Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Long-term debt and hidden borrowing

Bar-Isaac, Heski and Cuñat, Vicente (2014) Long-term debt and hidden borrowing. Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 3 (1-2). pp. 87-122. ISSN 2046-9128

Full text not available from this repository.

Identification Number: 10.1093/rcfs/cfu007


Borrowers can raise funds from a competitive banking sector that shares information and from opaque hidden lenders. Hidden lenders allow borrowers to conceal poor results, and thereby affect contracts in the banking sector. In equilibrium, borrowers obtain funds from both sectors simultaneously. The lack of transparency generates cross-subsidies between different borrowers who are observationally equivalent to banks and face the same interest rate. As the cost of hidden borrowing falls, an increasing number of borrowers face identical terms; for sufficiently low costs, all borrowers who take loans (which may include inefficient borrowers) use the same bank debt contract.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2014 The Authors
Divisions: Finance
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Date Deposited: 17 Apr 2015 14:15
Last Modified: 20 Aug 2021 02:01

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item