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Theory Guiding Practice: the Neofunctionalists and the Hallstein EEC Commission

Jonathan P. J. White

It has become a widely accepted dictum within the social sciences that all theory is rooted in the circumstances of its authors.\(^1\) Political and International Relations theory is contingent on time and place, and may not be read as a neutral response to some form of ‘objective reality’. In the words of Robert Cox, ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’.\(^2\) Such an observation stands as one of the essential legacies of post-positivist thought.

Arguably this leaves the point only half-made, however, for in many cases the relationship between scholarly theory and its subject matter is dialectical. Just as a theoretical model, explanatory or predictive, will exhibit the assumptions and the concerns of the environment in which it was conceived, so the course of decision-making in any practical field is apt to be guided, whether by deliberate prescription or silent influence, by the dominant intellectual currents of the day.\(^3\) ‘The foreign policy of a nation’, it has been written, ‘addresses itself not to the “external world”, but to the image of the external world that is in the minds of those who make foreign policy’.\(^4\) Clearly, whenever theoretical influences on this image (in particular one dominant influence) exceed a certain level, there may be consequent difficulties for effective policy-making. The schematisation which is a necessary component of all theorising can be a constriction when it is taken up by those who fall within its compass. The ability to meet and overcome challenges in the policy-making process, in whatever sphere, requires a plurality of views, a plurality of perspectives on what are problems and what are solutions. Where this is lacking, political stagnation or misadventure may follow.

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\(^1\) For their guidance in the preparation of an earlier draft of this work I should like to thank Dr. Julie Smith and Dr. Geoffrey Edwards of the University of Cambridge. For its financial assistance, I am grateful to Corpus Christi College, Cambridge.


\(^3\) For a discussion of one instance of this, the impact of Game Theory and statistical models on U.S. foreign and defence policy in the 1950/60s, see F. KAPLAN, The Wizards of Armageddon, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1983.

Academic and political discourse in the years and decades following the end of the Second World War saw many attempts to conceptualise the course of European history and to analyse the options available for its future development. To those who felt the War had exposed the bankruptcy of the traditional balance-of-power relationship between the continent’s powers, the ‘federalist’ cause, understood as the advocacy of progression (whether directly or incrementally) towards a system of centralised regulatory power, was an attractive proposition and one that came to be adopted by many of the leading statesmen of the post-war era (amongst others, Konrad Adenauer, Winston Churchill and Jean Monnet). The common goal, moderated from one individual to the next, was some form of European unification, with a spectrum of views on the means by which this should be achieved, ranging from the ‘functionalist’ approach of Monnet, which emphasised the potential of cooperation in specific technical tasks eventually to lead to some kind of pooling of sovereignty, to the more directly constitutional approach of men such as Altiero Spinelli.

In the 1950s and 1960s, a series of further perspectives on European integration emerged. Economists sought ways of determining the prerequisites of a successful common market. International law theorists looked at ways in which sovereignty might be pooled, and considered the constitutional arrangements most appropriate to post-War Europe. And in political science, several schools of thought developed, each with its own particular perspective on the relations between states and how these might best be directed. ‘Liberal internationalists’ such as Inis Claude stressed the potential of supra-national institutions to manage international relations; ‘intergovernmentalists’ like Stanley Hoffmann argued that such institutions in Europe could do little more than reflect the immediate interests of the major nation-states, whilst ‘transactionalists’ such as Karl Deutsch highlighted the potential of travel, trade and telecommunications for creating peaceful interdependence. In the late 1950s, the work of the American Ernst Haas added a new methodological rigour, and perhaps a more prescriptive thrust, to the thinking of the federal functionalists, and in so doing spawned a new

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school of integration theory which achieved a certain dominance in the academic field in the early to mid-1960s: ‘neofunctionalism’.

As Europe, then, sought to rebuild itself in the years after the War, it did so against the backdrop of a very considerable amount of conceptual self-reflection. And yet in much of the historiography written on this period, this flow of ideas has tended to be underestimated, attention focused instead upon ‘the events themselves’. ‘The true origins of the European Community’, according to the leading historian Alan Milward, ‘are economic and social’.8 The significance of beliefs and individual perceptions, argues the historian and social scientist Andrew Moravcsik, should be limited ‘to cases in which material interests are weak or uncertain’, as though the interpretation of material interests were without normative content.9

Michael Burgess, in a recent examination of the role of federalist ideas in the early years of the European Community, has argued that historical revisionism, in seeking to do away with the imprecision of earlier accounts and their focus on the role of the individual, has in turn negated unjustifiably the significance of the goals and visions of the early figures of European integration. With reference to federalists such as Monnet, Spinelli, Schuman, Beyen and Spaak, Burgess writes that ‘their significance could be found in what Milward’s dour Gradgrind approach ignored, namely, the political context of the post-war debate about European integration’.10 An account of European integration which places paramount emphasis on socio-economic realities (understood as objectively pre-existing political evaluation) usually requires the assumption of a coherence and rationality of action often absent; it will also fail to discern the ideational concerns in the context of which critical decisions are made.

The focus of this paper is on the events of 1965-66 – the time of the ‘Empty Chair’ crisis in Europe, when French President Charles de Gaulle withdrew his country’s representatives from the Council of ministers, thereby paralysing the work of the European institutions. The Commission of the European Economic Community was at this time under the presidency of Walter Hallstein, a

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former German Foreign Office minister who had first come to prominence in European affairs as leader of the German delegation to the Schuman Plan negotiations in 1950. By examining the overlap of ideas between the Commission and various academics of the time, and by subsequently analysing in some detail the course of political events in 1965, this study will attempt to ascertain how far the Commission was guided in its policy-making by beliefs derived, at least in part, from contemporary integration theory.\(^\text{11}\)

Admittedly no single theoretical discourse had exclusive influence on decision-makers in this period. Work has already been conducted on the significance of contemporary legal, economic and federalist theoretical discourse for Hallstein and his Commission. The historian Matthias Schönwald has written on the extent to which Hallstein’s constitutional understanding of federalist structures was derived from the teachings of Heinrich Triepel, one of Hallstein’s professors whilst a law student in 1920s Berlin, and the Genossenschaftslehre of German legal philosopher Otto von Gierke, who had taught another of Hallstein’s university mentors, Martin Wolff.\(^\text{12}\) Economic theorists likewise were highly valued by a Commission which saw one of its main tasks as the creation of a European customs union. Richard Mayne, an adviser to Hallstein in the early 1960s, has emphasised the significance for Hallstein of a United Nations report produced in 1947 concerning the creation of customs unions.\(^\text{13}\) Also discernible in the source material is a high regard for the work of two economics professors in particular, Jacob Viner (author of The Customs Union Issue, 1950, and International Economics, 1951) and James Meade (author of Problems of Economic Union, 1953).

Yet legal and economic theory are arguably more relevant to the development of Hallstein’s thought than to its more complete form in 1965-66. True enough, law was the foundation on which the Communities rested, and hence the ultimate justification for all actions taken, but the Treaty of Rome was a highly complex and

\(^{11}\) In the analysis that follows, extracts from the speeches, conversations and writings of Hallstein are quoted in the original language; for all other sources, English translations have been used where these exist in published form.


nuanced agreement, and how one chose to interpret it would always be dependent upon factors that lay outside the field of law, dependent upon views held on political matters. Similarly, the specifics of economic integration could never constitute more than one dimension to the overall process of European integration. As Commission President, Hallstein thought of himself as far more than an economic coordinator for the six national governments. He saw his role primarily as a political one. Both economic and legal theory provide useful starting-points for looking at the evolution of Hallstein’s thinking on European integration, but if one wishes to understand the full nature of his thought then one must consider its political dimension also.

‘Federalism’, as expressed in the ideas of Monnet, was undoubtedly a crucial influence on Hallstein. Monnet’s role in the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community meant that he and his ideas on European integration were always likely to be held in affection by members of the EEC Commission. His links to Hallstein were particularly close. As Hallstein explained in a BBC interview in spring 1972,

'It worked between us from the very first moment; we had the same - should I say - antenna, and so we have very rapidly become really intimate friends [...] it’s a personal friendship, an all-round friendship if I may say so'.

The ways in which they articulated their strategies for constructing the new European order are strikingly similar. Both used the metaphor of a chain reaction to describe the integration process, and both felt that some kind of ‘federalism by instalments’ was the best way forward. In the incrementalism of his approach, Hallstein clearly displays the legacy of his close association with Monnet. Ultimately, however, Hallstein was less restrained in his federalist ambitions than Monnet, a feature that the historian Matthias Schönwald has drawn attention to, and one that is readily apparent when one looks at Hallstein’s

14 Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BA) N 1266-2493.
speeches towards the mid-1960s. Moreover, a reading of the sources suggests that there were dimensions to his understanding of political integration, especially by 1964-65, that cannot be classified in terms of the functionalist-federalist discourse of which Monnet was the most significant proponent. To view Hallstein as simply a disciple of Monnet is to neglect the complexity of his political thought in its mature form.

It is the discourse of 'neofunctionalism' – clusters of ideas, concepts and categorisations which had their origins in the work of a certain school of academic scholars – which, I wish to suggest, is needed to complete the survey of influences. This is particularly true in the light of new evidence which suggests that its significance for Hallstein, and for one of his advisers in particular, was considerably greater than has been recognised to date.

The type of discourse analysis used in the following approach has a number of distinctive methodological features: notably, the discourse under examination is assumed to be of a peculiarly manufactured quality; that is, with its origins lying primarily in the world of systematically devised ideas (the work of various integration theorists), rather than in 'ritualised social practices' generative of patterns of thought and behaviour. It is not so much the discursive impact of Foucault’s ‘disciplines’ (patterns of behaviour at the micro-level) which will concern us here; rather, the emphasis will be on the limiting power of specific modes of thinking at the macro-level. In this sense, perhaps the model which conforms most closely to the aims of this study was that presented by Alexander George as far back as 1969. The ‘Operational Code’, as it was known, sought to identify the ‘instrumental’ and the ‘philosophical’ beliefs of decision-makers – the former being the very kinds of belief which are discussed here. But methodologically (and not just in its brittle name!), the Operational Code betrays its origins in the 1960s behaviouralist movement, and perhaps George’s most relevant advice is that ‘questions of data and methods [should] be approached in an eclectic and pragmatic spirit’. Paul Chilton has recently employed an updated version of this kind of

\footnote{Compare J. MONNET, op.cit., p.206, where he portrays the Community structure as sui generis rather than federal, with Hallstein’s speech to higher EEC officials, 30 September 1963 (BA N 1266-968, p.10), where he speaks of the Community as ‘bereits ... eine Quasi-Föderation’.}


\footnote{A. GEORGE, op.cit., p.221.}
discourse analysis in Security Metaphors, a study of the significance of the metaphors employed by foreign policy advisers during the Cold War; but his approach, though it provides a valuable examination of the constraining effect of certain patterns of thinking, contains little that is analogous to the following attempt to link a specific theoretical discourse to the understanding of decision-makers.

The Neofunctionalists and the Hallstein EEC Commission

The principal figures of the neofunctionalist school were: Ernst Haas, professor at the University of California, Berkeley, author of the seminal 1958 book The Uniting of Europe, and as such the recognised founder of the school; and Leon Lindberg, of the University of Wisconsin, author of several major works of neofunctionalist theory in the mid-1960s. Also researching in Brussels at this time, in collaboration with Lindberg, was Stuart Scheingold, assistant professor at Wisconsin. These individuals constituted an academic school in the true sense: though there were certainly a number of differences of emphasis between them, their work was marked by fundamental agreement on all the essential questions of perspective, also by the use of a common body of descriptive terminology and by much cross-referencing with each others’ work.

Richard Mayne, speaking in his capacity as a former adviser to Hallstein and Monnet, has expressed some scepticism at the idea that this group of academics might have helped to shape the political understanding of those in the Commission. As presented by Mayne, Hallstein’s thought appears fundamentally the same as that of Monnet. Yet persuasive evidence has been discovered, and is reproduced here, suggesting that by 1965, i.e. after Mayne had left the Commission, the links between the academic school and the institution it was studying were strong.

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25 Interview, op.cit.
The recollections of Stuart Scheingold, who was researching in Brussels between September 1964 and February 1965, provide a useful insight into the closeness of this relationship. Scheingold recalls developing a number of contacts at the Commission during his period of research (in particular Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, an adviser in the Commission’s Legal Service between 1961 and 1973). Significantly, Scheingold remembers lunching with Karl-Heinz Narjes – Hallstein’s chef de cabinet from 1963 onwards – in the winter of 1964-65. At this lunch, Scheingold says, Narjes ‘went out of his way’ to ask him about neofunctionalist theory and to talk through its implications. Indeed, Narjes had apparently on another occasion met Scheingold’s colleague Leon Lindberg. Most interestingly, on that occasion Narjes had reportedly left the academic with the impression that he viewed him and his neofunctionalist associates as ‘consultants’ on European integration.

The link between these political scientists and the Commission can be traced to the top of the institution. Ernst Haas’ Uniting of Europe is to be found in the bibliography for the 1962 publication of Hallstein’s Clayton lectures. More significantly, while Hallstein does not explicitly mention the neofunctionalists in his prominent speeches, an examination of the notes for one speech in particular, his February 1965 address to students at Kiel University, reveals that their work was not only familiar to him, but also highly rated by him. Some early drafts of this lecture may be found amongst his papers in the Bundesarchiv. The lecture will be frequently cited, since it resembles neofunctionalist thinking closely, is largely free of political rhetoric, dates to February 1965 – just before the crisis began – and also because much of the material is in Hallstein’s own handwriting – a clear suggestion that it directly reflected his personal views.

In one of these drafts, written in the President’s hand, one finds the following passage:

‘Das Beste, was die politische Wissenschaft bisher zur Sammlung der Tatsachen, zur systematischen Analyse und zur Bewertung der Vorgänge beigetragen hat, kommt aus amerikanischer Feder. Ich denke besonders an die Schriften, die Leon N. Lindberg, Professor an der University of Wisconsin, unserm Phänomen gewidmet hat. Ich zitiere ihn

\[26\] Correspondence with the author, Seattle USA – Cambridge UK, May 2001.
\[28\] BA N 1266-1004.
This is high praise indeed. Although the paragraph did not make it to the final version of the speech, the fact that Hallstein was contemplating it (and clearly, given the handwriting, doing so on the basis of personal reflection), also the extent to which he was so comprehensively identifying his own thought with Lindberg’s neofunctionalism, surely is of considerable significance. It seems to justify the analysis of Commission texts from this period for traces of neofunctionalist theoretical discourse.

The ‘Logic’ of European Integration

By the mid-1960s, it was a central belief of Hallstein’s that the process of European integration could be described as a ‘logical’ phenomenon. Since much earlier in his Commission presidency, Hallstein had been asserting that ostensibly economic issues were also essentially political. As he made clear in March 1962, ‘die Realität unserer Gemeinschaft ist nicht wirtschaftliche Integration […], sondern […] wirtschaftspolitische Integration’. However the idea of the ‘logic of integration’, Sachlogik as Hallstein called it, was more complex than this, and in its many facets bore remarkable similarity to the work of the neofunctionalists. Here was the theoretical means which enabled Hallstein to incorporate his early belief in the unity of the economic and political spheres into a more comprehensive account of the process of European integration.

It is possible that the term Sachlogik was coined for rhetorical purposes, as a means of justifying the various steps of the integration process to sceptical observers. Whatever the truth of this, the idea itself was in no way purely cosmetic. Robert Marjolin, in his memoirs, suggests that he himself was one of very few notable Commission figures who did not believe in the ‘logic of integration’:

29 BA N 1266-1004, Fiche 3, section A7/8. For the authoritative identification of the handwriting here, I am indebted both to Richard Mayne and to Dr. Matthias Schönwald.

30 T. OPPERMANN, op.cit., p.338.
‘my own reaction [...] was one of extreme scepticism. I did not believe in the ‘engrenage’ or ‘spill-over’ theory [...] above all [because] it would be a fundamental error to think that a government having to contend with acute domestic problems, often threatening its very existence, could be constrained to take crucial decisions involving relinquishments of sovereignty, simply because an ‘inner logic’, the reality of which is moreover debatable, left it no other alternative’.31

The tone of these comments, somewhat confrontational and self-justifying, would seem to indicate the dominance of the ‘logic-interpretation’ amongst his colleagues. That Hallstein retains the idea of Sachlogik in his 1969 political resumé, Der unvollendete Bundesstaat, suggests it was far more than a rhetorical device, that it was an axiomatic principle of his understanding of European integration.32

Belief in the ‘logic’ of integration, for both the neofunctionalists and for Hallstein, involved a series of key elements. Perhaps the most fundamental of these was the idea that integration could be explained almost entirely with reference to the material ‘interests’ of the parties involved. This view was expressed by Haas in 1958, when he wrote that ‘major interest groups as well as politicians determine their support of, or opposition to, new central institutions and policies on the basis of a calculation of advantage’.33 In his lecture at Chatham House in December 1964, Hallstein talks of the Community as being founded on ‘the balancing of individual interests and Community interests’, whilst in his Kiel lecture Hallstein talks of ‘Menschen, von Interessen bewegt’ and goes so far as to employ the English term ‘vested interests’.34 Further shared vocabulary may be found: ‘interest coalition’ is a term which the neofunctionalists were prone to using, and one which may be found occasionally in the texts of Hallstein.35 The term ‘package deal’ (in the sense of the packaging of competing interests into a

33 E. HAAS, op.cit., p.xiv.
35 HALLSTEIN, lecture, Johns Hopkins University, Bologna, 15 May 1965, BA N 1266-1017, p.9.
single agreement) is one which Scheingold links to Lindberg, and is used by Hallstein, in English, in his Kiel lecture.

The second major area of overlapping ideas can be described as belief in the 'logic of spill-over', as explained by Lindberg in 1963: 'the initial task and grant of power to the central institutions creates a situation or series of situations that can be dealt with only by further expanding the task and the grant of powers'. The idea of 'expansive tasks' which Lindberg outlines is reproduced by Hallstein in a speech in October 1964: he states that

'jedes gemeinschaftliche Handeln schafft zugleich wieder die Gründe, die Notwendigkeiten für weiteres gemeinschaftliche Handeln [...]. Täglich wächst der Kreis der Aufgaben, denen nur eine gemeinschaftliche Zusammenarbeit gerecht werden kann'.

Concern with the 'logic' of the enterprise had implications for the tactics and strategy with which integration was to be pursued. In several of his works, Haas describes three methods of resolving disputes: the 'lowest common denominator' method, 'splitting the difference', and 'upgrading the common interest'. Lindberg follows Haas in this categorisation in 1963, and explores the implications of each method. It appears to be exactly these three different methods of conflict resolution which Hallstein outlines in his Kiel lecture under the headings 'ein quantitativer Kompromiß', a 'sowohl als auch' approach and 'eine Synthese neuer Elemente'. Interestingly, Hallstein adds that conflict resolution is the very essence of the Community, a source of progress rather than potential danger:

'Die elementarste Kraft jeder Gemeinschaft ist die Verschiedenheit der Partner. [...] Jeder Sieg des Gemeinsamen über das Besondere macht sie härter'.

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37 T. OPPERMANN, op.cit., p.538.
38 L. LINDBERG, The Political Dynamics ..., op.cit., p.10.
41 L. LINDBERG, The Political Dynamics, ..., op.cit., p.12.
42 T. OPPERMANN, op.cit., p.536.
The concern to balance ‘interests’, to accommodate them within ‘package deals’, was indicative of a general inclination to deal with issues as a bundle, rather than individually. Here was another point of overlap between Hallstein and the neofunctionalists. If one believed in the logic of integration, it followed that one could never view a problem in isolation, but had to see it as part of a series of issues to be addressed. This, as Scheingold made clear, was germane to the logic-perspective:

‘the packaging of proposals as documented by Leon Lindberg [...] calls for the simultaneous advance in interlocking areas [...] The packaging process is thus grounded on the logic of integration’. ⁴³

Hallstein seems to have been well aware of this imperative: one finds him using such words as ‘synchronisation’, ⁴⁴ ‘equilibrium’, ⁴⁵ and ‘der innere Zusammenhang aller Bereiche der Wirtschaft und der Wirtschaftspolitik’ ⁴⁶ to explain the need for packaging problems. There was an inner connection between all fields of integration, a connection which had to be ‘respected’. ⁴⁷

Indivisible from a belief in the logic of spill-over was a tendency to view the integration process as in some sense inevitable. ‘Spill-over’, as the concept was understood at the time, was inherently unidirectional – there was no notion of ‘spill-back’ – and to believe in it was to believe that political integration was ultimately a predestined fact, whatever reverses it might suffer along the way. This sense of inevitability has been highlighted by Schönwald, ⁴⁸ and there is much in the source material to corroborate it. In his Kiel lecture, for example, Hallstein uses the Sachlogik idea to set out ‘die Gründe für die Nützlichkeit, die Notwendigkeit, die Unabwendbarkeit der europäischen Einheit’. ‘Wie die Vollständigkeit des Alphabets,’ he explains, ‘gibt es eine innere Einheit aller Wirtschaftspolitik, die stärker ist als alle Willkür politischer Gewalten’. ⁴⁹ The simile is significant, for it suggests an

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⁴³ S. SCHEINGOLD, op.cit., p.480.
⁴⁵ Lecture, Johns Hopkins University, op.cit., BA N 1266-1017, p.28.
⁴⁶ Lecture, Kiel University, op.cit., BA N 1266-1004. In the published version of the lecture, the phrase is ‘der unlösliche innere Zusammenhang aller Einzelmaßnahmen der Wirtschaftspolitik’ (T. OPPERMANN, op.cit., p.538).
⁴⁷ T. OPPERMANN, op.cit., p.541.
⁴⁹ T. OPPERMANN, op.cit., p.524; p.537.
indivisible whole which is impenetrable, invulnerable to hostile external forces.\textsuperscript{50} (The simile evidently pleased Hallstein, for he reproduced it verbatim in \textit{Der unvollendete Bundesstaat}).\textsuperscript{51} Such a perspective must surely have guided his thinking on the extent to which president de Gaulle of France, the major troublesome political power, would ever successfully be able to challenge the advance of European integration.

Of course, Hallstein and his speech-writers were always careful to stress that European integration was not an inevitable process, that it depended on political will. Much the same linguistic formula is used to make this point each time: ‘these things did not happen automatically: in politics, nothing does’;\textsuperscript{52} ‘let me stress that I am not suggesting that all this will follow automatically or without snags. In politics nothing does’.\textsuperscript{53} But the mantra is unconvincing. As Robert Marjolin recalled:

[for Hallstein and those who shared his perspective], federal Europe was within reach, if the political will were there. Practically speaking, once the first step had been taken in this direction, events would necessarily follow on from one another and inevitably lead to the desired result. This is the gist of the so-called theory of ‘engrenage’, of the ‘spill-over effect’.\textsuperscript{54}

It should perhaps be added that a belief in the ‘logic of integration’ was likely to presage an interpretation of history which confirmed it. One sees hints of this in Hallstein’s Chatham House lecture, when he details how the success of the Common Market generated new circumstances conducive to further economic

\textsuperscript{50} For a discussion of the significance of metaphor choice in political discourse, see P. CHILTON (op.cit., Chap.2). Of the various types of cognitive schema that Chilton identifies, the ‘alphabet metaphor’ which Hallstein uses here, with its connotations of interior and exterior, would seem to be a ‘container’ schema, implying ‘protection from, or resistance to, external forces’ (p.51). Its usage perhaps indicates a disposition on Hallstein’s part, despite what he asserts elsewhere on the unity of the economic and political spheres, to see the process of European integration as separate and protected from the realm of arbitrary high politics.

\textsuperscript{51} W. HALLSTEIN, \textit{Der Unvollendete Bundesstaat} …, op.cit., p.20.

\textsuperscript{52} W. HALLSTEIN, \textit{Economic Integration and Political Unity in Europe}, in: Community Topics 2, Information Service of the European Communities, London, 1961, p.11.


\textsuperscript{54} R. MARJOLIN, \textit{Architect of European Unity} …, op.cit., p.265.
integration.\textsuperscript{55} One may assume that in early 1965, after the reasonably successful deal on cereal prices in December 1964, belief in the ‘logic of integration’ was seen to have been vindicated.\textsuperscript{56} A sense of the inevitability of the integration process was therefore, in parallel with the notion of the ‘logic of integration’, at its peak in the early months of 1965.

Finally, a shared perspective on the role to be played by economic, bureaucratic and political elites in the process of spill-over may be found. For both the neofunctionalists and Hallstein, the need to create new identities and to change the loyalties of elite groups was one of the fundamental tasks of the integration project. The neofunctionalists called this shifting of loyalties the ‘system transformation effect’.\textsuperscript{57} This was a term which Hallstein included in his Kiel lecture.\textsuperscript{58} It is there in the hand-written version of the lecture. It is also to be found in an abridged version published in the April 1965 edition of \textit{EEC Bulletin} where, although several sections of the speech are cut, the phrase ‘system transformation effect’ is retained, a move that suggests its inclusion in the original lecture was not just tokenism designed to appeal to students of political science, but that it was considered of genuine explanatory worth.

The developed form of this belief in the ‘logic’ of integration, comprising the various points examined above, is not present in Hallstein’s earliest texts. One does not find mention of \textit{Sachlogik}, for example, with its cognitive (rather than purely economic) connotations, in Hallstein’s 1961 lectures at Tufts Massachusetts, even though these deal with ‘The Economics of European Integration’ and ‘The Politics of European Integration’ and are directed at academic audiences – precisely where one might have expected to find it. One hears of the logic of economic integration, which is ‘compelling and inexorable’, but in 1961 this is not yet extended into the social and political spheres.\textsuperscript{59} Nor does one find it in another academic lecture in 1961, ‘Wirtschaftliche Integration als Faktor politischer

\textsuperscript{55} T.\textsc{oppermann}, op.cit., p.512.
\textsuperscript{56} For a summary of these negotiations and the positive response to their conclusion, see M. \textsc{camps}, European Unification in the Sixties: From the Veto to the Crisis, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1967, pp.23-28. Note also \textsc{camps}’ observation (p.35) that Hallstein was, by spring 1965, in the wake of the successful resolution of several protracted sets of negotiations, prone to ‘confuse crises with progress’.
\textsuperscript{57} T. \textsc{lindberg}, ‘Decision-Making’, pp.58-60. was not jet quoted: T.\textsc{inderberg}, editor, place date.
\textsuperscript{58} T. \textsc{oppermann}, op.cit., p.525.
\textsuperscript{59} W. \textsc{hallstein}, United Europe ..., op.cit., p.58.
Einigung’, given at Freiburg University.²⁶⁰ Around 1962, one sees the introduction of the word ‘Zwang’ into speeches – ‘ein logischer Zwang’; ‘mit einem inneren Zwang ergibt sich […] die Notwendigkeit des Aufbaus einer eigenen Wettbewerbsordnung’.²⁶¹ But only from around 1964 onwards (after the publication, one should note, of Lindberg’s Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration) is the logic of spill-over, political and social as well as strictly economic, to be found in the sources.

As has already been emphasised, the relationship between the neofunctionalists and the Commission was reciprocal, and part of the correlation in perspectives must be due to the fact that the former were modelling their studies on the work of the latter. Basic notions of spill-over predated the neofunctionalists and are present in the earlier discourse of Monnet and Hallstein himself; by repeating and developing these the neofunctionalists were simply reinforcing beliefs which were, in outline form, already in circulation. Equally, it must not be assumed that Hallstein and his speechwriters adopted neofunctionalist theory wholesale once it came to their attention. Hallstein was never ‘a neofunctionalist’. What can be observed, rather, is what one might call a series of ‘organising beliefs’, beliefs about the very nature of the process of European integration and the role of the Commission within it, which bear many of the essential elements of the neofunctionalist discourse – the vocabulary, and with the vocabulary many of the key ideas. On the basis of the above these can be recapitulated as beliefs in: a) the determining integrative pressure of material interests; b) the logic of spill-over; c) a strategy of treating problems collectively, and a specific set of tactics for resolving disputes; d) the virtual inevitability of the integration process (and a view of history that confirmed this); and e) the need to transfer the loyalties of the economic, bureaucratic and political elites to the Community level.

These beliefs were not, perhaps, without a degree of self-contradiction in places. To what extent, for example, was it reasonable to articulate one’s political goals, and seek to engineer them, if one saw the progress of integration as being led by an anonymous material logic? Indeed, might not a stated aim interfere with the conduct and policy-making of certain other actors, and hence disrupt the flow of this material logic? These beliefs did not necessarily form a coherent whole, but nonetheless do seem to have played a significant role in shaping the way the integration process was conceptualised by certain key actors.

²⁶¹ Ibid., p.338; p.375.
figures in the Commission towards the spring of 1965 — Hallstein and, one may infer from his contact with Lindberg, Hallstein’s *chef de cabinet* Karl-Heinz Narjes.

**The Commission and the ‘Empty Chair’ Crisis, 1965/6**

The background to the 1965 crisis was as follows. The first five years of Hallstein’s presidency of the EEC Commission, from 1958 to the end of 1962, had been a period of some considerable success. Progress on the steps towards integration time-tabled in the Treaty of Rome had been such that, in October 1962, the Commission had predicted that the customs union would be completed three years ahead of schedule, by 1 January 1967.\(^6^2\) In January 1963, the first major difficulties of the Community’s short history arose when de Gaulle vetoed the British application for Community membership. This was an unpopular move amongst all the other five member states, and an impasse was resolved only by virtue of a package deal that tied further negotiations on the British question with progress in matters important to the French — most notably, agriculture. Thus it was that one of the most significant issues in Community affairs in the period which interests us here was integration in agricultural matters, and the establishment of a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

Progress was slow for much of 1964. The setting of a common price for cereals had developed into something of a stumbling block, and the French, anxious to see advances made, had become agitated. Alain Peyrefitte, the French minister of Information, had announced in *Le Monde* on 22 October 1964 that France would ‘cease to participate’ in the EEC if the common market for agriculture ‘was not organised as it had been agreed that it would be organised’.\(^6^3\) There was a general sense of relief, therefore, when, on 15 December of that year, a deal on cereal prices was finally agreed. This left the financing of the CAP as the next major issue on the agenda, proposals on which the Council of ministers asked the Commission to have ready by the end of March 1965.

The Commission’s response to this request forms the central subject of our analysis, for it was these proposals that ultimately sparked the so-called ‘Empty Chair’ crisis. As asked, the Commission put forward regulations on the financing of the common agricultural fund; but, controversially, it introduced two

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\(^{63}\) M. CAMPS, op.cit., p.17.
extra dimensions to its proposals, beyond what the Council of ministers had specifically been looking for. First, it included provisions for replacing the system based on member states’ financial contributions with one that allowed the Community to have its own financial resources, to be raised through tariffs on industrial imports as well as frontier price-equalisation levies on agricultural products. In proposing this the Commission was greatly enhancing the financial powers of the Community (and thus of itself); it was also directly snubbing previous French policy on the question of own resources, which had been to have them drawn instead from frontier levies and tariffs on agricultural imports alone – the rationale being presumably that, if own resources were to be introduced at all (and it is probable that the French had little enthusiasm for them in any form), it would be Germany and, potentially, Britain that would be the main contributors. Second, the Commission proposed that, so as to regulate the new powers it would now wield through these own resources, the European Parliament be given new authority to oversee the Community budget (a move which would require modification of Articles 201 and 203 of the Rome Treaty).

The 31 March 1965 proposals thus contained three elements, rather than the original single element – proposals on the financing of the CAP – envisaged by the Council of ministers. The French, interpreting this as a bid for power, reacted angrily when the proposals were put before the Council of ministers for discussion in June of that year, and ultimately refused to negotiate any further. In July, de Gaulle withdrew the French representatives from the Council in protest, leaving the French chair empty. It would remain so until January 1966, leaving the other Five to conduct only the most routine of Community business. The Community was essentially paralysed for six months.

What, then, caused the Commission to formulate its proposals in such far-reaching fashion? The French had already made it clear in the course of 1964 that they would not accept the extension of Commission and European parliamentary powers⁶⁴ – so why did the Commission create a package linking that which the

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French emphatically opposed with that which they strongly desired, the completion of the CAP? And then, when France’s disapproval was evident, why did the Commission not swiftly moderate its proposals so as to reach consensus?

Much has been written on the question of whether the ‘Empty Chair’ crisis was the inevitable clash of pro- and anti-integrationists, or whether it was a simple case of political mismanagement on the part of the Commission.65 This polarises the argument unnecessarily. The clash was indeed a clash of concepts, of fundamental perspectives on the very nature and objectives of European integration.66 But that is not to say that the crisis had to happen; rather, in the years and months leading up to March 1965, policy-makers in the Commission somewhat unfortunately came to adopt a series of convictions and beliefs which encouraged them to misjudge and hence to mishandle the political situation.

The previous section set out the ‘organising beliefs’ which could be tied to contemporary neofunctionalist theory. Here, these beliefs are linked to the Commission’s decision-making in 1965. The intention is not to give a mono-causal account of the crisis; these beliefs did not determine Commission policy, rather they set the terms on which it was made, and encouraged certain courses of action over others.

One issue has to be addressed at the outset: that of who was involved in formulating the March 1965 Commission proposals. Robert Marjolin, the French Commissioner, recalls in his memoirs that the ‘triple deal’, as the proposals came to be known, was ‘entirely the brainchild of Hallstein, who had won [Sicco] Mansholt [the Dutch Commissioner for Agriculture] over to it. The project had been drawn up in the utmost secrecy by a few of their collaborators, the other members of the Commission being


66 That de Gaulle was acting partly with regard to issues of sovereignty generally, and not purely those connected to agriculture, is acknowledged even in the work of Moravcsik, where commercial considerations are given primary emphasis. See A. MORAVCSIK, De Gaulle between Grain and Grandeur: the Political Economy of French EC policy, 1958-70 (Part 2), in: Journal of Cold War Studies, 2.3(2000), pp.37-40.
carefully kept out of the picture’. Mayne’s account of the drawing up of the proposals confirms that very few were involved in the process, and also indicates the identity of the ‘collaborators’ that Marjolin mentions: the triple deal was ‘cooked up by Karl-Heinz Narjes and Ernst Albrecht, who was a colleague of his, and sold to Hallstein’. On the basis of both these accounts, and given that his final approval would certainly have been required, the emphasis so far placed on the thinking of Hallstein himself seems fully justified.

The triple deal reflects the stated organising beliefs in a number of ways. Mayne has argued that the thinking behind the deal was to seek to take advantage of French interest in the agricultural question as a means of pushing through further acts of integration in other areas. This would seem to be predicated on the idea that the French had too much to lose from pulling out of the integration process, even if they realised they were being manipulated; predicated, in other words, on the assumption that French policy was determined by ‘interests’ that followed a ‘logic of integration’.

That domestic commercial interests in France generally precluded an anti-integration stance certainly seems to be something that the neofunctionalist Lindberg believed in 1965:

‘De Gaulle does not act without regard for the internal repercussions. His decision to bar the British from membership in the EEC was certainly supported by the overwhelming majority of French elites, but the opposite would be the case were he to withdraw from the Community or even to practise an “empty chair policy”’. Were Lindberg’s views of any significance specifically for the formulation of the March proposals? In his lecture at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Hallstein mentions that academic advice was usually sought when the Commission was drawing up proposals:

‘Um zu solchen Lösungen zu gelangen, verläßt sich die Kommission bei der Ausarbeitung ihres Vorschlages nicht allein auf den Sachverstand ihrer Beamten; sie versucht vielmehr, die Ansichten unabhängiger Wissenschaftler, der

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68 R. MAYNE, interview, op.cit. Mayne is quite firm on this point: ‘it was cooked up by these two people, Narjes and Albrecht’.
69 Ibid.
70 LINDBERG, Decision-Making, op.cit., p.75.
Lindberg undoubtedly fits the description of ‘unabhängiger Wissenschaftler’ – indeed, in Hallstein’s handwritten notes for the Kiel lecture, it was precisely Lindberg’s objectivity (together with his competence) that was underlined. Finally, it is known that Narjes met with Lindberg in this period, and that he was inclined to regard Lindberg as something of a ‘consultant’. Given that (if one follows Mayne’s account) Hallstein and Narjes were two of the three people involved in formulating the March 1965 proposals, there seems to be a good case for arguing that Lindberg’s neofunctionalism was indeed a meaningful influence.

The proposals also convey the ‘logic of integration’ in as far as they indicate a sense of the unity of all policy-making and a concern to bundle together issues which were ostensibly separable. It was the logic of funding the Community’s ‘own resources’ through both the agricultural and the industrial sectors, even though only the CAP and agricultural issues were formally on the agenda, and of proposing also the extension of the Parliament’s powers, which impressed Hallstein, as is clear from a speech made in June of the same year:

‘Hier haben wir schon ein schönes Beispiel für ein Gleichgewichtsproblem: wir können gar nicht dieses eine Stück vollenden, ohne daß sich sofort die Frage stellt, was mit den anderen Stücken wird. Wird die Sache nicht schiefl, gerät sie nicht ins Rutschen, wenn wir uns auf das eine beschränken? […] Das ist unsere Ausgangsthese, wie Sie wissen’. It should be noticed how Hallstein refers to it as an ‘example’ – an example indicative of a broader pattern of sector spill-over.

Finally it is worth noticing that the inclusion in the triple deal of the extension of European parliamentary powers conformed to the neofunctionalist sense of the need to win greater popular legitimacy for the Community, and thereby transfer elite and popular loyalties away from the national governments towards the centre. It was, as Hallstein said in

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71 T. OPPERMANN, op.cit., p.549. Hallstein makes the same point in his Kiel lecture (p.532).
October 1964, a question of ‘democratisation’.  

Is it not possible that this aspect of the proposals was inspired in part by the notion of ‘system transformation effect’, which, as we have seen, seems to have made an impression on Hallstein?

**Clash of paradigms**

Hallstein evidently saw the logic of integration as expressed in the integrative impulse of competing material interests (Sachlogik, after all, meant ‘material logic’). He saw de Gaulle’s political options, therefore, as constrained by material forces that favoured further integration. This is evident in a report of a conversation between Hallstein and McGeorge Bundy, U.S. Presidential special assistant for National Security affairs, on 29 March 1965:

‘da die Bauern und ihre Organisationen die größte wirtschaftliche Widerstandsgruppe des Generals sei, habe nunmehr das Zustandekommen des Agrarmarkts auch für de Gaulle die Bindung an die EWG irreversibel gemacht’.

The neofunctionalist theorist Lindberg – arguably the critical influence on Hallstein’s Sachlogik – had, as we saw above, come to the same conclusion that de Gaulle had too much to lose domestically from an ‘empty chair’ policy.

The problem was, of course, that de Gaulle most certainly did not see the issues of European integration as indivisible in the way that Hallstein did, nor did he wish to forge a new European identity for the French people. His concept of Europe was one of limited economic cooperation, ultimately according to what he decided was in France’s best interests. In several speeches he had made clear his hostility towards any moves to extend the Community’s supra-national powers. Indeed, recent research suggests that commercial considerations may actually have contributed to de Gaulle’s hostility towards all integrative moves other than those strictly associated with financing the

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74 T. OPPERMANN, op.cit., p.491.  
75 W. HALLSTEIN, BA N 1266-1756.  
76 L. LINDBERG, Decision-Making, op.cit., p.75.  
77 See, for example, de Gaulle’s press conference, 31 January 1964: ‘obviously no country in Europe would agree to entrust its destiny to the control of an Areopagus composed of foreigners. In any case it is true for France’. (Cit. in The Monthly Bulletin of European Documentation, 2(1964), pp.5-6).
CAP. Hallstein and the majority of the Commission, concerned with the logic of the enterprise, failed sufficiently to appreciate this. The words of Monnet’s memoirs are instructive:

‘The majority of the Commission […] was impatient with the diplomats’ warnings: ‘De Gaulle will never accept it […]’ ‘We shall see’, was the reply. […] Hallstein, Mansholt, and others believed that the French government would agree to that transfer [of sovereignty] as the price of Europe’s financing French farm exports. They also believed that the French, because of their intellectual training, could not resist the logic of the argument. Marjolin warned them: ‘For de Gaulle your logic is a trap, and he’ll smash it’.

According to Mayne, Hallstein was ‘completely flummoxed’ when the crisis broke out. ‘He rang up Monnet, and I was listening on the earphone, and he was just flabbergasted, he didn’t know what to say or what to think, because, he said, we’d not got to the end of the agenda’.

If the preconceptions of the policy-makers are evidenced by the March 1965 proposals themselves, they surely also account for the slowness with which the Commission responded to the warnings thereafter that consensus would not be reached in the Council of ministers when the time came to discuss them. Marjolin writes that ‘from March to June’, the Commission was ‘entrenched in the positions [it had adopted], stultified at once by the criticism to which it was being subjected and by the often embarrassing support it was receiving from certain frenzied anti-Gaullist quarters’. Not until July at the earliest did it ‘begin to think again’. It was for June, however, that two major meetings of the Council of ministers had been scheduled with the purpose of discussing the Commission’s proposals. Up to and during these negotiations, the Commission’s stance did not waver. Hallstein refused to see the package of proposals broken up into separate parts, as the French desired, and criteria of logic rather than consensus continued to be paramount to him.

Given the Commission’s continued attachment to the principles that had led it to package its proposals in the first place, it was hardly surprising that the Council of ministers meetings on 13-15 and 28-30 June 1965 broke up without agreement.

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80 Interview, op.cit.
The French, dogmatically pursuing their agenda as it was always likely that they would, refused to contemplate all other issues until the CAP funding question had been resolved to their preference. When such a resolution did not materialise by the agreed deadline of midnight 30 June, de Gaulle withdrew his representative Couve de Murville from the negotiations, and the crisis became public.

Theory and Practice

It has been the argument of this paper that the Commission proposals of 31 March 1965 were born of a set of beliefs about the nature of European integration markedly inspired by contemporary attempts in political science to conceptualise the process in theoretical terms. The proposals, it is argued, were a miscalculation. The crisis that followed was not the predetermined clash of two irreconcilable views, for it is assumed that de Gaulle realised that there were gains to be made for France in Europe, and consequently that it was not his aim simply to crush the European project for the sake of it. But once the Commission had come to develop the perspective on European integration that it did, the miscalculation that caused the triple deal to be formulated in such provocative terms was a natural consequence, and the unwillingness to moderate it thereafter entirely predictable. Moreover, the public articulation of this Commission perspective at various instances in the months before and during the crisis (repeated references, for example, to the ‘logic of integration’) meant that the Commission was likely to appear to onlookers as ‘scheming’ and goal-fixated, and therefore risked being cast by those with a grievance as an ideological opponent, intent on bringing about a hostile super-state.

The crisis which broke in July 1965 had severe consequences, not least in that it led to Hallstein’s position as President becoming untenable. It slowed the process of integration, and arguably weakened the Commission for up to two decades. If one

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83 As well as de Gaulle’s press conference, 9 September 1965, one thinks of the accusation made by the Gaullist French MEP Jean de Lipkowski before the European Parliament on 20 October 1965: Hallstein and the Commission, he argued, were guilty of acting out of an ‘excess of logic’ (European Community, 11(1965), p.6).
maintains that the influence of contemporary theoretical discourse was a central contributory factor in this political misadventure, it would seem natural to consider whether the scenario might have been avoided.

Hallstein valued the work of Lindberg not just because he saw it as accurate, but because he felt it had impartiality and was protected from the concerns of those directly involved in the integration process. Such an assessment would seem to be problematic. As was emphasised at the very beginning of this piece, theorists tend to be more subjective than they suppose, or present themselves as being. The neofunctionalists were working to refine a theory which demonstrated the logical premises of integration; they would have wished, naturally enough, to see reality conform to their theory. Scheingold recalls that, when they were in Brussels in the mid-1960s, both he and Lindberg felt that Hallstein was acting with reference to a neofunctionalist logic. ‘It just seemed obvious that the clash between de Gaulle and Hallstein was like a real-world replication or reflection of the debate between Stanley Hoffmann [the Harvard professor, opposed to the neofunctionalist interpretation] and Ernie Haas’.84 One can imagine, then, that the lunchtime conversations that took place with members of the Commission in the winter 1964-65 were not ‘objective’ in any real sense, since the academics were most definitely observing events with their own particular perspective in mind, and indeed since it would have been natural for them, for the sake of their theory’s accuracy, to encourage practitioners to act it out.

Even if the Commission was determined to adopt some of the principles of neofunctionalism for practical purposes, it might still have been better advised not to voice the theoretical basis of its actions quite so openly. As Haas himself recognised after the event, it was the role of the Commission President to suggest policies that ‘happened’ to be integrative, rather than to construct a scheme, especially one that might incite opponents to hostility.85

There are also some points to be made about the formal side of policy-making. The March proposals, we are told, were drawn up under a certain amount of secrecy, by a small group consisting of the President and his closest aides, ‘the other members of the Commission being carefully kept out of the picture’.86 (That this

84 Correspondence, op.cit.
account is not simply motivated by the bitterness of an excluded Commissioner, Marjolin, seems to be borne out by its similarity with Mayne’s). The conditions invite reference to Irving Janis’ concept of ‘groupthink’, whereby policy-making is distorted by over-reliance on the views of key individuals and a failure to engage with countervailing perspectives. In this instance, the figure of Marjolin is significant: he was a Frenchman, with contacts in the French government, and was notoriously one of the more cautious pursuers of European integration in the Commission. Marjolin recalls:

‘as soon as I had heard about it [the triple deal], I had stated my total opposition to what I regarded as an absurdity. [...] I knew [...], given the sentiments prevailing not only in Paris but also in government and civil service circles in the other capitals, that there was not the slightest chance of the project’s being accepted, or even of its being considered seriously’.

Mayne and Hans von der Groeben confirm that Marjolin made clear his opposition at the time. Even if his views were ultimately to have been over-ridden, had his scepticism been acknowledged during the formulation of the March proposals, rather than only when they had already been drawn up (and thus had assumed a degree of finality for their makers), it is conceivable that the proposals might have been cast in more moderate terms. The dissidence of Marjolin was too conveniently side-stepped.

It was the initial premise of this inquiry, however, that policy decisions are made with reference to an ‘image’ of external reality which is a simplification, a schematisation, and as such always likely to be informed by the efforts of others to conceptualise likewise. In this case, the inclination to schematise was no doubt particularly strong: the EEC Commission had something of a ‘missionary’ quality in the 1960s, and its project of European integration was (and remains) a peculiarly attractive subject for theorisation, not least because the issues at stake are fairly easily identified, and thus a predictable pattern seems within reach. In this, it was perhaps singular. But the conclusions one can draw are in no way uniquely applicable.

87 I. JANIS, Groupthink, 2d ed., Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1982. Janis defines groupthink as ‘a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action’ (p.9).
89 R. MAYNE, interview, op.cit.; H. VON DER GROEBEN, op.cit., pp.31-32.
Walter Hallstein, the former university professor, may have been likely to adopt an intellectual approach to his role as Commission President, but increasingly, in the West at least, those who take up policy-making posts do so after substantial periods spent in an academic environment, and are therefore susceptible to similar inclinations. Political science in the 21st century may well be more cautious in its approach than in the 1960s, but one need not suppose that its appeal to certain practitioners (if not all) has diminished.90

Today, just as in the Europe of the 1960s, the relationship between theoretical discourse and practical policy-making is reciprocal. Theoretical conceptualisations lie behind and often inspire practice, even if they do not alone determine it. Frequently-heard notions of a ‘Great Divide’ between two separate pursuits (often cast as ‘Truth’ and ‘Power’) are therefore misleading, for the division that they posit is artificial.91 Even where this has been recognised, debate has still tended to focus on the implications of this fact for International Relations as a discipline, rather than on its implications for practical policy-making.92 Attention is frequently drawn to the dangers of political concerns being present in the process of knowledge-acquisition and theory-formulation; rarely, though, is similar attention paid to the significance of theoretical concerns being present in the formulation of practical policy.93 This omission is one that has to be addressed, both by those who set political goals and design the policies to realise them, and by commentators who wish to examine and analyse the course of political events.

90 At a recent conference organised by The Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, several representatives of the practitioner community went out of their way to emphasise their receptivity to academic ideas as tools to aid them as they ‘wrestled with complexity’ in their daily professional lives. (Theory and Practice in International Relations: The Great Divide?, R.I.I.A., Chatham House, London, 22 November 2000).
93 As one of the very few examples of this linkage being explored, see an analysis by Alexander George (Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1993) of US foreign policy towards Iraq in the years 1988-91.