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The neo-colonialism of decolonisation: Katangan secession and the bringing of the Cold War to the Congo

Whether decolonisation was a footnote to the ‘real’ Cold War remains an important historiographical question, but answering it has not been helped by the fact that the Cold War generally, and particularly in Africa, is often misunderstood. The misleading orthodoxy often sees the conflict as being primarily a struggle over hard power in which the US reacts defensively to the Soviet Union by ‘containing’ its expansionist aims.1 The crucial thing is to determine which of the many elements of the Cold War were particularly important in which particular time period. Thus the idea that the most important connection between, and key elements of decolonisation and the ‘real’ Cold War could have been formed by the crucial ideological struggle between the economic forces of capitalism and communism and their social and political manifestations (ways of life) has often been neglected in Africa. Hence the main aim here is to look at the Cold War decolonisation linkage and in so doing highlight a neglected element of the decolonisation process, while emphasising that the orthodox perception of the Cold War as centered on elements of military strategy and reactions to Soviet expansionism should be reconsidered. The idea that ‘containment’ arose from concepts such as geopolitics and geostrategy does not constitute the essence of the early 1960s Cold War with the temporary significance of Africa within it.

For the Kennedy administration, the most significant anti-communist struggle in that phase of the Cold War was over newly emerging nations adopting Western capitalism rather than Soviet communism. With the short lived Cold War emphasis on the less developed and decolonising world, the Congo placed the US and the UN on the centre of the European decolonisation stage, sometimes with significant divisions over what should be involved in the processes by which power was transferred. The Congo also produced a complex mix of African and international forces
interacting within and outside the newly independent territory. These are not directly comparable with other European territories, even though their indirect importance arguably may nevertheless have some general decolonisation significance.

In addition, events in the Congo do not conform to conventional 'patterns' of decolonisation and thus, as with alternative Cold War interpretations they are inconvenient when trying to change emphases, or gain fresh insights from an often excellent historiography in English on decolonisation. It is thus important to increase awareness of how decolonisation interacted with the Cold War system during the first half of the 1960s and produced a Cold War policy to Africa and to US relations with the UN which clearly distinguished the Kennedy administration from the Johnson one. The aim is to link explanations of the ‘real’ African Cold War, particularly as perceived by US African policy makers, to the historical specificities of colonialism and to insert the Congo's neo-colonial experiences into explanations of the end of colonial rule. This is important during the early 1960s (arguably the crux of decolonisation), when the Kennedy administration’s distinctive African policy exposed the differences between the US and Britain over black African decolonisation that were generally absent or beneath the surface under Eisenhower. Such differences essentially involved the neo-colonial elements of decolonisation which were generally seen by the Kennedy administration as damaging the Cold War struggle on such an important African battlefield as the Congo with its international focus.

Neo-colonialism is simply used here to mean the continuation of colonial practices, and their effects, after independence, which in the Congo centered on the immediate secession of the mineral rich province of Katanga with the assistance of Belgian military forces. These neo-colonial practices took the particular economic form of arrangements with Tshombe’s Katangan regime over greater access to foreign exchange earnings than would have been available from the legitimate government’s central bank. This benefitted the commercial operations of the Katangan copper industry and its settler employees, along with the European owners of the financial capital of the operating companies as well as the concessionary payments that Tanganyika Concessions  had
started receiving under King Leopold. Operationally the export of Katangan copper through Angola on the Benguelan Railway (again owned by Tanganyika Concessions), rather than the *route nationale* through Port Francqui to the Kasai and Congo rivers was secured by the sabotage of the railway bridge over the Lubilash River making the railway inoperable until October 1962. Its use would have made it more possible for the legitimate Leopoldville government to have collected export duties on Katangan copper. The issue of customs revenue was to figure in the controversy and Anglo-American differences engendered by how best to bring about the re-integration of Katanga.

An arguably neo-colonial role was played by both the main operating company, *Union Minière du Haut Katanga* (UMHK) and by Tanganyika Concessions, the company that had originally provided some capital and respectability along with *Société Générale de Belgique* given the impending absorption of King Leopold’s privately owned lands into the Belgian Congo state in 1908. In 1960 this situation was still reflected in the unique circumstances in which Western capitalism, predominantly European rather than North American, operated in the Congo. The exceptionalism lay in the way the colonial Congo state was merged with private enterprise, and the link between concessionary companies, holding companies and those extracting the minerals from the concessions, . In effect when Leopold’s fiefdom became part of the colonial state, private companies became partners with the colonial government and metropolitan institutions under arrangements which were still in place in 1960. These circumstances meant the financial benefits from the copper industry were more at risk with independence. Retaining control over their profits was facilitated by the secession of Katanga, and the fact that the economic levers of power had NOT been transferred to the independent government when it secured political power.

The differences with other companies operating in Central Africa, like the British South Africa Company, were in part reflected in that the concessions in Southern Rhodesia were transferred to the 1930s ‘colonial’ government, and the transfer in Northern Rhodesia to the independent Zambian government took place on independence in 1964 which did not happen in the
Limiting any Cold War damage arising from charges of neo-colonialism by modifying the nature and post-independence profits of European capitalism was what the ending of Katangan secession and Anglo-American disagreements were to be all about. Arguments about how to achieve this key Cold War American goal produced arguments within the US administration, and what eventually emerged as policy conflicted with the financial interests of the Union Minière du Haut Katanga and Tanganyika Concessions and their shareholders. The board of UMHK contained the chair of Tanganyika Concessions (and 3 other leading Conservative figures) and it was the latter company whose profits provided the main financial backing for the governing Conservative party. The sums were large with the Americans calculating that UMHK had gross monthly earnings of $15 million. Of course Tanganyika Concessions owned shares in UMHK, but received 40% of the concessionary payments along with the Comité Spécial du Katanga (CSK) while the Compagnie du Katanga (CK) received the other 20%. The CSK had been established under Leopold in 1900, but two thirds of it was owned by the colonial government with one third of its share portfolio, including its shares in UMHK, belonging to the private Compagnie du Katanga itself an associate of Société Générale de Belgique. Crucially, the CSK shareholders, largely the colonial government, agreed to dissolve the CSK and transfer one third of its assets to the CK leaving the other two thirds to go to the government of the Congo which was about to be led by Patrice Lumumba. This was contrary to the original plan of the minister in the Congo, Ganshof Van der Meersch, who hoped to avoid appointing Lumumba as formateur if a coalition government failed to be put together. Thus with the Belgian troops assisting the Katangan secession to maintain the colonial economic relationships, the dissolved CSK assets, other than property, did not go to the legitimate Congo government and the dividends on these share assets were instead paid to the secessionary government of Katanga.

The difference in the economic relationships of the colonial Congo state worked particularly against a left wing nationalist like Lumumba. That was because, as Charles Waterhouse pointed out, European firms in the Congo had to operate without the full rights normally accorded
to boards of management because the colonial/independent state as a shareholder had some voting rights. These were fine when exercised by European capitalists but when on independence a Lumumba government would be exercising them, that was a very different matter. The Congo was again different in that the bulk of companies, including small independent ones that operated there, had assets held by, and transactions conducted through, a parent holding company eg Société Général de Belgique. The Belgian government and the Belgian Congo government before independence had such close relations with these holding companies that personnel were often interchanged. Hence the role of Belgian government troops in protecting the companies’ economic interests by supporting Katangan secession as soon as the Congo became independent. The fact that their presence was not primarily to protect European civilians, but to protect the secessionary regime from possible African resistance to its rule is even more telling.

A key result of secession in July and the control of foreign exchange was the refusal of Tshombe’s government to recognise the central Congo bank whose assets and branches in Katanga were eventually seized in August. A National Bank of Katanga was established and decrees issued requiring Katangan residents to deposit all foreign exchange earnings in the new institution while Katanga also established its own import licensing controls. Prior to independence Katanga ran a net surplus on its current foreign exchange account of 6.5 billion francs which went towards the rest of the Congo’s deficit of 5 billion. Although there was a 4 billion deficit on invisibles some foreign exchange earnings would likely have been earmarked on independence for whatever proper or improper usage by a left wing nationalist like Patrice Lumumba.

The Katangan foreign exchange surplus soon ‘disappeared’, with some to help finance Tshombe’s armaments and mercenaries along with wages for the Katangan gendarmerie and some of it probably to Tshombe’s personal Swiss bank accounts. The US government, through the Brussels Embassy, acquired details of the Swiss bank accounts of leading African figures (the means by which this was done are unclear) both on the left and right of politics in the Congo. Tshombe’s accounts had 43 million Belgian francs and 1.6 million Swiss francs which was a sizeable post-independence sum.
The British played an important role in the Congo crisis in ways which revealed a very different approach to the normal end of European colonialism. They also formed often neglected differences with the Kennedy administration. The consensus about liberal influences and the political dominance of the transfer of power in British high politics has tended to obscure the impact of the Congo on assessments of the decolonisation process. It is not to suggest that this consensus should be overturned but that the British and Belgian interactions with the Congo should generally be seen in a rather different light before finalising an overall assessment of decolonisation. The argument here is that neo-colonialism has been ignored and has prevented an accurate portrayal of Belgian actions and the tacit support of the UN and the British for them. This has occurred precisely because the misperceptions of the ‘real’ Cold War have enabled that obfuscation to succeed. In the case of the Congo, as in several other situations, the Cold War portrayed in the form of a Soviet geo-political expansionist threat to a strategically important region has been invoked to conceal the real threat inherent in communism, and by extension, any radical left wing ideology. Moreover the potentially catastrophic actions of a member of the Western alliance in defying numerous security council resolutions in order to make sure an independent African nation was unable to throw off the constraints put in place by the economics of colonial capitalism has also been downplayed or ignored. With the UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, determined to keep the Soviets out of Africa his inaccurate portrayal as a neutral UN figure standing between East and West has been another Cold War distortion.

The Belgians had done little to prepare their African territory for a future as a self-governing state until the late 1950s when a start had been made which was an important cause of the Congo’s problems on independence. Hence the maintenance of the Western liberal interpretation of decolonisation and ‘nationalism’. The first historiographical ‘myth’ of decolonisation in the Congo was thus born from the conventional interpretations which see the Congo crisis as ‘engendered by’ the precipitate unwinding of Belgian rule. Hence the problems were not linked to neo-colonialism nor to any malevolent policies designed to make the independent state
subservient to the economic interests of Europeans. The reality was, as realised by the US government, that a substantial infrastructure and service provision had been belatedly financed by close to 1 billion dollars of debt to bondholders. Burdensome payments of the interest servicing these loans were to be incurred by the independent state not the colonial or Brussels governments - unless agreements on the contentieux led to the withholding of the transfer of economic assets. The neo-colonial incentive would come from ensuring repayments of debt made by the independent government came not from the control of European assets in the Congo by a left wing democratically elected regime; nor from increased influence on company boards of directors resulting from the replacing of colonial government representatives with those of the new state; nor from the legitimate taxes on trade and industry which would soon be withheld from Leopoldville and paid to the Katangan government but from the independent government and its African subjects. These are the unmentionables associated with the role of financial capital.

The second ‘myth’ relevant to neo-colonialism and the Cold War is that the Belgians intervened to restore law and order and protect Europeans threatened by disorders in the wake of the Congolese Army (ANC) mutiny at Thysville some 100 miles from Leopoldville. The mutiny had been resolved by Lumumba and Kasavubu with an agreement on 8 July – the day before the Belgians announced that additional troops would be sent to strengthen those in the bases at Kitona and Kamina (the latter of which was in Katanga). In addition the UK Foreign Office was informed that 300-400 Belgian troops had arrived in Elisabethville the day before Tshombe announced secession and 2 days before troops arrived in Leopoldville allegedly to deal with the disorders.

Hence rather than a specific cause producing an important policy, we have subsequently seen some intangible Cold War concepts, some of which (strategy/security) have been used as Cold War justifications, allegedly producing a situation that influenced the end of colonial rule. In retrospect the specifics in the Congo have assumed the form of ‘chaos’, the spread of which to the Central African Federation allegedly had to be prevented because of the geo-strategic or geopolitical importance of Central Africa in the Cold War. Interpretations of decolonisation
have rarely taken on board the significance of neo-colonial elements that appeared in parts of Central Africa; nor the impact that disagreements over them in the Congo had.\textsuperscript{xix,23}

There was also the murder and suspicious death of key protagonists Patrice Lumumba and Dag Hammarskjöld. All in all there was a lot to cover up, or detract attention from, in the Congo. Hence it was not so much decolonisation being affected by the existence of the Cold War in Africa but the Cold War in Africa being used or embellished in order to conceal the neo-colonialism of the decolonisation process in the Congo. This problem has been enhanced in the historiography by the obstacles to building up expertise in both Cold War and imperial history.\textsuperscript{24} At the same time the role of the United Nations, as perceived in Washington, was fundamentally altered in Cold War foreign policy terms by the Congo. This meant that the ability of the US to manage the UN as a Cold War tool of US foreign policy had evaporated. With it went a reduction in Africa’s importance for both decolonisation and the Cold War.

The failure to give the right Cold War emphasis to the economic importance of African acceptance of Western capitalism, along with the transfer of political power, was highlighted by the Congo where there was a significant opportunity to continue with a neo-colonial relationship, even if the use of an uninvited troop deployment by the former colonial power aroused immediate hostility in Africa and the United Nations.\textsuperscript{25} Yet achieving the transfer of economic power as part of the transition to independence proved difficult to arrange in the Congo. The effect of this did not so much involve ‘business’ and its influence on governmental decision makers in London and Brussels ie trade and commercial operations extracting minerals, as the roles European owners of financial capital. In the Congo European capital faced a greater left wing African nationalist threat with much more at stake because of the way in which capital benefitted from Belgian colonial rule and would be handicapped by a left wing government inheriting power.\textsuperscript{26} Such a difficult decolonisation situation in the Congo may have been an exception to the rule, but like many such exceptions no less important for general explanations of international phenomena.\textsuperscript{xx,27}
It has always been the case that the British have generally refused to acknowledge in any
everyday non-academic discourse the unmentionable and derogatory attitude of ‘il est capitaliste’
that is sometimes found on the continent;28. Only in continental Europe have the economic
elements of decolonisation been more generally explored outside the realm of ‘high policy’ that
allegedly dominated foreign and colonial policy decision making in the European capitals of the
colonial powers. Even non-English writers examining the process have done so primarily from the
perspective of how the possession of overseas territories has had an impact on the changing
metropolitan economies.\textsuperscript{xvi}29 The inconvenient fact for decolonisation in the Cold War was that
liberal interpretations of Western policy did not look an attractive fit for the particular and often
unique circumstances of the Congo.

Politically the May 1960 elections, normally the precursor for transferring power to
significant African collaborators, had taken place under the Belgian \textit{loi fondamentale} which
required a \textit{formateur} to determine the composition of the new independent government. The
elections resulted in the \textit{Mouvement National Congolais (MNC)} of Patrice Lumumba, a radical left
wing demagogue,\textsuperscript{30} becoming the largest party, but a long way short of an overall majority (36 of
137 seats). The minister in the Congo, Ganshof Van der Meersch hope to use Kasavubu, a rival
from the Bakongo people, as \textit{formateur} of an anti-Lumumba coalition. Although Kasavubu was
able to do so without any elected MNC members, other party representatives would not serve
without Lumumba who would only serve as the head of his own government.\textsuperscript{31} The impact and
meaning of these machinations to stop Lumumba were noted by the British consul Ian Scott, who
became the first UK ambassador to the Congo and was critical of Belgian colonial policy.\textsuperscript{32} It
seems reasonable to conclude that even before the surrendering of political power, many individuals
and political and commercial groups in Brussels and Leopoldville, if not London, were hoping, or
expecting, that the essentials of the colonial economic relationship would not be disrupted by the
transfer of political power.
From the Brussels government’s point of view the Belgian Congo's foreign exchange earnings (from Katanga) were, apart from 1 year, covering the metropolitan country's payments deficit which thus added to the colony's importance for the Belgian government.33 The first payments on the loans taken out by the colonial government would be due shortly after independence and were expected to absorb 23% of ordinary Congo budget expenditures. The gap between revenue and expenditure produced under colonialism by the debt would require an International Bank of Reconstruction and Development loan of $180 million to bridge. xxii 34

In addition the transfer of the economic rights of the colonial state, with their linkage to private companies notably the Comité Spécial du Katanga, were not intended to take place immediately on the transfer of political power but be a matter for negotiation with assets being handed over in a trade off for assuming debt through the contentieux. The prospect of a left wing nationalist like Lumumba using those companies, directly or indirectly, to alleviate that debt became a distinct possibility once the formateur had been finally been assigned. e and thus the economic incentives to retain the colonial economic structures remained significant. The political means by which to guarantee the financial interests of the Belgian investors and pro-imperial groups in Brussels and the Congo along with the returns on British capital which were important for the finances of the British Conservative party thus had to be found.35

There were by early 1960 a number of different other balls in play to stop Lumumba - which went back to the days before his electoral success. The Americans were aware that Moise Tshombe, the African tribal political leader and his party CONAKAT from the mineral rich Katanga, had been planning the secession of that province as advocated by settler groups ‘anxious to maintain as much control as possible’ with the possibility of separating the province from the rest of the country. The problem was that Tshombe’s CONAKAT party, described by the US ambassador to Belgium as ‘an instrument of European interests’, was at odds with the Balubas from Haut Lomami in Katanga whose numbers had been increased by the arrival of Balubas from Kasai to work on the railways and in the copper mines. The Balubas were against separatism and the
BALUBAKAT was the main political opposition to Tshombe. Major ethnic and political strife culminated in March 1960 in serious riots in the urban areas of the copper producing region of Southern Katanga. Although the British always portrayed Katanga as an ocean of stability it was deeply divided which was why the sending of Belgian troops to support secession in July was so needed and such an important element of the neo-colonialism on independence. And there was another possibility of Katanga joining the Central African Federation under Roy Welensky, also at the instigation of Belgian settlers, which would unite the copper producing regions of Northern Rhodesia with Katanga. The State Department indicated that ‘if this particular province were to separate from the rest of the Congo with European support, it might prevent the depreciation of mining investments in this region which might be a desirable objective from our point of view’. European investors in British and Belgian enterprises in the Congo and some members and former members of the Belgian governments in Leopoldville and Brussels were soon to make the same argument about the value of investments more forcefully. The issue was whether Washington would support the interests of the mining investors or the broader interests of the African Cold War.

Once the Kennedy administration took power in Washington in 1961, the Cold War centred more and more on winning over the African elites in newly independent states to the Western world. Making capitalism an attractive proposition for newly independent nations in ‘Africa for the Africans’ was what the Anglo-American disagreements over the future of the Congo’s post-independence economic and political structures were all about. Under Eisenhower, the opportunity arose of using the anti-Soviet Cold War western bias to conceal this as the consequences of Belgian neo-colonial actions became clearer following the Thysville mutiny of Congolese soldiers against their Belgian officers on the night of 5-6 July. With some disorder and stories of rape and pillage by the mutinous soldiers, this was used to justify the despatch of Belgian troops. Pierre Wigny the Belgian foreign minister thus lost no opportunity to portray the Congo mutiny as the
result of a communist plot. The implication was that a left wing government was susceptible to such phenomena and US attention might have a better focus.

According to the Foreign Office, troops, presumably from Kamina in Katanga province, began arriving in Elisabethville prior to the announcement of secession on 11 July which was justified because of a 'neo-communist Congo government in Leopoldville'. As with many Cold War situations the actual threat to the Western socio-economic status quo presented by radical non-communist left wing ideas and movements was best presented under the guise of a more extreme communist threat and if possible the expansionist goals of the Soviet state - however unrelated to the African reality the latter might be. The real reason was to enable seccession to embody the continuing colonial relationship between European capital and a Congo state headed by willing African collaborators in the form of Moise Tshombe and CONAKAT. Thus avoiding the left wing nationalism of Patrice Lumumba threatening the neo-colonial economic arrangements accompanying decolonisation.

Moves were quickly underway to ensure that Tshombe's new state received more European support. The chairman of Tanganyika Concessions and UMHK board member, Charles Waterhouse, the backbench right wing Tory MP, contacted the Foreign Office on 13 July. Until Alec Douglas-Home became Foreign Secretary on 27 July, Waterhouse and his fellow UMHK board member Lord Selborne had to meet with officials. He thus met E B Boothby from the Foreign Office as Belgian troops were taking over the airport in Leopoldville, which Boothby thought was a mistake, noting that they should return to their bases as requested by Lumumba and Kasavubu. Boothby also noted that the troops' purpose was not merely to protect lives but to impose a Belgian solution on the Congo. Waterhouse explained that his Brussels contact was telling him the directors of the Société Générale de Belgique, including most of the UMHK directors, had passed a unanimous resolution in favour of creating an independent Katanga as indispensable for the security of shareholders' interests. In London Waterhouse asked Boothby if Britain would pressure the Belgian government to act in accordance with the resolution of the Société Générale de Belgique.
Belgique. Two days later Wigny summoned the British, French and American ambassadors in Brussels to tell them he hoped they would all give encouragement short of recognition to Tshombe's secessionist regime. By now, Lumumba, Kasavubu and 15 cabinet members had held a four hour meeting with Ralph Bunche the personal representative of the UN Secretary General (SYG) Dag Hammarskjöld which resulted in an appeal to the UN for 'technical military assistance to help in organising, strengthening and training the national forces of the Congo for purpose of defence and the maintenance of law and order'.

In Leopoldville the British ambassador, with an overview of the disturbances, used to justify Belgian troops being sent to Katanga to shore up Tshombe’s secession, described them as definitely not an uprising of Africans against whites, but an uprising against Belgians and particularly the ones of Flemish origin. The British Ambassador discounted all talk of plots, Russian intrigue or other extraneous factors in the uprisings which were not against foreigners but against the Belgian colonial regime. Scott thus refused to accept the 'deep laid communist plot' connection that Wigny was trying to make with the causes of the disturbances. He was quite clear in explaining to the FO that the Belgians were 'not willing to accept a transition to the sort of relationship that Britain now enjoys with its former dependent territories'.

When the Security Council met on the 13-14th July to deal with the newly independent government’s request for technical assistance to strengthen their national forces, that request had been modified. The legitimate Congo government was now asking for troops to assist 'against aggression' because of the 'dispatch to the Congo of Belgian troops in violation of the treaty of friendship of June 29th. Under the terms of that treaty Belgian troops may only intervene at the express request of the Congo government....We accuse the Belgian government of having carefully prepared the secession of the Katanga with a view to maintaining a hold on our country...The essential purpose of the requested military aid is to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression which is a threat to international peace' In addition the Soviets were requested by Kasavubu and Lumumba to follow the situation ‘from hour by hour’ as
they could be *brought to ask for Soviet intervention if Western aggression continued.* However after the Security Council passed a clear resolution calling for the withdrawal of Belgian troops, the Soviet leader congratulated the UN on its response, with UN troops arriving on that same day, thereby dealing with the imperialist aggression. Only if the aggression continued would the Soviet Union see the need for more effective UN measures ‘on the part of the peace loving states’54. Here, in the form of possible Soviet action in support of a UN resolution, was the alleged entry of the Cold War into the Congo crisis. The portrayal of that Cold War has generally been along the orthodox or ‘unreal’ lines of the West reacting to the Soviets without detailing the specifics of the Congo situation, but has nevertheless produced some dramatic interpretation by Western historians.55

The withdrawal of Belgium’s uninvited troops made the UN’s credibility and Africa’s western alignment dependent on Belgian compliance with the resolution. Yet a withdrawal was precisely what the Belgians could not immediately do because the deployment of troops had been primarily designed to protect the secession and the benefits that Europeans and their African collaborators would secure from it. They informed the Americans that to comply with the resolution on withdrawal would adversely affect NATO's interests in retaining the bases at Kitona and Kamina 56 A good indication of how the Belgians wanted to link the ‘unreal’ Cold War and decolonisation.

Decolonisation or neo-colonialism was becoming an important question. On the ground in the Congo this was represented in acute form by the issue of sending UN troops to Katanga. Trouble would then be likely to occur as the UN forces faced the possibility of confronting Belgian troops and resistance from Tshombe’s European and African supporters which would raise the spectre of more violence. An awkward Cold War scenario was made worse by the Belgian government’s position. Hammarskjöld, although frustrated by the Belgian defiance, wavered on sending UN troops to Katanga in the first week of August, but eventually declined to do so in the face of Tshombe calling the proposed entry into Katanga a declaration of war and promising resistance by all means.57 By then another security council resolution had been passed, calling for Belgium ‘to
implement speedily the security council resolution of 14 July on the withdrawal of their troops’.

Britain and France abstained but the US and the Soviet Union voted with the majority. Hence the value of misrepresenting reality and the Russian and communist threats as causes of the situation in order to justify the steps taken (or not taken) by the West as reactions to Soviet machinations. In reality the Soviets were only reacting to what the Belgians were doing in the Congo by vaguely outlining what could happen if the aggression continued. What the Soviets actually did to help Lumumba before he was removed from power in September only ever amounted to aid and equipment, albeit provided independently outside the UN as had been stipulated.

For the Americans, securing the newly-independent-state’s unified sovereignty entitlement was important for the success of their African credibility in the Cold War, but this could bring them into conflict with the Belgians. The Belgians did not withdraw their troops ‘speedily’ in line with the Security Council resolution on July 22nd despite it authorising Hammarskjöld ‘to take all necessary action to this effect’. Thus, through a desire to perpetuate key aspects of colonial rule, which would be badly received by most Afro-Asian states and those about to emerge from colonial rule, important Cold War disadvantages were likely to follow. Whether diplomatic pressure could successfully be applied to change the Katangan situation was the moot point. In short the advantages and disadvantages of neo-colonialism for particular members of the Western alliance had to be weighed against the ‘real’ Cold War advantages and disadvantages of a successful Congo decolonisation process in the battle for the hearts and minds of the inhabitants of the less developed world.

By now the viable choices for the US were becoming equally unacceptable, e how to portray and justify following a particular option was also problematic. The effects of maintaining or removing an African secessionist state which was protecting the economic benefits of colonial rule for European shareholders were the crux of the matter. The British Government, like the other Western governments, could not overtly provide support for Tshombe or deny the legitimate, democratically formed government in Leopoldville the right to govern the former colonial territory
International support for self-determination and a successful decolonisation process was too significant in the ‘real’ African Cold War to be opposed openly. In this situation, four days after the first UN resolution and the Waterhouse intervention the British government had decided that its objectives were a settlement between the (legal, democratically elected) government in Leopoldville and Tshombe's secessionist regime which had seized power in Elizabethville ‘that preserves Western interests’. And to give this practical effect, the Foreign Office was to insist that no UN troops (which could end secession) should be allowed into Katanga 'as long as law and order prevails'. The Foreign Office decision, in effect to do nothing, meant no formal recognition of, nor overt support, for the Tshombe regime. Yet it also meant unofficial support for secessionist Katanga, through UMHK in particular, and the tacit acceptance of the advantages and benefits Tshombe's regime was providing for European capital. The broader Cold War interests involved in winning over the newly independent states and their leaders to the cause of democratic capitalism under African control were less significant despite the broader Western interests in the general Cold War being made several times by the Americans.

The Belgians with interests in the Congo sought repeatedly to conceal these interests by using the Cold War and blowing up the Soviet threat as an obvious smoke screen for their Katangan intentions. Scheyven, in the Belgian Washington Embassy argued that Khrushchev's response gave substance 'to this mounting Soviet threat' that could lead to World War III. Thus, according to Scheyven it would not be appropriate for the West to suppress Tshombe's independence movement, as Katanga might become the only part of the Congo available to the free world. Wigny lost no time in adding new colours to the Cold War picture that the Belgians were painting in the Congo. He told the US, British and French ambassadors on 16 July that ‘Lumumba’s activities of the past few days ... have now made it clear that the Congo's problems must be looked at in the context of the East-West struggle.' For the Americans the East-West struggle centered on how to preserve Western opposition to communism without assisting Soviet appeals to the newly independent states. Supporting European interests in the form of the Congo's exploitative colonial
capitalism by Belgian troops did not look good. The alternative of not allowing the Belgians and their African supporters under Tshombe to defy the UN security council could be even worse as it was increasingly looking as if this would have to involve supporting democracy in the form of the left wing nationalism of Patrice Lumumba.

On 25 July, after the second Security Council Resolution, a CIA briefing for the National Security Council noted that apart from those in Katanga the Belgian troops had now withdrawn to the bases at Kamina and Kitona. Four days later the Belgian Cabinet decided that 1,500 troops could be withdrawn leaving 8,500 in the Congo bases against the wishes of the legitimate government and UN resolutions. Despite Cabot Lodge, the US Ambassador to the UN telling Foreign Minister Wigny in early August that the key to the present situation was the position of Belgian troops and they should announce a withdrawal date as soon as possible, Wigny said that was impossible. Lodge reacted by explaining that withdrawal of the troops was the West’s only chance of preventing a Soviet victory in Africa. Thus, as Wigny informed the American that such unconditional actions could jeopardise his political career, the American UN Ambassador was analysing the relationship between neo-colonialism and decolonisation in the East-West struggle in terms of the disastrous effect of neo-colonialism on the Cold War in the Congo. Yet historians, ignoring the neo-colonial elements have ended to interpret the Cold War as a causal influence driving the decolonisation process in Central Africa. Meanwhile on 9 August, with the troops still not leaving the Congo, a third Security Council resolution now required the Belgians to withdraw them ‘immediately from the province of Katanga’.

The Eisenhower administration had initially hoped to use the UN to avoid appearing too close to the European colonial powers. The problem was that an appeal to Africans on the basis of traditional US anti-colonialism was problematic if an ally was supporting what seemed to be neo-colonialism in the Congo in defiance of the UN. The dilemma was heightened by the perceived importance of denying Katangan assets to the Soviets but also denying them to the Congo government, as Tshombe was doing, could present a ‘funding and development problem for the US
and the UN’. In a briefing paper for the National Security Council the Assistant Secretary responsible for the Bureau of African Affairs, Joseph Satterthwaite, laid out the ambivalence of a desired US policy. It was to refuse to recognise Katanga ‘while not closing the door completely in view of the possibility that the Katanga is all that can be salvaged for the West’. Thus there was no concerted effort to terminate the secession as the Eisenhower administration approached its end. Hammarskjöld’s dilemma was over maintaining support for the West and preventing Soviet influence in Africa while cultivating the Afro-Asian bloc. The Secretary General, like many others in government, believed that Soviet influence and interest in Africa were much greater than they were. Moreover the West tended to assume the Soviets would pursue African goals with vigour if the chance arose, rather than, as was actually the case, with caution and incompetence that would always be likely to render them ineffective. In addition, Hammarskjöld, despite his annoyance with the Belgians, would not fully condemn them for violating the resolutions even though this was the very reason most likely to produce Soviet involvement if the UN did not cooperate with the legitimate government. It was becoming more and more obvious that the UN was not acting as an independent neutral force in the Congo but one which was actively working against the Lumumba government to prevent it exercising more influence and acting against Katanga.

Lumumba now foolishly decided to attack Hammarskjöld personally for failing to carry out the wishes of the UN by supporting the legitimate government in ending the secession and restoring the Congo’s territorial integrity. Khrushchev decided on a similar strategy of concentrating on Hammarskjöld and the UN. Rather than attacking the reasons for not upholding the UN Security Council resolutions, his main aim seemed to be to use the crisis as a way of promoting a new tripartite, less partial, management of the UN and ensure that the dominant manipulation of it by the US and its Western allies was ended. If so it would indicate that Khrushchev was not too attracted by getting involved in an area of the world where Soviet power and influence was clearly lacking, and would be difficult and costly to change. By August 18th with troops in bases at Kamina and Kitona, Belgium's defiance of UN resolutions still remained a potential embarrassment. In
Elisabethville the US consul had been told by a Belgian military leader Major Guy Weber of the business community’s plans to run Katanga, with Tshombe’s consent, through a white government behind the facade of an African ministerial council. Be that as it may, the importance of preserving British and Belgian economic, even if the risk to Western Cold War reputations was considerable. The Americans remained ambivalent about it, but the danger of reputational damage would be reduced if Lumumba became a communist and the ‘unreal’ Cold War could be used to justify Belgian actions and disguise the economic stakes. Nevertheless it remained difficult to fight and justify any Cold War with the myth of containing Soviet expansion when the Soviets were not supporting African revolutions but UN resolutions a member of NATO was in breach of.

As August progressed the stakes and the intractable nature of the dilemma increased as the situation in the Congo deteriorated especially after the third security council resolution on 9 August. The force publique (ANC) began arresting Belgians, and the State Department believed the soldiers ‘could be incited to action against UN troops’. The possible reason for that was also noted in that the Belgians were ‘organising ABAKO and other elements to overthrow Lumumba’. They were not the only ones, as both the UN and the CIA had began to seek ways to remove Lumumba. In a telegram of 11 August the station chief Larry Devlin informed the CIA that in the chaotic Congo situation unless Lumumba ‘was stopped’ he would establish a regime ‘under influence if not fully controlled by Commies’. Hence Devlin recommended steps to strengthen the Western position, including the provision of funds to bribe Congo politicians, especially in the Senate, to ‘take anti-Commie line and oppose Lumumba’. However continuing to tolerate secession would lead to justified charges of neo-colonialism from the Afro-Asians in the UN just as the West’s relationship between the recently emerged and emerging African nations was going through a delicate stage of decolonisation. Not to tolerate secession would mean falling back on the left wing Lumumba, whatever the debates and divisions in the US administration over his communist or left wing nationalist sentiments. However remote the possibilities of Soviet control of the Congo, relying on Lumumba would certainly mean the reduction of European economic benefits that the secession of
Katanga was providing. A potential double whammy which was clearly more related to specific Western interests and general embarrassment than to Soviet actions or geo-strategic considerations.

The Congo position and the Cold War/decolonisation dilemmas were discussed by the National Security Council on 18 August. The most serious and troubling issue was now the threat of Lumumba seeking the withdrawal of UN forces. Two days earlier Hammarskjöld himself had stated that ‘the UN effort could not continue with Lumumba in office— one or other would have to go’76 This was another key stage in dealing with the problem, as the die was now cast for the ‘elimination’ of Lumumba in order to alleviate the Cold War/decolonisation dilemmas and avoid tackling the neo-colonial secession issue. President Eisenhower was adamant the UN had to stay, and Dillon believed the situation that would be created by a UN withdrawal would be too ghastly to contemplate. The economic situation of both Katanga and the Congo was discussed and tellingly Allen Dulles suggested it was important to preserve Katanga as a separate, viable asset.77 The Eisenhower administration still had one eye on its European allies.

The one policy which would alleviate all Western concerns was the elimination of Lumumba, either by removing him from power or killing him.. A few days later Hammarskjöld was telling American UN representatives that Lumumba had to be ‘broken’78 More significantly Dulles was arguing that even if UN forces remained Lumumba would retain the initiative. In that case the Belgian presence, so it was argued, would become minimal as European settlers, including administrators, would leave. Whereas if Lumumba was removed that would open the way for ‘new arrangements’79. More amenable collaborators in the central government could then reconcile moderate/centre right African acceptance of elements of European capitalism, and more time would be available to reconcile the Tshombe government with Leopoldville while ending the Cold War embarrassment for the West.80

At least until this was done the spin of the ‘unreal’ Cold War, which the Belgians had started by portraying the mutiny as a communist plot, now had to be encouraged in order to conceal Western, and specifically Belgian and British interests. Moreover the idea of ‘eliminating’
Lumumba in line with orthodox Cold War mantras based on keeping the Soviets out of Africa, united Hammarskjöld, some right wing pro-Western Belgians and the Macmillan and Eisenhower administrations in a common goal. The first stage of the process began when President Kasavubu was persuaded to dismiss him as prime minister. At the crucial moment in the removal process, troops in Stanleyville who were loyal to Lumumba were prevented from flying to Leopoldville by UN troops occupying the city’s airport and being more than willing to interfere in the Congo's internal affairs in direct contravention of their assigned UN role.

With Colonel Mobutu, then governing through a non-parliamentary council of commissioners, Western unity began to crumble. For Hammarskjöld and his team, believing in the importance of democracy in newly independent states, there was a greater need for the UN to be more sympathetic to the Afro-Asian bloc that appeared to be increasingly disturbed by the relative priority accorded to capitalism over democracy by the West. Yet for the US this importance did not automatically extend to 20th century European colonial capitalism. For the president elect the latter was definitely seen as preventing a successful Cold War appeal to independent Africa based on the benefits that capitalism should provide. Thus with the murder of Lumumba and Kennedy’s January arrival in the White House, things began to change.

Kennedy, faced with the furore over Lumumba's death, called for a new Congo policy that included the return of parliament which was seen as both a virtue and a necessity. At the heart of this new policy was the Kennedy administration's greater interest in the less developed African world and a more tolerant Cold War approach to the non-aligned states. It embodied Kennedy’s virulent anti-communism and a firm belief that the existing problems of the less developed world could be tackled and overcome. Kennedy aspired to a future in which the beneficial operations of capitalism, assisted by the state as in the New Deal, would bring a new and ultimately successful dynamic to the struggle between free enterprise and communism. This was an optimistic vision, in which Cold War success against communism would build a better world, notably for the less developed states that were throwing off the burdens of colonialism. The development process in
Africa would not be built on the colonial foundations of European capitalism, but on freer and more open competition, epitomised in American values. Ensuring that democratic capitalism, influenced by these particular US values, would be welcomed by the newly emerging nations of Africa, was seen as the more positive and crucial Cold War task by the new administration. Whatever the importance of Latin America under Kennedy, it was Africa where the expected Cold War benefits of capitalist development and economic progress were most anticipated because of the more immediate contrast with colonialism. The process would produce the greatest challenge of decolonisation to be met by the values of New Frontier development with a role for progressive Europeans. For the Americans, left-wing forces and the relics of colonialism would risk the instability that would provide opportunities for the unwelcome tenets of communism or its facilitators. The fact that instability in the less developed was generally produced more by the failures of, or problems with, capitalism was not normally noticed in Western government circles.

The way in which European capitalism was expected to adapt to the Cold War the end of colonial rule in the Congo was central to Anglo-American differences during the Kennedy administration. The contrast was epitomised in social terms by some leading members of the Conservative party establishment and their associations with white settlers and Central African enterprises. They entertained Ambassador David Bruce at their clubs, and the American regarded such visits as an essential part of his ambassadorial duties. The views he encountered at these wealthy men's institutions, frequented by leading right wing socialites with their reactionary support of empire, were duly reported to the State Department. In Washington, the Americans were simply informed by British Ambassador David Ormsby Gore, a close Kennedy confidante, that ‘Tshombe ran a much better show’ than the other Congo ‘governments’ that had appeared since independence.

In August 1961 the establishment as prime minister in Leopoldville, with CIA financial assistance, of the former trades unionist, Cyrille Adoula, free from radical nationalist influence, allowed attention to refocus on ending Katangan secession. A unified anti-communist Congo
state was seen in Washington as still vital to the success of in the ‘real’ Cold War. By now, UN demands the withdrawal of Belgian troops in Katanga had been superseded by the need to remove the mercenaries who had replaced them and become a vital part of Tshombe’s armed forces, or *gendarmerie*. Unfortunately for the British a new UN representative in Elisabethville, regard as. Conor Cruise O’Brien was not sympathetic to colonial attitudes. As the UN representative in Katanga he felt himself duty bound to use UN troops, now in Elisabethville, to remove Tshombe's mercenaries in line with UN resolutions.\[^{xlvi}\][^87]

The British Foreign Secretary was outraged once fighting started in late August 1961 and the Cabinet was told that UN local representatives were taking steps beyond removing Tshombe's ‘military advisers’ (that is, the mercenaries). These steps, if they included removing civilian advisers, could be represented as interference in internal affairs and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, proposed to inform Hammarskjöld, who was killed shortly afterwards in a plane crash the circumstances of which were highly suspicious,\[^{xlviii}\][^88] that stability (and returns on investment and greater access to foreign exchange) in Katanga depended on maintaining the Tshombe administration – not a view that would be welcomed in Washington. The British Cabinet saw dangers of disorder and communism threatening the Congo, but, perhaps given British reticence and unspoken assumptions, nothing appeared to have been noted about the more specific and serious threat to British financial interests.\[^{xlix}\][^89] While the British may have influenced the Americans to exert pressure to end the fighting, yet another UN Security Council Resolution of 24 November 1961 authorised the new Secretary-General, U Thant, to ‘take vigorous action including the use of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension... of all foreign military and para-military personnel not under UN command and mercenaries.’\[^{l}\][^90]

The second round of fighting in the Congo began on 5 December at Tshombe's instigation, as he hoped to seize the moment before UN forces had the opportunity to make the military preparations to implement Resolution 169 of 24 November. For Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, the UN should not now be prevented from implementing its mandate as this ‘would destroy for
good the image of the US as a supporter of the UN's collective effort. The same conclusions had been reached by the US Ambassador, Edmund Gullion, in Leopoldville and by the National Intelligence Board in Washington. Rusk, however, was subjected to very different views from the British, French and Belgians. As Home and Macmillan prepared for a Commons debate on the Congo, Ball, acting Secretary of State in Rusk’s absence, discussed the ceasefire proposal with Kennedy. He was eager to avoid ceasefires in the middle of implementing UN resolutions, while Kennedy was prepared to accept a ceasefire only if Tshombe agreed to discuss the re-integration of Katanga with Adoula. The president’s idea was put to the Cabinet and served to paper over the Anglo-American disagreements with as the Kitona agreement was reached, in December 1961, on the principle of Katangan re-integration. But the Anglo-American Congo differences remained with Cold War implications as the requirements of European capital could not be easily reconciled with independent African states.

The practical details of implementing the Kitona agreement proved difficult as constitutional provisions for greater provincial autonomy and the incorporation of Tshombe’s armed forces into the Congo army had to be arranged. Then the sharing of tax revenues and foreign exchange had to be decided with Robert Gardiner, now the leading UN civilian representative, playing the key role. As the French pointed out however, such lengthy process were unnecessary as nothing but money was involved. Therefore if the UMHK, rather than cooperating with Tshombe, could be made to apply pressure on him by paying taxes to the legitimate government, the secession would end. Not only would the UMHK and European investors suffer losses in the short term if it did, but Spaak would faced political difficulties from the Brussels supporters of Tshombe and UMHK. Economic questions of Katangan re-integration into the Congo involved the same neo-colonial issues as the secession of 1960 with UMHK and Tanganyika Concessions remaining at the heart of the 20th century ties between the colonial state and private enterprise. The Belgian government had refused in 1960 to hand over its part-ownership of significant economic assets to the new state. on independence. British income from the days of King Leopold came not only from the UMHK and
the Comité Spécial du Katanga, as Tanganyika Concessions also had shareholdings in the Compagnie du Katanga (CK), which were described by the Foreign Office as substantial but indeterminate. A further ‘neo-colonial’ element was the fact that the Belgian Government appointed four of the six directors of the CSK, who sat in Brussels. The situation was made more embarrassing by Tshombe cancelling the pre-independence agreement whereby the CSK was to be dissolved with two thirds of the Comité’s holdings going to the independent government. Instead with secession, Tshombe appropriated them for his Katangan state. Crucially for British government attitudes, Tshombe was now stating that he would destroy the dams that provided hydroelectric power to mining operations in Katanga in the event of UN actions involving force. Ambassador Derek Riches was clear that any serious pressure on Tshombe would result in him destroying these major UMHK installations and thus the status quo should be accepted faute de mieux. Yet with the UN likely to run out of money, as the US ambassador in the Congo pointed out, something clearly had to be done before the simple passage of time produced a Tshombe success. The Americans wanted to co-ordinate policies and their implementation with Britain and Belgium, hoping the Belgians could provide much needed expertise through French-speaking technicians.

As a result a May tripartite meeting, was held in London, chaired by Lord Dundee, a FO Minister of State, whom Ormsby Gore described to the Americans as ‘a fool’. The crux of the secession problem was whether forceful measures could be agreed that would get Tshombe to take irreversible steps to re-integrate Katanga into the Congo. The issue was so important to Kennedy that he sent a personal letter to Ambassador Bruce emphasising that time was running out. While the Americans wanted a peaceful re-integration, if Tshombe remained obdurate ‘we must be prepared to pursue actions which could involve the UN in the use of force.’ Tshombe had to be disabused of the notion that this would never happen and Bruce should make sure that those with financial interests got the message that the failure to re-integrate Katanga into the Congo would be a commercial disaster. A few days earlier, Sir Brian Urquhart had explained to the Americans...
why the Congo was seen as so important in London. Urquhart was a former FO official, appointed by Hammarskjöld as one of his advisers in 1953. He explained that the reason for Anglo-American differences was not simply the relationship between the Foreign Secretary and the Chairman of Tanganyika Concessions, but that the lack of British enthusiasm for Katangan re-integration was the result of the governmental influence of the Conservative Party's chief financial backers who 'almost to a man were the principals in Tanganyika Concessions'.

The two-day tripartite meeting began on 15th May, with the chair emphasising Home's concerns about the 'disaster' that might result if punitive measures were taken against Tshombe. Wayne Fredericks, the American Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, pointed out, following Kennedy’s line, that, as part of the key US goal of agreeing on how best to apply pressure on Tshombe and overcome his delaying tactics, the disaster resulting from the failure to re-integrate would be equal to the destruction of Katanga. The neo-colonial Katangan issue now boiled down to whether pressure should be applied to Tshombe to end the secession and the benefits it brought to European investors and their African supporters, and if so in what ways. Or whether reintegration could and should be secured with the freely given consent of Tshombe. An interesting Cold War difference between Lumumba’s situation and Tshombe’s was that, whatever their respective legitimacies or legalities, the former's removal/elimination because of his left-wing, nationalist views could enable different Western concerns to be fused into an anti-Soviet crusade.

In mid-1962 the British were arguing that the use of force would produce chaos, as the collapse of the Tshombe government would lead to communism or the UN taking over Katanga; while the Americans countered that it was ruling out force that would lead to chaos by bringing about the collapse of the Adoula government and opening the door to a communist take-over of the Congo.

At the tripartite conference, the Belgians drafted a paper in an unsuccessfully attempted to bridge the gap between the British and the Americans. Dundee had been instructed by Home to oppose any measures that might lead to hostilities. Any such resolution would be vetoed and the
UK would probably withdraw its financial contribution to the UN’s Congo operations.\textsuperscript{lxvi}

With no further progress being made, Bruce concluded correctly at the end of the conference that the State Department would be unable to accept the points of agreement.\textsuperscript{lxviii} Letters exchanged between Macmillan and Kennedy on 25 May and 1 June could not however paper over the Anglo-American cracks as the Americans found any form of Katangan autonomy unacceptable.\textsuperscript{lxvii} The British government asked the Kennedy administration not to reveal the extent of the disagreement between Washington and London. Privately the Americans believed that the reactionaries in UMHK were 'hiding behind the skirts of British directors from Tanganyika Concessions'.\textsuperscript{1089} The determination to put Tanganyika Concession's interests in the Congo before the cultivation of good relations with Washington left the Americans in no doubt that Tanganyika Concessions was significantly more hard line than UMHK. Bruce noted that London only wanted to achieve re-integration of the Congo if the 'stability of mining operations, and revenues dependent on them [could be] preserved'.\textsuperscript{109} With Spaak seen in Washington as more amenable than the British, the Americans and Belgians agreed on a programme to escalate gradually the pressure on Tshombe through measures increasing the risk of force. Washington was still eager, before risking force or applying economic sanctions on Tshombe, to reach a common Western position, but Britain remained at odds with the US interpretation of events.\textsuperscript{lxv} On 27 June, the American-Belgian proposals for the re-integration of Katanga were put to the UN which led to the August 1962 agreement on the UN Reconciliation Plan drafted in the State Department. The British were thus left on the sidelines as mere recipients of information and nearing their 1950s nightmare of 'now being classed with the French' in the Congo crisis.\textsuperscript{lxvii} However as the US hesitated over the implementation of measures to apply pressure on Tshombe, UN representatives in the Congo became more significant in the ending of secession.\textsuperscript{110}

The first of several consequences was that the use of force by the UN which removed Tshombe did not damage the interests of European capital through destroying UMHK installations. The second consequence was a false dawn produced by the success of the Kennedy
administration in removing the original stain of neo-colonialism. A pyrrhic ‘real’ Cold War victory over those Europeans in Brussels, London and Katanga who were unwilling to abandon the economic benefits of colonialism, failed to enable the people of the Congo to embark on any viable long term developmental future. Despite Harland Cleveland leading an investigatory team set up by Kennedy to produce an economic development path for the Congo which, like the general ‘new frontier’ approach, was fundamentally optimistic both about problems to be faced and, oddly, the resource provisions to overcome them. Cleveland and his team, during their three week stay in the Congo, were to consult with the UN the Belgians and the British ‘on the nation building phase the Congo was now entering’\textsuperscript{111} The albeit excessively idealistic focus was on the domestic economic situation, with the key nation building component of conventionally analysed decolonisation processes also subsequently accepted uncritically by historians. One key domestic aspect of decolonisation in the Congo was, by any measure, the enormous economic mess that had been produced in the first three years of independence. Conventionally, the causes are deemed to lie more in the dilatoriness and lapses of the Belgians, which allowed for Soviet meddling, than in deliberate attempts to prevent the Congolese inheriting the economic fruits of power other than in the form of large debts. Some of the mess was clearly the result of Katangan secession which was designed to preserve the colonial advantages of the European production of copper by minimising the economic disadvantages of independence. How much the economic mess had been produced by colonialism, secession and neo-colonialism, Soviet aid or, internal domestic rivalries will always be a matter of dispute. The internal dislocation had interrupted most aspects of domestic and international trade within and between the Congo and its neighbours, thus seriously hampering the developmental process. In other words getting newly independent African nations to ‘stand on their own two feet’ in the international economy became even more difficult and was not achieved even with the end of secession. Not least because of the UN’s departure and Tshombe’s return as leader of the reintegrated Congo in 1964. The result was the the contentieux were not resolved and
it took the nationalisation after Mobutu’s second coup finally to remove all the benefits from Europeans.

In terms of decolonisation’s links to the Cold War, the CIA in January 1963 made the connection, or rather the lack of one, between the internal situation in the Congo and Soviet involvement. There had always been an element within both US administrations prepared to play up in a sinister way or exaggerate the actual Soviet desire for influence or subversion in the Congo, while ignoring the likelihood of its realisation. However the CIA was now clear that there had never been, as they claimed the Soviets had realised, any effective means of intervention by Moscow in the Congo. This would not stop the Soviets offering assistance to benefit from opportunities to increase their influence, but significantly the CIA believed, in submissions for the national intelligence estimates, that the Kremlin did not regard the Congo as a central problem because the Soviet stake was small and involved ‘neither vital interests nor a commitment of prestige’.  

Decolonisation for Europeans with investments or employment in the Congo was a different story as it certainly involved interests in a specific and concrete form. These were unusually significant because of the interconnection between the colonial state and private economic interests. These ‘business interests’ either in the form of trade or the operations of extractive industries have primarily been dealt with in the decolonisation literature without distinguishing between ‘business’ in the form of the operations of trading companies and those of extractive industries on the one hand (aka the real economy), and on the other hand, particularly in the British case, the more important interests of financial capital, and in Central Africa the operations of the London metal market in the City along with the role of investors. For the Europeans in Katanga and UMHK and its shareholders and directors, the benefits from Tshombe’s neo-colonial state were not just in the form of paying taxes to the Elisabethville regime rather than Leopoldville, but getting greater access to foreign exchange and avoiding having undesirable left wing African representatives on their boards as replacements for the colonial states’s representatives.
The connections to Cold War perceptions and the causal influence on policies throughout the crisis stemmed more from these financial interests and their protection than from Soviet actions. But it was more convenient to blame problems and their causes on the Soviets once explanations for European policies had had to be provided. Doing so would not involve a thorough analysis of how absorption into the international capitalist economy might damage the ability of a new state to overcome any handicaps left, deliberately or not, by a colonial regime. Thus the ‘unreal’ Cold War was used by important Western policy makers both to justify and obscure the Congo’s problems and the Belgian defiance of UN resolutions. In the British case initially to do nothing that could threaten the continuance of the economic benefits produced by colonialism by acting against a right wing anti-communist regime was a conscious policy choice clearly influenced by the Foreign Secretary’s social contacts within the Conservative Party. The economic strength of Tanganyika Concessions board members and how that was used to finance Conservative electoral interests may have been particularly significant.

Only 11 days after independence, Katangan secession was declared on the assumption of Belgian military intervention supporting it with troops. The Brussels government justified the intervention because of disorder and attacks on Europeans following a mutiny which they claimed the Soviets were behind. Tshombe justified it by alleging neo-communists formed the legitimate Leopoldville government. Hence cause and effect were gradually reversed in the portrayal of the ‘unreal’ Cold War in the Congo. The Soviet Union, like many African countries and Lumumba were playing more of a reactive than an initiating role by responding to the Belgian defiance of UN resolutions. The latter threatened to tarnish the end of colonial rule which had to be presented by the West, particularly the US with its less tangible economic interests, in ways that avoided damage to their position in the ‘real’ Cold War.

Unfortunately the SYG’s increasing desire to strengthen ties with the emerging independent states could not easily be reconciled with failing to maintain the unity of the independent left wing Congo state. Nor, in the ‘real’ Cold War, could the prestige to be gained
from the ending of colonialism and the western allegiance of newly independent states be reconciled with the preservation of the profits of European capitalism courtesy of Tshombe’s regime. Unlike the ambivalent Eisenhower administration, the Kennedy White House argued that winning the ‘real’ Cold War in Africa required some significant modification of the profits from colonial capitalism for the broader gain of securing African allegiance to a liberal capitalist economic order.

The old colonial economic order and its African supporters were directly assisted by the UN under Hammarskjöld in order to avoid an undesirable left wing regime and the threat of Soviet influence, despite the UN masquerading in the form of a neutral SYG spinning non-interference in the Congo’s internal affairs. From July to mid-August with the Belgians refusing to withdraw troops completely, the role of the UN, whether or not as a surrogate for the US, was itself in danger of being undermined. By the time it became obvious at the end of August that Lumumba had to be ‘removed’, Hammarskjöld remained furious with the Belgians for refusing to tell the truth about their lack of withdrawal from Congo bases, although he believed that the Belgian Foreign Office was not responsible for ‘Belgian lies on withdrawal’. As September approached, the unpalatable choices were not just between splitting the Western alliance, or actively supporting a legitimate left wing nationalist regime threatening European economic interests; nor even about acting to remove an illegitimate right wing one, but were inherent in a deteriorating Congo situation in which a legitimate government was deemed likely to request the removal of a UN force. This was the situation that finally lifted the constraints on implementing the informal American-UK-UN agreement to remove Lumumba.

It is difficult to provide causal explanations linking decolonisation to the ‘real’ Cold War in Africa by using the specifics of the exceptional Congo circumstances. Hence the historians’ need for the ‘unreal’ Cold War to justify the policies of the West, which for some European ministers and officials, were less about ending empire in the Congo than about protecting colonial economic benefits on independence. Hence the importance of portraying Soviet actions and fears of Soviet
actions as communist subversion despite there being no strong communist party anywhere in Central Africa. Nevertheless with limited Soviet interest in the Congo and even less capability to expand that into significant influence in Africa, it has generally succeeded in distracting attention from the neo-colonial desires to continue profiting from investments in the mineral rich Katangan province.

Kennedy's assessment of Africa's ‘real’ Cold War importance proved particularly unwelcome to the British government. Despite the somewhat precarious US-UN- British-Belgian alliance initially wobbling, it was preserved by the removal of the left wing Lumumba which avoided some more unpalatable options. Only when Tshombe’s, as opposed to Lumumba’s, removal proved contentious did the consequences of disagreements within the Western alliance become serious. As tacit European support for neo-colonialism looked like strengthening left wing African nationalist forces under Lumumba, it became necessary to create perceptions of pro-communist nationalism, and use the ‘unreal’ Cold War Soviet threat to promote Western unity and render neo-colonialism of secondary importance. When the ‘real’ Cold War assumed pride of place under Kennedy, ironically the British noted that the communist threat to Africa was being exaggerated by the Americans. In the end the Kennedy administration won the ‘real’ Cold War in the Congo but more long lasting than the pyrrhic Cold War victory was the impact on the UN.

As the UN’s decolonisation operations in the Congo ended, there were too many African states for Washington to manipulate the UN effectively which was why Johnson had less time for it. He also had much less time for Africa and Africans than Kennedy, especially given the divisions within the Organisation of African Unity which immediately emerged after 1963. In the Congo the collateral economic damage could not be remedied by Kennedy’s developmental idealism driven by government help to private enterprise and states free from colonialism. Whether the economic damage has come more from the exposure of the Congo to the market forces of international capitalism, or from attempts to retain colonial economic advantages will remain open to debate.
The desire to use the ‘unreal’ Cold War to obscure the reasons for Western policy whether in Brussels Washington or London has not helped an understanding of the decolonisation process itself. With the historiography often using the Cold War as a catch all of anything and everything, in so doing it fails to specify which of the many constituent parts of the Cold War are being referred to. As a result it has rarely come to terms with the Cold War’s relationship with decolonisation or neo-colonialism in the Congo. Thus the true importance of the specifics of the neo-colonial Congo relationships or the Cold War’s decolonisation footnotes, have tended not to feature in the significant and substantive works on the end of colonial rule.

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Ronald Hyam first introduced the idea of this Cold War/decolonisation relationship at a BDEEP seminar nearly twenty years ago. For the increased importance of the ‘real’ Cold War (meaning the different priorities actually given to its constituent parts by US administrations)) in the less developed world and non-alignment under Kennedy and Johnson see Odd Arne Westad *Global Cold War: Third World Interventionism and the Making of our Times* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2005), Robert McMahon (ed) *The Cold War in the Third World* (New York Oxford University Press 2013); and Robert B Rakove *Kennedy, Johnson and the Non-aligned World* (New York Cambridge University Press 2012). The broad extent of the Cold War revealing its many constituent parts is well covered in the three volume Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2010). For a useful summary of those interpreting the Cold War as a clash of social systems and the other emphases on culture and ideology with the role of see Federico Romero ‘Cold War Historiography at the Crosswords’ *Cold War History* 14 4 (2014). Recent collections of themes and regions in the Cold War following the Cambridge History – ie Petra Goedde and Richard H Immerman (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War* (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2013) and Artemy M Kalinsky and Craig Daigle (eds) *The Routledge Handbook of the Cold War* (Abingdon Routledge 2014) have articles entitled Cold War and Decolonisation. Neither have helped significantly to link decolonisation with the Cold War through the specifics of archival research despite the articles specifically entitled Decolonisation and Cold War. The excellent and interesting article of Ryan Irwin ‘Decolonisation and Cold War’ in the Routledge volume is a conceptual exercise analysing the 20th century relationship between broad themes of empire, colonialism and imperialism only a part of which touches on decolonisation. Cary Fraser’s similarly titled article in Petra Goedde and Richard H Immerman (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War* (New York Oxford University Press 2013) is a general overview written within a conventional decolonisation framework starting with World War I. Jason Parker deals more with specifics with the Congo’s decolonisation being ‘consumed by the Cold War’ Jason C Parker ‘Decolonisation, the Cold War, and the Post-Columbian Era’ in Robert J McMahon (ed) *The Cold War in the Third World* (2013) 132. There are also two recent articles on the Cold War in the Third World, one in the McMahon volume and Michael Latham’s article in the Cambridge history of the Cold War. The latter article begins after the Katangan secession ended and is also based on secondary sources but nevertheless succeeds in accurately tracing some links between the specifics and the general and covers the Kennedy administration and the Congo. In the McMahon volume the Cold War in the Third World two articles, dealing with the Third World as an addendum to China and culture and the Cold War are provided by Chen Jian and Andrew Rotter. Articles on the Cold War in Africa are provided by Jeffrey Byrne for both the McMahon and Routledge volumes with the first dealing effectively with decolonisation’s role in the re-infusing of sovereignty and the state system and the second providing a potted history of the African Cold War crises from World War I
dealing briefly with the Congo. It includes factual errors and avoids almost entirely the use of published and unpublished documentary sources. The different views of these authors all see the Cold War as influencing indigenous movements, or as the Cold War failing to have a significant effect on such movements that were allegedly determined to prevent the decolonisation process being tarnished by the Cold War. All neglect the economics of the relationships in Africa as important influences on the Cold War’s relationship to decolonisation. Paradoxically, Soviet Third World policy in the second half of the fifties is starting to be seen as influenced by economics and financial capitalism. See Oscar Sanchez-Sibona *The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge University Press 2014)

ii 2 In addition to being a key figure in the *British Documents on the End of Empire* (BDEEP) series editing singly or jointly several volumes and their respective parts in two of the general BDEEP series A edited by Steve Ashton., Ronald Hyam has also produced by far and away the best book on British decolonisation in R Hyam *Britain’s Declining Empire The Road to Decolonisation 1918-1968* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2007). Its excellent prose combines well with the knowledge that he has been able to gain from a study of more British documents on the end of empire than any other academic.

3 Kennedy, even as a US senator was interested in, and concerned with the Cold War implications, (not just the US domestic political implications), of the less developed world, and particularly of an African continent seeking to find ways to escape from European rule. ‘He wrote scornfully of the…popular American “ill-conceived and ill-concealed disdain for “neutralists” and “socialists” who, in fact, represented “the free world’s strongest bulwarks to the seductive appeal of Peking and Moscow”. Robert B Rakove *op cit* 32 using John F Kemnedy ‘A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy’ *Foreign Affairs* 36,1 (1957). Hence the importance of Africa and the Congo when Kennedy became president. He set aside time to meet numerous African leaders and potential leaders in the White House including left wing ones ie Keita, Nkrumah, Touré and Nyrere. The Bureau of African Affairs, only established in Eisenhower’s second term, contained 3 Offices and 18 desk officers when Kennedy entered the White House. Sixteen months later it had expanded to 5 Offices and 26 desk officers and according to the FO matched the European Affairs and Inter American Affairs Bureaux for size National Archives Kew (TNA) FO371/161374 JDB Shaw (Washington Embassy) to KM Wilford 23 March 1962

4 See John Kent ‘US Reactions to Empire, Colonialism and Cold War in Black Africa 1949-1957’ *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* (33,2 May 2005)

5 Information on the financial situation and economic resources of the Congo are both lengthy and detailed in the State Department papers many of which initially drew on the academic assistance of MIT in the form of Robert West who compiled a number of detailed reports on the Congo’s economy available in the Kennedy Presidential Library and the
State Department’s Central File. They provide the basic analysis of the Congo’s economic position used here. West was a former analyst with the Federal Reserve Bank in New York and on the part time staff at Yale University. Prior to independence he was on a study mission to the Congo for MIT. As such he helped the UN negotiate the liquidation of the Belgian Congo’s Central Bank (Banque Centrale du Congo Belge et Ruanda Urundi), which with the help of the IMF had, by the start of 1961, established a body known as the Monetary Council of the Congo to try and bring order to the chaos of foreign exchange transactions, partly produced by secession. That chaos was reflected in an unknown loss of foreign exchange and non-payment for imports, the latter of which was reckoned to constitute $24 million in the second half of 1960. Subsequently West worked as a specialist on African problems for the Rockefeller Foundation, again visiting the Congo, and in 1963 became a Counsellor for Economic Affairs in Leopoldville and provided reports directly to Harlan Cleveland the Assistant Secretary for International Organisation Affairs in the State Department. In December 1962 when the issue was taking measures to end secession, Cleveland referred to the danger of the US being seen, (given the British and Belgian actions and inactions), as having a desire ‘to protect the arbitrary and imposed tax and profit system of a mining company’. For Cleveland, after an African country [the Congo] had achieved independence, these profits were widely regarded as constituting ‘a prototype of an exploitative imperialist-capitalist-monopoly.’ An appropriate definition of the economic results of neo-colonialism. Cleveland went on to head a team in February 1963 to produce a report for Kennedy based on three weeks in the Congo supposedly in consultation with the British and the Belgians on how the nation building of the reintegrated state should proceed. John F Kennedy Presidential Library (JFKL), Harland Cleveland Papers, Box 68 Cleveland to Ball (personal) 14 December 1962. His report is in JFKL, Harland Cleveland Papers, Box 69 Memo for the President ‘Harlan Cleveland’s Report on the Congo’ Feb 1963

6 Because of the intertwined mix of concessionary, holding and operating companies in the workings of European capitalism in the Belgian Congo, Tanganyika Concessions benefitted from financial stakes in a number of different companies including the Société Générale de Belgique and the Comité Spécial du Katanga. See fn 11

7 The details of asset transfers to the independent Congo became known as the contentieux to be discussed after independence essentially because the belated Belgian commitment to colonial development in the Congo had been financed by bondholders whose returns in the form of interest on that debt were to be paid for after independence, thus at the very least providing some Belgian leverage when or if asset transfers were discussed.

8 Sir Brian Urquhart supplied the US with this information as an explanation for the lack of British government support for Katangan reintegration. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) College Park RG 59 Central Decimal File (CDF) 770G:00 1960-63 Box 1965 Tel 1477 State Dept to London 19 Sept 1961
9 TNA FO371/161517 de Boulay (Washington Embassy) to Foster  Sept 1962. It was estimated by the FO that the value of Tanganyika Concessions’ interests in UMHK was £80 million

10 TNA FO371/161516 Sir J Nicholls to Roger Stevens 6 March 1962

11 Another feature of colonialism in the Congo was that the operating companies extracting mineral resources from the concessionary lands deposited share-securities to the domainial authority ie the company owning the concessions from Leopold. – in souther n Katanga primarily the CSK. Thus royalties were not paid to the colonial state because of the original land having ‘belonged’ to Leopold and then to a combination of the Belgian Congo state and private firms. Conventionally in the Congo it was the dividends paid on these shares that served as royalties. For Tanganyika Concessions this meant until 1962 they were paid in the form of dividends to shareholders The CSK collected such dividends for the Belgian Congo government and the shares went into the Congo Portfolio, which before and after independence was controlled in Brussels. The Portfolio was a mix of shares and parastatals with the latter often operating at a loss. See John Kent, America, the UN and Decolonisation: Cold War Conflict in the Congo p81 fn 116

12 Ganshof van der Meersch Fin de la Souveraineté Belge au Congo 191-299 (1963)

13 TNA FO371/176725 GE Milard to Sir Roderick Barclay 27 Feb 1964

14 See the assessments of the new British Ambassador Ian Scott (former consul-general) of the post-mutiny disturbances in TNA FO371/146639. This is not to say that these neo-colonial plans for the support of secession were hatched in Brussels rather than by settlers and Belgian officials in Katanga. I am grateful to Emmanuel Gerard for pointing out that Belgian Cabinet records indicate that government opinion was divided until Lumumba broke off relations in mid-July

15 JFKL Harlan Cleveland Papers Box 70 West Report for G Mennen Williams ‘Financial Groups in the Congo’ 22 Dec 1961

16 JFKL President’s Office Files (POF) Box 114 Airgram Brussels to S of S 13 Mar 1962 (source giving the info to the Ambassador redacted)


18 For details on this I am grateful to the work of Per Axel Frielingsdorf for his Ph D thesis on Hammarskjöld's role as UN Secretary General and his 1960 actions in the Congo.

19 This applies to the original 'nationalist' model put forward by A Low. A broader international perspective was outlined by John D Hargreaves and by the ideas of Ronald Robinson and Wm Roger Louis represented in ‘The Imperialism of Decolonization’ Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History Vol 22.3 (1994) before the work of
new generation historians of decolonisation was added to the new work of ‘old’ imperial historians. The arguments of Robinson and Louis about Anglo-American cooperation over the renewal and subsequent disinvestment of the British Empire effectively covers the 1950s. The criticism of Nigel Ashton in ‘Anglo-American Revival and Empire during the Macmillan Years 1957-1963’ in Martin Lynn (ed) uses the Middle East with the colonial aspects centering on Guiana and the Congo ie post-1960. While Ashton correctly identifies more clearly the Anglo-American conflicts he casts the Congo into the conventional end of Empire framework based, in the Congo’s case, on the over-rapid transfer of power.

20 Nigel J Ashton ‘Anglo-American Rivalry and Empire during the Macmillan Years 1957-1963, in Martin Lynn (ed) the British Empire in the 1950s: Retreat or Revival? 171

21 JFKL Harlan Cleveland Papers Box 69 Robert West to Cleveland 30 Jan 1963

22 Dwight D Eisenhower Library (DDEL) White House Office Files, Office of the Staff Secretary (General Goodpaster), International Series, Box 4, Tel 58 Brussels to S of S 8 July 1960; TNA FO371/146639 Leopoldville to FO 14 June 1960. Ambassador Scott pointed out that not a single Belgian had been seriously hurt in Leopoldville, the town quite close to the mutiny at Thysville camp, which was sparked by the lack of pay for extra independence day duties and the European CO telling the men that nothing would change with independence. When referring to the reasons for the mutiny and the sending of Belgian troops, Scott discounted ‘talk of Soviet plots’ as the uprising was against colonial rule and a consequence of the feeling that ‘Belgium was here to stay’ - with Belgian flags still flying after independence TNA FO371/146646 Leopoldville to FO 18 July 1960; TNA FO371/146642 Account by Sir J Nicholls of events in the Congo 10 July 1960; Nicolas J White Decolonisation the British Experience (2nd ed) 2014 95-96

23 Work on the Special Relationship as a general guiding light for Anglo-American relations continues to flourish without taking into account the nuanced qualifications centred on the attractions and conflicts provided by the British Empire in both the pre- and post-war years. See the recent article by John Baylis and Steve Marsh ‘Anglo-American Relations 1950-51: Three Strikes for British Prestige’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 23.2 (2012) which still uses Churchill’s 3 circles as part of a consistent aim of British foreign policy, albeit if it was to be achieved by different means. One FO official is used to justify the 1944 view that Britain was now abandoning the policy of balancing British power against that of America and the detailed FO report of Graham Spry after a 1943 tour to gauge US opinion of the British empire as part of an assessment of the general difference of American views within and outside Washington is ignored. Nigel Ashton by focussing on ‘interdependence’, or the lack of it, provided a more sophisticated assessment of the cooperation and conflict with reference to the British Empire.
While there has been an increased willingness to link the two, the number of academics who have specialisations and research monographs in both these areas is limited, thus helping to produce more orthodox or superficial coverage in one of the two areas.

The UN Security Council meeting of July 13/14 followed Belgian troops taking the port of Matadi on 11 July with some loss of African life, and the landing of paratroops on the Leopoldville Airport on 13 July JFKL. POF Box 114 Policy Paper ‘An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis’ 2 May 1961. This was not a briefing paper but a policy paper designed to permit a review of the Congo crisis.

The neglect of the influence of economics and financial capital in the decolonisation process precedes the acceptance of the Washington consensus and the Panglossian impact of the ‘free’ market.

The new breed of English language historians of decolonisation also tend not to mention the Congo to any significant degree or to present a distorted picture. See for example Nicholas J White Decolonisation the British Experience (1999) and more particularly ‘The Business and the Politics of Decolonisation: the British Experience in the Twentieth Century’ Economic History Review 53, 3 (2000). Sarah Stockwell however argues that British policy was more accommodating of business interests. Sarah Stockwell (2004) Trade, empire, and the fiscal context of imperial business during decolonization' Economic History Review, 57, 1 (2004). See also LJ Butler ‘Business and British Decolonisation: Sir Ronald Prain, the Mining Industry and the Central African Federation’ Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 35, 3 (2007); Andrew Cohen ‘Business and Decolonisation in Central Africa Reconsidered’ Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 36, 4 (2008) White deals briefly with the Congo and notes the dinner companionship of Home and Waterhouse, but is incorrect in saying Britain accepted US policy in 1962 (which it never did), as illustrated by the Nassau ‘arguments’ on the Congo and the British refusal in 1962 to support all the measures which the State Department drafted for the UN and which formed the basis of the UN Reconciliation Plan in that year. Philip Murphy’s BDEEP volumes Series B Vol 9 Central Africa Parts I and II (The Stationary Office 2005) do give the Congo more than a passing reference as does Alan James Britain and the Congo Crisis but the latter essentially deals with the Congo as an appendage to the story of Britain and the UN. Murphy deals with Waterhouse, Tanganyika Concessions and the Congo investments accurately in Party Politics and Decolonisation pp 111-116 drawing attention to the lack of Waterhouse’s influence on Foreign Office officials BEFORE Home, whom Waterhouse was closely connected to socially, became Foreign Secretary on 27 June 1960. He also refers to the subsequent cooperation over approaches to Tshombe. While pointing out that it was ‘difficult to argue that the business background of Conservative politicians was a major determinant of their general attitude to political change in Africa’. (p117). The crux of the Congo issue is really the way owners of capital in general acted there where the issue was not influencing the
formulation of British colonial policy but ensuring a ‘do nothing’ British foreign policy towards neo-colonialism in (with or without commercial business activities) an independent Congo. A ‘do nothing’ policy was less likely to result in losses to the owners of that capital when action would have threatened the main financial contributions to the Conservative party.

28 While such statements heard in a French bar are unlikely ever to be heard in a UK equivalent, you would also be unlikely to hear a UK government minister comment (putting aside the degree of veracity) in private, as Couve de Murville did: ‘it is well known that the Société Générale [de Belgique] is in the control of the Belgian government’.

NARA RG59 CDF 770G:00 1960-63 Box 1973 Tel 1973 Paris to S of S 11 July 1962. The other side of the coin is that you would never see a British businessmen spit on a European official amidst accusations of criminality over policy disagreements. NARA RG59 CDF 770G:00 1960-63 Box 1955 Tel 349 USUN to S of S 10 Aug 1960


30 Lumumba’s character and political beliefs were much discussed and not only in Washington. Initially Lumumba was not portrayed as a communist, and it was the disorders that were depicted as communist inspired but that interpretation was provided by the Belgian Foreign Office. The Americans, the further away they were from direct contact with or particular knowledge of the Congo eg members of the National Security Council as opposed to the Congo Embassy officials under Eisenhower and Kennedy (with the exception of the CIA’s chief of mission in Leopoldville), had a greater proclivity to ascribe Lumumba as a communist or as manipulable by communists. Members of the State Department, with more direct knowledge were as late as mid-Aug portraying Lumumba as ‘moving left’ but ‘probably not firmly communist oriented’. But ‘at any event it appears doubtful that Soviets, any more than US, could, under present conditions in Congo, establish reliable continuing influence’. NARA RG59 CDF 770G:00 tel 438 State Dept to Leopoldville 12 Aug 1960. See John Kent America, the UN and Decolonisation Cold War in the Congo (London, Routledge, 2010) 12-15 for assessments of Lumumba based on FRUS 1958-1960 Memcon
US Ambassador Brussels (Burden) and Lumumba 25 Feb 1960; Tel 730 State Dept to Accra 28 April 1960; Tel 469 Leopoldville to State Dept 14 June 1960. In the FO the brief for the Prime Minister’s visit to Bonn in August 1960 simply stated Lumumba was not a communist. FO371/146506 Brief for Prime Minister’s Bonn visit Aug 1960

31 NARA RG59 CDF 755A:00 1960-63 Box 1831 Memo by Hugh Cumming INR (State Dept Bureau of Intelligence and Research) 17 June 1960; Van der Meersch's account and documents are in his *Fin de la Souveraineté Belge au Congo* (1963) pp 191-299

32 TNA FO371/146639 Report by Ian Scott 5 July 1960

33 NARA RG 59 755A.00 1960-63 Box 1832 Tel 302 Leopoldville to S of S 7 April 1960; RG 59 855A.00 1960-63 Box 2061 Tel 1272 Brussels to S of S 13 April 1960

34 JFKL POF Box 114 Policy Paper ‘An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis’ 2 May 1961

35 Tanganyika Concessions had a significant shareholding - initially 50% in the new operating company *Union Minière du Haut Katanga* until the Depression - when it sold all but 14% of its UMHK holdings while retaining seats on the UMHK board for three British Conservative politicians and 20% of voting rights. The other half of UMHK shares were held by the *Société Générale de Belgique*

36 NARA RG59 CDF 755A:00 1960-63 Box 1831 Savingram 1226 Brussels to S of S 9 May 1960 with account of the Ambassador's trip to the Congo March 1960. The larger US resources for embassy and consular staff meant that the reports of trips to the African interior were numerous and informative

37 Ibid Tel 8 Elisabethville to S of S, 7 March 1960

38 NARA RG 59 CDF 755A:00 1960-63 Box 1831 Memcon by Joseph Satterthwaite (AF) of call by Belgian Ambassador Louis Scheyven 1 July 1960

39 This was the decolonisation-Cold War link. Kennedy’s determination to confront communism and his interest in the less developed world, given new life by Khrushchev’s 1961 ‘wars of national liberation speech’ became key components of the ‘New Frontier’ reflecting the development idealism of Walt Rostow, the Alliance for Progress and a new approach to neutralism in Africa and Asia. See Rakove Chapt 2; Stephen G Rabe incorporates a greater emphasis on ‘security’ into Kennedy’s approach to dealing with Latin American counterinsurgency *The Most Dangerous Area in the World John F Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1999) 127-134. Amongst the many Kennedy biographies an excellent summary of Kennedy’s formative experiences and his different Cold War emphasis on Africa and the less developed world is Jason K Duncan *John F Kennedy The Spirit of Cold War Liberalism* (Routledge New York 2014)
The British Ambassador, believed the mutiny had three causes of which was Bangala resentment at Lumumba not giving their ethnic political leader a key governmental role. Secondly, resentment was exacerbated by having to do extra independence day duties without adequate financial reward. Then there was the general African dislike of being told by the Belgian officer commanding, General Janssens, that things were not going to change with the achievement of independence particularly as democracy did not apply to the Congolese army. TNA FO371/146639 Tel 224 Leopoldville to FO 6 July 1960

The Congo, much bigger than Europe, and with even more distinct ethnicities, had particular rivalries in Katanga although the British, for Cold War and neo-colonial reasons, officially maintained throughout the secession that Katanga was particularly stable. See TNA FO371/146642 Account by Jack Nicholls (Ambassador in Brussels) of the recent events in the Congo recorded in diary form in a letter to Hoyer-Millar 19 Aug 1960.

For the events in Katanga of July 10th see Ludo de Witte The Assassination of Lumumba (2001) p7

Earl Selborne, (Roundell Cecil Palmer) was the 3rd Earl whose mother was Beatrix Cecil the daughter of Robert Cecil 3rd Marquess of Salisbury. The 5th Marquess of Salisbury from 1947, formerly Viscount Cranbourne, was a leading member of Macmillan’s government. ‘Bobbety’, as he was known, was a defender of white regimes in Africa before becoming the first president of the Monday Club in 1961

TNA FO371/146639 Minute by E B Boothby 13 July

TNA FO371/146642 Account by Nicholls 19 Aug 1960

NARA RG59 CDF 770G:00 1960-1963 Box 1954 Tel 88 Brussels to S of S 10 July 1960 with text of Ambassador Timberlake’s cable on the dangers of Belgian unilateral action favoured by Wigny and the Liberals.

TNA FO371/146642 Scott to Hoyer-Millar 2 Aug 1960

TNA FO371/146640 Leopoldville to FO 18 July 1960

TNA FO371/146639 Leopoldville to FO 20 July 1960

Policy Paper ‘An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis’ 2 May 1961

The contents of the telegram from Lumumba and Kasavubu had found its way into US hands and can be found in NARA RG59 CDF 770G:00 1960-1963 Box 1956 Tel 136 State Dept to Brussels 15 July 1960

from Khrushchev on 15 July stating that the Soviet Union would not shrink from ‘resolute measures to curb the aggression’

55 R F Holland European Decolonisation 1918-1961 Houndsmills Macmillan 1985) ‘Within days [of independence] the country had been swept by large-scale tribal disturbances and renewed external intervention became inevitable…Disturbances spread throughout much of the Congo’ 184-85; Nicholas J White Decolonisation the British Experience since 1945 (Abingdon Routledge, 2014). ‘Radical nationalists vied for Soviet support, while the pro-western and mineral rich provinces of Katanga and Kasai attempted to secede. Bloody civil war and ethnic in-fighting ensued, and Belgian troops returned. Moreover the Cold War had arrived in Africa and the fallout from superpower intervention threatened the whole continent’ 95 Jason C Parker op cit ‘The chaos of the Belgian departure induced a power struggle among Congolese factions and a contest for influence between the superpowers…Lumumba’s disillusion with the West along with his openness to the East bloc helped turn the Congo into a Cold War pawn’ 131.

Thus the perception is of Africans chasing Soviet support, chaos and disturbances appearing out of the Belgian departure and nowhere is there a mention of Belgians, Tshombe or European capitalism in order to manufacture a superpower conflict out of the ‘unreal’ Cold War to threaten the whole African continent.

56 NARA RG59 CDF 770G:00 1960-63 Box 1954 Tel 85 USUN to S of S 15 July 1960.

57 NARA RG59 CDF 770G:00 1969-63 Box 1955 Tel 300 USUN to S of S 3 Aug 1960.

58 UN Security Council Resolution S/4405 22 July 1960

59 Sergei Mazov using Soviet sources has no evidence of Soviet involvement in the Congo before late August 1960 with the provision of planes and helicopters to several African states ‘Soviet Aid to the Gizenga Government in the former Belgian Congo 1960-61’ Cold War History 7, 3, 2007

60 The fact that the Soviets and the Americans were both supporting a resolution to prevent what was happening to a newly independent state is testimony to the importance of winning the Afro-Asian bloc to their ideological cause.

61 NARA RG59 CDF 770G:00 1960-63 Box 1958 Tel 274 USUN to S of S 1 Aug 1960. Hammerskjöld remained convinced at the start of August that the best way of keeping the Soviets out and avoiding another ‘Korea type situation’ was to get the US to pressure the Belgians to give a declaration of an intention to withdraw from Katanga and all of the Congo. This was to change within the next few weeks.

62 TNA FO371/146442 Account by Jack Nicholls in day by day form of events in the Congo in a letter sent to Hoyer-Miller on 19 August referring to details of 17 July

63 The extent to which UMHK actively encouraged and promoted secession, as opposed to elements in the Belgian government encouraging UMHK to do so, is not easy to determine even from the information received by the Americans. There were benefits to both sides of painting the other as leading supporters of Tshombe and secession. The
differing assessments of the respective views indicates the different degrees of influence of individual managing directors in UMHK. Waleffe for example was described by the Brussels government as taking an extreme pro-Katangan independence line NARA RG59 CDF 770G:00 1960-63 Box 1957 Savingram 546 Brussels to S of S 16 Dec 1960. Harold d’ Aspremont, the chef du cabinet of Gaston Eyskens, (the Belgian PM) was sent on a special mission to the Congo in July 1960 (ie after colonial rule had ended) and became Minister for African Affairs in September. When in August Sture Linner a senior UN official, met with the head of UMHK in the Congo and 24 other European managers, 4 of them came back to see him after the meeting which had focused on the disastrous impact of any UN entry into Katanga as economic collapse would ensue because the white population would leave. They informed Linner that Aspremont had told them that unless the UN effort was sabotaged they would all lose their jobs. NARA RG59 770:G:00 1960-63 Box 1955 Tel 349 USUN to S of S 7 August 1960

64 See for example Lodge urging Wigny to view things from a world wide perspective NARA RG59 CDF 770:G:00 1960-63 Box 1955 Tel 347 USUN to S of S 7 August 1960

xxxviii 65 NARA RG59 CDF 770G:00 1960-63 Box 1954 Tel 137 State Dept to Brussels 15 July 1960

xxxix 66 NARA NARA RG59 CDF 770G:00 1960-63 Box 1954 Tel 200 Brussels to S of S 16 July 1960


68 NARA NARA RG59 CDF 770G:00 1960-63 Box 1955 Tel 347 USUN to S of S 7 Aug 1960

69 NARA RG59 CDF 770G:00 1960-63 Box 1955 Tel 271 USUN to S of S 1 Aug 1960; NARA RG59 CDF 770G:00 1960-63 Box 1955 Tel 300 USUN to S of S 3 Aug 1960

70 NARA RG59 CDF 770G:00 1960-63 Box 1979 State Dept Circular Tel 129 20 July 1960; JFKL POF Box 114 Policy Paper ‘An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis’ 2 May 1961

71 Hammarskjöld referred specifically to Lumumba’s request for Soviet intervention being ‘dead’ NARA RG59 CDF 770.0G 00 1960-63 Box 1954 Tel 137 USUN to of S 19 July 1960

72 Hammarskjöld was still failing to comply with the first resolution requiring the UN force to work with the Congo government, as Lumumba complained, because it thus rendered any legitimate government action in Katanga impossible or more difficult. Within weeks the UN were to deny the use of the radio station and the airport to Lumumba as well as not taking action in Katanga (interference in internal affairs) in line with the resolution in early
August. Finally there was UN involvement probably through Andrew Cordier in the plan to remove Lumumba by Kasavubu dismissing him.

73 NARA RG 59 CDF 770G:00 Box 1954 Tel 13 Elisabethville to State Dept 20 July 1960

74 Dwight D Eisenhower Library (DDEL) White House Office Files Staff Secretary Goodpaster International Series Box 3 Situation Report 15 Aug 1960; Ludo De Witte *The Assassination of Lumumba* (2001) p18 De Witte quotes a Belgian Foreign Ministry telegram concerning a meeting between Wigny's assistants and George Denis a Belgian adviser to Kasavubu on 'the overthrow of the government according to our wishes'

75 *FRUS* 1964-68 Vol XXIII Congo Tel from the station in the Congo to the CIA 11 Aug 1960 Doc 8


77 *FRUS* 1958-60 Vol XIV Africa Record of 456th NSC meeting 18 Aug 1960

78 NARA RG59 CDF 770G:00 1960-63 Box 1955 Tel 517 USUN to S of S 26 Aug 1960 For the British FO’s desire to eliminate Lumumba see D Gibbs *The Political Economy of Third World Exploitation Mines Money and US Policy in the Congo Crisis* (Chicago University Press Chicago 1991) For the Belgian and Katangan involvement in the murder see de Witte *op cit* Chapt 5. The US military expressed a desire for ‘forceful action’ and ‘all possible steps t eliminate Lumumba as a political force’ *FRUS* 1958-60 Vol XIV Africa Memo by JCSM 2 Sept 1960 Hammarskjöld told a US official in New York 4 days after Kasavubu’s dismissal notice that he was trying ‘to get rid of Lumumba without compromising UN position or himself.’ NARA RG59 CDF 770G:00 1960-63 Box 1956 Tel 605 USUN to S of S 7 Sept 1960

79 *FRUS* 1958-60 Vol XIV Africa Memo from the Board of National Estimates for Allen Dulles 22 Aug 1960

80 The constitutionality of this act was disputed by Lumumba who retaliated by dismissing the president and while the issue remained unresolved Colonel Joseph Mobutu seized power in a bloodless coup. The role that CIA money in either of these events is suspected to be considerable but lacks evidence due to redactions in the CIA documents referring specifically to individual sums and the individuals receiving the money. There was a close relationship between Mobutu and the CIA station chief Larry Devlin. His memoirs *Chief of Station Congo: a Memoir 1960-67* (2007) only indicate his claim that he was acting without approval. After the coup, details of a CIA plot to assassinate Lumumba are in Devlin’s memoirs Chap 8 and the poisons provided by an unnamed senior CIA officer. The issue is who authorised it and the approval of Eisenhower is noted, according to Devlin, by the senior officer who was not likely to have been present at the NSC meeting in which it was allegedly given. That approval was the subject of conflicting testimony to the Church Committee (the Senate investigatory committee). Ludo de Witte identifies those Belgians and Africans who actually carried out the murder in his biography of Lumumba.

82 The new Congo initiative draft paper divided the State Dept and a working group with intelligence representatives was established and began discussions on 26 January 1961.


84i In terms of the paperwork in the central file, that generated by US relations with Britain and the Soviets combined was under half of that generated by relations with the Congo under Kennedy. Only Vietnam generated more - another indication of the importance of Africa and the Congo.

85 Kent, America, the UN and Decolonisation: Cold War Conflict in the Congo (2010), 77.


87 For the UN military actions in August- September 1961 see Kent, America, the UN and Decolonisation, 60-68.

88 On Hammarskjold's suspicious death in a plane crash in Northern Rhodesia and the even more suspicious investigation into it by the local authorities in the Central African Federation see Susan Williams Who Killed Hammarskjöld the UN, the Cold War and White Supremacy in Africa (2011) who by revealing the misinformation given at the time, the presence of MI6 agents at the airport where the plane was landing and the refusal of the official investigation to accept any eye witness evidence from black Africans raises more suspicions and mysteries without providing answers or solutions to them.


94 JFKL, George Ball papers, Box 2, record of telephone conversation, Ball-JFK, 11 December 1961.


97 TNA FO 371/161516, Nicholls to Stevens, 6 March 1962.

98 JFKL NSF, Country Series, Congo, Box 30, Leopoldville to State, 9 April 1962.

99 NARA RG59 CDF 770G:00, 1960-63, Box 1971, Leopoldville to State, 19 April 1962.
The political importance of the issue for high policy can be gauged by the fact that in 1961, when the crisis in Central Africa hit British territories in the wake of the Monckton report, the Congo was brought to the attention of the British Cabinet on fifteen occasions, as compared to the four times that the Central African Federation featured. In the following year, 1962, Central African Federation issues were raised in Cabinet twenty times, compared to twenty-seven times for the Congo. This does not mean that the neo-colonial elements were necessarily always of prime significance but it does indicate the importance for understanding decolonisation of an international dimension, and that for the British in the Congo something else was even more significant in influencing the general formation of high policy and the decolonisation policy.

The key documents on the London conference are all included in FRUS, 1961-63, Vol XX. As Bruce predicted the paper the conference produced was unacceptable to the State Department because of the measures proposed in the transition period to independence and the inadequate measures of pressure on Tshombe: FRUS, 1961-63, Vol XX, Tel 1953 State to Leopoldville, 19 May 1962.

JFKL NSF Country Series Congo Box 31 Tel 58 Brussels to State 11 July 1962


JFKL NSF Congo Box 34A Tel 1989 Leopoldville to S of S 4 Feb 1963
112 JFKL NSF Congo Box 29 CIA Office of National Estimates Memo for the Director ‘Soviet views of the Congo’ 7 Jan 1963

113 NARA RG 59 CDF 770G:00 1960-63 Box 1954 Tel 88 Leopoldville to S of S 10 July 1960

114 NARA RG 59 CDF 770G:00 1960-63 Box 1956 USUN to S of S 7 Sept 196048

lxxiii 115 TNA CAB128/36, CC(62) 73, 6 December 1962.

lxxiv