Civil society organisations’ political control over Brazil and Japan’s development cooperation in Mozambique: *More than a mere whim?*

By Sérgio Chichava & Jimena Durán.
INTRODUCTION.
Mozambican civil society organisations (CSOs), backed by foreign civil society counterparts from Brazil and Japan mainly, have become highly critical of ProSavana, the trilateral Brazilian-Japanese-Mozambican agricultural development programme. It is perhaps Brazil’s and Japan’s most ambitious and headline-catching initiative in the recent history of their international cooperation on African development projects. The success of Prodecer, a Japanese-Brazilian development partnership, in transforming Brazil’s tropical savannah (known as the cerrado) into one of the world’s most agriculturally productive regions inspired ProSavana in Mozambique.¹

ProSavana’s promoters view the situation differently from the CSOs. Proponents describe the programme as a way to revolutionise agriculture in Mozambique by transforming the Nacala Corridor in the north into a highly productive agricultural zone that will definitively address food security issues. Mozambican CSOs, by contrast, claim that this programme will mainly benefit Brazilian and Japanese capital, as well as the Mozambican elite, while marginalising local small farmers. These groups predict that ProSavana will instigate land grabs by foreign companies and migrant farmers, leading to a rural exodus – the same problems created by Prodecer in Brazil.² As a result, the CSOs decry the programme as Japanese and Brazilian “neo-imperialism” and “neo-colonialism” (ADECRU 2014). Accordingly, Mozambican CSOs have undertaken an intense campaign to persuade the three governments to suspend, rethink and reformulate the programme, giving more attention to small farmers and providing more information and transparency.

This article aims to analyse and explain the reasons behind the CSOs’ strong criticism of the ProSavana programme. This will contribute toward: (1) understanding the role of Mozambican CSOs as actors regulating international development cooperation projects; (2) revealing the political and economic interests behind ProSavana, as a first step toward a more critical approach to trilateral cooperation; and (3) illustrating through this case how a partnership between Brazil and “traditional” donors actually works.

Firstly, we will analyse the cooperation policies of Brazil and Japan in Mozambique, taking into account its evolution, actors, mechanisms and motives. Secondly, we will introduce ProSavana, examining the narratives and roles of Japan and Brazil in this programme. Thirdly, we will consider the engagement of CSOs from the three countries, their role in exerting a political check on the Brazilian and Japanese governments, investors, and companies, as well as their narratives and mechanisms of protest.

MOZAMBIQUE: THE FIRST AFRICAN-BRAZILIAN SUCCESS?
Brazil’s interest in international development skyrocketed during the mandate of President Luís Inácio Lula Da Silva (2003-2010). Da Silva’s Administration had a special interest in strengthening

¹. For more details about Prodecer see: http://www.campo.com.br/proceder/?lang=es
². Prodecer is described as a State-led colonisation programme that has promoted land ownership in Brazil to become more concentrated and more foreign (Clements & Fernandes 2012).
relations with the Southern hemisphere, as evidenced by the attention given to Brazil’s immediate neighbours (South America; Mercosul) and its active participation in “Global South” arenas such as the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), the IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) Forum, BRICS, Africa and South America Summit (ASA), and the South Atlantic (Alves 2013). African countries have been a central part of recent Brazilian foreign policy (Stolte 2012; White 2010; World Bank & IPEA 2011), which has fostered Brazil-Africa political and economic relations. President Lula visited the continent on twelve occasions and opened seventeen embassies in African nations during his Administration. In addition to this diplomatic activism, there was an important increase in the implementation of technical cooperation projects under the rubric of South-South Cooperation (SSC), which shares and transfers national capacities and knowledge in areas of Brazilian expertise like agriculture, health, and social policy (IPEA 2013). As a result of this expansion of foreign relations, trade between Brazil and African nations increased from US$4 billion to US$20 billion in the same timeframe. The Brazilian National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES in the Portuguese acronym) set up incentives for Brazilian companies to invest in Africa (World Bank & IPEA 2011). Continued investment via development programmes like ProSavana seems likely in the long-run, given recent developments in Brazil-Africa economic and political relationship.

In this context of rising Brazilian investment in African nations’ relations with Mozambique went from mutual ignorance to close economic and diplomatic cooperation. Today the African country is chief among Brazil’s partners in Africa. For example, Brazilian-Mozambican trade has increased considerably, reaching US$146 million in 2012 (CCBM 2013). More importantly, Brazilian economic groups now operate in Mozambique, the best known example being Vale do Rio Doce’s concession to exploit the Moatize coal mine (the biggest in the country), but also construction firms like Oderbrecht and Camargo Correa.

#### Table 1. Brazilian Companies in Mozambique

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Project</th>
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</table>
| Oderbrecht SA    |  - Moatize Project: an infrastructure project to develop the Moatize coal mine, which includes building roads, constructing civil works and creating a processing plant for coal. The project provides for the rehabilitation of railways, the expansion of the port of Beira, and the construction of a thermoelectric plant.  
  - The Nacala Air Base in Nampula province, to be transformed into an international airport. |
  - Evate Project: a project for the extraction of phosphate rock. |

3. The CPLP is multilateral forum created in 1996 to deepen cooperation and consists of Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, East Timor, and Equatorial Guinea.
4. The Africa-South America Summit is a diplomatic conference first organised in 2006 in Abuja, Nigeria followed by the second summit in 2009 in Margarita Island, Venezuela and in 2013 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea.
5. Under Lula Brazil opened embassies in Ethiopia, Sudan, Benin, Tanzania, Cameroon, Togo, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, São Tomé and Principe, Botswana, and Zambia, in addition to a consulate in Nigeria.
Regardless of these numbers and examples, the intensification of ties between Brazil and Mozambique has been mostly driven by the intensification of presidential diplomacy, and marked by the promotion of cooperation programmes like the Fiocruz factory producing anti-retroviral drugs in Maputo or the ProSavana programme developing the Nacala Corridor’s agriculture potential.

Since Dilma Rousseff’s election in 2011, however, Brazil has not sustained the same level of relations with African nations as before (Fingermann 2014). As a result of the economic slowdown, Brazil-Africa trade has significantly decreased since 2011. Brazil’s exports in particular dropped from US$12.2 billion in 2011 to US$9.7 billion in 2014, whereas its imports maintained an ascending trend, which has resulted in a greater deficit for Brazil.

In tandem with the government, Brazilian companies have also decreased foreign direct investment in the African region (Mello 2015). Although most companies are privately owned — only in some cases, like Vale and Petrobras, does the government hold a stake — the government’s sentiment impacts directly on their degree of internationalisation, as most Brazilian companies rely on credit facilities provided by the BNDES and Banco do Brasil to finance their investments overseas. Hence Dilma Rousseff’s reticent foreign policy in Africa probably influenced indirectly the disinvestments of Vale and Petrobras. Mello also points out that Vale recently closed its operations in three African countries and sold a stake in its operations to Mitsui in Mozambique, while Petrobras returned five oil exploration blocks in Namibia, Angola, Tanzania and Libya in 2013 and 2014. Dilma’s retrenchment has also restrained the investments in ProSavana – Brazil’s largest Trilateral Development Cooperation agreement – of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC in Portuguese), as ABC has not been able to begin building the requisite laboratory in Lichinga. Equally, the CENAI Centre has ceased functioning due to the dearth of finance.

6. This change, likely the result of slowing economic growth in Brazil, does not only affect African nations. Brazil’s economic slowdown affected the South-South cooperation agenda as well as the other political and commercial relations.
7. The case of Vale is also motivated by the fall of coal price in the international market. In the case particular of Mozambique it can also pointed out the poor transport infrastructure.
8. Brazil’s federal government established ABC in 1987, linking it to the Ministry of External Affairs. ABC’s mission is to plan, coordinate and execute Brazil’s international cooperative ventures, both those received and those offered.
9. This Centre was established in Mozambique by Lula da Silva when he visited the country in 2009 and has the aim of forming and training labour in reforestation and prison work.
The year 2015 so far has seen a change in Brazil’s political and economic interests in Mozambique under Dilma. The March-April 2015 tour of four African countries (Ghana, Mozambique, São Tome and Angola) by Mauro Vieira, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Armando de Queiroz Monteiro Neto, the Minister of Development, Industry and Commerce, shows that even with the internal crisis and economic slowdown, Brazil is still committed to African development (Sul21 2015). During this tour, Mozambican and Brazilian officials signed four important agreements to: 1) promote partnerships between businessmen from both countries through facilities expediting the requisite visas; 2) finalise undertakings concerning renewable energy; 3) promote investment by foreign ventures; and 4) expand trade, investment and technical cooperation (Voz da América 2015).

The re-set of Brazil-Africa relations represents a shift toward an increased importance given to international affairs in Dilma Rousseff’s second term, but with a more commercial approach. In the words of Brazil’s Foreign Affairs Minister, “The valuable symbolism of our presence cannot replace diplomacy results – results that are measured with numbers, are obtained with awareness of the mission, with action, through engagement, with means, in short” (Sul21 2015). This perception corresponds with the conclusion of Leite et al. (2014) that the Rousseff Administration has taken a more pragmatic approach to South-South relations, giving more importance to commercial relations and investment.

**Brazilian Development Cooperation: Instruments and Narratives.**

The Brazilian government does not consider growing investment lending by the BNDES, debt relief, and concessional lending as instruments of developmental cooperation. Brazil’s definition of “cooperation” comprises technical, educational, scientific and humanitarian cooperation; refugee protection; and contributions to international and regional multilateral organisations (IPEA 2013). Cooperation stems from Brazil’s foreign policy priorities; hence diplomacy is the point of entry for the establishment of cooperative relations, where the Presidency’s guidelines play a key role. The Brazilian government often resorts to SSC as an instrument for maintaining and fostering economic and political relations with strategic partners (Leite et al. 2014), Mozambique being no exception. In fact, the forging of cooperative alliances with Mozambique has been interlinked with the intensification of diplomatic and economic relations. The fiscal resources allocated to Mozambique for the sake of cooperation totalled US$32,000,783 in 2011, of which US$22,157,013 went to bilateral cooperation and US$9,843,770 to trilateral cooperation (ABC 2014).

Within these mechanisms, technical cooperation takes the spotlight among development cooperation initiatives. Even though technical cooperation only represents 6% of the overall cooperative budget of US$923 million in 2010 (IPEA 2013), this aspect of Brazilian development cooperation initiatives is highlighted by the Brazilian government as one of its priorities.

10. The Brazil-Mozambique Agreement for Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (Acordo Brasil-Moçambique de Cooperação e Facilitação de Investimentos - ACFI), the first agreement to be signed based on Itamaraty’s new investment agreement model created together with the Ministry of Development, Industry and Commerce and the Ministry of Finance, stands out as the most important of these new deals.
effort enjoys important visibility. Technical cooperation may be defined as any activity designed to develop human resources and capacities through the transfer of knowledge and technical knowhow, without direct financial transfer (Cabral 2011).

The importance of technical cooperation in Brazilian development policy may be explained by two factors. Firstly, it consists of knowledge transfer, which is cost-efficient and so relevant for other developing countries. Secondly, the principles and content of technical cooperation reflect Brazil’s foreign policy narratives. The official discourse behind SSC and technical cooperation is based on the following principles: (1) horizontality, (2) non-conditionality and demand-drivenness, and (3) the sharing of Brazil’s knowledge and best practices about fighting poverty with other developing countries. These guiding principles are aligned with Brazil’s foreign policy principles, such as autonomy and non-intervention (Leite et al. 2014; Vigevani & Cepaluni 2007). Indeed, the technical cooperation offered by Brazil is based on its own development experience and its technology and public policies, which are perceived and portrayed as more relevant to developing countries, especially those located in the tropics, too, and sharing similar ecological circumstances. The idea is that “what is good for Brazil is good for Africa”. As Lula da Silva once said, “I am convinced that the public policies implemented in Brazil can be exported to Africa. There will need to be some adjustments of course, but these policies can work in Africa” (Instituto Lula 2013). This enhances Brazil’s narrative and self-image as a “development partner” rather than a “donor” (Dauvergne & Farias 2012).

Brazil’s technical cooperation further illustrates the shift in Rousseff’s approach to Africa noted above; for example, in 2012 and 2013 ABC’s budget for technical cooperation fell to BRL3 million, from BRL52 million in 2011 (Leite et. al. 2014). Moreover, Rousseff has scaled down the rhetoric and grand announcements concerning new Brazil-to-Africa technical cooperation undertakings. For example, the few announcements made during her first year consisted of plans to revise development cooperation agreements left over from Lula’s years which had not been fully implemented (Hochstetler 2013).

The legal framework of Brazil’s international development cooperation constrains its effective deployment. Brazilian law prohibits the allocation of national resources abroad for the benefit of a third country, that is, for cooperative purposes. In order to implement technical cooperation programmes and initiatives, ABC had to make arrangements with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Cabral & Weinstock 2010). This was going on throughout Lula’s administration, but since Rousseff came in, there have not been any changes made to strengthen ABC’s capacity or to reform the legal framework.

Dilma nevertheless made two big announcements in 2013 concerning the future of Brazil’s development cooperation: 1) a new agency of cooperation, trade and investments for Africa and Latin America, which she announced at the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the African Union (Suyama 2014) – in her words, “It’s a funding agency; but it is also a business agency; it is an agency to facilitate investment” (Brazil Africa 2013); – and 2) a White Paper on Brazil’s foreign policy,
which Rousseff asked the new Foreign Affairs Minister, Luis Alberto Figueiredo, to lead. Although the first proposal has not taken off yet, it’s clear that Brazil’s development cooperation stands at an important juncture, where the logic of cooperation based on solidarity and that of private investment seems to have converged, as exemplified by the ProSavana programme.

Another key aspect of Brazilian technical cooperation is its enhancement of alliances with member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and with multilateral agencies, through triangular development-cooperation partnerships. In fact, as noted by Abdenur, “engagement in triangular cooperation has served to further the Brazilian government’s broader goal of consolidating Brazil’s position as a ‘pivotal’ Southern state in the international arena” (2007). Cooperation alliances with Northern or traditional partners is not seen as contradictory with SSC principles and logics; indeed. As expressed in ABC’s position on trilateral cooperation, “Although bilateral cooperation is a priority in its foreign policy, the Brazilian Government believes that such partnerships constitute a triangular sum of efforts that adds value to the specific and complementary initiatives undertaken by bilateral channels of South-South cooperation. Triangulation is thus understood as a type of Brazilian South-South cooperation” (ABC 2014a).

As at 2014, Brazil has developed TDC with Japan, Germany, the United States, Italy, Australia, the United Kingdom and France; and previously had worked out triangular cooperation agreements with Spain and Canada (Itamaraty 2014). In 2007 ABC counted nineteen triangular cooperation projects in effect (Itamaraty 2007), and by 2011 there were 31 triangular cooperation projects in different phases of negotiation and implementation (Ayllon 2013). The most common sectors of intervention were public health, education and agriculture. The Brazilian government deploys discourse similar to its technical cooperation programme ideology in justifying triangular cooperation, viz. altruism; pragmatism – (the association with a Northern donor or multilateral agency is perceived as a way to expand the impacts of the transfer of the Brazilian stock of knowledge and public policies); – cultural ties, for example with the Community of Portuguese Language Countries; and the strengthening of relations with key partners (Abdenur 2007).

Mozambique is a typical case, and an important number of triangular cooperation projects, such as the ProSavana programme, have been or are in process of being implemented there with the engagement of Brazil. Indeed, this programme has aroused important criticism, which inquires into strategic economic and political issues as exhibiting the country’s real motives, e.g. Brazil’s claim for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (Lima & Hirst 2006; Vigevani & Cepaluni 2007); its efforts to disseminate globally the production of biofuels which it is best-positioned to supply; its goal of creating markets for Brazilian agricultural technology, inputs,

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11. Trilateral Development Cooperation (TDC) is characterised by partnership with a third party, a “traditional” donor (member of the OECD or a multilateral agency) with a pivotal country from the global South, to work with a beneficiary country (Mawdsley & McEwan 2012). This type of arrangement is not new in the development-cooperation landscape; nevertheless, its impressive expansion in the last few years is quite new. In the academic and policy-briefings literature, the terms trilateral and triangular are often used synonymously.
machinery and equipment (Ayllon & Leite 2010); and the land-grabbing ambitions of Brazilian agroindustry (Clements & Fernandes 2012).

Traditional donors and emergent development partners have geostrategic, commercial and political interests of their own which are mobilised via international cooperation, although apolitical humanitarian development aid can be genuine motives too, among the complex, diverse interests qualifying development cooperation (Lumsdaine 1993; Morgenthau 1962; McEwan & Mawdsley 2012). Officially, Brazil represents itself as a “development partner” whose technical cooperation consists purely of an apolitical process of knowledge transfer and technical expertise (Chichava & Duran 2013; Dauvergne & Farias 2012). The coherence of this “interest-free” narrative is questionable once we have evidenced the combination and coexistence of the different axes of the renewed Mozambique-Brazil relationship, viz. Presidential diplomacy, trade expansion, Brazilian foreign investment, and SSC. It would seem that in the Brazilian case at least, SSC may also constitute a foreign policy tool aimed at the realisation of strategic economic and political objectives, such as Brazil’s domestic development and international autonomy (Vigevani & Cepaluni 2007).

Discussion of economic and political cooperation is complicated by the engagement of competing actors in the definition of Brazilian foreign policy and development cooperation. ABC acts as a coordinating agency, but actual responsibility for implementation resides in other, more technical institutions, viz. ministries, agencies, NGOs, etc. Thus, divergent interests and priorities collide in the elaboration of Brazil’s cooperative programmes. This is illustrated by the case of ProSavana and how civil society is engaged in it.

**Table 2. Trilateral Projects Undertaken by Brazil in Mozambique**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Partner Country</th>
<th>Sector</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical project for the renewal of Chamanculo neighbourhood</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Urban development and sanitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project for the development of a national programme of school meals</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Food security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ProSavana</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical project for nutrition and food security (Proalimentar)</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical assistance for the establishment of meteorology stations in Mozambique</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Science and technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platform for agricultural innovation in Mozambique</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation Agriculture</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Purchase</td>
<td>World Food Programme (WFP)</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
JAPAN IN MOZAMBIQUE.

Shinzo Abe, the Japanese Prime Minister, visited Mozambique from 11 to 13 January 2014 on an African trip that included Ethiopia and the Ivory Coast. The first trip to Africa by a Japanese Prime Minister since 2006, it marked the commencement of closer, more strategic cooperative and trade relations with the African continent. According to the Japanese, the main objective of the tour was to cultivate strategic partners for Japanese companies doing business in infrastructure and resource development. Representatives of 34 companies accompanied the Prime Minister (Kawate 2014). They chose Mozambique because of the country’s strategic geographic situation, the importance of the current projects under development, and the country’s natural gas and mining development potential (Le Bec 2014). This was the most important official Japanese visit to Mozambique since 1977, when the two countries first established diplomatic relations. Before that, a State Secretary for Foreign Affairs had been the highest-ranking Japanese official to have visited Mozambique. On the trip in question, Shinzo Abe promised inter alia ¥70 billion (equivalent to US$683 million) over a period of five years for development of the Nacala Corridor, the area covered by the ProSavana programme.

Japanese and Mozambican representatives also brokered a loan agreement in which Japan was to provide an Official Development Assistance (ODA) loan of up to ¥17,269 billion for the Maputo Gas-Fired, Combined-Cycle Power Plant Development Project. The ODA loan is repayable over 40 years (JICA 2014). On the same trip Abe promised funding to support the training of 300 Mozambicans to different specialisms. A Japan-Mozambique Investment Forum was held in Maputo with the participation of Mozambican public and private companies. At this event the two governments signed six cooperative agreements, amongst which the most notable were two between the Mozambican state company Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos (ENH) and, respectively, Chiyoda Corp. and Mitsui Corp., to train engineers and to undertake a study of liquefied natural gas. Petromoc, the state oil company, also signed an agreement with Marubeni Corp. for a project to transform methanol into diesel fuel. At the same time, Abe affirmed the interest of Japanese companies in Mozambican oil, gas and coal.

In fact, Japanese companies had already started to invest in Mozambican oil, gas and coal prior to the official visit; for example, in 2008 Mitsui & Co. acquired a 20% interest from Anadarko in the Mozambique Offshore Area 1 exploration block (Mitsui & Co. n/d). More recently, in 2013 INPEX Corporation acquired a 25% interest from Statoil ASA to explore oil and gas in Areas 2 and 5 of Mozambique’s continental shelf. Alongside these two Japanese companies, other prominent

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12. According to JICA, “Japanese ODA loans (also called Yen Loans) are long-term, low interest-rate loans advanced to the developing countries and have the liability of being paid back” (JICA n/d).
investors include Tullow Mozambique Ltd. with a 25% interest, and the Mozambican public company Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos with a 10% interest (Inpex Corporation 2013). Since 2013, Japanese companies like Nippon Steel, Sumitomo Metal Corp., and Nippon Steel Trading Company have been exploring one of Mozambique’s most important coal reserves, the Revuboe coal mine in Tete province, with the aim of eventually producing 5 million tonnes of coking coal per year (Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal 2013). In what represents a convergence of interests of Japanese and Brazilian companies, Japan’s Mitsui and Brazil’s Vale have set up ACWA Power-Moatize Termoélectrica (APMT), a consortium to produce electricity from coal in the same province of Tete, an investment worth US$1 billion. The other partners are Mozambique’s Electricidade de Moçambique and Whatana (CPI n/d).

Bilaterally, Japan aids Mozambique via the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in various sectors, but mainly in the Nacala Corridor, where the ProSavana programme is to be implemented. Agricultural improvements and infrastructure are the main priorities. In partnership with the Special Economic Zone Office (GAZEDA), JICA launched the Nacala Corridor Economic Development Strategies Project in June 2012 with the objective of “formulating appropriate strategies to guide development and stimulate investment in the Nacala Corridor” (GAZEDA 2012). In June 2013, in the first agreement ever signed by Japan with any Sub-Saharan country, the two countries assented to the reciprocal liberalisation, promotion and protection of investment. Japan expects the agreement will facilitate Japanese companies’ investment in coal and natural gas (MOFA 2013).

It is important to note that ProSavana is not JICA’s only trilateral initiative in Mozambique. The Project for Improvement of Techniques for Increasing Rice Cultivation Productivity in Nante, a district of Maganja da Costa in Zambezia Province, also involves Vietnam (see Table 3). Japan believes that SSC will achieve more if it is done through triangular cooperation, which it has been encouraging (Honda 2013).

Table 3. JICA Major Projects in Mozambique (2007-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Period</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project for improving the research capacity of agriculture development project in the Nacala Corridor</td>
<td>Nampula, Niassa</td>
<td>April 2014-March 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for an Agricultural Development Master Plan for Nacala Corridor</td>
<td>Nampula, Niassa, Zambezia</td>
<td>February 2012-February 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project for the establishment of development models at community level for agricultural development in the Nacala Corridor</td>
<td></td>
<td>February 2012-February 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Duration</td>
</tr>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project for improving the research capacity of agriculture development project in the Nacala Corridor</td>
<td>Nampula, Niassa</td>
<td>April 2014-March 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for an Agricultural Development Master Plan for Nacala Corridor</td>
<td>Nampula, Niassa, Zambezia</td>
<td>February 2012-February 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project for Nacala Corridor Economic Development Strategies</td>
<td>Nampula, Niassa, Zambezia, Tete, Cabo Delgado</td>
<td>April 2012-May 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project for promoting sustainability in rural water supply, hygiene and sanitation</td>
<td>Niassa</td>
<td>March 2013-February 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project for construction of bridges along the Ile-Cuamba highway</td>
<td></td>
<td>February 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project for improvement of Nacala Port</td>
<td>Nampula</td>
<td>March 2012-August 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nacala Port Development Project</td>
<td>Nampula</td>
<td>March 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project for the construction of secondary schools</td>
<td>Nampula</td>
<td>August 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project for urgent rehabilitation of Nacala Port</td>
<td>Nampula</td>
<td>December 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project for the Improvement of Techniques for Increasing Rice Cultivation</td>
<td>Zambezia</td>
<td>January 2011-January 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project for enhancement of the capacity for destination marketing and promotion by strengthening the linkage among tourism-related organisations</td>
<td>Maputo city; Inhambane</td>
<td>March 2012-March 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project for rice productivity improvement in the Chokwe Irrigation Scheme</td>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>February 2012-October 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project for strengthening capacities of NPCS for HIV responses</td>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>March 2013-March 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable production from Jatropha in Mozambique</td>
<td></td>
<td>July 2011-June 2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project for the capacity development of road maintenance in Mozambique</td>
<td></td>
<td>August 2011-July 2014</td>
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NARRATIVES OF JAPAN’S ENGAGEMENT WITH AFRICA.

Consistent Japanese engagement with Africa can be traced back to the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), first organised in Tokyo in 1993 and reprised every five years since. TICAD is the platform used by Japan to formally consult African leaders about their development needs. Since 1993 four more TICAD meetings have taken place, the last in 2013. Today, Japan has thirty-four JICA offices on the African Continent, and is undoubtedly an established donor.

Like Brazil, Japan defines itself as one of Africa’s “true partners” and frames its engagement in Africa as a way to facilitate economic development. Also like Brazil, Japan seeks to export its own successful cultural and political “experiences” to Africa. According to the Prime Minister, successful development will only be possible through assimilation to the Japanese culture of hard work, tidiness and self-discipline, which may be transmitted by Japanese companies to Africans. This model is known as kaizen (“correction [of errors]”), a business culture and managerial philosophy that values the creativity and ingenuity of each individual worker, and promotes quality and productivity improvement. According to the Japanese Prime Minister, the kaizen philosophy is applicable to any country or any culture, and it was thanks to this philosophy that Japan achieved its own development (Abe 2014). Another approach to development which Japan intends to share with Africans is the “Community Road Empowerment” (CORE) concept. As the name suggests, the community is involved, mainly in rural areas, in road development and maintenance, utilising a sustainable technology called “Do-nou [sandbag] technology”. Arguing that in many rural areas in Africa the poor state of road networks is one of the reasons for poverty, Japan encouraged Africans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project for the promotion of Sustainable 3R activities</th>
<th>Maputo</th>
<th>February 2013-February 2017</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project for a comprehensive Urban Transport Master Plan for the greater Maputo area</td>
<td>Maputo city, Matola city</td>
<td>January 2012-March 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo Fish Market Project</td>
<td>Maputo city</td>
<td>February 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project for strengthening pedagogical and technical skills of teachers in health training institutes</td>
<td></td>
<td>January 2012-December 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project for development of local industry through OVOP movement</td>
<td>Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, Nampula, Manica</td>
<td>November 2013-January 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project for the establishment of sustainable forest resources and an information platform for monitoring REDD+</td>
<td></td>
<td>February 2013-February 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montepuez-Lichinga Road Project</td>
<td>Niassa, Cabo Delgado</td>
<td>March 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nampula-Cuamba Road upgrading</td>
<td>Nampula, Niassa</td>
<td>March 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JICA (2013a)
to adopt this technology which makes the local populations the main actors. The concept has been implemented in some African countries, like Kenya. In short, Japan is like Brazil in laying emphasis on putting its own development experience to work in Africa. The kaizen system, first introduced in 2009, has become very popular in Ethiopia, where the Ethiopian Kaizen Institute (EKI), the first of its kind, was founded in 2011. Since then the strategy has been introduced in Kenya, Ghana, Zambia and Tanzania (JICA 2013).

The Japanese are not the only ones who believe that their development experience and that of East Asia are valuable for Africa. Some Africans leaders, like the late Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi (who invited the introduction of kaizen), agree that the Japanese experience ought to be emulated in Africa.

**ProSavana: a brief presentation.**

As aforementioned, the development experience of Brazil’s cerrado, based on a 30-year cooperation programme with Japan known as Prodecer (1979-2001), inspired ProSavana. Prodecer’s promoters (viz. key Brazilian and Japanese actors like Embrapa, JICA, CAMPO, etc.) claim that it was responsible for transforming the Brazilian cerrado into one of the most productive regions in the country and a global producer of soybeans 2nd only to the United States. This was achieved with a “systems approach” such that the development of technologies, improvements to the soil, and the promotion of cooperatives and investment were all synergised (The Economist 2010). Through this collaborative programme Brazil gained from Japan important knowhow applicable to agricultural development in tropical savannah. Based on this fact, in 2009 Kenzo Oshima, then Senior Vice President of JICA, and Marco Farani, then Director of ABC, signed a Memorandum affirming commitment to a “Japan-Brazil Partnership Programme for the Development of the African Tropical Savannah” to replicate the cerrado experience. The partnership to do so in Mozambique was initially cemented between then Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso and then Brazilian President Lula da Silva at the L’Aquila G8 meeting in 2009, as part of the Global L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (ProSavana 2009).

ProSavana envisages development of commercial large-scale production systems alongside smallholder subsistence agriculture through cutting-edge technology, the Brazilian and Japanese experience, and conservational farming techniques. The ProSavana programme consists of three main components for supporting commercial- and subsistence-agriculture production systems (Embrapa 2012), namely: 1) ProSavana-PI, focussed on research and institutional capacity building; 2) ProSavana-PD, the drawing-up of an agro-industrial development plan; and 3) ProSavana-PEM, the objective of which is to develop agricultural pilot-models for increasing agricultural production.

The implementation of ProSavana started in 2011, and assumes a timeframe of at least 20 years. For operational purposes, its components have been turned into single projects, each having its own institutional arrangements and executive agencies, to be implemented in three phases. The first component, concerning the improvement of research and extension capacities, technological adaptation, and developing Mozambique’s institutional capacity, will be executed by Embrapa, the Brazilian Agricultural Research Company in cooperation with the Mozambican Agrarian Research
Institute (IIAM) and the Japan International Research Centre on Agriculture (JIRCAS), a key Japanese institution in the management of Prodecer in Brazil’s cerrado. ProSavana-PI was the first component to begin execution, with a timeframe of 5 years and a budget of US$13.4 million (ProSavana – Project I 2010).

How has it fared so far? Its specific objectives were to: 1) improve the operational and dissemination technology in Nampula and Lichinga through forming human capital and the building of two laboratories; 13) 2) assess the socio-economic conditions and environmental impact of new technology; 3) identify the natural resource circumstances for agricultural practice in the Corridor and invent technology for sustainable use; 4) develop specific and practical technology solutions; 5) develop agricultural technology and validate it with local communities in selected demonstration units (Schlesinger 2014).

The field research performed in Mozambique for this article in 2012 and the later research on ProSavana show that the development of ProSavana-PI has been affected by conflict between the Brazilian and Japanese teams owing to difficulties on the Brazilian side in managing resources, differences in approaches to cooperation and agricultural practices, and cultural and language distance (Fingermann 2014). The Brazilian legal framework in particular has been a limitation on the Brazilians’ capacity to answer their implementation needs; for example, only in December 2012 was an ABC representative appointed (the first of its kind in Africa) to Mozambique to facilitate the development of ProSavana.

The second component consists in formulating a Master Plan (ProSavana-PD) that devises an integrated type of agro-industrial development. JICA, ABC and Mozambique’s Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG) coordinate this component, which has an estimated budget of US$7.7 million (Fingermann 2014). The Master Plan has been entrusted to the Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV Projetos) in Brazil; Oriental Consulting and NTC International, two Japanese consulting companies; and MINAG. The Master Plan should include, according to its proponents: (i) proposals for agricultural development projects in the Corridor; (ii) proposals for management structures to support the Corridor’s development; and (iii) proposals for quick-impact pilot-projects (Chichava et al. 2013). Initially, ProSavana expected to deliver the Master Plan in 2013, but the critiques by various stakeholders, mainly civil society, have delayed the presentation of the final version further after it was postponed to early 2015 (Wise 2014).

The third component, ProSavana-PE, is to increase agricultural production levels in specific target areas through adoption of agricultural models. The main agencies involved in this are the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture; JICA; Brazil’s Association of Technical Assistance and Rural Extension (ASBRAER); Brazil’s National Service for Rural Learning (SENAR); and Brazil’s Ministry of Rural Development (MDR). This component will run until 2019, and its budget is estimated at US$15 million (Nogueira & Ollinaho 2013).

13. The Brazilian counterpart is in charge of building Lichinga’s laboratory, and according to Fingermann (2014) the construction has not started yet and there is no exact date established for it to start. Nampula’s laboratory is in charge of the Japanese counterpart and the activities started in 2013.
ProSavana is being implemented within a 14 million hectare area in the Nacala Corridor, covering the Provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, Niassa, Tete and Zambezia (ProSavana 2013). It is expected that the project will directly support 400,000 small farmers and indirectly benefit 3.6 million agricultural workers (Embrapa 2012). According to Satoshi Murosawa, Director of JICA in Brazil, the organisation chose the Nacala Corridor because it “possesses similar geography, climate and soil (red earth) to the Brazilian cerrado region, and some consider that it looks like the north of Paraná” (Murosawa 2012). Taking into account ProSavana’s magnitude in terms of expected outputs and the size of the implementation zone, important socio-economic changes may occur across the region. Moreover, in addition to ProSavana’s components, a large increase in public and private investment in the Nacala Corridor is also expected, particularly in sectors like agricultural production and infrastructure, even though private investment is not directly linked-in as a component of the ProSavana programme.

**Figure 1. ProSavana’s location in Mozambique**

JICA and Embrapa’s representatives in Mozambique confirmed the “win-win-win” logic of the ProSavana programme in several interviews conducted in July-December 2012. Indeed, the SSC logic of mutual benefit is translated into triangular cooperation in the programme’s representation. ProSavana was initially discussed and agreed by Brazil and Japan, meaning the programme wasn’t born of a direct request of the Mozambican government, as Brazilian SSC principles presume. The

14. The area is in the region between latitude 13°S and 17°S.
From the viewpoint of food security, Japan can find business opportunities in the distribution and marketing industries. [ProSavana] offers advantages of decreasing obstacles to enter the African market by promoting partnerships between Brazil and Japanese players. (JETRO, August 21, 2012, quoted in Funada-Classen 2013)

Mozambican government approved the programme and has confirmed that it corresponds to a Mozambican programme supported by Brazil and Japan, and is aligned with the Strategic Development Plan of the Agrarian Sector of 2011 (Macua 2014). Notwithstanding all this, the win-win-win logic and the alignment of ProSavana with official Mozambican priorities is disregarded by the Mozambican CSOs, for whom it lacks transparency precisely on the win-win-win features, especially as to the Brazilian and Japanese private interests.

It must be stressed that ProSavana is not the only or even the first engagement of Brazil and Japan together in Africa or in Mozambique. In this country alone, Japan and Brazil have cooperated on two previous projects, one for sustainable improvement of sanitation and water supply in Zambézia Province (2008-2010), and the other a human resources training project in the health sector (2009-2011). The two countries have also been working together in other African countries such as Angola and Madagascar on a triangular basis (JICA 2009). Moreover, Brazil considers Japan its oldest and main partner in TDC (Abreu 2013).

For Brazil and Japan an important gain is the participation of private firms as foreign direct investors in the region, which the ProSavana programme facilitates. In fact, ProSavana-PD was accompanied by parallel initiatives to promote the programme and to nudge the private sector to consider the business opportunities occasioned by it.

Various promotion activities have taken place in Brazil, Japan and Mozambique since the launch of ProSavana, to present it to the private sector, to other cooperation agencies, and to stakeholders. A seminar on “Agribusiness in Mozambique: Brazil-Japan International Cooperation and Investment Opportunities” was held in April 2011 in São Paulo to present ProSavana-JBM to its stakeholders: the Brazilian and Mozambican ministries of agriculture, ABC, USAID-Brazil, and JICA (Maturações 2012). That same month, the Mato Grosso Association of Cotton Producers (AMPA), the ABC, and Itamaraty organised another seminar in Cuiabá whose main aim, which benefited from the attendance of Mozambique’s Agriculture Minister, was to invite Mato Grosso cotton and soy producers to invest in ProSavana’s region (Ampa 2011).

As noted above, business opportunities are also important on the Japanese side. In April 2012 Japanese and Brazilian public and private concerns participated in a joint mission to explore the potential for agricultural development in the Nacala Corridor (Macahub 2012). Japanese businessmen as well as representatives of JICA, Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs made up the delegation. According to Funada-Classen (2013), the Japanese media and official institutions like JICA covered the visit by highlighting the potential for business opportunities for the Japanese private sector; for example:

From the viewpoint of food security, Japan can find business opportunities in the distribution and marketing industries. [ProSavana] offers advantages of decreasing obstacles to enter the African market by promoting partnerships between Brazil and Japanese players. (JETRO, August 21, 2012, quoted in Funada-Classen 2013)

15. PEDSA is its acronym in Portuguese.
According to the Fundação Getúlio Vargas project coordinator, Brazilian farmers are keen to migrate to Mozambique because of the low cost of land there compared to Brazil; the incentives proposed by the Brazilian government within the framework of ProSavana and the Fundo Nacala (Nacala Fund); and the better location of Mozambique nearer Asian markets. Conceived by FGV Projetos, ABC, JICA, Embrapa, FAO, MINAG, Mozambique-Brazil Chamber of Commerce and 4I. GREEN,16 the Fundo Nacala was launched in 2012 to attract private investment and develop agribusiness in particular in the Nacala Corridor. With FGV Projetos and 4I. GREEN as managers, its promoters’ claim that the Fundo will reach US$2 billion in Brazil and Japan combined. Its objectives are to: (i) incentivise large-scale production systems through creation of Brazilian lead associations, whereby Brazilian farmers will work with Mozambicans to assure capacity transfer; and (ii) integrate small-holders into the value-chain, the mechanism of which has yet to be defined (FGV Projetos 2012).

For their part, MINAG and the Mozambican investment company Gapi17 launched the ProSavana Development Initiative Fund (PDIF) in September 2012 with the support of JICA. According to JICA, the objective is to enable private sector efforts to involve small-scale farmers through contract farming (JICA 2012). Its promoters claim the PDIF as well as the Nacala Fund are not directly linked to the ProSavana programme; nevertheless, both were developed under the ProSavana-PD framework. The total amount available initially is US$750,000, while US$500,000 is JICA’s participation and US$250,000 is GAPI-SI’s (FGV Projetos 2012). PDIF approved its first credit package in 2012, which amounted to US$390,000 and benefitted five companies: Lozane Farms, Ikuru, Orwera Seed Company, Matharia Empreendimentos, and Santos Agrícola (Macahub 2012a).

The first Brazilian investments to be approved in northern Mozambique were Mozaperon Agropecuária and Araperon Agropecuária, both for cereal production in Niassa province, amounting to US$3,748,100 apiece. In September 2012 Agromoz announced its intention to produce soybeans in Gurue, Zambézia Province, with the participation of Grupo Pinesso from Brazil (Hanlon & Smart 2012), which is already well-established in Sudan growing soybeans and cotton (Ampa 2011). There is no evidence that these investments are directly linked to or resultant from ProSavana.

Given the heavy promotion of private-sector involvement, there can be little doubt of the leading role attributable to private investors in the implementation of the programme. The alignment of development strategies with foreign investment is not in itself the problem, but rather the lack of transparency about the private economic stakes in play, hidden behind the “solidarity”, “participatory”, “win-win-win” discourse of Brazil’s SSC. In consequence, Mozambican, Japanese and Brazilian CSOs alike have turned against ProSavana and now strongly oppose this triangular cooperation programme. This upshot reveals a new role for CSOs in the international development cooperation ecology.

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16. A Brazilian specialist’s consortium specialising in this kind of business.
17. GAPI-SI is a Mozambican institution that supports business development.
ARE CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS EXERTING A POLITICAL CHECK ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION?

Brazilian and Mozambican media have covered the seminars promoting ProSavana in both countries as proof of the business potential that is opened up by this triangular cooperation programme, each in their own way. Brazilian media have been touting that “Mozambique offers cheap land to Brazilians” (Terra 2011), and “Mozambique offers land to Brazilian soya” (Folha de São Paulo 2011). By contrast, Mozambican media accuse ProSavana of being “Brazilian neo-colonialism” and technical cooperation of being the “Trojan horse” of Brazilian economic interests in Africa (Folha de São Paulo 2011; Rafael 2011; Matutações 2012).

Mozambican CSOs share these concerns about ProSavana, and have been raising concerns about its impact on Mozambican small farmers in the Nacala Corridor. The CSOs who are the most active include União Nacional dos Camponeses (UNAC), Justiça Ambiental (JA), Plataforma Provincial da Sociedade Civil de Nampula (PPOSC-N), and Acção Académica para o Desenvolvimento das Comunidades Rurais (ADÉCRU). UNAC, for example, has excoriated ProSavana in these terms:

The Mozambican NGO Justiça Ambiental describes the Brazilian model as a failure: “more than 65 million Brazilians are in situation of food insecurity and millions of people struggle for access to land for food production as a means of ensuring livelihood” (JA4Change 2013). Even if Brazilian cooperation has a friendly dimension characterised by projects like Native Seeds Rescue, run by the Brazilian CSO Movimento Camponês Popular (MCP), where enhancing Mozambican farmers’ skills is a priority, for Mozambican civil society the main focus is still agro-business, such that the Mozambican farmers could end up as employees of Brazilian large-scale investors, promoted by SSC projects like ProSavana, and no strengthening or improvement of family farmers will actually happen. This position contrasts rather starkly with the Brazilian representation of it as a “success”.

Since 2012 UNAC has been put in touch by Via Campesina with Brazilian movements like Sem Terra and Japanese NGOs like No! To Land Grab, to discuss ProSavana and its effect on the Mozambican agricultural landscape (JA4Change 2013). Mozambican civil society’s concerns heightened and the biggest farmers’ organisation in Mozambique released its first statement against ProSavana in October 2012 (UNAC 2012), which garnered worldwide attention. Following this
first statement, twenty-three Mozambican CSOs published in 2013 an Open Letter to the Presidents / Prime Ministers of Mozambique, Japan and Brazil, in which they demanded suspension of the activities of ProSavana and proposed instead the establishment of dialogue channels with civil society. The letter was signed by the various Mozambican CSOs, but also by international civil society organisations (including CSOs from Brazil and Japan), and by various individuals, especially Japanese academics (UNAC et al. 2013). The main concerns raised by the CSOs were: 1) the lack of transparency and public democratic deliberation surrounding the genesis of ProSavana and its impact on rural folk in Mozambique, considering the magnitude of the programme; and 2) its focus on the entry of multinationals, which will subvert rural families’ self-determination (UNAC et al. 2013).

The Open Letter was handed to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the fifth TICAD in Japan. Following these events, in September 2013 Japanese civil society released the “Call for immediate suspension and fundamental revision”, a joint statement on ProSavana that denounced the drafting of the Master Plan, and the preparation of quick-impact projects and pilot projects funded by the ProSavana Development Initiative Fund, which were starting up without proper consultation with Mozambican civil society (AJF et al. 2013).

On 2 June 2014, in what may be described as a climactic moment, the Mozambican CSOs launched the “No to ProSavana” national campaign, in which to UNAC, JA and ADECRU was joined the CSOs Fórum Mulher (FM), Liga Moçambicana dos Direitos Humanos (LDH), Associação de Apoio e Assistência Jurídica às Comunidades (AAAJC), Livaningo, ActionAid Moçambique, and Kulima. According to the CSOs, the campaign was an answer to the “silence” of Shinzo Abe to their Open Letter. A huge conference in Maputo followed the same year at which Mozambican, Japanese and Brazilian CSOs were represented as well as international CSOs and scholars. Participants denounced the detrimental impacts that have already begun to affect northern Mozambique populations. Ana Paula Taucale, Vice-President of UNAC, noted that in the Monapo District of Nampula Province alone, about 3000 hectares of land had been taken from local farmers to be given to agribusiness for the production of soybeans (Via Campesina 2014).

The complaints addressed to the Mozambican, Brazilian and Japanese governments reflect different approaches, and take account of each government’s role in the implementation of ProSavana. The appeal to Mozambique President Guebuza reminded him of the importance of subsistence agriculture for Mozambican rural communities, and how the supervention of multinationals will inevitably dislocate small farmers (UNAC et al. 2013). Moreover, the critique addressed to Mozambique’s government and ruling party Frelimo highlighted the links between Mozambican elites and the foreign investors in the Nacala Corridor and all over the country (Ndhaneta 2012). It is now recognised that, although foreign firms grab the major land concessions and investment projects, domestic elites play a central role in facilitating the acquisition process, and definitely benefit from it (Fairbairn 2011).

The Open Letter demands from Brazil a promise to engage in cooperative relations with Mozambique on the basis of solidarity amongst peoples and that development cooperation shall not
be misused as a device to facilitate land grabbing in Mozambique by Brazilian investors (UNAC et al. 2013).

Finally, the Letter spotlights a change in Japanese cooperation policy toward Mozambique, from the promotion of development to the advancement of private interests and mega-project investments in agriculture, energy and infrastructure (UNAC et al. 2013).

For the past two years we have witnessed changes in CSO complaints regarding the roles of the partner countries involved in ProSavana, particularly Japan and Brazil. The first voices of criticism against ProSavana addressed Brazil’s perceived economic self-interestedness in bringing its agro-industries and farmers in to profit from Mozambique’s cheap land. Lately, criticism has been addressed to the Japanese engagement too, a point echoed by Japanese CSOs. For example, ADECRU, a Mozambican academic movement, stated:

Japan is responsible for: i) Expenditure of financial, material and human resources for the development of logistics of Corridor of Nacala (ports, roads, railways) to export soya, maize, cotton production to Japan, in order to face the Niponic demand for animal protein and fibre. ii) While Brazilian companies take control of productive component, including the fertiliser market, seeds and machinery, so the Japanese corporations are intended to take over the logistic market and the commercialisation. (ADECRU 2013)

In fact, the first protests against ProSavana focussed on Brazil’s role, as the emergence of Brazil’s ambitions in Africa and in the international system were in vogue. In parallel to Brazil’s approach to Mozambique, the emergence of new development actors like Brazil, China and India in the international system and in Africa caused great debate amongst academic and international cooperation circles (Gabas et al. 2013; McEwan & Mawdsley 2012; Mawdsley 2012). In this context, Brazil’s engagement with ProSavana fed concerns about a lack of transparency regarding its economic and political ambitions in Africa and in Mozambique. By contrast, Japan’s role was not initially in the spotlight. This situation has changed, and today’s protest against ProSavana addresses the perceived agendas of both countries.

It must be underlined that during his visit to Mozambique in 2014, the local CSOs harshly criticised the Japanese Prime Minister. One of the most prominent critiques came, again, from ADECRU:

ADECRU denounces and strongly rejects the dangerous and imperial agenda of visit of the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, and the Japanese foreign policy for Mozambique and Africa, masked in diplomatic maxim ‘enforce the consolidation of political and friendly relations between the two people, supposedly brothers’ and translated into programs like ProSavana and the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa. (ADECRU 2014)

The actions of the CSOs have been yielding some positive effects, leading the developers of the programme to make efforts to bring more transparency and inclusion of CSOs in the debates over ProSavana. The first meeting organised by MINAG to present ProSavana and consult with CSOs
Governments involved in this (triangular) cooperation are making efforts and will continue to do so in order to accommodate and address the concerns expressed by the Mozambican civil society organisations, and [they will] also [continue] to dialogue with representatives of civil society organisations in Japan and in Brazil in order to ensure a transparent, inclusive and participatory environment for dialogue. In this perspective, we reaffirm that we remain open and available to dialogue with all stakeholders and interested parties in contributing to the building of the programme, as well as the future of agriculture in the country, always transparently (MINAG 2014).

Since then, the government regularly publishes information on ProSavana through a special e-page about the programme and continues to hold meetings with the CSOs. Pamphlets in Portuguese and indigenous languages explaining ProSavana are also distributed to the local population by MINAG.

It is also important to mention that according to Amorim (2014) the nature of the Fundo Nacala, which as we said had the ambition to develop agribusiness in Nacala Corridor, was also changed and its implementation postponed since then. Pressure from Mozambican and Brazilian CSOs is among the reasons given to explain this evolution. According to Wise (2014), the critiques raised against ProSavana ended up contributing to a friendlier version of the programme whereby Brazilian farmers migrated, expecting 40,000 hectares ready for investment. (But according to a ProSavana officer, no investor could expect that in the Nacala Corridor.)

The CSO mobilisations are even more promising if we consider that ProSavana is not the only international programme critiqued by Mozambican CSOs. For example, the Chinese “Friendship” rice farm located in the Xai-Xai irrigation scheme in Gaza Province, financed by investments from Wanbao Africa Agriculture Development, Ltd. (WAADL) has been harshly criticised because of allegations that local farmers were expelled from their land (UNAC 2013; The Ecologist 2013). Another hotly contested project is the extraction of coal by the Brazilian company Vale do Rio Doce in Tete Province, where the resettlement of local communities has been strongly condemned by the CSOs. Equally, academic and CSO circles have sparked important debates about the implementation of infrastructural mega-projects in Mozambique and their impacts on local communities; for example, in April 2014 the Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP), the Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE) and the Observatório do Meio Rural (OMR) organised a “Conference on Mega-Projects: Policy and Governance”, where civil society representatives discussed national policy on mega-projects, particularly in the extraction sector.

The Mozambican CSOs’ contestation of ProSavana and of Brazil’s and Japan’s foreign development policy in Mozambique occurs in the context of the increased diversification of actors participating
in development cooperation. New issues and actors are emerging on the global agenda, triggering transformations in the international development cooperation system; for example, civil society has won participation space at aid effectiveness summits, and participated in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development negotiation in 2011 that had strong input from developing countries and from civil society. What stood out in the Busan process is that CSOs of the Global South demanded accountability from donors and governments, and were searching for ways to proactively participate in the shaping of the international development cooperation system (Hayman 2012).

The overriding concern expressed by Mozambican CSOs about agriculture development mega-projects like ProSavana which combine international development cooperation with foreign direct investment by private interests, lies in their single-minded pursuit of elite self-interest and the risk that local communities will end up dispossessed of their own land, serving foreign capital and a consolidated local elite. What is different about the critiques addressed to ProSavana is that they are directed specifically at Brazil’s and Japan’s foreign policy and development cooperation strategies in Mozambique. Moreover, one peculiarity of the anti-ProSavana activism of Mozambican CSOs is the number of international CSOs, not only those of Japan and Brazil. Support from Brazilian and Japanese CSOs as well as the visibility of the critiques addressed to ProSavana through international platforms like GRAIN or Via Campesina has helped affirm the Mozambican CSOs’ claims.

Before presenting the concluding remarks, it is important to recall that during the pre- and post-Independence periods in Mozambique’s history, civil society’s capacity to exercise its rights has been often in doubt. In fact, after Independence, the single party system did not allow the conditions necessary for the emergence of civil society associations, and it was not until a multiparty system was established in the 1990s that civil society organisations emerged. CSOs’ current situation is far better nowadays than at the end of the civil war in 1992. Important obstacles remain, however, despite important progress. Some difficulties encountered by Mozambican CSOs are the constrained political “space”, a product of the ruling party’s firm control of political life; the lack of resources and capacities; and the fragmentation of civil society and lack of coordination amongst CSOs (Pereira 2011; FDC 2007). That said, the support of international CSOs, mainly Japanese and Brazilian, for initiatives led by UNAC, JA or ADECRU has been a key factor in generating better visibility for the activities of Mozambican civil society.

Table 4. List of CSOs actions against ProSavana

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Statement – Leaked copy of the Master Plan for the ProSavana programme in northern Mozambique confirms the worst</td>
<td>The leaked copy is dated March 2013, and according to the CSO Statement, it makes clear how the governments of Japan, Brazil and Mozambique are “paving the way”</td>
<td>- Justiça Ambiental (JA) (Mozambique) - Forum Mulher (Mozambique) - Friends of the Earth (Mozambique)</td>
<td>29/04/2014</td>
</tr>
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</table>

19. These emerging actors not only reflect the shifts of power balances among countries, but also the prominence of non-governmental actors like private sector, philanthropic foundations, civil society, etc.
for a massive land grab”. According to the Statement, the Master Plan seeks to:
1. Push farmers away from traditional cultivation toward intensive cultivation practices based on proprietary seeds and chemical inputs;
2. Push farmers into contract farming arrangements with corporate firms;
3. Prioritise the opportunities of private companies to profit from the Nacala Fund;
4. Bring about the end of peasant agriculture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Open Letter from Mozambican Civil Society Organisations and Movements</th>
<th>Letter addressed to the Presidents of Brazil and Mozambique and the Prime Minister of Japan to suspend ProSavana activities.</th>
<th>More than 23 Mozambican CSOs and 43 International organisations.</th>
<th>28/05/2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Japanese civil society statement on ProSavana | Addressed to Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and JICA, calling for the immediate suspension and fundamental review of ProSavana. | - ATTAC Japan  
- Citizens Concerned with the Development of Mozambique  
- Africa-Japan Forum  
- Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC)  
- Oxfam Japan | 30/009/2013 |

| Fifth General Assembly of ADECRU | The Political Letter from ADECRU’s General Assembly manifests the disaffection with the encroachment of agribusiness in the country through mega-projects like ProSavana. | ADECRU | 20/12/2013 |

<p>| ADECRU’s Position on the visit of the Prime Minister of Japan to Mozambique | ADECRU warns of “the dangerous Japanese policy and presence in Mozambique”, and protests against the New Alliance for Food and Nutrition and the ProSavana programme. | ADECRU | 9/01/2014 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Source:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Press release – the Platform of Nampula Civil Society (PPOSC-N)</td>
<td>Press release relating to the visit of M. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, where PPOSC object that the support of the Japanese government reflects the logic of colonialism and protects the interests of international capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAC's General Assembly</td>
<td>One of the central discussion topics was the emergence of land conflicts and land grabbing in Mozambique. Mechanisms of resistance to ProSavana were also discussed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nampula Declaration - UNAC 2014 Ordinary General Assembly</td>
<td>Peasant leaders from Mozambique confirmed their position against ProSavana. A resistance agenda was settled on: 1. UNAC will no longer tolerate ProSavana and promises to sue in court the Mozambican and foreign citizens involved in it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Mobilisation “Não ProSavana”</td>
<td>Launch of the national campaign NÃO AO PROSAVANA (“No to ProSavana”).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Triangular Conference of the People of Mozambique, Japan and Brazil</td>
<td>Debate surrounding the ProSavana programme and the development priorities of Mozambique.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compilation by the author based on the press release, journals information and CSO websites.
CONCLUSION.
This working paper has discussed how and why Mozambican civil society have been so critical of the Japanese-Brazilian-Mozambican ProSavana programme. Mozambican CSOs have contested the programme basically through open letters and the organisation of public seminars or debates, with the participation of international CSOs, particularly from Japan and Brazil. Given that the programme is still in its infancy, so that nothing concrete, either laudatory or pejorative, can yet be said about the impacts of the programme, critiques have essentially had to be based on the negative impacts of the Brazilian cerrado experience, in particular the marginalisation of small farmers in favour of big capital and the deleterious effects on the environment. However, the Mozambicans don’t explicitly cite to the cerrado experience. They probably don’t know much about it, and likely care less. Usually, it is only academics who invoke the cerrado experience in their discourses. It is mainly the Brazilian partners who have transmitted the lessons from this experience to Mozambican civil society.

The advent of massive investment in Mozambique by the “rising powers” of the global South, particularly Brazil and China, has caught the attentions of local civil society, which has become activist in scrutinising the impacts of these investments, especially as relates to agriculture and mining, which typically include the forcible eviction and resettlement of local populations. What is criticised is not investment itself, but what is considered a lack of transparency and of involvement by locals in discussions over project implementation. Civil society is also concerned over the huge expanses of land demanded by these projects. Their contestation of donors’ activities is beginning to produce positive results with policy makers, who are becoming more willing to involve CSOs in some consultations concerning ProSavana. The contestation has also forced the three governments’ partners to react, to give explanations, and to answer civil society complaints about the implementation and impacts of the programme. Last but not least, it is important to note that ProSavana is more a result of Brazil’s and Japan’s shared experience in TDC than Mozambican local demand, and represents a signal example of how this kind of partnership works in reality, beyond the transposition of SSC principles and narratives to TDC. Note that the practice of “exporting agrarian practices to Africa” continues a legacy of failed colonial efforts and pre-supposes that Africans can’t develop by themselves, and that they can’t do agriculture on their own.

The broader logic behind ProSavana, additional to the technical terms, is that Mozambique needs to boost its agricultural sector, and Brazil and Japan need to promote and safeguard their big companies’ foreign investments. In this context, Mozambique is a good place to pursue these ends, having fertile and available land comparable to the Brazilian cerrado. Even so, we cannot compare today’s Mozambique to Brazil’s socio-political situation in the 1970s, when it lay under military dictatorship such that civil society could not possibly have followed up developments in the cerrado. This is quite contrary to the situation we witness in Mozambique today, where local CSOs engage in important debates over mega-projects in agriculture, infrastructure building, and extraction industries, with international visibility. In this sense, CSOs’ involvement in and monitoring of the ProSavana programme as well as other mega-projects, and their reflections on the impacts of these for the inclusive and sustainable development of local communities, remain essential to a balanced
development strategy for Mozambique. As this chapter attests, the ProSavana programme will continue to face criticism and will have to accommodate at least some of Mozambican civil society’s demands.
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS.

Sérgio Chichava.
Senior researcher at the Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE), Mozambique.
Lecturer in Political Studies at Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM).
sergio.chichava@iese.ac.mz

Jimena Durán.
Independent researcher.
jime.duranp@gmail.com