Studies in the Ontology of Emergence

Part 1

The preparation for the move from Sociology toward a Philosophical Inquiry and the Query concerning the Unquestionable

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These ‘Studies in the Ontology of Emergence’ are working papers written and given to my advisors prior to the submission of my final dissertation The Structure of Theoretical Systems in relation to Emergence at the London School of Economics in Sociology completed in 1982.

[1.0] “The refinements I consider necessary concern the nature and composition of knowledge itself. My argument is that one cannot divorce the sociology of knowledge from epistemology, that is, from the philosophical theory of knowledge. This contention, I realize, goes against the accepted tenants of sociological theory, at least in England and the United States, which recognizes the relevance of philosophy to its own subject-matter only in so far as it restricts itself to what is known as the philosophy of (social) science - that is, methodology, and theoretical self-consciousness. I do not think such a clear demarcation can be, or ought to be made. What is important, of course, is that the type of question being asked is recognized; whether it is empirical, "conceptual, theoretical, or metaphysical ... Sociology, too, involves philosophy, not only epistemology, as I am arguing here, but also, and much more radically, ontology - the philosophy of being.” BIB 271 p 11 (Wolff, J Hermeneutic Philosophy and the Sociology of Art)
Part A: TIRYAKIAN's CONFUSION

[1.1] A distinguished contributor [T. Parsons] to this volume has pointed out elsewhere,¹ a fundamental question running through the development of general sociological theory has been the question of social order. What accounts for social order rather than social chaos, which in its asymptotic Hobbesian formulation would be the war of the all-against-all? This basic sociological question is, parenthetically, of the same nature as the ontological question raised by the philosopher Heidegger: Why is there Being rather than non-Being? Indeed, directly or indirectly, this general sociological problem underlies the vast spectrum of sociological investigations involving the operations of social organizations and social institutions; it also underlies a great deal of sociological theory, including much of contemporary structural-functional analysis" BIB191 p112 (Tiryakian "Structural Sociology" in Theoretical Sociology)

[1.2] E. A. Tiryakian must be commended for his ingenuity in fitting the name of the most prominent living sociologist (T. Parsons) into the same paragraph, and even the same train of thought as the mention of the name of the most influential philosopher of our time. This harmless bit of name dropping seems innocuous enough at first glance. What happens, though, if it is taken seriously and looked at closely. Indeed is the question

P1. What accounts for social order rather than social chaos...?

is "of the same nature" as that Heidegger takes up in his Introduction to Metaphysics¹? Is the similarity merely superficial and extraneous perhaps involving only their natures as questions: asking for a particular sort of answer in a specific manner? If their natures are the same in a deeper and more significant way, then maybe the elusiveness of one may shed light upon the unanswerability of the other. In order to approach this knot of concern Tiryakian's statement quoted above must first be disentangled into a

¹ BIB174
² Thus giving rise to nihilism.
propositional form for easy handling, then must be witnessed the bearing of the balance of Tiryakian's article upon proposition P1, so to determine finally the thrust of the analogy posed parenthetically if it were considered more formally as an argument.

**P2. Hobbs' formula 'War of all-against-all' is asymptotic to social chaos.**

**P3. Why is there Being rather than non-Being?**

**P4. P1 and P3 are 'of the same nature.'**

**P5. P1, underlies the investigation and theory concerning social institutions (forms).**

[1.3] Tiryakian quickly establishes in the remainder of the article a "Structural Sociology" that the most prevalent line of division in models offering at least rhetorical answers to P1 is between conflict (coercion) and consensus. Wishing to sidestep these for mutations he goes on to pose another perspective.

"In at least one major respect, social changes and social order are not even analytically distinct\(^2\). Only if the notion of social order is based upon some purely static model, wherein order is equated with immobility or a social analogue of physical constraints, can such a distinction be made. We opt for the perspective that order and change are concretely part of any social process which takes place within and as a function of existing structures, and in doing so, latently validate the sanctity of these structures." ibid p 118-119 (Tiryakian)

Given this situation Tiryakian sets out to "understand how change may be distinguished conceptually from process.\(^3\)" To accomplish this feat he uses the basic distinction between form and structure.

"These remarks lead us to observe that social phenomena qua phenomena have a becoming aspect; they are not frozen or static entities. Rather, they are actualizations or manifestations from an existential ground of possibilities, and it is this ground which we refer to as social structure...The actualization or "surfacing" of social phenomena from the ground of possibilities is, in one sense, a process wherein social existence takes on increasing configuration or form. That is, the

\(^2\) Thus giving rise to nihilism.

\(^3\) Ibid p114
increasing actualization of social phenomena within the structural framework of a certain mode of social being enables the form of the activity to become visible. This process of formalization is, it seems to me, what underlies the concept of institutionalization. Form and structure are interrelated but not identical; structure is an inner condition regulating interchanges between elements; form is the external appearance of this configuration which derives from the underlying structure. " Ibid p118-119 (Triyakian)

With this distinction in hand he can now build a conceptual bridge from processes which happen at a merely formal level to deeper species of social change.

"This points to the phenomenon of social change being involved in changes in the rates of flow of social events, and this is closely related to changes in the temporal structure of society. " Ibid p191 (Tiryakian)

Finally, Tiryakian advances the hypothesis that "genuine social revolution is an attempted overturning and radical rotation . . . of the normative axis [structure] which frames and orders institutional life."4

[1.4] The basic contention in all this is that social order is experienced as a patterned flow of differential flows in specific sequences of defining events.* This order is conditioned by an underlying structure which regulates the sequence patterning and formal specification of events which appear in concatenations. Social changes are indistinguishable from this multifarious and constantly mutating sort of social order on any level of analysis except that at which the deep structure has the potential of revolving to produce another completely different mode of patterning and specification. Process refers to the self referencing formation within the differential passage of the flows of events of apparent internal coherence. Boundaries are traced, outlines projected and the signpost or guidelines of everyday living appear. With structural revolutions all processional boundaries are effaced. Sequences and events indexed to

4 Ibid p126
these formations may no longer be coherently patterned or specified. Patterning and
specification are continually activities of renegotiation regulated or constrained by
processional limits. When new limits and ceilings are set the modes of patterning and
specification of contents are totally reoriented. The internal coherence of the major
foreground (Institutional) patterned and specified differential flows may conflict with
seemingly illegitimate or superfluous marginal events. However, the deep structure
conditions all events within the field of social life whether they take place in figure or
ground. Ground events are diffractions of obscured aspects of the deep structure caused
by the particular orientation of structure to field. If the structure revolves on its
normative axis it then provides a new sort of coherence which may highlight hitherto
ignored background events while destroying the significant arrangement of foreground
events which up to now were comprehensible. The argument, therefore, is that social
order exists because it is possible for the deep structure to rotate or turn over. The struc-
ture itself persists and merely offers different views of itself reflected in the different
formations within the comprehensible cultural surfaces in which institutions as
processional formations arise.
Figure 1.1

[1.5] If the forms themselves acted as structural constraints, then a social order would be static as though held by physical bonds; while if there were no structural constraints at all to be distinguished from the forms, the result would be pure flux. On the other hand, if the structure existed separately from forms but either did not rotate or rotated constantly, the result would be social chaos. The latter source of chaos is obviously the instability of the intentional structure which, because it constantly changes, would mean that one formal type would only begin to coalesce before it were replaced by another undeveloped formal type. Now that we have eliminated three 'throw away' paradigms of stasis (identity of form and structure), flux (form without structure), and structural non-constraint (constant rotation), we are left with the paradigmatic form of this model which is usually advanced wherein the structure is differentiated but does not change in anyway. This is the favorite working hypothesis of

5 Cf. Schutz Social Types
science with regard to its object of inquiry "nature". However, this very hypothesis plays havoc with open systems in a way it doesn't with closed systems such as 'nature' (whether considered the finite or infinite). An open system must deal with outside influences if the processional limits within the system could not be changed by quantum leap, then patterning and specialization alone would have to attempt to accommodate environmental changes. This would lead to maladaptation and circuits of positive feedback that would arise to destroy the system. The ability to change processional limits is structurally linked to the twin activities of sequence patterning and content specification. The linkage specifically must allow the structure to alter process limits which in turn causes the two active modes to become reoriented within the new limits. Because of this linkage, formalization may occur within the specified boundaries. Formalization\(^6\) is the segregation of the field reigned over by the system into internally-coherent foreground and this is separated from neutral or conflicting background events and noise. If this formal segregation is to be maintained in an open system, then processional limits must be alterable. If there is to be maintained coherence during this transition, then the structure must allow for such change without itself altering. Tiryakian calls this possibility a rotation through a three-dimensional metaphor. Deep structure rotation is constrained by a feedback loop from the background which measures ratio of noise to conflicting and neutral information.

[1.6] In brief, the answer to P1. proposed by Tiryakian is social change defined as periodic rotation of the deep structure. He suggests we view society as a volcano

\(^6\) Formalization is the product of a gestalt.
about to erupt rather than as an iceberg with most of it's depths hidden but static. Every other sort of social change merely takes place within the social order as it stands and has a process character. Without the possibility of structural revolution looming in the background, ever present, either chaos or unmitigated boredom (in the form of flux or stasis) would result. These are equivalently nihilistic ultimately because in either case nothing could ever really "happen", i.e. there could be no difference that makes a difference to use Bateson's key phrase. This is tantamount to saying that there is social order rather than chaos only because there is a real possibility of another order different from the prevailing order which may become manifest in a stroke at any moment, i.e. social volcanoes might erupt at any time. Social change as structural revolution is always an eminent possibility; therefore there is a non-static social order rather than chaos.

**P6. Social Change (as possible structural revolution) accounts for P1.**

If this were an argument which claimed consistency any logician would reject it out of hand, that is if he could get a word in edgewise for all the virulent protests of metaphysicians risen from their graves. However, to elaborate in spite of these outcries from the wings, the backwaters of real science. It appears that this argument of Tiryakian would lead inevitably to the unstated but implicit conclusion . . .

**THEREFORE P7. Becoming accounts for P3.**

This is inevitable if and only if (a) social change is to becoming as Being is to social order and Non-Being is to social chaos, in the nature of things and (b) to question 'why?' is to say what accounts for something.
This form, of reasoning when exhibited in this manner is obviously fallacious and philosophically naive even though when incompletely presented it may have a certain charm. But why did Tiryakian subordinate the ultimate question* (P3) to the penultimate query concerning the status of becoming? One might be misled to believe that social change if described accurately could explain the modus of social order and chaos. However, no one will fall into the obvious trap of claiming that becoming might explain the sufficient reason for Being's dominion over non-Being. Either Tiryakian is wrong in claiming that P1 and P3 are of the same nature (parenthetically) or he is wrong in claiming P6 because it implies P7. In Hegel Becoming is a synthesis of Being and Nothing, i.e., something derivative due to the interaction of Being and Non-Being not something prior to this basic distinction. Even Nietzsche who is not afraid to question the domination of Being over becoming realizes that a revaluation is only possible by destroying the meaning of Being altogether. The justification of setting his sights lower takes up a major part of his time. However, once this justification is carried out, Nietzsche doesn't make himself appear ridiculous by saying that the lower category explains the operation of the higher but discarded one.

"6. We have abolished the real world: what world is left? the apparent world perhaps?... But no! with the real world we have also abolished the apparent world! (mid-day; moment of the shortest shadow; end of the longest error; zenith of mankind? Incipit Zarathustra." BIB206 p41 (Nietzsche Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ)

Of course, here the shadow is Nihilism and the error the dominion of Being. with the destruction of the meaning of Being the whole problematic of becoming is transformed so that becoming is no longer merely the apparent but something completely different. One may not traverse this difference to explain destroyed Being
in terms of the new found concept of Becoming. However, Tiryakian does not even get this far. His deep structure itself has Being and is changeless throughout all of its periodic rotations which are to its own permanence as becoming is to Being. Tiryakian merely moves the question of social order's stasis into the depths of obscurity by placing its foundation out of reach behind some hypothetical deep structure. Social change's intervention is merely a ploy, a delaying tactic, to protect him from thinking about the problem.

[1.8] The reason why Tiryakian would take up such a contradictory position, setting aside for the moment any disreputable motives, must be searched for in his attempt to bring sociologism and existentialism into relation with each other.* In his book on this subject he attempts to show the differences between Durkheim and assorted existentialist thinkers and so beyond that find a stage for "rapprochement" between the two strands of modern thought which have always maintained themselves "in a state of cold war." Tiryakian feels that this rapprochement might be mediated by the relationships of each to pragmatism though we must jump across the Atlantic to reach this arbitrator.

"Existentialism and pragmatism share essentially the same critical outlook on traditional rationalism. Existentialism seeks to overcome the subject-object dichotomy by asserting that thought is ground in existence. Like pragmatism, existentialism stresses the primacy of becoming over static being; existence is always a becoming-possible. Finally, existentialism criticizes the prevalent notion of truth in traditional philosophy along exactly the same basic lines as pragmatism does." Ibid p159 (Tiryakian)

Evidently Durkheim's approach to truth is very pragmatic as well. However, for the moment what is of interest is the reference to the primacy of becoming over static

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7 BIB255 p151 (Tiryakian)
8 Ibid p163
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being. Later in the book Tiryakian elaborates this in reference to the mutual usefulness of Sociologism and Existentialism to each other.

"Moreover, existentialism might benefit greatly from a genuine appreciation of sociologism. Sociologism, to reiterate an earlier point, does not view the relation between the individual and society as one marked by conflict, for it stresses ultimately the needs and contributions of each to the other. Durkheim's conception of society as an historically evolving reality could well be used to give human existence a dynamic dimension hitherto neglected in existential thinking. Since existentialism conceives of the existence of man as a process of becoming, it should be receptive to Durkheim's notion that societal existence is an historical process of becoming. Furthermore, the sociological concept of socialization could well provide justification for this important existential notion of becoming. If existentialism accepted that man's being has an authentic, intrinsic social dimension - one whose form remains constant but whose content changes since the individual's statuses and roles in society are never static - this would provide valid grounds for the notion of existence as a dynamic process. Ibid p167-8 (Tiryakin)

If man has an intrinsic social dimension whose form remains constant but whose content unceasingly changes, then Being has been affirmed over becoming. This authentically intrinsic social dimension reminds one of the three-dimensional deep structure in society which remains self identical throughout its periodic rotations. The structure remains constant but rotates within society, the form remains constant in the individual but supports many changing contents. The idea that becoming is affirmed over being is really only true of Nietzsche and not pragmatists. That becoming is affirmed by Existentialists is true. In fact, what is alluded to here is in fact the essence/existence dichotomy. Being is an essence of beings of ontic determination. Existence is what is pointed to as related to this "is" which is said. Existence is mute, but still highly vocal in its superfluidity. Existence's most positive characteristic is, in fact, its becoming. Being and Becoming stand over against one another as essence does to existence. The existentialists affirm existence over essence - inverting the traditional scholastic formula. (Heidegger must be excepted here). If Being and Becoming are understood this way, then Tiryakian's statements begin to make sense. However,
essence & existence arise as metaphysical ultimates after the Being/Becoming distinction is already founded. Nietzsche's affirmation of Becoming over Being is not of this crude type in the least.

[1.9] Where there is any hint of permanence or constancy, there being dominates over becoming. Only Nietzsche has had the courage to throw away this crutch.* For all else, Being is the essence of beings while existence refers to their modes of manifestation in each case. The most discernible thing about these modes are their constant and unrelenting becoming. Becoming is perhaps the only real constant. However, if it is a constant, then it shows us an essential being in its depths. If, on the other hand, becoming is inconstant as well, then it is only Being that it might relinquish itself to. Either way, becoming shows us its subordination to being. If Nietzsche affirms becoming over being, it is because he sees perhaps an unexplored area behind both of these terms as they are understood traditionally. Be-come, which Nietzsche praises has perhaps nothing in common with its hyphenated spelling which signifies mere appearance. "Be-come' takes it’s "Be" from Being and "come" from the thus-come of becoming existence. This same synoptic area was perhaps best grasped by Merleau-Ponty who called it WILD⁹. For now, it is merely necessary to point out that Tiryakian doesn't even approach these ideas which figure in Nietzsche's thought, to which he appears to be referring at first glance. The reference to social change and the affirmation of Becoming over Being are surreptitious attempts to push the problem of being into a background obscurity where it may not have to be dealt with. Being has

⁹ BIB269 p30 Merleau-Ponty The Visible and the Invisible
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not in any way been purged only a castling move like those of beginner's in chess, which come too soon, has been carried out.

This, of course, brings us to what is seen by Tiryakian as the genuine area for reproachment between these two factions of modern thought. That area is transcendence. What is permanent or constant, that is Being, obviously transcends becoming. Transcendence will become a major theme of this essay. Tiryakian, if he is right about anything, it is about the importance of the problem of transcendence as a sore point to both existentialists and sociologists alike. This problem must be approached slowly and cautiously. So as a means of first approach, it may be best to go back and explore the contradiction in which Tiryakian sets himself.

[1.10] Unless the whole identification of the so called 'ontological question' (P3) and the sociological question (P1) is no more than a rhetorical dodge which allows quick movement from familiar to unfamiliar theoretical territory? There must be merit in exploring the status of the questions themselves in the context of contradictory relations uncovered here. The rhetorical interpretation shall be bracketed, for while it appears plausible in terms of what has been noted above, it is still relevant to understand why the use of such a means of avoiding the problems at hand leading to contradiction, would be willingly chosen by a sociologist of some stature. What is the exact form of the rhetorical device if it is such and why is it employed. This may seem a small matter, but at times it is the trivialities which reveal the chinks in the armor.

10 BIB255 p156 Tiryakian
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[1.11] First, if the questions (P1 & P3) themselves are interrogated it is found that Tiryakian gets them wrong. Heidegger asks "Why are there essents (die seienden = existents) rather than nothing?". And this question is first in rank for us. First, because it is the most far reaching; Second, because it is the deepest; and finally, because it is the most fundamental of all questions.

P3.1 "As every philosophical inquiry when pursued far enough; opens on avenues of metaphysics, so every thorough metaphysical endeavor ultimately deals explicitly or implicitly (sic) with the question; "Why is there something rather than nothing?" Leibniz, who first formulated the question in this sharp manner, was acutely aware of its final status and privileged position in the outlining and articulating of the totality of metaphysical inquiry." BIB215 p1 (Tymieniecka, A. T. Why Is There Something Rather than Nothing?)

It might be added, above that every scientific endeavor opens upon the back streets of philosophy. Be that as it may, we may say along with Heidegger -

"In this threefold sense, the question is the first in rank - first, that is, in order of questioning within the domain which this first, question opens, defining its scope and thus founding it. Our question is the question of all authentic questions, i.e. of all self-questioning questions, and whether consciously or not it is necessarily implicit in every question. No questioning and accordingly no single scientific "problem" can be fully intelligible if it does not include, i.e. ask, the question of all questions." BIB174 p6 (Heidegger Intro. to Metaphysics)

But, the point is that Nobody asks the question in the form of P3. Being simply is. The facticity of the question itself exemplifies this irrevocably. The whole point is there is both Being and non-Being and because of this situation we are led to question "Why there is something", any one individual aspect of Being rather than the actualization of the possibility that the essent entity might founder and slip away into non-Being. If no Individuated being, no essent, is spoken of then there is really no

11 BIB174 p1-2 Heidegger
12 or the esseent as a whole. BIB174 p2-3
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distinction between Being and non-Being. Without individuation they are interchangeable.

"The (dialectical) method finds its most basic expression in Hegel's trinity of Being, Nothing, and Becoming. He argues that pure, indeterminate Being is opposed to any determinate and particular Being, just as the later concept is also opposed to Nothing. Being and Nothing, though opposites are therefore identical; they pass from one into the other. But in this mutual dissolution of Being and Nothing lies their "truth" and a synthesis is of the contradiction, etc... they dissolve into Becoming." BIB247 p95 (Murphy The Dialectics of Social Life)

Individuation is the threshold of the question itself. Being and non-Being are the first concepts highlighted by the act of pointing out the individual thing. Thus it is these three ideas which form the basis of the ultimate question.

[1.12] Tiryakian has evidently confused the ultimate question of metaphysics with what Heidegger calls the question beyond metaphysics, which is that of ontological difference. The question of ontological difference asks the difference between the Being of beings and the beings of Being. Or, less esoterically, it asks the difference between the individuated being and Being as non-individuated. This steps beyond the precincts of the ultimate question by asking of the internal relation of participation between the ontological concept of Being as a universal and the ontic concept of the individual beings which bear out the universal. The ultimate question merely asks the entity to act as a flow through the tea bag for the water of Non-Being to siphon off the essences of Being like tea. In all this the entity is left untouched. Heidegger wishes to step beyond this into the unquestionable realm of the interaction between entity as individual and as exemplar of Being - the remainder of the individual in all its determinations and beyond its individuality.
This question - the supra-ultimate question of ontological difference - asks how the individual came to be specified within the plenitude of Being in the first instance. This question is not merely un-answerable but is in principle impossible because it merely results in paradoxical tautologies.\textsuperscript{13} Non-being instead of acting as a strawman to be knocked down is taken up into the very structure of the entity as a negation that annihilates even itself as it is posited at the very heart of Being.\textsuperscript{14} Although Tiryakian has fallen into this unfortunate confusion of believing the ultimate question and that of ontological difference to be the same, it does not affect the argument advanced before as long as P3.1 (Why is there something rather than nothing) is merely substituted for the erroneous formulation P3. The ontological question is meaningless in the context of the first paragraph of Tiryakian's article and a synthesis or hodge-podge of the two questions borders on insanity. This abyss must be stepped back from before discourse may proceed.

[1.13] If P1 and P3 are of the same nature and if there was something so vitally wrong with P3, then perhaps there is something wrong with P1 also. The presence of the qualification P2 points toward the difficulty. 'Social'' chaos, as defined radically, is an extreme contradiction in terms.

"Social anthropology is beset by a basic contradiction that perhaps will never be surmounted. This contradiction arises from the fact that, although we search for order, social life is visibly chaotic. Its basic characteristic is flow and flux? Its concrete ingredients are people, numbering into the millions and hundreds of millions; the substance of our observations is events, each of them unique, in as much as each human is unique. As strict empiricists, we must confront the truth that

\textsuperscript{13} cf. Adorno's criticism of Heidegger "debtor"
\textsuperscript{14} cf. Sartre \textit{Being and Nothingness}
The most evident query is why in both of these cases is the term chaos used instead of disorder. Chaos brings back into this discourse the memory of the transformation of Non-Being from strawman into self-negation as the questioner moved from consideration of the ultimate question to that of ontological difference. Perhaps that insane confusion of ontological difference with the ultimate question is germane after all. Perhaps P1 is of similar nature to P3 in that it is a similar sort of insane hodgepodge of metaphysical relics. In P3, the emphasis shifted from the individual as an unquestioned frame of oscillation\textsuperscript{15} to the origin of the frame itself based upon its participation in the Being/non-Being dichotomy which is mediated. P1 shows a similar structure; only here the frame is a level of analysis - the social - and the oscillating dichotomy is order/disorder. As long as the origin of the level of analysis remains unquestioned\textsuperscript{16}, then disorder remains a straw man. However, when the question as an ultimate is turned in upon itself to furnish its own ground, then disorder is turned into chaos, and internalized into the very structure of the level of analysis at the heart of order itself.

[1.14] 'Social' chaos is a contradiction, but not in any merely superficial way. It points to a discipline which asks not only for answers, but also for the questions to reveal their very foundations.

\textsuperscript{15} Cf. BIB174 p28 Heidegger
\textsuperscript{16} Cf BIB271 p5 Wolff
"Speech is analytic when it is consistent with itself. For us this means: since the very accomplishments of speech makes reference to its achieved character, speech which is true to itself makes reference to the fact (and mystery) of its grounds. Speech which is truthful to itself is not self-centered because it is faithful to the analytic conception of speech as grounded speech and this very idea points beyond speech to that which causes all things to endure, to persist, and to be. Speech which is true to itself is speech which re-cognizes that it is not self-sufficient, that it is not first, but derivative. The speech recognizes the difference between time and eternity.

"Concrete speech ignores its achieved character, violates itself and conceives of itself as first. When concrete speech attempts to locate its grounds, it points to 'externals' nature, to 'internal' mind(s), to the self-organizing activity of speech itself, or to past events under the delusion that such 'sources' are external to speech. Those sources are presumed to be the origins of speech, and so the delusion consists in thinking that origin is that part of speech which is self-organizing."

BIB245 p15 (McHugh On the Beginning of Social Inquiry)

Here the distinction between the ultimate question and the one concerning ontological difference is defined in terms of the difference between so called concrete and analytic speech respectively. It is probably A. Blum here who goes on to say.

"When concrete speech does not see analytic speaking as narcissistic or capricious, it will often see it as nihilistic, because the informulability of grounds seems to mean that the object of analysis is nothing (is silent). But there is a difference between nothing and no-thing, for while it is true that the so called object of analysis is no-thing in the sense that it is not a thing, it is not true that this object is nothing. We must note that the what (quiddity) of ground is not formulable or characterizable, because grounds are not a determinant thing the 'that' of ground is enunciated or announced in every intelligible speech. Being does not show itself in itself but announces itself through phenomena, which show themselves. The analyst is one who is committed to this recognition and who seeks to speak under its auspices. " BIB245 p16 (McHugh)

The distinctions made between no-thing and nothing we have already run into in our transition between the question of ontological deference and the ultimate one. It is the same transition between disorder and chaos. When one moves from considering something in its relation of exterior possibility to nothing to considering something in relation to one of its constituent elements, namely no-thing, then nothing turns in on itself and produces nothingness

[1.15] In the peculiar light of the above, P1 disintegrates into . . .
These two questions may be collapsed into a single concrete query which reads . . .

P1.3 Why is there social order rather than social disorder?

Concrete versions of this sort do not way lay the discourse for very long. They seem to float in mid-air as brief forays of question begging. The real concern here is the relation between the concrete and analytic versions as such. The first floats serenely over a sea of nothingness while the latter takes this nihilation to heart and shudders in the throes of an ugly death. P1.3 and P3.1 are of the same nature, but that inner nature reveal a transformation which distinguishes the prejudices of metaphysics and those of science (e.g. sociology) from what Heidegger calls true thought\(^\text{17}\). In these terms, Blum's distinction between analysis and the concrete should be reversed. Analysis, Heidegger would say, is what science and metaphysics do best while the concrete thought which underlies all analysis, which has no real respect for method is exactly that which allows the thinker to enter any domain of science at will. If compelled to do so, this fundamental and original thought may remain outside all science and meta-science and still authentically think its thoughts. This question then, of the relation between Blum's analytical and concrete questions reveals to this discourse the possibility of the collapse of all sciences and meta-sciences into one another. A fair analogy might be the collapse of a super nova of a red giant star into a black hole\(^\text{18}\). All science appears as this unstable star in

\(^{17}\) BIB185 Heidegger
\(^{18}\) Discoveries of Science are icons of thought projected on the onitc. BIB37 Husserl
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its tenuous connection with the Lifeworld.* Perhaps the unbridled proliferation and differentiation of the science is like the nova of that star. Its collapse into the morass of nothingness which, hidden as a immutability in its heart, has perhaps already enveloped us. It is said that the event horizon of a black hole catches one before one is aware. But perhaps if we can bounce off this event horizon, then, instead of leaping into the future as a science fiction daredevil cosmonaut might do, we might leap into a whole new realm of thought poised critically between science/meta-science and its ultimate limit grounded in groundlessness which is Heidegger’s concrete thought. Could this analogy hold true?

[1.16] More to the point, the above analogy suggests a hidden ordering principle working itself out implicitly in these questions behind the facade of the analytic/concrete distinction.

Note: At level -1 Being and non-Being ARE (crossed out) and they are together have their source in the Clearing of Being.
This list of questions is generated out of Tiryakian's arguments. Before the ultimate question may be asked, three things must be simply given - Being, positive and negative determination, and individuation. The ultimate question merely synthesizes these into a single statement in interrogative form. Becoming adds the possibility of rearrangement of the relations between the givens. Question three asks whether if one steps outside the knot or neighborhood of the system of givens if one would be lost or whether one might work one's way out from the knot by means of more or less relatively stable landmarks. The next question posits the knot as a having transitive relations with its neighborhood. The level of analysis in this case is social but any sort of level might have been selected (e.g., biological, micro-physical, etc.). 'Level of analysis' means that one discovers that the entities given in the knot of initial understanding have horizons internal and external upon still other different entities and so on indefinitely.

Home base was, it is discovered, selected arbitrarily. Level five asserts a synthesis similar to that of the ultimate question only wider in scope presupposing all that went before it. Question six asserts the diacritical nature of these various components just as question two did with narrower scope before it.

[1.17] Now consider how in each case the nihilistic versions of these questions are contrived. In each case the synthesizes are made accountable for their given and taken-for-granted components. Specifically, the question of the relations between levels zero and negative one or four and three is asked. The former is then referred back to the latter in each case for its ground. At this point, a distinction which Heidegger says it is important to make comes to the fore.

19 thus emergence enters the picture. Cf. Husserl.
"But such an inquiry itself - ontology taken in the widest sense without favoring any particular ontological directions or tendencies - requires a further clue. Ontological inquiry is indeed more primordial, as over against the ontical inquiry of the positive sciences. But it remains itself naive and opaque if in its researches into the Being of entities it fails to discuss the meaning of Being in general."

Footnote 3: "While the terms 'ontisch' (ontical) and 'ontologisch' (ontological) are not explicitly defined, their meanings will emerge rather clearly. Ontological inquiry is concerned primarily with Being; ontical inquiry is concerned primarily with entities and the facts about them." BIB 265 p31 (Heidegger Being and Time)

Here it may be seen quite clearly that the ontological is concerned with the status of Being in its positive or negative determinations (-1) whereas the ontical concerns what is individuated (0) as such within the context of the ultimate question which forms the world of that persecuted entity.* However, just as clearly it can be seen that a similar involution occurs with regard to questions three and four. The transitive relations between the central knot and its neighborhood are referred back for their ground in the exploratory and tenuous sight taking which determines the relation between the known (because assumed) central knot and all else.

Is it possible that another distinction of the same nature as that made by Heidegger might be made here between the sociological and the social. The sociological would refer to the level of analysis as such wherein transitive relationships thrive, while on the other hand the social would refer to the reference of the central knot to all else in its initial and exploratory stages. This usage may be quite eccentric but perhaps it gives new life to these shop worn adages. It is meant to point out the remarkable similarity between the pre-selected universal medium, Being, and the preselected arbitrary level of analysis, in this case the social. The social becomes sociological as it is designated the preeminent level of analysis by thought. The movement from ontic to ontological and from social to sociological are
movements away from the ultimate question to a safe universal ground. Sociation as such is neither approachable in terms of exploratory relations of the pre-selected knot to its surroundings nor from the direction of a universal level of analysis. Sociations as such take place in the Wild. Its all a question of how to find it.

**Part B: THE MODEL OF TRANSCENDENCE**

[1.18] Given, now, these two distinctions how do they relate to a further elaboration of the first distinction given by Heidegger between the existential and existentiell.

“That kind of Being towards Dasein can comport itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself somehow, we call "existence" (existenz). And because we cannot define Dasein's essence by citing a "what" of the kind that pertains to a subject-matter (eines sachhaltigen Was) and because its essence lies rather in the fact that in each case it has its Being to be, and has it as its own, we have chosen to designate this entity as "Dasein", a term which is purely an expression of its Being (als reiner Seinsanussdruck). Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence - in terms of a possibility of itself to be itself or not itself. Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself or got itself into them, or grown up in them already. Only the particular Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold or by neglecting. The question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself. The understanding of one self which leads along this way we call "existentiell". The question of existence is one of Dasein's ontical 'affairs'. This does not require that the ontological structure of existence should be theoretically transparent. The question about that structure aims at the analysis (Auseinanderlegung) of what constitutes existence. The context (zusammenhang) of such structures we call "existentiality". Its analytic has the character of an understanding which is not existentiell, but rather existentiell. The task of an existential analytic of Dasein has been delineated in advance, as regards both its possibility and its necessity in Dasein's ontical constitution." BIB265 p32-33 (Heidegger)

The correspondence seems quite simple. The ontic is to the existentiell as the ontological is to the existential. This simplistic assertion however does not fully render the meaning implicit in these terms. In effect, there are now six terms which must be reconciled.

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20 Cf Wild Being Merleau-Ponty *The Visible and the Invisible.*
including 'existentiality' and a 'pre-ontological' over and above the simple ratio as stated.

Beware as this quickly turns to eight.

"Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. But in that case, this is a constitutive state of Dasein's Being, and this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being - a relationship which itself is one of Being. And this being understands itself in its Being, and that to some degree it does so explicitly. It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it. Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological."

"Here 'Being-ontological' is not yet tantamount to 'developing an ontology'. So, if we should reserve the term 'ontology' for that theoretical inquiry which is explicitly devoted to the meaning of entities, then what we have had in mind in speaking of Dasein's 'Being-ontological' is to be designated as something 'pre-ontological'. It does not signify simply 'being-critical', however, but rather 'being in such a way that one has an understanding of Being.' BIB265 p32 (Heidegger)

Here at the heart of Heidegger's system of definitions is an essential involution which must be brought out clearly.

Figure 1.2
[1.19] There is an essential division made here between the being of Dasein and all other sorts of entities. The radical division is between entities who use "is" and those to whom it can merely be applied. The "is" may be applied to Dasein as well, but only Dasein has the added feature of being able to use the signification of "is" to dominate what is merely ontical. Entities to which or to whom the "is" is applied are ontical. The "is" itself is ontological and may be the springboard of the science of ontology. Those who over and above its application to them can use or apply this application themselves are said to have a pre-ontological understanding of Being. This is to say that in order to use it they must in some primordial and unreflective way understand how it is to be used. However, this does not necessarily mean that they must understand their understanding of Being as ontology as being based upon the ontological would imply. Thus between mere ontical application and its full theoretical understanding of itself the "is" in Dasein must have a primordial understanding of itself. Thus the ontological is an ontical characteristic of Dasein itself which shows up an anomalous case which does not fit the clarity of this distinction. This anomalous territory which the pre-ontological understanding of being opens out on is called existence. Dasein's essence is this anomalous territory itself. What accrues to the life of Dasein within this territory as it unfolds on its own is existentiell. This refers to the mere ecstatic projection in the existing itself without grasping theoretically the structure of the projection itself. The context in which this projection occurs is its existentiality and the understanding of it theoretically in terms of its structures is existential.

[1.20] Thus the simplistic ratio of equivalence does not describe at all accurately the relationships under discussion. In order to get a clear picture, two other concepts must be

21 Cf. BIB265 Heidegger
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brought into the matrix of concepts. These are ontology and existenz. which provide the medium for theoretical and non-theoretical operations of understanding. Now we may describe a cubic matrix whereby the structure of nihilating involution is appropriated.

![Figure 1.3]

**FIGURE 1.3**

In Figure 3, we find two tetrahedra interpenetrated representing the realms of present-at-hand\(^{22}\) and ready-to-hand\(^{23}\) respectively. The two tetrahedra each have components of similar function. These functions are **particularity** (ontic, existentality), **universality** (ontological existential), **mediation** (ontology, existence), and **unquestionability** (pre-ontological Existentiell). These functions allow multiple bonding between universal and particular through surreptitious passage from the ready-to-hand tetrahedra to that of the

\(^{22}\) cube points ontology, ontic, pre-ontological, ontological  
\(^{23}\) cube points existential, existential, existeniality, existence
present-at-hand and vice-versa. The major distinction with which the matrix is inaugurated, of dasein verses non-dasein entities is twisted into that of ready-to-hand verses present-at-hand. This twisting within the problematic is symbolic of the nihilating involution where Dasein is made to appropriate for itself the exteriority of beings. The inauthentic character of the ready-to-hand mirrors the vacuous quality of present-at-hand theorizing. The trick is to pass to the ready-to-hand when theorizing becomes vacuous in the mode of presence-at-hand and then pass back to the presence-at-hand when the ready-to-hand becomes inauthentic. This restless oscillation never becomes stabilized and this provides the motive force which keeps the matrix vitalized.

[1.21] Particularity, Universality, Mediation and Unquestionability are the functions represented in each tetrahedron. Why do these two latter elements appear? The ultimate question rests upon three given elements. Universality, positive and negative determination, and particularity. Evidently the positive and negative determinations of the universal and particular are set out by mediation and unquestionability respectively. These then represent the routes by which individuation finds and then receives its foundation in the universality of Being. Determination instead of holding itself as a simple compensatory polarity splits into a mediator and something unquestionable separates itself from it. It is this splitting which causes nihilation to become internalized where it has been excluded. Nothing becomes distinguished from no-thing then nothingness arises as the unquestionable. The radical splitting of determination is the difference between the question of ontological difference which marks the pathway to the question of the meaning of Being* in general, on the one

24 Oscillation between the knot and kernel in this paradoxical system.
hand, and the ultimate question on the other. This leads us to consideration of
unquestionability as unanswerability as such.

[1.22] First a theory of Sociation should be elaborated which corresponds to the above
model. In this case the universal is a level of analysis taken as an absolute stage for a
totalitarian reductionist policy. This is sharply distinguished from the opposite
interdisciplinary imperialist policy of applying a single paradigmatic analogy to different and
arbitrarily selected phenomena with seeming similarity. The first policy is epitomized by
sociation being chosen as the sole subject matter of this paper, while the second is instanced
by the analogy of nova in stars and black holes in space being applied to scientific and
thoughtful phenomena. The sociological and the social respectively may be represented by
the two mutually compensatory strains of imperialism: reductionist and paradigmatic. When
the reductionist considers his model paradigmatic for all levels of phenomena or when the
paradigmaticist maintains that one analogy is the basis of all others, then a similar
involutionary movement as that described above happens with regard to sociation. There is,
though, a compensatory reversal. Where the ontological contained two components and the
ontic merely one component on this other side of the ultimate question, the universal is
singular while the particular is dual. The sociological claims merely to be a level of analysis
and the social contains both the positing of a neighborhood beyond the limits of the knotted
system and selectivity of relations between the knot and its neighborhood. Limitation and se-
lectivity are the two natural poles of a common directionality which adheres to the knot and
defines the social as such. When the social is referred to the sociological for its foundation as
Blum describes in Theorizing*, that is when the sociological becomes bent upon rationalizing
society and acting itself as a model of such a rationalization accomplishment then limitation
and selectivity split out of their common directionality which expresses the negative entropy of the system. Limitation becomes the medium of reconciliation while selectivity is appraised negatively and regulated to the unquestionable. The open system is closed in upon itself.

[1.23] In this movement a similar matrix arises in Figure 4 as described in Figure 3. A psychological tetrahedron becomes opposed to the sociological one. The relation between individual and society becomes the focus of theorizing concerning Dasein.

FIGURE 4

Views of this matrix cannot be as exact as those of the prior because it must be gathered out of a tradition rather than from the work of a single theorist. This matrix is the implicit framework for analyzing social-psychological phenomena suggested by this study, its explication is no simple matter. Society and consciousness serve as the limitations while sociation and the psychical become selective. The former are mediums across which the
universal and particular reach out to one another in terms of participation then the latter are relegated to the unquestionable.

[1.24] In themselves these reified conceptual matrices mean little when abstracted in this way, and the fact that they may be constructed and elaborated as a philosophically deep structure is not in itself significant. What claims our interest is the general problematic out of which they arise. This problematic seeks to lay out the structures of involution which may take place on either side of the ultimate and pen-ultimate questions. In each case, involution occurs when the universal's bond with the particular is split. In the case of ontological difference, the bonds affinity is with the universal whereas in the case of sociological difference, the bond cleaves to the particular originally. In both cases involution need not occur but is always a possibility and as such should be investigated. If it does not occur, unquestioned presuppositions always remain below the threshold of inquiry. If it does occur, then these presuppositions are brought to light at the risk of destruction of inquiry itself.

[1.25] Finally, before attacking the problem of unanswerability, it might be helpful to relate the above set of questions to a more well known philosophical standpoint. Take, for instance, Karl Jasper's *Reason and Existen*enz. Treating the conceptual system set out in this work, only as such, a short description may be given. The encompassing which is the name of Being takes two forms - Being as other and Being which we ourselves are. The first sub-category has two titles below it - World and Transcendence. The first title refers to empirical existence conceived under the dominance of a universal and the second, title is properly Being in itself as noumena. The second sub-category contains three titles under it; Consciousness as such, Empirical Existence, and Spirit. These three titles stand in generally for mediation, object and subject. Beyond this, a free floating dichotomy is named reason and
existenz. Reason acts as bond between the titles while existenz motivates the sub-categories.

Notice how easily certain elements in this system may be matched up with elements out of the Heideggerian matrix.

FIGURE 1.5

Each element on the third level of divergence from the encompassing may be matched to an element from Heidegger's matrix. But beyond this it should be noted how the encompassing is equivalent to being, the second level is founded upon negative and positive determinations or self and other, and finally the third level raises out of a capacity for individuation specification. Therefore, in Jasper's anti-system, there is a marriage between the roots of the ultimate question and the eightfold cubic matrix form.
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[1.26] Jasper's anti-system is a finely tuned conceptual formulation indeed, because besides laying out the roots of the ultimate question and providing for the generation of an eightfold matrix, it also provides answers for our set of eight questions. The encompassing Being Itself, differentiates out into its positive and negative forms in question negative one. Question zero asks what accounts for individuation. Jaspers answers Existenz. The ultimate question uncovers for us the world and the pen-ultimate question shows us the operations within empirical existence. Question three asks why there is meta knot security rather than chaos and Jaspers answers in a psychologically motivated system of reference that it is through the mediation of consciousness as such. What accounts for this level of analysis? Transcendence itself as the essence of consciousness. Why is there psychological order rather than psychological disorder? Because spirit as the will to totality guides consciousness through empirical existence. What accounts for psychological change? Nothing less than reason itself which allows through the bonding of all the modes of encompassing that change to be borne out.

[1.27] The question which comes directly to the fore in this understanding of Jaspers anti-system of thought is that of the special relation between the Existenz / Reason dichotomy and the split field of individuated elements which it bounds. Namely, World and Transcendence which is along with Empirical Existence, consciousness as such, and spirit.

"Thus reason and Existenz are not two opposed powers which struggle with one another, They mutually develop one another and find through one another clarity and reality." BIB270 p68 (Jaspers)

"Each without the other loses the genuine continuity of Being and, therefore, the reliability which, although it can not be calculated, is nevertheless appropriate to genuine reason and Existenz. They separate themselves from one another only to become violent powers lacking any communication. In isolation they no longer mean what they should only formulas without other basis or purpose remaining, in a narrowing sphere of empirical existence. There, through a veil of justifications which are no longer true and no longer believed, they are simply the means of expression for mutually destructive empirical existents."
"But there is rest in temporal existence, rather there is always movement issuing forth from the ultimate substantial ground - the movement in the tension between the individual and the universal, between the actual and the total range of the possible, between the unquestionable immediacy of existential faith and the infinite movement of reason." BIB270 p68-69 (Jaspers Reason and Existentz)

Reason and Existentz are in fact the poles of differentiation and directionality which split when involution occurs. The medium separates out from the unquestionable. The limitation separates from selectivity. The mere positive and negative modes of differentiation of the encompassing into self and other is rotated through involution to give rise to reason and existenz. Reason in its perfect transparency and will to totality becomes the medium of participation between particular and universal. Existenz becomes the stronghold of the unquestionable. Before involution they are self and other, but after reason and existenz.

[1.28] Jaspers combined in his finely tuned categorical system both pre and post involution relics. It symbolizes the narrow line of decision which lies between these two mutually supporting possibilities. The choice is between groundless reason or self-groundless reason or self grounding but unreasonable existenz. Both options point directly to the quandary of answerability. The unquestioned presupposition is such on the basis of its unanswerability. No questions are put where no answer is thought to be forthcoming. It is surely obvious that if you can answer any one of these eight questions it is possible to answer all which follow in sequence. In fact, one may also extrapolate back from a successful answer. To answer any one is to indicate some sort of metaphysical preference.

"Yet, in a certain sense, this kind of knowledge must unquestionably be looked upon as given; in other words, metaphysics must be considered as really existing, it not as a science, nevertheless as a natural disposition of the human mind (metaphysica naturalis). For human reason, without any

25 BIB379 p20-21 O'Malley calls the unanswerable question the 'radical question'.  
26 BIB406 p326 Gadamer
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instigations imputable to the mere vanity of great knowledge, unceasingly progresses urged on by
its own feeling of need, towards such questions as can not be answered by any empirical
application of reason, or principles derived there from; and so there has ever really existed in-
every man some system of metaphysics." BIB365 p36 (Kant Critique of Pure Reason)

Here emphasis should be put upon the word 'unquestionably'. The natural disposition
towards metaphysics is as unquestionable as the questions through which it formulates its
unrestrainable approach. The problem with the set of questions as formulated is that no
question before number six can be answered. Thus, when on the sociological level of
analysis, Tiryakian makes the Ultimate subordinate to the pen-Ultimate, he is in truth
attempting to progress from a specifically answerable question toward mere general meta-
physical questions. These more general questions (2-5) seem answerable on this basis only
because to give an answer to six, one must assume a priori answers to two through five
inclusive. It is merely a matter of filling in the blanks and working back to one's own implicit
assumptions. One might give many answers to six, to be sure Tiryakian himself gives two
others besides structural rotation - of disequilibria or conflict and consensus. From the
threshold of answerability, one may work back as far as question two, inclusive. However,
the ultimate question requires an additional premise ~ e.g. God or Existenz.

[1.29] It may be easily noticed that this scheme if generalized - meaning the
substitution of any arbitrary level of inquiry is permitted - has a specific structure.
This specific structure is worth meditation because it provides the substrate for sufficient reason. A reason may be given for any question beyond six which is sufficient unto itself. The reason for question six is never self sufficient but merely answerable per se. But this answerability falls away with respect to questioning one which premises the relation of man as an essent's relation to the essent as a whole which includes him.

"This question and all the questions immediately rooted in it, the question in which this one question unfolds - this question "why" is incommensurable with any other. It encounters the search for its own why. At first sight the question, "Why the why?" looks like a frivolous repetition ad infinitum of the same interrogation formulation, like an empty and unwarranted brooding over words...

"But if we decline to be taken in by surface appearances, we shall see that this question "why", this question as to the essent as such in its entirety, goes beyond any mere playing with words, provided we possess sufficient intellectual energy to make the Question recoil into its "why" - for it will not do so of its own accord. In so doing, we find out that this privileged question "why" has its ground in a leap through which man thrusts away all the previous security, whether real or imagined in his life. The question, is asked only in this leap; without it there is no asking... Here it may suffice to say that the leap in this question opens up its own source - with this leap the question arrives at its own ground. We call such a leap, which opens up its own source, the original source or origin (Ur-sprang), the finding of one's own ground. It is because the question "Why are the essents rather than nothing?" breaks open the ground of all authentic questions and is
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thus at the origin (Ursprung) of them all that we must recognize it as the most fundamental of all questions." BIB174 p5-6 (Heidegger)

This leap brings out into the open what should be called the principle of insufficient reasons. The reason of reasons has no reason.\textsuperscript{27} Even taking reason as crudely encompassing purpose, explanation, and evidence\textsuperscript{28} it is obvious that to trace a chain of reasons past the first logical type is fruitless. "Reason" itself, rather than in one of its concrete manifestations has no purpose, no explanation, and what's more, the only evidence for it is apodicticity itself. The principle of sufficient reason which assures a firm foundation for each reason to which we prescribe stretches to the boundary of the primordial set of questions set out above. The counter principle holds that within the kernel of these questions the principle of sufficient reason holds no sway. Thus, the principle of insufficient reason is more primordial if for no other reason than that it is answerable to no one.

[1.30] Involution\textsuperscript{29} occurs as the self grounding collapse of questions zero to one and three to four. The ontic seeks the ontological just as the social homes in on the sociological. Tiryakian states (parenthetically) that these two moments are 'of the same nature.' \textit{They are in fact identical}. Here are merely two deflected representations of the same self-grounding motion of transcendence. Within the knot of the ultimate question lies merely one deflection whereas within the kernel of the question of social order lies two deflections. The generalization of Being as total encompassing is the same sort of universalization as the selection of an absolute level of analysis. Working from individuated entity to generalized Being or from knot, outward to a generalized level of analysis is the same essential notion of

\textsuperscript{27} Schopenhauer The Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reason p27
\textsuperscript{28} BIB254 p178-189
\textsuperscript{29} Heidegger Introduction to Metaphysics BIB174 p4 "Because it confronts the essent as a whole, but does not break lose from it, the content of the question reacts upon the question itself. Why the Why?" This reaction on itself is called here involution.
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thought. It is then advisable to look at this set of questions as an inner knot and outer kernel separated by an interval of involution. The double nature of this interval of involution mirrors the splitting of mediation from unquestionability which occurs in each singular involution. The doubled interval of involution mediates between the particular of the kernel and the universal of the knot. The temporal structure of this relationship is indicated by the unraveling of the knot in becoming. This is matched by the outer raveling of meta-level changement. This meta-level changement, the raveling or folding which compensates for inner becoming, unraveling or unfolding, is the basis of reason in terms of its internal self reference. The overall involuting structure of the eight questions is the kernel of answerability which itself answers to no one. Once involution occurs it reverberates throughout the universe of discourse infecting everything that "is" at all. However, in the case of unquestioning science which avoids involution merely by never raising the question of its ground. There is no safety in that ploy either. Incipient involution lurks there if not only as a possibility to be realized then as a certain avoidance of questioning whence and wherefore. If the possibility of an involution is there, then, itself is there so that pre and post involutionary science are merely two aspects of the same thing.

Part C: INQUIRY: QUERY

[1.31] The kernel of answerability which itself gives no answers brings to the fore the structure of questioning itself.

"It makes manifest that in anyway of comporting oneself towards entities as entities - even in any Being towards entities as entities - there lies a priori an enigma. The very fact that we already live in an understanding of Being and that the meaning of Being is still veiled in darkness proves that it is necessary in principle to raise this question, again."
"By considering these prejudices (such as self-evidence), however, we have made plain not only that the question of Being lacks an answer, but that the question itself is obscure and without direction. So if it is to be revived, this means that we must first work out an adequate way of formulating it." BIB265 p23-24 (Heidegger)

The meaning of Being is here veiled in the darkness of unanswerability. But how is a question first formulated in order to aspire to unanswerability. When its intention must first be answerability. Inquiry which calls up questions in the first place does not seek where it expects no answers.

"Every inquiry is a seeking (suchen). Every seeking, gets guided beforehand by what is sought." BIB265 p24 (Heidegger)

Inquiry seeks the fruitful where it lies because it is guided there by what is fruitful. Inquiry would not be itself if it sought toward barrenness. In that case it would be a form of madness. Inquiry must know where it is going even if the inquirer does not. This is the pre-ontological essence of inquiry which Husserl calls receptivity.

"Inquiry is a cognizant seeking of an entity both with regard to the fact that it is and with regard to its Being as it is." BIB265 p24 (Heidegger)

Here the essence/existence dichotomy is brought forward. The facticity of the Being of an entity is its existence. For Jaspers this remains the source of individuation of modes of encompassing beyond as positive or negative determination. Existence remains for him primordial before the delineation of a specific system of modes of Being into which it can be pigeon-holed.

There is a play off between the precise mode of existence of an individuated entity, its Individuation as such and the facticity of its presence. Jaspers believes that the facticity of
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presence comes before its individuation as such while the mode of existence (dream, fantasy, perceived) becomes clear last of all. Here in Heidegger's quote the entity is already mentioned as individuated so that facticity takes certain specific narrow limits and manifests itself in a particular mode of existence, once an entity is recognized as having a particular mode of existence then it may be questioned as "to its Being as it is", that is, as to its what, its essence. It is as such and such a particular manifestation of Being.

"When I ask myself what the something or the world or the material thing is, I am not yet the pure spectator I will become through the act of ideation? I am a field of experience where there is only sketched out the family of material things and other families and the world as their common style, the family of things said and the world of speech as their common style, and finally the abstract fleshless style of something in general. In order to pass from this to the essences, it is necessary for me to actively intervene, to vary things and the field, not through some manipulation, but, without touching them by supposing changed or putting out of circuit, such and such a relationship or such and such a structure, noting how this would affect the others, so as to locate those relationships and structures that are separable from the thing, and those on the contrary that one could not suppress or change without the thing ceasing to be itself. It is from this test that the essence emerges - it is therefore not a positive being. It is an invariant, it is exactly that whose change or absence would alter or destroy the thing and the solidity, the essentiality of the essence is exactly measured by the power we have to vary the thing. Pure essence which would not be at all contaminated and confused with the facts could result only from an attempt at total variation." BIB269 p110-111 (Merleau-Ponty The Visible and the Invisible)

So the modes of existence of a particular entity must be distinguished from the generation of the modes themselves\(^{30}\). But once a particular entity has been modalized then its familial relationships with other entities within a worlding must be distinguished from the essences which may be squeezed out of this worlding exposed by the ultimate questions through sorting that question out by crossing it with the question of becoming.

[1.32] Inquiry is "cognizant seeking of an entity" in terms of its mode of existence and its essence. Here both of these determinations of the entity are secondary having stemmed from the interface between the ultimate question and those questions which lie on either side of it. However, they are also secondary in the sense that modes of existence and essence assume a

\(^{30}\) Clearing of Being is source of generation of the modes of Transcendence.
level of analysis has already been selected. The essence of say, a tape recorder, is tied to its mode of existence. One may be interested in it as merely a present-at-hand object to throw, or as ready-to-hand as a machine to be fixed, or as a surveillance device. The throwing, fixing and surveillance assume certain levels of analysis pre-posed before the mode of existence and essence of the tape machine may be exposed. One comes to the tape machine upon a certain level of approach to its existence as individuated in the world. This level of approach determines its mode of existing and essence. So the ideational shift, which Merleau-Ponty speaks of above, is one which carries one outside the kernel of unquestionability all together.

[1.33] "This cognizant seeking can take the form of 'investigating' ('Untersuchen'), in which one lays bare that which the question is about and ascertains its character. Any inquiry, as an inquiry about something, has that which is asked about (sein Gefragtes). But all inquiry about something is somehow a questioning of something (Anfragern bei ...). So in "addition to what is asked about, an inquiry has that which is interrogated (ein Befragtes). In investigative questions - that is, in questions which are specifically theoretical - what is asked about is determined and conceptualized. Furthermore, in what is asked about there lies also that which is to be found out by the asking (das Erfragte) this is what is really intended; with this the inquiry reaches its goal. Inquiry itself is the behavior of a question, and therefore of an entity, and as such has its own character of Being. When one makes an inquiry one may do so 'just casually' or one may formulate the question explicitly. The latter case is peculiar in that the inquiry does not become transparent to itself until all these constitutive factors of the question have themselves become transparent. " BIB265 p24-25 (Heidegger)

For Heidegger, then, there is the asked about, the interrogated, the found out, and the questioner. With regard to the question of meaning of Being the asked about is Being itself while entities are interrogated and the questioner is Dasein. However, the found out, the meaning, must be left open indefinitely because ... "the question of Being lacks an answer..."31* But can an inquiry, least wise an investigation, be called such which seeks to find out where there is nothing to be found out. Where inquiry launches off the tracks which leads it towards answers, where does it plunge?

31 BIB265 p23-24 Heidegger
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[1.34] What must be distinguished at this point is between plunging off the tracks completely and stopping the train to take account of the mechanism of inquiry itself\(^{32}\). The question of Being does precisely the latter. Inquiry is "affair" of the inquirer so to explore its mechanism one dissects the inquirer: Dasein. In Being and Time as opposed to most other such inquiries of this sort not only the train is dissected at full stop as present-at-hand but also its Breaking action is recorded and explored in terms of the Ready-to-hand. The moment between breaking and full stop is exalted as authentic temporality caught between the fall of velocity and the full stop of death. This method doesn't catch the acceleration of the train nor can it highlight the cow catcher as it cleaves the night air.

[1.35] Inquiry cannot inquire after itself. Inquiry exposes in its movement - purposes, explanations, and evidences, but it does not form, the foundation of these itself\(^{33}\). Heidegger's formulation of inquiry must be understood in such a way that questioner and interrogated, question and answer fall outside the realm of inquiry itself as such. In-quiry means "seeking toward" but four elements of inquiry which Heidegger only as such defines the movement toward. What is the nature of the Query itself? The cutting of the train into the night is not exposed in any mere intentionality. The movement of inquiry as thought of as pure pressing forward in space present-at-hand does not approach the definition of the spectacle of the Query itself - the actual cleavage.

[1.36] Sartre mimics Heidegger's approach to inquiry up to the point where he specifies the form of the answer.

\(^{32}\) See Persig Zen and Art of Motorcycle Maintenance p.282-278 for metaphor of train.

\(^{33}\) Ontological Monism is rejected.
of these two equally objective and contradictory possibilities which on principle distinguishes the question from affirmation or negation

* * *

"There exists then, for the questioner the permanent objective possibility of a negative reply. In relation to this possibility, the questioner by the very fact that he is questioning, posits himself as in a state of indetermination, he does not know whether the reply will be affirmative or negative. Thus, the question is a bridge set up between two non-beings: the non-being of knowing in man, the possibility of non-being of being in transcendent being. Finally, the question implies the existence of truth. By the very question, the questioner affirms that he expects an objective reply, such that we can say of it, "It is thus and not otherwise." In a word, the truth, as differentiated from being, introduces a third non-being as determining the question - the non-being of Limitation. This triple non-being conditions every question and in particular the metaphysical question, which is our question.

"We set out upon our pursuit of being, and it seems to us that the series of our questions had led us to the heart of being. But behold, at the moment when we thought we were arriving at the goal, a glance cast on the question itself has revealed to us suddenly that we are encompassed with nothingness. The permanent possibility of non-being, outside us and within, conditions our questions about being. Furthermore, it is non-being which is going to limit the reply. What being will be must of necessity arise on the basis of what it is not. Whatever being is it will allow this formulation: "Being is that and outside of that nothing" BIB239 p4-5 (Sartre Being and Nothingness)

To clarify it might be reiterated that Heidegger poses four elements of In-quiry: the asked about = Being? the interrogated = beings; the found out = meaning vis. Being and the questioner = Dasein. Thus the question and the interrogated mediate between meaning and Dasein. The structure which results is Being-in-the-world. So we see that Heidegger uses two of the fundamental elements underlying the ultimate question, the most general attribute, Being, and the principle of individuation, beings. Sartre appropriates the third element participating in the structure of the ultimate question in order to level this attack upon its foundations: the positive or negative determination. Sartre points out a triple basis of non-being which conditions every question. That is, the asked about and the questioner are united by the question which subjects both to the possibility of non-being. The questioner and the asked about according to Sartre are pushed into a state of indetermination by the question. The question as a bridge of suspense connecting these two elements of the quadrate of inquiry
automatically unites the found-out and the interrogated as an expectation of a reply. This expectation of reply introduces a third possible non-being wherein the questioner in asking is not limited to itself and may receive answers from the interrogated which have meaning. So Heidegger and Sartre relate the four elements of inquiry in two different ways. The former from corner to corner across ways while the latter lateral and vertically.* In either case, one moves from two positively defined cells connected to the open cells whose meaningful connection is hoped for. Sartre makes his lateral approach meaningful by bringing into play another dimension of analysis using negative and positive determination.

Figure 1.6
Neither Heidegger nor Sartre step outside In-quiry to approach the nature of the Query because neither can free themselves from the presuppositions of the ultimate question. Each loses himself in the superficial intentional aspects of inquiry because to them inquiry itself may be queried. To see this in greater relief it is possible to go back to Husserl who links questioning almost with doubt.

"The phenomenon of questioning has its origin in the domain of modalized certainty and is found there in close association with doubt. Like doubt, it is originally motivated by events in the passive sphere. In this sphere a disjunctive fluctuation of apprehensions corresponds to the intuitions which are split in intentional conflict ...We say, for example, "I question, I doubt, whether A is." Therefore, what precedes the questioning, as similarly, what proceeds the doubting in the passive sphere, is a unified field of problematic possibilities. Naturally, there are at least two such. But, in addition, it can also be the case that only one of these conflicting possibilities consciously emerges, while the others remain unnoticed in the background, in the manner of empty and thematically uncompleted representations. Each ego-act has its theme? and the theme of doubt, like that of a question, is either a problematic singularity, whose disjunctively opposed members remain extra thematic,...or the theme is the whole problematic disjunction..."* BIB411 p307 (Husserl Experience and Judgment)

A. Schutz maintains this orientation in his study of relevances34. "In doubt" the ego strives for comfort and a dissolving of this frustration through the arrival of "a firm judicative decision."

"Questioning is not itself a modality of judgment...(but a)...practical mode of behavior relative to judgments." Ibid p308 (Husserl)

"We then understand primitive questioning as a practical striving toward a judicative decision and more broadly, as a habitual practical attitude, which, perhaps effective for a long time, is always at the point of passing over to corresponding volitions, endeavors, activities, to testing methods of solution, etc. " Ibid p309 (Husserl)

Expressed here is a fine distinction between the practical endeavor of questioning and pure judging for which it works tirelessly and thanklessly. Judging operates on a pure eidetic level and takes place merely on the basis of doubt. There is something distasteful about this

34 See BIB035
subjugating of questioning under the auspices wholly of doubt. It can not be denied that doubts are assuaged by questioning but it seems that once doubt has entered the scene that no amount of questioning may really put it to rest. Cross-examine, a witness all you like but if you doubt the story no amount of interrogation will relieve that doubt. Husserl recognizes this problem and distinguishes simple questions from those, which need justification. However, by distinguishing these he merely reiterates the problem of questioning and doubt being separated by a gap of logical type. The point is that questioning may be undertaken either under the flag of doubt or belief. Questioning may cause doubt to be transformed into belief or vice versa as a result of its working against the resistance of the interrogated. To be sure questioning really has little to do with doubting and does not naturally find its roots there. One does not ask the time or what another has been doing out of doubt normally. One asks them because one doesn't know or because one just wants to know. However, if one doubts the accuracy of one's own watch or the reliability of the person the questioning does not itself satisfy these doubts. One's own watch may be right and the other wrong, for instance. To satisfy doubt one must ask further for evidences or reasons. So doubt must be generated and maintained outside the auspices of kernel of un-answerability where reasons have substance or reliability. Questioning which is traced back to curiosity rather than doubt must therefore be more primordial. Curiosity does not necessarily begin with doubt and seek justifications of answers. Curiosity may be satisfied with an answer or not regardless of its qualifications with regard to evidence and reasonableness. Curiosity is the characteristic of the Query, which may be separated from the intentional aspects of questioner/interrogated, asked about/found out, doubt and form of reply.
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[1.38] Curiosity as the principle characteristic of the query shed of its non-essential intentional apparatus must not be confused with, interesting.

"Interest, interesne, means to be among and in the midst of things, or to be at the center of a thing and to stay with it. But today's interest accepts as valid only what is interesting. And interesting is the sort of thing that can freely be regarded as indifferent the next moment, and be displaced by something else, which then concerns us just as little as what went before. Many people today take the view that they are doing great honor to something by finding it interesting. The truth is that such an opinion has already relegated the interesting thing to the ranks of what is indifferent and soon boring."

BIB185 p5 (Heidegger What is Called Thinking)

Interest is the hallmark of the intentional apparatus of In-quiry in all its superficiality whereas curiosity stems from the Latine 'cura' care. Care is, of course, the inner nature of Dasein and Heidegger expresses it in relation to mere interest as being provoked to thought. That which provokes us to thought is dangerous. However, the dangerous may only provoke where there is the possibility of thought to begin with.

"Man can think in the sense that he possesses the possibility to do so. This possibility alone, however, is no guarantee to us that we are capable of thinking. For we are capable of doing only what we are inclined to do. And again, we truly incline only toward something that in turn inclines toward us, toward our essential being. What keeps us in our essential nature holds us only so long, however, as we, for our part, keep holding on to what holds us."

"In order to be capable of thinking, we need to learn it first. What is learning? Man learns when he disposes everything he does so that it answers to whatever essentials are addressed to him at any given moment. We learn to think by giving our mind to what there is to think about."

BIB185 Ibid p3-4 (Heidegger)

"Interest means to be among and in the midst of things, or to be at the center of a thing and to stay with it." Interest has to do with the modes of existence and essence mentioned above in their superficiality. Curiosity is "minutely careful" and as such points to the inter-leaving of mutual inclination, which operates beneath the level where questioner/interrogated,

35 Ibid p31
36 BIB185 p5 Heidegger
37 Concise Oxford Dictionary p299
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asked about/found out, and doubt/justified reply, might be recognized. Curiosity in the sense of what queries, is a compass which is minutely sensitive to danger and constantly changes its direction with respect to the quarter from which it can immediately expect the most trouble.

"In wonder everthing is at stake." BIB277 p2 (Verhoven The Philosophy of Wonder)

Danger* is the subtle shift of power (Old French - dangier) relations in which the questioner and the interrogated are both awash. It is neither in the subject or object but is a characteristic of a situation of entrapment. The inter-leaving of mutual inclination in which the beacon of danger operates defines a single situation in which questions are put, answers whether looked for or not are given. Forthrightly, there is no real difference between question and answer both indicate merely shifts in the beacon\(^\text{38}\) because answers may be given where no questions were asked and questions asked where no answers were given. No answer is still an answer and no question, still a question while an unsolicited answer is merely a question in disguise and an unanswered question is no mere shot in the dark but an answer with regard to the questioners orientation. It is the directionality which must be shorn from our thought. Without this directionality, we stand firmly on the line between un-question/answer-ability and question/answer-ability. This line marks out the question mark and exclamation mark which together -?!- reverberate throughout the "at all" of the question "Why is there anything at all? !"

No answer/question and its obverse answer/question must be distinguished from question/answer-ability which stands chiasmically\(^\text{39}\) at the root of both. Question/answer-ability and question/un-answer-ability pivot around a fundamental interrogation that rips

\(^{38}\) Cf. Kubler, G. The Shape of Time BIB376 "actuality"

\(^{39}\) Merleau-Ponty The Visible and the Invisible
through brute being. The kernel of the unquest/on/answerable stands as what is necessary for this interrogation to take place at all. Question/answer-ability takes place as the interrogation breaks out of the womb of muteness allowed by the unquest/on/answerable. The price is paid whether questions and answers are made or not.

[1.39] Unanswerability itself has been explored in some detail by M. Munitz in the Mystery of Existence without his realization that unanswerability immediately involves unquestionability too. To clarify what has been said hitherto let's say that the basic set of questions with which we began led to the question of inquiry itself. Heidegger, Sartre and Husserl felt that this was possible within their understanding of questioning. But this superficial possibility soon gave way to the heart of In-quiry itself. The heart of inquiry, the Query, omits all directionality and merely highlights what is eminently necessary to be noticed, the thought provoking, the essential. In this noticing or attentiveness questions and answers are not distinguishable. What becomes prominent is the dividing line between unnoticeability and noticeability. Whether notice as such is given, taken, or not. Within this cleavage a fundamental push of interrogation (?!?) takes place for which both the unnoticeability and noticeability are necessary. Unnoticeability allows the interrogation to frame its silent query while noticeability allows interrogation to break into the realm of the speakable whether anything is ultimately said or not. Through the action, of interrogation, but not because of it, the unnoticeable passes into that which is noticeable and the noticed passes into that which is not noticeable. The unnoticeable is framed for us in speech and thought by our set of first questions while the noticeable rules over all other questions.

40 BIB254
41 See BIB277 p12 (Buck)
"For those who are provoked by the mystery of existence, and so display another dimension of human wonderment, the root question is why there should be a world at all. To ask this latter type of question is not to ask a scientific question. If we are caught in the toils of this question, no amount of scientific explanation of how the world underwent various stages of development, on a cosmological or on a more restricted level, will serve, in any way, to allay the difficulty summed up by asking why there should even be a world in existence, whatever its stages of development or its patterns and qualities." BIB254 p4 (Munitz The Mystery of Existence)

It will be noticed immediately that by framing his approach to the sense of ultimate question in terms of world and existence, Munitz has already begun with certain presuppositions in hand. These prevent him from reaching much depth in his analysis but on the other hand they, as all presuppositions, solve a priori certain difficulties. The major problem which he does face though is a perennial criticism of the ultimate question.

"Since the discussion of the mystery of existence does not depend on any settlement of an issue of fact, in the way ordinary scientific questions are commonly thought to be so dependent, should we not regard the mystery of existence as an intellectual knot into which we get ourselves in asking a meaningless, because unanswerable, question?" BIB254 ibid p5 (Munitz)

This description of the ultimate question as an intellectual knot is particularly telling as will be seen later when the knot itself is identified as a manifestation of the minimal system. Munitz attempts to counter this sort of criticism by locating the precise meaning of unanswerability.

"May it not be that the mystery of existence is entirely genuine, that it is a sui generis question, and is neither a soluble scientific problem nor a dissoluble puzzle?"

* * *

"Might we not say, instead, that the mystery of existence consists precisely in the fact that we do not know, nor do we have any reliable way of finding out, whether there is a reason for the existence of the world? If, however, we link a more acceptable treatment of the mystery of
existence to a rejection of the presupposition that the demand for rationality must be satisfied by the very existence of the world, does this have any genuine philosophic merit?"  BIB254 p5-6 (Munitz)

The principle of sufficient reason would demand the existence of the world, which is really the superstructure of the ultimate question itself, a priori. If the principle of sufficient reason may be rejected as a universal principle as applying to the roots of reason itself as well as all else and may be instead linked in tandem with a principle of insufficient reason which is limited to those roots then perhaps the status of the ultimate question may be more primordially understood. This ultimately means "that the methods of science are incapable of being universalized to deal with all questions." 42

"I shall argue, accordingly, for the view that the mystery of existence has to be recognized for what it is. It is neither a problem nor a puzzle. It is meaningful as a philosophical question, though not as a scientific one. As a philosophical question, however, it is not capable of being removed, as is the case with some Others, by being shown to stem from some radical confusion of thought or from some misuse of language. It persists because it is sui generis. It must be accepted for what it is, as an ineradicable feature of our human response to the world. To want to solve the mystery - this is the normal hope, and the inevitable mistake that it cannot be solved that indeed this meaning and irremovable character of the mystery, is what...(must be established) . "  BIB254 Ibid p11 (Munitz)

[1.41] Following from what was said above, Munitz goes on to enumerate different sorts of unanswerability.

"I propose to distinguish three principle types of unanswerable questions; 1) those violating accepted rules of linguistic use, 2) those resting on false presuppositions, 3) those for which no answer is obtainable by any known rational method. "  BIB254 p34 (Munitz)

Munitz quickly isolates the mystery of existence as being of the third type of unanswerability. But this typification scheme is interesting in itself because it points out several different characteristics of the ultimate question. The ultimate question if dissected

42 Ibid p11
causes violations of linguistic use and results in silence. All questions above the level of the ultimate question may be said to rest upon false, because interchangeable mutually exclusive, presuppositions. The ultimate question is itself the foundation of reason. Thus this typology sets the upper and lower limits of the ultimate question as well as specifying its essence of non-rationality. The logical positivists protect themselves from this specter by faith in what is called the principle of verification or restated, the principle of answerability.

"The view that a question to be meaningful must be answerable in principle, was formulated as a central theory in Wittgenstein's early writings. In the Tractatus he wrote; "For an answer which cannot be expressed, the question too cannot be expressed. The riddle does not exist. If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered. BIB254 p37 (Munitz reference to Wittgenstein Tractatus 6.5)

Given this source and its elaboration by Wittgenstein's followers Munitz develops further the principle of verifiability governing assertions - a parallel principle to rule over questions.

"I propose, as a suitable designation, The principle of Answerability. This principle names the criterion to be used for determining whether a question is meaningful. The criterion is summed up by two conditions; It must be possible to specify the methods by which an answer can be found to a proposed question, and 2) given a proposed answer to a question, it should be possible to determine, in principle, whether the statement is true or false." BIB254 p40 (Munitz)

Munitz quickly shows how irrelevant this criterion is for the mystery of existence itself since its application must surely be limited to scientific questions.

"In short, a question to be called "scientific" must be answerable - which is not to say, of course, that it will be answered,. The method of empirical science offers a set of criteria for the appraisal of statements that might serve as possible answers to scientific questions. The method of science is a set of decision-procedures for the evaluation of answers proposed to scientific questions. BIB254 Ibid p41 (Munitz)
It is necessary to clearly distinguish scientific questions which must be answerable from other sorts of questions. One other type of question is that of the mystery of existence.

"Admittedly, this question is not a scientific question. Indeed it cannot be a scientific question because it is unanswerable. Despite the fact that it is unanswerable, it is not meaningless." BIB254 Ibid p42 (Munitz)

This is the crux of the matter. The ultimate question is unanswerable but not meaningless. It cannot be meaningless because it informs all other questions which are answerable with meaning.

Genuine scientific questions do not question their own origin. They protect themselves from this by their unfounded faith in principles of verification and answerability. However, such science is adrift and without foundation as if constructed in mid-air. However, when such a science turns to question its basis, it must stop the forward march of its inquiry. It then involutes and attempts to ground itself on Itself which leads to nihilistic formulations of doctrine and method. In one case, nihilism is incipient but unmanifest, while in the other the nihilism is overtly apparent. One science chatters on over nothing while the other is silent in its embrace of nothing.

Part D: QUERYING-PRESUPPOSITIONS

[1.42] Munitz rejects the traditional formulation of the Ultimate question for his watered down version? "why does the world exist?" There are three major faults with the ultimate question in his view - 1) the indeterminacy of reference of the word 'something', 2) the sense of nothing and 3) the lack of a feeling of mystery. Munitz inadvertently assumed that a
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process of substitution is appropriate with regard to the words 'something' or 'anything' in the formulation of the ultimate question. This is patently not so. Substitution of particularized objects for the generally individuated entity is not appropriate. Particularization occurs well after an entity is individuated and the term 'something' refers solely to this individuation as such. Substitution misses the point very wide of the mark by assuming that something is equivalent to any particularized object which may be substituted as if it were a variable in its place. 'Something' is not a variable but a certain stage in revelation which all particularized objects at one time stage passed through. 'Something' is anything in terms of being a stage of revelation not in terms of mathematical variability. Something is a full not an empty space saving concept. Nothing, likewise is a full concept and does not refer to 'absolutely nothing' as some sort of mathematical vacuum. Something and nothing refer to positive experiences of individuated revelation or oblivion and therefore are not indeterminate voids with merely-positive or negative mathematical abstract designations. Hence Munitz is also wrong in saying that the mystery is missing from the ultimate question. The fact is that it is so overpoweringly present in that question that it is easily missed. The jump from individuated revelation to individuated oblivion through a modicum of reason (why?) as a positive thought is no mean intellectual acrobatic and puts even the preeminent awe we have of the stars to shame.

[1.43] Because of these oversights the bulk of Munitz's work may be rejected as superficial even though it remains an excellent guide for orientation to the real mystery to which it approaches. The real high point of his treatment comes just after a sound rebuke of mysticism.

"In saying there is a distinctive mystery in the existence of the world, I do not wish this to be understood as claiming that the awareness of this mystery requires a special form of mystical insight and, therefore that it cannot be adequately conveyed in language. The mystery of existence is not something that requires an appropriate silence on our part, on the ground that we are,
supposedly, unable to say in what the mystery consists. On the contrary, it seems to me, one can state the basic character of the mystery of existence. And having done thus, we are not called upon further to exercise a special faculty or mode of cognitive awareness to gain some deeper, or more hidden, insight into that mystery. The concept of mystery, to be developed here, has no connection whatever with mysticism.

"In explicating the idea of the mystery of existence, I shall adopt the working hypothesis that this idea contains the following main elements: (1) the awareness that the world exists. (2) the asking of the question "Is there a reason-for-the-existence-of-the-world?"; (3) the reasoned conviction that the preceding question, though meaningful, has neither be satisfactorily answered by any known rational method, nor can be. This conviction amounts to the realization that the existence of the world is incomprehensible, and can not be adequately explained in any way. (4) The feelings of astonishment, awe, and perplexity that arise from, and accompany the awareness of the incomprehensibility of the world's existence. These feelings persist and cannot be removed.

"To assess the soundness of this way of analyzing the idea of the mystery of existence, it will be necessary to examine these several components, and to consider the arguments that may be raised in connection with their proper formulation. It is only in so far as the view, thus laid bare, can be defended against attack, that it can be said the idea of the mystery of existence ought to be retained and incorporated in any sound philosophy." BIB254 p12-13 (Munitz)

It is a crime that Munitz did not fulfill the intention stated in the last paragraph quoted above free from the presuppositions which led him to reject the traditional formulation of the ultimate question. If this had been accomplished then perhaps the work would have moved out of the rank of the myriad trivial efforts claiming philosophical merit. That Munitz had an inkling of what lay beyond the superficial level upon which he maintained himself is indicated by the undeveloped thoughts which lay behind the fourfold analysis of the idea of the mystery of existence in the second paragraph quoted above.

If we consider closely Munitz's four elements we see that he distinguishes between what Merleau-Ponty in a deeper analysis calls the arena of Perceptual Faith (element 1) and Interrogation (element 2). Then he postulates that the interrogation of the arena of perceptual faith is meaningful but the interrogation cannot pierce beyond this arena to find a ground of its comprehensibility. Soon we shall see that this is the structure by which metaphysics always attempts to lay its foundations. The infra-structure of APPEARANCE of the arena of
perceptual faith is used as a strata upon which to construct a superstructure, from which an interpolation into the FOUNDATIONS of the infra-structure may take its departure.

FIGURE 1.7

Inquiry may either be forgetful of its foundations or obsessed with them.

"Philosophy is not science, because science believes it can soar over its object and holds the correlation of knowledge with being as established, whereas philosophy is the set of questions wherein he who questions is himself implicated by the question. BIB269 p27 (Merleau-Ponty The Visible and the Invisible)

The Query is oriented toward the incomprehensibility of the foundations. The Inquiry into the foundations is meaningful but it is never finally fruitful. The forgetfulness of the foundations is the same as the inability of Inquiry to comprehend them. Each way the foundations are in some way unquestionable for Inquiry. Either they can not be questioned because they are forgotten or they can not be questioned in such a way as to yield an intelligible answer. So we see that the infra-structure of perceptual faith cannot be questioned by the superstructure which interrogates it. The arena of perceptual faith can put into question the super-structure from which interrogation is carried out but the reverse is definitely not true.
This brings our attention to the one way threshold of unquestionability between the infra and superstructures. Munitz draws our attention to the fact that this incomprehensibility which flows from unquestionability is the source of astonishment, awe and perplexity. The Query is therefore oriented to something beyond the distinction between infra and supra-structures. The Query has curiosity concerning the dangerous which is the source of awe, astonishment, and perplexity for it. When the Query transmogrifies into Dasein this curiosity becomes a care. The Query posits on the other side of the unquestion/answer-ability toward which it is oriented a realm of Brute Being which is the source from which the super/infra-structure chiasmically arises. This realm of Wild Being is the source of its awe, astonishment, and perplexity. The query itself sees only the unquestionable which is the demarcation between supra and infra-structure but beyond it, it posits their source.

This source, however, covers over a deeper source. In order to comprehend the deeper source beyond superficial one posited the Query must be transmogrified. It is transmogrified first into Dasein as its curiosity concerning the unquestionable becomes care in the face of the unknowable. Dasein lays upon the boundary of the Clearing in Being. As Dasein receives intimation of what lies beyond the Clearing in Being, it is transmogrified back into the Query (2) which is oriented toward the Clearing of Being which is the deeper source of awe beyond Wild Being.
FIGURE 1.8a
FIGURE 1.8b

For query, the unquestionable is a source of awe and to account for this awe it posits Wild Being. When the query undergoes transmogrification through the phase of Dasein it finds that the real source of this awe is not Wild Being but the Clearing of Being. Dasein experiences the Clearing of Being as the Novum. It is the Novum that transmogrifies Dasein back into the Query. The Clearing of Being is the external coherence of the Clearing in Being. The means by which the external coherence of the Clearing in Being is imprinted on the internal coherence of it is the Novum. When the external and internal coherences are balanced then the Clearing itself evaporates in the Pure Astonishment of White Light, which was called by the ancients *Glory*. The Novum effaces all karmic traces. The Clearing of Being is articulated into four states of Being. The four states of Being are descriptive of the essencing forth of the Clearing
of Being as Novum within the Clearing itself. Emergence is a breach within the system of correspondences erected by thought in its theoretical praxis, which denotes the de-fusion of the Novum. Philosophy functions as a reduction of the sensibilities and science as a further and more extreme reduction and constriction. This reduction is motivated precisely by anxiety and fear of the disruption of the constructed world. Emergences are a way of dealing with disruptive phenomena which threatens the safety of the artificial platform of Inquiry constructed and set over the arena of perceptual faith. The Novum is effectively the opening up of the transformational lacuna which the reductions of philosophy have as their point to keep closed. The four states of Being (Pure, Process, Hyper and Wild) are a description of the Clearing of Being based upon the essencing forth of the Novum and emergence is the reduction of this essencing forth. Therefore, an understanding of the four states of Being is necessary in order to comprehend emergence, which connotes the limits of the scientific and philosophical reductions of the sensibilities to "experience". The opening up of the transformational lacuna, is our own transmogrification.

[1.44] The internal structure of the unquestionable is the only basis for an approach to the problem of emergence. The problem of emergence by its very nature precludes scientific or "empirical" approach because one never knows where, when or how a genuine emergence will take place. One may therefore never be there before-hand ready for it to happen and watching it unfold. If on the other hand, one arrives after it has occurred it is not possible to do anything but archaeological surveys of the scene because it by its nature transforms the entire world into something other than it was in a quantum like jump. Finally, if one experiences an emergence first hand, then one's own experience has been radically transformed, and therefore only unsuitable subjective interpretations of this experience remain. Any way it is approached the
question of the nature of emergence itself is unanswerable. We are led by this problem outside the normal realms of scientific investigation to the uneasy border that metaphysics keeps with ontology. Increasingly too, the problem of emergence is haunting scientific endeavors in a myriad of underhanded ways, and setting unforeseeable limits to their effectiveness. Science is being referred to its foundations by means of the problem of emergence and many other problems of the same essential nature. Many scientists and philosophers are taking up the challenge and duly examining the foundations of science only to find themselves chasing their own tails. Emergence is not merely a philosophical problem to be left at that, but it marks the boundary between science and philosophy in a peculiarly extravagant way and to be sure no one knows what to do with it. The quest of this discourse to understand emergence in an adequate way as a valuable scientific concept even though no scientific approach to it seems to exist, must lead to the clearer definition of the border line between the questionable and the unquestionable which is the object of a certain type of interrogation which is beyond the hyper-reflective and hyper-dialectical.

What ultimately leads us to unquestionability from the problem of emergence is the state of affairs which science faces today. This state of affairs is that emergence has ceased to be epochal and by a Pandora's box effect has become an ever deepening crisis. Rather than this suggesting progress and advance, it suggests the rapid deterioration of the basic scientific and philosophical model of the Western tradition which is based on finitude and ultimately founded upon the implicit conception of God as limited. It suggests as Heidegger has so clearly pointed out that the issue is the confrontation between man and technology.

"If the essence, the coming to presence, of technology, enframing as the danger within Being, is Being itself, then technology will never allow itself to be mastered, either positively or negatively, by a human doing founded merely on itself. Technology, whose essence is Being itself, will never allow itself to be overcome by men. That would mean, after all, that man was the master of Being."
"Nevertheless, because Being, as the essence of technology, has adapted itself into enframing, and because man's coming to presence belongs to the coming to presence of Being - inasmuch as Being's coming to presence needs the coming to presence of man, in order to remain kept-safe as Being in keeping with its own coming to presence in the midst of whatever is, and thus as Being to endure as present - for this reason the coming to presence of technology cannot be led into the change of its destiny without cooperation of the coming to presence of man. Through this cooperation, however, technology will not be overcome (uber wunden) by men. On the contrary, the coming to presence of technology will be surmounted (ver wunden) in a way that restores it into its yet concealed truth. This restoring surmounting is similar to what happens when in the human realm, one gets over grief or pain. But the surmounting of a destiny of Being - here and now, the surmounting of enframing - each time comes to pass out of the arrival of another destiny, a destiny that does not allow itself either to be logically and historiographically predicted or to be metaphysically construed as a sequence belonging to the process of history." BIB452 p38-39 (Heidegger Question of Technology)

This confrontation brings our attention abruptly to ontological issues. Emergence is strictly a product of the interface in the confrontation between man and technology. The crisis of intensifying emergence leaves as unquestionable the necessity of posing the world to ourselves as questionable. Emergence only can exist within the auspices of the apparatus of inquiry. Our Query must orient us toward the danger implicit in the crisis of geometrically increasing emergence. Why do we look at the world in such a way that emergence is given sway over us and unleashed to bombard us with novelty such that a "crisis in basic concepts" can no longer be distinguished from the mere play of changements on the surface of science. Looking at it from the point of view of ontology, the most significant factor is the fragmentation of our concept of Being into different states of Being. This is brought about by the very necessity of dealing with continual emergence as a crisis situation. Emergence is a penetration into finitude of ontic determinations which cross over through the transformational gaps with which every science deals. This causes a re-balancing of the descriptive bridge over the transformational lacuna. In order to deal with this process by which the transformational lacuna open themselves up, the penetration of finitude occurs, the readjustment of the descriptive bridge grasps the changes and then maintains itself until the process repeats itself. To describe this process it has been necessary for fundamentally different conceptions of Being to be developed. Of course, we must
first ask ourselves why we wish to conceive the world as full of places which we cannot see, or know, or understand. Why transformational lacunae exist as unquestionable regions where we have decided to not know what is going on is the real question. Why do we propose the world to ourselves in this way? However, once these sources of emergence have been set out, then it is necessary to ask why our attempt to comprehend what comes from them causes our conception of Being to be fragmented. It is impossible to ask the real question and maintain ourselves within the Western philosophical tradition. We must then ask the next question concerning the fragmentation of Being. This essay will deal at length with the relation between the fragments of the concept of Being under the heading - the Clearing of Being. The Clearing of Being is the closest one may get to the real question from within the philosophical tradition starting with the fragmentation of Being as a concept. To ask the real question is to obliterate the necessity of the transformational lacunae as blinders on the sensibilities. All such attempts to do so are labeled non-scientific, occultist or, theological. However, the impetus to ask the real question enters the bloc of the scientific and philosophical tradition with greater and greater force as the crisis of increasing emergence gets worse - as man and technology become locked into their dance of death. This question destroys the possibility of science at its roots in a flash like the Novum of a bright star. The confrontation of man and technology is essentially the confrontation between finitude and what lays beyond the limit of the finitude. Technology is the "making limited" of man by himself. It is man's finitizing himself. The real question asks why man is to be conceived as finite. With the answer to this question both man and technology disappear in the essencing forth of the Clearing of Being.
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[1.45] Munitz reduces the Ultimate question to an unquestionably superficial level and thus turns away from what its depth has to offer us. That is, he turns away from the approach to the unquestionable which is allowed by the Ultimate question. Heidegger's involution of the ultimate question is another diversionary tactic. Heidegger turns us away from the entity toward the Being which is ontologically different from it. Adorno's Negative Dialectics has as its goal our reorientation toward the entity. But this reorientation is based upon having been dis-oriented in the first place. The Negative dialectics is founded upon the dialectic. It takes its departure from there. We are however interested in finding what is there before our initial disorientation. That is what is there (Da-sein) which is covered over by the unquestionable itself.

"Since the enigma, of the brute world is finally left intact by science and reflection, we are invited to interrogate that world without presupposing anything." BIB269 p156 (Merleau-Ponty The Visible and the Invisible)

To get back to what lies beyond our automatic taking-for-granted, beyond our predisposition toward the reduction of our own sensibilities, beyond the one major philosophical presupposition of our own time - namely ontological monism - it is necessary to gain a clear viewpoint. For we must realize that even presenting the possibility of a Brute, 'Wild' and interrogative Being beyond presupposition (the unquestionable) presupposes itself the existence of worked over modes of Being which are to be surpassed in our, movement back to the pure source. Thus to see beyond the unquestionable to what it covers over is to assume the covering process. What is necessary then is an act of what has been called in the introduction a primordial disclosure of truth. In such a disclosure we see clearly that Being unaware of its presuppositions, the Being of the Presuppositions themselves, the Being shown up when the presuppositions are unveiled or involuted, and the Being of the source before the arising of presuppositions, are all
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four intimately interconnected. In this essay these will be called the Four States of Being from which unfold the four essential types of transcendence and the four fundamental modalities. These states of Being will be called the plenum of Pure Being, Process Being as original horizon, Hyper Being and Wild Being respectively. We disclose their interrelation and call the fundamental de-cision, which will not allow us to re-conceal this as their cancellation. The cancellation of the States of Being is our clear viewpoint from which it is possible to understand the type of Being (Wild) which is more original than our act of reduction of our own sensibilities. Thus presuppositionlessness may only be understood in terms of the assumptions which we go beyond. Absolute presuppositionlessness is the clearing of the site of all traces. Wild Being still presupposes the going beyond of all presuppositions. To destroy even this most tenuous of assumptions is to obliterate everything. This obliteration is called the Clearing of Being.

"We see the things themselves, the world is what we see: formulae of this kind express a faith common to the natural man and the philosopher - the moment he opens his eyes; they refer to a deep-seated set of mute "opinions" implicated in our lives. But what is strange about this faith is that if we seek to articulate it into theses or statements, if we ask ourselves what is this we, what seeing is, and what thing or world is, we enter into a labyrinth of difficulties and contradictions."

BIB269 p3 (Merleau-Ponty)

Without a viewpoint such as the Clearing of Being upon presuppositionless Brute Being then our statements about it become merely another labyrinth. Our focus upon it cannot remain steady and shortly it wavers and we are lost again. Beyond the fact that the Cleaning of Being fixes Wild Being in relation to the three other states of Being it also calls our attention to the more interesting problem of the relation between the presuppositions which arise and that in relation to which they arise. Why must we work back to the source? Why did we sink into the morass of presuppositions in the first place? Why does the source look different to us than to the
first philosophers? It is obvious that Wild Being - the recoil from the dilation of Being-in-the-world - may only be seen from the vantage point which we are at within the philosophical tradition. It is totally caught up in the presuppositions and unveiling of presuppositions which has taken place in that tradition.

"The essence of enframing is that setting-upon gathered into itself which entraps the truth of its own coming to presence with oblivion." BIB452 p36 (Heidegger The Question of Technology)

The Clearing of Being may be considered a destruction of the enframing, which barters oblivion for disclosure. Through it we bring to the surface the very acts of passing over which define each state of Being. The plenum of Pure Being passes over its presuppositions in order to present things. Being as horizon passes over the things to present us the world as the store house of our presuppositions. Hyper Being passes over both things and world to present us with the oblivion of "passing over" itself. Wild Being passes over the "passing over" of presuming to attempt to return to the source. The four types of surpassing - transcendence - are founded within the plenum of Being as the icon of these four states of Being. Within modern ontology, however, these states of Being have unraveled a new icon of themselves as modalities. Be this as it may, the Clearing of Being is the refusal to pass over (and thus found surpassings or modalities). It is the refusal to trade disclosure for oblivion. It is the bringing to light of the mechanism of this barter. That we see Wild Being from our point within the Western philosophical tradition means we are lost to something else and that it is lost to us. The Clearing of Being is the Obliteration of the Enframing which allows us to see one by losing another. Wild Being re-focuses our attention upon the "things themselves" before presuppositions arise. It is the fulfillment of our call for onticists rather than ontologists. Process Being as a horizon cancels with its manifold twin Nothingness revealing the modality of Hyper Being. In the hollow between these two super
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powers the things themselves prevail - they endure and it is their life under the canopy of fire power from the camps of opposing ontologists which is the field of exploration in which Wild Being is discovered.

"What Saint Augustine said of time - that it is perfectly familiar to each, but that none of us can explain it to the others - must be said of the world. Ceaselessly, the philosopher finds himself obliged to re-inspect and redefine the most well-grounded notions, to create new ones, with new words, to designate them, to undertake a true reform of understanding - at whose term the evidence of the world, which seemed indeed to be the clearest of truths, is supported by the seemingly most sophisticated thoughts, before which the natural man now no longer recognizes where he stood. Whence the age-old humor against philosophy is re-animated, grievance brought against it that it reverses the roles of clear and obscure. The fact that the philosopher claims to speak in the very name of the naive evidence of the world, that he refrains from adding anything to it, that he limits himself to drawing but all its out all its consequences, does not excuse him; on the contrary he dispossesses (humanity) only the more completely, inviting it to think of itself as an enigma." BIB269 p334 (Merleau-Ponty The Visible and the Invisible)

To think the unquestionable and the world of things which exists before it arises is to engage actively in the deepest philosophical inquiry and that is always an entry into the realm of nihilism. The philosopher merely brings out the nihilism inherent in the position of the "natural attitude". Thus, for our four states of Being, we may substitute the terms EMPTINESS/VOID, NIHILISM, OBLIVION, AND SURREAL. The static Pure Being of the Plenum casts the shadow of dis-sociation, detachment, boredom, and indifference over everything. It is the other a side of a nihilism which creates myriad alternatives. Between the first state of Being in which things fade and the second in which too many alternatives are created is a veil of oblivion where these two states of Being are collapsed together to form a synergy in which everything is lost. As an escape from this, the 'things themselves' are focused on obsessively and compulsively and take on a surrealistic atmosphere. Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida (Adorno), and Merleau-Ponty (exploring the plenum of Pure Being, Process Being, Hyper Being, and Wild Being

43 Lack of feeling; Psychosis; Autism; Schizophrenia
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respectively), all go back to the things themselves with a vengeance and each in terms of a different state of Being.

"This is the way things are and nobody can do anything about it." BIB269 p4 (Merleau-Ponty The Visible and the Invisible)

This statement by Merleau-Ponty is quite staggering. He is literally saying that the philosopher must bring out the Emptiness or Void, Nihilism, Oblivion, Surrealism, hidden in everyday life - as Husserl would say, the life-world. To do philosophy; that is, to think deeply, leads inevitably to this and there is no escape from it. The exegesis of the Clearing of Being is a means of intensifying this process in order to attempt to find its meaning.

"It is at the same time true that the world is what we see and that, none the less, we must learn to see it - first in the sense that we must match this vision with knowledge, take possession of it, say what we and what seeing are, act therefore as if we knew nothing about it, as if here we still had everything to learn. " BIB269 p4 (Merleau-Ponty)

To do philosophy is, then, on the other hand, wonder and astonishment and a tentative exploration based upon that wonderment.

"Astonishment is the only realistic emotion."

"The way to do research is to attack the facts at the point of greatest astonishment."

BIB443 p1 (Celia Green The Decline and Fall of Science)

Thought uncovers the Mystery of Existence in mundane existence itself. It frees from things their possibility of not-Being. It takes out of everyday life its Emptiness or Void, Nihilism, Oblivion, and Surrealism and then wonders ceaselessly how everyday life can stand up to this monstrosity which thought has freed from it. Thought then attempts to explore the
everyday life, the things themselves again, to search for the secret. The atomic explosion, merely the fission of atoms, like those in everyday things. The release of the States of Being from the things themselves is like an atomic explosion. The Clearing of Being is the ultimate intensification of this. It is like the Novum of a Star. It expresses the ultimate wonderment. Thought brings with it the unbinding of Nihilism and Oblivion and the gift of wonderment. Between these two extremes in the inter-space, the measure of things are taken. Thought begins at the extremes of desperation and wonderment and works towards the things themselves which it can see only in terms of these extremes.

"It is the things themselves, from the depths of their silence, that it wishes to bring to expression. If the philosopher questions, and hence feigns ignorance of the world and of the vision of the world which are operative and take form continually within him, he does so precisely in order to make them speak, because he believes in them and expects from them all his future science." BIB269 p4 (Merleau-Ponty The Visible and the Invisible)

Thought by positing extremes of desperation and bewilderment takes away the possibility of understanding these things which it already comprehends. It must feign ignorance in order to question. However, to have a question is already to have an answer. The question is like the handle of a knife and the answer its blade which is hidden when it is sheathed.* The query gives up the difference between question and answer as superficial but focuses upon what gives unity to feigning ignorance and the disclosure that goes with it. Heidegger calls this the Enframing - the oneness of the blade and handle.

"Enframing comes to presence as the danger. But does the danger therewith announce itself as the danger? No. To be sure, men are at all times and in all places exceedingly oppressed by dangers and exigencies. But the danger, namely Being itself endangering itself in the truth of its coming to presence, remains veiled and disguised. This disguising is what is most dangerous in the danger." BIB452 p37 (Heidegger Question of Technology)

44 also known as Foundation and Appearance
The query is oriented towards Primordial Truth because it is only this truth which brings the danger of oblivion to light. Oblivion is only brought to light when the en-framing itself is exposed - where the mechanism of concealment is revealed as well as the concealed and both are brought to light. The oblivion of the unquestionable is first revealed below the apparatus of Inquiry. Then the intensification of oblivion as the most dangerous in the danger occurs when the nihilistic alternatives cancel. The intensification of oblivion is the addition of the unknown of Inquiry and unquestionable of the Query into the unknowable to which Dasein is oriented. The cancellation of the nihilistic alternatives of Hyper Being indicates the oblivion of oblivion which is the Essence of Manifestation. Wild Being is glimpsed between the generation and cancellation of the nihilistic alternatives in the hollow of that virtual space. The Clearing of Being provides the philosophical viewpoint which allows us to keep Wild Being in clear focus for we must immediately question the presuppositions which have arisen and ask why they arose once we catch a glimpse of the source beyond their arising.

"The questioning here is not a beginning of negation, a perhaps put in the place of being. It is for philosophy the only way to conform itself with the vision we have in fact to correspond with what, in that vision, provides for thought, with the paradoxes of which vision is made, the only way to adjust itself to those figured enigma, the thing and the world whose massive being and truth teem with incompassible details." BIB269 p4 (Merleau-Ponty The Visible and the Invisible)

So, finally, to deal with the Clearing of Being which has been briefly introduced we must understand the interrelationships between the different states of Being for the Clearing of Being is nothing else but that interrelationship - that cancellation. The clearest view of the States of Being comes if we begin with Wild Being as that source before presuppositions arise which is none the less dependent on presuppositions to be seen and then move from there toward the

45 See M. Henry The Essence of Manifestation
understanding of the greatest presupposition in the Western tradition, namely Ontological Monism. So the progression from Unquestionability to the view of the world arising on the hither side of the Ultimate Question which is not the question of the meaning of Being toward an exploration of ontological monism impresses itself upon us as a necessary one.

[1.46] "These remarks concerning negativity permit us already to make precise the meaning of our question before the world, for the most difficult part is to avoid mistaking what it is, what it can be, its exact or proper-meaning, what It asks."

* * *

"We are not asking ourselves if the world exists; we are asking what it is for It to exist." BIB269 p95-96 (Merleau-Ponty The Visible and the Invisible)

The Ultimate Question points toward the unquestionable - that is towards the hidden presuppositions, towards the presuppositions that will never be unearthed. It shows these up by "casting over the world the shadow of a possible non-existence." Not as a doubt or reduction to epiphenomena or dream, but by means of negation. This amounts to an attack upon our Perceptual Faith by language. Questioning through holding negation as a possibility is the method of the one trapped in a realm in which presuppositions hold sway having already arisen. Presupposition is tied to the "act of Ideation" which makes the one who presupposes a "pure spectator".* The ultimate question is an idealization of the limits of ideation and thus a picture of its source. To return to the source before the arising of unquestionability is to look deeply into the roots of ideation from the viewpoint of ideation itself. Our question before the world is what it is for it to exist. Our question is then posed as to what there was before the world - before the unquestionability before presupposition arose. We ask for the condition of the arising of ideation which necessarily projects as its grounds presupposition. We are already in the world and this is

40 p95 Merleau-Ponty The Visible and the Invisible BIB269
the source of our perceptual faith. To ask what it is for the world - the mirage, the oneness of the
seen - to exist is to ask about the source of its arising as ideation which projects as
unquestionable presuppositions. The major presupposition is Ontological Monism which will be
dealt with in the next section. Ontological Monism is the answer given to the real question
within the philosophical tradition. Transformational lacunae as the places we decide not to be
able to know are our reductions of our sensibilities. Ontological Monism is the justification for
their existence. We presuppose that transcendence must ground itself and this self-grounding
implies the transformational lacunae as abyss over which the bridge of self-grounding is built.

This abyss must be created by the application of negation to the realm of our perceptual faith.

"We are not asking ourselves if the world exists; we are asking what it is for it to exist. But even
thus transformed, the question is not yet radical. For one can understand it still in a surface sense
that hides its true mainspring. When we ask what it is for the things and for the world to exist, one
might think that it is only a matter of defining a word. After all, the questions take place in
language. Even if it seems to us that an-affirmative thought can detach itself from words and rest
on its internal adequation, negation and especially interrogation, which do not express any
property intrinsic to the things, can be sustained only by the apparatus of language. One can
therefore be tempted to count the philosophical question concerning the world among the facts of
language, and it would seem that the response can be sought only in the meanings of words, since
it is in words that the question will be answered. But our previous reflections have already taught
us that this would be to evade it: the question concerning the meaning of the world's being is so
little solvable by a definition of words - which would be drawn from the study of language, its
posters, ; and the effective conditions for its functioning - that on the contrary it reappears within
the study of language, which is but a particular form of it. One can reduce philosophy to a
linguistic analysis only by supposing that language has its evidence within itself, that the
signification of the word "world" or "thing" presents in principle no difficulty, that the rules for the
legitimate use of the word can be clearly read in a univocal signification. But the linguists teach us
that this is precisely not the case, that the univocal signification is but one part of the signification
of the word, that beyond it there is always a halo of signification that manifests itself in new and
unexpected modes of use, that there is an operation of language upon language which even
without other incitements, would launch language back into a new history, and makes of the word-
meaning itself an enigma. Far from harboring the secret of the being of the world, language is
itself a world, itself a being - a world and a being to the second power, since it does not speak in a
vacuum, since it speaks of being and of the world and therefore redoubles their enigma instead of
dissipating it. The philosophical interrogation concerning the world therefore does not consist in
referring from the world itself to what we say of the world, since it is reiterated within language.
To philosophize is not to cast the things into doubt in the name of words, as if the universe of
things said were clearer than that of the brute things, as if the effective world 'were a canton of
language, perception a confused and mutilated speech, the signification of words a perfectly
reassuring sphere of positivity. But this observation does not. only argue against a positivism of
language: it affects every attempt to seek the source of meaning in pure significations, even when
no mention is made of language." BIB269 p96-97 (Merleau-Ponty The Visible and the Invisible)
The Ultimate Question specifies the abyss between language and the arena of perceptual faith - between the world and being to the second power and their first power. That which is unquestionable is that relation between the world and being in which we have perceptual faith and its intensification and reductive over-determination in language. From out of language our negation of the thing which allows the Interrogation of grounds arises. The question whose object is Wild Being is strictly impossible because it attempts to open up the abyss of the unquestionable between language and the arena of perceptual faith and see beyond it their synoptic and chiasmic interpenetration. That is it attempts to see how each can be what it is yet still be interconnected to the other intimately and reversible with it, so it has access to its oneness with the other from within itself. Language is seen as an over-determined superstructure laid over the realm of perceptual faith which intensifies it and acts back upon it to mold it. The interrogation of Wild Being seeks to see the source from which both supra-structure and infra-structure arise and differentiate themselves out before their reification and the accretion of distortions.

The philosophical interrogation about the world cannot consist, for example, in casting into doubt the world in itself or the things in themselves for the profit of an order of “human phenomena,” that is, of the coherent system of appearances such as we men can construct it, in the factual conditions that are ours, according to our psychophysical constitution and the types of connections that make the relation to an "object" possible for us. Whether this construction of the object be understood in terms of the method of the sciences and by the means of algorithm, or whether one confronts the constructa with the concrete because science after all wishes to be a scientia intuitiva, an understanding of the world itself, or whether finally one envisages more generally rendering explicit the acts and attitudes of all kinds— emotional, practical, axiological— by which a consciousness refers itself to objects or quasi-objects. refers them to one another, and effects the transition from one attitude to another—in all cases the question posed is not yet radical, ultimate. For over against the things and the world, which are obscure, one gives oneself the field of operatons of consciusness and of the constructed signications whose terminal product one supposes the world and things to be - and befors this field as before the field of language (which in fact it presupposes), the philosopher . must ask himself if it is closed, if it suffices to itself, if as an artefact, it docs not open upon an original perspective of natural being, if, even supposing it decisive in what concerns the being-verified, the being-averred, the being
converted into an object, it does not have a horizon of brute being and of brute mind, from which the constructed objects and the significations emerge and watch they do not account for." BIB269 p97 (Merleau-Ponty The Visible and the Invisible)

Merleau-Ponty points out to us two artificial realms which act as super-structures laid over the infra-structure of perceptual faith. Language is one of these. The other is the field of operations of consciousness and constructed significations. These two may be designated as Logos and Legein respectively.

FIGURE 1.9

Unquestionability is the interstice that separates each of these artificial overlays from the arena of perceptual faith. The arena of perceptual faith is what has been excluded from the artificial superstructure. The reification by exclusion and inclusion covers over the source of the super and infrastructures. This source is Brute or Wild Being. We have expressed this supra/infra structure in terms of the difference between the apparatus of Inquiry and the Query. The Query is precisely that which is covered over by the artificial apparatus of Inquiry. The Query is however oriented toward the boundary of unquestionability which excludes it from the apparatus of
Inquiry. What makes faith the necessary counterpart of reason or unquestionability the obverse of Inquiry? It is one thing to posit the unquestioned as the realm into which inquiry has not yet penetrated. But why must it also posit the unquestionable? The Query is that which is oriented toward the danger of perceptual faith. Inquiry is a synthesis of the two super-structures that Merleau-Ponty posits (i.e. language and consciousness). Inquiry is an interrogation as an operation of consciousness of constructed significations using negation to dismantle the questions in order to find their implicit answer. The Query, the deep feeling that something is wrong with a perceptual faith as the underside of a ruthless interrogation and doubt. The query is oriented to the unquestionability itself and does not aspire to the realm of Wild Being from out of which both faith and doubt arise as opposites which they do not account for. Thus the precision of the artificial superstructures whose synthesis is inquiry is balanced by the obscurity of arena of perceptual faith. The Query finds reification of precision and obscurity strange and finds in this an indication that we are oblivious to something. The Query focuses in on the unquestionability which mediates the reification making reason unquestionable to faith and vice versa. Merleau-Ponty goes beyond this to posit the realm of Brute or Savage or Wild Being beyond the Unquestionability. In order to understand the state of Savage Being it is necessary to work our way through the artificial superstructure and comprehend it. It is impossible to go immediately to it because it may only be seen in terms of the presuppositions which must be denied in order to reach it. Thus more interesting to us is the abyss of unquestionability which lies between supra and infra structure and the veil of unknowability which separates these from the source of Wild Being.
Knowledge of the source is impossible without knowing what it is the source of. Then one may glimpse it as it were in the unarticulated aspects of the dialectical relation between superstructure and infrastructure. To know the source is to know what binds it to that which it is the source of. That which binds Wild Being to the other fragments of the concept of Being is the Clearing of Being. In order to explore Wild Being it is then necessary to catch a glimpse of the
necessity of the Clearing of Being. In order to go beyond what is unquestionable to the
superstructure of Inquiry one must go into it and discover the unknowable in it and in order to go
beyond the unknowable to the source of Wild Being one must go into it to discover there the
Clearing of Being. The Query transforms into Dasein, which transforms again into the Query.
They are oriented toward the unquestionable, unknowable and the Clearing of Being,
respectively. So in order to explore the transformational lacunae the explorer must be himself
transformed. The Clearing of Being is the source of all the transformational lacunae. It is the
source of all sources like that of Wild Being, since it binds the sources to what they are the
source of. The Novum is the herald of the transformation of the Explorer of the transformational
lacunae.

“Thus is specified the sense of our astonishment in face of the perceived world. BIB269 p98
(Merleau-Ponty The Visible and Invisible)

Our astonishment is our own transformation as we experience what lies beyond the
transformational lacunae. The only way for experience what lies there is by the transformation of
our experience. Wild Being is a reconstruction of pre-transformation experience based upon the
possibility of transformation. The transformation of experience destroys all artificial super-
structures based upon pre-transformational experience. It also destroys our perceptual faith. The
transformation of experience is precisely the altering of in that which we have unquestionable
faith. Deep thought harbors the possibility of destroying the experience in which we have
perceptual faith and transforming it. These two movements are the same. However, to see them
as the same we must cease to be subjects who think we think and instead orient ourselves toward
the oblivion from which the thoughts come. We must begin to take the stance of the Query.
Inquiry takes perceptual faith as a starting point and this creates the opposites of the destruction
of perceptual faith and its wondrous transformation. Through the destruction of and
bewilderment at the arena of perceptual faith, thoughtful inquiry confronts its own
groundlessness. The Query is oriented toward what inquiry makes unquestionable. The Query is
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a stance toward the difference between thought and its grounds - between the starting point and what follows from it.

"Wonder is central to philosophy, not only as a starting point but also as a principle and a foundation from which everything else proceeds. BIB277 p9 (VerHoeven The Philosophy of Wonder)

[1.47] Those who take the stance of the query must be rigorously distinguished from those who cling to subjectivity and make the starting point for their inquiries and the end as well - inquiry itself. Specifically we might consider the work of E. Coreth and his student M. Clark as an example. The former summarizes his Metaphysics in the following way:

"At the beginning of metaphysics comes the question about its starting point. This question cannot be avoided. The starting point determines the further development and contains the whole system in germ. If we select the correct starting point, we shall be able to bring our task to completion. That is why the correctness of the starting point can be fully shown only at the end. Here, however, the question about the starting point can only be a question about that which comes undeniably first, which presupposes nothing else, which validates itself in its possibility and its necessity, thus providing a firm basis for further reflection. Hence our first task is to discover the starting point and to derive from it the method for all further inquiry. Now, the starting point is the question about the starting point, which turns into the question about the question, thus leading into further inquiry. This inquiry shows that the condition of the question is being. For every question is a question about being, which we always already know, yet must always further inquire about, without ever being able to grasp it in fully comprehensive knowledge. BIB275 p45 (Coreth Metaphysics)

For this study meta-inquiry is not necessary nor revered as a method. Coreth says "the question about the starting point"... 'turns into the question about the question." This is the infinite regress "thus leading to further inquiry" which we want to avoid. To avoid the infinite regress everything here must be turned upside down.

"To introduce someone to philosophy is not to show him a stretch of the road and then to indicate expansively how the road continues. It means halting where this exploratory path begins and where all others begin? it means practicing philosophy at the place where philosophy begins and ends the whole history of philosophy lies in a broad circle about the loose space of wonder, even when this wonder is regarded only as a starting point. What can not be approached from there is not philosophy, however important it may be.
"Everything attainable from that point is philosophy and is mutually connected. Via this central point all philosophical themes are interrelated. The choice of theme is thus of little importance in philosophy. Whatever does not deal with everything, taking wonder as its starting point, deals with nothing from the philosophical point of view. An introduction could begin just as well with the cogito of Descartes as well as with the ideas of Plato. It just so happens that from the historical standpoint Plato has priority. This is our thesis: philosophy is a radicalization of wonder in all directions. But radicalization is a slow process and we are necessarily obliged to work over the same ground over and over again. " BIB277 p10-11 (Verhoven The Philosophy of Wonder)

These two views of the importance and non-importance of the starting point are mutually compensatory. The first is from the point of view of inquiry and the second the query. They will soon be called Transcendence and Sameness. The first is right in saying that the starting point contains the whole system and its development in germ. But it forgets to refer beyond the starting point itself to whatever else there might be. So the second is right in saying that with reference to discovering whatever else might be beyond the system, of the starting point any starting point will do because all ultimately open out upon everything else there is. In this study the intention is to grasp the down to earth bedrock which underlies this distinction between importance and non-importance of the starting point. Our Icon of the starting point has up to now been the Ultimate Question. It has been found that the ultimate question and its kernel of related questions must be distinguished from all else by their unanswerability. The fissure between the starting point and all else has been explored in terms of the Query's interaction and Merleau-Ponty's Wild Being has been located beyond the unquestionable. But what all this points to is the fact that there is a graspable bedrock surface* which is the physiognomy of the Knot of Paradoxicality, the boundary of the Clearing in Being, which lies between the noticeable and unnoticeable, between, the starting point whatever it is and all else. Coreth's philosophy is of the sort which has been shown to be caught in involution. In his meta-questioning he turns the starting point back on itself to serve as its own ground.

[1.48] It is because of this involution that Coreth can find being as the condition of the question. A concept analyzed out of the abstract description of the starting point is used as a
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ground for the starting point as a whole. The concrete fact that there is a starting point is lost in frantic, nihilating throws of abstraction.

"We have shown that the condition of all inquiry or questioning is the horizon of being, as unconditioned and unlimited. But with the universal and empty horizon of being we do not know as yet what kind of beings are to be found in the totality of being. The pure knowledge of being does not give us any specific knowledge about being, it does not tell us what is and how it is. However, our starting point was not pure being, but the question. The act of questioning already presupposes a difference, the difference between knowing and not-knowing. We can ask questions only if our knowledge anticipates some answers, yet we can ask questions only if our knowledge is still incomplete. It is a condition of the possibility of questioning that we should know about being and also that we should not know about it. "BIB275 p69 (Coreth)

It can easily be seen by these two summaries that what Coreth calls questioning is merely a restatement of the Ultimate Question all over again in a different way. Whereas, what has been called query above is the relation between the starting point and all-else between the supra-structure and perceptual faith, whatever that starting point is.

[1.49] Coreth's student is more to the point in considering questioning as an exercise like practical reason.*

"perhaps we feel no need to ask what justification there is for inquiry in general, But if we do recognize any such need, then we discover that inquiry is self-justifying. The more I put it into question, the more I bring the theme of my inquiry to light in my performance of inquiry." BIB276 p.vii (Clarke, M. Perplexity and Knowledge)

Coreth does not ask for the justification of inquiry in general but accepts it as a justification and a starting point. Clark is interested in it as a preference and asks for its starting point to discover it to be self-justifying. That is, as a performance inquiry can only inquire further. It just happens and is justified by its ever recurrent happening.

"To collect the conclusions of the historical chapters, the suggestion is that such self-questioning is self-validating. Whereas, any particular fact or particular meaning is 'shaken' when put in question, the fact and meaning of my own performance of questioning are thereby affirmed and renewed. Whatever challenge I can pose is an implicit validation of what is explicitly challenged. From the most articulate scepticism to the most amorphous anxiety or malaise, I reaffirm the situation of
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knowledge-in-ignorance I have as a questioner. All I am suggesting is that we like as questioners, that our questions in some way turn on themselves, and that any manner we have of challenging this implicitly affirms it." BIB276 p177-178 (Clark)

This pragmatic approach\(^47\) to questioning is contrasted to Clark's mentors views forcefully in the following:

"The Cartesian image of finding an unshakable rock on which to build one's philosophy is singularly inappropriate. No indubitable beginning is proposed, exempt from the challenge of repeated questioning. Rather, if the method is to yield any results, these must appear through a shaking of the foundations." BIB 276 Ibid p181 (Clarke)

Coreth would make questioning the unshakable rock whereas Clark would continuously shake whatever was built. This continuous shaking of whatever is built, Clarke calls the performance of questioning. The picture this leaves us is of a city at siege from the outside continual bombardment of its foundations while on the inside continual rebuilding. The key to the performance concept of questioning is self-questioning self-mediation.

"Strawson is right in insisting that any conclusions of a transcendental method remain open to challenge. But the suggestion (here)... is that the structure of the performance of questioning, precisely in remaining open to challenge, are thereby reaffirmed rather than displaced. It is in the act of challenge that I pass from the particularity of my question of fact or meaning to the inescapability of the structure of challenge. Questioning is neither an immediate datum nor a fact mediated by something outside itself. It is 'self mediating'... Perhaps, though, we can 'postulate' such exemptions as the 'overlooked possibility' which reduces even a questioning beginning to the status of a hypothesis... But even in challenging my present notion, the 'alternatives' must in some way appear within my experience so far as it is open to challenge, i.e. self-questioning. I may talk of a non-questioning state where reality is intuited as it finally is, but I remain a questioner who is so talking." Ibid BIB276 p179-180 (Clarke)

We see then that Clarke is taking the opposite tact to that of his teacher. For him questioning is going beyond the starting point and leaving it unquestioned. Then in this transcendence of the starting point, Clarke looks for a structure in the transcendence itself. Self-mediation is what he names this structure because the transcendence passes between the

\(^47\) Ibid Clarke p183
immediate and the mediate. It passes from the starting point to something other and is the mediator between these itself. Questioning is therefore identified with transcendence and the structure of mediation. The passage from the starting point outward is made the center of attention.

"The proposal in this book is that we take the sheer fact of questioning, the very situation of perplexity in which we find ourselves, as the starting point for in transcendental analysis. On the one hand, this beginning is factual. I cannot explain why I need to question in order to know. If I could, I should cease to be a questioner. There is a 'brute ultimacy' about my situation of perplexity. On the other hand, we have here a fact of a rather remarkable nature. Like all others, it is open to questioning. Yet the fast 'in question' is self-renewing or self-justifying. The more thoroughly I question it the more I reveal what is inescapable in my questioning, or what it is to be a questioner." BIB276 p6 (Clarke)

When questioning has been reified into a fact it may be questioned itself but this only re-emphasizes the transcendental nature of questioning qua performance. The outward passage has a brute ultimacy in the sense one such passage continually calls for more. Thus if Coreth's unending regression of the starting point toward itself is matched by Clarke's infinitely repeating outward passage.

[1.50] In the end we find that here we are repeating the distinction made earlier between the two sorts of nihilating options: one involuted upon itself and the other unquestioning as to its own foundation, caught up in transcendence. Our conception of query must be slipped into a hidden repose beneath the level on which these possibilities arise. This form of interrogation is not caught up in unquestioning transcendence nor merciless involution but clings to the boundary between the unquestioned and the questioned, the unanswerable and the answerable, or synoptically the unnoticeable and the noticeable. Clinging there it seeks no more than to grasp the bedrock\textsuperscript{48} that is exposed.

\textsuperscript{48} See Sallis \textit{Being and Logos} BIB278 p27
"An introduction to philosophy is an introduction to the wonder that makes philosophy move. Without this movement, philosophy is merely an institution with which we become acquainted from the outside as curious tourists or, taking an inside view, as mere office clerks. An introduction to philosophy is not the transmission of knowledge that will make a man a philosopher, for philosophy is not the fruit of the possession of any particular knowledge. It is not founded on knowledge, nor has it knowledge as its goal. Rather it is an obstinate ignorance, as in Socrates - the art of avoiding institutionalized and certain knowledge. Knowledge leads to science, not to philosophy. Science has a firm grasp of reality which it uses as its tool. In this operation, as endorsed by the data of reality, scientific knowledge is verifiable. It can be expanded by hypotheses and experiments. BIB277 p11 (Verhoven The Philosophy of Wonder)

This analogy fits well Coreth's philosophy which resembles a Kafkaesque bureaucracy which only passes papers around within itself and nothing further. At one point, this currency is taken as the justification of the bureaucracy itself. Clark's philosophical position is one more in tune with that of science pictured above wherein he looks for transcendental structures whereby all scientific questioning is carried out. Our conception of query lies between as "an obstinate ignorance", such as that of Socrates. The Query grasps the bedrock by means of crystallizations (signs). Note that between questioning and questioning questioning, Socrates attempts to find a bedrock.

"Socrates explicitly presents his practice as origins giving in a response to a sign given through the Delphi Oracle. At the simplest level, this means that the already established mythical tradition supplies a context for Socrates' presentation of his particular practice and its motivation. But it also means something more fundamental. Socrates, is (?) one who is engaged in unlimited questioning, is compelled to carry this questioning so far that finally he must question questioning itself, must ask "What about the what?" "Why the Why?" And even if he should resist this radicalization of his questioning, it is forced upon him when the men of Athens bring him to trial precisely because of what his incessant questioning has provoked. What is crucial is that Socrates "answers" the second-order question, the question about questioning, by explicitly attaching his practice to a mythos, that is, to a basis that is not immediately dissolved by the reiterated recoil of questioning upon itself. BIB278 p27 (Sallis Being and Logos)

[1.51] The Query and Dasein are of different characters. Dasein finds itself thrown and has the essential nature of care which attempts to de-throw itself through the structure of its existentials before reaching the threshold of Death. The Query awakes to danger and has the essential nature of curiosity which allows the danger to crystallize which leads to astonishment.
The essential structure of the interval between Dasein's awakening to its thrownness (befindlichkeit) until it crosses the threshold of death comes from the Query. This structure will be called in this essay the Merleau-Ponty apparatus. The query substitutes the apparatus of its interrogation of Brute Being for the apparatus of inquiry which Dasein is caught up in as a component but which flows from subjectivity. Merleau-Ponty describes the apparatus of interrogation on pages 98-104 of *The Visible and Invisible*[^49]. Schematically, it may be set cut as follows.

![Figure 1.11](image-url)

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[^49]: BIB269
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The dangerous becomes noticeable but is still ambiguous. It crystallizes and that crystallization indicates an inner limit and an openness. At the point of measurement, the crystallization hardens and reifies itself and then explodes into Astonishment and awe, becoming again indiscernible. Upon this fundamental structure of Wild Being is founded what will be known as Dialectics, Negative Dialectics, and Anti-Dialectics. Dialectics is the structuralization of the crystallization. Negative Dialectics is the measurement of the non-conceptual flotsam and jetsam within the conceptual structure created by Dialectics and Anti-Dialectics is the explosion of the structure in the identification of it with its concomitant groundlessness. Wild Being shows up in the transversal measure between openness and inner limit which flows from the primary measure of the interval from first noticeability to the indiscernibility of astonishment. In order to fully explicate the Merleau-Ponty apparatus a long route through the super structure of presumptions lies before this discourse. Just like in relativity theory one must begin from the classical physics in order to generate the paradoxes, which are necessary for its logical proof. Otherwise, one must call it Absolutist Theory for in effect it does away with relativity. It only appears relativistic in the transition from Newtonian physics. So here we must work through the super-structure, which has been levied over Wild Being in order to understand it further. We approach it both from the point of view of the Clearing-of-Being which bonds Wild Being to these three other states of Being\textsuperscript{50}.

\textsuperscript{50} Pure, Process and Hyper Being.
Coda: These working papers for the dissertation The Structure of Theoretical Systems in Relation to Emergence (LSE U. London 1982) have been scanned from a photocopy of a typed copy and then corrected per the original hand written manuscript, and then minimally revised when the typescript or the manuscript were in error, or when they could be clarified by more recent wording usages. For instance, Plenum Being is called more recently Pure Being; or ‘Savage’ and ‘Brute’ Being is now just called Wild Being. The ideas in this particular part have pretty well stood the test of time. The most recent Dissertation on Emergent Design also talks about the Axiomatic Platform. It is now however believed that there are five instead of four kinds of Being with the addition of Ultra Being. Also the concept of the Clearing of Being as the complete cancellation of the Clearing in Being has been played down more recently. However, I notice that Heidegger in Contributions had a similar idea and used Clearing in a similar way sometimes. Instead of only having Dasein and the Query each kind of Being has its own form of subjectivized reification. Query is reserved for Hyper Being in current Studies and Wild Being more recently also has the Enigma. Ultra Being is added as the difference between Emptiness and Void at the level of Existence. Both Emptiness and Void are used interchangeably in the manuscript. The chiasm between them is substituted back into this text. This whole section is merely introductory to the rest of the studies starting from ontological questions that come up in reflexive Sociology.