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War and state formation in Lebanon: can Tilly be applied to the developing world?

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Introduction

Lebanon's existence as an independent state following the end of the French Mandate (1920-1943) is one that is nominal. Control over Lebanon, both territory and the government, developed into a dynamic conflict which lasted for fifteen years, forcing the collapse of state structures, division of territory, dissolution of monopolised coercion, and the development of a fragmented economy. Lebanon quickly went from being a weak state to a collapsed state at the onset of the Civil War (1975-1990). The central political control of Lebanon came to a standstill as various factions took control over territory through the use of coercion, developed methods of capital extraction, and entrenched identity constructs conducive to maintaining the divisions of the Civil War long after its settlement. Thus the Civil War dramatically altered the state in Lebanon, ultimately forcing the Civil War elites to renegotiate the state by undertaking a process of state formation.

State formation can be explained as the product of, or processes related to, religious work ethic, elite politics, economic development, institutional diffusion, centralisation of social identities, political and territorial stability, colonialism, territorial and political isolation, and war¹. All of the explanations can be used convincingly depending on the case, but three elements resound from these explanations: the role of capital, coercion, and identity. Moreover, they highlight the underpinnings of the state through military force and internal security; economic extraction and redistribution; and the development of nationalist ideologies. While the application of a European model of state formation to explain state formation in the developing world is often argued to be over simplistic there is also the problem of an argument based on rhetoric of exceptionalism. The arguments against applying such theories to the developing world include fear that it would negate

social, cultural, and political histories that are different from the European experience. However, theories are not a means of prediction, but a framework to be employed to help social scientists understand global phenomenon. Although these histories are important and are markers of difference, there are times when similar conditions are produced in different global environments.

Under these conditions of similarity, I argue that it is possible to use a specific frame of reference, or theoretical model, in a generalizable fashion. In doing so, I use Charles Tilly's explanation of state formation to help explain the development and consolidation of the Lebanese state after the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) and the continuation of state formation in the aftermath of Syrian withdrawal (2005) from Lebanon. Specifically, I argue that the Civil War and the conditions of war drove the state in Lebanon into a period of formation. The paper discusses Tilly's argument regarding state formation and the various ways in which it has been applied to areas exogenous of Europe. It goes on to discuss how the Tilly's argument can be applied to the case of Lebanon and subsequently examines the consequences of the Civil War on the Lebanese state and its consolidation; drawing on specific examples that highlight the tension of state-formation.

Tilly and State Formation

Tilly's argument regarding state formation in Europe focuses on the development of state structures through war and the preparations of warfare. Primarily, it is focused on progresses regarding the extraction and redistribution of capital and the monopolisation of coercion by rulers. The emergence of state structures related to capital and coercion allowed rulers to maintain control over the population within a territorial enclave that could be securitised through its coercive forces. Tilly remarks that competition developed over

trade and territory, with those who controlled the means of coercion attempting to maintain and increase the total area in which they controlled.² Due to increased competition rulers began extracting resources from individuals within the controlled territory; redistributing capital to aid in the development of standing armies that could enforce internal and external security. State formation in Europe therefore centred on four broad conditions: neutralizing competitors within the territory controlled by the rulers; deterring rivals through war making; the protection of allies inside and outside the controlled territory; and resource extraction that could support the first three activities.³ An unintended consequence of these conditions was that of the development of state structures and, ultimately, the formation of states.

In applying Tilly's arguments to the contemporary environment of the developing world there are a few caveats that need to be accounted for. The first deals with the environment in which Tilly describes: the pre-state environment of early modern Europe. Through competition and coercion, mechanisms of control were developed and provided a hierarchical order which permitted instances of domination and subjugation within an overarching anarchical environment. Similarly, this is evident during the Lebanese Civil War when the state collapsed and the various militias acted in manners similar to the pre-state Europe. The development of competition between the militias necessitated coercive measures that both protected territorial and economic gains and controlled the populations within those territories. The competitive environment that developed after state collapse was one that parallels the anarchic environment of pre-state Europe. With no central control, the militias of the Civil War were playing a game of domination and subjugation.

The second caveat is concerned with the controversial notion that *all* wars make states and *all* states make wars. This is a gross misreading of Tilly and he does not claim that the phenomenon of war inherently means that new states will emerge. That does not, however, negate the fact that state transformation can be informed by interstate war. One way in which the state can go through a transformation caused by interstate war in the contemporary period is the strain that is exerted on the national economies of warring states. The pressure of funding war can increase capital extraction by governments, placing the burden on its citizens. Additionally, it is unlikely that once the war has ended that taxation rates will return to pre-war levels.⁴ This could affect the state through increased demands by its citizens in regards to structural changes and increased welfare programmes,⁵ potentially changing the character of the state.

The third area of contention in applying Tilly's argument to the contemporary period is that the generation of, and focus on, cities that aided in the accumulation of capital and buttressed war-making activities; a component that played an important role in the transformation of polities into states.⁶ In the case of Lebanon, the division of Beirut into East and West and their subsequent domination could be argued as the establishment of two capitals – which until today remain geographically isolated due to poor and corrupted attempts of urban reconstruction and regeneration. Nevertheless, Beirut is a prime example of uneven economic development and securitization that occurred during and after the Civil War, similar to the uneven economic development of the European state during its formative years.

The fourth area that requires addressing is the issue of identity formation and the role of identity in the formation of states. While Tilly alludes to the nation and national

identity through the use of the term 'national states', he does not overtly discuss identity formation in *Coercion, Capital, and European States*. The role of identity emerges in a subsequent discussion titled 'Armed Force, Regimes, and Contention in Europe since 1650' in which Tilly asserts that without the strategic use of *connections* – described as social groupings of individuals – the base of support for the rulers would be formed primarily by the capitalists. Specifically, Tilly argues 'Creators of effective states used their coercive means to draw resources from their capitalists in exchange for protection of commerce. But they also employed moderately centralized webs of *connection* to integrate subject populations into their state enterprises through stable indirect rule.'⁷ Drawing links from histories of nationalism, the use of connections to integrate populations under a ruler provides the cornerstone for social identities to develop.⁸

Applying Tilly, So Far

Detractors of the thesis of war and state formation and its application to the developing world argue that it cannot be applied for a variety of reasons including, environmental realities of population densities, geography, and systemic issues of globalisation and international norms. Jeffrey Herbst who examines the pre-state environment in Africa argues that because of its ecology and low population densities, rulers found it difficult to broadcast power and gain the loyalty of populations. This negates the conditions for state formation through territorial conquest as it meant fewer instances of prolonged social contact and competition.⁹ Herbst is correct in asserting that pre-state wars in Africa did not produce similar outcomes to those in Europe because of divergent conditions. And in such cases, where conditions are not similar enough to produce similar outcomes, as experienced by Europe, the framework cannot be applied.

While Herbst examines the pre-state conditions of Africa, Brian D. Taylor and Roxana Botea examine the effects of state building and capacity on interstate war, using the US intervention in Vietnam and the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan as case studies. Taylor and Botea find that in the case of Vietnam the combination of war and revolution provided an environment that fostered a unifying ideology and combined nationalism.¹⁰ Interestingly in this case, Taylor and Botea examine the effects of interstate war and focus on the state that is having its territorial sovereignty breached. In the case of Vietnam, there was a clear centralisation process that occurred in response to the US intervention; however, this was not apparent in the case of Afghanistan.¹¹ The application of Tilly's war and state formation argument to these cases fails to produce positivist findings. However, the findings from this study unveil the important link between interstate war and internal state capacity; an argument that has been explored by other scholars.¹² Additionally, the thesis regarding war and state formation is not concerned with interstate war, but conflict between non-state polities, specifically the cases of pre-modern Europe. Whereby the conflict between non-state polities over contested territory provided rulers with the ability to make territorial gains and renegotiate and impose state-like structures of capital extraction, redistribution and the slow development of standing army.

In response to the application of Tilly's thesis to interstate war, Andrea Leander argues that interstate war in the contemporary environment does not 'make states, but rather unravels them' because of an international shift to exogenous forms of state building.¹³ Similarly, Cameron G. Thies and Lingyu Lu fail to see how Tilly's thesis can be applied to the contemporary Middle East; arguing that "both interstate and civil wars greatly damaged state building."¹⁴ Moreover, despite increased extraction of capital during

periods of external and internal pressure by domestic and international rivals, the effects of redistribution did not follow the patterns of Western Europe.¹⁵ The arguments laid out by Leander, Thies, and Lu, although compelling, fail to apply the framework to cases that evoke similar conditions to which Tilly describes. This creates a problem of theoretical and empirical logistics in which a framework is applied to a case that does not fulfil the conditions of the theory or framework.

George Sorensen also contends that the argument 'war makes states' does not apply;¹⁶ and in the cases where war has occurred - the countries have often been left worse off. Sorensen argues that because of norms of national sovereignty, many of the developing states that use force are unconstrained and are free to do as they please, while the issue of time is an unknown. Moreover, he states that developing areas are hindered from becoming strong states under Tilly's model because the nature of war in pre-state Europe was differentiated by the global context concerning sovereignty, international public law, intervention, responsibility to protect, and domestic conditions relating to the quality of leadership.¹⁷ These are valid rationalisations for the thesis that Tilly's explanation of state formation cannot be applied to developing world states. Nevertheless, Sorensen is too rigid when applying international norms and international public law, which are often breached and are rarely applied if more powerful actors have specific interests and gains to reap through unlawful interventions. Problematically, Sorensen treats individual conflict during pre-state Western Europe as if it were in a *black box* without the help of allegiances and self-interested third parties. Additionally, he fails to distinguish between internal civil conflict and interstate warfare; the former being integral to understanding the effects of war on state formation, while the latter could produce a variety of other outcomes.

Many of the academics who explore the possibility of applying Tilly's, or a Tilly-esc, approach to the developing world argue that the temporal realities of international politics are a factor that works against the thesis of state-making through war-making. Additionally, they take the phenomenon of war as the independent variable which affects state formation, when in fact, war and the preparations of war should be analysed as an intervening variable which facilitates processes of capital extraction and redistribution, the development of the monopolisation of coercion, and the settlement of statehood through domination or negotiation.

Tilly Applied to Lebanon

Tilly's account of European state formation begins with an anarchic environment containing various competing and allied groups seeking to secure territories within their domain and expand their control outwards. Given the similarities of the pre-state condition to the environment of state collapse during civil war, the Lebanese Civil War emerges as a plausible invocation of Tilly's argument. The Lebanese Civil War is characterised by an environment of anarchy and self-help. In such an environment, groups are, in competition for resources and power. Using the variables to measure state fragility, weakness, and collapse outlined by Robert Rotberg, it is apparent that the late 1960's and early 1970's in Lebanon displayed an overwhelming sense of internal instability. Widespread social discontent over wages, cost of living, disparaging work conditions, and unfavourable amendments in labour legislation provoked confrontations with the state security forces. The violent encounters with the state laid the foundations for numerous autonomous groups to emerge and challenge the state as well as each other.¹⁸ Eventually, these groups eroded state power over a plethora of economic and political issues, aiding in the emergence of a system of internal anarchy that exploited societal divisions. The

environment of the Lebanese Civil War has therefore provided the rudimentary conditions and variables necessary to apply Tilly's model of state formation.

The institutionalisation of identity politics and sectarianism prior to the outbreak of the Civil War provided the militias with the capitalists and social connections necessary for exploitation and domination.¹⁹ Because of the institutionalisation of divergent identities within the Lebanese state prior to the Civil War, once the state dissolved, so did the loyalty of its citizens. The identity driven divisions that are highlighted in accounts of the Lebanese Civil War were not a production of the Civil War, but were pre-existing fractures robustly institutionalised during the French Mandate (1920-1943). The effect of the Civil War on these identities was the facilitation and strengthening of sectarian structures and sectarian antipathies driven by the need to capture the state and secure the survival of the group.²⁰ Security and survival through domination became a driving force for hierarchical organisation. An outcome of this hierarchical organisation was the bolstering the particular histories that reinforce notions of otherness;²¹ consequently using the myths as a rallying point to legitimise their pursuit of the state.²² As each group stressed its distinct cultural and religious characteristics and their right to state power, they became more inward looking. With the capture of the state in their sights, the militias began to ratchet up the discourse of an existential threat and thus the need for protection by amassing weapons and capital.²³ While this occurred primarily at an elite level, attacks against populations gave way to stronger feelings of animosity at the domestic level; helping to fuel the Civil War into a protracted fifteen year conflict. In exchange for security, citizens gave material and symbolic support to the militias that formed after the state collapsed. Thus creating what Tilly calls *connections* between power wielders and their social base of support.²⁴

The internal dynamics at the beginning of the Civil War led many of the militias to consolidate and professionalise within the first year.²⁵ Similar to the environment described by Tilly, consolidation and professionalization of the militias provided the structure necessary to concentrate the use of force over a given territory and population. The modern environment of the Lebanese Civil War, in comparison to pre-state Europe, provided a gross imbalance that is not accounted for in Tilly's description. While Tilly does discuss the importance of alliances during war-making that aided in the consolidation of the state,²⁶ the formation of internal and external alliances in the case of the Lebanese Civil War hindered any possibility of a single group acquiring a monopoly of force.

During the Civil War militias impaired the national economy by creating localised subsistence economies. The elites, who led the militias, or those who provided economic capital and other material resources to their favoured group (the capitalists), developed a series of illicit economic practices, including hidden economic transactions and the use of violence for short-term economic gains.²⁷ Mimicking the dynamic that Tilly describes in pre-state Europe, protection was offered to the communities that the militias represented and controlled, in return, resources were extracted, often by force. Unlike the conditions of pre-state Europe, these militias also received remittances from abroad,²⁸ making it difficult for any single group to obtain a monopoly. Since capital from abroad was flooding the country, there appeared to be a near never-ending reservoir of funds that problematised the status of each militia relative to their competitors. Towards the end of the Civil War the surviving militias were deadlocked in a mutually hurting stalemate,²⁹ preventing any single group to gain an advantage through the use of force.

Those who captured wealth during the war transformed their groups into exploitative organisations to finance their greed for power. It is well documented that the Phalangist (Kataeb)

Militia, the Marada Movement, and the Lebanese Forces were involved in the illegal operations such as opening Pier Five at the Beirut Sea Port, exporting hashish from the Bekaa Valley, developing their own taxation systems, and establishing compulsory military service. The need to secure these resources in an effort to capture the state instigated protracted violent conflict. For the Shiite community, historically poor and disenfranchised, a call to arms was made by communal leaders who suffered from unfavourable conditions of the years before the Civil War.³⁰ What emerged from the economic environment during the Lebanese Civil War was a new class of capitalists who professionalised the trade of contraband and armaments. The new profiteers created an unprecedented level of disorder, and they lacked the political finesse of the pre-civil war feudal system, including its established social network. They were, therefore, unable to maintain the same level of social cohesion as the old guard; ultimately, resulting in greater schisms between the poor and the elites.³¹ The new capitalists profited from their associations with the militias while those from the lower economic classes greatly remained connected through the provision of security and a vague social order.

The social order that developed was one of *connections*. The warlords of the Civil War aimed to maintain capital extraction to support their activities and make territorial gains in hopes to capture and consolidate the state vis-à-vis a game of elimination. To do so, the militias had to take predatory postures against the populations they pledged to protect.³² This predatory posture coupled with mutually beneficial relations with capitalists ensured social organisation under the command of the militias while making territorial gains against their enemies. The collapse of the state, the subsequent development of strong organisations based on sectarian divisions, and the ability to collect resources and capital provided militias with permanent programmes of conflict.³³

As the militias were attempting to consolidate their power over territory, Syria, Israel, Iran, and the US were all vying for their favourite groups to gain the upper hand; having direct consequences on the Civil War environment. Syria outwardly asserted that its ambitions were that of peace, however, the commands of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad proved otherwise. With the approval of Lebanese President Suleiman Franjeh, Syria deployed 25,000 troops into Lebanon in May 1976. The Syrian troops helped defeat the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and allied leftist militias, while solidifying the sectarian divisions within the state. The initial accomplishments of the Syrian deployment led the Arab League to authorise the Syrian army to act as an 'Arab Deterrent Force', a mandate that was later extended in 1979.³⁴ In the meantime, Israel began opening its northern borders to the Maronite villages, and provided weapons to the Druze populations in the mountain ranges, in hopes to form alliances and inject its influence.³⁵ Syria, unbeknownst to the Maronites, the US, and Israel, used this opportunity to become a dominant force within the Lebanese Civil War, constantly and consistently shifting alliances, and supplying various groups with direct military aid. While Syria was actively mediating between the Lebanese factions after helping defeat the PLO, al-Assad was also sending troops from the Palestinian Liberation Army out into battle under his command.³⁶ With such powerful players making enormous alliance changes and thus pulling the strings during the civil war, it became even more difficult for any one group to acquire and maintain a monopoly of force and secure significant territorial gains.

Although the argument can be made that intervention was necessary to limit sectarian-driven human rights violations, it can also be stated that the funds and military means aided in the violation of human rights by prolonging the conflict. It can be argued that state formation, as outlined by Tilly, following the Civil War failed because of the saturation of capital and the ever

increasing means of coercion; the ability to neutralise competition through territorial gains became almost non-existent and perpetuated a system of sabotage rather than domination. Attempts to gain a concentration of capital and the monopoly on the use of force during the Lebanese Civil War devolved into a zero sum game. Large amounts of capital flooded the Civil War economic system and negated many of the advantages that leaders were able to obtain; too many external actors had stakes in the outcome of the war and the survival of specific groups; and no single group was able to capture the state despite producing state-like structures and mechanisms such as professionalised militias, taxation, and redistribution.

Despite the similarities in the environment such as overall anarchy and violent competition with the aim of capturing territory, contemporary state collapse presents problems that were not existent in the analysis of the pre-state environment. These problems include external intervention and economic and military assistance. What was first viewed as a quick conflict to change the status quo of the state turned into a prolonged civil war due to the intervention of external actors and materials. The environment created during the Lebanese Civil War prevented any single group or coalition of groups to capture and secure the state. These differences in environmental conditions from those of pre-state European polities, at first sight, obstructed the type of state formation that Tilly describes. However, in exploring the Civil War and the consolidation of the state afterwards, especially in the case of Lebanon, it is possible to maintain the argument that given the right conditions Tilly's framework of war and state formation applies to non-European states.

The significance of stalemate and the Ta'if

The realities of the Lebanese Civil War, namely the inability for any single group to capture the state, forced the competing militias into a stalemate which was broken with the negotiation of the Ta'if Accords in 1989. The negotiation of the Ta'if accords was an event that included the militias involved in the fighting and external parties that held strategic interests in the formation of stable Lebanese state. Because no single party successfully captured the state, the stalemate became a reality that

threatened to exhaust the militias economically and coercively. Due to the inability of a single group to dominate, the state was renegotiated between the fighting factions of the Civil War, enabling a process of state formation that would suit the interests of the elites holding the reigns of the warring parties.

The Ta'if Accord set the foundation for the formation of the state through a process of negotiation; however, Lebanon experienced a drawback following these negotiations: Syrian occupation. Following the Civil War, Syria was permitted through a mandate established by the Arab League, to occupy Lebanon until stability returned. Its mandate was to ensure stability in the period immediately after the Civil War and to slowly withdraw from the Lebanese political landscape once political stability returned to the state. In reality, Syrian occupation was maintained for fifteen years. The occupation brought the Lebanese political environment to a stand-still, hindering political evolution and development; during this period Lebanon was a defacto client state.³⁷ Upon Syrian withdrawal in 2005 after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on February 14, 2005, the Lebanese state began a process of rebalancing that, at times, looked perilous.³⁸

After the Syrian Withdrawal: 2005-2013

In order to qualitatively measure Lebanese state formation, we must consider the contemporary period to which Lebanon exists and functions. In other words, a careful study of the state in its post-war context will help establish to what extent the phenomenon of war had on state formation. Since the Civil War, Lebanon – even under Syrian occupation – has been considered a weak state due to political and economic corruption, a devalued national currency, deeply entrenched divisions within the state institutions as well as society, and regular outbreaks of violence.³⁹ The divisions that are still present in the post-Syrian period are fostered at the level of the national government through the political parties that reign from the Civil War. At the heart of the divisions is a lack of consensus over the character of the Lebanese state. The result has been the continued generation of inward looking discourse by various political actors resulting in blind opposition to unity and conciliation.

Despite these divisions, there are projects and movements at a national level that unintentionally encouraged cooperation amongst the elites; at a grassroots level individuals and social groups have challenged popular discourse and narratives of the *other*. Although such instances of elite cooperation and the challenges directed at divisive political rhetoric set the foundation for an optimistic outlook, the state services (military, education, media, social welfare etc) remain highly politicised and divided.

The politically influenced media stations and education boards that have perpetuated notions of the *other* through the construction of narratives that have their roots in the Civil War are only two of a wider set of politicised services. The provisions and distribution of welfare services and legal protection along sectarian and political divisions have slowly begun to erode, the continued distribution of services based on sectarian and political divisions have become contentious ground in the eyes of Lebanese citizens.⁴⁰ The contemporary private media also has its origins in the Civil War, yet, emerging in parallel to the media are higher levels of political critique.⁴¹ Despite the media outlets not being state sanctioned during the Civil War period, the post-Civil War stations that have received state licences offer a continuation of highly politicised rhetoric. The licencing of media outlets in the post-Civil War period were limited and granted to individuals with vested interests in Lebanese state politics. Licences were given to the late Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri who owned Future Television; Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri who controlled the National Broadcasting Network; and former Interior Minister Michel Murr who controlled Murr Television (better known as MTV).⁴² The channels target those with specific political alliances and views, a problem that is also prevalent in the developed world; similarly to various global media landscapes, the media often becomes the vehicle for political messages. However, this continues to impact the Lebanese state through the reiteration and continuation of discourses that were fostered during the Civil War. In doing so, the media risks positioning itself against growing political sentiments emerging from grassroots organisations and a society that is increasingly becoming internationalised. Much like media practices elsewhere in the world, the divisive political discourse helps entrench political

divisions by providing ideological interpretations of events. On the other hand, the entrenchment of political divisions in the case of Lebanon stirs memories of the Civil War period.

The education system is another aspect of the state that has maintained its divisions along similar lines inherited from the Civil War. Though there are schools that provide politically unbiased education regarding the formation of a national discourse concerning identity and the history of the Lebanese people, these schools are inclined to the children of upper-middle class urban professionals. Families who are unable to take advantage of, or who do not agree with this type of education are compelled, or choose, to enrol their children to inflexible and dogmatic teachings within the sector of private sectarian schools or be required to send their children to state schools. Students who receive religious private education through sectarian schools are not encouraged to think critically or discuss politics in any form. They are rarely educated on other religions outside of their own and are educated to turn to their religious leaders for protection and social welfare. While the private secular schools are abundant, they are expensive and geared towards the educated upper and upper middle class economic strata. On the other hand, the public secular schools are notorious for their poor quality of education and infrastructure.⁴³ Because the religious private education is heavily subsidised by political parties or religious charities, they are a popular choice for low-income families.⁴⁴ Politicians and political parties notoriously buttress the private religious schools ensuring that the schools espouse the rhetoric of their financial supporters. Due to the politically lucrative establishment of the sectarian based education system, the public sector remains in dire need of attention.

At a grassroots level, there has been a push to construct a national narrative of reconciliation and national identity. Some of these projects have questioned the sectarian divisions directly, including a commercial by Byblos Bank, and the film by Nadine Labaki titled *Where Do We Go Now?* The commercial sponsored by Byblos Bank titled *Ana*

Loubnani (I am Lebanese) asks the question “When do we become Lebanese?” after a sequence of individuals stand in front of the Lebanese flag and proclaim their religion.⁴⁵ The film by Nadine Labaki addresses the issue of otherness through a story of one village whose men are divided amongst sectarian lines due to external pressure from within the country. The women in the village take it upon themselves to try to keep the communities together, and when all else fails, they swap their religion to show that they are, in fact, the same.⁴⁶ The sentiments regarding the state of the Lebanese state are echoed in the short film directed by Ziad Oakes and produced by Khalil Khatib called *A Lunch with Lara Khoury*. In the film, a group of young, Lebanese, professionals sitting down for lunch are asked to describe Lebanon in one word. Some of the words used to describe the state include “schizophrenic,” “chaos,” “beautiful,” and “home.”⁴⁷ The emphasis on identity within the culture industry is trying to fill a void that has been entrenched by the politicians and their overarching interest to maintain their seats of power. This void drives the divergent notions of what it means to be Lebanese while attempting to establish a narrative of a single identity; one that has emerged from a history of conflict.

These grassroots movements have continued to have an impact on the state; altering the relationship with and the expectations of the state. In one case, a women’s rights organisation, *Nasawiya*, was throwing a goodbye party for one of their members on the evening of the 28 June, 2013 when the private security forces of Minister Nadim Gemeyal, son of Bachir Gemayel, entered the building to shut down the party. The members of *Nasawiya* were held at gunpoint for two hours and when they went to the police station the next day to report the incident they were subsequently arrested and detained. The demand for their release was fulfilled once the police, perceived as clients of Gemayel, discerned that the civil protest, growing as news of the events spread, would not back down.⁴⁸ While state corruption is still very much present and impacts all levels of statehood from the elites, to

services, and society, there has been growing vociferousness and social movement in the aftermath of the Syrian withdrawal. The case surrounding the *Nasawiya* protests in 2013 exemplifies two shifts in state-society relations. The first is the slow changing relationship society has with the state: a decreased feeling of fear within society in protest movements and political opposition. It also highlights a problem that has remained from the Civil War period the struggle for the state to maintain a legitimate monopoly over the means of coercion.

The Meqdad family is an example of a family run militia that impacted the Lebanese state by overshadowing state coercion. In August 2012, Syrian rebels in Lebanon kidnapped Hassan al-Meqdad. The Meqdad family quickly organised their clan's militia wing and undertook reprisals, resulting in the kidnapping of twenty Syrians and a Turkish national. Within hours of the organisation being called forward to retaliate against the kidnapping, other groups within Lebanon took advantage of the evolving anarchic environment by organising ad-hoc militias for protection. Maher al-Meqdad, the family patriarch, was arrested in September,⁴⁹ and is quoted as saying: “[W]e don’t consider ourselves above the law, but when there is no state, like now, then we need to protect ourselves.”⁵⁰ Although Maher al-Meqdad felt that the state was absent or non-existent, the state was quickly able to reassert its authority and al-Meqdad, along with complicit members of the family, were later arrested and charged for forming a militia and the abduction of foreigners.⁵¹

Despite the ability of the state to regain control over the means of coercion and reassert its position during periods of crises, the means of state coercion are indeed highly politicised through the chain of command and recruitment patterns. In 2013 discussion regarding the fractionalisation of the security forces became a topic of discussion with the Internal Security Forces (ISF) being perceived as a client of Sunni interests run by Sunni politicians.⁵² Evidence of fractionalisation is not only exemplified in recruitment processes and command, in 2006 there was a growing critique of the ISF and their mismanagement of

the Cartoon Riots that led to the destruction of the Danish embassy in Beirut.⁵³ Alternatively, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is widely seen as a client to the Christian parties in general and the Maronite encampment more specifically.⁵⁴ While the argument can be made that the politicisation of the state security forces is evidence of state weakness, it can also be viewed as an institutional step in building sectarian confidence and trust. Through elite cooperation over the security of the various segments of the population, trust can be slowly institutionalised.⁵⁵ One example of how this trust has worked out is demonstrated by the LAF and ISF controlling and neutralising circumstances of internal dissidence, including the fighting that occurred at the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in 2007.⁵⁶ This exhibits the importance placed on developing a government controlled security force since the end of the Civil War. Although both security services are highly politicised, they do serve the Lebanese state.

The politicisation of the state security forces has also helped to reinforce Hezbollah's position within the state as a resistance force. In the case of Hezbollah, as they were slowly brought in to the legitimate Lebanese political framework, their radical characteristics softened over time. Having since been officially declared as a resistance force in Lebanon, they have – for the most part – remained within these confines. In one particular instance on 7 May, 2008, Hezbollah took Beirut by force in protest over a governmental decision to remove their telecoms systems.⁵⁷ The use of force by Hezbollah was seen as an attack against the civilians with some commentators calling it a 'breaking point' and a potential return to civil war in Lebanese politics.⁵⁸ The threat of heightened sectarian divisions and discontent over such a short period of time prompted each side to eventually back down. While it is portrayed that the 'breaking point' was a lit fuse to further civil conflict, it also meant that the ruling coalition in the government would have to work with other parties in order to gain internal stability. On the other hand, it also established the rule that the country cannot, literally, be

held hostage at gunpoint to the political will of a single party without facing political loss of support.

The increasingly evident new order in state-society relations, the growing power of grassroots organisations, and the increasing trust across sectarian boundaries in the management of state security have been positive steps towards the development of a strong Lebanese state. That is not to say that the reformulation, renegotiation, and development of Lebanon have been easy. An analysis of the Lebanese economy exhibits lacking methods of extraction and redistribution of capital, which, as some argue, has permitted the continuous corruption and politicisation of the economy by fortifying sectarian enclaves.⁵⁹ A probable explanation for this is the increase of oil rentier capital that flooded the post-war economic environment; creating a real-estate bubble in certain districts of Beirut and increasing the discrepancy between the rich and the poor. Both the inflation of real-estate prices and the disparities between the rich and poor are problems that have yet to impact the Lebanese government due to the welfare programmes and services offered to the needy by political and sectarian parties.⁶⁰ These welfare programmes offered by sectarian groups and political parties help buttress the divisions within the socio-political environment and increase social impetus for individuals to sell their political loyalty in exchange for basic goods such as healthcare, education, electricity, water, and waste management.⁶¹ The method of distribution of these services works for the moment; however, it leaves the central state with a fault line: uneven economic development and no central method of alleviating the state from this potential political tipping point.

The evidence of uneven development and the lacking centralisation of capital can be observed when the total percentage of depositors is compared to the total percentage of deposits owned by depositors. In 1992, 2.4% of the depositors owned 40% of the total deposits, compared to depositors in 2002 where 2.4% of total depositors owned 60% of the

total deposits.⁶² However, deciphering this data is quite difficult because of the increasing gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, which grew from 5,499.9 U.S. dollars in 2006 to 9,705.4 U.S. dollars in 2012.⁶³ In addition to a growing GDP per capita, the Lebanese gross national income (GNI), a figure which includes income earned by Lebanese nationals abroad and expressed in national purchasing power parity (PPP) grew from 40.7 billion U.S. dollars in 2006 to 53.4 billion U.S. dollars in 2009;⁶⁴ showing great increases in the total income purchasing power per capita since the end of Syrian occupation. Nevertheless, the number of depositors versus the number of deposits indicates that wealth has not been redistributed. The state has been unable to capture domestic capital and the influx of foreign capital from these deposits because the state has inadequate methods of extraction.⁶⁵

Despite the positive growth of wealth, as of 2007, approximately 21% of the Lebanese population is considered poor and 8% is considered extremely poor; figures which have not changed since 2004-2005.⁶⁶ The percentage of those living in poverty works out to be roughly 1.2 million Lebanese citizens who are considered poor or extremely poor by international standards. This raises questions regarding the lack of demands directed towards the state concerning the redistribution of capital amongst those living in poverty. This is an important point as many academics continue to look at abject poverty as a source of political mobilisation.⁶⁷ Arguably, despite the state not being in a position to offer social welfare programmes that are available through the central governments in most Western states, the political elites, parties, and sectarian groups have been able, and willing to, fill the void; offering, in exchange for political support, goods and services to individuals, who otherwise cannot afford to take part in the neo-liberal economic market.⁶⁸ This is an act of balance that is quietly consented to by the government and the actors within government. While it does not benefit a centralised state apparatus it has helped in the acquiescence on Lebanese statehood.

Conclusion

Charles Tilly argues that war and the preparations for war unintentionally brought about the state in Europe. War required rulers to gain access to funds that could support their efforts and establish a standing army that would remain loyal. It meant protecting the territorial dominion of the ruler and assuring that the population consented to be ruled either through legitimacy or force. While the state in Lebanon did not form in the exact pattern that Tilly describes, the consequences of civil war in Lebanon have been that of state formation.

The onset of the Civil War gave way to an environment of internal anarchy that led to increased competition by warring factions. As the war progressed, the factions professionalised into militias, mimicking standing armies, while developing methods of capital extraction and redistribution in order to support their efforts and maintain a soft consent from the population. Due to the circumstances of the war, including external intervention and the influx of foreign capital, the warring factions were eventually locked into a mutually hurting stalemate. As it became clear that such conditions were no longer stable, the Lebanese state consolidated through a process of negotiation between the surviving militias and intervening members of the international community.

The negotiations following the Civil War led to the Ta'if agreement, an agreement that was never fully implemented due to the ongoing Syrian occupation, nevertheless, it contributed to the consolidation of the state. Upon Syrian withdrawal, the state, as per the Ta'if agreement began to develop. While there are continued problems, including issues regarding capital extraction and redistribution within the central state apparatus, there has been growing focus on the legitimate monopoly of force and increased pressure from the civil society on the government and state institutions to provide legitimate services. Arguably this

established state-society relations over political issues that are often made out to be plaguing the state of Lebanon.

With the looming history of Civil War influencing instances of political deadlock, the state in Lebanon has become much more amenable to compromise amongst its diverse population and their representatives. While Lebanon shares characteristics similar to the pre-Civil War period because of the character of its population, it is also vastly different in terms of structure. Although Lebanon did not and has yet to centralise into a state that parallels the central capacity of France or Britain, it does maintain many similarities with the development and emergence of Switzerland.⁶⁹ These similarities include civil conflict along with external pressures that consolidated the state – allowing it to be renegotiated and developed through democratic practices such as civil protest.

¹ Tuong, "Studying the State Through State Formation;" Gorski, *The Disciplinary Revolution*; Bax, "Religious Regimes and State Formation;" Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*; Strayer, *On The Medieval Origins of the Modern States*; Carneiro, "The Circumscription Theory: Challenge and Response;" Kiser and Linton, "Determinants of the Growth of the State;" Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States*; Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*; Mawhood, "State Formation in Tropical Africa;" Sandbrook, "Hobbled Leviathans;" and Schayegh, "1958 Reconsidered: State Formation and the Cold War."

² Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States*, 54, 70.

³ Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States*.

⁴ Scheve and Stasavage, "The Conscript of Wealth."

⁵ Herb, "Taxation and Representation." Michael Herb examines the role that taxation has on representation and argues that while taxation has had an impact on representation, in the non-Western world it has not provided strength and longevity to representative institutions because of the variation of historical precedence in the implementation of taxation.

⁶ Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States*, 16.

⁷ Tilly, "Armed Force, Regimes, and Contention," 49-50.

⁸ Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*; Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*.

⁹ Herbst, "States and Power in Africa."

¹⁰ Taylor and Botea, "Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making."

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Cohen et al. "The Paradoxical Nature of State Making;" Thies, "The Political Economy of State Building;" Thies, "Public Violence and State Building;" Thies, "War, Rivalry, and State Building;" and Thies, "State Building, Interstate and Intrastate Rivalry."

¹³ Leander, "Wars and the Un-Making of States," 71, 80.

¹⁴ Thies and Lu, "War, Rivalry, and State Building in the Middle East," 11.

¹⁵ Ibid.

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- ¹⁶ Tilly, "War-Making and State-Making as Organised Crime," 170.
- ¹⁷ Sorensen, "War and State-Making."
- ¹⁸ Khalaf, *Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon*, 224-5.
- ¹⁹ al-Khazen, *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon*, 380; Norton, "Changing Actors in Leadership Among the Shiites of Lebanon;" Haugbolle, *War and Memory in Lebanon*, 35; Ghosn and Houry, "Lebanon After the Civil War," 383; Kedourie, *Democracy and Arab Political Culture*, 50-51; Firro, *Inventing Lebanon*, 118-119; and Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society*, 116, 185, 248. Economic and political grievances helped create inward looking communities, as was apparent in the case of the Shiites, leading to the subsequent establishment of Harakat Amal by Imam Musa al-Sadr. This posed a threat to the Maronite hegemony that feared a loss of political and economic power. Eventually escalating into embellished hostile narratives.
- ²⁰ Beydoun, "Movements of the Past and Deadlocks of the Present," 15.
- ²¹ Tilly, "Armed Force, Regimes, and Contention in Europe since 1650," 53.
- ²² Dahl, "The Concept of Power," 206.
- ²³ Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," 167-214, 169.
- ²⁴ Brock et al. *Fragile States*, 16; and Tilly, "Armed Force, Regimes, and Contention in Europe since 1650," 53.
- ²⁵ Haugbolle, *War and Memory in Lebanon*, 51.
- ²⁶ Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States*, 176.
- ²⁷ Miklaucic, "Contending with Illicit Power Structures," 190.
- ²⁸ Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society*, 217.
- ²⁹ Pruitt, "Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks."
- ³⁰ Klare, "The Deadly Connection," 120; Najem, *Lebanon: The Politics of a Penetrated Society*, 37; Murshed, *Explaining Civil War*, 16; Brock et al. *Fragile States*, 50-51; and Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society*, 179, 217.
- ³¹ Ibid.
- ³² Cramer, *Civil War is not a Stupid Thing*, 77.
- ³³ Branovic and Chojnacki, "The Logic of Security Markets," 553.
- ³⁴ Najem, *Lebanon: The Politics of a Penetrated Society*, 36-7.
- ³⁵ Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a*, 134; and Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society*, 202.
- ³⁶ Olmert, "Syria in Lebanon," 99-101.
- ³⁷ Salem, "The Future of Lebanon;" Najem, *Lebanon: The Politics of a Penetrated Society*, 55-9; and Johnson, "Managing Political Change in Lebanon," 157.
- ³⁸ Choucair-Vizoso, "Lebanon: The Challenge of Reform in a Weak State," 116.
- ³⁹ Rotberg, "The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States," 8.
- ⁴⁰ Cammett and Issar, "Bricks and Mortar Clientelism."
- ⁴¹ In addition to international news access via the internet and satellites, dedicated blogs concerning the politics of Lebanon have emerged, two such blogs are <http://www.karlremarks.com> and <http://www.beirutreport.com>
- ⁴² Najem, *Lebanon: The Politics of a Penetrated Society*, 90.
- ⁴³ Frayha, "Education and Social Cohesion in Lebanon."
- ⁴⁴ Shuayb, "Education," 167-191.
- ⁴⁵ Byblos Bank, "Ana Loubnani (trans. I Am Lebanese)."
- ⁴⁶ Labaki, *Where Do We Go Now? (Et Maintenant on Va Ou?)*.
- ⁴⁷ Oakes, "A Lunch with Lara Houry."
- ⁴⁸ *Al-Akhar*, "Lebanese Protest against Gemayel's Attack;" and Kullab, "MP Gemayel and Nasawiya Remain at Odds after Violent Row."
- ⁴⁹ *Naharnet Newsdesk*, "Meqdad Military Wing Kidnaps Turkish National;" and Samaha, "Kidnappings Expose Lebanon Weakness."
- ⁵⁰ Samaha, "Kidnappings Expose Lebanon Weakness."

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- ⁵¹ Ibid.
- ⁵² *Ya Libnan*, "Lebanon is Dangerously Divided."
- ⁵³ *BBC*, "Danish Embassy in Beirut Torched."
- ⁵⁴ Ajemian, "Lebanon's Internal Security Forces."
- ⁵⁵ Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*; Hartzell and Hoddie, "Institutionalizing Peace," 320-321, 331-332; and Schneckener, "Making Power-Sharing Work," 204.
- ⁵⁶ Ajemian, "Lebanon's Internal Security Forces."
- ⁵⁷ Perry, "Lebanon political conflict turns violent;" and *BBC*, "Hezbollah takes over west Beirut."
- ⁵⁸ Ibid.
- ⁵⁹ Johnson, "Managing Political Change in Lebanon," 143; and Leenders, "Nobody Having Too Much to Answer For."
- ⁶⁰ Farha, "From Beirut Spring to Regional Winter?," 213.
- ⁶¹ el-Kak, "Towards a Regionally Balanced Development," 121-125.
- ⁶² Farha, "From Beirut Spring to Regional Winter?," 214.
- ⁶³ World Bank. "GDP per Capita: Lebanon."
- ⁶⁴ World Bank, "World Development Indicators."
- ⁶⁵ Republic of Lebanon. "The Lebanese Income Tax System: A Summary."
- ⁶⁶ Laithy et al. "Poverty, Growth and Income Distribution in Lebanon," 1, 6.
- ⁶⁷ Andrews, "Social Movements and Policy Implementation;" and Smith, "Collective Action With and Without Islam."
- ⁶⁸ Bradley and Cammett, "Informal Politics and Inequity;" and Kronfol and Bashshur, "Lebanon's Health Care Policy."
- ⁶⁹ Tilly, "Astonishing Switzerland," 322. The end of the Swiss Civil War and the agreement of a peace settlement in 1848 established a national regime and became a model for decentralised democracy in Europe.