Does the exclusion argument put any pressure on dualism?

List, Christian and Stoljar, Daniel (2016) Does the exclusion argument put any pressure on dualism? Australasian Journal of Philosophy . ISSN 0004-8402

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Abstract

The exclusion argument is widely thought to put considerable pressure on dualism, if not to refute it outright. We argue to the contrary that, whether or not their position is ultimately true, dualists have a plausible response. The response focuses on the notion of ‘distinctness’ that is employed to distinguish between mental and physical properties: if ‘distinctness’ is understood in one way, the exclusion principle on which the argument rests can be denied by the dualist; if it is understood in another way, the argument is not persuasive.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rajp20
Additional Information:	© 2016 Australasian Association of Philosophy
Library of Congress subject classification:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Sets:	Departments > Government Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)
Date Deposited:	06 Jun 2016 14:20
URL:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66814/

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