Chapter 1

A Time after Copernicus

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We live in a time of mutation. We – who? We the inheritors of the understanding of the world and the significance of our lives that belongs to the Greco-Christian epoch we still inhabit, the epoch that Heidegger called the epoch of ‘the first beginning’ (2000: 125), that Derrida called the epoch of ‘the sign’ (1998: 14). This mutation belongs to a movement of decentring: the displacing of a discourse in which what is called ‘Man’ holds a special position or distinction at the centre of nature and history. In this mutation, Man is knocked off his pedestal.

Talking of ‘our time’ as ‘a time after Darwin’, but transparently also a time after Copernicus (Freud said, in addition, a time after Freud, but I will come back to that), the British philosopher David Wiggins, in a text written before the fall of the Berlin Wall, describes this mutation neatly if not unproblematically like this:

Unless we are Marxists, we are more resistant [today] than the eighteenth- or nineteenth-centuries knew how to be [to] attempts to locate the meaning of human life or human history in mystical or metaphysical conceptions – in the emancipation of mankind, or progress, or the onward advance of Absolute Spirit. It is not that we have lost interest in emancipation or progress themselves. But whether temporarily or permanently, we have more or less abandoned the idea that the importance of emancipation or progress (or a correct conception of spiritual advance) is that these
are marks by which our minute speck in the universe can distinguish itself as the
spiritual focus of the cosmos. (1998: 91)

The mystical and metaphysical conceptions at issue here are ways of thinking some kind of
ultimate unity of Man and the-Cosmos, or of Man and World. In mystical thought there is the
achievement of unity with the One which we can, in principle, attain now. In metaphysics by
contrast this unity is posited as a spiritual finality in which Man attains a proper relation to
himself and to the World in a movement of emancipation and de-alienation. It is
the metaphysics of the epoch of Greco-Christian anthropo-teleo-messianism which dreams of
the future attainment of a condition in which the inherent capacities of Man finally flourish.
Within this epoch one finds again and again the thought that this is an inseparably global
development, fundamentally tied to the future attainment of a cosmopolitan existence, where
every other is my fellow; not just ‘my fellow Americans’ or ‘my fellow Europeans’.

But these fellows – all of them – they are all human, and first of all men (males): my
fellow is my brother. Hence we might also speak of the epoch in mutation in our time as the
epoch of androcentric cosmopolitanism. Here is Derrida on this tradition:

[The cosmopolitan tradition is one] which comes to us from, on the one hand, Greek
thought with the Stoics, who have a concept of the ‘citizen of the world’. And also, on
the other hand, from Saint Paul in the Christian tradition, where we find another call
for a citizen of the world as, precisely, a brother. Paul says that we are all brothers,
that is, sons of God. So we are not foreigners, we belong to the world as citizens of
the world. (Derrida, 1997)
We the inheritors of the understanding of the world and the significance of our lives that belongs to the epoch of anthropo-teleo-messianic reason, the epoch of androcentric cosmopolitanism, we live in a time of mutation, of epochal exhaustion, of deconstruction. We could focus on the slow and painful access of women to this brotherhood, but I am confident that the matter for thinking that is announced in the title ‘cosmopolitan animals’ – perhaps heralding the projection of a cosmopolitanism beyond the community of ‘brothers’, whether these are men or women – is not one theme among others in this time. It perhaps has the power to gather together all other movements in mutation concerning our understanding of the world and the significance of our lives.

What then can we say about cosmopolitan animals today? Philosophers are already familiar with the idea of political animals – animals plural, animals in addition to Man. Going right back to Aristotle we have had this idea. In his History of Animals, Aristotle maintained that some gregarious animals – not those that merely herd or flock together or swim together in shoals – should be called ‘political animals’: ‘Animals that live politically are those that have any kind of activity in common, which is not true of all gregarious animals. Of this sort are: man, bee, wasp and crane’ (1965: 488a). So, political animals: yes. We know about them. But what about the idea of a cosmopolitan animal? This, surely, is never a non-human thing. Other political animals, perhaps, but cosmopolitan animals, surely no.

And yet, today, in the OED, as plain as can be, one can read this:

**cosmopolitan adj**…4 said of a plant or animal: found in most parts of the world and under varied ecological conditions.
Cosmopolitan animals today – or perhaps yesterday – are those of the ‘It can thrive anywhere’ type. Not an upgrade from already rare political animality. On the contrary – something really common. Man was in the original line-up of political animality – and as we shall see, uniquely, had an upgrade in that class to cosmopolitical animality. However, the thought of cosmopolitan animality as we have it today (or perhaps yesterday) is also one likely to include Man, but Man downgraded. Not ‘Man, Bee, Wasp and Crane’ but rather ‘Man, Rat, Fox, and Crow’. Cosmopolitan animals – not so much the worldly sophisticates as the eat-anything-live-anywhere global survivors.

But that is not all we have today. Already today, and here perhaps making some kind of step towards a tomorrow, there is more: it would also seem feasible to speak today of cosmopolitan animals in a quasi-socio-political sense; namely, in relation to a possibility of inter-species trust and hospitality, of forms of mutual aid constituting an original unity of species differences. Indeed, the internet will quickly show that the world is full of ‘the cutest interspecies animal friendships’.

Perhaps these are just ‘joke animals’, however (Diamond, 1996: 357). While there may be something of tomorrow here, it is really a sort of pre-lapsarian fantasy, and I don’t want to get involved with cuteness.

On the other hand, it is not obvious that one can maintain a discourse on cosmopolitical animality that is not concerned with fellowship or brotherhood as friendship – my fellow, my brother, is my friend, in the community of friends all equal. Here, however, even where my fellow is my friend, my concern for him must be dissociated from sentiment, dissociated from love of Man. In his great discourse on cosmopolitanism, Kant stressed that his concern with hospitality to the other ‘is not a question of philanthropy but of right’ (1991: 105). With cosmopolitical animality as I want to think it in this essay the point will be the same: it is not about liking animals – nor about animal rights – but about an acknowledgment
that our lives on earth are not only lived in ‘a time after Darwin’ but, as Derrida came to put it, ‘more and more’ lived in a time after Copernicus (1994: 97). In the words of Kant, the very words that provided the impetus for his thought of a universal right of hospitality more than two-hundred years ago, there is an existential relation between the living things on this earth – let’s call it, after Donna Harraway but also retrieving something of the Heideggerian resonance she resists, ‘multi-species becoming-with’ – that they cannot get out of, and that obtains ‘by virtue of their common possession of the surface of the earth, where, as a globe, they cannot infinitely disperse and hence must finally tolerate the presence of each other’ (Kant, 1991: 106).

Should we say then, from today on, that Man is, in some sense, both a political animal among others and a cosmopolitical animal among others?

I cannot see (without a good helping of tiresome self-denial) that we can comprehend this in terms a discourse concerning a line-up of animal equivalents, of examples among others of cosmopolitical animality. Indeed, even the appeal to Aristotelian naturalism I began with would have to contend at some point with the fact that Aristotle finds this kind of ‘one among others’ formulation ‘clearly’ too simple, and more or less consistently, more or less coherently, and still today more or less unforgettably (one can only pretend to forget it), interrupts it with a thought of something like a concept of a human difference. In The Politics, for example, Aristotle states that ‘it is clear that man is a political animal more than any bee or any gregarious animal’ (2013: 1253a). In other writings one finds that Aristotle’s ‘more than’ amounts to more than a mere difference of degree too, and that ‘political association’ strictly so called is reserved only or uniquely for Man (see Mulgan, 1974: 440). Moreover, and beyond Aristotle, in the Greco-Christian or onto-theological tradition of philosophy, in our tradition, this ‘more political than any other animal’ of Man is also thought through with regard to a distinctive end of Man: in terms of the movement of all humanity towards a
genuinely cosmopolitan horizon. This ‘more than’ is then fundamentally tied to the idea of Man’s ultimate political telos. If Man is more political than any other animal, this, for a modern tradition that is now classic, is because the form of political association finally proper for Man is the authentic form of human universality found in a world-wide cosmopolitical existence. Today (yesterday), if Man is conceived as ‘more political’ this is related to the idea that he is, uniquely and finally, universally cosmopolitical – i.e. cosmopolitan in a genuine sense.

The classical interpretation of the political distinction of Man is thus inseparable from a global movement of transcendence of all political particularity: every other (human) is my fellow. And it goes along with someone being your fellow that you would not normally kill him – or eat him.

How might we respond today (tomorrow) to this classic philosophical cosmopolitical tradition? In this essay I will do so in a way which acknowledges what might be called a mutation within human cosmopolitics. Kant tried to impress on us that we already find feelings within ourselves that testify to the idea of cosmopolitan right, for example when we acknowledge that ‘a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere’ (1991: 108). Here he was thinking of revulsion felt in the face of the unprecedented subjection of native peoples by colonial Europeans. He also stresses the importance of events which take a step towards realising a collective cosmopolitan condition in which humanity would express its pure humanity. His example is the French Revolution of 1789 – a revolution made in the name of the Rights of All (‘Man’), and not simply the Rights of the French.

In our time I think we are beginning to experience a new sense of cosmopolitan right – an experience in which the ‘pure humanity of Man’ is beginning to be expressed in the recognition or acknowledgment of a fellow feeling beyond the human. And this cosmopolitanism has its corresponding testimony in feelings – for example, in revulsion felt
in the face of the *unprecedented subjection* of animals all over the world today – and also its *events*. Indeed, the mutation in our time is perhaps inaugurated by an *event of cosmopolitical testimony beyond the human horizon*, incredibly also written in 1789, when, in a mere footnote, Jeremy Bentham (in fact speaking against Kant) turned the world around insisting regarding non-human animals: ‘The question is not, Can they *reason*? nor, Can they *talk*? but, Can they *suffer*?’ (2007: 236).

**These Associations**

Before exploring the idea of cosmopolitical animality further, I want to go back to the dimension concerning which such an idea was conceived as the *telos* of the political animality of Man. What should we say about political animality – and especially the political animality of those animals that are not human?

As we have seen, Aristotle seems to leave some room for doubt whether the bee, wasp and crane are genuinely political animals after all. Can we straighten out this idea? In a justly famous essay, R. G. Mulgan attempts to do so by interpreting Aristotle as using the expression ‘political’ in a wide sense (in which various non-human animals are also included) and a narrow sense (applying only to human beings). Mulgan further suggests that the latter is its ‘literal meaning’ and the former its ‘metaphorical meaning’ (1974: 441).

The idea here is this. The appearance of some analogy or comparability between human ways of going on and certain animal ways encourages the use of a concept that has a genuine (literal) sense only in relation to the speaking animal. We can appeal to this concept in relation to the behaviour of some other animals too – but this is not to be taken literally, even if it is to be taken seriously.

Is this interpretation or something like it unavoidable? Do the obvious differences between Man and bee rule out one saying that, when it comes to speaking about forms of
association as ‘political’, Man and bee really are in their own ways equally political animals? There are bee associations and human associations – but in their own ways they really are both ‘political’ associations. Is that really so odd? Must the wider sense really be counted as figurative? Aristotle’s definition doesn’t seem to demand that at all. He points, rather clearly I think, to a generic character of the case: it is the presence, in both man and bee, of some kind of ‘activity in common’, a certain way of doing-a-thing-together, rather than simply doing things at the same time or in the same place. At issue, then, is a mode of collective self-organisation in which what gets done gets done only by working together. So Man and bee are both political animals, even though their ways of being such are, naturally, very different. However, and pace Mulgan, to say they are both political animals is not to speak in a figurative sense of ‘political’ – it is simply a generic sense.

So just as both Man and bee and Man are, for example, both alive, alive not only in a related sense but genuinely both alive in the same sense – in a sense in which it would make no sense to say one was ‘more alive’ than the other or that one was alive only figuratively – so they are both genuinely (generically) political animals.

What then of Aristotle’s conviction that is this not the end of the story? Is there any reason to affirm his thought that, in addition, it is ‘clear’ that human beings are ‘more political’ than bees?

I think there is. The point here is not so much to point up a categorial contrast as a modal inflexion. Think of one of the most basic dimensions of our genuine aliveness (and not just any example we can now see): namely, our vulnerability to suffering pain. We might in this case find it compelling to hold in view both (generic) ‘feeling pain’ and the specific form of that condition for most human beings – in which its mode of givenness is both sensible and conceptual. It is an ‘experience’ in the Kantian sense. The mode of receptivity normal for
human beings is not exclusively sensory: we take in *that things are thus and so* – with ourselves, with the world.

If we are going to follow tradition in this very elemental sensory case, and I can’t see how one can altogether avoid doing so, then it would seem reasonable to do so in more complex cases too. So, for example, we might also want to acknowledge a modal inflection of the generic political criterion of ‘having an activity in common’ for an animal that is not only political but, as it were, *politically aware*: a political being whose political-being-with-others is an issue for it. Perhaps certain possibilities of being-political will only be available to an animal whose political life is pervaded by political concepts. Such an animal might well be called *more political* than any other.

On the other hand, as Mulgan’s reflections suggest, there is a genuine worry about extending concepts which belong to the life of an animal that is pervaded by political concepts to the lives of animals that are not, or are only primitively. This worry gives rise to the thought that perhaps we need to draw a distinction between ‘genuine’ or ‘literal’ cases of some phenomenon (cases where the concept concerns precisely a conceptual relation to the phenomenon in question) and those that are not. This worry does not disappear even if we acknowledge (as I am urging) that the lives of certain non-human animals might also provide ways of making ourselves *generically* intelligible to ourselves as a political animal. The worry concerns a reflective hesitancy we can feel with respect to *what we are speaking about* when we ordinarily speak about the lives of animals that do not speak.

**Heidegger Muted**

Heidegger, it seems to me, provides one of the best ways of expressing our reflective hesitancy to ascribing to non-human beings the kinds of things we ordinarily ascribe to them, reflections which lead him to resist ascribing to non-human animals a ‘genuine sense’ of their
‘having a world’. Through the distinctive dispositions of their own forms of living, non-human animals really are, and are ‘genuinely’. Heidegger says, brought into [being-there’ (2009: 40). This is a very significant acknowledgement within Heidegger’s thought, since ‘being-there’ (Da-sein) is, in his major work Being and Time, the term he uses to denote only ‘man himself’ (1962: 32), and ‘Being-in-the-world’ (In-der-Welt-sein) is Dasein’s basic ‘way in which it is’ (1962: 79). So the suggestion that non-human animals are ‘genuinely’ in-dwelling ‘worldly’ beings too is an important qualification. Nevertheless, Heidegger does not simply equate man and animal: this genuine mode of being-in-the-world of the animal is not to be characterised in terms of the mode of a genuine ‘having a world’ of the kind that belongs to Dasein. There are two sides to this: a genuine in-being and a genuine having of this in-being. If one stresses the first, the ‘only difference’ between humans and animals can seem rather slight:

If all life is disclosive world-having, i.e., in ‘being = dwelling, then it is also true that there are degrees or levels of complexity or intensity of such having/dwelling. Thus, for example, life for animals ‘is characterized through φωνή [phone] and for human beings through λόγος [logos]’ – the only difference between these being that in λόγος, ‘what is living ‘in-a-world appropriates the world, has it there, and genuinely is and moves in this having ‘it there.’ (Johnson, 2012: 61)

The trouble is that this ‘only difference’ – the life characterised through logos – seems to make all the difference in the world to the sense of ‘having a world’. In the radical absence of such a life-characteristic the animal does not ‘have a world’ in a genuine sense: it is not simply worldless, like a stone, but it is still, as Heidegger famously puts it ‘poor in world’ (1995: 269). And this world-poverty will inflect every mode of being of the animal, including
those animals Aristotle called political animals: it is not that it is only dimly politically aware, it does not ‘have’ a relation to the political as such; it is not, in this sense, politically aware at all. Of course, unlike animals that are not political animals at all, some animals (bees, wasps and cranes) have some kind of relation to the political, since they are political. Nevertheless, while such an animal moves politically, it does so without moving in a political world disclosed and had as such. So what should we or can we say about this relation, this other relation, this relation without relation as such? We are floundering about, Heidegger says, lost for words. For example, from the essay ‘Aletheia’ from 1943:

The rising of animals into the open remains closed and sealed in itself in a strangely captivating way. Self-revealing and self-concealing in the animal are one in such a way that human speculation practically runs out of alternatives when it rejects mechanistic views of animality – which are always feasible – as firmly as it avoids anthropomorphic interpretations. Because the animal does not speak, self-revealing and self-concealing, together with their unity, possess a wholly different life essence [Lebe-Wesen] with the animals. (1984: 116-7)

We simply cannot get our heads around such a ‘strange’ mode of genuine being-in. Thus when speculative efforts to say something finally wind up rejecting both mechanistic views (on the one hand) and anthropomorphism (on the other hand) we ‘practically run out of alternatives’ for understanding the animal and its mode of being-in-the-world. We are muted in the face of the animal that is mute. Hence while we very often speak of an animal’s genuine being-in in familiar ways (we say, for example, that the dog believes a squirrel is up the tree, that the frog is trying to catch the fly, that the horse is tired, etc.) – but when we are asked whether this is the same as cases where a person believes such and such or is trying to
do something, or is feeling tired, and so on, then suddenly we are not so sure, and sometimes wind up taking it all back, and feel like we do not know what we should say about the life of the other animal at all.

The Cock Calls the Hens
But focussing on the giddiness produced by the invitation to comparative speculation passes over something Heidegger seems also to pass over: namely, that in everyday life we really do want to say that the dog believes a squirrel is up the tree, that the frog is trying to catch the fly, that the horse is tired, etc.

In the ‘Aletheia’ passage Heidegger raises something I think is of the first importance when we are attempting reflectively to come to terms with animal life. Even if we want also to reject them both in the name of a wholly different life-essence – one that is revealed as radically concealed to us – mechanistic and anthropomorphic interpretations are both possible – and always feasible. Interestingly, Wittgenstein suggests something similar – but unlike Heidegger he does not wind up muting what we ordinarily want to say:

We say: ‘The cock calls the hens by crowing’ – but doesn’t a comparison with our language lie at the bottom of this? – Isn’t the aspect quite altered if we imagine the crowing to set the hens in motion by some kind of physical causation? (1973: §493)

Here we have the two apparently unhappy alternatives. What we say seems problematically anthropomorphic – and is revealed as such when we consider that a wholly mechanistic interpretation is always just as feasible. However, Wittgenstein does not leave this see-saw at that, and invites us to consider the same situation in our own case:
But if it were shewn how the words ‘Come to me’ act on the person addressed, so that finally, given certain conditions, the muscles of his legs are innervated, and so on – should we feel that that sentence lost the character of a sentence? (§493)

Well, should we feel that? Surely not. Wittgenstein is insisting that our appreciation of the language character of language – what we want to include as belonging to the sphere of language and what we want to exclude as something altogether different – is not beholden to discoveries that would show that its normal functioning depends (causally) on baldly natural physiological conditions and mechanistic processes.

That is, what we feel to be the sentence character of a sentence (‘Come to me’) is not ruined by such discoveries. It is not that we must now suppose that really there is no sentence (genuinely or properly speaking) here after all, and that really it is just noises that have certain mechanistic effects.

But the cock crowing case may seem far more fragile. We may feel that what we say in this case – that the cock calls the hens by crowing – is something that really is vulnerable, extremely vulnerable to losing its character (the call character of the call) when we discover underlying mechanisms. In this case maintaining its character of a call depends on what one might call a problematically anthropomorphic extension. Wittgenstein accepts that this is, indeed, an extension from our own case:

I want to say: It is primarily the apparatus of our ordinary language, of our word-language, that we call language; and then other things by analogy or comparability with this. (§494)
We say that the cock calls the hens by crowing, and we do so, Wittgenstein suggests because of the ‘analogy or comparability’ of the crowing with sentences from our own word-language, sentences like ‘Come to me’. However, Wittgenstein does not suggest that this makes what we say irredeemably vulnerable to mechanistic interpretations: just as the sentence character of that sentence is not lost when we give mechanistic explanations of the way it affects the person who is addressed by it, so too the call character of the cock’s call to the hens – which does indeed rest on a comparison with human ways of calling (and so of human ways of influencing the behaviour of other people) – is, he suggests, not undermined by such explanations either.

But why isn’t it more vulnerable? Indeed, isn’t this extension beyond the human horizon (as perhaps Heidegger thinks) just a ‘sentimental anthropomorphizing’ (Diamond, 1996: 326) of the sort that belongs only with a special and not at all compulsory fondness for or liking of animals that is not only not obligatory but is perhaps to be avoided if we want to avoid confusion – for example if we want to avoid making certain representations of cosmopolitan inter-species friendships.

Cora Diamond considers this point in relation to thinking of a particular animal – in this case a titmouse – from what I want to call the cosmopolitan point of view of tomorrow, i.e. as a ‘fellow creature’. In doing so, she says we are not simply supposing that we should extend cosmopolitan philanthropic feelings to all biologically living things, but rather that we are extending a non-biological concept of being-in-this-together to non-human animals – the cosmopolitan concept of others as ‘fellow travellers’, as ‘being in the same boat’, as ‘companions in a worldly sojourn’. That is, it is not a matter of our saying (as if asserting an empirical fact in a world after Darwin) that we are all ‘equally animals’ but, from the other direction as it were, that we are all fellow mortals, all fellow travellers ‘on this earth’.

Diamond describes this way of thinking as follows:
The response to animals as our fellows in mortality, in life on this earth…depends on a conception of human life. It is an extension of a non-biological notion of what human life is. You can call it anthropomorphic, but only if you want to create confusion. The confusion, though, is created only because we do not have a clear idea of what phenomena the word ‘anthropomorphic’ might cover, and tend to use it for cases which are sentimental in certain characteristic ways. The extension to animals of modes of thinking characteristic of our responses to human beings is extremely complex, and includes a great variety of things. (1996: 329)

What we ordinarily say about animal life does involve the extension to animals of modes of thinking characteristic of our responses to human beings. But the complex variety of extensions Diamond refers to here is not structured by a fundamental duality of genuine (human) modes and more or less deficient, impoverished or attenuated (animal) modes of being-in-the-world, still less literal as opposed to metaphorical ways of speaking. The significance we attach to the idea of ‘the humanity of Man’, even ‘the pure humanity of Man’ – and so the significance we attach to the concept of the difference between human beings and other animals – need not show up in our lives as the idea of an uncrossable border, so that certain concepts (e.g. ‘calling’ others) should really be marked ‘for human use alone’. Indeed, more and more today its shows up in the willingness on our part to experience the way we extend those responses characteristic of our responses to human beings beyond the human not anthropomorphically but cosmopolitically: as a response to my fellow on this earth.
**The Pure Humanity of Man**

Does it matter that *what one calls* ‘political co-operation’ relates, *before all*, to human forms of social life? Not at all. This does not mean that an extension beyond the human horizon should be avoided or that really we should really say nothing about other animals as political animals. On the contrary, by analogy and comparability, we can say a good deal.

But what of cosmopolitan animals? My argument here is different. The point is not to invite human beings to take more interest in the behaviour of animals where they are, for example, hospitable to other animals – which is certainly common enough. But so is eating each other. Rather my aim is to help us see the extension of the concept of the ‘fellow creature’ beyond the human as an expression of our contemporary aliveness to animals as being, in this old and worn out world, more and more in the same boat as we are.

But this means that, today, perhaps not for the first time, but for the first time in a long time, we have come to the point where what Kant had recognised as ‘the fellow-creature response’ is no longer framed by the horizon of humanity, no longer experienced by us within a thought of cosmopolitan existence construed in terms of a brotherhood of man.

There is a mutation in our time. Traditional cosmopolitan political philosophy was elaborated within an overarching *theological* vision of Man and the history of Man. For example, Kant did not suppose that the course of human history – the movement from ‘barbarism to culture’ (1991: 44) – is something we forge after a plan of our own. There is, Kant assumes, ‘a definite plan of nature’ here (42), a ‘teleological’ plan through which ‘the germs implanted by nature in our species can be developed to that degree which corresponds to nature’s original intention’ (43). Kant talks (modestly he says) of nature here. But he is quite clear that what he means is that there is a hidden hand and ‘design’ of a ‘wise creator’ (45) in all history. The hand of God sending the human species ‘from the lower level of
animality to the highest level of humanity’ (48). Man is that being that is, by nature, on the way to a ‘universal cosmopolitan existence’ as the specific form of social life that will provide, finally, ‘the matrix within which all the original capacities of the human race may develop’ (51).

This, for Kant, is what ‘a philosophical mind’ might be able to say about human history in an a priori rather than empirical form. And even though he is aware that ‘it would seem that only a novel could result’ (52) he believed that, in an indirect way, explicit cosmopolitical awareness could accelerate a real cosmopolitan history.

Perhaps the same could be said about the concept of the ‘pure humanity of man’ today, today (tomorrow) when, more and more, this is no longer understood in opposition to animality but as the topos in our culture for new expressions of interest in a cosmopolitan existence beyond the human. Perhaps we need not have waited for what Freud called the ‘blows’ to human ‘self-love’ to begin to think of history otherwise than as the unfolding of human capacities in a movement towards the end of Man in a final form of flourishing. But for sure we have some way to go here. Freud had supposed his psychological blow – the discovery of the unconscious – was the most serious, most decentring of all. Derrida was probably right to think that the blow struck by Darwin – the discovery of an animal descent of Man – has been fundamentally more troublesome than Freud’s:

A powerful and ample chain from Aristotle, at least, to our day….binds onto-theological metaphysics to humanism. The essential opposition of man to animal – or rather, to animality, to a univocal, homogeneous, obscurantist concept of animality – always serves the same interest there… Of the three wounds to anthropic narcissism, the one Freud indicates with the name Darwin seems more intolerable than the one he
has signed himself. It will have been resisted for a longer time. (Derrida, 1990: 27: column 1 insert)

Marx was exultant when he read The Origin of Species, writing to Lasalle in 1861 that it dealt ‘the death-blow…for the first time to teleology in the natural sciences’ (Cohen, 1985: 345). But Marx retained, for all that, an assumption of the uniquely human horizon of the political, international and cosmopolitan teleology of human history. But is the blow struck by Darwin really the most troubling today? In the passage in which he places it above Freud’s Derrida hints but does not comment on the first of the three wounds, the one produced by the Copernican blow. However, only two years later, in a world whose geo-politics were being turned upside-down by the end of the Cold War that had framed Wiggins’ ‘unless we are Marxists’, Derrida returned to the ‘three wounds’, presenting them as being gathered together by the ‘blow’ to ‘Man’ brought about by the destruction of political hope brought about by the horror of ‘the century of Marxism’. And here, suddenly and almost imperceptibly, the Copernican blow did not figure as only one wounding blow among others, the earliest and perhaps easiest to accept. Rather, in a world facing unprecedented geo-political upheavals and global environmental challenges, Derrida observes an increasingly not a decreasingly forceful blow from the experience of a ‘more and more’ Copernican earth (1994: 97). And as we find ourselves more interconnected than ever in our increasingly devastated ‘minute speck in the universe’, we are becoming less resistant to the Darwinian upheaval too.

The ‘pure humanity of man’ can no longer be credibly construed in terms of a philosophical history of (exclusively) human politics with a cosmopolitan end. However, the demise of that old concept of ‘Man’ and the associated discourse of a movement of emancipation and progress towards a final ‘end of Man’ does not mean that a certain cosmopolitical interest is over in our time:
In the same place, on the same limit, where history is finished, there where a certain determined concept of history comes to an end, precisely there the historicity of history begins, there finally it has the chance of heralding itself – of promising itself. There where man, a certain determined concept of man, is finished, there the pure humanity of man, of the other man and of man as other begins or has finally the chance of heralding itself – of promising itself. (Derrida, 1994: 74)

As the old notation of Man, and the pure humanity of man, loses its grip on our imagination, so a new understanding of our mortal lives, and of those we increasingly respond to as our fellows in mortality – those for whom we are the other – promises to take shape.

And if this is felt ‘more and more’ so today, as I think it is, perhaps this is because it is not Freud or Darwin whose blow is experienced most strongly in our time, but the blow struck by Copernicus. On our fragile and threatened little planetary home, we are more and more inhabiting a Copernican earth; more and more living in a time after Copernicus.

Works Cited


