Hix, Simon (2002) Constitutional agenda-setting through discretion in rule interpretation: why the European Parliament won at Amsterdam. British Journal of Political Science, 32 (2). pp. 259-280. ISSN 0007-1234
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Abstract
It is a widely accepted that the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam significantly increased the powers of the European Parliament (EP). The critical question, however, is why the European Union (EU) governments did this. I argue, contrary to existing explanations, that these changes came about because the EP was a ‘constitutional agenda-setter’. The rules in the EU Treaty, as established at Maastricht, were incomplete contracts, and the EU governments had imperfect information about the precise operation of the Treaty. As a result, the EP was able to re-interpret these rules to its advantage and threaten not to co-operate with the governments unless they accepted the EP's interpretations. The article shows how this process of discretion, interpretation and acceptance worked in the two main areas of EP power: in the legislative process (in the reform of the co-decision procedure), and in executive appointment (in the reform of the Commission investiture procedure). The article concludes that ‘agenda-setting through discretion in rule interpretation’ is a common story in the development of the powers of parliaments, both at the domestic and EU levels.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJourna... |
Additional Information: | © 2002 Cambridge University Press |
Divisions: | Government |
Subjects: | J Political Science > JZ International relations J Political Science > JC Political theory J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe) |
Date Deposited: | 17 Feb 2006 |
Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2024 17:27 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/636 |
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