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Chapter 4

Status is Cultural: Durkheimian Poles and Weberian Russians Seek Great Power Status

Iver B. Neumann

Like its etymological twin—the state, status emerges within a specific cultural context or, in order better to capture the importance of relations between polities, a civilizational context. According to Durkheim and Mauss, “[a] civilization constitutes a kind of moral milieu encompassing a certain number of nations, each national culture being only a particular form of the whole.” Status-seeking between any groups of polities takes place in a specific social context. What Durkheim and Mauss had in mind was Christendom.

The historical fact that the state system grew out of Christendom and a Christian legal code (first ius gentium, then ius inter gentes) has repercussions not only for those who were left status-less, but also for how status was conferred within the system. Conflict over status played itself out as a discussion of which king was closest to God. Earthly powers were ordered in a hierarchy of descending closeness to God, with France on top, then other Christian rulers, then non-Christian rulers (and, we may add, people who were seen to be without rulers altogether). This hierarchical order carried over into early modernity and beyond, most recently as a “standard of civilization.”
Cultural and civilizational analysis defines its object by what Durkheim and Mauss referred to as “a kind of moral milieu.” If the analysis of great power status is to be a global analysis, then two additional questions must be asked. The first one is inter-civilizational, and concerns what happens to status when the moral ground upon which it is sought and accommodated becomes the object of radical contestation. Barry Buzan has suggested that we may conceptualize the contemporary states system as a hybrid, where historically Christian-based international society co-exists with an international system that is the result of what is here called inter-civilizational interaction.\textsuperscript{4} We have already noted one result of this interaction: the disappearance from international law of an explicit “standard of civilization.”

The second question that should be asked of any analysis of symbolic interaction concerns how symbolic resources are related to material resources. As pointed out in Chapter 1 in the introduction to this volume, academic debates over relative state status within the social sciences and international relations (IR) have located two rather different traditions. The first tradition is the one discussed so far, focusing on the symbolic resource of exemplary behaviour according to some civilization-specific standard. Durkheim has perhaps its greatest spokesman in Durkheim, and the tradition is now dominated by constructivists. The second tradition hails back to Vattel, Ranke, and Weber, and is now dominated by realists. It focuses on degree of massed material resources.
There is no obvious common ground on which these two traditions may meet. If status is determined by material resources alone, then civilization is an epiphenomenon. If status is determined by symbolic resources alone, then material resources are simply a prop. Two different routes for analyzing power in all its forms follow— including what is at stake here, namely the status of great powers—follow. The first route would be to analyze how civilizational characteristics are hierarchized according to a power logic. This approach involves introducing social approaches that are peripheral to established debates, and I will not follow it here. The alternative approach is to bring the two established traditions into dialog with one another. What follows are two exercises that clear the ground for such a dialog.

Let us start with a nutshell history of ideas, to see how the two traditions of thinking status do indeed overlap, particularly in the work of Max Weber. Since I am not out to prove or disprove these theories, but to bring them into conversation, I need some extreme value cases that can allow both traditions to score points.

I have chosen Polish status-seeking in the interwar period as a case of the importance of material factors, and Russian status-seeking in the eighteenth century as a case of the importance of symbolic factors. Note the inter-civilizational logic of case choice: these are states that have historically resided on the Eastern periphery of Christendom. From the emergence of the modern state system, Poland was widely seen as being on the perimeter of Christendom. One historic study bears the telling
title *A Suburb of Europe*. Russia was the first outside status-seeker to engage the system and seek status within it, and the matter was negotiated in explicitly symbolic terms. Key questions in the seventeenth and well into the eighteenth century were whether Russia was a Christian state, and whether it was despotic. I do not undertake the analytical job of assessing which powers qualify as great powers, how, when, and why, but rather focus on methodology. More specifically, I focus on how to Poland and Russia signalling about status – how they “make available to others a of what they want, to use a classical sociological formulation, and – particularly grounds they choose to signal on – and how this status signalling is faring with established great powers.

The aim is not to prove or disprove the two traditions, but to assess their fruitfulness and complementarity. In terms of empirics, the question is how we may better understand Polish and Russian status-seeking and its reception by reading it in terms of the Durkheimian and the Weberian traditions. The conclusion I reach is that both traditions specify a necessary component that has to be there-present for great power claims to be accepted, but that it takes a combination of the two for the claim to be felicitously received. The Polish case is a study in how great power claims in terms of civilizational standards are insufficient when they are not backed up by capabilities. The Russian case is a study in how great power claims in terms of
capabilities are insufficient when they are not seen as being backed up by the performance of certain civilizational standards.

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**A Social Theorists on Greatness: Durkheim versus Weber**

When the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815) established a system whereby the great powers should meet in concert to discuss and manage the topics of the day, it formalized a system that had taken shape over the preceding century. During the eighteenth century, when treaties were drawn up, particularly but not exclusively in the wake of wars, certain powers had retained the prerogative of guaranteeing those treaties to themselves. With the exception of Spain (a state that no longer commanded the respect it once had), the Concert of Europe consisted of those states that had usually guaranteed treaties during the eighteenth century. In the sense that different states were held to belong to different layers whose power and hence importance varied, the European system of states had been hierarchical from its very inception. It is true that there also existed a norm of sovereign equality, which worked against interventions in the internal affairs of others as well as the kind of ranking of individual states that had existed before the system took shape. This norm, however, concerned the ranking of specific states, not the ranking of layers of states.

As pointed out in the Chapter [Introduction] to this volume, we treat the status of great power as a club resource. Being recognized as a great
power means that decision makers in other polities will take what they see as your interests into consideration. The great power is thus present even when absent; it exerts power in settings that its representatives do not even know exist. It governs from afar. In addition, other great powers will, at least in principle, recognize your rightful interests. There may also be institutional rewards, such as a position as a guarantor of the peace or membership in a club. For these reasons, rising states may aspire to great power status, and those who possess it may try to limit the number of additional great powers. For example, when Catherine the Great insisted that Russia was a great power, she was making a claim for Russia to be included in certain specific political processes from which great powers of the day had been trying to exclude it. Since there is no way for politicians or analysts to define a great power without intervening in this essentially political process, the concept of great power has remained an essentially contested one. The ensuing confusion surrounding the concept may be found both in historical analyses, where there are considerable yet rarely highlighted differences in usage, as well as in contemporary political debate.12

The expression “great power” emerged coterminously with the modern state system, and began life not as a concept, but as a (composite) word. Vattel’s definition of a power that can stand up to any combination of others—is the classic one.13 Ranke’s celebrated essay on the matter encapsulates the views of the German Machtschule, and was so dominant throughout the entire nineteenth century
that I would argue that “great power” remained a word as opposed to a concept to its
very end. To Ranke as to most statesmen, great powers were states that by dint of
their economic and military might were able to maintain a sphere of influence where
other great powers gave them a droit de regard. More specifically, Kratochwil
identifies “the rule of a ‘great power’” as “a power with system-wide interests as well
as a say in matters pertaining to the management of the system. Managing the security
issues in the classic conception of politics involved largely the issues of a balance of
power.” Although the great powers did not maintain the practice of meeting in
concert for more than seven years after the 1815 Congress of Vienna, the concert
itself survived by dint of other practices. This institutionalization of what Ranke
meant by “great power” explains why it went largely unchallenged for so long –
Ranke was simply read as summing up the received and hence obvious opinion (doxa)
of the day.

This institutionalization also explains why, on first reading, the major theorist
of power of the early twentieth century and the immediate precursor of IR realists did
not really add anything new on the topic of great powers. In his major work, Max
Weber stated that: “Nowadays one usually refers to those polities that appear to be the
bearers of power prestige as [Macht prestige] the ‘Great Powers.’” To Weber,
prestige is not specific to the system of states, but is rather a general “irrational
element” towards which every polity strives. In the state system, it is relational: it means “the glory [Ehre] of power over other communities.”\textsuperscript{17}

The reason why this definition does not at first appear as new is that, to Weber as to Vattel and Ranke before him, prestige is obviously tied in with military and economic factors. The comparatively superior strength and the mutually recognized spheres of influence that are constitutive of great powers may, therefore, be seen as what we would now call structural characteristics of the system of states. In their eyes, these are characteristics of the social organization of states. Vattel and Ranke think in analytical terms, in the sense that what the agents themselves think is of no importance. It is the analyst, writing from a distance, who decides what prestige is and how it is distributed. Weber, on the other hand, is ambivalent on this issue. In some places, he writes as if the issue of prestige is analytical, whereas in others, he writes as if it is what the actors themselves think about prestige that is of the essence. Consider, for example, the following quote: “There is a close connection between the prestige of culture and the prestige of power.”\textsuperscript{18} To Weber, prestige of culture is an intersubjective phenomenon; it is a question of how cultures assess one another. To\textsuperscript{19} the degree that prestige of power is tied to prestige of culture, prestige of power becomes not only an analytical question, but also a question of intersubjectivity. Intersubjective meanings depend on a game of negotiation by two or more agents. Seeing a great power as intersubjectively constituted by the actors of a system is a
very different thing from seeing it as structurally constituted by the system of states. Since Weber’s usage was in line with the meaning commonly ascribed to the term “great power,” however, this seems to have gone unnoticed at the time. A similar tension may be traced in what remains, arguably, the most widely used and explicitly realist and descriptive definition, namely that offered by Jack Levy. To him, a great power is a state that plays a major role in international politics with respect to security-related issues. The great powers can be differentiated from other states by their military power, their interests, their behaviour in general and interactions with other powers, other powers’ perception of them, and some formal criteria.19

The existence of another meaning of the term “great power” became apparent only when it was spelled out in the work of the other key sociologist at the time, Emile Durkheim. The context was a lecture course on the state, held in 1913 but not published in its entirety until 1950.20 Durkheim saw the emergence of the modern state as emanating from a small cadre (historically, the king and his advisers). This state is one thing, and the society that eventually comes to rule another: “the State is nothing if it is not an organ distinct from the rest of society. If the State is everywhere, it is nowhere. The State comes into existence by a process of concentration that detaches a certain group of individuals from the collective mass.”21 In the beginning, Durkheim held, this state does not have many ties to society: “it is above all the agent of external relations, the agent for the acquisition of territory and the organ of
diplomacy.” The more the state grows, however, the denser its interface with society. Durkheim famously describes this as an organic process, whereby the head grows an ever more finely honed cybernetic system with which to operate its societal body. He maintains that this process is characteristic of the modern state from the seventeenth century onwards. Here we have a clear-cut criterion for gauging which states are “great powers” and which are not. Drawing on the concept of pride, which seems close to Weber’s “prestige,” Durkheim argues:

As long as there are States, so there will be national pride, and nothing can be more warranted. But societies can have their pride, not in being the greatest or the wealthiest, but in being the most just, the best organized and in possessing the best moral constitution.25

Durkheim’s classificatory scheme is now used by statespeople about other powers. To pick a recent example, during her state visit to New Delhi in 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that:

Not so long ago, the measure of a nation’s greatness was the size of its military, or its economic strength, or its capacity to dominate its friends and allies [...]. But in this century – in the interconnected and interdependent world in which we live – greatness can be defined by the power of a nation’s example.24
The two meanings of great power appear in contemporary analytical usage as well. Clear-cut examples of privileging materiality over morals may be found in Waltz, who holds that the key characteristic of the existing international system is that it produces units that are functionally equivalent.25 These functionally similar units are now nation-states, and they differ in one aspect only: their power resources. Some states are greater than others, and this greatness may be explained by the characteristics of the system itself, which differentiates between its units only at this very level. As William Wohlforth has argued where Russia is concerned, greatness is therefore a systemic characteristic.26 It has nothing to do with intersubjectivity or recognition, which should be treated as questions of foreign policy.27 A similarly clear-cut example of privileging morals may be found in Reus-Smit’s work, whose thrust emanates from the idea that overt institutions of IR like sovereignty are dependent on covert constitutional structures, which he defines as “coherent ensembles of intersubjective beliefs, principles, and norms that perform two functions in ordering international societies: they define what constitutes a legitimate actor, entitled to all the rights and privileges of statehood; and they define the basic parameters of rightful state action.”28

Note, however, that both neo-realists and constructivists like Reus-Smit perform ideal-typical analytics. Empirically, the two meanings may simply not lend
themselves to disentanglement. To sum up, the literature on what makes a power “great” suggests two ideal-typical methodologies, where one highlights material resources, and the other civilizational standards. The only criterion for deciding which of these ideal types is the better one is fruitfulness – but there is no agreement on which is the more fruitful. We may have reached a theoretical dead end.

Granted that civilizational standards add up to more than an epiphenomenon, the combination of material resources and civilizational standards is multiply realizable. The clearest stance on the matter in this volume is that of Deborah Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, who see civilizational standards as compensatory relative to material resources. Since this chapter is an attempt to bring the two approaches into conversation, I will treat them as complementary.

Table 4.1 Here

If we follow Reus-Smit’s train of thought as outlined above in the preceding paragraphs, we could argue that, in the European case, the relative weight of the criteria has changed, with closeness to God – a status question of civilizational standards – becoming relatively less important than material resources over time. However, during the period when closeness to God was most important, France was considered to be both the closest and number one in material resources, so we do not have the status inequality needed to disentangle the issue.
In the following, I will ask two questions. From the Durkheimians, I take not the normative question of morals, but rather the analytical one of civilization:

Historically, is it necessary and/or sufficient for a great power to belong to Western civilization? From the Weberians, I take the question of whether it is necessary and/or sufficient for a great power to command a certain amount of material resources. I apply those questions to two great power status-seekers at the Eastern margins of Europe: Poland and Russia. The periods chosen are the ones when these powers struggled the most to be recognized as great powers. For Poland, this means the interwar period in the twentieth century; for Russia, the eighteenth century. These cases are also felicitous because Russia principally argued its case for great power status on grounds of material resources, whereas Poland relied mainly on civilizational grounds. From the two cases we can see how these kinds of status-seeking have fared in terms of necessity and sufficiency.

Trust in Honor: Durkheimian Poles

The third partition of Poland in 1795 wiped a great power off the map of Europe. In its heyday, the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom had stretched from the Baltic in the north to the Black Sea in the south, and Poland had been known as “the land between the seas.” Even though the Polish state thus ceased to exist, what was called the Polish nation still remained: that was the szlachta – the Polish gentry. This group made up
around 8 per-cent of the population, and was ethnically diverse. During the nineteenth century, influenced by the new ideas of a nation as an imagined community arising west of the areas where Polish was spoken, the *szlachta* was able to transform itself into the Polish *społeczeństwo*. *społeczeństwo* signified “the more complex notion of the organized, politicized, albeit still stateless, community of all Poles, led now by an intelligentsia that preserved, at the same time as it modified, the values and the style of the old szlachta.” In lieu of a Polish state, the Polish intelligentsia took it upon themselves to furnish the civilizational leadership of the Polish nation, which since the 1870s they saw in organic terms.

The Polish national romantic poet, Adam Mickiewicz, had called on Polish patriots to “*M[easure] your powers by your purposes, not your purposes by your powers.*” Heeding his advice, they attempted to re-establish a Polish state in 1830 and 1863. The third-time-lucky chance to reconstitute Polish statehood came in the wake of the First World War (WWI). Given the historical setting and the weakness of Germany and Russia at the time, it comes as no surprise that most Poles saw the new Poland as a great power. First, the precedent was at hand historically. Secondly, the cultural hegemony in Poland was still held by an *elite* that understood itself and legitimated its leading role as the successor of the *szlachta* of the old kingdom, which had *previously* been a great power. Thirdly, Poland was located between Germany in the west and Soviet Russia in the east, great powers both. In
terms of what was still, in 1919, referred to explicitly as the standard of civilization, Poland’s credentials were not in doubt. Poland’s status as a Christian historical nation was acknowledged by all concerned. A twenty-year-long campaign for recognition as a great power followed.

At first, relative capabilities between Poland and the old great powers superficially seemed to accommodate the Polish position. Already in 1920, the French historian Louis Eisenmann noted how “It was a tragedy for Poland to have been reborn too weak to be a power, and strong enough to aspire to more than the status of a small state.” As a result of lost wars and internal upheavals, both German and Soviet Russian capabilities were temporarily weakened, and both states were having trouble projecting their great power images on their surroundings. The dip in German and Russian prestige following their World War I losses and the October Revolution meant that Poland could temporarily stand up to comparisons with these two great powers. Anton DePorte holds that, initially, the main actors in the interwar system perceived Poland to be “...almost a great power.”

The point for us is that there were enough capabilities in evidence for Poland to launch its campaign without falling flat immediately. Poland, a population of around 30 million and an army of one-quarter of a million, was allied with France, claimed a sphere of influence over the Baltic states, and was strategically important as the door to invasion of Russia.
Because of its weak economy, however, Poland could ill afford to keep an army of this size. In the 1930s, defense costs reached as much as 27.5 percent of government expenditure, which was high even by contemporary standards. Polish territory, which had belonged to three different political units for well over one hundred years, lacked a common infrastructure. The far northwestern part, the “Polish Corridor” (Pomerelia), gave Poland access to the sea, but also split Germany in two. Polish territory, ravaged by warfare, included few industrialized patches, and what economic life there was, was often shorn of its previous context and was not necessarily complementary. As judged by public statements, there was domestic consensus that Poland was a great power, whose destiny it was to play a leading role in the region between the German and the Russian state formations. This element was present not only in the 1920s, but throughout the period. In terms of defense, Poland’s capabilities were spread thin. The borders of the Polish state were seemingly fixed during the period from 1919 to 1921, but problems remained. In the northeast, Poland claimed the ethnically Polish city of Vilna on ethnic grounds. In the south, there was the problem of Teschen. The duchy of Teschen (Cieszyn) had a mixed Polish-Czech population, with Poles being in a solid majority. At the Paris Peace Conference, Poland was given Upper Silesia; Danzig, with its predominantly German population,
was made a free city. In the plebiscites held there in 1920, no less than 96.5 percent of the population opted to remain part of Germany.\textsuperscript{36} The Polish Corridor (Pomerelia),\textsuperscript{36} through formerly German territory,\textsuperscript{36} and, together with the Free State of Danzig,\textsuperscript{36} thus cutting off East Prussia from the rest of Germany,\textsuperscript{36} made Germany the only land-based non-contiguous state in Europe. The negative impact of the Corridor on German–Polish relations in particular can hardly be overrated.\textsuperscript{37}

In its dealings with smaller powers, Poland tried to act the great power by posing itself as a fully fledged alternative for military alliances. At the 1922 League of Nations conference on reparations in Genoa, Poland actually played a leading role among the breakaway successor states to Tsarist Russia. The reasons for this could, however, be traced back to the common economic interest of these states in not having to meet a share of the old Tsarist debts. Then, with that common interest gone, Poland failed to interest Lithuania in its project to organize a Baltic League later that year, and Lithuania’s absence contributed heavily to the downfall of that idea. Although Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Finland actually signed a convention, Finland failed to ratify it, so the scheme came to naught. When, in 1924, a “small” Baltic conference comprised of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania was held in Kaunas, it was widely interpreted as a further blow to the Polish leadership of the successor states. Undeterred, Warsaw tried to build a four power Baltic alliance, but Lithuania proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to Polish aspirations in the Baltic. In 1934,
and again in 1938, the Polish foreign minister visited Estonia and Latvia, seeking to forge a common defense against the dangers that lurked from Germany and the Soviet Union.

In the south, too, Polish attempts at forging a Central European organization all folded. During World War I, Beneš had found cooperation with the Poles to be “systematic, sincere, and rather successful.” The Teschen issue soon made cooperation between the two states difficult. When when in 1920–21, what came to Little Entente between Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia was forged, it was a setback for Poland. In 1927, Warsaw presented a plan for an “Eastern Locarno,” but it had to act on its own, and the initiative proved fruitless.

Having established that Poland was serious in its quest for great power, and that the material base for this claim was weak, and that Poland failed signally in its somewhat panicked alliance policies, I conclude that Poland’s status-seeking was based on civilizational standards more specifically, memories of past greatness, a code of military honour, and a sense of maintaining old European social and political mores against Soviet Russia, and, after 1933, also Nazi Germany.

Poland’s aspirations of being measured on par with Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were formally challenged by the great power victors of World War I already in 1925; at the Congress of Locarno. To Poland and also Czechoslovakia, whose foreign ministers were present at Locarno but did not, to
humiliation, take part in the main negotiations, Locarno was a disaster. By guaranteeing Germany’s borders in the west, but not in the east, the Western great powers had created a situation whereby German revisionism in the east was greatly facilitated. Locarno exposed Polish aspirations to sit at table with the great powers as an equal power as mere wishful thinking. Nevertheless, nearly all Poles clung to their perceptions of Poland as a great power with unimpaired tenacity. As part of Locarno, Germany would re-enter the League of Nations, and, as a great power, it had been promised a permanent seat on the League’s Council. Warsaw reacted by demanding that Poland, too, should be given a permanent seat. Poland was in fact refused a move which confirms the assumption that the great powers perceived some kind Central European region between Germany and Russia as existing. Czechoslovakia was made to relinquish its temporary seat, and the Assembly Council was asked to Poland instead. It was understood that Poland would expect to hang onto its on a quasi-permanent basis.

The picture painted above brings out Poland’s constant aspirations to become a great power, but it also shows that the policies designed to carry out those aspirations varied with the changes in the general balance of power in Europe. In the years immediately after World War I, with Germany and Russia temporarily weakened, Poland tried to go it alone. Later, with Germany and Russia ascending, Poland looked to France. When that policy proved unsuccessful, Poland once again
tried to go it alone by distancing itself from Germany and Russia in equal measure, and also from France and the League. Poland signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union in 1932, and one with Germany in 1934. The ensuing go it alone policy is by definition at loggerheads with a policy based on civilizational standards. On the contrary, it is a strategy based on the idea that material capabilities will suffice to maintain great power status.

Such a change is in direct evidence in Polish policy from the mid-1930s onwards. Regarding formal standards, Poland withdrew from the League of Nation’s minority rights scheme, refusing to comply with it until such time when all other European states would also do so. John Maynard Keynes even characterized the new Poland as “an economic impossibility whose only industry is Jew-baiting.”

Regarding alliance policy, in 1934, plans for an “Eastern Pact” were being prepared within the framework provided by the League Covenant. This Eastern Pact would consist of a regional mutual assistance pact, a Franco-Soviet guarantee pact, and a general treaty signed by all participants. France would be the guarantor, and the Soviet Union would assume obligations towards France as if it were a signatory of Locarno. The pact needed Polish support to be realized. However, Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck regarded it as a “form of a big concern, this time French, to push Poland down.” In 1937, true to the non-program of going it alone, produced a new plan for establishing a neutral bloc between Germany and Russia.
Poland’s overtures toward its smaller neighbors in the interwar period all failed. Breaking with the basic civilizational standard of non-use of military force, Poland turned to the use of force instead, and so lost out on civilizational standards. Following the 1938 Anschluss, Poland presented Lithuania with an ultimatum, and was only in this way able to establish diplomatic relations with Kaunas. Then, after the German intervention in Sudetenland, Beck, thinking that Czechoslovakia was a dispensable quantity, seized the opportunity to take Teschen by force of arms.45

Predictably, the great powers did not accommodate Poland’s go-it-alone-based status-seeking. The principal authority on Polish interwar policy, Piotr Wandycz, approvingly cites the French military attaché to Poland in the mid-1930s, who “spoke disparagingly of the intoxicating ‘great power elixir,’ served to the Polish public periodically by the governmental press.”46 As late as in 1936, following an exclamation by Polish Foreign Minister Beck that Poland was a great power, French Foreign Minister Barthou ridiculed this by repeating that Poland was a great power, and, after a pregnant pause, added, “a very big power.”47 Poland chose to disregard the lack of status accommodation, and continued to voice its status claim on the level of public debate as well as on the highest level of state. In September 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union split the region between themselves. The Polish campaign to be accommodated as a great power ended in tears.
To sum up, Poland’s claim of the great power status of the state’s previous incarnation as eighteenth-century Poland was prominent domestically, but not taken seriously internationally. In terms of moral standing, after Piłsudski’s military coup in 1926, Poland was no longer a democracy. This meant that the principal ground on which it sought status, namely civilizational standards, was jeopardized for within the League, democratic standards held sway. With the increasing breaking of specific standards from the mid-1930s on, and culminating in the threat of war with Lithuania and the land grab of Teschen, Poland effectively shifted the grounds of its status-seeking from civilizational standards to material capabilities. When Britain made the German infringement of Poland’s sovereignty a casus belli in 1939, Britain it did so in terms that unequivocally confirmed Poland’s civilizational credentials, but nowhere was it argued that they were exemplary. That was thoroughly overdetermined, since the great powers at no point accommodated Poland’s campaign to be treated as a great power. It is evident that the claims in terms of civilizational standards did not suffice to secure status accommodation of Poland as a great power. The obvious conclusion is that references to civilizational standards were not a sufficient condition to be accommodated as a great power. Indeed, the literature is rife with other examples of this, with India as a particularly important example. Baldev Nayar and T. V. Paul demonstrate how Nehru’s India was rich in the civilizational standard of moral fortitude, without this being enough to give it the status of great power. The difference was that this was very clear indeed to Nehru, who argued, “we are not a
Power that counts; potentially we are very much so.” In Poland, there was no such insight.

In terms of material capabilities, German and Russian weakness proved to be ephemeral, and Poland’s relative standing in this regard sank drastically throughout the interwar period. Poland was not fully represented at the Locarno conference, proved unable to build or even participate in alliances, and reneged on its treaty obligations without having the material base to do so with impunity. Still, an overwhelming number of Poles stuck to the perception that Poland was a great power. Characteristically, as late as in 1938, just before the Polish military detachments were to collapse like a deck of cards before German and Russian forces, the former Polish ambassador to Moscow and Paris, Juliusz Łukasiewicz, published a book programmatically titled Polska jest mocarstwem (—“Poland is a power”), by which he meant a great power. Status-seeking may go on, even when the two principal grounds on which to seek it – civilizational standing and material capabilities – have both failed, and even though no other state takes the effort seriously. Poles trusted honor – the “outward recognition we gain from others in response to our excellence” – to secure great power status for them. They forgot that honor is different from status, in that it is not enough to be true to your own standards. Status is competitive, in that one also has to outcompete other status-seekers, and here Poland failed. From the mid-1930s, they failed doubly, in that they did not live up to their own standard of
excellence, and so slipped up not only where status was concerned, but also in terms of honor.

**Trust in the Material: Weberian Russians**

According to official Soviet historiography, “beginning from the mid-seventeenth century onwards, Russia already played a most important role in the political life of Eastern Europe, so that no international problem could any longer be solved without her participation.” Anisimov concurs when he usefully sketches out a tripartite journey into international society: “The first step that Russia took into the Westphalian world of international relations was its participation in the First Northern War (1655–60), a step determined by the decision of 1654 on the subjugation of the Ukraine. The next step was taken in 1686 by the Eternal Peace with the Rech Pospolita [that is, Poland-Lithuania].” This is not only due to the way both largely proceeded to draw up the treaty according to the general standard of the day, but also because Russia at this time also succeeded in its long struggle to form an alliance with key powers (with the Empire, Venice, Brandenburg, and Poland-Lithuania against the Ottoman Porte). The third step, Anisimov argues, was taken hot on the heels of Peter’s Grand Embassy 1697–1698, when he grasped the potential of alliance with states that his predecessors had considered untouchable for religious reasons, for in a war against Sweden, Poland-Lithuania, and the Porte. Westernization
greatly speeded up by Peter the Great’s famous Grand Embassy. Peterson outlines how one crucial set of techniques, those of government, were imported first and foremost from Sweden, with attempts to fit them onto Russian social conditions. Historians universally stress the role of the Great Northern War (1701–1721) in establishing Russia as a central player in international society. It was the war that broke out on the eve of the new century which really brought Russia in.

The leading eighteenth-century specialist Hans Bagger even argues that "The Peace of Nystadt on 30 August 1721 confirmed the position that Russia had attained as a great power during the Great Northern War. As a consequence of its new status as a great power, Russia became a European state insofar as the Russian Empire had to be incorporated into the system of European international relations." Now “the courts of Europe could no longer ignore Russia as a semibarbarian state,” but had to take it into account. Note, however, that Bagger explicitly brackets how Russia was still classified as semi-barbarian (as opposed to civilized) when he confers great power status upon it. The tension identified by Bagger where Russia is concerned between a clear military potential on the one hand and a lack of civilizational level, on the other, mirrors the tension in status previously noted above. Furthermore, Bagger produces a quote from Russian Vice-Chancellor Peter Shafirov to demonstrate that Russian statesmen themselves knew full well that “a few decades ago, in the states of Europe people thought and wrote of the nation and state
of Russia in the same way as they did of the Indian, Persian and other nations [... had] no intercourse with Europe whatsoever, apart from a little trade.” Shafirov also stated that Russians knew very well that the greater part of their neighbors view unfavourably the good position in which it has pleased God to place us; that they would be delighted should an occasion present itself to imprison us once more in our earlier obscurity and that if they seek our alliance it is rather through fear and hate than through feelings of friendship.

Crucially, as seen by that key Russian statesman, Russia had the material power but lacked the social mores required to be fully recognized. Shafirov proved to be the first in a long series of Russians who saw things this way, but who were not heard; the leadership kept privileging materiality. Here we may note how Peter experienced problems marrying off his offspring – the ultimate snub in an age of dynasticism. In 1724, Peter managed to marry off his daughter Anna Petrovna to the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp at Swedish behest. In 1745, feelers from British throne pretender Charles Edward Stuart were sent out regarding Elizabeth, but nothing came of this. Even at the end of the century, when Emperor Paul tried to marry off his daughter to the King of Sweden, the project still stranded on the issue of religion.

During the sixty years following the Great Northern War, Russia became gradually more successful in being recognized as a worthwhile ally, a power entitled to participation in peace settlements and a power mentioned in treaties as a guarantor.
of the peace. Russia attended its first Peace Congress at Soissons in 1728–1730. In the War of the Polish Succession, Russia, by dint among other things of having fielded an army about 30,000 men strong, was definitely a player. However, Russia was conspicuously absent when it came to the peace settlement. But come the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763, known in the United States as the French and Indian Wars), Russia was a key player in the basic change in alliance patterns that precipitated the war. According to Craig and George, this was when the term “great power” became a part of the “general political vocabulary,” and at the time of this war it was considered “normal and right” that there should be five great powers. Still, Paul Kennedy quotes the French minister Choiseul to the effect that:

[I]n the present state of Europe it is colonies, trade and in consequence sea power, which must determine the balance of power upon the continent. The House of Austria, Russia, the King of Britain are only powers of the second rank, as are all those which cannot go to war unless subsidized by the trading powers.

This is a useful reminder that the hierarchy may not have been as fixed as Craig and George hold. To the materially minded, this is when Russia became a great power: “By the Seven Years War the Russian army was the largest in Europe, the establishment aimed for at its commencement consisting of 162,430 men in field regiments, 74,548 garrison troops, 27,758 men in the landmilitia, 12,937 members
of the corps of engineering and artillery, and 44,000 irregulars. The Seven Years' War seems to be an important turning point also in the sense that Russia apparently restrained its military campaign short of crushing Prussia in order to keep that state in a shape where it could continue to play an important part in the workings of the balance of Europe. In other words, Russia had entered into the management of the state system to the extent of downplaying immediate interests for what were held to be more long-term ones.

During the following decades, Russia also became a “great responsible” of the system. Adam Watson indicates the Empress Elizabeth’s secret negotiations with the heads of France and Austria in 1760 as the crucial date. Certainly, by dint of the role Russia played in all three of Poland’s partitions, this criterion was firmly fulfilled by the end of the century. If 1760 marked an informal breakthrough, the 1779 Treaty of Teschen was a formal one, inasmuch as Russia became for the first time a guarantor power.

Official Soviet diplomatic history stresses how Russia’s 1783 convention with Turkey, as well as developments in the law of the sea, gave Russia a practical role in the formation of international law – definitely another breakthrough in terms of managing the system. By the end of the century, Russia was a fully-fledged participant in the formation of alliances. For example, as of 1780, Russia was a member of the League of Armed Neutrality, which also counted Denmark and
Portugal. Twenty years later, a successor was formed, now consisting of Russia, Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia. In 1800, the new Russian Emperor Paul ordered the College of Foreign Affairs to draw up a comprehensive analysis of Russia’s current standing and future prospects in terms of foreign policy. In the report, the College characterized Russia as “the world’s leading power,” a “Hercules,” etc and so forth.68

In terms of materiality, there is no doubt that Russia had become a great power by the end of the eighteenth century. There remained no doubt about its Christian credentials, the principle of legitimacy was the same as in the other powers, and dynastic intermarriages had become common. Still, European complaints about Russia’s lack of civility and the continuing doubt about the extent to which it should be considered to be “of Europe” continued unabated. David Hume, for one, complained that “the two most civilized nations, the English and French, should be in decline; and the barbarians, the Goths and the Vandals of Germany and Russia, should be in power and renown.”69 Variants of this complaint were heard in other forms and in other arenas. For example, in 1804, the French Ambassador to St. Petersburg Hédouville complained to his Foreign Minister Talleyrand: “There is no other foreign court where the diplomatic corps is less informed on political dispositions and proceedings than here.”70

The reason why Russia did not provide information to its corps diplomatique reflected a penchant for secretiveness in all dealings with foreigners that Russia had
taken over from the Mongols. Here I think we have the key to why Russia was not accepted as a great power. By the lights of the established great powers, its state was not in order – and, as Hegel was about to work out in great detail, the ordering of the state was the key criterion of “civilization.” As underlined by Frederick the Great and other politicians of the time, if regarded as a police state, Russia was less successful than others:

He [Frederick] says, for instance, let us compare Holland with Russia: Russia may have the largest territory of any European state, but it is mostly made up of swamps, forests, and deserts, and is inhabited by miserable groups of people totally destitute of activity and industry; if one takes Holland, on the other hand, with its tiny territory, again mostly marshland, we find that it nevertheless possesses such a population, such wealth, such commercial activity, and such a fleet as to make it an important European state, something that Russia is only beginning to become.

The capacity for state action was less efficient and more limited. Also, in Europe, societies were emerging and states were changing their way of handling societies from being one of direct rule to one of indirect governance. In Europe, this period saw the gradual emergence of liberal forms of governing that replaced the police state, and society gradually replaced territory as the object of reference for governing. In degrees that became weaker the further east from Britain...
moved, liberalism understood as concrete social practice firmed its grip. A whole plethora of Europeans argued that eventually, Russia had to take cognizance of the change. Writing under the alias of Ivan Aletof, Voltaire cast Russia in the role of an apprentice to European civilization, a “Scythian voyaging to Athens” coming to Paris in order to be enlightened.\[73\] In summing up the reign of Catherine the Great, Bruce Lincoln places the emphasis on how one cause of its social policy was that Russia’s “status as a Great Power” imposed an imperative for civil peace, which again imposed heightened efficiency on the Russian administration. He goes on to note another factor which added to this imposition: that a number of young Russian bureaucrats held that, to a Europe dominated by Enlightenment thinking, the pre-modern military and fiscal concerns of Muscovite C Tsars conformed poorly to the image of a G Great P power that their sovereigns hoped to project. To be sure, Russia’s military needs continued to be greater than ever, but, as a great power, it also must exhibit some proper concern for its citizens.\[74\]

In other words, a new ethos of what governing a state entailed was setting a new standard not only for what a state had to be in order to be considered well-ordered, but also, and as a corollary, for which states should be considered great powers. Russia’s great power status-seeking ambitions were thwarted by the emergent standard of civilization, a symbolic factor. Material capability alone proved to be not enough. Mutatis mutandis, this theme has complicated Russian status-seeking ever...
since. Consider how, as Stalin emerged out of World War II (the Second World War) military power of the Eurasian continent, Konrad Adenauer wrote in 1946 to William Sollmann that “Asia stands on the Elbe” or how, taking on board Western representations of the Soviet Union, a central slogan of the perestroika period (1986–1991) was the need for Russia to “return to civilization.”

<space>

A Conclusions

The case of Poland in the interwar period has demonstrated that, in order to be acknowledged as a great power, a state must be perceived as possessing a certain amount of material resources that are translatable to military capability. Durkheim was correct in specifying that it is societies, not states, that “can have their pride, not in being the greatest or the wealthiest, but in being the most just, the best organized and in possessing the best moral constitution.” Such symbolic capital may be converted to status in international relations—but not to the status of great power.

Inversely, the case of eighteenth-century Russia should demonstrate that material capability alone does not make a great power. This conclusion is at odds with Wohlfarth’s work, which, based on neo-realist tenets, provides a functionalist analysis of Russia’s road to greatness. If we return to the two-by-two matrix that summed up part one of this chapter (see Table 4.1 above) and specify it in light of discussion, the following result emerges (see Table 4.3):
During the interwar period, Poland started as a normative power aspiring to be a great power. It failed: it lost out in terms of relative capabilities, and, at the end of the period, it also compromised civilizational standards. Instead of a northerly direction, Poland ended up taking a westerly one, and came close to ending up as a peripheral power. As for Russia, it started the eighteenth century as a military power and inched its way in an easterly direction, but not far enough to become a great power.

Poland learned from its mistakes, and has not pursued great power status since 1939. The repercussions of the sequence discussed here include a certain distrust by neighboring powers, particularly Lithuania, and these do not concern us here. Where Russia is concerned, however, the discussion above has repercussions for the situation today. Contrary to Wohlforth, I would argue that Russia’s status deficit remained even in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, and that it has, nolens volens, remained even since. Further, I would argue that the issue at stake is how Russia has been represented by Western great powers: as a state that does not pass muster according to the standards of civilization. Beginning in the late 1980s, post-Soviet leaders themselves began to identify the root cause of their uneasiness vis-à-vis the West in civilizational terms. One of the key slogans of the
perestroika period was the need to “rejoin civilization” – which logically implied that the Soviet path had somehow led Russians away from it. With the fall of communism, the official Russian self-understanding of the Soviet past came to blame a mistaken system of governance for the lingering problems in what was frequently referred to as the “civilized world.” For example, when Vladimir Putin addressed the nation at the millennium, he said:

Soviet power did not let the country develop a flourishing society which could be developing dynamically, with free people. First and foremost, the ideological approach to the economy made our country lag increasingly behind (otstavenie) the developed states. It is bitter to admit that for almost seven decades we travelled down a blind alley, which took us away from the main track of civilization [...]. Russia will not soon, if ever, be a replica of, say, the US or Great Britain, where liberal values have deep-seated traditions. For us, the state, with its institutions and structures, always played an exclusively important role in the life of the country and its people. For the Russian (rossiyanin), a strong state is not an anomaly, not something with which he has to struggle, but, on the contrary, a source of and a guarantee for order, as well as the initiator and main moving force of any change. Contemporary Russian society does not mistake a strong and effective state for a totalitarian one.78
This could be read as a plea for recognition of great powerhood status on new of democracy and market economy—that is, according to the present-day civilization (human rights, neoliberalism). Ostensibly, this is a liberal model. But note that the Russian leader is trapped within a problematic order, with a strong state appearing as the guarantor of the system of governance. The problem is that the model of governance that Russia pledges to implement here runs directly against the key liberal trend, where the question is always how the state may govern less. view of what a state should do is the exact opposite. The Russian state should rule in direct fashion, not govern from afar. What this means is that Russia is once again evolving a rationality of government that has firm precedents in Western Europe, but that has since been abandoned by Western European states themselves. One corollary of evolving a different rationality of government is that the specific social practices to which those rationalities give rise will differ. And indeed, notable differences do exist between Russia and Western Europe regarding ownership, freedom of contract, judiciary and penal practices, health administration, and a whole swathe of other practices. A further corollary is that, as seen from Western Europe, Russia is once again rigged with a system of governance that jeopardizes its possible standing as a great power.

Via an alternative route, I reach the same conclusion as Larson and Shevchenko: that Russia’s standing as a great power must remain in serious doubt.
Russia’s nuclear arsenal and what a realist would judge to be its sphere of influence in Central Asia count in its favor. So does the size of its armed forces, but the weight of this factor evaporates if we correlate for quality of personnel and equipment. As seen by its inability to use military power efficiently and effectively (most conspicuously in Chechnya), Russia falls short on a key material criterion: the ability to project military power that is on par with (other) great powers. Today’s Russia also falls short on most other material criteria such as technological innovation, not to mention size of population and gross national budget.

Russia ostensibly shares a moral purpose and a whole string of norms with the (other) leading powers of the system. It is one of five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and, following the demise of the Soviet Union, it became a member of the Group of 7 (G7), which became the Group of 8 (G8). Russia is also a member of key international institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), and participates in a wide range of international regimes. However, Russia’s membership portfolio is patchy, with key economic institutions lacking and the overall total of institutional and regime memberships being considerably smaller than, for example, that of France. Furthermore, as recurrently noted in the literature on Russia’s role within international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) system or within regimes such as those in the area of human rights, Russia tends to wield its influence by veto rather than by initiative. It rarely plays a
leading role within these institutions. These observable facts all sow doubt about the
degree to which Russia actually does share a moral purpose with the other powers of
the system.

During its heyday in the eighteenth century, liberalism posed the question of
great powerhood in terms of a “standard of civilization,” turning around the
classic character of the state. Liberalism came to dominate in such a degree that this became
the “natural” way in which to discuss global politics. Today, neo-liberalism imposes a
similar discursive order, by bringing to bear a set of criteria in global politics that
centers on governance. Like liberalism in an earlier era, it is rapidly emerging as the
“natural” way to discuss such global political questions as the relative standing of
powers. The issue of compatible rationalities of government lies at the heart of
struggles over globalization and system transformation. In various discourses (for
example, on development, or on women’s rights) neo-liberal standards for what
should be considered good governance have long been dominant, already well
described empirically and thoroughly theorized. It is high time for scholars working
within the field of International Relations to shed their presuppositions about the
non-importance of social factors for state relations, and to begin to realize that the rise
of hegemonic liberalism is relevant for other discourses on global politics as
– not least the one on great powerhood.
With the coming to power of Vladimir Putin in 2000, the official line continued to be that Russia remained a great power, but one that now sought recognition in terms of democracy and market economy. This might appear to be a liberal model – but only on the surface. In a work on the 1905 reforms in Russia, Weber once characterized the new system of government as Scheinkonstitutionalis – fake constitutionalism. Putin’s use of liberal catchwords like “the rule of law” has been equally lacking in seriousness and practical purchase. To quote but one of many analysts who single out this as a key development, Viatcheslav Morozov writes:

As the liberal reforms of the social security system failed, the government tended to opt for paternalistic solutions, such as the measures aimed at raising nativity rates, demonstrating that the stronger state is better in providing security to the people. Foreign policy came to be dominated by the idea of establishing Russia as a strong and independent player on the global stage – here, as in domestic politics, autonomy became an end in itself.80

The thinking about government which is promulgated by slogans like “managed democracy,” “sovereign democracy,” etc. and so forth is predicated on the idea that a strong state may serve as the guarantee of the system of governance. The problem is that the model of governance that Russia pledges to implement here runs
directly counter to a key liberal trend, where the question is always how the state govern less. Once again, the Russian state is opting for direct rule.

In the final analysis, in order to achieve and maintain the status of a great power, social compatibility is essential. To quote a paradigmatic voice from today’s Russia, Natal’ya Narochnitskaya argues that Russia “haunts Europe, which, having built its ‘paradise on earth,’ remains apprehensive of our magnitude and our capacity to withstand all challenges.” She sums up the problem neatly. It is not enough to parade what Russia itself considers “strength” in order to be recognized as a great power. That would be to commit the same error as did Poland in the interwar period: to seek status according to criteria that the relevant circle of recognition does not find to be of relevance. What is needed is to demonstrate strength and power recognized as being of a sort that makes its wielder a great power in the eyes of the firmly ensconced great powers. If that is what it takes to be recognized as a great power, then Russia is playing the wrong game.

That is, if the game remains the same. Here we have made the assumption that civilizational standards, in the sense of sharing and working towards maintaining a certain kind of international order, is a necessary, but not sufficient, prerequisite for being established as a great power. The choice of time frames and cases has led to a Euro-centric specification regarding the kind of international order that made up part of the matrix for the great power game studied. While this may be warranted for
historical study, it is the consensus of this volume that such Euro-centrism is now past its due date.\textsuperscript{84}

We are now in the midst of an intense struggle about what kind of international order will make up the matrix for future great power seeking.\textsuperscript{85} While I would maintain that the general set-up of this chapter is valid, the temporal area of validity for the specific concept of civilizational standards used would no longer hold, for status emerges within a specific civilizational context. If a standard of civilization based on human rights and neo-liberalism prevails, then adherence to such a standard will remain crucial to great power status-seeking. If it does not, then some new and yet unknown intersubjectively determined concept of civilizational standards will take the place now occupied by neoliberalism.\textsuperscript{86} Russia may, or may not, score better on practical norm fulfillment of such a hypothetical standard of civilization. The historical record so far indicates that Russia has had problems with norm fulfillment according to all previously operating standards.\textsuperscript{87} If the problem boils down to following any standard that is not domestically determined, then Russia’s great power status-seeking will in all probability remain elusive.

Charles Tilly famously quipped that states make war and war makes states. Furthermore, realists have long argued that war is the crucible wherein great powers are forged. My two cases support that argument. World War I re-made Poland, and the way Poland fared in World War II unmade the Polish hankering after the status of
great power. In the case of Russia, the Great Northern War, the Napoleonic Wars and, we may add, World War II definitely helped its status-seeking, but that was not enough to establish Russia as a fully-fledged great power. Judged by the historical record and, within the modern system of states, war victories seem to be a necessary but not sufficient precondition for being accommodated as a great power. To end on a normative note, one reason for the particular appositeness of the topic of this volume lies exactly here. We may piously hope that today’s status-seeking by rising powers will break the historical pattern, so that accommodation may take place without war.
**Table 4.1.** Durkheimian and Weberian Great Power Criteria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilizational Standards</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material Resources</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>W+, D+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>W−, D+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Low | W−, D+ | W−, D− |

**Table 4.2** Perceived Population in Millions and Size of Armed Forces by Manpower for Poland, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, France, Germany, and the USSR for the Years 1922 and 1937.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Size of Armed Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>839*</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>131**</td>
<td>166**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Metropolitan forces only. **=Given as European Russia (i.e., west of the Urals). Sources: The Statesman’s Yearbook, 1922 and 1937 (London: Macmillan, 1922 and 1938).

**Table 4.3** Four Types of Powers, Defined in Terms of Degrees of Capabilities and Civilizational Standard Fulfillment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Fulfilling Civilizational Standards</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

42
### Degree of Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High</th>
<th>Great Powers</th>
<th>Military Powers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Normative Powers</td>
<td>Peripheral Powers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. I would like to thank my fellow contributors, and particularly the editors and Andrei Shevchenko, for comments on previous versions. I also thank Benign de Carvalho, Jakub Godzimirski, Jennifer Sterling-Folker, Ole Jacob Sending, Shogo Suzuki, and Jonathan Wright for help and written comments.


5. The Weberian tradition is the dominant one in this volume; witness how the introduction chapter defines capabilities not as symbolic or material, but simply as “material resources states can use to seek ends.” I have adopted this usage throughout the chapter.


Thomas J. Volgy et al., chapter in this volume Chapter 3.


21 Ibid., 82.

22 Ibid., 85.

23 Ibid., 75.


28 Reus-Smit, Moral Purpose, 30.

One caveat: The immediate cause of the 1926 coup was quarrels between Piłsudski and his main political opponent Dmowski. The latter, who thought that Poland might “grow to be one of the greatest nations in Europe,” feared that under German tutelage it might dwindle to a “narodek,” a disparaging term for a little people alluding to the nineteenth-century idea of non-historic nations; Piotr S. Wandycz, “Poland’s Place in Europe in the Concepts of Piłsudski and Dmowski,” *East European Politics and Societies* 4, no. 3 (September 1990), 451–69.


41 Korbel, *Poland between East and West*, 206.


49 Ibid., 133.

50 Roos, *Polen*, 240. Roos erroneously has 1939 as the year of publication.


57 Ibid.


59 Shafirov to a French colleague in 1721, quoted in Dukes, *The Making of Russian Absolutism*, 77.

60 Bagger, “The Role of the Baltic,” 52.


62 Craig and George, *Force and Statecraft*, 3 and 22, respectively.


64 Dukes, *The Making of Russian Absolutism*, 129.


69 Quoted in David Bayne Horn, British Public Opinion and The First Partition of Poland (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1945), 18–19.  
76 Durkheim, Professional Ethics, 75.  
80 Viacheslav Morozov, “Russia and the West: Dividing Europe, Constructing Each Other,” Paper presented at the annual conference of the International Studies Association,

81 Quoted in Sergei Prozorov, Understanding Conflict Between Russia and the EU: The Limits of Integration (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

82 Quoted in Sergei Prozorov, Understanding Conflict Between Russia and the EU: The Limits of Integration (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

83 See also Larson and Shevchenko, “Status Seekers.”

84 I thank T. V. Paul and Andrei Shevchenko for the exchanges that spurred me in this direction.

85 For a particularly policy-relevant overview by a seasoned Singaporean diplomat, see Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008).


87 Neumann and POUliot, “Untimely Russia.”