Political conflicts, the role of opposition parties, and the limits on taxation

Wolton, Stephane (2015) Political conflicts, the role of opposition parties, and the limits on taxation. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 27 (4). pp. 570-587. ISSN 0951-6298

Preview

PDF - Accepted Version Download (378Kb) | Preview

• Published item via DOI

Abstract

In democratic systems, the rich have diverse channels through which they can influence policies. In a model of taxation, I study the capacity of the rich to constrain the fiscal choice of a government by starting a costly political conflict (for example, a press campaign), which imposes a cost on the government and influences the fate of the government’s fiscal plan. I show that the government’s tax proposal depends critically on the marginal disutility of taxation for the rich. This approach provides a new rationale for the empirically documented U-shaped relationship between inequality and taxation. It also highlights a new role for opposition parties. By agreeing to bear part of the cost of a political conflict in exchange

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://jtp.sagepub.com/
Additional Information:	© 2014 The Author
Library of Congress subject classification:	H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Sets:	Departments > Government
Date Deposited:	23 Nov 2015 09:48
URL:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64475/

Actions (login required)

Record administration - authorised staff only