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Game of zones: the political economy of conservation areas

Ahlfeldt, Gabriel M. and Möller, Kristoffer and Waights, Sevrin and Wendland, Nicolai (2016) Game of zones: the political economy of conservation areas. The Economic Journal. ISSN 0013-0133 (In Press)

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We develop and test a simple theory of the conservation area designation process in which we postulate that the level of designation is chosen to comply with interests of local homeowners. Conservation areas provide benefits to local homeowners by reducing uncertainty regarding the future of their area. At the same time, the restrictions impose a cost by limiting the degree to which properties can be altered. In line with our model predictions we find that an increase in preferences for historic character by the local population increases the likelihood of a designation, and that new designations at the margin are not associated with significant house price capitalisation effects.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2016 Royal Economic Society
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD100 Land Use
H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
K Law > KD England and Wales
Sets: Departments > Geography and Environment
Date Deposited: 27 Apr 2016 09:49
Last Modified: 30 Nov 2016 09:45
Funders: English Heritage, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines

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