Blanes i Vidal, Jordi and Möller, Marc (2016) Project selection and execution in teams. The RAND Journal of Economics, 47 (1). pp. 166-185. ISSN 0741-6261
Abstract
We use a mechanism-design approach to study a team whose members select a joint project and exert individual efforts to execute it. Members have private information about the qualities of alternative projects. Information sharing is obstructed by a trade-off between adaptation and motivation. We determine the conditions under which first-best project and effort choices are implementable and show that these conditions can become relaxed as the team grows in size. We also characterize the second-best mechanism and find that it may include a “motivational bias,” that is, a bias in favor of the team's initially preferred project, and higher-than-optimal effort by uninformed team members.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(IS... |
| Additional Information: | © 2016 The RAND Corporation |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management |
| Sets: | Departments > Management Research centres and groups > Managerial Economics and Strategy Group |
| Date Deposited: | 26 Jan 2016 14:34 |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/65153/ |
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