Work Package 12: Trust and attitudes to justice “abroad”
Task 12.3: Testing the legitimacy model on “new-crimes” and addressing supra-national trust and institutional legitimacy
Deliverable 12.3: Trust in justice “abroad” and the role of legitimacy in “new-crimes”
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the heart of Work Package 12 is a seven-country survey designed to extend procedural justice theory in two new directions. The first is to address the role of legitimacy in the context of new form of crimes, like illegal downloading. The second is to consider people’s perceptions of the legitimacy of justice institutions in European jurisdictions other than their own. Reporting some preliminary findings from the survey, this deliverable (12.3) is organised into five sections:

1. The introduction;
2. Extending procedural justice theory;
3. Method;
4. Preliminary findings;
5. Summary and next steps.
1. INTRODUCTION

In this deliverable we present top-line findings from a 7-country survey conducted in Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Turkey and the United Kingdom. In D12.1 we motivated the overarching theoretical goals of Work Package 12, as well as key concepts and measures. Full details of the Fiducia survey can be found in D12.1. Given that the survey was based on nationally representative samples, one can estimate at the population level a range of different attitudes, behaviours and experiences regarding crime and criminal justice, including contact with the police, trust in the police, police and legal legitimacy, compliance behaviour, willingness to cooperate with legal authorities, attitudes towards the law, citizenship and cyber-crime. One could also estimate group differences at the population level (e.g. one could assess whether there are gender differences in compliance behaviour).

However, our objective in this deliverable is not to present population estimates and assess cross-national differences in attitudes, behaviours and experiences. We instead focus on two of the key theoretical goals of the survey. The first is to assess whether procedural justice theory pertains to downloading music, TV shows or films from internet sites that may be illegal, buying alcohol, cigarettes or other goods that have been brought into the country without taxes being paid, and employing somebody who does not have the right to work in the country (e.g. as a plumber or nanny). The second is to investigate the extent to which norms-based justice policies might apply across as well as within national boundaries. With increasing international social mobility, more and more people are finding themselves asked to cooperate and comply with criminal justice systems and actors outside the country in which they normally reside. Are procedural justice, trust and legitimacy important here too, or do people on holiday, or working in a country for a short period place more emphasis on instrumental factors?

The deliverable is structured as follows. After a brief overview of the theoretical motivation of the current study, we outline the survey design and analytical strategy, before presenting some preliminary findings. Concluding words provide a summary of the results and highlight some ways forward in terms of analysis of the current data.
2. DEVELOPING PROCEDURAL JUSTICE THEORY

Our goal is to make two extensions to procedural justice theory. The first involves testing the theory using so-called ‘new crimes’, while the second involves an assessment of people’s perceptions of the legitimacy of the police in another European country. A full outline of the theoretical motivation of these two extensions can be found in D12.1; for now we give only a brief overview of theory.

According to procedural justice theory, people place great importance on the justice or fairness of the behaviour of authority figures (Tyler, 2006a, 2006b; Justice & Meares, 2014). People are less interested in the effectiveness of the authority, or in the outcomes it provides, than in the processes by which it makes decisions and in the motivations behind its actions. What looms most prominently in people’s minds is the fairness of the processes by which power holders wield their power. This is a relational account based on identity; when officers treat people with respect and dignity, utilise neutral and fair decision-making processes, and allow them a voice in the interaction, those officers communicate messages of status and worth to the individual concerned (that the individuals concerned are valued and respected members of the social group the police represent).

Procedural justice also demonstrates to citizens that the legal authority acts according to people’s values about how authority should be wielded. When police officers act in a procedurally fair ways, people in a given political community are more likely to regard their power to be justified in some normative sense, and as such they will be more likely to recognise and defer to their authority (Geller et al., 2014; Tyler et al., 2014; Trinkner & Cohn, 2014; see also Baker et al., 2015). This is a psychological account of legitimacy: legitimacy exists when people believe (a) that the police wield their power in appropriate ways (Jackson et al., 2015; Bradford et al., 2014; Hough et al., 2013) and (b) that they have a positive moral duty to allow the police to dictate appropriate behaviour (Murphy, Tyler & Curtis, 2009; Papachristos, Meares & Fagan, 2012; Mazerolle, Bennett, Antrobus & Tyler, 2013). Importantly, studies have found a number of downstream effects of legitimacy, including offending behavior (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Tyler, 2006a; Fagan & Piquero, 2007; Cohn et al., 2012; Jackson et al., 2012a; Trinkner & Cohn, 2014; Tyler & Jackson, 2014; Jackson, 2015; Brunton-Smith & McCarthy, 2015)
and willingness to cooperate with the police (Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler et al., 2010; Huq et al., 2011a, 2011b; Jackson et al., 2012b; Dirikx & van den Bulck, 2014).

This research has important implications for crime-control (Tyler, 2009). In the current policy climate answers to the question ‘how can legal authorities encourage compliance?’ often revolve around the idea that crime occurs when the criminal justice system provides insufficient likelihood of punishment, or when insufficiently tough sentences are imposed. To deter people from committing offences, police and other criminal justice agents need to signal effectiveness, force, a high probability of detection, and a swift recourse to justice. Mechanisms of coercive social control and credible risks of sanction seek to persuade homo economicus that – while otherwise desirable – a criminal act is not worth the risk.

Yet, the work of Tyler and colleagues points to the value of a different model of policing (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Justice & Meares, 2014). The role of legitimacy in shaping a commitment to be law-abiding – and the mixed research evidence for the role of deterrence (see inter alia: Fagan, 2006; Nagin & Pepper, 2012; Nagin, 2013) – suggests that criminal justice institutions should try to shift the balance away from adversarial, ‘crime-control’ models of policing towards more consensual, ‘due-process’ models (Tyler, 2003, 2004, 2011a; Schulhofer et al., 2011; Hough, 2013; Geller et al., 2014). People (usually) obey the law and cooperate with the police and criminal courts because they think it is the right thing to do, or because they have simply acquired the habit of doing so. The fact that most people obey most laws, most of the time, suggests that criminal justice policy makers might profitably spend more time than is currently the case thinking about sources of voluntary compliance and cooperation, rather than triggers for offending and what should be done after an offence has occurred (important as these latter two aspects of policing continue to be).

Prior studies have focused on so-called ‘everyday crimes’ like buying stolen goods and committing traffic offences. The first extension to procedural justice theory is to see if legitimacy predicts three new types of crime: namely, downloading music, TV shows or films from internet sites that may be illegal; buying alcohol, cigarettes or other goods that have been brought into the country without taxes being paid; and employing somebody who does not have the right to work in the country (e.g. as a plumber or nanny).
Extant studies have also focused exclusively on people’s perceptions of the legitimacy of legal authorities in the country in which they reside. The second extension to procedural justice theory is to assess whether people feel a moral duty to obey the police when they are in a foreign country. Our methodological strategy involves first asking respondents whether they have visited a different European country recently and if they have, then secondly to imagine that they are driving through that country on holiday and are stopped by the police and asked for identification. We measure people’s expectations about how fairly they would be treated and whether the outcome of the encounter would be positive. We then link these expectations – as well as people’s felt duty to obey the police in their own country – to their felt duty to obey the police in this hypothetical encounter. We thus see whether legitimacy ‘travels’ (in the sense that felt duty to obey one’s own police is related to felt duty to obey another country’s police) and whether procedure or outcome is most important.

3. METHOD

The short version of the questionnaire (see D12.1) was fielded in each of the 7 countries (in the UK survey the ‘legitimacy abroad’ set of questions was dropped). Because of budget constraints, there was considerable variation in the survey design. Sample sizes ranged from just above 700 to just over 1,000; response rates ranged from 6.3% to 70.6%; face-to-face interviewing was conducted in some countries while in other countries telephone was the mode of interview; and multiple sampling strategies were employed (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sampling strategy</th>
<th>Mode of interview</th>
<th>Response rate</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
<th>Short or long version?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Two-stage stratified random sampling</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
<td>1,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Random location</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>705</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Due to delays in fieldwork, data were received very close to the end of the project, meaning that the final analysis will follow this deliverable. For the preliminary findings we report in Section 4 we fit count and linear regression models in each of the countries separately. Tests of procedural justice theory typically use path analysis or structural equation modelling, given certain mediational layers that are posited by the framework. We leave this for future work; for now we present some initial results.

### 4. RESULTS

#### Compliance with the law

*Two measures of offending behaviour*
The Fiducia 7-country survey contained two sets of items relating to respondent’s self-reported offending. The first set comprised five questions whether they had engaged in any of the following illegal behaviours in the last 5 years:

- Downloaded music, TV shows, films and other files from internet sites that may be illegal?
- Stolen a DVD or other media format containing music, TV shows or films from a shop?
- Bought something you thought might be stolen?
- Bought alcohol, cigarettes or other goods that you know have been brought into [country] without taxes being paid?
- Employed somebody who you know does not have the right to work in [country], for example as a plumber or nanny.

Response categories to these questions were: never; once; twice; three or four times; or five times or more. Two measures of self-reported offending were generated from these measures. To create a measure of new crime offending, responses to the first, fourth and fifth items were summed, with scores on the new variable ranging from zero (did not report any offending behaviour) to a possible 12. Scores on this new variable were highly skewed – most respondents in all countries did not report any offending behaviour – a fact that was taken into account in the regression modeling described below. Similarly, a measure of old crime offending was created by summing responses to the second and third items to generate a new variable with scores ranging from zero (did not report any thefts or purchase of stolen goods) to a possible eight; responses on this variable were again very skewed. Analyses of this measure will allow comparison of the predictors of new crimes versus more ‘traditional’ types of offending.

The second set of items assessed respondent’s self-reported propensity to offend in the future. In each country three items asked ‘If the opportunity arose, how likely is it that you would’:

- Buy something you thought might be stolen?
- Buy alcohol, cigarettes or other goods that have been brought into the UK without taxes being paid?
• Employ somebody who does not have the right to work in [country], if for example you were looking to employ someone as a plumber or a nanny.

Response categories ranged from ‘not at all likely’ to ‘very likely’. Answers to these questions tended to be highly correlated with each other, so an overall measure was again created for each country to represent respondent’s self-assessed propensity to offend in the future (a simple sum score of the three items – this was again heavily skewed as most respondent’s replied ‘not at all likely’ to all three items).

**Police legitimacy as a predictor of offending behaviour**

Recall that a dual-component notion of legitimacy informed the design of the Fiducia surveys (for discussion, see Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Tyler & Jackson, 2013; Jackson & Gau, 2015). A series of survey items intended to tap into, first, respondent’s sense of normative alignment with police – the extent to which they believed that police act according to people's values about how authority should be wielded. Normative alignment reflects a normative justification to power and enhances a broader sense of shared goals, purposes and interests. Second, items tapped into respondent’s sense that they had a moral duty to obey the instructions of police officers. The items used to measure these two components of legitimacy are shown in the Appendix Table; factor analysis was used to generate measures of each component, with each country treated separately from each other.

**Other predictors of offending behaviour**

Many factors other than legitimacy are likely to predict the propensity of people to commit – or refrain from committing – crimes. In the Fiducia survey we concentrated on two in particular: respondents’ moral judgements about crime; and the risk of sanction they envisaged would be applicable if they were to commit a crime. Perceived risk of sanction therefore represents an instrumental orientation to the commission of crime and its prevention – on this account, people commit crimes when they think the risk of getting caught is low, and the way for authorities to prevent crime is to demonstrate a credible risk of sanction to potential offenders. By contrast personal morality and legitimacy represent normative accounts of offending and prevention –
people refrain from committing crime because they believe it is wrong to engage in acts prescribed by law and/or because they have internalized the value that it is right to follow the instructions of legitimate authorities.

To measure moral judgements about crime respondents were asked ‘how wrong’ they thought each of the same five acts included in the measure of self-report offending, above; and how likely they thought it was that they would be caught if they engaged in the same five acts. Factor analysis was again used to create measures of personal morality (in relation to crime) and perceived risk of sanction. See the Appendix Table for item wordings.

**Method and results**

To assess the predictors of new crime offending we estimated separate negative binomial regression models for each country. This technique takes into account the skew in the response variable described above. Included as predictors were the four measures described above (normative alignment, duty to obey, personal morality and risk of sanction), plus respondent age and gender.

Initial models included both components of legitimacy outlined above. However in all cases normative alignment was the component of legitimacy that was the significant predictor of compliance; moreover, in some countries the two components of legitimacy were very highly correlated. To avoid problems with multicollinearity while retaining consistent models across the seven countries, the final models estimated therefore contained only the normative alignment aspect of legitimacy as a predictor.

Results from these models are summarized in Table 2. We find, first, that conditioning on the other variable in the models, personal morality was the most consistent predictor of self-reported ‘new crime’ offending, with a negative association between this variable and the measure of offending in six of the seven countries (note also that overall levels of self-report offending in the seventh country, Italy, were very low, which may explain the lack of predictive power of the explanatory variables included in the model). People who think crime is more wrong are less likely to report engaging in illegal acts.

Second, risk of sanction is an inconsistent predictor of self-report offending. In only one country (Lithuania) was there a negative association with the response variable – here, greater
perceived risk predicted lower levels of self-report offending. But in one country there was a positive association, and respondents in Germany who perceived more risk were more likely to report offending. In the remaining five countries there was no association between perceived risk and reported offending.

Table 2

**Summary of models predicting self-reported offending (new crimes)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Personal morality</th>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Normative alignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Third, legitimacy as normative alignment was negatively associated with offending in three of the seven countries. In Bulgaria, Germany and Turkey respondents who tended to believe police represented and shared their own moral values were also tended to be less likely to report offending behaviour on the new crime measure. In the other four countries there was no association between legitimacy and offending (and in no country was there a separate association between duty to obey and offending).

Table 3 shows results from a second series of negative binomial regression models, this time predicting the measure of old crime offending in each country. Results are in general similar to those reported above. Personal morality was again the most consistent predictor, with a negative association with self-reported offending in six of the seven countries. Legitimacy as
moral alignment was negatively associated with offending in two countries (Bulgaria and Finland). Finally, risk of sanction was only significantly associated with offending in two countries, and again inconsistently – in Lithuania the association was negative, but in Germany it was again positive.

Table 3

Summary of models predicting self-reported offending (old crimes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Personal morality</th>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Normative alignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Negative association with response variable
- Positive association with response variable
- No association with response variable

Turning to the predictors of future propensity to offend (Table 4), separate regression models were again estimated for each country.\(^1\) We find once more that personal morality was the most consistent and strongest predictor – in all six countries included in the analysis those who expressed a stronger sense that committing crime was wrong were less likely to say they might commit crime in the future. By contrast, only in Bulgaria was there a significant association between perceive risk of sanction and propensity to offend, and it was positive (so people who thought there was more chance of being caught were also more likely to say they might commit a crime). Finally, in three of the six countries – Bulgaria, Finland and Turkey – there was a significant negative association between legitimacy and offending.

\(^1\) Note that the UK was excluded from this analysis because the relevant questions were not fielded in the survey conducted there.
Table 4

Summary of models predicting self-reported propensity for future offending

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Personal morality</th>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Normative alignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>No association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>No association</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>No association</td>
<td>No association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>No association</td>
<td>No association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>No association</td>
<td>No association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>No association</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary

Unsurprisingly, personal morality emerges from the modeling described above as the most consistent predictor of self-reported offending. People who think crime is ‘more wrong’ are less likely to say they have in the past offended or would in the future offend. Risk of sanction is, however, a rather poor predictor of offending – only in some countries, in some circumstances, does it seem that a higher perceived risk of sanction associated with less reported offending. Moreover, the legitimacy of the police emerges as a more consistent predictor of offending, with greater legitimacy associated in three of the seven surveyed countries with a lower offending on one or other measure.

These results would seem to lend some support to the overall approach advocated by the Fiducia project. Demonstrating a credible risk of sanction to potential offenders may be important in some times and places, but a more effective criminal justice policy would
concentrate (a) on promoting the idea that crime is wrong – for example because it is harmful – and (b) on enhancing the legitimacy of criminal justice actors among the publics they serve, especially, it seems likely, the police.

**Does legitimacy travel?**

In an increasingly mobile world, where people move from one country to another for tourism, to visit friends and family and to work, it is of significant interest to explore how people think about and interact with police outside their home country. The key question for present purposes is whether trust-based policies travel. Do people care about the fairness of ‘foreign’ police? Does the legitimacy of the police in one’s home country ‘spill-over’ into the legitimacy of the police in another country? Is it even realistic to expect them to feel a sense of duty to obey police other than those associated with their home country?

Both questions are made more salient by what is known of the reasons why process-based styles of policing, premised on issues of fairness, are so important to people when thinking about the police. Social-psychological research suggests that procedural fairness is important to most people because it is linked to feelings of belonging and inclusion. On this account, the police represent a social group most people find important – associated with the nation, state and community – and the behaviour of police officers communicates to them messages concerning their inclusion, status and security within this group. Fair treatment says ‘you belong, you are included’, while unfairness communicates denigration and exclusion. Moreover, this sense of belonging is closely linked to people’s legitimacy judgements – we are motivated to legitimize the authorities of groups to which we feel we belong, and we are encouraged to take cooperate and comply with group authorities when we feel those authorities share and enact our own moral values.

This account renders problematic the idea that people will respond to or expect fair treatment at the hands of police officers outside their own country. When the police represent a social group other than their own, as, for example, when an Italian travelling in Germany encounters the police, will they be attuned to the fairness of police behaviour? Or will they take a more instrumental stance to what transpires? More broadly, is it reasonable to expect people to feel a moral duty to obey the police officers or countries other than their own, particularly in as
much as judgments about the legitimacy of the police are associated with notions of shared group membership?

There is, however, another way of thinking about this issue. In as much as positive judgements about the legitimacy of the police in one’s own country indicate a positive orientation to authority, this may ‘bleed over’ into one's assessments of the police in other countries. People may also hold an image of ‘the police’ in their minds that, to some extent at least, crosses national boundaries, such that their orientations toward police in their home country influence their orientations toward police elsewhere.

Method
To explore these issues the Fiducia surveys contained a set of questions that attempted to probe respondent’s views of ‘foreign police’. To motivate respondents to think about police in countries other than their own, they were first asked whether, in the past five years, they had visited another European country for work, holiday or other reasons. Those who responded positively were asked which country they had visited most recently or most frequently (CHECK), and a series of questions about how their views of that country and its way of life.

There followed a brief vignette. Respondents were asked to imagine they had the following encounter with the police in the country they had previously identified:

You are driving through [insert country] on holiday, within the speed limit, with nothing wrong with your car, and with valid identification. A police officer stops you and asks to see your identification.

This vignette was followed by a set of questions about the likely behaviour of police during this encounter, and then a set of general questions about the legitimacy of the police in the country.

Measures
There were four key measures in this piece of analysis. The response variable represented respondent’s sense that they had a moral duty to obey the police of the country they identified as
having visited. This was chosen as it seems the most relevant aspect of legitimacy in policy terms – the underlying question here concerns what motivates people to feel they should obey police, where it is recognized that police rely to an important extent on the voluntary compliance of those they police regardless of whether those people are citizens of the same country as the police.

The response variable was produced by combining response two survey questions, which asked 'To what extent is it your moral duty to':

- do what the police in [country] tell you even if you don’t understand or agree with the reasons?
- do what the police in [country] tell you to do, even if you don’t like how they treat you?

There were three main explanatory variables. The first combined answers to two questions concerning how procedurally fair respondents thought the police would be in the scenario described above. The items probed whether they thought would the police be polite and respectful and would they be interested in anything [the respondent] might have to say; and these were combined to produce a measure of the fairness of the foreign police. The second was a single item measure assessing what respondents thought the likely outcome of the encounter would be – how likely they thought it was the police would be satisfied with their identification and allow them on their way they would be allowed on their way. We treat this as measure of outcome favourability. The final explanatory variable was respondent’s perceived sense of duty to obey the police in their own country, measured as described in section XX above.

**Method and results**

Linear regression models were estimated for each country, with response and explanatory variables as described above.² Included as control variables were age and gender, and respondents’ feelings about the country concerned (did they like the way of life in and the people of the country concerned). Results from these models are summarized in Table 5.

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² Note that only five countries are included in this analysis. Too few Turkish respondents indicated they had travelled abroad to make analysis meaningful, while the relevant questions were dropped from the UK survey for reasons of cost.
We find, first, that conditioning on the other variables in the models, felt duty to obey one’s own police was the strongest and most consistent predictor of duty to obey foreign police. In all five countries there was a statistically significant and substantively large association between the two measures of duty to obey. As suggested above, it seems that positive orientations toward the police in one’s own country are linked to positive orientations toward police in another country.

Second, however, conditioning on felt duty to obey one’s own police, in three countries there was a significant association between judgements about the likely fairness of the foreign police and perceived duty to obey them. When respondents in Bulgaria, Germany and Lithuania thought about their duty to obey police in another country, it seems they also thought about how fairly those police might treat them. In Finland and Italy, though, there was no such association.

Table 5

**Summary of results from models predicting felt duty to obey foreign police**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Foreign police PJ</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Duty to obey own police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Positive association with response variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td></td>
<td>Negative association with response variable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Positive association with response variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td>No association with response variable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Positive association with response variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Positive association with response variable

Negative association with response variable

No association with response variable
Finally, the likely outcome of the encounter was only associated with legitimacy judgements in two of the five countries included in the analysis. In Germany, a more favourable outcome (a greater chance that the police would simply let the respondent go) was associated with greater legitimacy, while in Finland a more favourable outcome was actually associated with lower legitimacy.

In sum, it seems that legitimacy does travel, to some extent at least. People’s views on the legitimacy of the police in their own country are highly correlated with their views on the legitimacy of police in other countries (or, at least, with their orientation toward police in a particular foreign country they know relatively well). If the findings described above are reflected in people’s actual behaviours, this suggests that policies which aim to enhance the legitimacy of the police within particular countries may pay dividends on a European-wide level. Moreover, in some cases at least, when people think about the legitimacy of foreign police they are also thinking of the fairness of those police, which suggests that it can be as important for police to treat non-citizens in a fair, open and respectful as it is for them to treat citizens such a manner.

5. SUMMARY AND NEXT STEPS

In this Fiducia deliverable we presented some preliminary findings regarding two of the theoretical goals of a new seven-country survey. Prior research indicates that the perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system activates self-regulatory mechanisms: when people believe that legal authorities have the right to power and the right to dictate appropriate behaviour, they tend to defer to, and cooperate with, legitimate authorities because they feel it is the right thing to do (e.g. Tyler, 2006a, 2006b; Elliott et al., 2011; Huq et al., 2011a, 2011b; Jackson et al., 2012a, 2012b; Mazerolle et al., 2013; Murphy & Cherney, 2012). This work also shows the centrality of procedural justice to legitimacy: when police act in line with the norms and values of procedural justice, members of the public tend to believe that the police have the right to power.

The first goal was to extend procedural justice theory by addressing whether the framework applies to three crimes that have not yet been investigated empirically. These crimes
were: (a) downloading music, TV shows or films from internet sites that may be illegal; (b) buying alcohol, cigarettes or other goods that have been brought into the country without taxes being paid; and (c) employing somebody who does not have the right to work in the country (e.g. as a plumber or nanny). The legitimacy of legal authorities may be an important factor promoting compliance with new laws and regulations, such as those surrounding file sharing or the grey market, which pertain to behaviours that many people do not have firm or fixed opinions on. That is, most people do not commit burglary because they believe it is morally wrong to do so. They may not, however, believe it is morally wrong to buy cigarettes on which tax has not been paid, meaning that compliance with tax or duty-related regulations must be obtained via either (costly) deterrence measures or promotion of the idea that obeying the law is in itself the right thing to do, regardless of what one thinks about specific illegal acts. To summarise our findings, personal morality was a consistent predictor of compliance in the context of ‘old’ and ‘new’ crimes and legitimacy explained some variation in three of the countries. By contrast, perceived risk of sanction was relatively unimportant.

The second theoretical goal was to assess whether procedural justice theory applies to the police in a country that one does not reside in. A key aspect of procedural justice theory is the notion of shared group membership. Procedurally fair behaviour on the part of justice agents strengthens the social bonds between citizens and justice institutions, and between citizens and the social group the institutions represent, which in turn encourages trust, legitimation of group authorities, the sense that they are worthy of cooperation and support, and acceptance of their right to determine behaviour. Conversely, procedural injustice weakens peoples social bonds, serving to marginalise and exclude those who experience it, while damaging trust, legitimacy, cooperation and compliance (Blader and Tyler 2009; Bradford 2014; Bradford et al. 2014b). These ideas presuppose, however, that citizens believe that they can at least potentially share group identities with justice agents; absent this connection, why should they care about the identity relevant aspects (for example fairness) of the behaviours of group authorities?

On the one hand, we found that legitimacy does seem to cross borders. Felt duty to obey the police in one’s own country was a consistent predictor of felt duty to obey the police in another country. On the other hand, procedural justice was explained more variation than the
desired outcome in two of the five countries (although in Finland, outcome was more important than procedural justice). This is indicative of the idea that, in at least some of the countries in the Fiducia survey, people are sensitive to the identity-bearing nature of procedural fairness in a foreign country.

The analysis we have presented here constitutes only an initial, preliminary run. Due to delays in fieldwork, the data only recently became available. Further analyses will extend the focus to include not just more definitive statistical modelling, but also to include other aspects of the survey such as the notion of the bounded authority, the role of normative alignment with the law, reasons to defy certain laws, and the links between citizenship and legal duty.
REFERENCES


