

[Nigel Ashton](#)

Searching for a just and lasting peace? Anglo-American relations and the road to United Nations Security Council Resolution 242

**Article (Accepted version)
(Refereed)**

Original citation:

Ashton, Nigel J. (2015) *Searching for a just and lasting peace? Anglo-American relations and the road to United Nations Security Council Resolution 242*. [The International History Review](#), pp. 1-40. ISSN 0707-5332 (In Press)

© 2015 [Taylor & Francis](#)

This version available at: <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60920/>

Available in LSE Research Online: February 2015

LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk>) of the LSE Research Online website.

This document is the author's final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.

Searching for a Just and Lasting Peace? Anglo-American Relations and the Road to United Nations Security Council Resolution 242

Abstract

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 continues to rank as a key point of reference for the Arab-Israeli peace process. The resolution laid down a 'land for peace' formula for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, under which Israel would withdraw from territories occupied during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War in exchange for full peace agreements with her Arab neighbours. This article analyses the Anglo-American diplomacy at the United Nations which led to the passing of the resolution. It argues that the policy-making of the Johnson Administration was rendered incoherent by internal rivalries and disorganisation. US Ambassador to the UN, Arthur Goldberg, was perceived as excessively sympathetic to Israel by the Arab delegations. The British approach, by contrast, was perceived by all parties as more even-handed. The clear position adopted by Foreign Secretary George Brown on Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, together with the skilful diplomacy of the Ambassador to the UN, Lord Caradon, explains the British success in sponsoring resolution 242. The episode holds broader lessons for the conduct of Anglo-American relations showing that Britain was better placed to achieve diplomatic success when it retained its freedom of manoeuvre in relations with the US.

Key Words: *Anglo-American relations; United Nations; Arab-Israeli conflict; Lyndon Johnson; Israel.*

Nearly half a century after its passage, United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 continues to rank as a key point of reference for the Arab-Israeli peace process. While describing the resolution variously as a 'remarkable study in ambiguity' and 'ambiguously balanced', Roger Louis has also called it 'a British triumph, perhaps as significant in its own way as the Balfour Declaration fifty years earlier'.¹ In essence, the resolution laid down a 'land for peace' formula for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, under which Israel would withdraw from territories occupied during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War in exchange for full peace agreements with her Arab neighbours. This formula for peace was subsequently successfully employed in the negotiation of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The two operative clauses of the resolution call for: 'withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict'; and 'termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force'.²

Important though resolution 242 remains as a landmark in the Arab-Israeli peace process, the focus here will be on another less remarked aspect of the passage of the resolution - what it signified for Anglo-American relations. The resolution was passed at a key juncture in this respect, sandwiched between the announcement of the devaluation of the Pound Sterling on the 18 November 1967, and the British Cabinet's final decision on 15 January 1968 to withdraw its armed forces from 'East of Suez' by the end of 1971. The backdrop for this 'British triumph' could thus hardly have been less promising in terms of the trajectory of British power. The devaluation of Sterling marked the humiliating end of a protracted struggle to maintain the currency's parity within the Bretton Woods system, while the abandonment of remaining defence commitments East of Suez represented a watershed in

Britain's retreat from its world power role.³ For all the attention drawn by the Wilson Government's artful refusal to commit troops to the Vietnam War between 1965 and 1968, it was these twin decisions which arguably had a much greater immediate and enduring impact on the course of Anglo-American relations.⁴ While President Lyndon Johnson's late night telephone explosion to Prime Minister Harold Wilson in February 1965 on the subject of Vietnam – 'I won't tell you how to run Malaysia, and you don't tell us how to run Vietnam' was theatrical - it was his message regarding the British plans for withdrawal from East of Suez sent on 11 January 1968 which was the more emotive.⁵ 'I cannot conceal from you my deep dismay upon learning this profoundly discouraging news', he wrote. 'If these steps are taken, they will be tantamount to British withdrawal from world affairs, with all that means for the future safety and health of the free world. The structure of peace-keeping will be shaken to its foundations. Our own capability and political will could be gravely weakened if we have to man the ramparts all alone.'⁶

Against the backdrop of these momentous events, it is perhaps not surprising that resolution 242 and the diplomacy which surrounded it have drawn rather less attention from scholars of British policy and Anglo-American relations in the Middle East.⁷ In so far as it has been treated in this historiography resolution 242 has tended to be seen as an example of Anglo-American cooperation. Indeed the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, went so far as to claim that the US delegation was primarily responsible for the wording of the British draft and for the leg-work of recommending it in national capitals.⁸ The British role under this interpretation was essentially one of taking over an American initiative in the final stages of the negotiations and effectively resolving the remaining minor semantic disputes. This conjures up the image of a sort of diplomatic relay race, with the United States passing the baton of resolution 242 to Britain on the final leg, with the latter charged merely with running it over the line for victory from a commanding position.

In fact, the course of Anglo-American relations from the end of the June War to the passage of resolution 242 did not run quite as smoothly as this metaphor might imply. Key British officials demonstrated not only a willingness to act independently of their American counterparts, but also aired frequent disagreements on vital aspects of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Part of the reason for this was the relative incoherence which characterised the framing of the Johnson Administration's Middle East policy at this juncture. But there was also an underlying difference in perspective regarding policy towards Israel and the Arab states as between Britain and the United States. Because of the personal sympathies of key members of the Johnson Administration, including the President himself, and the American domestic political landscape, US policy consistently exhibited more deference towards and understanding of Israeli interests than did that of the British government. Conversely, on the British side, the economic threat posed by the closure of the Suez Canal and the British interest in security of access to Gulf oil supplies meant that there was a tendency for the key officials to give greater weight to Arab reactions in the formulation of policy towards the region.

The argument here will illuminate the path to the passing of resolution 242 in terms of Anglo-American relations, firstly by introducing the key British and American diplomatic players; secondly by contextualising British and American policy towards the region; and thirdly by analysing the key areas of Anglo-American debate and disagreement over the Arab-Israeli peace process between the end of the June war and the passing of resolution 242 in late November 1967. By way of conclusion, an analysis of what this episode signifies more broadly, particularly for scholarship of contemporary Anglo-American relations, will be offered.

The two key players among many on the British side were the Foreign Secretary George Brown and the British Ambassador to the United Nations, Lord Caradon. Brown's

role in the framing of the British position regarding a Middle East peace settlement was central. By this stage of his career, Brown had acquired a reputation for being 'pro-Arab' in outlook. This was largely because of the good personal relations he had established with various Arab leaders including Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan, which dated back to the early 1950s. But this characterisation represents an oversimplification of his views. Brown's wife, Sophie, was Jewish, and like other leading members of the Labour Party, Brown had also developed contacts with leaders of the Israeli labour movement.⁹ During the 1950s he had been introduced by Hugh Gaitskell, the pro-Zionist Labour Party leader, to key Israelis including Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon. A letter in the private files of King Hussein relating to a subsequent visit Brown paid to Israel in early 1970, makes clear that Brown was evidently sufficiently trusted by at least certain senior Israelis for him to be used as a covert channel to Hussein: 'You and I met just before I went to what we call the Middle East', Brown wrote to the King. 'I think you should know that I am still being used as a post-box. Letters these days are bad. Too many people read them. I wonder if I could meet you, or anybody you would nominate, in any place to have a talk about the situation as I now think it to be.' The concluding lines of Brown's conspiratorial letter are indicative of his broader, temperamental approach to the handling of Middle East diplomacy, which characterised his tenure as Foreign Secretary: 'I am for helping. I reckon there is still a chance and you and I together can handle the rest of the world!'¹⁰ Brown, as this private letter implies, was mercurial, outspoken, confident in his abilities, and intelligent, but, also occasionally erratic and abrasive. This was due in part to his alcoholism.¹¹ As one former Foreign Office official has observed, 'Brown was a hard drinker and invariably not sober at the evening meetings that he regularly called.'¹² In terms of the course of Anglo-American relations after the June war, the combination of Brown's temperament, his intimate knowledge of the region and its leaders, his firm views as to the rights and wrongs of the

Arab-Israeli conflict and his bluntness made for periodic disagreement and an undercurrent of tension, especially in relations with the US Mission to the United Nations led by Ambassador Arthur Goldberg.

The head of the British Mission at the UN, meanwhile, was an almost perfect temperamental foil for Brown and an expert in defusing the tensions which the Foreign Secretary's approach sometimes aroused. Lord Caradon, previously (Sir) Hugh Foot, had served in various colonial administrative roles, including postings as Governor of the Gold Coast and of Cyprus. Crucially, Caradon had also served for eight years in Palestine during the British mandate which gave him a particular interest in the Middle East. Among other attributes, Caradon spoke Arabic which eased his path in maintaining good relations with the Arab delegations in New York.¹³ More broadly, he was well known both for his sympathy for colonial independence movements and his contacts with Third World nationalists. He was also deeply committed to the role of the United Nations, an outlook which he shared with Foreign Secretary Brown. Caradon had acquired a deep and detailed knowledge of UN procedures which he deployed to great effect in the negotiations leading up to the passing of resolution 242. Temperamentally, he was much steadier and less exuberant than Brown, although he also had more than a dash of personal vanity. He showed considerable patience as well as persistence and resolve in playing what was often a difficult diplomatic hand in New York.¹⁴

While Brown and Caradon were the key players on the British side, the role of Prime Minister Harold Wilson is also worthy of brief mention. Although Wilson left the management of British diplomacy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict largely in Brown's hands, it is arguable he played an important balancing role in the background. Wilson was a staunch Zionist and friend of Israel, whose personal sympathies were well known to the Israeli government.¹⁵ Throughout the period before and after the 1967 war, Wilson maintained his

own back channel to the Israeli Ambassador in London, Aharom Ramez, via Gerald Kaufman, who was at that stage his parliamentary press liaison officer.¹⁶ Although Wilson did not play the leading diplomatic role, it is arguable that he in fact supported Brown's efforts by dissipating potential dissent on the part of other Labour Zionists, such as Lord President of the Council, Richard Crossman.¹⁷ He was also able to calm some Israeli fears about the direction of British policy by supplying information to them through the Kaufman back channel.¹⁸

On the US side there were also arguably two key players among several: President Lyndon B. Johnson and Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg. Although his main foreign policy focus was on the Vietnam War, President Johnson was unabashed about his personal sympathy for Israel, which conditioned his handling of both the crisis which led to war in 1967 and the post-war diplomacy which resulted in resolution 242. He later noted that 'I have always had a deep feeling of sympathy for Israel and its people, gallantly building and defending a modern nation against great odds....'¹⁹ Certainly, the Israeli government saw Johnson's personal sympathy as one of its key assets in influencing the course of US policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Meanwhile, "Judge" Goldberg as he preferred to be known (although his correct title was "Justice") was a leading member of the American Jewish community. Johnson, who had personally persuaded Goldberg to leave a lifetime position at the Supreme Court to take up the post of Ambassador, described Goldberg as 'an old and trusted friend' who would always have 'direct and ready access to... the President'.²⁰ As Goldberg told the CIA officer, Jack O'Connell, who was temporarily assigned to his staff to handle the private negotiations with the Arabs, especially with King Hussein, at the UN, 'well, O'Connell, as you can see, I have a blank check from the President. I also have a blank check from the American Jewish community. They will buy whatever I decide upon. Your king and the other Arabs should know that I hold the key.'²¹ The British

were also all too well aware of Goldberg's political influence, particularly of his standing with President Johnson. A hand written annotation by George Brown on one despatch detailing Goldberg's role reads: 'the "Justice" is a real politician whom the President needs (especially now!)'²²

While one would have expected the State Department to play a leading role in the negotiations at the UN, its effectiveness was largely neutered by two key factors. Firstly, the Secretary of State Dean Rusk kept the negotiations largely at arm's length, allowing Ambassador Goldberg to take the lead. Secondly, Eugene Rostow, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs who chaired the so called Control Group within the State Department which was notionally responsible for the coordination of policy towards the peace negotiations, was notoriously disorganised and erratic.²³ As the senior National Security Council staffer responsible for the Middle East, Harold Saunders, later commented, people in the State Department felt that Rostow's Control Group was a 'floating crap game': 'a fluid, amoeba-like, unsystematic' decision-making process.²⁴ This lack of coordination in the State Department opened the way for Goldberg to take charge.

In terms of the context for policy-making, differences in the trajectory of British and American policy in the Middle East pre-dated the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. While both powers had troubled relations with the Arab nationalist regime of Egyptian President Nasser, in the months leading up to the outbreak of war the British Foreign Secretary, George Brown, had devoted a considerable effort to retrieving Britain's relations with Egypt, which had been broken off at Nasser's instigation on 17 December 1965 in the wake of the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Brown's efforts bore fruit to the extent that the British received informal diplomatic signals that Egypt would like to renew diplomatic relations, with 1 July 1967 floated as a possible date, before the June war intervened.²⁵ Meanwhile, US relations with Egypt had run precipitously downhill in the months leading up

to the outbreak of war with the departing US Ambassador, Lucius Battle, noting that, in his final interview with the Egyptian President in March 1967, Nasser had launched into a 'thirty minute tirade [against US policy] of [the] most emotional character yet displayed in my meetings with him.'²⁶

Nevertheless, both powers were able to cooperate up to a certain point during the crisis which preceded the outbreak of war on 5 June 1967. Perhaps surprisingly it was the British government which was the more proactive during the first phase of the crisis, taking the lead in proposing the creation of a multinational naval force to convoy ships through the Gulf of Aqaba in the wake of Nasser's announcement of the closure of the Straits of Tiran from 23 May. Preoccupied with events in Vietnam, the Johnson Administration's approach was to a certain extent passive, although the President did caution Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban against launching a war during the latter's visit to Washington on 26 May 1967. 'Israel must not make itself responsible for initiating hostilities', the President warned.²⁷ By the beginning of June, however, both the British and American positions had become more ambivalent. The British Cabinet backed away from taking the lead over the convoying proposal due both to military concerns about the vulnerability of naval forces in the confines of the Gulf of Aqaba and political concerns about the impact of any such action on its relations with the Arab oil-producing states. Meanwhile, the President's initial red light to Israel had shifted to an amber, shading over to a green light in the wake of Mossad Chief Meir Amit's visit to Washington between 31 May and 2 June. The President's final pre-war letter to Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol indicated indirectly that he had received and understood Amit's warnings, delivered to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and CIA Director Richard Helms, that Israel could not wait any longer before launching an attack on Egypt. 'We have completely and fully exchanged views with General Amit', the President wrote.²⁸

Meanwhile a Johnson-Wilson summit and a meeting of senior British and American officials in Washington on 2 June did little to advance the cause of multilateral contingency planning for naval action to open the Straits of Tiran.²⁹ Indeed, the limits of Anglo-American cooperation were amply illustrated by Walt Rostow's private advice to the President that the British should be kept in the dark about a contemporaneous approach from the Israeli Minister in Washington, Ephraim Evron, exploring the possible American response to an Israeli naval probe through the Gulf of Aqaba designed to precipitate a confrontation with Nasser. 'It is my judgment that the Evron conversation should not be shared with Prime Minister Wilson', Rostow wrote.³⁰ Given that the Administration was supposed to be cooperating with the British in organising the convoying of ships through the Straits this was an extraordinary omission.

The nuances of British and American policy in the region were of little concern to the Arab states as the extent of their defeat became apparent early in the ensuing war. Both Britain and the United States were unjustly tarred with the same brush of the so called "Big Lie", the claim, which appears to have originated in a telephone exchange between King Hussein of Jordan and President Nasser in the early hours 6 June, that they had participated in the Israeli air assault on the opening day of the war.³¹ While King Hussein publicly retracted the claim on American television on 27 June, the damage had already been done in terms of Arab public opinion.³² The "Big Lie" formed part of what was an unpromising backdrop for post-war British and American diplomacy over the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In the wake of the formal ceasefires on the battlefield, efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict focused on the United Nations. With the Security Council divided, the Soviet Union instead requested an Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly which convened on 17 June. This Soviet move was seen in London and Washington as a device to transfer debate to a forum more likely to be

sympathetic to the position of the Arab states. Anglo-American differences in approach soon became apparent during this special session of the General Assembly and focused initially on the principles outlined in a speech given by British Foreign Secretary George Brown.

Brown's speech to the General Assembly on 21 June touched on two points which were controversial to the extent that they were unwelcome to the Israeli government and to a large degree to the Johnson Administration. The first concerned the inadmissibility under the UN Charter of territorial gains made by conquest. The second concerned the status of Jerusalem.³³ On both issues Brown went further than the Johnson Administration would have liked.³⁴ As Sir Leslie Glass, a senior member of the British delegation to the UN noted, the Foreign Secretary's speech, and his comments on Jerusalem in particular, 'did much to dispel the feeling that Her Majesty's Government would inevitably follow an American pro-Israel policy.'³⁵ On withdrawal, Frank Brenchley, then assistant under-secretary of state for Middle East affairs, later recollected that on the plane over to New York, Brown was unhappy with the anodyne draft for his speech prepared by the Foreign Office and demanded a re-draft with 'more life in it'. Specifically, he instructed Brenchley to strengthen the sections on the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by conquest and of any Israeli actions to change the status of Jerusalem. This was despite the fact that Brenchley warned him these changes would produce 'a speech highly objectionable to the Israelis'.³⁶ Specifically, on withdrawal, Brown was unequivocal: 'I see no two ways about this, and I state our position very clearly. In my view, from the words in the Charter, war should not lead to territorial aggrandisement.' On Jerusalem, he addressed the Israeli Government even more directly: 'I call on the State of Israel not to take any steps in relation to Jerusalem which would conflict with this principle. I say very solemnly to the Government of Israel that, if they purport to annex the Old City or legislate for its annexation, they will be taking a step which will not only isolate them from world opinion, but will also lose them the sympathy that they have.'³⁷ As Brenchley noted,

Brown was calling unequivocally on the Israelis to withdraw from all the territory they had occupied, including East Jerusalem. As Brown left the Assembly there was time for one more moment of drama. By chance, and somewhat to his own consternation, Brown immediately ran into the Israeli delegation which included Golda Meir, one of the Israeli friends Brown had made through his attendance at meetings of the Socialist International. Brenchley, who was at his side, noted that without a moment's hesitation Brown went over to kiss Golda Meir on the cheek, an act of courage in itself. 'I was the only other member of the British delegation close enough to hear her one-word comment', Brenchley later recollected, 'which interestingly was "Judas"'. Brown said nothing in reply.³⁸

Brown's blunt approach on the question of Israeli withdrawal stood in marked contrast to the more circumspect line adopted by President Johnson, who had outlined five principles for peace in the Middle East in a speech delivered in Washington DC rather than at the UN in New York on 19 June.³⁹ The first and most important was that 'every nation in the area has a fundamental right to live, and to have this right respected by its neighbours.' The second was 'justice for the refugees'. The third was respect for maritime rights. The fourth was the danger presented by the Middle East arms race which he proposed might be controlled by all UN members reporting arms shipments to the region. The fifth was the 'importance of respect for political independence and territorial integrity of all the states of the area.' All nations in the region needed 'recognized boundaries and other arrangements that will give them security against terror, destruction, and war.' On Jerusalem, Johnson called merely for 'adequate recognition of the special interest of three great religions in the holy places of Jerusalem.'⁴⁰ The question of withdrawal was addressed only indirectly through the references to territorial integrity for all states and the need for recognized boundaries.

The Anglo-American differences signalled by Brown's and Johnson's speeches became more fully apparent as the question of the status of Jerusalem moved to the forefront

of debate at the special General Assembly session at the beginning of July. This followed the approval by the Israeli Knesset on 27 June of three bills authorising the extension of Israeli law and administration to occupied Arab territory which fell within the borders of the former Palestine mandate. Under the auspices of this general enabling legislation Israel issued a decree extending Israeli law to East Jerusalem.⁴¹ While both Washington and London took the public stance that the Israeli action was illegal under international law, and that as an occupying power Israel was required to use existing law as the basis for its administration, the litmus test of the positions of both countries was provided by a resolution now introduced by Pakistan at the UN General Assembly. This expressed deep concern at measures taken by Israel to change the status of the city, describing them as 'invalid'. It also called on Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and to 'desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem'.⁴² The resolution put the Johnson Administration in a quandary. Whilst it opposed unilateral Israeli actions in Jerusalem it regarded the wording of the resolution as too strong. In London by contrast, given the fact that Brown had been the first to raise the issue of Jerusalem in blunt terms, there was no such dilemma. When resolution 2253 came to a vote on 4 July it passed with 99 votes in favour, including that of Britain, 20 abstentions, including that of the United States, and none against.

The position in terms of Anglo-American relations was made more difficult a week later as Pakistan floated a second resolution (2254) condemning Israel's failure to comply with the first resolution (2253). The wording of resolution 2254 was even stronger, expressing the 'deepest regret and concern' at Israel's non-compliance and stating that the General Assembly 'deplores the failure of Israel to implement General Assembly resolution 2253'.⁴³ The forceful wording of the resolution brought Anglo-American differences even more to the fore. In a discussion between Caradon and Goldberg, the US Ambassador made it clear that any resolution which included condemnation of Israel should be ruled out. Caradon

for his part underlined that he did not share this view, a case he also argued forcefully in communications with the Foreign Office in London.⁴⁴ The main reason for Goldberg's approach was elucidated in a memo written to President Johnson by his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Walt Rostow. The US should abstain again on the second resolution, Goldberg had argued, because 'in his judgement, the Jewish community here would be up in arms if we switched.'⁴⁵

In the event resolution 2254 was also passed by the General Assembly, this time with 99 votes in favour and only 18 abstentions. Once again the British delegation voted in favour while the US abstained. The Administration was sufficiently discomfited by the US's relative isolation for Secretary of State Rusk to issue an explanatory statement which balanced the US's deep regret at the administrative actions taken by Israel with its recognition of the 'deep emotional concerns' which motivated the people and government of Israel.⁴⁶ This reflected the advice to the President from both Walt Rostow and his special consultant McGeorge Bundy to the effect that the US needed to 'balance our accounts somewhat with the moderate Arabs'. Reflecting the divisions within the Administration, and his recognition of Goldberg's reputation with the Arabs, Rostow also reported candidly to the President Bundy's view (which he evidently shared) that 'Amb. Goldberg cannot really swing it politically.'⁴⁷

If the voting over these resolutions at the General Assembly was a public illustration of the gap between the UK and US positions, as well as a private illustration of the factors which shaped US policy, similar differences were also evident in the covert diplomacy of the peace process. At a meeting with King Hussein of Jordan in London on 3 July, both Brown and Prime Minister Harold Wilson had expressed their serious doubts about the King's suggestion that he might be willing to pursue covert, bilateral negotiations with Israel.⁴⁸ According to Brown, 'the King had shown himself by his recent behaviour to be one of the bravest men alive: but he believed that that King could not afford, without serious risk to

himself to take any position in regard to Israel which put him too far ahead of his Arab colleagues in other countries.⁴⁹ Ten days later, however, the King approached both the American and British Ambassadors in Amman to tell them he had decided to take the plunge and pursue a bilateral settlement with Israel.⁵⁰ The King's initiative was given the immediate and enthusiastic backing of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who described it as 'a major act of courage' and an 'important breakthrough toward peace' in a telegram to Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban.⁵¹ This reflected the positive line taken by the State Department over Hussein's initiative. In London, Foreign Secretary Brown, in keeping with his earlier warning to Hussein, was much more sceptical. Brown referred to Hussein's approach as 'suicidal' and also described the American response as 'dangerously and unnecessarily precipitate'.⁵²

The Anglo-American differences in approach crystallised over the State Department's decision to convey the positive Israeli response to Hussein's initiative back to the King via the US Ambassador to Jordan, Findley Burns. Brown was both 'intensely irritated' at the lack of consultation over this US decision and deeply sceptical as to its merits.⁵³ According to US Ambassador to London David Bruce, 'Brown was emphatic about his belief that Israel is not anxious, is indeed perhaps unwilling, to negotiate seriously with Hussein.'⁵⁴ Given what we now know from Israeli sources Brown's scepticism about the Israeli Cabinet's willingness to negotiate in good faith with Hussein at this juncture was well placed.⁵⁵ These Anglo-American differences were reported by Walt Rostow, special assistant for National Security Affairs, to the President.⁵⁶ Secretary Rusk's position was that the US was 'not at this time playing [a] much greater role than mailman' and was not specifically endorsing the initiative by conveying the Israeli reply.⁵⁷ However, in keeping with the muddle which characterised the State Department's approach, this stood in contrast to Gene Rostow's earlier description of the US's policy as one of 'giving things a push at one remove'.⁵⁸ Rostow even claimed that

divisions in the Israeli Cabinet might result in a more flexible negotiating position on their part if Hussein now pressed ahead.⁵⁹

The disjointed reaction to Hussein's initiative within the Administration prompted a remarkable and candid private memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President. Bundy underlined the chaotic approach to decision-making in the State Department, caused largely by Gene Rostow's combination of activism and disorganisation. However, Bundy also obliquely criticised Secretary of State Rusk who had asked Rostow to take on tasks which Bundy believed should fall within the remit of Under Secretary of State Nick Katzenbach or Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Luke Battle. 'I find it embarrassing to have to bring this matter to you, but I honestly don't know what else to do', Bundy wrote. 'My own reluctant judgment is that there is no substitute for a direct decision that Gene Rostow and his Control Group are to be ended...' Bundy diagnosed the cause of earlier hesitation to dismiss Rostow from this role as 'a belief that the American Jewish community would be suspicious of this decision.' But he felt this problem could be overcome since Rostow's likely replacement, Under Secretary of State Nick Katzenbach, was 'not a man they mistrust and he has the good sense and judgment of a sticky continuing situation which Gene simply does not have.' Bundy concluded by indicating that Secretary of Defense McNamara strongly agreed with him on this matter.⁶⁰

In the event, the President once again took no direct action against Gene Rostow who retained his coordinating role. The Anglo-American differences which had been exacerbated by the incoherence of US policy-making were not tested further at this juncture since Hussein himself now drew the conclusion that the time was not in fact ripe for a formal attempt at bilateral negotiation. However, the exchanges over Hussein's putative peace initiative do serve to illustrate the greater degree of scepticism in London about Israel's willingness to

negotiate a settlement, as well as the relative incoherence of US policy-making towards the peace process.

Through the summer, Gene Rostow continued his campaign to promote the prospects for bilateral negotiations between Hussein and Israeli leaders, returning to the theme once again in discussions with British interlocutors in September. In the wake of the conference of Arab Heads of State convened in Khartoum at the end of August, he told the British Ambassador in Washington Sir Patrick Dean that Israeli Foreign Minister Eban had indicated the time might now be right for a secret meeting. Once again, Rostow argued that there was danger in delay and that King Hussein should be encouraged to be more forthcoming. Dean noted in his report of Rostow's views that he may have been unduly influenced by the Israeli Ambassador in Washington and that his comments did not reflect the mood elsewhere in the State Department which was one of 'resentment against the increasingly negative attitude of the Israelis at a time when the Arabs are showing signs of flexibility'.⁶¹ From Tel Aviv, the British Ambassador Michael Hadow, normally a sympathetic reporter of Israeli views, noted that opinion was hardening regarding the territorial situation as time went by. According to Hadow, Foreign Minister Eban's approach was to 'continue to give the appearance of more flexibility in his exchanges with the Americans than is warranted by his ability to "deliver" his Cabinet colleagues.'⁶²

Rostow reiterated his views in discussions at the Foreign Office in London on 14 September, but met with a frosty response. 'We see no evidence yet for Mr Rostow's optimism about a "reasonable deal" being possible at the moment', noted Foreign Secretary Brown.⁶³ In conversation with Ambassador Dean after his return to Washington Rostow indicated that King Hussein had told US Ambassador Burns in Amman that if there was no progress towards a settlement at the UN during October, then 'the Jordanians would be prepared to enter into secret talks with the Israelis in either New York or Washington.'⁶⁴

However, the British soon discovered that Rostow's account of the conversation was a misrepresentation. When UK Ambassador Adams questioned his US counterpart Ambassador Burns about the report, he was told that the King had not in fact indicated that it was his definite intention to enter into secret talks with the Israelis if no progress was made at the UN, but rather that there was a possibility he might feel himself forced to take that step. Given Rostow's earlier attempts to promote such covert talks, this misrepresentation was more likely a deliberate rather than an accidental misreading of the report from Amman.⁶⁵ At any rate, it served once again to highlight the confusion surrounding US policy-making from the British perspective.

If Gene Rostow's encouragement of covert Israeli-Jordanian talks, which were likely to be an unproductive and insubstantial exercise in prevarication, was one illustration of a pro-Israel bias in US policy-making at this juncture, at the UN, Ambassador Goldberg's foot-dragging over further moves to promote a Security Council resolution during September and October was a further such illustration. Goldberg's approach was an additional source of tension in Anglo-American relations. Both Caradon and Dean believed that Goldberg had adopted a consistently pessimistic attitude about the chances of making progress and that his own preference was for 'not taking initiatives and for letting events take their course'.⁶⁶ However, the British continued to hope that despite Goldberg's political influence and his direct access to the president, Secretary of State Dean Rusk's views, which they saw as being closer to their own, might prevail over the framing of a Security Council resolution.

Nevertheless, it would be an unwarranted over-simplification of US policy-making to suggest that Goldberg and Gene Rostow were both reading from the same script sympathetic to the Israeli position, while Rusk followed another line, more similar to that of the British government. The confusion on the US side was such that although both Goldberg and Rostow probably did entertain the same underlying pro-Israel sympathies, there was frequently

tension between the two men. The reason for this was straightforward. Goldberg wanted to exercise leadership in the formation and implementation of US policy from New York and resisted any attempt by the State Department, whether by Rusk or Rostow, to usurp this role from Washington.⁶⁷ Rostow's activism was therefore resented by "the Justice". Talks between British and American officials in Washington in mid-August had served to highlight the tension between the two men, a theme which became a refrain of British reporting throughout the autumn.⁶⁸ The British tried to tread a delicate line, using their contacts in the State Department to gain a sense of how representative Goldberg's views were of the Administration's policy, while at the same time trying to avoid the appearance of going behind the Ambassador's back to the State Department. They did not always succeed. At one particularly tense juncture in early October, Goldberg called in Lord Caradon to treat him to a direct and colourful rebuttal of comments offered by Rostow to British officials in Washington over the modalities of a return to the Security Council for the consideration of a possible resolution.⁶⁹

It was during November, in the final phase of the negotiations which ultimately led to the passage of resolution 242, that the differences in the US and UK approaches already outlined became more important. In short, because of the distinctive British position on the key issue of withdrawal, the UK delegation led by Caradon was much better placed to draft a final resolution which would bring the Arab states and their supporters in the Security Council on board. As the senior NSC staffer responsible for the Middle East, Harold Saunders, put it a fortnight before resolution 242 was passed, 'in spite of Ambassador Goldberg's best efforts, obviously the Arabs distrust him with a passion.'⁷⁰ Caradon, by contrast, had won the respect and trust of all parties.

The crucial juncture in terms of the launching of a British initiative, came at the end of the first week of November by which stage there were two key resolutions in play in the

Security Council: a non-aligned/Indian draft which was unacceptable to Israel and a US draft which was unacceptable to the Arabs. As far as the key Arab delegations of Egypt and Jordan were concerned, the US draft championed by Goldberg was insufficiently explicit on the question of Israeli withdrawal. Arab dissatisfaction with the US draft mingled with their ingrained distrust of Goldberg's personal role. As Foreign Secretary Brown wrote to Ambassador Dean in Washington, 'the Arab attitude towards Mr Goldberg is disturbing if not surprising. It cannot be to the advantage of the United States or strengthen their influence, that he should appear to them to be arm-twisting to such an extent at Israeli behest.'⁷¹

On 3 November, Caradon first tentatively floated the idea of introducing a British draft resolution in a telegram to Brown, in which he also underlined the potential risks of this course of action. The UK might incur the displeasure of supporters of other drafts including the US in what risked amounting to no more than a quixotic operation.⁷² Nevertheless, Caradon followed up on his suggestion with a draft text sent to Brown on 4 November, which was very similar in form and wording to the eventual text of resolution 242.⁷³ In terms of Anglo-American relations Caradon now had to play a very delicate hand for on the same day as he despatched his own draft to Brown, Goldberg made a bid for British support for a new US draft resolution. Goldberg hoped in particular that if the UK would associate itself with the US draft it might help persuade King Hussein of Jordan to accept the text. Caradon prevaricated in the face of this request telling Goldberg that he would have to consult London before giving any firm answer, although indicating that his personal opinion was that 'it would be better that the United Kingdom should not be associated with the new American text.'⁷⁴

In London, Foreign Secretary Brown chose his words equally carefully when faced with a direct request delivered by Ambassador Bruce for British support for the US resolution. He told Bruce that it represented a substantial move on the part of the United

States but noted in a telegram to Caradon that he had not committed himself on co-sponsorship and would not decide on the matter until he knew the reactions of Hussein and the Israelis.⁷⁵ It soon became apparent that what now concerned King Hussein the most was not the wording of the US draft text addressing the issue of withdrawal, but what the Johnson Administration understood that text to mean and what action it would take to implement it.⁷⁶ To help assuage Hussein's doubts, Jack O'Connell, the CIA station chief in Amman and a qualified international lawyer, who had been drafted to Goldberg's staff to act as a go-between to the King, now prepared a formal document which confirmed that 'the United States is prepared to support a return of the West Bank to Jordan with minor boundary rectifications.'⁷⁷ The King asked for assurances that the US would implement this commitment from Goldberg, Rusk and the President in turn.⁷⁸ However, he evidently remained unconvinced by their responses, not least by the President's observation that 'it was difficult to be precise in one part and not on the others. There were imprecise statements in the resolution in several respects.'⁷⁹ For his part the King pointed out that if he were to support the US resolution, he would be sacrificing 'the previous Arab insistence on certain resolution language which they felt protected their position in return for a promise from the US G[overnment].'⁸⁰

Evidently, the trust in US intentions needed for King Hussein to make this leap of faith was lacking. This issue of trust, more than the semantics of the wording on withdrawal, was the key reason why King Hussein did not signal his acceptance of the US draft. In the background, Caradon, an interlocutor whom the King did trust, was now working to clarify the as yet still private UK text in ways which might attract the King. These encompassed the separation of the withdrawal provision from the 'peace' provision in the text, and the addition of the words 'occupied in the recent conflict' to specify from which territories withdrawal should take place. His purpose as outlined to Foreign Secretary Brown was 'to ensure that our

new draft cannot be claimed as simply the American draft in a different guise'.⁸¹ Caradon recognised that launching this UK initiative would make Goldberg, who had staked his personal prestige on securing the passage of the US resolution, 'a good deal upset'. However, he argued that 'I think I know him well enough to explain to him very frankly that we must have a line of our own'.⁸² Apart from any other consideration the choice between backing the US resolution or the non-aligned/Indian resolution would create a difficult dilemma for the British government. The Indian draft was in fact closer to the British position but voting for it, or even abstaining if it came to a vote, would constitute a significant snub to the United States.⁸³

On 10 November Brown authorised Caradon formally to launch the British initiative.⁸⁴ In a difficult interview with Goldberg the following morning, Caradon explained the British position. 'Brits have thought it best to maintain independent position, commit UK to no text and leave way open for UK to come forward with helpful move or compromise', Goldberg reported to Rusk. "The Justice" was not amused, and told Caradon that 'his efforts would interfere with our efforts if he went ahead, even to discuss UK text with Eban, before we received a definite reply from King [Hussein]'.⁸⁵ However, despite agreeing to wait for King Hussein's response to Goldberg before disclosing the British initiative, Caradon went ahead and discussed it with both Eban and Hussein regardless. Eban's initial response to the British draft was tough and unwelcoming as Caradon had expected. It would be 'impossible for Israel to live with such a text', Eban told him.⁸⁶ When Caradon met Hussein alone later the same day he found the King, who had almost reached the end of his tether, 'very tired and disturbed'.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, he responded positively to the possibility of a British compromise resolution which Caradon also discussed with him in personal confidence. The effect of Caradon's initiative was to kill off any remaining possibility that the King might give his personal backing to Goldberg's draft resolution.

There remained considerable obstacles in the way of the British resolution gaining the acquiescence of all parties, as emphasised by the formal Israeli response delivered by Eban to Caradon the following day. The British had 'extracted with pliers the four or five things in the American text which made it supportable for them', Eban complained. 'Anything worse for Israel than the American resolution would be quite unacceptable.'⁸⁸ To add to Caradon's problems, the Latin American members of the Security Council, Argentina and Brazil, now proceeded to cut across the British initiative by preparing their own compromise draft text which Caradon expected to be seized on by the Arabs as more sympathetic to their position.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, the prospect of a more unfavourable Latin American resolution gaining Arab support at least helped shift the US position, with Goldberg now encouraging Caradon to go ahead with the British initiative.⁹⁰ The prospect that the Latin American draft might get majority support on the Security Council also encouraged the Israelis to look again at the British text.⁹¹

By 16 November Goldberg was actively encouraging Caradon to table the British resolution, with a promise that 'the Americans would give us all the help they could, including pressure on the Israelis.'⁹² With King Hussein also working to secure President Nasser's backing for the British resolution, Foreign Secretary Brown felt able to send a cautious congratulatory telegram to Caradon: 'you and your team have done a magnificent job. No flannel. Congratulations. Let's keep our fingers crossed.'⁹³ The shift in the US approach put the Israeli government in a difficult position. British Ambassador Hadow's judgement from Tel Aviv was that Israel was still 'counting on getting away without any resolution at all. They will be in an awkward dilemma if our present text is adopted with American support.'⁹⁴ From a Machiavellian point of view, Hadow judged that the Israelis might be better served by the success of the Latin American resolution since they could then safely reject it with American support.

At this late stage another key variable came to the fore in Caradon's calculations: the position of the Soviet delegation led by deputy Foreign Minister Vasili Kuznetsov. On the afternoon of Friday 17 November, Kuznetsov insisted on a delay in bringing the British resolution to a vote until the beginning of the following week. Caradon was anxious, fearing that 'Latin American and other rats may get at the resolution over the weekend.'⁹⁵ Moreover, it was unclear to Caradon for what purpose Kuznetsov had requested the delay. In fact, unbeknown to Caradon, a high level exchange of notes now took place over the weekend between Soviet Premier Kosygin and President Johnson. Its apparent purpose from the Soviet side was to make sure that full Soviet support for the Arab position on withdrawal was on the record. A draft resolution couched in terms overwhelmingly favourable to the Arab position was appended to Kosygin's letter.⁹⁶ In response President Johnson underlined the need for a resolution to be passed which both sides found tolerable. To that end he solicited Soviet support for the United Kingdom draft.⁹⁷

When Kuznetsov proceeded to table this Soviet draft on Monday 20 November, Caradon confronted him, accusing him of a 'wrecking operation'.⁹⁸ However, Kuznetsov assured him 'most earnestly that he wished to work for peace in the Middle East'. He insisted that he was not trying to undermine the British initiative. Nevertheless, he now requested a further 48 hours delay in bringing the British resolution to a vote. With the prospect of a rival Latin American compromise resolution having now seemingly been averted through intensive British and American lobbying, the Soviet resolution represented the major remaining obstacle in Caradon's path. He at once protested the Soviet move to Kuznetsov, but again the deputy Foreign Minister 'promised... that there was no trick in this and speaking very earnestly he begged me to agree to the postponement for 48 hours, assuring me that this would be for the good.'⁹⁹ Caradon hoped that the Soviet move represented no more than 'a face-saver, to show that the Russians did their best for the Arab cause', but still feared the

possibility that it was 'part of a wrecking operation which we must do our utmost to defeat.'¹⁰⁰ Goldberg for his part was convinced that the Soviet move was a 'spoiling operation'.¹⁰¹

There was still time for one more pirouette from the Soviets in the diplomatic dance leading up to the 22 November Security Council session. On the afternoon of 21 November the Soviet Ambassador in Washington Anatoliy Dobrynin presented another letter from Premier Kosygin requesting an urgent response from President Johnson that same day. Kosygin's letter stated somewhat tautologically that the USSR would 'not oppose the acceptance of the British draft if, of course, it is acceptable to the Arabs.'¹⁰² In his immediate reply President Johnson expressed the hope that 'you can join the broad consensus of the Security Council by voting for the United Kingdom resolution tomorrow.'¹⁰³

Not having been privy to these secret Soviet-American exchanges,¹⁰⁴ the day before the vote Caradon expected that the Soviets would almost certainly abstain. 'A consensus is still conceivable but very unlikely', he wrote to Foreign Secretary Brown.¹⁰⁵ In the end, when the resolution came to a vote on 22 November, all fifteen hands, or more accurately fourteen hands and Kuznetsov's index finger, were raised in favour of the British resolution.¹⁰⁶ The Soviet vote, according to Caradon, was 'an act of political courage' largely attributable to Kuznetsov's work.¹⁰⁷ Caradon's view was that it was Kuznetsov's personal intervention which had ultimately led to the withdrawal of the Soviet resolution and the vote in favour of the British resolution.¹⁰⁸ In Washington, less favourable interpretations of Soviet actions were circulating to the effect that the Soviets had only backed down when it became clear that Nasser was willing to accept the British resolution.¹⁰⁹ One way or another, relations with the Arab states were most likely at the core of Soviet diplomacy over the Security Council resolution. Whether or not the Soviet leadership misjudged the degree of Arab flexibility, it is clear that for political purposes they wanted to have on record a draft resolution which re-

affirmed their support for the Arab position on Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.

Viewed more broadly, despite the unpromising backdrop in terms of the devastating defeat of its Arab allies in the June war, the Soviet Union had played a constructive post-war role in the search for a resolution which might provide the basis for an Arab-Israeli peace process. The unanimous passing of resolution 242 was a significant indication of the fact that the United Nations Security Council was not permanently paralysed by East-West rivalry during the Cold War era. Indeed, as Caradon reflected, it was a triumph for multilateral diplomacy. Even the Latin American draft text introduced during the final stages of debate had in fact proved ultimately helpful by underlining the relative impartiality of the British resolution. The successful passing of the resolution was due to the genuine desire of all parties to find common ground and, in Caradon's view, reflected credit on the Security Council as a whole.¹¹⁰

For British diplomacy, as Brown put it in a congratulatory message to Caradon: 'this is a magnificent outcome which indeed surpasses all our hopes when the operation began.'¹¹¹ While Caradon must take the credit for the skill and determination with which the final negotiations were conducted, the position Brown had staked out at the General Assembly meeting in June, and his efforts to cultivate relations with the key Arab leaders, President Nasser and King Hussein, provided the essential backdrop to the British achievement. Indeed, it is no coincidence that the process of Anglo-Egyptian dialogue, initiated by Brown but interrupted by the June war, had culminated in the announcement of the restoration of formal diplomatic relations between Britain and Egypt on 19 November, just before resolution 242 was passed.¹¹² The successful passage of resolution 242 was a clear indication of the fact that the skills of individual ministers and diplomats are vital in the conduct of international relations. Without Caradon and Brown it is doubtful that resolution 242 would have been

framed, defended and passed, and without resolution 242 there would have been no benchmark for the subsequent Arab-Israeli peace process.

In terms of Anglo-American relations, the immediate picture was much more mixed. While Secretary of State Dean Rusk wrote a personal note of congratulation to Foreign Secretary Brown once the result of the Security Council debate was known, the atmosphere at the United Nations in New York was more troubled. As Ambassador Dean in Washington noted, 'if there is a feeling that perhaps the Americans did not really deserve many thanks for the outcome of the Middle East Debate in the Security Council I would only say that the difficulties were in New York and not here and Rusk's influence was certainly very helpful throughout.'¹¹³ These bureaucratic rivalries, which shaped the US approach after the June war, particularly the dominating role played by Ambassador Goldberg, made it difficult for the Johnson Administration to exercise effective leadership in the search for peace in the Middle East. The British success in sponsoring resolution 242, therefore, was on one level a measure of the failure of US policy.

The resolution 242 episode also points to some broader conclusions which might be drawn about the conduct of Anglo-American relations from a British perspective. The Middle East diplomacy of the Wilson government, especially that of Foreign Secretary Brown, shows that the UK was better placed to achieve significant and lasting diplomatic success when it maintained its freedom of action vis-à-vis the US, rather than having its hands tied by the 'special relationship'. What might be termed the consultative but not constrained or craven approach adopted by Brown and Caradon proved to be a successful model for British diplomacy towards the United States.

More broadly, it is arguable that the Anglo-American diplomacy surrounding resolution 242 helped set the pattern for the next two decades of British diplomacy and Anglo-American relations over the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Heath government maintained a

similar approach, with the tone set by Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home's Harrogate speech of 31 October 1970, which underlined the need for full implementation of resolution 242. Likewise during the October 1973 war, the Heath government kept its distance from the Nixon Administration and maintained its freedom of manoeuvre as the crisis unfolded.¹¹⁴ Even the Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher maintained an independent policy from 1979 onwards, with Thatcher acting as a persistent, often unwelcome, advocate in Washington of credible Palestinian representation in the peace process.¹¹⁵

However, if successive British governments maintained their own line over the Arab-Israeli conflict, the passage of resolution 242 nevertheless represented the end of an era in terms of Britain playing the leading great power role in the search for peace in the region. Henceforth it would be the United States which would act as the principal external sponsor of the peace process. In that sense it is no small irony that resolution 242 was passed almost precisely half a century after the promulgation of the Balfour Declaration in November 1917. What Elizabeth Monroe memorably dubbed Britain's 'moment in the Middle East' might appropriately be bracketed by these two ambiguous, but portentous pieces of British diplomatic draughtsmanship.¹¹⁶

¹ William Roger Louis, 'The Ghost of Suez and Resolution 242', in William Roger Louis, and Avi Shlaim, *The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 234, 235, 241.

² United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, quoted from Arthur Lall, *The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 308-9.

³ For the backdrop to devaluation see: Steven G. Galpern, *Money, Oil and Empire in the Middle East: Sterling and Post-War Imperialism, 1944-1971* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 268-86; Kevin Boyle, 'The Price of Peace: Vietnam, the Pound and the Crisis of the American Empire', *Diplomatic History*, xxvii (2003), 37-72; Samuel Brittan,

‘The 1967 Devaluation’, *Contemporary Record*, i (1987), 44-53. On the East of Suez decision see Saki Dockrill, *Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez: the Choice between Europe and the World, 1945-68* (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Peter Caterall (ed.), ‘The East of Suez Decisions’, *Contemporary Record*, vii (1993), 612-53; Philip Darby, *British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947-68* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1973); Jeffrey Pickering, *Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez: the Politics of Retrenchment* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1998).

⁴ For Anglo-American relations over the Vietnam War see: Jonathan Colman, *A ‘Special Relationship? Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo-American Relations ‘at the Summit’, 1964-68* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004); Sylvia Ellis, *Britain, America and the Vietnam War* (Westport: Praeger, 2004) and ‘Lyndon Johnson, Harold Wilson and the Vietnam War: a Not so Special Relationship?’ in Jonathan Hollowell (ed), *Twentieth Century Anglo-American Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 180-200, John Young, ‘Britain and LBJ’s War, 1964-1968’ *Cold War History*, ii (2002), 63-92.

⁵ Record of a telephone conversation between the Prime Minister and President Johnson at 3.15am, 11 February 1965, PREM13/692, The United Kingdom National Archives [hereafter TNA].

⁶ Message from President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson, 11 January 1968, document 289, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XII, Western Europe* [hereafter *FRUS*] (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2001), 608-9.

⁷ Works which consider British policy in the Middle East and Anglo-American relations during this period include: Frank Brenchley, *Britain, the Six-Day War and its Aftermath* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005); Moshe Gat, *Britain and the Conflict in the Middle East, 1964-67: The Coming of the Six-Day War* (Westport: Praeger, 2003); Robert McNamara, *Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East, 1952-1967* (London: Frank Cass,

2003); Tore T. Petersen, *The Decline of the Anglo-American Middle East: A Willing Retreat, 1961-69* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2006); Simon C. Smith, *Ending Empire in the Middle East: Britain, the United States and Post-War Decolonization, 1945-73* (London: Routledge, 2012); William Roger Louis, 'The Ghost of Suez and Resolution 242', in William Roger Louis and Avi Shlaim (eds), *The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 219-46; and William Roger Louis, 'Legacy of the Balfour Declaration: Palestine, 1967-1973', in Zach Levey and Elie Podeh (eds), *Britain and the Middle East: From Imperial Power to Junior Partner* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2008), 108-30.

⁸ Sydney D. Bailey, *The Making of Resolution 242* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), 146, 159. Goldberg's biographer, David L. Stebenne, goes further still, describing resolution 242 as 'largely Goldberg's handiwork' (*Arthur J. Goldberg: New Deal Liberal* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 354-55). See also Seymour Maxwell Finger, *American Ambassadors at the UN: People, Politics and Bureaucracy in Making Foreign Policy* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1988), 185, for the same claim.

⁹ Brenchley, *Britain, the Six Day War and its Aftermath*, xv.

¹⁰ Letter, George Brown to King Hussein of Jordan, 5 March 1970, British File, Royal Hashemite Archives, Amman, Jordan.

¹¹ Richard Crossman, *The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Volume Two: Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons 1966-68* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1976), 394-5.

¹² Brenchley, *Britain, the Six-Day War and its Aftermath*, xvi.

¹³ *ibid*, xvii.

¹⁴ Louis, 'The Ghost of Suez and Resolution 242', 239; Bailey, *The Making of Resolution 242*, 176.

¹⁵ Brenchley, *Britain, the Six-Day War and its Aftermath*, 57, 59. Wilson's Zionism is evidenced by his book, *The Chariot of Israel: Britain, America and the State of Israel* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), published after he left office.

¹⁶ For Kaufman's later description of his role see:

<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/resources/commentary-and-analysis/1571-michael-white-in-conversation-with-sir-gerald-kaufman-mp> (accessed 26 September 2014)

¹⁷ Crossman, *The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Volume Two*, 392-5.

¹⁸ For example, Wilson passed on details about a trilateral meeting between King Hussein, George Brown and himself on 3 July 1967 via Kaufman to the Israelis (Avi Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace* (London: Allen Lane, 2007), 265).

¹⁹ Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Vantage Point* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 297.

²⁰ Finger, *American Ambassadors at the UN*, 160.

²¹ Jack O'Connell with Vernon Loeb, *King's Counsel: A Memoir of War, Espionage, and Diplomacy in the Middle East* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011), 72.

²² Brown's annotation on Hayman to Brenchley, 'The Middle East and the United Nations', 10 October 1967, FCO17/529, TNA.

²³ For further discussion of the role and organisation of the State Department during this period see: William I. Bacchus, *Foreign Policy and the Bureaucratic Process: The State Department's Country Director System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); John Franklin Campbell, *The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory* (New York: Basic Books, 1971); John P. Leacacos, *Fires in the In-Basket: The ABC's of the State Department* (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1968); Frederick C. Mosher and John E. Harr, *Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership: An Attempted Innovation* (New York and Oxford: OUP, 1970); Smith Simpson, *Anatomy of the State Department* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967);

Donald P. Warwick, Marvin Meade and Theodore Reed, *A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality and Organization in the State Department* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1975).

²⁴ Harold H. Saunders, Oral History interview, 15 September 1983, AC 05-01, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas [hereafter LBJL].

²⁵ For discussion of Brown's attempts at détente with Nasser see McNamara, *Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East*, 233-7.

²⁶ Telegram, Cairo to State, 4 March 1967, document 393, *FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol.XVIII*.

²⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, 26 May 1967, document 77, *FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, 143.

²⁸ Letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol, 3 June 1967, document 139, *FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, 264. For further discussion of the shift in the U.S. position during the week before the outbreak of war see: William Quandt, 'Lyndon Johnson and the June 1967 War: What Color was the Light?', *Middle East Journal*, xlvii (1992), 228; Nigel J. Ashton, 'For King and Country: Jack O'Connell, the CIA and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1963-71', *Diplomatic History*, xxxvi (2012), 893-7; Peter L. Hahn, 'The Cold War and the Six Day War: US policy towards the Arab-Israeli Crisis of June 1967', in Nigel J. Ashton (ed), *The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73* (New York, 2007), 23-5; Moshe Gat, 'Let Someone Else Do the Job: American Policy on the Eve of the Six Day War', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, xiv (2003), 131-58.

²⁹ For the meeting of officials see: Record of a Meeting in the White House on 2 June 1967, PREM13/1906, TNA; and Memorandum of Conversation, 11.30-1.15pm, 2 June 1967, document 130, *FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, 237-44. The only available record of the Wilson-Johnson conversation is contained in Wilson's telegram to Brown reporting the meeting, UKUN to Foreign Office, telegram no.1202, 3 June 1967, PREM13/1906, TNA.

³⁰ Memorandum, Rostow to Johnson, 1.00pm, 2 June 1967, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Box 17, Folder Volume 30, June 1-12 1967 [3 of 4], LBJL. The record of the Evron approach is in Rostow to Johnson, 12.45pm, 2 June 1967, National Security File, Country File, Box 107, Folder MEC Vol.III Memos and Misc [2 of 3], LBJL.

³¹ Nigel Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life* (London and New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 119.

³² Text of King Hussein's interview with Pauline Fredericks on NBC's 'Today Show', 27 June 1967, in FCO to Certain Missions, 28 June 1967, PREM13/1622, TNA.

³³ Brenchley, *Britain, the Six-Day War and its Aftermath*, 54-60.

³⁴ Memorandum, 'The General Assembly Debate', Nathaniel Davis to Walt Rostow, 21 June 1967, National Security File, Country File, Box 110, Folder Middle East Crisis Vol.VII Memos and Misc [2 of 2] 6/67-7/67, LBJL.

³⁵ Glass to Brown, 'The United Nations and the Arab/Israel Crisis: the Emergency Session of the General Assembly', 14 August 1967, FCO58/84, TNA.

³⁶ Brenchley, *Britain, the Six-Day War and its Aftermath*, 55.

³⁷ Full text of the Speech by the Secretary of State, the Rt. Hon. G. Brown M.P. to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 21 June 1967, FCO17/520.

³⁸ Brenchley, *Britain, the Six-Day War and its Aftermath*, 56.

³⁹ Bailey, *The Making of Resolution 242*, 114-15.

⁴⁰ Editorial Note, document 308, *FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XIX*.

⁴¹ Arie J. Kochavi, 'Jerusalem in Anglo-American Policy in the Immediate Wake of the June 1967 War', *Israel Affairs*, xix (2013), 452-3.

⁴² Text of United Nations General Assembly resolution 2253, 'Measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City of Jerusalem', 4 July 1967,

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/6798&Lang=E (accessed 20 August 2014).

⁴³ Text of United Nations General Assembly resolution 2254, 'Measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City of Jerusalem', 14 July 1967, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/6798&Lang=E (accessed 20 August 2014).

⁴⁴ For Caradon's exchange with Goldberg see memorandum, Lambert to Morris, 12 July 1967, FCO17/253, TNA. For Caradon's advocacy of British support for the second resolution (2254) see memorandum, 'Jerusalem', Lambert to Morris, 12 July 1967, and memorandum, 'Jerusalem', Morris to Brenchley, 13 July 1967, *ibid.*

⁴⁵ Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, 13 July 1967, document 357, *FRUS, 1968-68, Vol.XIX*.

⁴⁶ Kochavi, 'Jerusalem in Anglo-American Policy', 454.

⁴⁷ Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, 13 July 1967, document 357, *FRUS, 1968-68, Vol.XIX*.

⁴⁸ Ironically, Hussein had already held his first post-war covert meeting with Yaacov Herzog, the director-general of Prime Minister Eshkol's office, the day before his meeting with Wilson and Brown. (Michael Bar-Zohar, *Yaacov Herzog: A Biography* (London: Halban Publishers, 2005), 300-5; Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, 259-64). The meeting with Herzog was held at the home of his London physician, Dr Emmanuel Herbert. Wilson and Brown may already have been briefed about this meeting and the earlier establishment of the Herzog channel via Dr Herbert in London which dated back as far as 1963. The CIA station chief in Amman, Jack O'Connell, later observed that British Intelligence 'must have bugged that doctor's surgery and if they hadn't they weren't doing their job properly'. (Author's interview with Jack O'Connell, Washington D.C, 27 September 2007).

⁴⁹ Record of a Conversation between the Prime Minister and the King of Jordan, 3 July 1967, FCO17/240, TNA.

⁵⁰ For Hussein's approach to US Ambassador Burns see State to USUN, 13 July 1967, footnote 2, document 360, *FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. XIX*. His approach to British Ambassador Adams is confirmed in Foreign Office to Washington, telegram no.7915, 14 July 1967, PREM13/1622, TNA.

⁵¹ State to USUN, 13 July 1967, Document 360, *FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. XIX*.

⁵² Foreign Office to Washington, telegram no.7915, 14 July 1967, PREM13/1622, TNA.

⁵³ State to London, 22 July 1967, NSF, Country File, Box 113, Folder MEC [1 of 2] Sandstorm/Whirlwind, LBJL.

⁵⁴ London to State, 24 July 1967, NSF, Files of the Special Cttee of the NSC, Box 12, Folder Sandstorm [2 of 2], LBJL. For further discussion of Ambassador Bruce's role in Anglo-American relations see: Raj Roy and John W. Young (eds.) *Ambassador to Sixties London: The Diaries of David Bruce, 1961-9* (Dordrecht, Republic of Letters, 2009); and John W. Young, *David Bruce and Diplomatic Practice: An American Ambassador in London, 1961-9* (London: Bloombury, 2014).

⁵⁵ For further discussion of the Israeli government's position see Avi Raz, *The Bride and the Dowry: Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians in the Aftermath of the June 1967 War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012).

⁵⁶ Rostow to Johnson, 24 July 1967, NSF, Files of the Special Cttee of the NSC, Box 12, Folder Settlement [1 of 2], LBJL.

⁵⁷ Rusk to Bruce, 25 July 1967, NSF, Country File, Box 113, Folder MEC [1 of 2] Sandstorm/Whirlwind, LBJL.

⁵⁸ Washington to Foreign Office, telegram no.2428, 21 July 1967, PREM13/1622, TNA.

⁵⁹ Washington to Foreign Office, telegram no.2438, 23 July 1967, *ibid*.

⁶⁰ Memorandum, Bundy to the President, 25 July 1967, NSF, Files of the Special Committee of the NSC, Folder Minutes of Central Control Group Meetings, LBJL.

⁶¹ Washington to Foreign Office, telegram no.2861, 6 September 1967, PREM13/1623, TNA.

⁶² Tel Aviv to Foreign Office, telegram no.1012, 9 September 1967, *ibid.*

⁶³ Foreign Office to Amman, telegram no.2059, 18 September 1967, *ibid.*

⁶⁴ Washington to Foreign Office, telegram no.3006, 19 September 1967, FCO17/550, TNA.

⁶⁵ Amman to Foreign Office, telegram no.1123, 21 September 1967, *ibid.*

⁶⁶ Washington to Foreign Office, telegram no.3088, 29 September 1967, FCO17/527, TNA.

⁶⁷ Washington to Foreign Office, telegram no.3409, 31 October 1967, FCO17/514, TNA.

⁶⁸ See for example: Washington to Foreign Office, telegram no.2862, 6 September 1967, FCO17/513, TNA; Tomkins to Hope, 9 November 1967, and Hope to Tomkins, 14 November 1967, FCO17/515, TNA.

⁶⁹ UKUN to Foreign Office, telegram no.2614, 8 October 1967, FCO17/528, TNA.

⁷⁰ Memorandum, Saunders to Rostow, 9 November 1967, NSF, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Box 25, Folder Middle East 11/1/67 – 12/31/67 [1 of 3], LBJL.

⁷¹ Foreign Office to Washington, 1 November 1967, telegram no.11440, FCO17/514, TNA.

⁷² UKUN to Foreign Office, 3 November 1967, telegram no.3000, *ibid.*

⁷³ UKUN to Foreign Office, 4 November 1967, telegram no.3026, *ibid.*

⁷⁴ UKUN to Foreign Office, 4 November 1967, telegram no.3022, *ibid.*

⁷⁵ Foreign Office to UKUN, 5 November 1967, telegram no.5975, *ibid.*

⁷⁶ The initial US draft, shared with Hussein and Caradon, affirmed that UN Charter principles required the 'withdrawal of armed forces from occupied territory' (UKUN to Foreign Office, 4 November 1967, telegram no.3023, FCO17/514, TNA). The word 'territory' was amended to 'territories' in a subsequent draft in view of Hussein's concerns about the implementation of withdrawal (UKUN to Foreign Office, 6 November 1967, FCO17/514, TNA).

⁷⁷ Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, 30 November 1968, document 506, *FRUS, 1964-68, Volume XIX*. A footnote to this document indicates that the original text could not be found by the editors of the volume. Jack O'Connell later expressed his firm conviction that the loss of the original document was deliberate (*King's Counsel*, 74-5).

⁷⁸ See: telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, 6 November 1967, document 507, *FRUS, 1964-68, Volume XIX*; telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations, 8 November 1967, document 508, *ibid*; memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, undated, document 513, *ibid*; memorandum for the files, 8 November 1967, document 515, *ibid*.

⁷⁹ Memorandum for the files, 8 November 1967, document 515, *ibid*.

⁸⁰ Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, 30 November 1968, document 506, *ibid*.

⁸¹ UKUN to Foreign Office, 7 November 1967, telegram no.3078, FCO17/514, TNA.

⁸² UKUN to Foreign Office, 9 November 1967, telegram no.3132, *ibid*.

⁸³ Foreign Office to Washington 10 November 1967, telegram no.11847, *ibid*.

⁸⁴ Foreign Office to UKUN, 10 November 1967, telegram no.6174, *ibid*.

⁸⁵ Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, 11 November 1967, document 517, *FRUS, 1964-68, Volume XIX*.

⁸⁶ UKUN to Foreign Office, 11 November 1967, telegram no.3159, FCO17/515, TNA.

⁸⁷ UKUN to Foreign Office, 11 November 1967, telegram no.3159, *ibid*.

⁸⁸ UKUN to Foreign Office, 12 November 1967, telegram no.3163, *ibid*.

⁸⁹ UKUN to Foreign Office, 13 November 1967, telegram no.3194, *ibid*.

⁹⁰ UKUN to Foreign Office, 13 November 1967, telegram no.3193, *ibid*.

⁹¹ UKUN to Foreign Office, 14 November 1967, telegram no.3217, *ibid*.

-
- ⁹² UKUN to Foreign Office, 16 November 1967, telegram no. 3251, *ibid.*
- ⁹³ Foreign Office to UKUN, 16 November 1967, telegram no. 6331, *ibid.*
- ⁹⁴ Tel Aviv to Foreign Office, 19 November 1967, telegram no.1273, *ibid.*
- ⁹⁵ UKUN to Foreign Office, 17 November 1967, telegram no.3271, *ibid.*
- ⁹⁶ Letter from President Kosygin to President Johnson, undated, document 534, *FRUS, 1964-68, Vol.XIX.*
- ⁹⁷ Letter from President Johnson to Premier Kosygin, 19 November 1967, document 535, *ibid.*
- ⁹⁸ UKUN to Foreign Office, 20 November 1967, telegram no. 1319, FCO17/515, TNA.
- ⁹⁹ UKUN to Foreign Office, 20 November 1967, telegram no.3319, *ibid.*
- ¹⁰⁰ UKUN to Foreign Office, 20 November 1967, telegram no.3321, *ibid.*
- ¹⁰¹ Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations, 20 November 1967, document 536, *FRUS, 1964-68, Vol.XIX.*
- ¹⁰² Letter from Premier Kosygin to President Johnson, undated [21 November 1967], document 539, *ibid.*
- ¹⁰³ Letter from President Johnson to Premier Kosygin, 21 November 1967, document 540, *ibid.*
- ¹⁰⁴ The British were only told about the exchanges a week after the resolution had passed, and then only 'because *Newsweek* got hold of the story' (Memorandum, Day to Palliser, 30 November 1967, FCO17/515, TNA).
- ¹⁰⁵ UKUN to Foreign Office, 21 November 1967, telegram no.3352, *ibid.*
- ¹⁰⁶ Louis, 'The Ghost of Suez and Resolution 242', 240; UKUN to Foreign Office, 22 November 1967, telegram no.3373, *ibid.*
- ¹⁰⁷ UKUN to Foreign Office, 22 November 1967, telegram no.3373, *ibid.* UKUN to Foreign Office, 24 November 1967, telegram no.3410, *ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ 'The Security Council Decision on the Middle East, November 1967', Caradon to Brown, 1 January 1968, *ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ Letter, Bendall to Smith, 29 November 1967, *ibid.*

¹¹⁰ 'The Security Council Decision on the Middle East, November 1967', Caradon to Brown, 1 January 1968, *ibid.*

¹¹¹ Brown to Caradon, 24 November 1967, telegram no.6724, *ibid.*

¹¹² Brenchley, *Britain, the Six-Day War and its Aftermath*, 65-71.

¹¹³ Letter, Dean to Maitland, 30 November 1967, FCO17/515, TNA.

¹¹⁴ For Anglo-American relations over the 1973 war see: Geraint Hughes, 'Britain, the Transatlantic Alliance and the Arab-Israeli War of 1973', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, x (2008), 3-40; Thomas Robb, 'The Power of Oil: Edward Heath, the 'Year of Europe' and the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship'', *Contemporary British History*, xxvi (2012), 73-96; Alex Spelling, 'Recrimination and Reconciliation: Anglo-American Relations and the Yom Kippur War', *Cold War History*, xiii (2013), 485-506; Andrew Scott, *Allies Apart: Heath, Nixon and the Anglo-American Relationship* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 166-95.

¹¹⁵ Nigel J. Ashton, 'Love's Labours Lost: Margaret Thatcher, King Hussein and Anglo-Jordanian Relations, 1979-1990', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, xxii (2011), 651-77; Neil Lochery, 'Debunking the Myths: Margaret Thatcher, the Foreign Office and Israel, 1979-1990', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, xxi (2010), 690-706.

¹¹⁶ Elizabeth Monroe, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1971* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1981).