Campaign cost and electoral accountability

Prato, Carlo and Wolton, Stephane (2016) Campaign cost and electoral accountability. Political Science Research and Methods . ISSN 2049-8470 (In Press)

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Abstract

The increasing cost of political campaigns and its impact on the electoral process are issues of paramount importance in modern democracies. We propose a theory of electoral accountability in which candidates choose whether or not to commit to constituency service and whether or not to pay a campaign cost to advertise their platform. A higher campaign cost decreases voter welfare when partisan imbalance is low. However, when partisan imbalance is high, a higher campaign cost is associated with a higher expected level of constituency service. More costly campaigns can thus have a rebalancing effect that improves electoral accountability. We discuss the implications of our findings for campaign finance regulation and present empirical evidence consistent with our key predictions.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJourna...
Additional Information:	© 2016 The Authors
Library of Congress subject classification:	J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Sets:	Departments > Government
Funders:	Hoover Institution
Date Deposited:	04 Feb 2016 16:51
URL:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/65239/

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