Cookies?
Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Conglomerate entrenchment under optimal financial contracting

Faure-Grimaud, Antoine and Inderst, Roman (2005) Conglomerate entrenchment under optimal financial contracting. American Economic Review, 95 (3). 850 - 861. ISSN 0002-8282

Full text not available from this repository.
Identification Number: 10.1257/0002828054201260
Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/
Additional Information: © 2005 American Economic Association
Divisions: Financial Markets Group
STICERD
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification: G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure
G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration; Conglomerates; Subsidiaries
Date Deposited: 03 Jul 2008 12:53
Last Modified: 11 Dec 2024 22:57
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/6376

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item