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Article (Accepted version)
(Refereed)

Original citation:

DOI: 10.1017/S0010417515000560

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Available in LSE Research Online: March 2016

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Export-Import Theory and the Racialization of Antisemitism: Turkish- and Arab-only Prevention Programs in Germany
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Since the turn of the twenty-first century remembering the Holocaust and fighting against antisemitism emerged as the connected centerpieces of European identity. In 2000 European leaders signed the Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust and pledged to “remember the victims [of the Holocaust] who perished, respect the survivors still with us, and reaffirm humanity’s common aspiration to mutual understanding and justice.”\(^A\) Members also promised to “uphold the terrible truth of the Holocaust against those who deny it.”\(^B\) Three years later the same European leaders committed to “intensify efforts to combat antisemitism in all its manifestations.” They declared that antisemitism “has assumed new forms and expressions, which [...] pose a threat to democracy, the values of civilization and therefore, to overall security in the OSCE region and beyond” (Berlin Declaration 2003).\(^C\)

German historian Aledia Assmann’s words attest to the deservingly celebratory nature with which this development is received in Germany: “fifty-five years after the liberation of Auschwitz, there was agreement that the murder of six million European Jews should become a common memory, and, in turn, that this memory should inform the values of a European society and serve as a reminder of the obligation to protect the rights of minorities” (2006, 13). In this article I focus on the flip side of this otherwise deeply meaningful development. Despite

\(^A\) https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/about-us/stockholm-declaration

\(^B\) ibid

\(^C\) http://www.osce.org/cio/31432?download=true
Assmann’s assessment that embracing Holocaust memory serves as a “reminder of the obligation to protect the rights of minorities,” I show how in practice the interconnected commitments of European leaders to remember the Holocaust and fight antisemitism became one of the grounds for legitimizing racialization of immigrants and specifically Muslims, by singling them out as the main contemporary antisemites.

In Germany researchers consistently find that 25 – 27 percent of the population hold antisemitic (and 50 percent hold anti-Muslim) prejudices. According to annual police reports, of the hundreds of anti-Semitic crimes, mostly directed against Jewish cemeteries and buildings, more than 90 percent are committed by right-wing Germans. Since the beginning of the Second Intifada in 2000, and every time the conflict between Israel and Palestinians intensified, many Muslim Europeans, along with other non-Muslim activists, took part in anti-Zionist demonstrations and numerous times crossed the line towards antisemitism. To date, however, no study has proven that Muslim-background Germans are significantly more antisemitic than non-Muslim Germans. The most comprehensive study to date shows that 29% of Muslims in Western Europe hold antisemitic prejudices. Although not a figure to be dismissed by any standards, it is important to note that it is only 2 points higher than the German average (27%) and much lower than the countries of origin in the Middle East and North Africa (74%). In other words, the prejudices European Muslims hold show that in terms of their values they are part and parcel of the European society in which they live, even when they are not recognized as such. While reports produced by the German government recognize the lack of evidence for higher

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D This number puts Germany ahead of more than half of other nations in the European Union.


E For the discussion of different studies whose findings were similar, see Germany, Bundesministerium des Innern 2011, 54-58.

F http://global100.adl.org/#map/eeurope
rates of antisemitism among Muslims, the new wave of the fight against antisemitism is mostly focused on Muslims. Government-issued reports including “Antisemitism in Germany”\textsuperscript{G} and millions of Euros allocated to combat antisemitism are directed almost exclusively to Muslims. This article begins with the discussion of a decade and half long effort dedicated to defining the uniqueness of antisemitism and especially its difference from anti-Muslim racism. I show how this effort went hand in hand with singling out Muslims as the main carriers of antisemitism in Germany and throughout Europe. By looking at government-issued reports and education programs I demonstrate how this campaign depicts Muslims as outsiders to German society, evaluates their antisemitism as more dangerous than that of right-wing German nationals, and attributes culturally-transmitted psycho pathologies that make different Muslim nations prone to antisemitism.\textsuperscript{H} Through such specific mechanisms the new wave of the struggle against antisemitism depicts a new Europe, and a new Germany specifically, that fully liberated itself from any antidemocratic tendencies surviving from its Nazi past; locates antisemitism as a problem located outside Europe; and obscures connections between antisemitism and anti-Muslim racism, both active forces in mainstream German society.

\textbf{The Brief History of “Muslim antisemitism”}

\textsuperscript{G} The research for this project was conducted over five years, between 2009 and 2014. In addition to reading government issued reports and calls for projects, it included participant observations of numerous antisemitism prevention programs devoted to Muslims developed by five different non-governmental organizations all receiving money from the earmarked sources from the government. Most of the research was conducted in Berlin, with several trips to towns and cities outside Berlin.
The concept of Muslim antisemitism became a public concern not only in Germany but throughout Europe, and for that matter in the United States, after 2000. When the failure of the Oslo Peace Accords led to the Second Intifada in Palestinian territories and mobilized sympathizers through Europe in protests against Israel that had antisemitic overtones, and at times was outright anti-Semitic, an alarmist discourse accused Muslims of a new antisemitism (Taguieff 2004).\(^1\) European leaders, who a couple of years before had signed the Stockholm Declaration, met in 2003 in Vienna for a first Europe-wide meeting committed to fighting antisemitism and focusing on its uniqueness. More than 450 representatives from 55 OSCE member states participated the meeting to address the fact that “antisemitism is surging in the world to an extent unprecedented since the end of World War II.”\(^3\) The participants also stressed that this antisemitism was new: “antisemitism in Europe today is not a history lesson, but a current event” and had a different source: “at the root of [today’s] anti-Jewish efforts is the same kind of extremist [i.e. Islamist] thinking that lies behind the international terrorism that is threatening our civilization.”\(^K\) Or, more obviously stated, their concern was: “antisemitism coming out of the Arab and Islamic world.”\(^L\) The Vienna meeting was followed up in Berlin in 2004, where participants declared this meeting as “an end to European denial of antisemitism.” There European governments agreed to allocating funds to combat this “new” form of antisemitism, believed to be brought to Europe in the suitcases of newcomers, namely, immigrants from Muslim majority countries.

Two major developments that split political actors on what kind of a stance to take regarding the Second Intifada, as well as rising anti-Zionism and antisemitism, formed the

\(^1\) Other scholars including Brian Klug 2004 and Brian Silverstein 2008 have been critical of this discourse and pointed out the politically motivated aspects of this alarmism.

\(^3\) http://archive.adl.org/anti_semitism/conference_vienna.html

\(^K\) http://archive.adl.org/anti_semitism/conference_vienna.html

\(^L\) http://archive.adl.org/anti_semitism/conference_vienna.html
background of the 2003 Vienna and 2004 Berlin meetings on antisemitism. The first was the unfortunate failure of the 2001 United Nations “World Conference Against Racism” in Durban, South Africa, based mainly on disagreement as to how to react to the escalating Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During the conference, Arab countries drafted a resolution criticizing Israel and likening Zionism to racism. In the draft proposal they accused Israel of being a “racist apartheid state” and committing “crimes against humanity” including “genocide and ethnic cleansing” of Palestinians.\textsuperscript{M} In response, Israeli and U.S. American representatives walked out of the meetings, and European leaders also refused to sign the resolution.\textsuperscript{N} Another controversial issue during the same conference was the question of slavery. In this meeting, a group of African countries asked for an apology and reparations from all countries that were involved in slavery, based on the same model that payments were given to Jewish survivors and offspring of victims of the Holocaust. The United States from the beginning showed its reluctance to engage this topic by contributing only a minimal amount to the conference and keeping its representation to the minimum (Maran 2002). The European countries agreed to increase aid to Africa but they refused to consider reparations. Both events led to a split between the affluent and white global North, on the one hand, and poor and brown and black South, on the other, in the way they approach issues relating to racism and discrimination.

The recent European commitment to intensify the fight against antisemitism, and the split at a UN meeting devoted to racism between Western countries, on the one hand, and Middle Eastern and African countries, on the other, led the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to organize the above mentioned conference in Vienna specifically focusing on antisemitism. The OSCE is a product of the 1975 Helsinki process, which aimed to promote

\textsuperscript{M} http://archive.adl.org/durban/durban Ngo.html

\textsuperscript{N} The conference continued a full day beyond schedule and a compromise resolution was written between European and Arab states, facilitated by South Africa that did not include anti-Israel language. http://archive.adl.org/durban/default.html
human rights and democracy in Cold War Europe. In a unified Europe, the OSCE played the leading role in fighting antisemitism, first in the Baltic counties and central Europe and then in Western Europe. The fifty-five nations participating in the organization include European countries, the successor states of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Canada. The 2003 Vienna Conference is significant for being the first international attempt to focus uniquely on antisemitism. Jewish delegates to a 2003 Warsaw meeting of the OSCE held in preparation for the Vienna Conference argued, European states had only recently grasped that antisemitism was a “mutating virus that comes from different and new directions.” They stated that some Jewish communities felt less threatened by the racist Far Right and more so by the “spillover of tensions from the Middle East” (Weiner 2004). Participants in the Vienna conference defined the specific qualities of antisemitism as conspiracy theories, Holocaust denial, anti-Zionism, and belief in the imagined power of the Jews (Germany, Bundesministerium des Innern 2011, 137).

Press releases of the Vienna meeting show how fighting against antisemitism was defined as a central value of the recently enlarged Europe. In his opening speech, the Bulgarian foreign minister and future chairman of the OSCE Solomon Isaac Passy said: “We understand that ‘zero tolerance’ to any form of intolerance, including antisemitism is a key part of our role in international relations and of our share in the [European] integration processes.” He added that it was through international institutions such as the OSCE that the “strong common will of mankind [worked to] bring an end, once and for all, to the tragic and powerful legacy of World War II and the Cold War. The common commitment is the basis of integration in the Euro-Atlantic area and its only possible future. Antisemitism is not part of this future” (20 June 2003 press release)

A year later in 2004 the German government organized a follow-up conference in Berlin that also uniquely focused on antisemitism. In the opening speeches the fingers were directed at Muslim immigrants. For example Abraham Foxman, the director of Anti-Defamation League said “Islamist campaigns within the Muslim world and Europe have moved the anti-Jewish
beliefs within Islam from the fringes, where they historically resided, closer to the center. The Berlin Conference was preceded by a workshop organized by the American Jewish Committee that focused on education to combat antisemitism. Workshop participants asserted that Holocaust education is not fit for the purpose and that education must focus on different events; educators had to confront antisemitism among Muslim communities and antisemitic forms of Israel critique (Whine 2004). The Berlin declaration called the new version of antisemitism a threat to democracy, civilized values, and security in the OSCE region (Germany, Bundesministerium des Innern 2011, 136–37). By the way it defines new antisemitism as antithetical to democracy, civilized values, and interests of the OSCE region, this declaration reveals that the issue in question is seen as exterior to the Western civilization to which the majority of OSCE countries belong. It is noteworthy that in Vienna and in Berlin, birthplace of the worst modern form of antisemitism, immigrants were accused of bringing antisemitism to a Europe imagined to be otherwise free of it. Antisemitism was now seen as the mind-set of an external enemy that threatened European civilization and security. This “new” mind-set attributed to immigrants was distinguished from all other forms of xenophobia, racism, and discrimination common in contemporary Europe and made these seem like not significant threats to democracy, civilization, or security.

Simultaneously with the Berlin declaration, a plea to combat the new/Muslim antisemitic wave was launched. Already in 2002 and 2003, the German Ministry of the Family had funded the Center for Democratic Culture in Berlin to write a report about antisemitism, homophobia, and gender discrimination among Muslim immigrants. In 2002, the Taskforce Education on Antisemitism was formed as a network of experts, “due to the insight that previous educational approaches regarding topics like racism, and methods—in the tradition of general Human Rights education—did not do justice to the specific challenges in the field of antisemitism and the

http://archive.adl.org/osce/default_osce_ahf.html#.VD-7vhZwqLB
development of possible educational actions against it.” In 2004, the Antisemitism Research Center in Berlin wrote a report pointing to residents with Muslim backgrounds as responsible for current expressions of antisemitism in Germany (Bunzl 2007). Between 2002 and 2005, an organization called Bildungs Bausteine gegen antisemitismus developed material to combat antisemitism among Muslims with funding from the German federal government’s Entimon program. In 2003, the Kreuzberger Initiative gegen Antisemitismus (KIgA), a civil society initiative, and then, in 2004, Amira—Antisemitismus im Kontext von Migration und Rassismus—were established specifically to combat antisemitism in Muslim communities. KIgA identifies its agenda as “pedagogical work with Arabic, Turkish, and Moslem youth” and more specifically to develop models for curricular and extracurricular education, such as for after-school programs. Amira similarly defines its focus as “the antisemitism of youth migrants whose families come from Muslim countries” and developing projects that engage youth outside the school. Other existing organizations such as Antonio Amadeus Foundation, the American Jewish Committee, and many other smaller organizations began implementing programs to combat antisemitism among Muslims and received money from the international, federal, and local sources newly earmarked for the issue. Based on his analysis of public funding for programs against antisemitism, Frank Gruel (2010) states that in the 2000s antisemitism training for mainstream German youth was reduced dramatically and replaced by projects for Muslims. For example, the organization that established Amira, the Association for Democratic Culture in Berlin, established in 2003, originally focused on combating right-wing extremism among East

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P www.european-forum-on-antisemitism.org/taskforce-education-on-antisemitism/overview/?fontsize=0%2Fcontact.php
Q Kiga-berlin.org/index.php?page=ueber-uns&hlsen_US
R Amira-berlin.de/Aktuelles/35.html. Both organizations develop model projects. They implement them a few times before they publish their models. Staff from both organizations complained about how difficult it was to have to constantly develop new models, especially when they know the older models they developed were never becoming a permanent part of the curriculum. The only chance many programs had implementation was while being tried out. People who work in the field explained this to me as part of the general difficulty in Germany in incorporating multicultural education.
German youth, but by 2007, it concentrated exclusively on Muslim youth. Representatives of many other smaller youth based social work organizations told me that their focus had similarly changed from East Germans 1990s to Muslims in the 2000s, following shifting funding sources.

In 2006, the German Ministry of the Family established an organization called Vielfalt tut gut: Jugend für Vielfalt, Toleranz und Demokratie (Diversity Does Good: Youth for Diversity, Tolerance and Democracy) with an annual budget of nineteen million euros. The organization calls for applications that will develop educational projects among “children and youth in danger of right-extremism” and “migrants” in order to strengthen democracy and examine “historical” and “contemporary” forms of antisemitism. The official language itself makes it clear that “children and youth in danger of right extremism,” meaning East German youth, are seen as prone to “historical” antisemitism, while “migrants,” meaning Muslims, as predisposed to “contemporary” antisemitism. By distinguishing between antisemitisms of locals and immigrants in temporal terms, the ministry gestures toward hierarchizing them in terms of the urgency of the threat they pose to society. Calling antisemitism committed by right-wing and hence nonimmigrant residents of Germany “historical” indicates that 90 percent of the crimes committed by this group are to be perceived as anachronistic, outmoded historical errors. Calling antisemitism among immigrants (almost always meaning not any other immigrants but only Muslims) “contemporary” points to an urgent danger it poses for the present and the future, and the need to find new ways to deal with it.

The predecessor to this program, called Entimon, operated from 2001 to 2006 with a yearly budget of fifteen million euros and the motto “Together against Violence and Right-Extremism [Rechtsextremismus].” The shift in the focus of the program from “right-extremism,” meaning East Germans, to one that includes migrants, meaning Muslims, is visible in the 2007 program. Beginning on January 1, 2011, this program was replaced by a parallel program called Toleranz Fördern—Kompetenz Stärken (Promoting Tolerance—Boosting Competence). The new program has the same goals.

The new focus on the uniqueness of antisemitism and its independence from all other racisms found ramifications in scholarship as well. It is noteworthy that the greatest effort was spent to separate antisemitism, not from any other form of discrimination, but specifically from anti-Muslim hatred, or Islamophobia. Two German scholars based at the Moses Mendelssohn Center for European Jewish Studies in Potsdam state that Islamophobia and antisemitism are incomparable, because “antisemitism has motivated mass movements, declared Jews to be the ‘enemies of mankind,’ and in the past and present forms, attributes to Jews global conspiracies, including hidden power, control over media and politics, the subterranean global destructions of societies . . . none of which [exist] even in the most radical forms of public anti-Muslim resentments” (Rensmann and Schoeps 2011, 52). Such a view promoting the idea that antisemitism sees Jews as more powerful than other humans, while all other racisms regard the racialized subjects as lower forms, is widespread among antisemitism experts in Germany.

Jochen Müller, a leading expert on antisemitism among Muslims, has been active in promoting a total distinction between antisemitism and Islamophobia, going so far as to contend that no one organization can fight against the two. In a piece he wrote entitled “Islamobiohe und Antisemitismus—Kritische Anmerkenungen zu einem fragwürdigen Vergleich” (Islamophobia and Antisemitism: Critical Comments on a Questionable Comparison), he argues that it is wrong to assume that “the two forms of discrimination are just different because they focus on different forms of victims, one Jews and the other Muslims” (2009, 24). According to Müller, “Islamophobia is based on culturalistic ascriptions that are typical of the new forms of racism. . . . Muslims and their religion are discriminated against in a colonialistic and racist manner as unenlightened, terrorist, and backward” but are not under the threat of being exterminated (ibid.). The problem with this view is that it does not recognize that antisemitism was not originally a policy of extermination, and that it is an ideology that took on different degrees and shades of meaning over the centuries, and has done so even in modern times. This view approaches all manifestations of antisemitism as equivalent to Nazism and hence makes any comparison between antisemitism and any other racism that is not genocidal untenable.
More problematically, and typical of antisemitism experts in Germany, Müller also adds that antisemitism is based on fantasy, whereas Islamophobia is based on reality:

“Modern antisemitism is a worldview that works even without Jews. Independently of what Jews really do, antisemitism is based on the fiction of the Jew as conspirer. . . . In contrast, in Islamophobia, single cases of terrorist Islamists are projected onto the entire Muslim community as the militance of Islam . . . Islamophobia is based on distinct problems of this society, like integration, or images of integration, terrorism, and other questions. And these are related to Islam and the existence of Muslim minorities . . . Islamophobia is not a simple projection of an experience of crisis on just any group. That is why we have to talk differently about real existing problems that are the basis of Islamophobia and how to deal with them. And that is the real difference with antisemitism” (Müller 2009, 27). In other words, while recognizing that anti-Semitic prejudices are fictional, Müller insists that anti-Muslim ideas are based on real problems. In doing so, he reaffirms the Islamophobic arguments about what is believed to be wrong with Muslims and blames the victims of racism for discrimination against them.

Comparing antisemitism and Islamophobia became such a contentious issue that when the then chair of Center for Antisemitism Research in Berlin, Wolfgang Benz, had organized a conference in 2008 with the title “Enemy Image of Muslim, Enemy Image of Jew” (Feinbild Muslim, Feinbild Jude) it was considered a scandal. The fact that the conference call, and an article Benz wrote in 2010 after he retired from his position, compared the exclusionary mechanisms of antisemitism from the 19th century with that of today’s anti-Muslim sentiment was considered as an equation of antisemitism with Islamophobia and hence dismissing antisemitism and even relativizing the Holocaust. V In this heated debated Benz and the

V After he retired, Dr. Benz wrote an article in the influential Suddeutsche Zeitung that discusses how Islamophobia works in similar mechanisms with antisemitism.
Along with many others his critics included German-Jewish intellectual Henryk Broder (2010), who accused of Broder for being “clueless,”
conference participants were attacked as scholars. Benz was even indirectly accused for being a Nazi by those who brought up the fact that his PhD advisor was a member of the Nazi party.

It is important to note that as late as in the 1990s -- a particularly bad decade for immigrants in Germany -- it was not so impolitic to think about antisemitism and discrimination against Muslims together. Especially following the fire bombings of Turkish houses in 1992 in Mölln and in 1993 in Solingen, which killed several Turks, including one family of three generations, Turkish German activists began to attract public attention by likening their situation to that of the Jews. After the events, protestors carried banners that read, “We do not want to be the Jews of tomorrow” (Bodemann and Yurdakul 2006). After the 1992 fire bombings, the then leader of the West German Jewish community, Ignatz Bubis, said that there was no great difference between xenophobia and antisemitism (cited in Peck 2006, 91). Turkish German friends who attended school in Germany in the 1980s and 1990s have told me that in those days likening the experiences of immigrants to that of Jews in school classes was not uncommon.  

Michal Bodemann and Gökçe Yurdakul (2006) show that it was acceptable for Turkish German activists to draw such analogies all the way up to the year 2002, the tenth anniversary of the fire bombings.

For opinion pieces that attack the conference and participants see http://jungle-world.com/artikel/2008/51/32312.html


http://www.taz.de/!26952/

Ruth Mandel notes that through her ethnographic research among Turkish communities in Germany in the 1990s she heard from many German Turks that they see themselves as “the new Jews of Germany” (Mandel 2008, 129)
bombings, and have their message sympathetically heard by members of the Jewish community, as well as indigenous German politicians.\textsuperscript{Z}

But in the 2000s, in a newly enlarged Europe that had awakened to anti-Zionist and antisemitic protests, just when reaching out to the memory of the Holocaust as the common identity that would unite all EU members, it was no longer acceptable for Turks or other Muslims to identify with murdered Jews. In 2008, Professor Faruk Şen, then director of the Center for Turkish Studies in Essen, had to resign from his post after he likened the experience of European Turks to that of European Jews a century ago. Ironically, Şen had written this article in a Turkish newspaper in order to criticize increasing antisemitism in Turkey as it was brought up in Turkey by Ishak Alaton, a Turkish Jewish businessman. In the article Şen wrote he directed his words to Alaton: “As European Turks we understand your importance for Turkey well. We, five million two hundred thousand [Euro Turks] with a similar destiny in Europe, the new Jews of Europe, can understand you the best. Do not feel sad because of anti-Semitic prejudice some groups in Turkey hold on to. As Turkish people and as new Jews of Europe we are on your side.”\textsuperscript{AA} This statement was considered outrageous in the German media, and numerous letters to the editor accused Şen of “defaming the German state” (Margalit 2009, 223).\textsuperscript{BB} Even though he later apologized and tried to distance himself from what he had said, he was not able to retain his position. By that time, it was established that antisemitism was a unique form of hatred that could not be compared to any other, but especially anti-Muslim, racism.

\textsuperscript{Z}Michal Bodemann and Gökçe Yurdakul (2006) interpret these analogies drawn by the Turkish community members as a strategy by which to instrumentalize the Jewish past so as to create public legitimacy for their demands against racism. What is important for the purposes of this essay is that in the 1990s, there was public space for such analogies, but this disappeared in the 2000s.

\textsuperscript{AA} http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/faruk-sen-die-tuerken-sind-die-neuen-juden-1545658.html

\textsuperscript{BB} It is important to note that Dr. Şen had already become unpopular in 2006, when he denied that the Ottoman mass killings of Armenians in 1915 could be called genocide. Gökçe Yurdakul and Michal Bodemann (2010) argue that when he wrote this Turkish article, he was already unpopular in his organization, and that the board used this incident as an excuse to fire him.
The Export-Import Theory of Antisemitism

Surprisingly, following a decade of talk about a new antisemitism attributed exclusively to Muslims, German specialists in the subject have more recently concluded that there is no antisemitism specific to Muslims. Nonetheless they continue to identify Muslim immigrants as the main disseminators of antisemitism. The German Ministry of the Interior’s 2011 report on Antisemitismus in Deutschland differentiates among seven different forms of antisemitism: religious (Christian), social (which defines Jews as usurers), political (which attributes to Jews a special power and a desire to rule the world), nationalist (which does not recognize the Jewish minority as part of the nation, but sees it as a disloyal enemy), racist (which believes that Jews belong to another group by reason of their racial characteristics and not of belief), secondary (which involves seeing Jews as guilty of what happened to them during the Shoah and confusing the victims with the perpetrators), and anti-Zionist (whose classic antisemitic stereotypes are concealed behind criticism of Israel). The authors concluded, however, that there was no separate “new,” Islamic antisemitism. “[W]hat were previously seen as new elements [in Muslim antisemitism] were actually already known” (Germany, Bundesministerium des Innern 2011, 12).

Such a conclusion about the lack of a specific “Muslim antisemitism” is the product of what I call the “export-import theory of antisemitism,” which is widely embraced among antisemitism specialists in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. Another trend that seeks for roots of distinct Muslim antisemitism in Islamic texts is still widespread in places like the United States, even though embraced mostly by right wing popular voices in the media or bona fide
scholars. They argue, “Jihad and Jew-hatred belong together” (Kunzel 2007, Patterson 2011) or talk about “an almost innate enmity the Prophet of Islam taught and practiced towards the Jews he encountered” (Israel 2009, ix). Promoters of this view typically ignore the historical context in which these statements in the Qur’an and Hadith were made, the fact that contrary statements can also be easily found in the same sources, and more importantly anti-Judaism never became an official policy and Jews had relatively better prospects in Muslim empires for hundreds of years (Barkey 2008, Cohen 2008). Over a dozen experts who wrote the *Antisemitismus in Deutschland* and many German scholars argue, instead, that antisemitism originated in Europe and was then exported to the Middle East—either through Christians in the case of the Ottoman Empire or through Nazis seeking collaboration with Muslim Arabs in the case, especially, of Palestinians. Then, it is argued, this European and especially German branded antisemitism was preserved completely intact in the Middle East from 1930s to 1970s while Europeans were coming to terms with and recovering from their own antisemitism. This exported antisemitism was then imported back to an otherwise antisemitism free Europe in the suitcases of post–World War II immigrants.

The export-import theory is clearly expressed by Klaus Holz and Michael Kiefer in one of their frequently quoted articles: “Antisemitism in the Arab world, and in the Muslim world in general, is a European import in all its essential aspects. Modern European antisemitism was simply adapted to Islamic semantics and required no fundamental change. As Muslim populations were partially re-Islamized, with the associated worsening of religious fundamentalism in Europe, this variant of modern antisemitism was imported back to Europe” (2010, 109). The influential journalist and Islam expert Claudia Dantschke makes a parallel statement and claims that it was the European Christian missionaries who originally infected Muslims with antisemitism, and that their ideas were brought back to Europe after being

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CC Kunzel is a German scholar who is active in antisemitism debates in Germany. But his position was not embraced by the panel of antisemitism experts who wrote the Antisemitism Report in Germany.
incorporated by Islamists into their ideology: “The classic Islamist view sees the Jew as denying God and wanting to separate humans from God [so as] to rule them. Such stereotypes, formed by nineteenth-century anti-modern European clerical anti-Judaism, were transported by Christian communities to the Ottoman Empire, where they entered Muslim and Islamist discourse. [In this Muslim view,] having disempowered Christianity, Jews are [now] ready to do the same to Islam” (Dantschke 2009, 16),

The export-import theory of antisemitism burdens European, and specifically German, shoulders with the invention of anti-Semitic ideas that now circulate around the world. At the same time, it implicates that in the period between export of antisemitism to the Middle East and its reimport, Europeans had eradicated it in Europe. That is how antisemitism could be seen as a “new” and “foreign” phenomenon in contemporary Europe and Germany. The notion of the lack of antisemitic sources in Europe and especially in Germany is so strong in this narrative that any report on antisemitism in Germany includes antisemitic writings in Turkish, Arabic, and Persian, whether they are available in Germany or not. It is argued that Germans with Muslim backgrounds who are not recent immigrants, but were born and raised in Germany, contract antisemitism from print media and satellite TV broadcasting from the Middle East. The underlying assumption is that it is otherwise impossible to be socialized in to anti-Semitic thinking in Germany. That is why more than half of Antisemitismus in Deutschland’s two hundred pages are devoted to antisemitism in the Turkish, Arabic (more specifically al-Manar, the official TV channels of Hezbollah and Hamas, both banned in Germany), and Iranian media. It is noteworthy that the report does not discuss immigration to Germany from other countries with high levels of anti-Semitic prejudice, including Greece (69%), Poland (45%), Bulgaria (44%), Serbia (42%), and Ukraine (38%). More important, Antisemitismus in Deutschland

DD Numbers are taken from the ADL Global 100, 2014 survey the Anti-Defamation League measured the Antisemitism Index of more than 100 countries. http://global100.adl.org/#map/eeurope
lacks discussion of the most significant source of antisemitism in Germany, namely, extreme right-wing, ethnically German political organizations and formations.

The official *Antisemitismus in Deutschland* report, which contradicts itself multiple times, repeatedly emphasizes that the children of Muslim background immigrants do not actually follow the Turkish- or Arabic-language media of their parents’ homelands. Rather, they follow German media, and watch the same entertainment programs as their nonimmigrant fellow youth. In the report, there is even a discussion of how Turkish media are no longer relevant to German Turks. It is admitted that the sales of Turkish-language newspapers in Germany have been decreasing over the past few decades, and currently do not total more than 60,000 copies. This is probably because “the readers have no direct connection to Turkey. Additionally, the younger generations do not know the Turkish language well enough, and Turkish newspapers lack a connection to the reality of migrants in Europe” (Germany, Bundesministerium des Innern 2011, 110). However, the report argues, the parents and grandparents of these young people follow the media from their homelands and then pass on the antisemitic ideas they acquire in this way to their children and grandchildren (ibid., 110) -- a proposition that is not supported by any evidence. This statement also seems counter intuitive since antisemitism among Muslims has never been an issue of public concern in the 1960s, 70s, 80s, or even 90s, when, according to this line of thinking, anti-Semitic tendencies should have been the strongest among immigrants freshly arrived from the Middle East.

The argument, which denies that a distinct Muslim antisemitism exists, but nonetheless holds Muslims responsible for antisemitism in Europe in general and in Germany specifically, equates anti-Zionism with classic modern antisemitism, which was originally constructed partly on the idea that Jews lacked a nation-state of their own. In an influential essay discussing antisemitism and Islamophobia, Matti Bunzl stresses a major difference between the old antisemitism and the new, anti-Zionist version: “when young, disenfranchised Muslims attack French Jews, they do not do so in the interest of creating an ethnically pure France. Nor are they asserting that French Jews do not belong in Europe. On the contrary, they are attacking Jews
precisely because they see them as part of a European hegemony that not only marginalizes Muslims in France but from their point of view, also accounts for the suffering of Palestinians” (Bunzl 2005, 504). Bunzl points to the irony that the success of the Zionist ideal of Israel as a place where European Jews could have a safe haven is what puts European Jews under attack now. By doing so, he points out that the contemporary antisemitism Muslims are accused to hold on to is not a hermetically sealed Nazi ideology that Arabs inherited and dutifully pack in their suitcases wherever they go. Rather anti-Semitic prejudices and anti-Zionist stance of European Muslims are closely related to today’s political developments in the Middle East and part of European social life.

**Producing Nationality-Specific Antisemitisms**

Even though antisemitism experts in Germany often discuss Arabs and Turks together as carriers of the new wave of antisemitism, a careful analysis of reports and projects shows that different sources of the problem and cures for it are assigned to each of these national groups. Most of the antisemitism-prevention training I observed in Berlin was aimed at Arabs, and more specifically at Palestinian refugees, although without always naming them as such. As the largest group of Muslims in Germany, Turkish immigrants also receive considerable attention. Discourses and prevention methods regarding each group as well as the attitudes of trainers differed significantly for each ethnic group. Trainers I talked to mentioned that the groups were so different that it did not always make sense to keep them together.

In nationality specific antisemitism prevention trainings, Turks are assumed to be suffering from a false “myth of tolerance”—a collective false sense that Turks have a history of good relations with Jews. Arabs are assumed to be suffering from a collective pathology of “self-victimization” and “desire for pride.” Both groups are believed to have brought these hereditary ethno-pathologies from their homelands and to pass them from generation to generation without interruption. German social workers and educators try to break these pathologies by showing
young people of Turkish background that Ottomans and Turks have been intolerant toward Turkish Jews, and they try to convince those of Arab and specifically Palestinian background that they are not victims in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Antisemitism specialists and educators regard Kurds as not antisemitic, and even pro-Zionist. Some of them recommend that Kurds be included in the antisemitism prevention programs to serve as positive role models and have a positive influence on Arabs (Verein für Demokratische Kultur in Berlin, 2008, 6).

**Fighting Turkish Antisemitism: Demolishing Unknown Myths**

Amira was one of the first organizations dedicated to fighting antisemitism among Muslim immigrants in Germany. In line with the notion that immigrants bring their antisemitism with them in their suitcases, the Amira team started off, not by talking to young Germans with immigrant backgrounds, but instead by sending a team of researchers to Turkey. Their aim was to study Turkish antisemitism at its roots. The report produced by the team was published as a slick booklet entitled *Antisemitismus in der Türkei* (Antisemitism in Turkey), which begins with the following statement: “This brochure is prepared for all educators who during their work confront Turkish-background youth or adults who make antisemitic statements. It gives a perspective on the background and context of antisemitism in Turkey.” It is distributed free of charge at many events organized for trainers and educators who deal with antisemitism among young people with Muslim backgrounds in Germany.

Because they assume the transmission of Turkish antisemitism to be strictly genealogical, the Amira team argues that it is crucial for educators who work with Turkish-background youth in Germany to know about the historical and contemporary manifestations of antisemitism in Turkey. They suggest that Turkish Germans are not only infected by Turkish antisemitism that their grandparents have passed on to them, but are also under the influence of contemporary antisemitic trends in Turkey through social contacts. “The hypothesis [behind the research] is that contemporary antisemitism in Turkey influences the Turkish migrant community in
Germany through mass media, the Internet, and transnational social contacts” (Amira 2009, 1). Since the document, typically of such reports on Turkish antisemitism in Germany, never discusses the social worlds in which Turkish Germans live in Germany. Clearly, they are assumed not to be under the influence of any social and ideological forces operative in German society. In other words, they are not seen as part of German society.

Among other observers who write about an essentialized “Turkish antisemitism” is journalist and Islam expert Claudia Dantschke (2010), who also sees no distinction between antisemitism in Turkey and among Germans of Turkish background. In her work, she argues that Turkish antisemitism is influenced by Islam, the nationalist Turkish-Islamic synthesis, and leftist discourses among secularists, all carried from Turkey to Germany. The only proof that she offers to substantiate this seamless connection between Turkey and Germany is that some Turkish-language antisemitic publications were sold in a traveling Turkish book exhibit that visited a Turkish-German mosque, and in a small Turkish-language bookstore in Kreuzberg in Berlin. Antisemitic publications are abundant in Turkey, but it is hard to imagine that a traveling Turkish book exhibit and the small Turkish-language bookstore in Kreuzberg would be influential enough to dominate the ideas of the three million Germans of Turkish background.

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EE Juliana Wetzel (2007) uses the same example that antisemitic books were sold at the Turkish bookstore in Kreuzberg to prove her point that we may assume that antisemitic ideas prevalent in Turkey are popular among Turks in Germany. She argues that these books and antisemitic satellite films influence both Turkish and Arab background youth. Elke Gryglewski (2010) argues against this widely held assumption and shows that young people with immigrant backgrounds usually watch the same television channels and shows as their ethnic German peers, and that they actually lack the linguistic skills to understand Turkish- or Arabic-language television programs. She claims that only during times of heightened political tension in the Middle East do young people with Muslim backgrounds watch Arab channels in order to see alternative images.

FF This number is according to the 2011 census. File Migrationsbericht des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge im Auftrag der Bundesregierung, Migrationsbericht 2012
Much of the recent wave of antisemitism-prevention trainings in Germany are built on the assumption of such seamless connections between antisemitism in Turkey and Turkish Germans in Germany. In 2006, KIgA developed a workshop for German educators who work with young people with Turkish backgrounds. The brochure prepared for the teachers states: “Paranoia, anti-Western resentments that hold the Western world and especially Americans and Jews responsible are very influential in the Turkish community. Conspiracy theories are not just part of the very radical currents such as extreme nationalists or Islamists but they are very popular in general” (KIgA 2006, 57). The report of the project written by the KIgA staff then confesses that “just a very small percentage of teenagers follow this debate”; however, it still argues “these ideas [which they do not follow] are still very important to them. Their parents and the officials of the nationalistic and Islamist organizations of immigrants receive their political arguments from their homeland . . . and pass it onto younger generations” (ibid.).

Hence, KIgA proposes even if Turkish origin anti-Semitic ideas are not followed by Turkish German teenagers, it is nevertheless very important to relay them to German national teachers who teach Turkish background students. The brochure suggests that if the teachers know the arguments of “Turks,” they can deconstruct these beliefs and produce rational ways of thinking. KIgA especially encourages the teachers to learn about and then shatter the myth of Turkish tolerance toward Jews: “What is of utmost importance when dealing with [antisemitism among Turks] is questioning the myth that Jews were fully accepted and lived without discrimination under Islamic rule and especially under the Ottoman rulers. Such a perception of history challenges taking contemporary antisemitism seriously and fighting against it.” (ibid., 57–58). Following this reasoning, teachers are indeed given the most horrific examples of statements that can be found in Turkey, irrespective of the fact that most German Turks are not typically exposed to such statements.

The workshop begins by giving the participants a chance to discuss their experiences with their Turkish students and friends, hence already singling Turkish Germans out as different from other Germans, regardless of how long they have lived in Germany. I attended a KIgA
workshop for teachers who worked with students with Turkish and Arab backgrounds to fight against Islamism. When the workshop began with a question asking teachers about their experiences of Islam and Muslims, the teachers, mostly of ethnic German background, spent a long time enthusiastically telling stories that clearly were fueled either by their imaginations or their lack of understanding of the lives of their students. One teacher claimed that many of the Muslim girls in her school were traditionally married off at the age of eight, and that boys commonly went to Syria to fight for al-Qaeda—both are in fact very rare occurrences. When the workshop leader, who was of Turkish background, offered to tell them about Islamism, saying that it was important to know that only a small minority of Muslims in Germany can be considered as falling into this category, one teacher said “then we do not care about Islamism. It is Islam that we do not want in our classrooms.” Other teachers nodded, and another teacher said with a stern face, “You know, brothers telling sisters what to do, wearing headscarves, and that kind of stuff. That is what we do not want. Tell us about how we can do that.” When the trainer told them that there is actually religious freedom in Germany, and that they were not allowed to say that they did not want Islam in their schools, the teachers became tense and told the trainer that they were not getting what they had come there for. During a later conversation, the trainer told me that it was very common for teachers to come to antisemitism-prevention training courses offered by KIGA with very clear opinions as to how ill-suited their Turkish and Arab students were to the values of German society, and how unwilling the participating teachers were to question their own suppositions and prejudices.

The second part of the antisemitism-prevention workshop is devoted to discrimination against Turkish Jews. The workshop discusses three events: the pogrom in Eastern Thrace in 1934, the sinking of the Jewish refugee ship Struma by a Soviet submarine off the Black Sea coast of Turkey in 1942 after the Turkish government refused to allow the passengers to land, and the forced labor camps for Christians and Jews who could not pay extremely high taxes directed specifically at them in Turkey in 1942–44. The report of the workshop states that “these events are not well known in Turkey, but it is useful to know the historical developments [in
Turkey],” because “these events do not fit the picture that shows Jews always had a happy life in Turkey. Everybody thinks since the arrival of the Sephardic Jews in Ottoman times 500 years ago, all Jews always experienced tolerance. But the material shown to participants reveals different experiences—that of exclusion” (KIgA 2006, 59). The third part of the workshop deals with antisemitism in contemporary Turkish society and covers themes that relate to theories about crypto-Jews—the Dönme—ruling Turkey, Holocaust denial in Turkey, and comparing Israel to National Socialism.

This very workshop was also taught to teenagers of Turkish background without success. It quickly became clear that the workshop materials, which consisted of texts from Turkish-language newspapers had to be translated into German. But even then, having grown up in Germany and not in Turkey, the teenagers had a difficult time following the conspiracy theories involved. Trainers told me that young people of Turkish background in Germany are not well educated enough to understand newspaper articles, which was why they had stopped doing this workshop with them. I disagree, because the articles used in the workshop are all written in simple language and are geared toward poorly educated readers in Turkey. Rather, what young Turkish Germans lack is familiarity with the convoluted logic of Turkish conspiratorial thinking, to which they are not exposed growing up in democratic Germany.

Needless to say, antisemitism does exist in Turkey and did in the past too. Latest Anti-Defamation League survey shows 69% of Turks hold anti-Semitic prejudice, a number that puts it far ahead of Iran, with an index of 56%. Especially since a race-based nationalism was embraced following the foundation of the Turkish Republic, Turkish Jews and the descendants of Jewish converts to Islam have been subjected to severe forms of discrimination (Baer 2013a, Bali 1999, Brink-Danan 2012, Guttstadt 2013). It is also true that a myth of tolerance with regard to Jews has been promoted by the Turkish government, especially in the 1990s, to counter the accusations regarding the Armenian Genocide (Baer 2013b). Still, all these facts do not justify

\[\text{http://global100.adl.org/#map/eeurope}\]
the essentialized understanding of Turkishness and more specifically of Turkish antisemitism that the training programs in Germany suffer from. Holding training sessions to sensitize Turkish German youth and their teachers to Turkish antisemitism by challenging commonly shared historical knowledge and public discussions in Turkey is, at its best, ignorant of the lives of Turkish German youth— and racist at worst. Further, it misses the opportunity of addressing the contemporary problem of antisemitism in Germany.

In 2010, I interviewed participants in a Turkish-only Holocaust education project presented by the Wannsee Conference House. The group, consisting of twelfth-grade high-school students, studied Turkish-German history and was taken to Turkey at the end of the program. The first site the group was taken to was the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul, one of the two synagogues which was bombed in 2003, leaving 57 people dead and 700 wounded by Turkish Islamic terrorists with connections to al-Qaida. Students told me that they were really surprised to learn that Jews live in Turkey today, or for that matter, had ever lived in Turkey. Unaware of the long Jewish presence in Turkey, they were completely ignorant of the myth of Ottoman tolerance of Jews that is believed to be responsible for antisemitism among this population. The trainer who worked with them for about a year for this project told me that she actually did not encounter anti-Semitic tendencies in the group. This specific group of fifteen students might not be completely representative, but as bright students at an academic track high school, it is safe to assume that the majority of the Turkish German population could not be any more informed about the realities and myths that relate to the Jews of Turkey. Ironically, it seems that without the translations and teaching of the organizations in Germany that seek to combat antisemitism, the antisemitic writings that appear frequently in Turkish-language media in Turkey would not be as readily available to Turkish German youth as the experts assume them to be.

Persuading Young Palestinians that they are not victims
If the “myth of tolerance” is the target of antisemitism prevention programs for Turks, the myth that is aimed to be broken for Arabs in general and Palestinians in specific is “self-victimization.” Reports that explain Arab antisemitism frequently mention how they wrongly perceiving themselves as victims of Israel and the Western world. This pathological feeling is assessed as more dangerous than the Turkish one, because experts warn against the dangers of other Arabs and Muslims becoming infected with this allegedly mistaken sense of victimhood. This wrong feeling attributed to all Arabs was discussed in detail in a five-day conference in Berlin in 2006. “Strategies and Effective Practices for Fighting Antisemitism among People with a Muslim/Arab Background in Europe,” organized by an independent organization called the International Institute for Education and Research on Antisemitism. The conference was supported by most significant actors who support work against antisemitism, many of which receive funding from the German government, including the Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future Foundation, the American Jewish Committee, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam, the OSCE on Combating Antisemitism, and the Community Security Trust.

Gunther Jikeli, the main organizer of the conference, who also served as an advisor to the OSCE on combating antisemitism in 2011–12, argues that it is first and foremost Palestinians who see themselves as a “community of victims” in relation to the policies of Israel. This false psychology, according to him, combined with their “Arab culture characterized by desire for pride leads to antisemitism” (Jikeli 2007, 10). This kind of “self-victimization” Jikeli posits is accompanied by a feeling that the Western world is conspiring against the Arab and/or Muslim world. Such unjustified feelings, he argues, are then used by Islamists and Arab nationalists to spread their propaganda (ibid., 8). He and other participants of the conference find this feeling especially dangerous because, they contend, it has the ability to spread like a virus to other groups: first Palestinians, then other Arabs, and then other Muslims, but not non-immigrant or non-Muslim Germans.
According to another participant in the conference, Jochen Müller, the independent researcher who wrote the Amira report on Turkish antisemitism, this feeling of “self-victimization” and “the desire for pride and power,” is not an effect of living in Europe as a marginalized subject, but rather “was and is imported to Europe by many [Arab] migrants from the region.” Furthermore “self-victimization” is a crucial part of an ideology of collective identity and is passed on from generation to generation” (Müller 2007, 36). This approach not only attributes pathological feelings to all Arabs worldwide but also sees ethnic groups and their feelings as unconnected with the social and political context in which they live. In this framework, the fact that Palestinian refugees lost their homes, live in precarious conditions, and are subjected to discrimination appear irrelevant to feelings attributed to them. Experts suggest that Palestinians specifically and Arabs in general victimize themselves for no good reason. Worse, they are said to carry along their pathological feelings and desires wherever they travel and even pass them on to other Muslims.

Parallel with this perspective, training programs designed for Arabs and especially for Palestinians aim to show them that they are not victims in the Middle East conflict, but equal partners in it. Palestinian background Germans are provided with narratives that show them the “Israeli perspective”: that Israelis did not simply take their land, and that Palestinians collaborated with the Nazis and were thus on the side of the perpetrators of the Holocaust. Before discussing the training, it is important to identify the Palestinians who are the targets of the lion’s share of programs in the fight against the new antisemitism.

Palestinians in Germany and especially in Berlin are a particular group, which has significantly different characteristics from other groups of Muslim background, such as Turks and other Arabs. Owing to their complicated legal status as refugees without a state, the actual number of Palestinians living in Germany is not known. Nikola Tietze (2006) reports that estimates vary wildly between 8,000 and 35,000. Most of them came to Germany fleeing from the violence they experienced in refugee camps in Lebanon in the 1970s. A considerable number of them first came to East Berlin, since East Germany did not require them to have visas, and
then moved to West Berlin. Thus many of them are refugees three or four times over. Since 1985, Palestinian refugees have been registered as people with “unclear state belonging.” This complication in their registration not only makes them difficult to count but has also hindered their obtaining many basic rights given to other residents of the city. Palestinian refugees in Berlin were not able to work or use social services. Most members of this group are dependent on social aid from the state, have very low levels of education, and are in a precarious socioeconomic condition. To top it all, many who experienced violence suffer from post-traumatic stress disorders. As a result, Palestinians in Berlin are a unique group who live in a distinctly precarious and marginal position and directly suffered from the Israel–Palestine conflict. The extent to which they may feel like victims is much more directly attributable to their refugee status and the difficult position they have had to endure for many years, first in Lebanon and then in Berlin, rather than a psycho-cultural inheritance.

Over the past few years, KIgA developed a project with the title “Beyond Black and White: Timeline about the History and Images of History in the Middle East Conflict until 1949.” The brochure for the project states that the aim is to discuss the history that preceded the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. They claim this is important because they want to “fight against problematic interpretations and views” that use images of history in order to make territorial claims. The common image they want to fight against is the idea that “Jews stole the land of Palestine from Arabs.” This training shows participants the history of the region with an emphasis on the fact that “over centuries different territories in the region were settled by Jews, Muslims, and other groups and that there has never been a Palestinian state that one can base their claims on” (KIgA 2013, 71).

According to the brochure, the exercise seeks “to sensitize teenagers for change in society and to question historical narratives that are used to legitimize territorial claims.” In order to achieve this goal, the training program focuses on how the region was ruled by different groups; its population changed frequently, with different migrations and rulers; there were different populations, cultures, and religions; Jews and Muslims have been living there for a long time;
and there was never a single state on its own. “In other words, by showing the diversity of rulers and populations in the region and by emphasizing that there was never a historical Palestinian state, the training aims to deliver the idea that Israelis took land that belonged to Palestinians is not a legitimate one. But by the same token, the trainers do not question Israeli claims to legitimacy based on historical territorial claims.

This historical narrative is followed by a time-line exercise that establishes that there are two sides to all events. The students are given a list of events that led to the establishment of Israel in 1948. They are asked first to put them in chronological order and then to mark if this event was good from Israeli perspective or from Palestinian perspective. The goal of this exercise, according to the brochure is to show that there are different Israeli and Palestinian perspectives on the events, and that the participants become aware of the complexity of the conflict. Hence, it is aimed Palestinian students see that there is no need to perceive themselves as victims and feel hostile towards Israel.

**Conclusion**

In a continent laden with antisemitic history, public intellectuals and policy makers search the suitcases of immigrants to find the source of contemporary antisemitism. There is no question that immigrants arrive with their own memories, attitudes, and ideologies in general (Rothberg and Yildiz 2011) and about Jews in specific. But it is equally obvious that the European wardrobes into which immigrants place these beliefs and dispositions have never been completely cleansed of antisemitism. Furthermore, Muslim youth who are the main suspects in the imported antisemitism narrative actually never migrated to Europe. The antisemitism they might be holding on to is part and parcel of life in the major European cities in which they grew up. So, how do we explain the popularity of the suitcase metaphor or the export-import theory to explain contemporary antisemitism in Europe?
First and foremost, the recent discovery of what is termed Muslim antisemitism keeps the fight against antisemitism alive in Europe. Seventy years after the Holocaust that annihilated two thirds of the continent’s Jews and after a decades-long struggle to de-Nazify and democratize German society, research consistently shows that one of every four Germans and one of every three European Union nationals still harbors antisemitic prejudice. In a democratic Germany that bases its principles on the negation of National Socialism, fighting antisemitism is central to German identity. The new campaign brings antisemitism to the center of attention, renews an EU-wide consensus about the malevolence of anti-Jewish hatred, and defines combating it as a European value. It shows the world that Europe in general, and Germany in particular, is still very sensitive to and intolerant of antisemitism.

At the same time, putting the focus of the antisemitism prevention campaign on Muslims shifts the blame to relative newcomers to European society, who are still commonly called “foreigners” (auslander) in Germany. Accusing immigrants, or rather the grandchildren of immigrants, of having imported antisemitism to the continent effectively hides non-immigrant European and German antisemitism. Despite the heightened attention paid to antisemitism and Holocaust memory in Germany, observers concur that increasing numbers of Germans report being weary of hearing about the Holocaust and no longer want to feel guilty (Margalit 2010, Markovits 2006). Indeed, a 2004 study shows that more than 60% of Germans agreed with the statement that they were tired of being told about the crimes against Jews, and they were angry that Germans were still considered responsible for them (Bergmann 2008, 45). These findings would suggest that shifting the blame for antisemitism onto Muslims relieves mainstream

HH The 2014 global survey of Anti-Defamation League shows that the antisemitism index in Western Europe is 24% and in Eastern Europe is 34%. http://global100.adl.org/
Germans of guilt, makes them feel vindicated as honorable opponents of antisemitism, and depicts Muslim Europeans as dishonorable and undeserving residents.

It is important to acknowledge that the export-import theory of antisemitism accuses Muslims of being carriers of antisemitism, but attributes its origin to Europeans and more specifically to Germans. The theory blames Muslims for holding onto an antisemitism that European missionaries and German Nazis taught them in the first place. Turkish and Arab cultures are depicted as quick to learn antisemitism but not equipped with the moral fiber necessary to regret it. Antisemitism prevention reports fault Turks for holding onto a myth of tolerance towards Jews that makes them wrongly feel superior to Europeans. The same reports criticize Arabs for clinging to a mistaken sense of victimhood as well as an ill-founded desire for power and pride. The antisemitism prevention programs designed for Muslims aim to break down these self-perceptions. Turkish-background Germans are told that their forefathers were not really virtuous to Jews, and Arab-background Germans, specifically Palestinians, are taught that their Arab grandfathers collaborated with the Nazis and then sold their land to Jewish settlers. The export-import theory attributes the origins of antisemitism to Europeans, but it stresses the inadequacies of Turkish and Arab cultures, posing them as obstacles to a proper, or properly European, repentance.

Understanding antisemitism as a malignant ideology brought back to Europe by Muslims produces perpetrators out of marginalized, racialized, and disadvantaged people. When it is established that Muslims are antisemitic – and worse, do not atone for it – it becomes difficult to recognize their victim position in relation to European racism. Critical race theorists of Europe have already pointed out that European variants of racism are built on an ideology of a racial blindness that persistently ignores contemporary racial differences and, as a result, is oblivious to
ongoing racist practices in Europe. They also agree that the memory of the extreme manifestation of racism that led to the Holocaust is partly responsible for this racial blindness, and hence blindness to racism (Goldberg 2006, El-Tayeb 2008, Partridge 2010). In that respect, the discourse of Muslim antisemitism works in a similar fashion to its sister discourses about Muslim sexism (Ewing 2008) and Muslim homophobia (Puar 2007), each of which characterizes Muslims as immoral perpetrators and exclude them from the fold of the ethically normative European/German community. Complex processes that have recently moved the fight against antisemitism to the center of European identity have distinguished this form of racism from all others, but especially from anti-Muslim racism. Depicting Muslims as past and present offenders against Jews, doing so officially and as part of a consistent educational policy, serves to conceal the subtle and not so subtle ways in which Muslims are victims of racism in today’s Europe.

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