List, Christian ORCID: 0000-0003-1627-800X and Valentini, Laura (2016) Freedom as independence. Ethics, 126 (4). 1043 - 1074. ISSN 0014-1704
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Abstract
Much recent philosophical work on social freedom focuses on whether freedom should be understood as non-interference, in the liberal tradition associated with Isaiah Berlin, or as non-domination, in the republican tradition revived by Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner. We defend a conception of freedom that lies between these two alternatives: freedom as independence. Like republican freedom, it demands the robust absence of relevant constraints on action. Unlike republican, and like liberal freedom, it is not moralized. We showcase the virtues of this conception and offer a novel map of the logical space in which different conceptions of freedom are located.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/et/current |
Additional Information: | © 2016 The University of Chicago |
Divisions: | Government CPNSS |
Subjects: | J Political Science > JC Political theory |
Date Deposited: | 13 Jan 2016 13:02 |
Last Modified: | 05 Dec 2024 04:36 |
Funders: | Leverhulme Major Research Fellowship |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/64956 |
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