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The sovereign-bank diabolic loop and ESBies

Brunnermeier, Markus K., Garicano, Luis, Lane, Philip R., Pagano, Marco, Reis, Ricardo, Santos, Tano, Thesmar, David, Van Nieuwerberg, Stijn and Vayanos, Dimitri (2016) The sovereign-bank diabolic loop and ESBies. American Economic Review, 106 (5). pp. 508-512. ISSN 0002-8282

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Identification Number: 10.1257/aer.p20161107


We propose a simple model of the sovereign-bank diabolic loop, and establish four results. First, the diabolic loop can be avoided by restricting banks’ domestic sovereign exposures relative to their equity. Second, equity requirements can be lowered if banks only hold senior domestic sovereign debt. Third, such requirements shrink even further if banks only hold the senior tranche of an internationally diversified sovereign portfolio – known as ESBies in the euro-area context. Finally, ESBies generate more safe assets than domestic debt tranching alone; and, insofar as the diabolic loop is defused, the junior tranche generated by the securitization is itself risk-free.

Item Type: Article
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Additional Information: © 2016 American Economic Association
Divisions: Economics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification: G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G18 - Government Policy and Regulation
G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
H - Public Economics > H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt > H63 - Debt; Debt Management
Date Deposited: 24 Mar 2016 17:22
Last Modified: 15 Feb 2023 00:20

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