Freedom as independence

List, Christian and Valentini, Laura (2016) Freedom as independence. Ethics, 126 (4). pp. 1043-1074. ISSN 0014-1704

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Abstract

Much recent philosophical work on social freedom focuses on whether freedom should be understood as non-interference, in the liberal tradition associated with Isaiah Berlin, or as non-domination, in the republican tradition revived by Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner. We defend a conception of freedom that lies between these two alternatives: freedom as independence. Like republican freedom, it demands the robust absence of relevant constraints on action. Unlike republican, and like liberal freedom, it is not moralized. We showcase the virtues of this conception and offer a novel map of the logical space in which different conceptions of freedom are located.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/et/current
Additional Information:	© 2016 The University of Chicago
Library of Congress subject classification:	J Political Science > JC Political theory
Sets:	Departments > Government Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)
Project and Funder Information:	Project ID Funder Name Funder ID UNSPECIFIED Leverhulme Major Research Fellowship UNSPECIFIED
Date Deposited:	13 Jan 2016 13:02
URL:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64956/

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