of moral violation, followed by a more thoughtful and sophisticated judgment which involves deeper reasoning about the severity, deservingness, and blame attributions, or justice cognitions. Each of these components may ultimately shape third-parties’ reactions. In the current studies, we investigate these propositions empirically; in particular we examine how third-parties’ first intuition of moral violation influences their
justice cognitions and ultimately their endorsement of punishment of the perpetrator.

However, we also extend this model by introducing an antecedent to third-parties’ intuition of moral violation: third-party perspective taking.

**The Role of Perspective Taking on Third-Party’s Reactions to Deviant Behavior**

Although O’Reilly and Aquino’s (2011) model provides a comprehensive framework for understanding third-party reactions to mistreatment, it does not account for the interpersonal relationships that are typical of workplace behavior and that can affect third-party reactions (Chui & Dietz, 2014). In most work environments, employees know each other and may therefore put themselves in the place of one or the other actors of mistreatment. Hence, we posit that one factor that affects third-party reactions to deviant behavior is their perspective taking of an actor involved in the (unjust) event.

The phenomenon of how people make sense of another individual’s mental states, feelings, attitudes, and evaluations is known as ‘perspective taking’ (Epley & Waytz, 2009). Perspective taking is beneficial in social interactions, as, for example, people who understand others negotiate better agreements (Bazerman & Neale, 1983; Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008) and are more likely to help others (Batson, 1994). The link between perspective taking and prosocial behavior has been explained by increased perceived closeness with the other person and greater empathic concern (Myers & Hodges, 2013).

The literature on the perpetrator and victim bias in judgment, however, has pointed to the negative consequences of perspective taking. Stillwell and Baumeister (1997) were among the first to show that victims and perpetrators each provide a biased view of deviant behavior, and that they do so by omitting information that may jeopardize their reputation. In the context of interpersonal relationships, Kearns and Fincham (2005) showed that perpetrators emphasized details that reduced the severity of the transgression, whereas victims did the opposite. Additional research investigated reactions to perception of deviance. For example, Catellani and Milesi (2001) showed how interpretations of a deviant behavior
changed depending on the perspective taken by participants in mock judicial cases. More specifically, participants taking the role of the perpetrator brought up more explanations that focused on the victim’s passive behavior (e.g., the victim’s controllable inaction), whereas those taking the perspective of the victim focused more on the perpetrator’s controllable actions. Another study (Skorinko, Laurent, Bountress, Nyein, & Kuckuck, 2014) investigated the effect of perspective taking on mock courtroom decisions, showing that perceptions of culpability depended on the perspective taken (perpetrator/victim) and that empathy with the target mediated this effect.

In the current studies, we extend the findings reviewed above emerging from the social psychology literature to the literature on workplace misconduct. In particular, we hypothesize that a fundamental aspect that accounts for third-parties’ endorsement of punishment of the perpetrator of deviant behavior at work resides in the extent to which a third-party takes the perspective of the perpetrator. We hypothesize that:

H1: Third-parties who are instructed to take the perspective of the perpetrator will be less likely to endorse punishment of the perpetrator compared to third-parties who do not take the perspective of the perpetrator.

As previously mentioned, O’Reilly and Aquino (2011) emphasized the role of justice cognitions in shaping third-party reactions to the negative behavior of others. In the current research, we investigate justice cognitions related to blame attributions. Blame arises as the result of two appraisals: a) the extent to which the event/behavior violates a norm; and b) the extent to which the agent is perceived to be the cause of the event (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014). The search for causality may occur spontaneously (see Weiner, 1985) and may modulate blame attributions through the perceived intentionality of the agent as well as the potential reasons behind the action.

We draw on attribution theory (Heider, 1958; Kelly, 1960) to explain how blame attributions might be affected by third-party perspective taking. According to the actor-
observer asymmetry (Jones & Nisbett, 1971), people tend to use different standards when assigning responsibility for their own negative behavior, as compared to someone else’s negative behavior; When one engages in negative behavior themselves, they tend to excuse behavior by claiming contextual expedients, whereas when someone else has engaged in negative behavior, they tend to blame the characteristics of the person. We propose that the actor-observer bias would also shape perceptions of behaviors when putting oneself in the place of another person. In particular, when taking the perspective of someone engaging in a deviant act, trying to understand why the person acted that way may lead individuals to blame the situation rather than the person. In contrast, when taking the perspective of the injured party, individuals may react to the perpetrator’s offense by assigning full responsibility to the perpetrator.

Although the actor-observer asymmetry in attribution is a widely studied phenomenon, there has been no systematic investigation of the role of perspective taking in such attribution bias. Furthermore, because recent theorization has emphasized the importance of perceived intentionality for perceivers’ attributions (Malle, 2006; Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014), we also examined the role of perspective taking in influencing third-parties’ attributions of intentionality.

To our knowledge, the above arguments about the effects of perspective taking on attributions have not yet been tested, neither in basic social psychological settings nor in the context of workplace deviance. Therefore, on the basis of attribution theory and O’Reilly and Aquino’s (2011) model of third parties' morally motivated responses to mistreatment in organizations, we hypothesize that:

**H2:** The effect of perspective taking on third-parties’ endorsement of punishment of the perpetrator will be mediated by third-parties’ blame attributions. Third-parties who take the perspective of the perpetrator will tend to make less internal attributions (H2a) and more external attributions (H2b) for the perpetrator’s behavior compared to
third-parties who do not take the perspective of the perpetrator, which will lead to less endorsement of punishment of the perpetrator.

As noted above, one of the judgments necessary to elicit a perception of blame is that the agent’s behavior violated a norm (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2012, 2014). Indeed, in O’Reilly and Aquino’s (2011) model, the automatic and immediate reactions to injustice, also called intuition of moral violation, precede more thoughtful and elaborated justice cognitions (i.e., blame attributions). We hypothesized that perspective taking—conceptualized as an antecedent of reactions to the deviant behavior of another—would affect the perception of moral violation such that third-parties’ judgement of the seriousness of the norm-violating behavior would depend on whose perspective the third-party takes, which will in turn affect their attributions of blame. More specifically, we hypothesize that:

H3: The effect of perspective taking on third-parties’ blame attributions will be mediated by third-parties’ perception of moral violation. Third-parties who take the perspective of the perpetrator will tend to perceive less moral violation compared to third-parties who do not take the perspective of the perpetrator, which will lead to less internal (H3a) and more external (H3b) attributions for the perpetrator’s behavior.

Figure 1 provides a summary of the hypotheses, which we tested in four studies.

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Robinson and Bennett (1995) distinguished among four different types of workplace deviance according to their level of severity (i.e., minor or serious) and the target (i.e., directed toward the members of the organization or toward the organization itself). Thus, to understand whether our findings generalize across different types of workplace deviance we tested our hypotheses using two different operationalizations. In Study 1, we examine third-party reactions to another employee (the perpetrator) coming to work under the influence of
alcohol, a relatively minor form of organizational deviance. In Study 2, we examine third-party reactions to shooting at a colleague in the workplace, a severe form of interpersonal deviance. Furthermore, to deeply explore the effects of perspective taking, we investigated the impact of taking the perspective of the perpetrator compared to both the organization (Study 1) and the victim of workplace deviance (Study 2). In Studies 3a and 3b, we corroborate findings obtained in Study 1 and 2 with a more robust design: We tested the role of the mediators—causal attributions and perceptions of moral violation—with a concurrent double randomization design (Pirlott & MacKinnon, 2016) in which we manipulated both the predictor and the mediators to observe their effects on the outcome variables.

**Study 1: The Effect of Perspective Taking on Endorsement of Punishment in the Workplace**

**Method**

We used an online scenario-based experiment to test our hypotheses in Study 1. Specifically, participants read a scenario involving an employee (the perpetrator) going to work drunk (Appendix A). In this case, the employee’s behavior was to the detriment of the organization, which was represented by the employee’s supervisor. Before reading the scenario, participants were instructed to take either the perpetrator’s or the supervisor’s perspective. After reading the scenario, participants completed scales assessing the extent to which they perceived the behavior to be a moral violation, the extent to which they believed that a list of possible explanations accounted for the perpetrator’s behavior (internal attributions), and the extent to which they endorsed punishing the perpetrator. Also, because previous research has shown that individual differences in empathy may account for differences in reactions to deviant behavior (e.g., Yunus, Khalid, & Nordin, 2012), we collected information about participants’ general tendency to engage in perspective taking and to experience empathic concern. These measures are described in detail below.
Participants. One hundred and sixty-six participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, an online participant recruitment platform. The mean age was 33.62 years ($SD = 9.50$ years) and 57.4% were male. The majority of participants (68.1%) were employed full-time, 18.4% were employed part-time, 5% were students, and 8.5% were unemployed.

Procedure and measures. We adapted the manipulation of perspective taking from previous studies (e.g., Batson et al., 1997; Johnson et al., 2002). Participants read a scenario (see Appendix A). In the employee condition (coded as 1), participants were told to take the perspective of the perpetrator, trying to understand “what he was thinking and feeling in that situation.” In the employee’s supervisor condition (coded as 0), participants were instructed to take the perspective of the employee’s supervisor, trying to understand what he would feel and think about the situation of the employee arriving at work drunk and leaving earlier because of “sickness.” Participants rated the extent to which they found the behavior morally acceptable and how much the employee should have been blamed for the behavior. They were also asked to make a recommendation for penalty to be given to the employee. We included a manipulation-check at the end of the questionnaire to ensure that participants understood whose perspective they were asked to take.

Moral violation. We based our measure of moral violation on O’Reilly and Aquino’s (2011) conceptualization. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they found the perpetrator’s behavior to be inappropriate on a scale from 0 (very inappropriate) to 100 (very appropriate).

Internal attributions. We measured participants’ internal attributions for the perpetrator’s behavior using seven items created for the current study. Specifically, we developed a list of potential explanations based on previous literature that employed causal attribution items (e.g., Norenzayan & Schwarz, 1999). Example items are “The employee is not a reliable person”, “The employee is lazy”, and “The employee does not care for his job.”
Participants responded to each item on a 7-point scale (1 = *Very unlikely* to 7 = *Very likely*). Cronbach α = .88.

**Endorsement of punishment of the perpetrator.** We used Rudman and Mescher’s (2013) organizational penalties scale to assess the extent to which participants endorsed punishing the perpetrator by reducing the perpetrator’s salary, demoting the perpetrator, terminating the perpetrator in the case of company downsize, and decreasing the perpetrator’s responsibilities at work. Participants responded to each item on a 7-point scale (1 = *Strongly disagree* to 7 = *Strongly agree*). Cronbach α = .83.

**Individual differences in perspective taking and empathic concern.** We measured individual differences in perspective taking and empathic concern using two 7-item scales developed by Davis (1983). An example item for perspective taking is “I try to look at everybody’s side before I make a decision.” An example item for empathic concern is “I would describe myself as a soft-hearted person.” Participants responded to each item on a 7-point scale (1 = *Strongly disagree* to 7 = *Strongly agree*). Cronbach α’s = .86 and .90 for perspective taking and empathic concern, respectively.

**Closeness to the victim and the perpetrator.** Participants were asked to indicate how personally close they felt with the victim and the perpetrator on a scale from 0 = not at all to 100 = very much.

**Control variables.** We collected information about participants’ age and gender, as well as their work locus of control. These variables were included as control variables in our analyses because of their potential relationship to third-parties’ endorsement of punishment. The Work Locus of Control Scale by Spector (1988) includes 16 items assessing the extent to which individuals perceive to have control over what happens at work (e.g., : “Promotions are given to employees who perform well on the job participants indicated their level of agreement on a 6-point scale from 1 = *Disagree completely* to 6 = *Agree completely*. Cronbach α = .88.
Results and Discussion

Analyses for all the studies were performed using both IBM SPSS version 21 (IBM Corp., 2012) and STATA version 14 (StataCorp., 2015). As a measure of the strength of the association between two variables and the magnitude of the difference between two groups we report eta squared ($\eta^2$). This effect size measure represents the proportion of variance in one variable accounted for by another variable. Values of 0.04 (equivalent to Cohen’s d of 0.2) can be considered an indication of small differences, values of 0.25 of medium differences (equivalent to Cohen’s d of 0.5) and values of 0.64 of large differences (equivalent to Cohen’s d of 0.8) (Sullivan & Feinn, 2012).

Manipulation check. To ensure that participants correctly perceived the perspective taking manipulation, we asked them to identify whose perspective they were instructed to take at the end of the study. Forty-seven participants (28%) who did not answer this question correctly were excluded from the analysis, resulting in a final sample of 119 individuals. The excluded participants did not differ from those who were retained in the analysis in terms of average levels of empathy (4.95 vs. 5.12) or perspective taking (4.81 vs. 5.05).

To further ensure that the manipulation was effective, we asked participants to indicate the extent to which they felt ‘personally’ close to the perpetrator and to the perpetrator’s supervisor. On a scale ranging from 0 to 100, individuals in the employee condition felt closer to the employee, ($M = 29.45, SD = 26.78$) than the employee’s supervisor ($M = 12.51, SD = 13.65$), $\eta^2 = .14$. Individuals in the employee’s supervisor condition felt closer to the employee’s supervisor ($M = 69.10, SD = 25.31$) than the employee ($M = 44.43, SD = 28.19$), $\eta^2 = .18$. These results also indicated that it was more difficult to feel close to someone who committed a deviant action than to the injured party (e.g., the organization). At the same time, the manipulation induced participants to feel closer to the target whose perspective they were taking, either the organization or the perpetrator, indicating that the manipulation was successful.
Hypothesis testing. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the study variables and their intercorrelations. To test our hypotheses, we conducted a series of analyses. First, we tested H1 with a regression analysis and found that the perspective of the perpetrator reduced endorsement of punishment ($b = -2.37$), supporting H1. To test H2 concerning the meditational path, we used two-stage least-squares (2SLS) estimation (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010). This method allows testing for mediation effect as well as estimating unbiased estimates through the use of instrumental variables in the presence of potential endogeneity problems in our model (Antonakis et al., 2010; Foster & McLanahan, 1996; Shaver, 2005). That is, because the regressor of interest (e.g., perceived moral violation) is measured and not manipulated, it could imply that it correlates with the disturbance of the dependent variable (Smith, 2012). In other words the mediator and the dependent variable may share an un-modeled common cause (Kline, 2015), which might lead to incorrect conclusions (for an example see Trafimow, 2015). The only way to deal with this problem is to test if the potential endogenous regressor--the mediator--is endogeneous.

First, we tested the mediating effect of perspective taking via internal attributions on endorsement of punishment. Results of the augmented regression and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test revealed the mediator to be exogenous (Antonakis et al., 2010; Baum et al., 2007). Thus, we did not use instrumental variables and estimated a structural equation model to test our hypothesis. As shown in Figure 2a, perspective taking affected internal attributions and internal attributions affected endorsement of punishment. A test of the indirect effect using the Delta method (MacKinnon, 2008) revealed an indirect effect of perspective on endorsement of punishment ($b = .59$), supporting mediation (H2a).

Hypothesis 3a referred to the mediation of perceived moral violation with respect to the relationship between perspective taking and blame attributions. We again performed an augmented regression and also a Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test to assess whether the mediator was endogenous (Antonakis et al., 2010; Baum et al., 2007). Because both tests
revealed the mediator to be endogenous, we estimated a 2SLS model using participants’ work locus of control as an instrumental variable in the first-stage equation (and excluded it from the second-stage equation of our model). Then, we performed the Sargan-Hansen overidentification test (Baum et al., 2007; Hansen, 1982; Sargan, 1958) to examine if the model constraints were valid. This test, analogous to the chi-square test of fit in structural equation modelling, indicates whether the instruments could be excluded from the second stage of the regression model. Results revealed that our instrument was valid, although not very strong (Baum et al., 2007; Stock, Wright, & Yogo, 2002). We thus used limited-information maximum likelihood (or LIML) estimation to test our model.

As illustrated in Figure 2b, results showed that in the first stage, perspective taking affected perceived moral violation, and that in the second stage, perceived moral violation affected internal attributions. A test of the indirect effect using the Delta method (MacKinnon, 2008) revealed an indirect effect of perspective taking on internal attributions ($b = .41$). These results support H3a.

Consistent with our hypotheses, we found that third-parties’ endorsement of punishment of the perpetrator was influenced by the perspective they were asked to take: Third-parties who were instructed to take the perspective of the perpetrator endorsed less punishment of the perpetrator compared to third-parties who were instructed to take the perspective of the supervisor. This effect was accounted for by third-parties’ internal attributions for the perpetrator’s behavior. Furthermore, third-parties who were instructed to take the perspective of the perpetrator perceived less moral violation, resulting in less internal attributions for the perpetrator’s behavior.
Study 2: Extending Results in an Extreme Situation of Interpersonal Workplace Aggression

In Study 2, we aimed to complement and extend the results of Study 1 with an extreme form of deviant behavior that was directed towards another employee, rather than towards the organization: shooting a colleague in the workplace. According to Robinson and Bennett (1995), deviant behavior varies along two dimensions: severity (i.e., low versus high intensity) and target (i.e., individual versus organization). In Study 1, we examined a low intensity form of deviance directed toward the organization. However, because our hypotheses are not contingent on the “type” of deviant behavior perpetrators engage in, we selected a radically different form of deviance in Study 2. Specifically, we operationalize deviance in Study 2 as shooting a colleague in the workplace, which is high intensity and directed toward an individual. Convergence of our findings across studies with such different operationalization of deviance would lend support to the generalizability of our results. Furthermore, we used a student sample in Study 2, to further examine the generalizability of our Study 1 findings. Finally, to complement our focus on internal attributions of blame in Study 1, in Study 2 participants rated the extent to which external factors accounted for the perpetrator’s behavior (i.e., external attributions).

In sum, in Study 1 we examined a moderate form of deviance which had the organization as the target, and measured internal attributions as the mediating factor. In Study 2, we examine a severe form of deviance that has a coworker as the target, and we measure external attributions as the factor accounting for the effect of perspective taking on participants’ endorsement of punishment of the perpetrator. In line with the hypotheses developed earlier, we expected that third-parties who were instructed to take the perspective of the perpetrator would be less likely to endorse punishment of the perpetrator as compared to third-parties who were instructed to take the perspective of the victim (H1), and that this relationship would be accounted for by the extent to which third-parties blamed external
factors as the cause of severe deviance (H2b). Furthermore, we expected the relationship between perspective taking and external attributions to be mediated by third-party perceptions of a moral violation (H3b).

Moreover, in Study 2 we introduce a new variable: intentionality. Studies of third-party reactions to injustice have pointed to the importance of perceptions of the perpetrator’s intention to harm the victim. Third-parties’ perception of the intention to harm appears to influence punishment more than the victim’s perception (Umphress et al. 2013). Indeed, in criminal law, a person is judged liable depending on the degree of intentionality of the action (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014). Thus, we explored the possibility that third-party judgments about the extent to which the perpetrator intentionally harmed the victim would influence third-party endorsement of punishment of the perpetrator. Specifically, we expected that third-parties who perceive the perpetrator’s behavior to be unintentionally harmful would be less likely to endorse punishment of the perpetrator compared to third-parties who perceive the perpetrator as intentionally harmful.

Beyond this anticipated main effect of intentionality on third-parties’ endorsement of punishment of the perpetrator (and of perspective taking, in line with the results of Study 1), we also considered the possibility that the effect of intentionality on punishment would change depending on perspective taking instruction. Specifically, we expected that third-parties who were instructed to take the perspective of the perpetrator might perceive the behavior as less intentional than third-parties taking the victim’s perspective. In the first case, the perception of low intentionality would help to make the behavior more acceptable, whereas in the second case the perception of strong intentionality would justify a harsher punishment. In fact, adopting the perspective of the perpetrator would lead third-parties to protect themselves by disregarding aspects of the situation that would make the perpetrator appear more blameworthy, whereas adopting the perspective of the victim should lead third-
parties to focus on factors that would justify punishment of the perpetrator. Thus, we hypothesize that:

H4: Third-parties’ perception of the intentionality of the perpetrator’s behavior will moderate the effect of perspective taking on third parties’ endorsement of punishment of the perpetrator. Specifically, the effect of intentionality on endorsement of punishment will be positive and significant for third-parties instructed to take the victim’s perspective, whereas it will be non-significant for third-parties instructed to take the perspective of the perpetrator.

In sum, Study 2 addresses the effect of third-parties’ perspective taking on perceptions of the deviant behavior of another by showing how it may affect the perception of moral violation and the blame attributions in a case of workplace misconduct that was severe and directed towards another employee. We also investigate the role of perpetrator’s intentionality as a factor that may affect punishment—in addition to or possibly in interaction with perspective taking—by manipulating intentionality.

**Method**

**Participants.** One hundred and fifteen students were recruited through the subject pool of a Swiss University, 61.7% were male ($M_{age} = 20.96, SD = 2.46$) and were remunerated for their participation in the study. The study was conducted in English and only participants who were fluent in English could sign up for the study. Participants read the scenario and then answered a series of questions regarding the characteristics of the people involved in the situation; they were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: taking the perspective of the perpetrator or of the injured party and in a scenario with high or low intentionality. As we did in Study 1, we controlled for individual differences in empathy. However, to minimize the chance that the null effect of dispositional empathy in Study 1 was due to the specific scale we had employed, we selected a different measure.
Procedure and experimental manipulation. The study was a 2 (perspective: perpetrator/victim) by 2 (intentionality: high/low) between subjects design. Participants read a scenario (see Appendix B) and were told to take either the perpetrator’s (coded as 1) or the victim’s perspective (coded as 0). Intentionality was manipulated by varying the number of times the aggressor shot (“he was shot several times” vs “shot one time”) and whether he wounded the victim (“he was wounded in the chest” vs. “he was not wounded”). We included a manipulation check to ensure that participants understood whose perspective they were asked to take, how many times the perpetrator shot, and what whether the victim was wounded.

Measures

Moral violation. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they found that the perpetrator’s behavior was morally acceptable on a scale from 0 = absolutely acceptable to 100 = absolutely unacceptable.

External attributions. We adapted 9 items from the Gudjonsson Blame Attribution Inventory (Gudjonsson, 1984) that emphasize the role of contextual factors as explanations of behavior (e.g., “He was under a great deal of pressure/stress when he acted like that”, “He would have not committed such action if he had not been seriously provoked by the victim/society”;). Participants rated their perception of the likelihood of each potential explanation on a 7-point scale (1 = Very unlikely to 7 = Very likely). Cronbach α = .76.

Endorsement of punishment. Participants rated the extent of their agreement with a series of penalties on a 7-point scale created for use in this study (1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree). Specifically, participants were asked whether the perpetrator should be: Fired, prosecuted, sent to prison, and sent to prison for life. Cronbach α = .72. We also included single items to assess the perceived guiltiness of the perpetrator (0 = Innocent to 100 = Guilty) and the number of years participants thought he should spend in prison (0 to 30 years).
**Empathy.** We measured individual differences in dispositional empathy using the Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (Spreng, McKinnon, Mar, & Levine, 2009), which includes 16 items measuring the accurate understanding of others’ feelings, such as “When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards him/her” measured on a 5-point scale (0 = never to 4 = always). Cronbach α = .73.

**Closeness to the victim and the perpetrator.** We employed the same items used in Study 1.

**Control variables.** We collected information about participants’ age and gender, as well as two personal variables that could have been broadly related to justice perceptions. Specifically, we assessed participants’ political orientation on a 100-point scale (0 = Leftwing to 100 = Rightwing). We also measured participants’ belief in a just world using Dalbert’s (1999) six item scale, in which participants rated their agreement regarding the extent to which they believe the world to be a just place on a 6-point scale (1 = Not true at all/strongly disagree to 6 = Very true/strongly agree). We included such variables as controls, or factors that could in principle influence results.

**Results**

**Manipulation checks.** As in Study 1, participants who did not respond correctly to the manipulation checks (whose perspective they were asked to take; the number of times the perpetrator shot, and whether the victim was wounded) were excluded from the analysis (33% of the sample, with a final sample of 77 individuals). These individuals did not differ from participants included in the analysis on average levels of empathy (2.59 vs. 2.66). As in Study 1, we also asked participants how personally close they felt to the injured party and the perpetrator. Individuals in the perpetrator condition felt closer to the perpetrator ($M = 37.57$, $SD = 28.97$) than to the victim ($M = 24.75$, $SD = 23.67$), $\eta^2 = .01$, although the magnitude of the difference in the two measures is quite small. Individuals in the injured party condition felt closer to the victim ($M = 52.00$, $SD = 28.54$) than to the perpetrator ($M = 30.48$, $SD =$

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1 Of note, the number of excluded participants is similar to Study 1. We believe that the relatively high number of participants who did not respond correctly to the manipulation check suggests that the task of putting oneself in the place of someone else, especially when this person was acting with severe deviance, was perceived to be rather challenging.
26.35), \(\eta^2 = .22\). Similar to Study 1 and not surprisingly, the results of the manipulation check show that it was more difficult to feel close to someone who committed an intensely aggressive behavior. Nevertheless, the manipulation induced participants to feel closer to the person whose perspective they were asked to take, indicating that the perspective taking manipulation was successful.

Individuals in the high intentionality condition perceived more clearly that the aggressor wanted to kill his colleagues (\(M = 4.44, SD = 2.15\)) as compared to participants in the low intentionality condition (\(M = 3.45, SD = 2.04\)), \(\eta^2 = .05\), indicating that the intentionality manipulation was successful. We also crossed intentionality and perspective taking in a 2x2 ANOVA using “wanting to kill the colleague” as the dependent variable: When taking the perpetrator’s perspective the effect size associated with perception that the perpetrator wanted to kill his colleague in the high and low intentionality condition was very small. When taking the victim’s perspective the effect was stronger: Individuals perceived greater intent to kill on the part of the perpetrator in the high (\(M = 5.00, SD = .48\)) than in the low intentionality condition (\(M = 3.90, SD = .46\)), \(\eta^2 = .06\). The overall interaction effect size was \(\eta_p^2 = .05\).

**Hypotheses testing.** Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the study variables and their correlations. To test for the effect of perspective taking, we performed a series of one-way ANOVAs. When individuals took the perspective of the perpetrator they assigned fewer years of prison (\(M = 4.97, SD = 4.49\)) than individuals in the injured party’s perspective (\(M = 8.00, SD = 5.93\)), \(\eta^2 = .08\). Individuals in the perpetrator condition also perceived the offender as less guilty (\(M = 69.01, SD = 21.81\)) than individuals in the injured party condition (\(M = 81.45, SD = 15.12\)), \(\eta^2 = .10\). Individuals in the injured party condition recommended harsher punishment in the victim (\(M = 5.03, SD = 1.09\)) than in perpetrator condition (\(M = 4.07, SD = 1.09\)), \(\eta^2 = .09\), supporting H1.
We used a similar procedure used in Study 1 to estimate our mediation model and test for potential endogeneity problem. Table 3 reports the results regarding the mediation analyses. We first tested the mediating effect of perspective taking via external attributions on years in prison. We performed an augmented regression and also a Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test to assess whether the mediator was endogenous (Antonakis, et al., 2010; Baum, et al., 2007). Both tests revealed the mediator to be endogenous. We thus estimated a 2SLS model including participants’ political orientation as an instrumental variable in the first-stage equation (and excluded it from the second-stage equation of our model). Results of the Sargan-Hansen overidentification test (Baum, et al., 2007; Hansen, 1982; Sargan, 1958) revealed that our instruments were valid, although not very strong. Accordingly, we used LIML estimation to test our model. In the first-stage of our model, results showed that perspective taking affected external attributions ($b = .71$); in the second-stage of the model external attributions affected years in prison ($b = -5.20$). A test of the indirect effect using the Delta method (MacKinnon, 2008) revealed a significant indirect effect of perspective on years in prison ($b = -3.61$). We used the same 2SLS estimation procedure to test the mediating effect of perspective taking via external attributions on punishment and perception of guiltiness respectively (see Table 3a for mediation coefficients). Overall, results support H2b.

Finally, we tested the mediating effect of perspective taking via moral violation on external attribution. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test revealed the mediator to be endogenous (Antonakis et al., 2010; Baum et al., 2007). We thus included participants’ belief in a just world as an instrumental variable in the first-stage equation (and excluded it from the second-stage equation of our model). Results of the Sargan-Hansen overidentification test revealed that our instrument was valid, although not very strong. Consequently we used a LIML estimation to test our model (see Table 3b). The first-stage results showed that perspective taking predicted moral violation ($b = -12.98$); in the second-stage moral violation
predicted external attributions \((b = -0.05)\). A test of the indirect effect using the Delta method (MacKinnon, 2008) revealed an indirect effect of perspective taking on external attributions \((b = 0.67)\), supporting H3b.

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**INSERT TABLES 3 ABOUT HERE**

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To explore the hypothesis regarding intentionality, we conducted a series of 2x2 between-subjects ANOVAs with perspective taking and intentionality as the independent variables, and punishment, guiltiness, and years in prison as the dependent variables respectively. Effect sizes for interaction effects were all negligible. Perspective taking was associated with small to medium effect sizes on all the dependent variables. The manipulation of intentionality was associated with an effect size of \(\eta^2 = 0.04\) on the variable ‘years in prison’, with individuals assigned to the condition of high intentionality recommending more years of prison \((M = 8.51, SD = 5.91)\) than individuals assigned to the low intentionality condition \((M = 4.23, SD = 4.00)\). Overall, it appeared quite clearly that perception of mistreatment was driven by perspective taking, rather than by the intentionality of the behavior. With respect to the hypothesis that perspective taking would interact with perception of intentionality in influencing intention to punish (H4), no interaction emerged with respect to any of the dependent variables; intentionality had a main effect, together with perspective taking, on years in prison. Hypothesis 4 was therefore not supported.

**Discussion**

Results of Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1 for which third-parties taking the perspective of the perpetrator of deviant workplace behavior endorsed less penalties to the perpetrator as compared to third-parties taking the perspective of the victim, even in the extreme context of shooting at a colleague in the workplace. Complementing the findings of Study 1, results showed that third-parties who took the perpetrator’s perspective attributed the
perpetrator’s behavior to situational (i.e., external) factors to a greater extent than those who took the victim’s perspective, which affected their endorsement of punishment. Furthermore, external attributions were predicted by perception of moral violation, whose values changed according to the perspective taken by the third-party.

Studies 1 and 2 provide very similar results with respect to the hypothesized relationships and underlying mechanisms, which suggests that results were robust. Also the instrumental variable method employed in Studies 1 and 2 provided a stronger test of mediation than traditional regression models. None the less, in both studies we manipulated the predictor (perspective taking), but we only measured the mediator; as such, conclusions about its causal role in predicting the outcome cannot be drawn. Indeed in social and applied psychology there is an ongoing discussion on the perils of conducting mediational analyses (e.g., Grice, Cohn, Ramsey, & Chaney 2015; Kline, 2015; MacKinnon & Pirlott, 2015; Tate, 2015; Thoemmes, 2015; Trafimow, 2015): Causal inferences regarding the role of the independent variable in causing the mediator, which then is assumed to cause the dependent variable, are often unwarranted due to assumptions that are rarely met in typical correlational designs, such as the directionality of the cause-effect relationship (Kline, 2015; Trafimow, 2016) or to the absence of temporal precedence (Tate, 2015). We therefore conducted two additional studies to address the causal role of the mediators—external attributions and moral violations—as the variables through which perspective taking may exert its effect.

**Studies 3a and 3b: Further Empirically Testing the Hypothesized Mediating Mechanisms**

We employed a concurrent double randomization design (Pirlott & MacKinnon, 2016) in which both perspective taking and the mediator (blame attributions in Study 3a and moral violation in Study 3b) were manipulated. To this purpose, the scenario employed in Study 2 was modified to reflect the manipulation of the mediators in Studies 3a and 3b. In setting up the manipulation of both the predictor and the mediator, special care was given to
ensure a time-ordered sequence of the predictor preceding the mediator and the outcome variable (Tate, 2015).

We recruited participants on the platform Amazon Mechanical Turk. To screen participants, we excluded those participants who incorrectly answered a manipulation check question regarding whose perspective they were asked to take (19.2%). We also excluded participants who incorrectly answered a question designed to check whether participants read instructions (Oppenheimer et al., 2009) (6.5%). In both studies we measured and controlled for emotional reactions associated with reading the scenario because negative emotional reactions could be a potential additional mediator, as also described in O’Reilly and Aquino’s model (2011).

The two studies were identical except for the manipulation of attribution (Study 3a) and of moral violation (Study 3b). The data were collected simultaneously for the two studies, with participants randomly assigned to either one or the other manipulation. A total of 457 participants were retained after manipulation checks, with 240 completing Study 3a and 217 completing Study 3b.

**Study 3a: Testing the Causal Role of Attributions in Mediating the Relationship between Perspective Taking and Endorsement of Punishment**

We aimed to show that endorsement of punishment changes according to the level of attributions. More specifically, we defined two levels of the mediator: external attributions, or attributions reflecting situational causes of the behavior such as pressure at work, and internal attributions that refer to causes pertaining to the individual such as being a troubled person. We expected that when attributions were external, individuals taking the perspective of the perpetrator would endorse more lenient punishment as compared to individuals taking the victim’s perspective. Indeed, emphasizing the situational causes of a reprehensible behavior may help to make the behavior more acceptable. In contrast, we did not expect differences in endorsement of punishment between individuals taking the perspective of the perpetrator and
the victim when attributions were internal. In fact, when the causes of reprehensible behavior are clearly due to the person, it would be difficult even for individuals taking the perpetrator’s perspective to defend his case (H5).

Method

Participants and experimental manipulation

The study was a 2 (perspective: perpetrator/victim) by 2 (attributions: external/internal) between subjects design with endorsement of punishment as the dependent variable. To manipulate external attributions, after reading the scenario of the shooting as also described in Study 2, individuals read the following: “Some co-workers reported that John White [the aggressor] was under a lot of pressure at work and that he complained about being harassed by his colleague Robert Taylor [the victim].” This manipulation was intended to make the situational determinants of the perpetrator’s behavior more salient. The condition of internal attributions was manipulated by substituting the above mentioned sentences with the following: “Some co-workers reported that John White was a troubled person at work, who had frequent fights with colleagues and who was suspended from work already two times for stealing expensive workplace supplies.”

Measures

We employed the following variables already described in Study 2: Endorsement of punishment, the manipulation check questions: closeness to the perpetrator and the victim, and the question regarding the perception of moral violation. Also the manipulation of perspective taking was conducted as in the previous studies by asking participants to put themselves in the place of the victim or the perpetrator.

Emotional reactions. We asked participants to rate the extent to which they felt a list of emotions while reading the scenario—including anger and disgust—on a 6-point scale (1 = not at all to 6 = very much).
Causal attributions. To check for the manipulation of internal and external attributions we also included a question asking participants to rate on a 10-point scale the extent to which they perceived that the behavior of the perpetrator was due to personal (i.e., 1) versus situational (i.e., 10) causes.

Results

Manipulation checks

In line with Studies 1 and 2, we first checked whether our manipulations were effective. Consistent with our perspective taking manipulation, we found that individuals taking the perspective of the perpetrator \((n = 63)\) felt closer to the perpetrator \((M = 31.70, SD = 32.79)\) than participants taking the victim’s perspective \((M = 19.68, SD = 23.93)\), \(\eta^2 = .04\); whereas individuals taking the victim’s perspective felt closer to the victim \((M = 64.51, SD = 28.24)\) than individuals taking the perpetrator’s perspective \((M = 41.30, SD = 32.48)\), \(\eta^2 = .13\). Consistent with our causal attribution manipulation, we found that individuals assigned to the external attributions reported more situational explanations \((M = 6.25, SD = 2.35)\) than individuals assigned to the internal attributions, who attributed the cause of the perpetrator’s behavior to more individual causes \((M = 4.30, SD = 2.13)\), \(\eta^2 = .16\).

Hypothesis testing

In testing H5 we controlled for anger and disgust, the emotions felt while reading the scenario. The two emotions were weakly associated with endorsement of punishment (see Table 4 for descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients).

\[\text{INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE}\]

Individuals who were assigned to the external attribution condition \((n = 117)\) endorsed more lenient punishment when taking the perspective of the perpetrator \((M = 25.82, SD = 6.33)\) as compared to those taking the perspective of the victim \((M = 28.01, SD = 3.83)\), \(\eta^2 = \]
.04. Individuals assigned to the internal attribution condition \( n = 123 \) reported similar levels of punishment endorsement in both the perpetrator \( (M = 26.18, SD = 4.61) \) and the victim \( (M = 26.52, SD = 5.75) \) perspective condition, \( \eta^2 = .001 \). Results, which are depicted in Figure 3, support H5 in that the level of endorsement of punishment was predicted by the type of attributions (i.e., internal or external) participants were encouraged to make. Overall, results supported our hypothesis that attributions mediate the relationship between perspective taking and endorsement of punishment.

\[ \text{INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE} \]

\[ \text{Study 3b: Testing the causal role of moral violation in mediating the relationship between perspective taking and external attributions} \]

We manipulated moral violation by varying the text of the scenario to encourage perceptions of the perpetrator’s behavior as morally outrageous in one case and less so in the other. It was expected that when moral violation was blatant (high), individuals taking the perpetrator’s perspective would make more external attributions in the attempt to excuse the morally outrageous behavior. When moral violation was less blatant (low), no differences in external attributions were expected as a function of the perspective taken (H6).

\textbf{Method}

\textit{Participants and experimental manipulation}

The study was a 2 (perspective: perpetrator/victim) by 2 (moral violation: high/low) between subjects design with external attributions as the dependent variable. In the condition of high moral violation, participants read that the perpetrator shot at the victim during a business meeting (which could have led to wound other people too), that he shot several times, and that he wounded the victim in the chest. In addition, the last sentence reported that “All employees agreed that John White’s behavior to shoot Robert Taylor was morally
outrageous.” In the condition of low moral violation, there was no information provided about the location of the shooting, but participants were told that the perpetrator shot only once, and did not wound the victim.

**Measures**

The same measures employed for Study 3a were employed for Study 3b. To check whether the manipulation of moral violation was effective, we asked participants to rate the extent to which they perceived the behavior of the perpetrator to be morally unacceptable on a 100-point scale from (0 = perfectly OK to 100 = morally unacceptable).

**Results**

**Manipulation checks**

Overall, perception of moral (un)acceptability of the perpetrator’s behavior differed for individuals assigned to the high (\( M = 86.92, \ SD = 24.18 \)) and low (\( M = 81.42, \ SD = 30.57 \)) moral violation condition, \( \eta^2 = .010 \). The difference between high and low moral violation became more evident once crossed with perspective taking. For individuals who took the perpetrator’s perspective, the effect size of the difference in perception of moral acceptability of the behavior in the high and low moral violation condition was negligible (80.02 vs. 82.24, respectively). By contrast, the effect size for individuals taking the victim's perspective was quite strong, \( \eta^2 = .75 \), with individuals assigned to the high moral violation condition perceiving as if the behavior was much more morally unacceptable than individual assigned to the low moral violation condition (93.20 vs. 80.70, respectively).

**Hypothesis testing**

To test whether our manipulation of the perception of moral violation affected the extent to which participants attributed the cause of the perpetrator’s behavior to external factors, we examined whether perspective taking predicted external attributions in both the high and low moral violation conditions. In all our analyses, we controlled for anger and disgust (see Table 4 for descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients). The dependent
variable was the question in which individuals were asked whether they thought the perpetrator’s behavior was due more to personal or situational factors on a scale from 1 to 10. Individuals assigned to the high moral violation condition ($n = 107$) made more external attributions for the perpetrator’s behavior when taking the perpetrator’s perspective ($M = 6.10, SD = 2.11$) than the victim’s perspective ($M = 5.00, SD = 2.10$), $\eta^2 = .07$. Individuals assigned to the low moral violation condition ($n = 110$) reported very similar levels of external attributions in the perpetrator and victim perspective conditions ($5.30$ vs $5.61$), $\eta^2 = .00$. Results, which are depicted in Figure 4, support H6 concerning the causal role of moral violation in influencing whether individuals perceive the morally violating behavior as caused by external factors and supports the role of moral violation in mediating the relationship between perspective taking and external attributions.

General discussion

Third-party reactions to deviant behavior in the workplace are starting to be more clearly understood. In two studies, we empirically tested a path of O’Reilly and Aquino’s (2011) model of third-party reactions to workplace mistreatment and showed that the perception of a moral violation the endorsement of punishment depend on whether third-parties put themselves in the position of the perpetrator or of the injured party. This relationship was fully accounted for by the extent to which third-parties blamed the internal characteristics of the perpetrator (Study 1) or external factors (Study 2) as the causes of behavior.

Overall, our results suggest that perspective taking may affect the way third-parties explain deviant workplace behavior. Third-parties taking the perspective of the perpetrator of deviant actions seem to downplay internal factors and emphasize external explanations in the
attempt to justify the perpetrator’s (mis)conduct. This effect can be explained by the actor-observer bias (Jones & Nisbett, 1972) for which, when taking the perspective of someone engaging in a deviant act, trying to understand why the person acted that way may lead individuals to protect themselves (in this case, the third party’s self that is identifying with the perpetrator) by blaming external factors for a reprehensible behavior, an effect that is magnified the stronger the self-threat (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). In contrast, when taking the perspective of the injured party, individuals may react to the perpetrator’s offense by assigning full responsibility to the perpetrator. The implication of this finding is that third-parties who empathize with the perpetrator may end up downplaying the gravity of their behavior. By contrast, dissuading third-parties from taking the perspective of the perpetrator may lead to greater perceptions of moral violation and more internal attributions for the perpetrator’s (mis)behavior, as well as greater endorsement of punishment of the perpetrator.

Third-parties taking the perspective of the injured party (i.e., the organization [Study 1] or the individual victim [Study 2]) tended to emphasize internal rather than external explanations for the perpetrator’s behavior; their identification with the injured party led them judge the perpetrator as more to blame for his deviant behavior, holding the perpetrator more personally responsible for it. Our findings provide empirical support for the relevance of putting oneself in the position of the injured party in terms of attributions of blame to the perpetrator and evaluations of the severity of the deviant behavior. Goldberg et al. (2011) propose that a third-party’s identification with the target of workplace misconduct depends on the extent to which they share a certain group or individual characteristics with the target. Similarly Skarlicki and Kulik (2004) emphasize the role of identification with a victim as a factor influencing attributions of organizational responsibility. In our research, we have demonstrated that third-parties can be directed to put themselves in the position of an injured party by simply asking them to do so (i.e., without needing them to share any specific characteristics or group membership). Although it is likely that individuals who may already
be inclined to put themselves in the position of a victim with whom they share certain characteristics, our results suggest that the process of encouraging employees to try to understand the perspective of a victim in the workplace might increase the likelihood of intervening in cases of workplace misconduct across the board.

It is noteworthy that the effect of third-parties’ perspective taking was consistent across two studies that varied in the type of perspective taking required (i.e., of the organization or an individual victim of workplace misconduct), and the type of deviant behavior (i.e., moderate and directed towards the organization or severe and directed toward another employee; Bennett & Robinson, 2000). Furthermore, the role of the mediators (i.e., causal attributions and moral violation) in influencing endorsement of punishment and external attributions was supported by the instrumental variable method (Studies 1 and 2) and with a design in which the mediators were experimentally manipulated to test for their causal role in determining the outcome (Studies 3a and 3b). Overall, results highlight the robust effect of perspective taking as a trigger of third-party reactions to the deviant behavior of others and confirm the causal role of moral violation and attributions as the mechanisms through which such effects occur.

In Study 2, we found that the perpetrator’s intentionality was less important than expected for the endorsement of punishment of the behavior. Instead, perspective taking seemed to account for most of the observed effect. One of the reasons why intentionality did not emerge as a strong determinant of perception of injustice and related punishment is that in Study 2 we employed a rather extreme scenario in which the act of shooting at the colleague, which may have seemed highly intentional regardless of the number of times the perpetrator shot and whether the victim was wounded. Differences may have been more easily detected if intentionality had been manipulated in a more definitive way (e.g., if the perpetrator had obviously shot the victim by accident).
Moreover, research on perpetrator intentionality suggests that intent drives third-party’s reactions much more than actual harm (Umphress et al., 2013) and that third-parties may keep separate the perpetrator’s motives from the harm inflicted to the victim (Chui & Dietz, 2014). However, in our manipulation, we varied the intentionality of the perpetrator (e.g., perseverance in shooting) at the same time as the harm inflicted (e.g., wounded-not wounded), making it impossible to determine whether one factor could have suppressed the effect of the other.

It should be noted that in Study 2 the motive of aggression was purposefully unclear (the scenario mentioned that aggression could have been either a reaction to harassment or of being a troubled person). Ambiguous transgressions may lead to more lenient and less blaming explanations (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2011), such as those that emphasize contextual factors that brought about the behavior more than the rational choice to act (Malle, Knobe, & Nelson, 2007). The interesting effect we show is that despite the ambiguously described situation, attributions of blame were influenced by the perspective (the perpetrator or the victim) the third-party was taking. Thus, our results suggest that the same deviant behavior can be interpreted differently and judged to be deserving of more or less punishment depending on the perspective the third-party takes. Appealing to mitigating factors in the ambiguous situation was employed systematically by third-parties motivated to justify or excuse the perpetrator’s behavior (i.e., those taking the perpetrator’s perspective), but not by those who were motivated to accuse the perpetrator (i.e., those taking the victim’s perspective). Because many incidents of deviance occur within an ambiguous context (i.e., without knowing the reasons behind the actions), our decision to use ambiguous deviant behaviors in the current research increases our confidence in the ecological validity of the vignettes employed in the studies and strengthens our conclusion that virtually any situation can be interpreted differently depending on the perceiver’s perspective.
Finally, our results help clarify why the assumption of the deontic model of justice (Folger, 2001) that perpetrators will tend to be punished for engaging in negative behavior is not always supported in the literature (Cortina & Magley, 2003; Mitchell, Vogel, & Folger, 2015; Rupp & Bell, 2010). We show that an important part of third-party endorsement of punishment of the perpetrator resides in the extent to which they take the perspective of those involved in deviant behavior (i.e., the perpetrator or victim). Taking the perpetrator’s or the injured party’s perspective is therefore an antecedent that may influence perceptions of the severity of moral violation, their attributions of blame, and ultimately their endorsement of punishment of the perpetrator. By examining perspective taking’s role in third-party reactions to the deviant behavior of others, we offer a potential avenue in which to expand O’Reilly and Aquino’s (2011) model of third-party reactions to mistreatment.

Of course, the current research has limitations. Third-parties to workplace deviance can be conceptualized as those who hear about misconduct or those who witness it (e.g., O’Reilly & Aquino, 2011). We adopted only the first part of this conceptualization in the current studies. Moreover, we used vignettes to describe deviant behavior instead of real interpersonal interactions. Actually witnessing workplace misconduct first hand may elicit stronger and more complex reactions, as well as a wider range of possible actions (Bowes-Sperry & O’Leary-Kelly, 2005). In this respect, our results likely represent a simplified third-party response. Nonetheless, just because our participants did not witness the deviant behavior firsthand does not mean they can’t “experience” it. For this reason, we believe that the effects we illustrated through the description of scenarios provide an important contribution to the literature of third-party’s reactions to workplace misconduct, but one that will need to be further examined in the field. Finally, because our investigation analyzed third-parties’ self-report perceptions and judgments of punishment, future research would benefit from exploring overt behavioral outcomes associated, such as verbal reproaches or real punishments.
Conclusion

Are third-parties more likely to let pass deviant workplace behaviors when they put themselves in the place of the perpetrator? Are third-parties who put themselves in the place of the organization or the victim of workplace misconduct more likely to whistle-blowing or to act? Our results imply that the answer to these questions may be yes, and speak to the importance of accounting for the extent to which third-parties feel close to the perpetrator or the injured party of misconduct as a key element that may account for endorsement or disapproval of workplace deviance.

Ultimately, our findings highlight the subjectivity involved in third-party reactions to the deviant behavior of others and suggest one means by which these reactions can be shaped: perspective taking. Third-parties who take the perspective of the perpetrator are more likely to excuse and less likely to punish the perpetrator, whereas this pattern is reversed for those who take the perspective of the victim. The potential for perspective taking to shape third-party reactions further highlights the need for those responsible for responding to incidents of workplace deviance to seek objective information when deciding how to respond.
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Figure 1. Summary of the research hypotheses for Study 1 and 2.

a)  

Perspective taking (Perpetrator=0) → Internal attributions → Endorsement of punishment  

b)  

Perspective taking (Perpetrator=0) → Moral violation → Internal attributions

Figure 2. Results of Study 1: a) The extent to which the perpetrator is blamed for the action (internal attributions) mediates the relationship between perspective taking and endorsement of punishment; and b) moral violation mediates the relationship between perspective taking and blaming the person. Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown.
Figure 3. Study 3a: Effect of attributions on endorsement of punishment depending on the perspective taken (perpetrator/victim).

Figure 4. Study 3b: Effect of moral violation on attributions depending on the perspective taken (Perpetrator/Victim).
Table 1.  
Study 1 descriptive statistics and correlations.

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<th>Emp. Con.</th>
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Table 2.
Study 2 descriptive statistics and correlations.

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Table 3

a) Study 2: Mediation of the effect of perspective taking (taking the perpetrator's perspective was coded as 1) on punishment, perceived guiltiness, and years in prison through External attributions (=mediator).

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b) Study 2: Mediation of the effect of perspective taking (taking the perpetrator's perspective was coded as 1) on External attributions through Perceived moral violation (=mediator).

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Table 4. Descriptive statistics and correlations for Study 3a and 3b. The correlations were calculated on a sample variable from 217 to 457, depending on whether the variables were included in one or the other study, or in both.

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<td>.401**</td>
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Appendix A

Study 1 scenario

On shift one day, an employee arrived late to work because he had stopped at a bar to drink alcohol at the time in which he was supposed to be at work. The employee worked much slower than usual and had several cigarette breaks. The employee left early because of "sickness".
Appendix B

Study 2 scenario

Example with perpetrator by high intentionality condition. Observers taking the victim perspective read the same scenario, but were told to take the perspective of Robert Taylor.

Please read the following scenario. While reading it, take the perspective of John White [Robert Taylor]. Try to put yourself in his position: imagine how John White [Robert Taylor] felt and what were the reasons behind his actions. Try to imagine what you would be thinking if you were in the place of John White [Robert Taylor].

John White, an employee of a pharmaceutical company, was arrested for shooting and critically wounding Robert Taylor, a colleague in the workplace. The shooting took place on Friday around 11 am in the office of Robert Taylor, who was the only one targeted. Robert Taylor is in critical but stable conditions at a local hospital after being shot several times and finally wounded in the chest. He called the police himself as John White left his office. The police is investigating the motive for the shooting. Some co-workers reported that John White had complained about being harassed by his colleague Robert Taylor. Other co-workers added that John White was a troubled person at work.