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Conglomerate entrenchment under optimal financial contracting

Faure-Grimaud, Antoine and Inderst, Roman (2005) Conglomerate entrenchment under optimal financial contracting. American Economic Review, 95 (3). pp. 850-861. ISSN 0002-8282

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Identification Number: 10.1257/0002828054201260
Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/
Additional Information: © 2005 American Economic Association
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Sets: Research centres and groups > Financial Markets Group (FMG)
Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Date Deposited: 03 Jul 2008 12:53
Last Modified: 01 Oct 2010 08:57
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/6376

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