The Evolution of Great Power Management in International Society

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Abstract

This paper is a contribution to the English School’s theory of primary institutions. It offers a historical and structural enquiry into the meaning of great power management (GPM) as a primary institution of international society as it has evolved since the 18th century. We seek to uncover the driving forces that shape this primary institution, and how they are working to redefine its legitimacy in the 21st century. We are particularly interested in uncovering whether and how particular conditions in international systems/societies facilitate or obstruct the operation of GPM. The paper examines how system structures, both material and ideational, have set different conditions for GPM. Using the evolution from traditional to non-traditional security as a template, it sets out the main functions that have evolved for GPM. It shows how the institution has quite different meanings and roles at different times, and how they play into the legitimacy that GPM requires. It considers how GPM works at both regional and global levels, and concludes by both looking ahead at the prospects for GPM, and opening a discussion on how to relate GPM to global governance.
1. Introduction

The idea of great power management (GPM) stands prominently within the English school approach to IR. It is one of the five classical primary institutions (PIs) of international society identified by Bull, the other four being war, diplomacy, international law and the balance of power. In Bull’s formulation, great powers not only assume themselves, but are also recognised by others, to have managerial rights and responsibilities for international order. This idea is also present in hegemonic stability theory, and up to a point in global governance. The key to great power management as an institution of international society is that the powers concerned attract legitimacy to support their unequal status as leaders by accepting special responsibilities as well as claiming special rights. They do this both by displaying good manners and by efficiently providing public goods, though in theory and in practice, GPM norms can be driven by calculation or coercion. Holsti shows how the institution of GPM emerged along with the balance of power during the 18th and 19th centuries as replacements for a declining dynastic principle.

Recently, especially with the rise of China, India and other non-Western powers, there has been growing interest in great powers and their roles and responsibilities in international society. There has

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2 Although the discussion of classical primary institutions focuses mainly on the five that Bull discusses at length, he also notes that ‘it is states themselves that are the principal institutions of international society’. This means that sovereignty and territoriality, which are the defining principles for modern states, should be added to the other five. A good case can be made for adding nationalism, which since the 19th century has become a key constitutive principle for the modern state. See, Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study in World Politics* (London: Macmillan Press, 1977), p. 71; James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For discussion of primary institutions see Barry Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: The Societal Approach* (Cambridge: Polity, 2014).


5 Jamie Gaskarth, ed., *China, India and the Future of International Society* (London:
been a particular focus on China, which is pressured from without to become a more responsible great power, and from within to balance the domestic political needs of the Chinese Communist Party with the necessity to engage in a Western-defined global economic order. More broadly, there has been interest in how rising powers gain the ‘legitimate’ great power status in ‘recognition games’, and some discussions on the legitimacy of power. But with a few exceptions there has been surprisingly little attention to the meaning of GPM itself as a primary institution. Our study makes a broader historical and structural enquiry into the meaning of GPM as it has evolved since the 18th century, seeking to uncover the driving forces that shape this primary institution, and how they are working to redefine its legitimacy in the 21st century. We are particularly interested in uncovering whether and how particular conditions in international systems/societies facilitate or obstruct the operation of GPM.

In the classical formulation, GPM is closely related to another of the classical primary institutions, balance of power (BoP), which some writers take to be the fundamental enabling condition for international society. A BoP is seen as necessary to preserve a system of sovereign states from both endless war, and domination by some form of universal empire. Great powers are a likely, though not absolutely inevitable, consequence of an anarchic system of states (likely

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because the number of possible unequal distributions of power is much greater than the possibility of a more or less equal distribution of power). Where great powers exist, they will be the principal players in the BoP, and GPM will have as its starting point the management of the BoP. As Little argues, in English School theory what he calls an ‘associational’ BoP is necessarily a social construction in which states in general and great powers in particular agree to treat the balance of power as a key principle in regulating their relationships. This understanding contrasts with the mechanical or ‘adversarial’ conception of BoP in realism in which states balance automatically against distributions of power they find threatening. It is the associational conception of BoP as something agreed amongst the great powers that underpins the strong link between BoP and GPM.

The nexus between BoP and GPM in English School theory provides close links to other mainstream IR theories, both those that put great powers at centre stage, such as realism and liberalism (and especially the ‘neo’ versions of both), and those that emphasise the ideational structure of the international system, most obviously constructivism and up to a point liberalism. As Waltz argues: ‘The greater the relative size of a unit the more it identifies its own interest with the interest of the system…. In any realm populated by units that are functionally similar but of different capability, those of greatest capability take on special responsibilities.’ Hegemonic stability theory builds on this insight to argue that management of the global economy is best done by a single hegemonic great power, and that such economic management should be part of great power responsibilities.

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As many have noted, because GPM strongly implies collective hegemony, it necessarily stands in some tension with the idea of sovereign equality that sits at the heart of modern international society. Despite the foundational importance of sovereign equality to modern international society, even after decolonization that society is still riddled with the hegemonic/hierarchical practices and inequalities of status left over from its founding process, and largely favouring great powers in particular and the West in general. Bukovansky et al. note that a consensual collective hegemony can be seen as a middle ground between sovereign equality and imposed great power primacy. They also note that civilizational traditions differ here, with the Western tradition strongly opposed to hierarchy and the Northeast Asian one more accepting of it.

The key to GPM is that great powers assume ‘special rights and responsibilities’. It is about a quid pro quo, in which lesser states legitimise a degree of sovereign inequality in return for the provision of order that only the great powers have the capacity and the will to provide. This inequality takes the form of great powers forming a club in which they recognize each other as equals at a higher level, and enjoy privileged positions in intergovernmental organizations. In return they take responsibility for upholding the core norms of international society. The consensual element in this deal is what distinguishes

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17 Bukoviansky, et al., Special Responsibilities, pp. 5-11, 34-45.


GPM from mere material hegemony, suzerainty, or in Clark’s terms ‘primacy’, based on intimidation. Both Wight and Bull note that the minimalist, state-centric position of classical international society tends to support the *status quo*: in Wight’s terms, it ‘makes a presumption in favour of existing international society’. Within that, GPM by definition looks like a predominantly *status quo* institution. But as we hope to show, under certain conditions it can also be revisionist.

The next section provides a brief overview and periodisation of how GPM has evolved in modern international society. Section 3 looks at how system structures, both material and ideational, have set different conditions for GPM. Section four surveys the main functions that have evolved for GPM, giving the institution a quite different meaning and role at different times. Section 5 looks ahead to the likely shape of GPM in the coming decades, and section 6 concludes by looking at how GPM relates to the rival concept of global governance.

2. The Evolution of GPM: an overview

Great power management is in a sense implicit in all of the big war-settling congresses from 1648 onwards. Like the BoP, not only the logic and legitimacy of great power interests, but also the principle of GPM, grew as the dynastic principle weakened. The BoP emerged as a principle of European international politics after the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), when it began conspicuously to challenge dynastic principles as a key institution for regulating relations among states. The

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principle of BoP was then enshrined in the Treaty of Vienna (1815). The emergence of GPM as a corollary of BoP tracks this pattern closely. Holsti argues that the practice of GPM becomes much more evident and formalised from the Treaty of Vienna onwards, most notably in the Concert of Europe. Simpson defines this process as a shift from the relatively pure and undifferentiated practice of sovereign equality set up at Westphalia, to a quite strong form of ‘legalised hegemony’ in which great powers saw themselves, and were recognised by others to have, managerial responsibility for international order.

The link between BoP and GPM has remained strong for much of the 19th and 20th centuries, and can be understood in terms of Little’s distinction between ‘adversarial’ and ‘associational’ balancing noted above, which exposes a markedly fluctuating pattern of BoP/GPM. GPM is closely tied to an associational balance of power, with the strength of adversarial balancing and great power management being inversely correlated. Associational balancing and the ‘legalized hegemony’ of GPM flourished for much of the 19th century as embodied in the Concert of Europe, and briefly after the First and Second World Wars with the formation of the League of Nations (LN) and the United Nations (UN). Adversarial balancing predominated in the run-ups to the First and Second World Wars, and throughout the Cold War, when GPM became weak.

But even within these swings, the principle of GPM and ‘legalised hegemony’ became institutionally consolidated from the LN onward. From 1919, the practice was to design intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) around a dual, hybrid arrangement in which the principle of sovereign equality was embedded in a general assembly,

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25 Holsti, *Peace and War*, pp. 114-37; see also Martin Wight, *Systems of States* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), pp. 42, 136-41. In a later and otherwise excellent work, Holsti somewhat surprisingly, and on what to us seem like thin grounds, rejects both BoP and GPM as institutions. On this question we prefer the earlier Holsti to the later one, and stay with the English School’s general view that both are institutions of international society. See, Kalevi J. Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 25-6.

and the principle of GPM was embedded in an elite council. Bull’s famous castigation of the two superpowers during the Cold War as ‘the great irresponsibles’, reflected the dominance of adversarial balancing at that time, and the consequent failure of the US and the Soviet Union to take adequate responsibility for managing international society. Yet even within the Cold War, the two superpowers spent some effort negotiating arms control agreements which both recognized their equality in this area, and aimed to increase their own, and the rest of the world’s, chances of survival. There was also some tacit acknowledgement of spheres of influence, most obviously in Europe. Although their antagonism prevented them from doing much by way of taking responsibility for GPM, the US and the Soviet Union nonetheless enjoyed a considerable measure of ‘legalized hegemony’ in relation to the rest of international society, a status acknowledged in the term ‘superpower’ itself.

The parallel between BoP and GPM breaks down after 1989, when the unchallenged rise of the US as the sole superpower raised doubts about the basic principle of BoP, but caused much less disturbance to GPM. Post Cold War, the US was perfectly willing to see itself as the leader and to claim privileges for itself on the basis of GPM. Up to a point, the US retained followers, though after 2001 under the Bush administration it moved away from the principle of legalized hegemony, and operated more on the basis of material primacy, not seeming to care much whether anyone followed its lead or not. Its legitimacy as leader consequently declined. Hurrell rightly posed the question: ‘How stable and how legitimate can a liberal order be when it depends heavily on the hegemony of the single superpower whose history is so exceptionalist and whose attitude to international law and institutions has been so ambivalent?’ Morris argues that the US sullied its normative opportunity by its unilateral and coercive approach to

27 Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States, pp. 147-93.
29 Clark, Hegemony in International Society.

At the present time another shift is underway. One way or another, the US is losing its sole superpower status, either because of rising powers aspiring to superpower status (most obviously China), or because power is diffusing and we are heading towards a world without superpowers. The first scenario suggests a return to an adversarial BoP and therefore a weak GPM. The second suggests a fading away of BoP and the rise of a rather novel international structure that opens questions of whether GPM will be weak or strong, and how it will relate to ‘global governance’. We return to this question in section 6.

### 3. System Structure and GPM

As noted in the Introduction, GPM shares with other IR theories both a strong interest in the material distribution of power (aka polarity), and a fundamental commitment to taking into account the ideational structure of international society. Ideas about material and ideational structure play into the operating conditions for GPM in three obvious ways: the distribution of power; the distribution of ideology; and the normative substance of the prevailing ideologies.

**The distribution of power**

In terms of the distribution of power, the standard distinctions are among multipolar, bipolar and unipolar systems. As evident from the historical discussion in the previous section, GPM has operated under all three of these material conditions.

Multipolarity was the historical norm up until 1945, with anything
between three and nine great powers in play. The Concert of Europe, which some might see as the heyday of GPM, was a multipolar affair, and multipolarity was embedded into the UN Security Council in the form of the P5. In strategic perspective, multilateralism is generally held to make things more complicated by increasing the number of players in the game of alliances and BoP, and therefore the number of possible disputing or competing dyads. Yet history does not suggest that multipolarity is in itself an obstacle to GPM. As Little notes, the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 is a classical example of GPM in action under conditions both multipolar and pluralist (the great powers had significantly different political ideologies). GPM under multipolarity requires an associational BoP with a pluralist commitment from the great powers to a principle of coexistence and tolerance, and some agreement about what kind of order is desired.

Bipolar systems are argued by neorealists to be necessarily ones in which adversarial balancing dominates, and in this perspective GPM is almost certain to be weak. Bull again seems to agree, though his analysis is made on empirical rather than theoretical grounds. In both cases the background of the Cold War seems to dominate thinking. Neorealists, for example, never much considered whether bipolarity would have been necessarily adversarial if both the Soviet Union and the US had been liberal democracies, and as noted there was some cooperation between them. Talk of a ‘G2’ as a possibility for the US and China hints at the idea that bipolarity might also have scope for an associational BoP in which two ideologically disparate superpowers might set up a managerial condominium.

Unipolarity, as much discussion of it in the IR literature suggests, is a special case. Waltz says little about it, thinking that it is pretty much impossible, or unsustainable because it would necessarily trigger frenzied counter-hegemonic balancing. Bull likewise focuses his discussion on systems with two or more great powers, and pretty much excludes unipolarity as a form of international society. After the implosion of the Soviet Union, American neorealists somehow became comfortable with talking about a unipolar world order despite the

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35 Bull, ‘The Great Irresponsibles?’
36 Waltz, Theory of International Politics.
profound challenge that an absence of balancing, frenzied or otherwise, posed to their theoretical position. From a more recent English School perspective, Clark picking up on the earlier English School interest in hegemonic/hierarchical systems and practices,\(^{38}\) has developed an argument that legitimate GPM is possible under unipolarity, using the same mechanisms of legitimation that apply to systems with more than one great power.\(^{39}\) Hegemonic stability theory, as noted above, sees a kind of unipolarity as necessary, or at least preferable, for the maintenance of a liberal international economic order.

There is, however, a further problem with the polarity approach, which is the ambiguity about who (or in the case of the EU, what) counts as a great power. Neither realists nor the English School have ever come up with a satisfactory definition, and history is full of cases of ‘honourary’ great powers such as Sweden (after 1648), the Ottoman Empire (during the 19th century) and France and China (in 1945). We are just supposed to know a great power when we see one, and that often leaves room for argument. It also makes the category of great power uncomfortably broad. Before the First World War there were nine great powers, but the gap between Britain, the US and Germany on one end of the spectrum, and Italy, Japan and the Ottoman Empire on the other, was huge, both militarily and economically.

One key cause of this basic problem is the failure of polarity theory to distinguish between great powers and superpowers.\(^{40}\) Waltz’s discussion ignores this distinction, seeing only great powers and lesser states, and most neorealists have followed his line.\(^{41}\) A bit surprisingly, Bull agrees, arguing that the term superpower ‘adds nothing to the old

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one of a “great power”. Polarity theory as currently formulated requires the single distinction between great powers and all others to be maintained, because otherwise its attractive simplicity disappears. While this simple distinction might just about work for the world up to 1945, after that it increasingly distorts more than it enlightens. Even during the 19th and early 20th centuries it can be argued that an important distinction was opening up between great powers that operated on a fully global scale, most obviously Britain, but also France and the US; and those whose operations were mostly regional, or in two or three adjacent regions, such as the Ottoman Empire, China, Japan, Italy, and Austria-Hungary. Germany and Russia lay awkwardly between these two groups. A good case can be made that Britain was the first global superpower.

After 1945, the system structure quickly became bipolar, with two superpowers far outstripping all the others on both power and scale of global operation. Japan and Germany were knocked into subordinate status despite their quick economic recoveries, but Britain, China and France had the power, the role, and within the P5 the recognition, to still meaningfully be called great powers above the rest. They retained some global operation, but became more confined to their home regions. The distinction between great and superpowers became even more obvious after 1991, when the US became the sole superpower, but Russia, the EU, China, and Japan were clearly in a class well above the rest. That power structure could only be captured as one superpower capable of fully global operation, and four great powers, having some global operating capacity, but mainly based in their home regions and sometimes in regions adjacent to that. This formulation voids polarity theory, and requires more complex and nuanced ways of thinking about the distribution of power and its effects.

We argue that this distinction between great powers and superpowers will become even more important in the future. If those who argue that China and the US will become a superpower duopoly are right, then there will be a structure of two superpowers and several great powers. If those who argue that the widening diffusion of power and the rise of the rest will lead towards a world without superpowers are right, then we will be in a world with no superpowers, several great powers, and a host of regional powers. In other words, the great powers will only

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operate relatively weakly at the global level, having their main focus within their own regions and immediate neighbouring ones. That kind of system structure requires new theorizing. It is not multipolar in the traditional sense of that term because the great powers will be incapable of competing intensely with each other for global dominance, and perhaps, in a post-imperial age, also unwilling to do so.

This discussion suggests that the material factor by itself has neither determined GPM in the past, nor defines its potential in the future. GPM can work within any distribution of power. Ideas and ideology need to be added into the mix.

The distribution of ideology

In terms of the distribution of ideology, one can also use a kind of polarity approach. In abstract, it is easy to imagine worlds in which there is one dominant ideology (e.g. *Tianxia* in the classical Chinese order), or two (e.g. democratic liberalism vs. communism during the Cold War; Christianity vs. Islam in western Eurasia after the 7th C AD); or multipolar (e.g. democracy, fascism and communism during the interwar years). The suggestion in this approach is that GPM would become easier if all shared the same ideology (e.g. the ‘League of Democracies’ idea), and more difficult the more ideologies there were in play. The English School’s concern with cultural homogeneity as a key underpinning for international society supports the hypothesis that ideological multipolarity should make GPM more difficult.  

Whether the neorealist hypothesis that material bipolarity produces particularly intense rivalry can be transposed to the ideational realm is an interesting question, but the Cold War case suggests that it can. Again, the historical discussion above shows that modern international society has lived with all three of these structures, albeit never with ideological unipolarity on a global scale.

Ideological multipolarity was in a sense the longstanding condition of the premodern world, where each core of civilization had its own distinctive religion. There were some encounters among these, such as Christianity and Islam, Hinduism and Islam, and Buddhism and Confucianism, but these might better be understood as local bipolar cases rather than a global multipolar one. The classical era is not really a fair case, because the lack of a full global international system  

44 Buzan, ‘Culture and International Society’.

prevented systemic rivalry among them and rendered the question of GPM marginal or irrelevant. The interwar years, when democracy, fascism and communism were all globally in play is a clear modern case of ideological multipolarity. The lesson from that period, with its sorry story of the weak LN, and failure to agree about how to manage – or indeed whether to have – a global capitalist economy, confirms a link between ideological multipolarity and the breakdown of GPM.

There are three clear modern cases of ideological bipolarity: monarchy vs. republicanism during the 19th century, totalitarian command economy vs. democratic market economy during the Cold War, and the emerging divide between democratic vs. authoritarian states post-Cold War. The lesson from these is that ideational bipolarity does not in itself have decisive effects on GPM. There is no doubt that the ideological divide between monarchy and republicanism during the 19th century was deep. Indeed, it might better be understood as a conflict between the fundamental principles of dynasticism and popular sovereignty.46 This deep ideational bipolarity coincided with a multipolar material structure, and yet despite this, for much of the period the Concert of Europe represented a heyday of GPM. The obvious intervening variable here is imperialism, and the shared commitment of the European (and later Western plus Japan) great powers to the legitimacy of a two tier Western-colonial international society.47 That shared interest and commitment, and the opportunities it offered for external expansion rather than zero sum competition in Europe, seemed to override even quite deep ideological divisions sufficiently to allow for a durable and quite effective GPM regime for much of the 19th century.

The ideological bipolarity of the Cold War was intensely zero-sum across a wide range of political, economic and social issues, and underpinned both the ‘inevitable conflict’ hypothesis of neorealism, and Bull’s lament about the ‘great irresponsibles’. The only real shared interest between the two superpowers was survival in the face of the existential risks posed by nuclear war. Only in that area were the US and the Soviet Union able to exercise a limited degree of GPM by

Oxford University Press, 2000).


47 Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
promoting arms control and nuclear non-proliferation, and stabilizing their spheres in Europe.

The third case of ideological bipolarity is emergent in the divide between democratic vs. authoritarian states post-Cold War. Amongst the major powers, this puts China and Russia in the authoritarian camp, and the Western powers, Japan, India and Brazil in the democratic one. This divide is significant, but it is not as deep as that of either the Cold War or the 19th century. The key difference, as Buzan and Lawson argue, is that now all of the major powers share a substantial commitment to global capitalism as the basis of their power and prosperity. This not only reduces the degree of ideological difference among them, but also provides a powerful shared interest in managing the global economy. Global economic governance requires much broader cooperation than the Cold War interest in nuclear survival. In addition, the contemporary group of great powers face a variety of shared fate problems including the environment and terrorism that pressure them to cooperate. It is too early to tell whether this will play out in a weak GPM, or whether the scenario will look more like the 19th century in which GPM is carried by a pluralist ‘Concert of Capitalist Powers’.

There are no global scale cases of ideological unipolarity. In principle one should expect such a condition to facilitate GPM. The classical English School makes much of the cultural coherence of early modern Europe (‘Christendom’) and classical Greece as the foundation for the shared values necessary for international society. Indeed, only ‘regional’ scale examples of this kind of unipolarity exist, most obviously the early modern European case, and the case of Tianxia in Northeast Asia. The European case puts ideological unipolarity into a context of power multipolarity, and the periodic conferences and congresses between the 16th and 18th centuries suggest that this combination facilitated a degree of GPM. The Northeast Asian case is more varied than classical accounts of the ‘tribute system’ suggest. In periods when China was strong there was an approximation to unipolarity of both ideology and power. Its historical record suggests a rather mixed outcome in terms of GPM. The Chinese emperor was certainly able to exercise a significant degree of legitimate GPM in the

48 Buzan and Lawson, ‘Capitalism and the Emergent World Order’.
region. But this did not work all that well with either the northern barbarians or the Japanese, both of whom periodically contested China’s position as the central power.

Therefore ideational polarity also does not provide any iron rules for GPM. This discussion does suggest that the intensity of ideological difference correlates with the difficulty of GPM. Yet it also suggests that the availability or not of compelling shared interests, whether ideational or material, is an important variable for GPM, and we pick this point up below. As well it is clearly not just at the distribution of ideologies, but also at the specific normative substance of the ones in play.

*The normative substance of the prevailing ideologies*

In terms of English School theory, GPM can have two normative foundations. The first one is *pluralist*, which means acceptance amongst the great powers of a logic of coexistence. That acceptance embodies a tolerance of difference, and an acknowledgment of shared interests that necessitate a degree of cooperation to be realized. Pluralism requires that the differences not be so deep, and of such a character, as to be either morally intolerable or existentially threatening to the other great power(s). Even where differences are substantial, the existence of a strong shared interest or value can suffice to override them. This was the case during the Cold War, when each camp found the other both morally intolerable and existentially threatening, yet they could cooperate to a limited extent when both, and indeed humankind as a whole, were existentially threatened by nuclear war. Pluralist GPM seems appropriate to international societies with two or more great powers and two or more ideologies.

The second normative foundation is *solidarist*, which means that the great powers are, or want to be, more alike, and therefore share a range of important values around which to organize GPM. Solidarist GPM points to ideological unipolarity, or if there are two or more ideologies in play that the differences between them should be neither so deep nor so wide as to eliminate any common ground. Solidarist GPM is not much dependent on material polarity. The EU provides a regional level case of solidarist GPM.

Since the possible variety of religious and political ideologies both historical and potential is more or less infinite, it would be fruitless to try to survey them all. A lot seems to hang on the nature and intensity of the ideological differences in play, and especially in the case of
pluralism, whether there is a strong shared interest or value to help override the differences. One response to this problem would be to adopt a case-by-case approach, examining the ideologies in play in any given case to assess the nature and depth of their differences, and their possible compatibilities if any.

Another way is to attempt some broader classification by which ideologies might be compared by type. Ideologies range across a spectrum from universal, open and inclusive, to parochial, closed, and exclusive. Universal, open, inclusive ideologies rest on the principle (and practice) that all people can join them if they agree to take on the necessary beliefs and practices. Examples are proselytizing religions such as Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam, and political ideologies such as liberalism, social democracy and communism. Parochial, closed, and exclusive ideologies are those that apply only to particular people and are either impossible or very difficult for outsiders to join. Examples are race ideologies positing the superiority of one race or people over others (white supremacy, Aryanism); ‘chosen people’ religions; or nationalisms defined in terms of deep and strong cultural exceptionalism, such as Chinese and Japanese. In a way, nationalism sits awkwardly between these two extremes, being universal in the sense that all peoples are entitled to the political rights of self-government associated with being a nation, but exclusive in the sense that all national identities reflect cultural and linguistic differences that are a barrier to entry. It is fairly easy for outsiders to become American, Canadian or Brazilian; possible, though more difficult, for outsiders to become British or French; and very difficult for outsiders to become Japanese, Korean or Israeli. Race ideologies are almost by definition exclusive and closed. Cultural ideologies are in principle open and inclusive, but the barriers to entry (and exit!) vary from quite low to extremely high. In classical China, for example, barbarians could become civilized by acquiring Confucian culture and observing its rituals – and Han could become barbarian by ceasing to observe the rituals. A classification approach along these lines is not incompatible with the case-by-case one: organization by type can be used to facilitate case-by-case comparisons.

This fairly simple classification approach offers some insights into whether any particular normative and material configuration will have scope for GPM or not. It seems, for example, safe to say that where ideological bipolarity takes the form of two universal ideologies, the scope for pluralist GPM will be low or zero (e.g. Christianity vs. Islam; offensive liberalism vs. communism). Such a pairing is by definition
zero sum unless there is some exceptionally strong intervening shared interest (e.g. survival during the Cold War) to mediate it. Two or more universalist ideologies will not be able to muster much in the way of pluralist GPM, and will be unable to pursue solidarist GPM unless one of them comes to dominate. At the other end of the spectrum the pattern is less clear because the character of parochial ideologies comes in two forms. One form is defensive and isolationist in which a cultural group simply wants the right to survive and coexist (e.g. American isolationism during the 19th century). The other is offensive and aggressive, in which a culture group claims the right to absorb, or dominate, or exterminate and replace, others (e.g. white supremacy, the Nazi lebensraum and eugenics projects; the Japanese empire). Defensive, parochial ideologies might well provide the most fertile ground for pluralist GPM. Offensive parochialisms, like bad apples in a basket, will reduce the scope for GPM of any kind.

Both kinds of parochial ideology will have trouble coexisting with a universal one. An offensive parochial one will create a zero-sum situation comparable to that of two competing universalisms. An example here might be the conflict that shaped the Second World War between two offensive parochialisms (Germany and Japan) and two universalist ones (liberalism and communism). A defensive parochial ideology will necessarily resist the pressure from the universal one to homogenize the system. Contemporary examples of countries that might be thought of as mainly defensive parochial – such as Russia, Iran and China – clearly feel under siege by the intrusive tyranny of liberal universalism, usefully reminding us of Simpson’s observation, that the ‘legalised hegemony’ of the great powers has its roots in the ‘standard of civilization’ thinking of the 19th century.50

This combination is perhaps a useful lens through which to examine the contemporary US-China relationship. The US clearly represents a universal, inclusive ideology, and consequently puts sustained pressure on China to come into line with that. On the other hand, China is on the parochial side of the equation. The ideological universalism of the Maoist period has been decisively abandoned, and the government’s main aim is the parochial one of domestic social stability and continuing economic growth under community party rule. China’s longstanding mantra of ‘Chinese characteristics’ suggests a desire to preserve a distinctive culture and politics from the intrusions of offensive liberal universalism. Whether China is a defensive or

50 Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States, p. 237ff.
offensive parochialism is, however, difficult to say. Up until 2008, its rhetoric of ‘peaceful rise/development’, and much of its behaviour, suggested a defensive parochialism. Since then, China’s apparent assertive turn has generated increasing international concerns, especially its increasing propensity for military swaggering, and the subtext in its rhetoric of a big power having the right to regional primacy in East Asia, seem all point to a more offensive parochialism. One solution to this puzzle is to say that the shift simply represents China’s response to its rising power. Another is to say that China was always an offensive parochial power, but it adopted a rhetoric of peaceful rise/development to hide this, and bide its time until it was strong enough to show its real face: a classic, Art of War strategy of deception. Yet another is to say that Chinese foreign policy making is incoherent, often sending contradictory signals, and hence causing confusions and misperceptions to outsiders. Thus, even though China has been actively promoting a new type of major power relations, especially with US, mistrust between them remains strong over their mutual provocations in the South China Sea and their general rivalry in the Asia-Pacific region. It is not just the particular issues that divide them, but the structural tension between an offensive universalist and a parochial one, whether offensive or defensive.

This uncertainty is what lies at the heart of the contemporary problem about GPM. In either its defensive or offensive interpretation, China’s ideological parochialism will be in tension with liberal universalism, though the tension will be higher if China’s parochialism is offensive and it attempts to ‘return to normal’ by regaining its primacy in East Asia. However, there are intervening variables. First, China’s parochialism requires that it remain engaged with the global economy, because the continued growth of its wealth and power, and its domestic political stability, depend on that engagement. Moreover, as a rising power, China has taken the legitimation of its rising power very

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seriously, because it knows the social and relational nature of the recognition. China is also not immune to other shared fate issues, from the environment to terrorism, that it cannot adequately address by itself. Perhaps it is in this context that China proposed the concept of community of common destiny in recent years, though outsiders as yet have been given insufficient clarification to be able to assess what this rather vague concept might mean. The contemporary US-China relationship thus looks like a case of fairly strong and fairly deep differences mediated by a very strong shared interest. There should therefore be some scope for pluralist GPM in this formation.

Although material and ideational structure give us some useful handles on GPM they do not provide simple formulas or mechanical predictions. Each case needs to be examined for the particular characteristics of the ideologies in play, and for possible common ground provided by intervening variables of shared interests. System structure also suggests that the environment and facilitating conditions for GPM change over time, not only in terms of the distribution of material power and ideological disposition, but also in terms of the substantive content of the ideologies in play. Dynasticism represented one form of universal normative political order, liberalism another, and communism yet another. That being the case, one should expect the functions of GPM to change along with shifts in the material and normative environment.

### 4. The Functions of GPM

A useful place to start thinking about the functions of GPM is Watson’s idea of *raison de système*, defined as ‘the belief that it pays to make the system work’. It stands as a counterpoint to the idea of *raison d’état*, which is explicitly central to realism, and implicitly to much Western IR theory. GPM means that great powers must take responsibility for making the system work, but exactly what needs to be done to ‘make the system work’ depends on what kind of material and normative structure (aka international society) is in place. There is a considerable difference between the functional requirements of a mainly dynastic, mercantilist, imperialist international society, like that of the 19th century Concert of Europe, and a mainly liberal, capitalist one with a global economy as at present. Likewise, a system with high

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interaction capacity (railways, container ships, aircraft, the internet) and high economic interdependence will present different functional priorities from one with low interaction capacity (muscle and wind powered transportation) and largely local economic and political dynamics. It is no accident that the first functional IGOs were established in the latter part of the 19th century, when new industrial technologies generated strong imperatives for global standards and inter-operability. We should expect the functions of GPM to evolve over time as the general character of international society and its particular suite of primary institutions evolves.55

In the space available here we can offer no more than a brief sketch of how the functions of GPM have changed over time: this topic could easily support a book-length treatment. Our approach is to look at the evolution of GPM mainly through the lens of security. Bull’s foundational discussion of GPM is firmly rooted in the traditional, military-political security agenda, and is broadly representative of the world up until 1945.56 These traditional functions do not disappear after 1945, but they change in context and priority, and are increasingly accompanied by new functions that emerged from the wider and deeper understanding of security.57 As the so-called non-traditional security (NTS) agenda comes into play, the functions of GPM expand into economic, environmental, health, human, and identity security. Bukovansky et al. note that ‘the special responsibilities that have been attached to great powers in the past have been narrowly focused upon managing the security aspects of international order’.58 They go on to suggest that the widening of the security agenda has extended and deepened what is accepted as the special responsibilities of great powers. This is an important insight. It provides both a driving force and a legitimating framework for tracking how and why the functions of GPM have changed over time. In this

55 Mayall, Nationalism and International Society; Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns; Buzan, An Introduction to the English School of International Relations.
section we use the well-understood evolution of the international security agenda from a purely traditional one, to one that is wider and deeper, to map the corresponding functional changes in GPM.\footnote{This evolution is set out in detail in Buzan and Hansen, see Buzan and Hansen, \textit{The Evolution of International Security Studies}, and has become almost the standard way of organizing textbooks on international security, for example, Michael Sheehan, \textit{International Security: An Analytical Survey} (Boulder CO.: Lynne Rienner, 2005); Michael E. Smith, \textit{International Security: Politics, Policy, Prospects} (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010); Alan Collins, ed., \textit{Contemporary Security Studies} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).}

The functions defined by the traditional (i.e. military-political) security agenda are well set out by Bull,\footnote{Bull, \textit{The Anarchical Society}, p. 207.} who argues that the basic role of great powers is to manage their relations with each other and to ‘impair a degree of central direction to the affairs of international society as a whole’. This nicely differentiates \textit{raison de système} from \textit{raison d’etat}. More specifically he identifies six functions for GPM (the examples are ours not Bull’s):

1. To preserve the general BoP (e.g. external balancing, as in the negotiated partition of Africa at the Berlin Conference of 1884-5; and of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War; and internal balancing, as in the US-Soviet arms control agreements during the Cold War);
2. To avoid or control central crises (e.g. as in the intended purpose of the League of Nations and the UN Security Council; the US-Soviet diplomacy during the Cuba Missiles Crisis; and various confidence-building measures);
3. To limit or contain central wars (e.g. through arms control agreements);
4. To exploit their local preponderance to maintain regional order (e.g. the US’s Monroe Doctrine; Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere; classical China’s tribute system – this becomes problematic when there is more than one great power in a region);
5. To respect each other’s spheres of influence (e.g. as between Portugal and Spain in the treaties of Tordesillas (1494) and Zaragoza (1529); and the US and the USSR in Europe after 1948); and
6. To take joint actions (e.g. the Eight-nation expedition in 1900 to relieve the Europeans under siege in Beijing by Boxer forces; some of the collective measures taken to limit nuclear
proliferation and to combat terrorism; and the recent anti-piracy operations off Somalia).

Perhaps the clearest model for this traditional security view of GPM is the Concert of Europe, which operated along these lines from the Treaty of Vienna to the middle of the 19th century, and more sporadically thereafter. Bull argues that excessively disorderly relations amongst the great powers will undermine the legitimacy of GPM, and that the great powers need to cultivate that legitimacy by paying at least some attention to the justice demands of the lesser powers. 61 This pluralist agenda largely reflects the circumstances of a multipolar, imperial international society in which great power war is a possibility. But as our examples show, it also covers the bipolar Cold War and more recent activities. So while this traditional military-political security agenda has certainly not disappeared, both the ending of the Cold War and the increasing normative and material restraints on racism, imperialism and great power war and violence, mean that it has declined in importance relative to the NTS agenda.

That said, there are four areas in which the traditional security agenda still drives the functions of GPM. First, it is conceivable that the issue of great powers managing their relations with each other could regain its centrality: scenarios of Russian expansionism, and US-Chinese rivalry over primacy in East Asia, could unfold into a new kind of spheres of influence game, and even cold war. This would pitch the closed, parochial, exclusive and authoritarian great powers against the open, universalist, inclusive and democratic ones which could either weaken GPM by setting the great powers against each other, or increase demand for it by raising fears of war. Second, traditional GPM remains important in the ongoing attempts to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. This issue is still capable of mobilising great power joint actions, as in sanctions against Iran, the Six-Party Talks about North Korea, and (falsely) against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. It is one of the notable continuities on the agenda of international security across the otherwise big divide at the ending of the Cold War. 62

Third, The violence problem is now much less about state-to-state conflict than about violence either within states (weak and failed states – where the state, or those who compete to control it, are the main

61 Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 228-29; Bull, 'The Great Irresponsible?'.
threat to the citizens), or between non-state transnational actors and states (terrorism and crime). Among the conflicts happening between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the 21st century, 89 conflicts out of the 116 were purely intrastate or civil wars, and another 20 were intrastate with foreign intervention.\textsuperscript{63} Moreover, as witnessed in the humanitarian crises in Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere, parties in these conflicts paid little regard to established rules of war, and it has been the increased vulnerability of civilians like women and children who were targeted with a level of brutality.\textsuperscript{64} The resulting cases of genocide and mass violence brought enormous pressure both on the great powers and international society as whole to do something to save innocent lives. As Morris argues, while Cold War constraints reasonably justified inaction, now failure to do something endangered liberal democratic ideals.\textsuperscript{65} It was in this context that a major change occurred in the normative structure of international society and security in the post-Cold War era. These problems fit into the traditional agenda in being threats that are for the most part intentionally made by organized groups of human beings against each other. Especially in relation to weak and failed states, this type of violence also raises issues of human rights and human security. Human rights and human security make individuals and people the main referent object, which creates significant tensions with the sovereign state framing of both international society and traditional international security.

Fourth, as Lasmar argues, transnational terrorism is in one sense an extension of the traditional GPM security agenda about violence. But he also hints that, in another sense, transnational terrorism, especially since 2001, has turned the traditional agenda inside out because the threat it creates is ‘neither state based nor state generated’.\textsuperscript{66} As reflected in the literature on international security, there can be no doubt that the attacks of 9/11, and the subsequent global war on terror (GWoT) had an enormous impact on the understanding of traditional security.\textsuperscript{67} The old state-versus-state agenda did not disappear, but alongside it was now a transnational violence threat between non-state


\textsuperscript{65} Morris, ‘Normative Innovation and the Great Powers’, p. 275.


actors and states. In part this threat could be read as wanting to remake some parts of the states-system in a different way, as for example in Islamic State’s attempt to reconfigure Syria and Iraq. But it could also be read as a much more profound assault on the very principle of sovereign, territorial states that underpins both international society and GPM. Despite being about violence, the GWoT constructed a threat that looked more like the non-military ones on the wider NTS agenda because it threatened all of the great powers together. It took them out of their traditional comfort zone of dealing with the balance of power among themselves, and into the problem of how collectively to confront shared transnational threats. The threat from transnational terrorism can never be eliminated, only managed. It threatens the sovereignty and territoriality of all states, not just great powers, and it is hardly surprising that on this issue Russia and China quickly got on side with the US regardless of their ongoing hostility to it. The threat from transnational terrorism links to that from nuclear proliferation, making these the dominant post-Cold War issues on the traditional military-political security agenda of GPM.

Because of this element of collective threat, the problem of terrorism provides a useful transition to the changing functions of GPM that developed as the NTS agenda took root. Like terrorism, the wider security agenda has a transnational dimension that differs from the traditional security agenda of GPM. Challenges such as air pollution, financial crises, terrorism, migration, disease, cyber-security, transnational crime and nuclear pollution – can and do spill over territorial borders and create a wide range of security threats and sources of instability. But unlike terrorism, much of the NTS agenda is about a range of functional issues that do not necessarily, or even usually, link to political violence. Since no single country can address these threats on its own, greater cooperation is necessary for effective security governance. In this sense, rather than managing the BOP, whether adversarial or associational, cooperation is the essential requirement if great powers wish to effectively tackle these new challenges. Relations between the US and China exemplify the mixed

character of this new security environment in that while they compete with each other in some ways, they also cooperate in many NTS areas including the GWoT and more recently in tackling climate change. Issues such as climate change and disease are clearly shared threats/fates faced by all. But some issues cut both ways: terrorism and cyber-security could be as much about rivalry between powers as about shared fates.

The decline of the great power military security agenda, and the rise of the NTS one is generally tracked back to the 1970s when the oil crises put economic security onto the agenda, and the first stirrings of environmental security began to be heard. Since then, the discipline of IR has been integrating economic, and to an increasing extent, environmental, interdependence into its thinking about international security. Yet while this dating is an accurate reflection of the IR security literature, it is not an accurate representation of the functions of GPM. Even at its time of writing, Bull’s rather pluralist, traditional security list of GPM functions displayed a striking indifference to another quite longstanding interest, shared amongst many great powers, in maintaining an orderly global economy: what is now called global economic governance (GEG). GEG is not mainly a pluralist goal (i.e. one aimed at a degree of peaceful coexistence), but more a solidarist one (i.e. aimed at pursuing a joint goal or value, in this case facilitating trade and finance across state boundaries in the belief that this will increase wealth and development faster than protectionist alternatives). Early examples of this as a function of GPM include the long history of gold standards for currency; and the negotiation of free trade and ‘most-favoured nation’ agreements, which took off during the 19th century and became institutionalised in the GATT and the WTO after the Second World War. Although more than a security issue, GEG now counts as part of NTS as ‘economic security’. But in fact it has been a longstanding function of GPM. When Britain and later the US were the leading industrial powers, both took the promotion of free

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trade seriously, and during the previous two centuries led many rounds of negotiations towards that end, some successful, some not, but all driven not only by the idea that fostering economic openness and interdependence would increase prosperity, but also that it would reduce the risk of war. As mentioned above, hegemonic stability theory puts such economic management, and provision of collective goods, at the core of GPM. There is no doubt that the history of GEG has been very up and down. Low points include both world wars, and the retreat into segmentary imperial preference after the great financial crash of 1929. Along the way many great powers have either tried to protect themselves, and promote their own industrial development, by resorting to high tariffs and other restraints on trade, (like the US and Germany during the 19th century), or by pursuing anti-capitalist mercantilist policies of self-reliance (like the Soviet Union and Mao’s China).

But as Buzan and Lawson argue, since 1945 there has been widening acceptance amongst the great powers, that a global form of capitalism is the most effective route to the pursuit of wealth and power. After 1945, this view consolidated itself in the West under American leadership and became one of the key defining features of the Cold War. China switched to this view with Deng’s reform and opening up from the late 1970s, and by the late 1980s the Soviet Union had decisively lost the struggle to maintain the credibility of its command economy as an alternative. Since then, all of the great powers have pursued their own quite distinct versions of capitalism (liberal democratic, social democratic, competitive authoritarian, and state bureaucratic), yet despite these differences all are committed to the idea that capitalism works best to deliver wealth and power when it operates globally. That commitment necessitates the maintenance and renewal of the suite of rules, regimes and IGOs without which the global economy cannot function efficiently. Despite the many controversies that surround its complex and ever-changing agenda, GEG now counts as one of the core functions of contemporary GPM. Arguably, given the massive constraints placed on great power wars by the cost and destructiveness of modern military technology, GEG has displaced the traditional military/political concerns as the first priority for GPM.

72 Buzan and Lawson, ‘Capitalism and the Emergent World Order’.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid., pp. 240-70.
Since the 1970s, environmental security, and particularly climate change, has also consolidated itself as part of NTS, and therefore the GPM agenda. Like economic security, it fits into the framing of shared transnational threats involving unintentional structural disruptions that will disproportionately affect the weak. The idea of environmental stewardship has since the 1970s acquired a host of international conferences, conventions, treaties and protocols, and some standing in international law. Falkner sees the main developments arising from the 1960s, tracking the rise of environmental norms within international society, and seeing the 1972 Stockholm Conference and the Rio summit of 1992 as particular landmarks. He makes a clear case that environmental stewardship is now established as a legitimate basis for moral claims in international society even though there is still disagreement about whether or not the problem exists. Bull argues that disagreement about environmental problems is intrinsic to the issues concerned, and that international society is the best place to start addressing the issue. Reus-Smit hints at the emergence of a green moral purpose of the state, and Hurrell emphasizes both the inescapable role of states as part of the problem and part of the solution, and the way in which environmental issues have pushed forward the process of global governance. The agreement reached for the final draft at the Paris 2015 climate summit demonstrates both that developed and developing countries now accept the fact that climate change is a global challenge faced by all, and that the leadership of the great powers, especially the US, China, the EU and India, is still crucial.

Since the 1970s, because of both the rise of the global economy as a factor of international order, and the decline of great power war as a daily concern, the widening and deepening of the international security agenda has continued to add new functions to contemporary GPM. Some of these are threats to international order that are for the most part unintentional, and usually not made by humans against each other:

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what Galtung called *structural violence*. Here we have in mind environmental threats that range from epidemic diseases, through the risk from space rocks hitting earth, to climate change, but also social ones such as when migration is constructed as a threat to identity. These threats have mainly natural causes, but some of them, particularly migration, transnational crime and cyber-security are driven by the same dramatic economic and technological developments that have shrunk time and space, and elevated the global economy to the first rank of GPM concerns.

As Hurrell and Woods note, many non-military security threats, such as transnational crime, drug/human trafficking, refugees, pandemics and environmental degradation, have emerged ‘not from state strength, military power, and geopolitical ambition, but rather from state weakness’. One of the serious implications of these new security threats is that they often cause greatest harm to the most vulnerable individuals and groups. As Cindy Yik-yi Chu’s study of human trafficking in China shows, the threat from organised crime constitutes a ‘contemporary form of slavery’ because it involves prolonged exploitation of men, women, and children. Importantly, in respect of the question of ‘security for whom’, the state is no longer the only referent object of security: under the wider agenda other referent objects, such as individuals, groups, even ecological systems, have now been recognised. From this new perspective, the traditional approaches to security precisely have ignored the security of the marginal, the poor, and the voiceless. One indicator of this functional shift in GPM is the rising role of Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), and their attraction to states such as China and Japan seeking to strengthen their legitimacy as great powers.

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84 Suzuki, ‘Seeking ‘Legitimate’ Great Power Status in Post-Cold War International
Another indicator is the growing importance of human rights and human security on the GPM agenda. The UNDP identified seven components of human security (including economic, food, health, environment, personal, community and political). Human security is about not only direct physical violence, but also by many other threats, such as structural violence, environmental causes and natural disasters. In a more positive sense it is about freedom from fear and want, and freedom to live in safety and dignity. Increasingly, this broader understanding of security has gained greater acceptance in ways that put it onto the GPM agenda. This dates back to at least 1948, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) made individual human beings ‘right holders on their own behalf’. Since then, human rights have become embodied not only in the Charter of the UN, but also in many UN Conventions and Committees, and in many regional bodies. The UN has a Human Rights Council, and there is a body of international humanitarian law. In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) popularised the concept of humanitarian intervention and democracy-restoring intervention under the name of ‘Responsibility to protect’ (R2P). It explicitly stated that ‘sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally, to respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state’. The UN World Summit in 2005 formally endorsed the concept of sovereignty as responsibility. It clearly stated that ‘[E]ach individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from

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genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’. \(^{90}\)

Yet as Foot observes, these solidarist underpinnings were also balanced by pluralism: reaffirming membership in a world of individual states, and noting the need to build state capacity. Thus, ‘R2P could be seen to represent a search for balance between human and state security’. \(^{91}\) Welsh likewise sees progress since the 1990s in attaching responsibility for human rights to sovereign states, but still holds great hesitation on the part of international society to intervene on humanitarian grounds. \(^{92}\) Despite these cautions, over the years humanitarian norms have gained increasing acceptance: as Wheeler argues, since the end of the Cold War a new norm of humanitarian intervention is emerging, linked to legitimation by the UN Security Council. \(^{93}\) Mayall and Donnelly both see human rights as having becoming influential in international society albeit far from universally. \(^{94}\) With these growing humanitarian considerations even health issues can now be seen as existential threats to international society. For example, in 2000, the UN Security Council (1308 Resolution) for the first time in its history declared a health issue (HIV/AIDS) as a threat to international peace and security. The 2014 Ebola crisis has again highlighted the particular vulnerability of countries with ‘low human development, high political instability and weak governance capacity’. \(^{95}\)


\(^{91}\) Rosemary Foot, *The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and China: Is This a Non-Traditional or Traditional Security for Beijing?*, Paper presented at the conference on “The Nexus of Traditional and Non-Traditional Security Dynamics: Chinese Experiences Meet Global Challenges”, Organized by the Centre for Non-Traditional Security and Peaceful Development Studies, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China, 18-20 September, 2009. See also Hurrell, *On Global Order*.


\(^{95}\) UN Development Programme, *Assessing the Socio-Economic Impacts of Ebola Virus*
Particularly with the ending of the Cold War, and the triumph of global capitalism, it might be argued that the normative structure of international society has undergone a substantial shift, in the process generating new functions for GPM. For more than a decade, the end of the Cold War radically changed the global distribution of power, and seemed to put the Western powers in a position of overwhelming power able to advocate new norms. In many ways international society still remains parochial and pluralist, but on top of that there is now a significant layer of more universalist values, diverse functions for GPM, and state-centric solidarism, not just about the global market economy and environmental stewardship, but also about human rights and human security, terrorism and cyber-security.\footnote{Disease in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone: The Road to Recovery (UNDP Report, December 2014), p.3.} During the Cold War this important normative shift into the wider security agenda remained somewhat in the background of GPM. But with the end of the Cold War, it moved into the foreground.

5. GPM in the 21st Century

Taking this general framing into account, where are we now in the story of GPM, and where does it seem to be heading? We can begin to answer this question by looking at the system structure variables set out in section 3 and the functions reviewed in section 4.

As noted in the discussion of the distribution of power in section 3, the simple categories of classical polarity theory now mislead more than they clarify. Some see the decades ahead in the form of two superpowers (China and the US) with a variety of great powers (the main candidates being the EU, Russia, India, and possibly Japan and Brazil). Others see a world without superpowers, but with several great powers and many regional ones. Neither of these scenarios fits within the logic of polarity theory. The two superpowers plus X great powers model violates the basic rule of polarity theory that there can only be one level of distinction: great powers vs. all the rest. The world without superpowers bears a superficial but deceptive resemblance to multipolarity. It is not multipolarity, because on a global scale the great powers have neither the capacity nor the will to compete with each other intensively to dominate the system. Decentred globalism is a

\footnote{For the distinction between state-centric and cosmopolitan solidarism, see Buzan, An Introduction to the English School of International Relations, pp. 111-20.}
new structural form that has not yet been theorised.\textsuperscript{97}

Polarity theory expects two superpowers to take a global view of GPM, and to be in competition to dominate international society. It does not say how a set of great powers would view GPM in the absence of any superpowers, but it seems reasonable to hypothesise that great powers would have both less global capacity materially, and a less global outlook, than superpowers. The 19\textsuperscript{th} century Concert of Europe offers some evidence that a society of great powers can mobilise itself for active GPM. But against that there is a worrying prospect that the set of great powers that will be in place over the coming decades is likely to be composed of states that are inward-looking to the point of being autistic. In individuals autism is about abnormal or impaired development that leaves people much more internally referenced than shaped by interactions with others. In states it can be understood as where reaction to external inputs is based much more on the internal processes of the state – its domestic political bargains, party rivalries, pandering to public opinion (whether it be nationalist or isolationist), and suchlike – than on rational, fact-based, assessment of and engagement with the other states and societies that constitute international society.\textsuperscript{98} To some extent autism in this sense is a normal feature of states. It is built into their political structure that domestic factors generally take first priority, whether because that is necessary for regime survival, or because the government is designed in such a way as to represent its citizens.

But in the current and near future set of great powers, autism will be strong for two additional reasons. First, the old, advanced industrial great powers (the US, the EU, Japan) are not going to go away, but they are exhausted, weakened both materially and in terms of legitimacy, and are increasingly unable or unwilling to take the lead. The rising great powers (China and India, possibly Brazil) are very keen to claim great power status, but equally keen not to let go of their status as developing countries. That combination leads them to give priority to their own development, to argue that that is a big and difficult


job for them, and on that basis to resist being given wider global managerial responsibilities. To the extent that states have autistic foreign policies they lose touch with their social environment, and fail to see how their policies and behaviours affect the way that others see and react to them. In such conditions a cycle of prickly action-overreaction is likely to prevail, and building trust becomes difficult or even impossible, a process already visible in US-China, Russia-EU, and China-Japan relations. Everyone sees only their own interests, concerns and ‘rightness’, and is blind to the interests, concerns and ‘rightness’ of others. If this diagnosis of autism turns out to be correct, then we are unlikely to see responsible great powers, and more likely to see a decline in GPM as an institution of 21st century international society. Autistic great powers lack much global vision other than their own self-interest, and will quickly lose the legitimacy necessary for GPM.

In terms of the distribution of ideology, the picture is also mixed. There remains a kind of ideological bipolarity with democracies on one side and authoritarians on the other. In what is fast becoming the post-Western age, this divide is taking on strong cultural overtones, with authoritarians of various stripes (Chinese, Russian, Islamic) claiming cultural legitimacy for their political form. This is a significant divide, but perhaps less intense than the ideological divides amongst autocracy, fascism, communism and democracy that played out during the 20th century. Underlying this divide is the often under-appreciated substrate of consensus on many of the underlying norms, rules and principles (aka the ‘primary institutions’) of international society: sovereignty, territoriality, the market, nationalism, diplomacy, international law, human equality, GPM, and suchlike. These primary institutions are mainly a legacy of Western hegemony, but many of them, most notably sovereignty and nationalism, have become so deeply embedded in both state elites and populations that they are now as global – and as local – as football (which few now think of as a British invention).

With the post-Cold War shift to more or less universal acceptance of the market, another powerful dimension has been added to this substrate of normative order. This contrasts with the pre-1989 world when ideological contestation over such issues was the norm. When the vast majority of states are capitalist in some form, the institutions and rules required by the global market provide foundations on which a
pluralist management of international society might be pursued. This argument is not meant to underestimate either differences of interpretation about these norms (such as over the right of non-intervention) or principles over which disagreements remain pronounced (such as the universal applicability of human rights). Emergent principles such as environmental stewardship could either add to the stock of disagreements or, depending on the circumstances, to the list of values held in common. But while ideological differences do remain, they seem to be less deep and less intense than during the 20th century.

In terms of the normative substance of international society there is a rather complicated picture. On the one hand, there is potential for serious tension between closed, parochial and exclusive ideologies such as those represented most strongly by China, Russia and Iran, and open, universal and inclusive ones represented most strongly by the US. A key factor here will be whether these opposing ideologies take offensive or defensive forms. Do the parochial powers seek to expand their spheres of influence, and do the universalist ones seek to impose their values on those who do not share them? On the other hand, there are two powerful factors that might mitigate this tension. First, is the narrower ideological bandwidth just discussed: all of the powers now share a fairly broad agreement about the general form of international society. Second, is the existence of the several strong shared-fate issues discussed above, and how these drive a wider and deeper security agenda to underpin GPM. As argued in section 4, shared interests seem to be an important condition for successful GPM, able to override both material and ideological polarity.

This general picture of tensions and mitigating factors remains the same regardless of whether one’s preferred scenario for the future is China and the US as rival superpowers, or a decentred globalist world with no superpowers. The US-China rivalry will have much the same drivers, and take place against much the same global background, regardless of whether it is a global clash between two superpowers, or a regional spheres one between two great powers. Even if the understanding that the US and China are superpowers prevails, the logic of the ‘rise of the rest’, and the diffusion of power will mean that they are relatively weak superpowers within a system containing a range of increasingly formidable great and regional powers.

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99 Buzan and Lawson, ‘Capitalism and the Emergent World Order’.
This overall structural assessment suggests that GPM is not going to become obsolete in the decades ahead. If those who anticipate strong Sino-US rivalry are correct, then much of the traditional security agenda of GPM will come into play. Regardless of this, the demand for GPM should also be sustained by the rather durable looking set of shared-fate, non-traditional security issues discussed in section 4. This structural assessment also suggests that when thinking about GPM in the coming decades, it is reasonable to assume a torn logic in which GPM might well operate more distinctly on two levels, regional and global, than it has at least since the end of the Cold War. This could produce a quite diverse picture. On the one hand, the global need for GPM is not going to disappear. Indeed, it might well intensify as the shared fate issues such as migration, terrorism, cyber-security and climate change, get amplified by the ever more tightly interconnected and interdependent international system/society. The shared fate issues sketched in section 4 affect everyone, and no single power under any likely scenario will be able to deal with them alone. On the other hand, the ideological and cultural character of the major powers will remain quite diverse, and many, possibly all, of them will be autistic in their behaviour. These factors are likely to become more influential as the hegemony of Western power and culture diminishes from the enormous heights it attained during the 19th century. That points towards a more regional form of GPM. It is easy to imagine the EU and the US running liberal regional orders, and Russia and China leaning towards authoritarian hegemonic or even imperial ones. One can also imagine condominiums, perhaps China and Russia in Central Asia, and conflicts, most obviously the US, Japan and possibly India vs. China in East Asia. Regions without great powers, such as sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, pose interesting questions. They might simply be chaotic and under managed, or they might attract intervention from the great powers adjacent to them.

The potential for a two-layer, regional and global, practice of GPM raises difficult questions about the criteria for great power legitimacy. By Bull’s criteria, failure either to order their relations or to deliver adequately on justice demands, might undermine great power legitimacy. By Clark’s criteria, great powers seeking legitimacy need to display good manners and to provide public goods. These factors operate at both global and regional levels, and there is likely to be a lot of complicated interplay among them. Great powers that fail either to show good manners by respecting the sovereign equality of their neighbours, or to deliver adequately on local justice demands, are likely to encounter real difficulties in establishing legitimacy as regional
managers. Failure to meet justice claims, or to provide adequate collective goods in relation to global shared fate issues might also undermine great power legitimacy. An intensification of autistic behaviour will compromise the ability of the great powers to order relations both amongst themselves and in their regions.

A lot could go wrong in a decentred globalist world, especially if that world is dominated by a set of autistic, irresponsible, great powers, unable and unwilling to order relations amongst themselves or to do other than bully smaller powers. There is already a substantial divide amongst the great powers about human rights and democracy, and potential ones about climate change and cyber-security. It is not clear whether the great powers will compete or cooperate on issues such as migration, terrorism, and cyber-security, where the incentive still cut both ways. Russia, for example, seems happy to ‘attack’ the EU and Turkey by stimulating mass migration to them from Syria. At the regional level, Europe and the Middle East might both be destabilised if Europe and Russia compete there, and the same but worse could occur in East Asia if China, Japan and the US fail to order their relations. On present trends, we might be facing another period of ‘great irresponsibles’ where great powers weaken their legitimacy not only by failing to deliver on justice claims, but also by abusing their neighbours and failing to order relations amongst themselves.

Yet globally, shared fate issues exert a strong pressure on the great powers to coordinate their actions, and this pressure is likely to increase in the coming decades. To the extent that shared interests are the dominant variable in determining the fate of GPM, there are also grounds for optimism. We might be facing a post-unipolarity, post-Western revival of GPM in a decentred, globalist world. That would require that the great powers agree about their spheres of influence at the regional level, accept the burden of providing collective goods, and face up to the responsibilities that shared fates define for humankind. They would have to curb their autistic tendencies, and, as in the 19th century Concert of Europe, look first to their shared interests, and accept a pluralist norm of tolerance towards their differences.

From where we are now, it looks as if we will get some messy mixture of these two. The balance will depend on whether the great powers focus more on raison de système, and the need to respond to shared fates, or more on raison d'etat, and the pursuit of their own interests, obsessions and advantages. Because IR is a dismal science, the latter outcome seems more likely. But if we are right about the importance of
shared interests to successful GPM regardless of material and ideational polarity, then there is a glimmer of hope. The pressure from shared fates that affect all of the great powers has never been stronger than it is now, and this pressure can only grow. At the same time, the divisions among the great powers, though real enough, are shallower than they have been for more than a century.

6. Conclusions: GPM and Global Governance

As hinted at above, analyzing GPM through the lens of the widening and deepening agenda of international security raises a question of both theoretical and practical significance about the management of international society: How does the institution of GPM relate to global governance? As the process of securitization spreads to ever more issues, using the move from the traditional security agenda to the NTS one clearly opens up a range of issues that look as much like the GG agenda as the GPM one. This constitutes a very dramatic shift in the nature of GPM. In effect, the securitization of issues from the economy, through migration to public health, has expanded the functions of GPM from keeping interstate order to managing complex global governance challenges. Since there can be no doubt that the creation and management of this expanded agenda involves not just great powers, but also lesser states, IGOs, and a whole range of global civil society and non-governmental organizations as well, GPM and GG have effectively merged. Non-state actors have led the way both on specific issues such as the Land Mine Treaty and on more general issues such as human rights. Lesser powers have sometimes taken regional leadership roles, of which the classic case is ASEAN.¹⁰⁰

Yet while this merger of GPM and GG is very apparent from the facts on the ground, it has hardly been addressed in the literature in any systematic way. The GPM literature, like realism in all its forms, and neoliberalism, takes for granted the ongoing, disproportionate influence of the great powers in the management of the international system/society, and does not look much beyond that. The development of the GPM concept came well before the literature on GG, yet the ES perspective provides a two-fold link to GG. First, there is acknowledgement that world society plays a significant role in

shaping the primary institutions of international society.\footnote{Clark, 
*International Legitimacy and World Society.*}

This acknowledgement opens up space for NSAs. Second, it is clear that what Simpson calls the 'legalised hegemony'\footnote{Simpson, 
*Great Powers and Outlaw States.*} of the great powers requires support from the lesser members of international society in order to have legitimacy. This was a key reason behind the classical ES’s concern over what Bull called ‘the revolt against the West’ by newly independent postcolonial states. As Bull and Watson noted:

Third World governments also maintain with great firmness the European doctrine that neither collective security nor financial aid nor any other guarantee or arrangement gives the strong powers any right to interfere in the domestic relations between the new governments and their subjects. They reject any idea of a directorate or concert of great powers entitled to ‘lay down the law’.\footnote{Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., 

As yet, the ES literature has had little to say about the role of IGOs, implicitly seeing them as tools of GPM.\footnote{For exceptions see, Rosemary Foot (2014) ‘Social boundaries in flux: secondary regional organizations as a reflection of regional international society’, in Barry Buzan and Zhang Yongjin, eds., 

The GG perspective became prominent during the 1990s. It was a response to the decline of interest in IGOs and world government,\footnote{Thomas G. Weiss, 
*Global Governance: Why? What? Whither?* (Cambridge: Polity, Kindle edn., 2013), locs. 516-1070.} but also more broadly a kind of revolt against the dominance in IR thinking of states, great powers and the use of force. Because of this orientation, and despite its later start, the GG literature broadly failed to make links to the existing literature on GPM. One key reason for this is that advocates for GG tend to see great powers more as part of the problem. Rosenau argues that global governance is about an ongoing relocation of authority upwards and downwards from the state.\footnote{James N. Rosenau, ‘Governance, order and change in world politics’, in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., 
*Governance without government: order and change in world politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 2-3.}
key driver behind this is the increasing prominence of shared-fate issues and the inability of states by themselves to address these.\footnote{Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, \textit{International Organizations: the Politics and Processes of Global Governance} (2nd edition)(Boulder CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), p. 3.}

States, including great powers, were having to share power with a whole range of NSAs.\footnote{Jessica T. Mathews, ‘Power Shift’, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Vol. 76, No. 1(1997), p. 50.} Bukovansky et al. make a big point about how special responsibilities have diffused away from great powers to a variety of other actors, the mix differing according to the issue.\footnote{Bukovansky, et al., \textit{Special Responsibilities}, pp. 73-8, 250-63.} The general image is one of states of all types and levels of power being not only entangled in a web of NSAs and IGOs, but also being constrained, and in some ways hollowed out, by global laws, norms, and transnational networks. As Weiss puts it:

‘global governance’ is the sum of the informal and formal values, norms, procedures, and institutions that help all actors – states, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), civil society, transnational corporations (TNCs), and individuals – to identify, understand, and address trans-boundary problems…. global governance is collective efforts to identify, understand, or address worldwide problems that go beyond the capacities of individual states to solve. As such it may be helpful to think of global governance as the capacity with the international system at any moment to provide government-like services and public goods in the absence of a world government.\footnote{Weiss, \textit{Global Governance}, locs. 359, 1202.}

This perspective of ‘governance without government’ does not, in principle, exclude either states in general, or the great powers and GPM in particular, as being part of it. But in practice little has been done to make this link. Some work in the GG tradition plays down the distinction between great powers and other states. Zacher and Sutton for example, argue that international regimes reflect both great power interests and those of most other states, as does the more general framework of sovereignty.\footnote{Mark Zacher and Brent A. Sutton, \textit{Governing Global Networks: International Regimes for transportation and Communication} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 2-3.} Other work just leaves the great powers out. Weiss though quite familiar with ES work, barely mentions great powers, and when he does, it is mainly in the role of Bull’s ‘great irresponsibles’, whose inability to agree sets up the problem that GG is
trying to address.\textsuperscript{112} Although he is concerned about the many inadequacies and shortcomings of GG in relation to the global problems now in play, Weiss confines his prescription to a plea for moves towards world government, leaving unexplored the idea that GPM might also be an option for strengthening GG. As Hurrell argues, the problem with the GG literature is that: ‘power has been neglected within liberal writing on global governance’.\textsuperscript{113}

So while in principle nothing stands in the way of thinking about GPM and GG, in practice, these literatures have looked in opposite directions, almost as oppositional views. How they might be blended together is an interesting and important question, and a big enough one that to do justice to it will require another paper. As Bukovansky et al. argue: ‘The global problems we face today, and the intellectual, cultural, organisational and material resources we must mobilise to address them, require a much more complex and diverse network of “great responsibles” than is envisioned by either state-centric or market-centric models of world politics.’\textsuperscript{114} This feels like a good place to start thinking about how to put GPM and GG back together again. As Weiss argues, NSAs cannot solve these problems by themselves. Doing so in combination with GPM might be a more achievable trajectory than waiting for world government. From a GPM perspective, linking in to GG provides an opportunity to increase legitimacy, and it is more than past time that the academic literature on this caught up with the real world practice.

In practical terms, how GPM and GG relate to each other will depend a lot on whether the great powers are responsible or autistic. The ASEAN case of smaller power leadership, for example, rests on the mutual inability of China and Japan to provide consensual GPM in East Asia. It therefore suggests not so much a general diffusion of managerial responsibility downwards and outwards from the great powers, as a specific, and perhaps indicative, role for lesser states when great powers fail in their responsibilities. Lesser power regional management may be the only option in regions without great powers such as Africa and Middle East. Ideally, if the great powers are able and willing to exercise their responsibilities, both GPM and GG should

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{112} Weiss, \textit{Global Governance}.
\item \textsuperscript{114} Bukovansky, et al., \textit{Special Responsibilities}, pp. 47, 263.
\end{itemize}
be in play to support international society.

As Hurrell notes, the hierarchical order established by the great powers during the 19th century remained ‘extraordinarily powerful and influential throughout the twentieth century’ including in the formation and functioning of the expanding set of IGOs. The great powers will continue to play a crucial role in world order even as GG extends beyond traditional GPM: ‘unsurprisingly, in debates on world order, it is the voices of the most powerful that dominate the discussion’. Even the work of a dedicated liberal institutionalist such as Ikenberry makes strong links between great powers and the creation and function of IGOs. So while global governance involves both a wider range of actors and a more consensual, horizontal, and negotiated character, it might still better be seen as necessarily entangled with GPM rather than as a replacement for it. The great powers still have the resources and interests to dominate IGOs. The management of international society is certainly not confined to an exclusive great power club as it was during the 19th century, but GPM remains both as an institution of international society and as a core component of GG. As argued in the previous section, there are strong reasons for pessimism about GPM, whether because of general autism amongst the great powers, or rivalry between authoritarians and democracies, or inability to adjust to the entry of non-Western great powers into the club. If GPM breaks down, we will be offered a case study of whether the new form of horizontal GG can operate strongly, or even at all, by itself. This will be of considerable theoretical interest to IR, but rather unpleasant for those who have to live through it.

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