WELLBEING AND WELFARE REGIMES IN FOUR COUNTRIES

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1. INTRODUCTION AND FRAMEWORK

The goal of this paper is to locate the pursuit of wellbeing of the WeD research sites in the four countries within a wider frame of collectivities and structures. Though wellbeing is initially located at the individual level, it is always mediated by relationships and collectivities. Thus a study of wellbeing must be located in the concentric circles of institutions and structures within which any individual is embedded. These include *inter alia* families, households, communities, nation states and the plethora of global institutions and networks.

The distinctive approach developed at Bath to consider wider social systems is the welfare regimes framework (Gough and Wood et al 2004; Wood and Gough 2006). Beginning with Esping-Andersen’s much cited and researched model of three welfare state regimes within the advanced capitalist democracies of the OECD, this framework seeks to extend it to the global South. The merits of the welfare regime approach are its focus on the welfare mix of states, markets and households, the novel approach to risk and welfare, the embedding of social policies in deep structures of power, and the finding of distinct regimes following distinct forms of path dependent development. However, this theoretical framework is radically redefined when applying it to the global South to take account of *inter alia* problematic states and imperfect markets (Gough 2004).

The result is a typology of welfare regimes with three broad meta-regime types: welfare state regimes, informal security regimes, and insecurity regimes. The second and third types recognise the ways that the security of poor people in the global South typically depends heavily on families, communities and clientelist relations with power brokers.

The 2004 book also included detailed regional studies of welfare regimes in Latin America (by Barrientos), East Asia (Gough) and Africa (Bevan), as well as a country study of Bangladesh (Davis), all of which provide a more textured analysis and categorisation. Thus the four countries studied in the WeD Research Group can be situated within this framework, as follows:

- Peru: a liberal-informal welfare regime
- Thailand: a productivist-informal welfare regime
- Bangladesh: an informal welfare regime
- Ethiopia: an informal-insecure regime

Thus these countries apparently display quite contrasting institutional environments for the pursuit of wellbeing.

The welfare regime approach has much in common with another important intellectual current in the WeD team: the social exclusion theory of the Peruvian economist Adolfo Figueroa (Figueroa et al 2001), whose ‘sigma society’ model explains the persistence of dualism, inequality and poverty in developing societies such as Peru. As Copestake (2006) explains, what is novel for economics in his model is how the persistence of dualism and inequality are endogenous due to different group interests and political mobilisations.

The remainder of this introductory section sketches the essential features of this framework, reinterprets it in the light of our research and modifies it where necessary. The following sections draw on some of the extensive WeD research material to develop a richer depiction of regimes at the sub-national level as a way of understanding inequality, diversity and power differentials within these societies, and to extend the regime approach to accommodate the broader
concerns of wellbeing, particularly its focus on values, personal goals and agency. The final section draws some general conclusions about wellbeing and welfare regimes.

Modifying slightly the model presented in Wood and Gough (2006), we can analyse the role of wider structures and institutions on wellbeing in our communities in the four countries as in Figure 1. The case for a more radical modification is made by Wood and Newton (2005), Newton (2007) and Wood and Copestake (2007), where it is described as a move from welfare regimes to ‘wellbeing regimes’. I remain doubtful that wellbeing regimes can be coherently formulated or empirically mapped. My goal here is more modest: to retain the welfare regime framework and to situate our wellbeing research within it, to see to what extent the latter can explain aspects of the former.

**Figure 1 here**

The paper works back from the simply descriptive to the explanatory in four stages, beginning at the bottom right hand corner of Figure 1. At all stages I attempt to integrate macro, meso and micro-level features and factors. In addition I also introduce further aspects and measures pertaining to human wellbeing.

i) We begin with a description of welfare outcomes, in terms of poverty, indicators of human development and basic needs satisfactions; but we also consider the achievement of people’s own goals within the communities, and thus measures of their satisfaction.

ii) I then turn to the ‘welfare or rectification mix’ or ‘institutional responsibility matrix’ to describe the pattern of resources and rectifications designed to enhance welfare or security in that society. This begins to map some of the mechanisms through which people pursue their wellbeing goals discussed in (i) above.

iii) I then turn to the structures and institutions which generate deprivation, insecurities and disempowerment, and which constrain the rectification mix. Here I concentrate on (a) the global political economy since 1990 and the national forms this has taken in the four countries, and (b) national family systems and their patriarchal effects.

iv) Finally, I move back to the actors and strategies which reproduce or seek to undermine these conditioning factors. This is done via case studies of food and assistance programmes in three of the countries.

By the end of this tour, it is hoped that some insight is gained into the ways that the agency of different groups interacts with structures and institutions to shape welfare and wellbeing outcomes.

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2 See the WeD toolbox on structures research: [http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/methods-toolbox/structures-toolbox.htm](http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/methods-toolbox/structures-toolbox.htm)

3 This is thus an exercise in comparative studies. The implicit methodology is qualitative comparison, utilising the methods of similarity and difference first identified by John Stuart Mill (1974), since the number of cases (four) is too small to use even QCA or Boolean methods (see Ragin 1987).
2. WELFARE OUTCOMES

The WeD approach to wellbeing embraces objective universal measures of welfare outcomes, local measures of peoples' goals, and subjective measures of satisfaction with their achievement. I consider each in turn.

2.1 Universal, objective measures

Figure 2 presents a summary picture of economic and social development from 1975 to 2005, using just one measure of each: income per capita and life expectancy. It reveals stark differences across the four countries: Ethiopia illustrates utter stagnation with no improvement in either economic or human development over the last three decades; Bangladesh exhibits good income growth coupled with fast improvements in life expectancy; Thailand very fast income growth plus continuing improvement in life expectancy (from a much higher base in 1975); and Peru fast improving life expectancy alongside a three decade stagnation of income per head. If we concentrate just on the period since 1990, the picture is much the same for Bangladesh (improvement on both counts); Ethiopia exhibits deteriorating life expectancy alongside stagnant incomes; Thailand reveals lower though still positive rates of improvement in incomes and life expectancy; while Peru registers improvements in both. The records could hardly be more different.

Table 1 presents more detailed indices of welfare outcomes in 2004 relating to health, education and poverty, together with intermediate indicators of social provision. In this and all the following tables, the four countries are ordered according to national income per head in ascending order: Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Peru, Thailand. This reveals the impact of the past growth records: income per head is more than ten times higher in Thailand than in Ethiopia. In most cases the welfare outcome indicators track this gradient. Yet there are anomalies: Bangladesh, despite an income per head 2.5 times greater than Ethiopia, has similar levels of poverty incidence and malnutrition (low weight for age) among children, indicating some systematic failure in translating economic development into human development. But
with few exceptions at a given point in time welfare tracks income per head, even if the relationships over time are more complex.

**Table 1 here**

### 2.2 Local, subjective measures: goal satisfaction

A major purpose of the WeD research was to move beyond such universal objective measures to understand local goals and priorities and subjective satisfactions with their achievements. Though a general question on happiness was asked, the vast bulk of research time was spent on developing the WeDQoL, an instrument developed by the WeD research team to understand people’s goals, goal attainment and satisfaction with goal attainment. This obtained information on 1. the goals of people in their local contexts (in response to a wide variety of questions, such as ‘What are the characteristics of a women or man who lives well/ badly?’)\(^4\), 2. the importance of these goals to individuals, and 3. the extent to which respondents were satisfied/ medium-satisfied/ not satisfied with their attainment of these goals. In terms of wellbeing outcomes the goal satisfaction score provides a useful local and subjective complement to the measures discussed above. It is local because the goals were generated within each community, not derived from a predetermined list; it is subjective because the evaluations of satisfaction are given by respondents. It moves well beyond widespread and simplistic happiness questionnaires.

Table 3 shows the top 15 goals identified in each country, ranked in importance or necessity (measured on a three point scale: very necessary, necessary and not necessary).\(^5\) It also shows the mean weighted level of satisfaction with each of these goals.\(^6\) Note that the table presents aggregated data only – in two senses. First, the data is aggregated across all the research communities where the WeDQoL was administered. Second, it presents averages for all respondents: no attempt is made here to correlate goals or satisfactions by gender, age, class, location etc. Since these will affect the necessity of some goals (eg. the necessity of agricultural implements in rural versus urban areas), differences in sample compositions may affect the results.\(^7\) Care must be taken in extrapolating from these results any more general statements about or comparisons of the four countries.

**Table 2 here**

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\(^4\) These came from two sources: a scale developed by the WeD research team in Peru (Yamamoto 2006), and interviews and focus groups in the other three countries. For information on WeDQoL see: http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/methods-toolbox/qol-toolbox.htm

\(^5\) The top 15 goals identified in three of the countries scored 1.6 or more out of a maximum of 2, whereas there was more variation between the countries when more or fewer goals were selected. However, this does not apply to Peru, where only the top 5 items achieved necessity ratings over 1.6; here the top 15 scored over 1.4. Data from Woodcock 2007 a, b, c, d.

\(^6\) These scores exclude for each goal those respondents who regarded them as ‘not necessary’.

\(^7\) It would be useful to compare these findings with data from the World Values Survey. Unfortunately this is available only for Peru (2001) and Bangladesh (2002), though it is now being collected in Ethiopia.
With these cautions in mind, the WedQol in Ethiopia reveals low levels of satisfaction with basic material resources and prospects, including wealth, land, housing, clothes and personal progress and economic independence. More surprisingly it reveals high levels of satisfaction with health. On the other hand, peace of mind, faith and behaving well are all highly valued components of quality of life in Ethiopia, and these are considered well satisfied on average, raising the mean score for the country. This may reflect adaptation, or a search for positive achievements, or a less materialistic culture.

Bangladesh exhibits the lowest mean levels of goal satisfaction in the four countries. This low satisfaction extends across the range of important goals, including collective infrastructure (roads, electricity, living environment), prospects for personal progress, basic needs (health, education), valued personal states (peace of mind, faith) and children and their upbringing. Only food, water and family relations score highly. However, caution should be exercised in interpreting these findings – it may reflect a lower propensity to respond positively to questions in Bangladeshi culture.

Peru also exhibits low average levels of goal satisfaction, with only health and food showing scoring above 4.5. This backs up the Corporacion Latinobarometro (2005) which consistently finds that Peruvians feel more negatively about their country than Latin Americans in general. On many measures they are more negative than any other country in the region, despite being far from the poorest and having strong economic growth since the early 1990s. The WedQol shows that having a professional job with a salary is perceived as a necessary goal on average only in Peru, yet remains an unsatisfied goal for the majority of respondents.

The Thai WedQol reports high average levels of satisfaction with some important community goals, such as health and basic necessities, but dissatisfaction with other key goals, notably the education and behaviour of children (Woodcock 2007). The study reveals the importance of non-material goals in Thailand, including community and family relationships, but also the enduring centrality of basic human needs.

The WeDQoL research in some respects mimics the variations shown by the standard objective indicators. For example, the relatively low levels of satisfaction in Ethiopia with material standards and prospects is not surprising in a sample of very poor communities in a poor country, with stagnating or deteriorating economic prospects over the last two decades. Yet in other respects, the WeDQoL vividly illustrates local priorities and tensions. The subjective picture of goal attainment in Bangladesh contrasts with Bangladesh’s progress in income and life expectancy in recent years; while emphasising the ongoing centrality of family relationships in mitigating this. The importance attached to a salaried, professional job in Peru, despite its widespread non-attainment, may well reflect the striking levels of inequality and stratification in Peru, such that these goals are a source of envy rather than aspiration (Woodcock 2007; Copestake 2007, ch.1). The Thailand results suggest that Thai-style development has broadly satisfied basic material needs that can be met through commodities, has not done so well in meeting needs via collective goods such as education, but is generating new tensions and dissatisfactions, for example in the relations between parents and children.

3. THE WELFARE OR RECTIFICATION MIX

The welfare or rectification mix or institutional responsibility matrix describes the pattern of resources and programmes that can act to enhance welfare or security in that society, It comprises the roles of government, private sector market activity,
community and the household, as well as of the supra-national equivalents of these actors and processes (see Figure 1). As well as describing these this section also begins to map the strategies and actions people use to access and manipulate the mix, in order to mitigate insecurity and ill-being. This forms a link between goals (discussed above) and structures (discussed below) (Newton 2007, section 4.2).

Table 3

Table 3 shows that public health and expenditure claims between 3.6% of GDP in Bangladesh and 6.9% in Thailand, with no clear gradient across country income levels. Private health expenditure by contrast accounts for a higher share the lower the country income. The figures for total health expenditure per capita reveals how crucial is level of economic development in translating relative budgetary claims into real spending levels: The average Peruvian receives 20 times as much health care as the average Ethiopian.

Table 3 also provides (more accurate and available) data on two major international resource flows: aid and remittances. This reveals the crucial significance of aid in Ethiopia which has escalated in the new millennium as the country is perceived as an ally of the West in the ‘War on terrorism’. It now accounts for almost one fifth of Ethiopian national income. Similarly Bangladesh is increasingly reliant on remittances from overseas workers, who add over 6% to national income. These private remittance flows far exceed the levels of public transfers in Bangladesh. Though they mainly take the form of money and consumption goods to families, diasporas can club together to provide collective facilities in communities.

However to understand the real welfare mix we must turn to detailed qualitative information gathered in the ‘structures’ and ‘processes’ phases of the WeD research. This is summarised in Table 4.

Table 4 here

Broadly speaking the institutional landscape is very different in the two low income countries compared with the two middle income countries. I can comment on Table 5 only briefly here.

In Ethiopia aid is of critical importance, so the interests and goals of donors, international governmental organisations and INGOs critically shape the welfare mix. Each of these groups comprises many organisations, such as USAID and the World Bank, conflicting faith-based organisations, diasporas and diaspora groups with very different interests (Bevan 2006, part 7). Much of past aid has been famine relief and emergency aid, but now there is a concerted shift to ‘productive’ services, notably health, education and food security. The government of Ethiopia sees for itself a major role in harmonising these numerous aid flows, and can pursue and implement policies in ways contrary to the wishes of donors, but the extent to which formal social policy is shaped inside and outside the country is disputed.

On the ground across much of the country ‘informal’ institutions and practices play a major role; these are predominantly based on kin relations within and beyond households, although they are also supplemented by community organisations such as burial societies (iddirs) which are important everywhere, religious institutions relating to charity and diverse local arrangements for supporting people in times of difficulty. The absence of decent comparable data on government expenditures across the world is extraordinary and lamentable.
need. The relationship between these informal practices and the formal policies is variable – some are complementary, some are adverse (as when food aid programmes, where communities are supposed to target the poorest, put strain on the more dependable assistance relationships between poor and less poor households). When all else fails individuals resort to begging, theft and distress migration.

Bevan (2006:3) argues that Ethiopia, like most African countries, has a ‘quadri- furcated’ mix:

The very rich and political elites rely on the burgeoning international liberal market-based welfare regime using private hospitals and education and financial institutions in OECD countries. The next tier, who are mostly urban-based and formally employed or self-employed, use a mix of government and domestic market provision. The third category are dependent on local informal security regimes while the fourth category are embroiled in violent crisis situations involving the failure of state, market, community and often family welfare institutions’.⁹

In Bangladesh, emergency aid has also played a major role especially in past famines; it now amounts to 2.5% GDP. More importantly it spawned a distinctive feature of the Bangladeshi welfare mix: the huge role of domestic NGOs, 1200 or more, some of which very large such as BRAC, Proshika, the Grameen Bank. These emerged in the chaotic early years of Bangladeshi independence and filled the gap left by a problematic state. Socially responsible activist channelled aid flows creating a remarkable set of extra-state development and welfare programmes (Wood 2007). The government of Bangladesh is now seeking to formalise the relationship between these and the public sector. From this institutional landscape has developed a hugely complex system of public works and relief programmes. However, access to these benefits and services remains ‘informal’ and dependent on local gatekeepers (see section 5 below). In addition, as noted above, past and present migration is yielding very large remittance flows to individuals and selected areas of the country.

The state has a larger role in the welfare mix in Peru but it remains predominantly informal especially in the poorer communities studied in the WeD programme. Government programmes embrace various forms of social protection, including food and social assistance. There is a new drive to decentralise the management and delivery of public programmes. Following the Sendero Luminoso insurgency, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has boosted rights-based discourse, but this has also been fiercely resisted (Copestake 2006). However, on the ground especially in rural communities vibrant community institutions continue to play a major role. These include peasant associations, neighbourhood associations (e.g. to improve access to water, sanitation, light, security) fiestas, faenas (days of unpaid collective work on local infrastructure) and church-based activities. There is also migration from the Andes to jungle areas, the coast (especially Lima), and abroad. However, a strong cultural value is attached to maintaining Andean links which enables some families to access different parts of the welfare mix (Wood and Copestake 2007).

In Thailand the role and expenditure of the public welfare sector continues to grow and to support expanding rights to education and now health care. The 30 Baht health programme instituted by the Thaksin government is a pioneering universal

⁹ While agreeing on this picture of the co-existence of utterly different systems within the borders of many countries, we disagree on terminology. Bevan argues these constitute different welfare (or illfare) regimes; I argue they constitute different welfare (or illfare) systems within a single self-reproducing regime.
access to near-free health care, though it is limited by inadequate investment in service provision. However, other social protection programmes remain limited. As poverty is diminished, the dominant discourse is shifting to inequality and wellbeing (referred to in the latest Thai national plan). Alongside this is growing commercial provision of many services and a new acceptance of NGOs. Yet a foundation of the Thai welfare mix remains the traditional Baan or Thai village, and the central role of the Thai family model. This permits family diversification and internal migration to Bangkok and other Thai cities, while maintaining a strong material base of marketised agriculture in many rural areas. It also connects many people to their home villages via telecommunications, remittances and home visits.

4. BACK TO THE BACKGROUND: STRUCTURES

The welfare mix is in turn shaped by the conditioning factors or social structures of a country: the pervasiveness and character of markets, the legitimacy of the state, the extent of societal integration, cultural values and the position of the country in the global system. Here I concentrate on three: the changing political economies of the four countries, inequality and difference, and family structures and patriarchy.

4.1 Changing Political Economy since 1990

1990 provides a convenient starting point for our comparison for global and national reasons. Globally it marked the end of the Cold War, the beginning of neo-liberal hegemony in global economic strategy, the apogee of the Washington consensus, to be followed towards the turn of the millennium by the rise of various post-Washington discourses (if not practices). In each of our four countries, there were dramatic political and economic shifts at this time, with evident but different links to this global shift.

In Ethiopia the Derg regime espousing a Marxist-Leninist ideology had ruled since 1974; but following its gradual loss of territorial control in the late 1980s, the victorious troops of the EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front) entered Addis Ababa in May 1991. The EPRDF regime replaced the centralised Jacobin state of the Derg with a Federal constitution. The ethnic-linguistic diversity of the country was recognised by establishing states with some autonomy, though there was little consensus underpinning this ‘re-mapping’ which involved population displacement. At the same time the ‘encadrement’ established by the Derg was strengthened to prevent centrifugal disintegration. Following 9/11 Ethiopia was still more firmly bound into the US sphere of influence (as demonstrated by the recent intervention by Ethiopian troops in Somalia). In contrast to this vigorous state restructuring, economic reforms were slow and patchy - the EPRDF-led government remained unconvinced of many policies in the neo-liberal programme. With fertility remaining very high, there was little growth in incomes and consumption. The chronic and deep poverty was hardly dented, but famine was on the whole averted through international food security programmes and the growing assumption of government responsibility for these. Elections in 1995 and 2000 were neither free nor fair, but the run-up to those held in 2005 suggested that a sea-change was in process. Despite an EPRDF clamp-down since, for the first time there is a relatively substantial number of opposition members of parliament (Bevan 2006, Bevan and Pankhurst 2007).

In Bangladesh 1990 saw the end of the military regimes which had ruled (with varying forms of civil participation) since 1975. In a relatively free election in early
1991 the BNP (Bangladesh National Party) won a plurality of votes and formed a government with support from the Islamic fundamentalist party Jamaat-I-Islami. There followed a structural adjustment package selectively implemented to liberalise and open the economy, which heralded a rapid rate of economic growth despite a continuing fast rate of population growth. This was mainly premised on manufacturing, eg. garments, rather than tertiary growth. The result has been rapid urbanisation, ‘rurbanisation’ and migration; some decline in poverty (from a very high level) and some rise in inequality (from a relatively low level). At the same time culture clashes increased between the Awami League and supporters of the secular foundations of the Bangladeshi state and a new millenarianism among militant Muslim groups (eg the JMB). This was heightened when Jamaat entered a coalition government with the BNP after the 2001 elections. The result is an increased melding of luxury consumption with heightened Muslim identity among many middle class families, alongside sharpened polarisation and ongoing violence between groups such as the JMB and secular nationalist opponents (Wood 2007). At the time of writing a state of emergency obtains and the 2007 elections are postponed.

In Peru, the election of Fujimori as president in 1990 signalled a break in the economy and security domains. In the security field, 1990 witnessed a peak in deaths resulting from the Shining Path Maoist insurgency, but it was followed by tougher measures and the capture in 1992 of Guzman. Though pockets of resistance linger, the movement collapsed quite quickly in the early 1990s. The new economic stabilization programme of August 1990 tackled hyperinflation and heralded a shift to neo-liberal economic policies. The result was initial stagnation followed by respectable rates of economic growth (following an annual decline of 1.2% in GDP in the lost decade of the 1980s). However, this was profoundly qualified by persistent ultra-inequality, blocked opportunities and in the 1990s by a decline in agricultural prices. Fujimori also ushered in a new authoritarianism that by the end of his term had done much to undermine state legitimacy. The result in the new millennium has been rapid but uneven cultural shifts and rising social fluidity, cultural malaise (see the findings above) and political polarisation, evidenced in the 2006 Presidential election by the split between reluctant middle class support for García and popular support for the anti-establishment candidacy of Humala (Copestake 2006).

The political economy of Thailand has for several decades combined a state form of alternating authoritarian civilian and military governments alongside a booming economy (growth rates exceeded 10% pa from 1984-96). This has brought about a drastic fall in poverty and historic improvements in human development. Yet inequality has risen and structural problems are endemic in both the economy and the state. In 1991 another coup ejected a democratically elected prime minister, but this was followed by demonstrations and the repression of May 1992. This inaugurated a series of roughly democratic elections, dominated by ‘money politics’ and continual governmental instability. In 1997 the collapse of the Thai Baht inaugurated the East Asian financial crisis which had a major social impact in Thailand, though the capitalist economy recovered swiftly. The election and re-election of Thaksin on a populist programme in 2001 and 2005 led to oppositional demonstrations in Bangkok which resulted in yet another military coup in 2006. Yet, with the exception of the Muslim South, Thailand appears to maintain a marked cultural consensus and symbiosis of traditional and modern cultural values which is explicit and rooted in Buddhism and monarchy. This in turn is founded on a productive symbiosis between agriculture, industry and services (in 1997 a remarkable 48% were still employed in agriculture and other primary activities) and is fostering a renewed discourse on a Thai road to wellbeing.
Underlying the unique paths of development in these four countries since 1990 are some common patterns:

- An institutional shift towards proto-democratic processes, in the Western sense of periodic roughly free national elections. Note however how unfinished is this process: elections and due processes have been annulled in Bangladesh and Thailand, and are under threat in Ethiopia.
- Neo-liberal reforms in macro-economic policy. These two shifts represent national forms of the global shift towards capitalism and democracy following the end of the Cold War.
- New cultural repertoires associated with modernisation, alongside renewed repertoires of traditional values. This might be described as unintended consequences of the ‘combined and exclusionary growth’ (Wood) the above has set in motion.
- New constitutional forms of the state in all four countries, seeking to reconcile these economic, political and cultural shifts and address some of the unintended consequences of all three.

However, the forms of these movements differ. For example, the emergence of conflicting values is taking a confrontational and violent form in Bangladesh. In Peru and Ethiopia conflicts are more repressed and take the form of popular disaffection. In Thailand, it remains possible that a Thai symbiosis of apparently contradictory cultural repertoires can take root.

The overall picture confirms the scenario of world society theory (Meyer et al 1997). On the one hand there is an isomorphism (the process whereby organisms of different ancestry evolve similar forms) of institutions and cognitive models in the four countries. These similarities are disseminated by dominant global ideologies and global powers and institutions. On the other hand, there is endemic decoupling: these forms are imposed on local social and cultural practices (‘different ancestries’) which adapt or exploit them, resulting in often incoherent implementation on the ground. Away from the capital city, the central ministries and the international hotels the reality is always more complex and contradictory. However, our framework goes beyond world society theory by recognising, at the meso-level, regional and regime differences that are stably reproduced through time.\(^\text{10}\)

### 4.2 Difference, fractionalization, inequality

Table 5 provides national data on various aspects of difference, fractionalization and inequality, as well as background information on income per head. Vertical inequality remains widest in Peru: the bottom quintile receives only 4% of total income and the ratio of the top to the bottom is greatest at 11.6:1. Recorded inequality is also high in Ethiopia, despite its low average income, while Thailand and especially Bangladesh are less unequal, notably due to the high shares recorded for the poorest.

There is now much more interest in so-called ‘horizontal inequality’\(^\text{11}\) and two sets of measures are presented. The growing literature on ethno-linguistic fractionalization attributes high rates of internal difference as causing lower rates of economic and

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\(^{10}\) On the relationship between these three levels, see Gough 2004c.

\(^{11}\) ‘So-called’ because in Ethiopia for example ethnic inequalities have not been horizontal: there is a traditional hierarchy from Amhara/Tigrayan through Oromo to small SNNP ethnic groups, which continues to fuel much resentment and some liberation front mobilizations (Personal communication from Pip Bevan).
human development (Easterly and Levine 1997, Laitin 2000, Posner 2004)\(^\text{12}\). Bangladesh stands out for its homogeneity, especially in terms of ethnicity and language. At the other extreme is Ethiopia, a mosaic of ethnic and linguistic groups (over 400 languages are spoken) and considerable religious diversity. In between lie Peru and Thailand; in both cases fractionalization is likely to have diminished somewhat since these data were compiled in the early 1980s.

Putting vertical and horizontal inequality together, Bangladesh would seem to be doubly favoured.

However, this is to neglect other aspects of difference and inequality - notably gender - and more subtle indicators. The UNDP’s Gender-related Development Index broadly tracks economic development across the four countries, as does the fertility rate. However, the sex ratio of males to females in the population, an index popularised by Sen (2003), reveals a different pattern. The normal pattern in developed nations with general access to good health care is a ratio of 96 males to 100 females, reflecting the lower mortality of females. This is close to the ratio in Thailand and Ethiopia\(^\text{13}\). However, Bangladesh stands out with an inverse ratio of 105 males to 100 females, confirming previous findings that South Asia and China reveal the greatest levels of sex discrimination. This can take the form of various practices, including selective abortion, neglect of girl’s nutrition and health care, and restricted autonomy of women. The sex ratios in the WeD research corroborate this pattern, with the exception of a lower, more ‘normal’ ratio in Peru, while the adverse ratio in Bangladesh is even greater. There is evidence of a Muslim effect in Ethiopia and the south of Thailand. In Ethiopia, the two sites with predominantly Muslim populations record 109 and 99 and the mixed site 100. In Thailand, the two southern rural sites record 108 (where the population is 70% Muslim) and 101 (where it is 50% Muslim). However, the southern urban site has a ratio of only 75, no doubt reflecting selective in-migration of males. This links to family structures, to which I now turn.

4.3 Family structures and patriarchy

In his impressive survey of family structures across the world in the twentieth century Therborn (2004) distinguishes five major family systems and two important ‘interstitial’ systems. These are:

- Sub-Saharan Africa
- Europe, including European New World settlements
- East Asia
- South Asia
- West Asia/ North Africa
- Southeast Asia
- Creole America, including ‘the Andean peripheries of South America’

If Therborn is right, our four countries will exhibit markedly different family systems, which may explain some of the different wellbeing regime features outlined above.

\(^{12}\text{Much of the data used is more than two decades old, though there is a presumption that fractionalization changes only slowly.}\)

\(^{13}\text{The low Ethiopian ratio would seem to conflict with the extensive patriarchal attitudes and preferences detailed below. In fact the last census in 1994 showed a ratio of 101 (information from Alula Pankhurst). However, according to Sen (2003) sub-Saharan Africa as a whole has a relatively progressive ratio of 98, quite unlike many Asian countries.}\)
To begin with I summarise in a broad-brush way Therborn’s relevant family systems, concentrating on their patriarchal aspects, treating patriarchy in its traditional meaning as rule of father and rule of men. These include: gender differences in legal and actual prerogatives in family decision-making, headship of households, parental influence over children’s marriage, control over the activity and mobility of women, polygyny and sexual double standards, discrimination against daughters, and ‘special sacrifices’ of females. At the start of the twentieth century ‘all significant societies were clearly patriarchal. There was no single exception’ (p.17); that is, they exhibited asymmetric male power of kinship (p.14). The twentieth century witnessed a step-wise decline in patriarchal power, but beginning at different points in time and proceeding at very different rates. By the start of the new millennium, patriarchy has become officially illegitimate across the world, as most countries have ratified the 1981 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

One hundred years ago ‘the South Asian family system was … religiously charged and regulated by caste rules of purity against pollution, largely affecting the Muslim population of the subcontinent as well [as Hindus]. Norms were strictly patriarchal and male-dominating … Particularly in the northern part of the region Muslim and Hindu tradition merged in institutionalizing female seclusion. Marriage was universal, regulated by strict rules of endogamy and exogamy, and a religious paternal duty. Fertility belonged to the patrilineal household’ (Therborn: 297-8).

Though there has been change, many features remain in 2000. ‘The northern part of South Asia [including Bangladesh] demands extra sacrifices of girls and women, with excess female child mortality …, much more seclusion, more patriarchal joint households, stricter norms of patrilocality, and more discrimination of widows’ (p.110). Part of this is indicated by today’s high rate of excess of males over females in the Bangladeshi population. According to a survey in the 1990s the median age of girls at marriage in Bangladesh was 15.3 years, and 69% were married by age 18 (p.216). Norms of female subordination remain pervasive, although like any norms they may be breached or evaded (p.111). Therborn concludes that ‘the entanglement of patriarchy and misogyny with caste and religion through rituals and rules of pollution and purity provides male domination with a deep social anchor, largely out of reach for a secular bureaucracy and its discourse of equal rights’ (p.112).

Southeast Asia as a region and Thailand in particular present a quite different family system in both 1900 and 2000. Therborn summarises the system at the start of the twentieth century as follows: ‘Buddhist nonchalance in family matters, and Malay and other customs of the region, made Southeast Asia an interstitial geoculture of family relations in Asia, basically less patriarchal and less sexually controlled… Marriage was universal, with a norm of strong parental involvement, but relatively informal – because of the virtual absence of Buddhist marriage rites… Bilateral kinship made the male heir issue less important… The family system had no strong political or clerical props’ (p.298). ‘Patriarchy was looser, more mediated and mitigated [than in East and South Asia]. Southeast Asia included bilateral inheritance, bifocal household location upon marriage, more leeway for young couples (p.123). ‘Buddhist and Malay marriage added little to the general inferiority of women’ (p.52) and the general weakness of wider kinship lessened the burden of patriarchy.

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14 With the exception of Afghanistan, Somalia, the Gulf States and the USA.
The distinctiveness of the Southeast Asian family system persisted through the twentieth century. In a marriage survey in Thailand in 1979-80 two thirds of women reported that, though parental consent remained a norm, their choice of marriage partner had been decisive. This regional difference from elsewhere in Asia is confirmed by Mason’s (1998) study. Asking married women expecting a child which sex they would prefer, she found high preference ratios for a boy in Bangladesh (3.3:1) as elsewhere in South and East Asia, but a ratio of 1.4:1 in Thailand (and lower still in Muslim Malaya). On a six-point scale of women’s domestic economic power, Thailand scored 4.3, compared with 1.3 in Pakistan and 1.7 in India. Therborn concludes that ‘region, and regional family systems, rather than religion provides the dividing line’ (p.126).

*Ethiopian* family systems are more difficult to categorise due to the unique place of the country in African history: the site of an indigenous Christian church dating back to the early centuries AD, the only African country to defeat colonial incursion militarily, and the only country never to have been colonised apart from a brief Italian interlude. In addition it is a country of remarkable ethnic and linguistic variety and lies athwart the divide between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa in Therborn’s taxonomy. Not surprisingly it exhibits aspects of both. The *Sub-Saharan* family system ‘combines an explicit gender hierarchy with a traditionally unique amount of female autonomy’ (p.298). This partly follows the mass practice (as opposed to elite practice) of polygyny which permits some conjugal autonomy as wives have their own individual residence within the compound and a crucial economic role (p.47). Genital mutilation of girls or women before marriage persists, as does the tradition of bridewealth. *North African* family systems have been heavily influenced by Islam, a legal system as well as a religion. They are patrilineal and patrilocal with an ideal of the patriarchal joint family. Marriages are arranged and child marriage or betrothal is common (p.66). The last century witnessed some relaxation of this system but a patriarchal counter-movement has emerged in the last quarter of the century. Ethiopia combines features of both major African family systems (Newton 2007a).

Therborn’s treatment of *Peru* and the Andean countries of South America is less satisfactory, as he lumps this area together with the Caribbean and southern USA under the label ‘Creole America’. This is broadly characterised as a dual family system. Around 1900 the ‘whiter’ ruling class groups exhibited a tight patriarchal culture, more restrictive than in Western Europe where it originated. Alongside these were a varied set of Indian communities whose cultural patterns, including family systems, were disturbed but not destroyed by the predominantly Spanish settlement. This marked duality is especially to be found in the high plateaux of the Andes. As a result traditional, relatively informal, family structures persisted with widespread unofficial cohabitation. The predominant interaction between the two systems according to Therborn was white male sexual predation of Indian women creating a large mestizo population. In the last quarter century, the urban family system has moved in a similar post-patriarchal direction to Europe and North America (the Peruvian family code was reformed in 1984) but this has affected far less the Indian system in the Andes (p.105); thus the dual system has persisted.

To what extent does the WeD research confirm or undermine these generalisations?

*Ethiopia* resembles a strongly patriarchal society in numerous ways; many of these are common across the four rural sites, while some differ between Muslim and Christian or between Amharic and Oromo. Reflecting both aspects of patriarchy, the division of labour is starkly related to gender and age (denoted as ‘genderage’ in the Ethiopian reports), under the authority of senior males. Most families are patrilineal with economic and social obligations to the father’s kin. In Korodegaga, a poor
predominantly Muslim village, 11% of households are polygynous male-headed. In addition the practice of inheritance of widows persists. Household arrangements in such situations are remarkably complex, but in general leave leave first wives who have been abandoned or neglected poor and inherited wives unhappy. In Yetmen child marriage is common (Bevan and Pankhurst 2007; Newton 2007a).

There is other evidence of discrimination against women and girls and of harmful practices towards them. Female circumcision is 'ubiquitous' and is valued by most men and women, though it is not recorded to what extent this takes the most damaging form of infibulation. It is normally undertaken 7 days after birth or just before marriage. Though this practice is now outlawed by the government of Ethiopia, and there is evidence of unvoiced opposition by some women, expressed sentiments stress that it is necessary to avoid dishonour and to enable women to be wedded and buried. The risk of marriage via abduction, forced marriage and rape is still prevalent. The survey in the African Child Report on Ethiopia (20 : 57) records exceptional levels of violence against girls, with 55% raped by the age of 17. This may explain the high male-female sex-ratio of 104 in Korodegaga, a remote, poor, Muslim village, and around 100 in the other rural sites.15

There is thus considerable evidence that customary family systems and practices undermine the health and autonomy of women in Ethiopia and thus contribute to the poor human development outcomes. On the other hand, there is also evidence of considerable support for many of these practices within the communities, even in the face of government and NGO hostility as with female circumcision.16 Recollecting that ‘peace of mind, faith and behaving well’ are regarded as highly valued components of quality of life in Ethiopia, and that these are considered well satisfied on average, this raises anew the issues of cultural identity or, in another language, adaptive preferences.

Incomplete: I need to integrate similar material from the other countries

5. AGENCY AND COLLECTIVE PROCESSES: Case studies of food and assistance programmes

In all countries the emergence of Western ‘democracy’ alongside neo-liberal policy frameworks is transforming existing collective forms of social protection or generating new forms. This applies to both informal security practices and more formal state or collective programmes. It is also transforming the links between the formal programmes and established patterns of patronage and clientelism. This will be studied through case studies of important food and assistance programmes in three of the countries17 (excluding Thailand): the rice distribution and SKSP programmes in

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15 These are general findings across the research communities. In other respects, religious and ethnic practices and outcomes vary. For example, women in Muslim households in Dinki have no right to control income or expenditure or to procure supplies. Nor can they get a divorce if their husband opposes.

16 A recent world bank study (2005) based on a nationally representative survey found that 85% of women believed a husband was justified in beating his wife for burning food, arguing, going out, neglecting children, and refusing sexual relations.

17 But it should be noted that while they may be significant in terms of anti-poverty policy, they remain a tiny part of national budgets, less than 1% GNP in the largest programme (in Bangladesh).
Ethiopia has been the major recipient of food aid in Africa and the world since the terrible famine of 1984/5. Since the fall of the Derg it has received $12b in development and food aid, equivalent to some 16% of GDP. Imports of food aid grain have averaged 10% of domestic production. The major suppliers are USAID, the EU and the World Food Programme (Jayne et al 2000). Food aid is distributed from the federal or province level to specific woredas (of which there are 348 in all) and from there to kebele or neighbourhood associations, the lowest level of government. At this stage, most food aid is then distributed either directly or via food-for-work programmes. Research in the WeD sites reveals many criticisms that the distribution is unfair. These include charges that some men register in more than one kebele, some needy households remain unregistered, kebele officials favour relatives and treat households unequally. The operation of Food for work programmes receives further criticisms: that there is little link between work expended and grain received, that weak excuses not to work are accepted, and that on the other hand some onerous work is insufficiently compensated by the extra food (Pankhurst and Bevan 2004).

Dependence on food aid has diminished somewhat but remains high – the period 1999-2003 witnessed severe food shortages in some areas. Thus over three decades of food aid has not overcome this structural dependency, rather the opposite. It is argued that the unintended consequences are twofold: first, such major aid flows destabilize local agricultural prices and markets and impede domestic production; second, they create negative incentives. These views are found also among WeD respondents: food aid creates dependency, ‘encourages laziness’ and fosters goals among the young to emigrate. On the other hand respondents recognised its benefits, ultimately ‘people are saved from death’ and food for work programmes enable involvement in improving collective infrastructure (Pankhurst and Bevan 2004). Food aid under the EPRDF appears to have strengthened still further the strong encadrement of government in villages established by the Derg. There is little overt theft or corruption (see below) but a buttressing of the strong state presence in rural areas. Coupled with the absent development of domestic food production, this reproduces dependent insecurity. Many respondents concluded that food production had deteriorated from the Imperial period to the Derg to the EPRDF.

In Bangladesh the SKSP relief programme distributes rice at a subsidised rate among the poorest: recipients pay 4 Taka per kilo and are entitled to 12 kilos each month. This is administered by obligatory SKSP committees at the Union Parishad (UP) level. It has been well documented that past relief programmes in Bangladesh have served to enhance power struggles and collusive practices among local power brokers. Davis (2004) concuded: ‘a psychology of plunder prevails where unholy alliances of de facto illicit beneficiaries get away with as much as donors will let them’. Our research in WeD documents the presence of two powerful gatekeeping groups in the WeD communities. The first are mastaans – mafia-type violent and criminal gangs who are perceived as a central force now in organising life in rural as well as urban communities. The second is a newer development: dolokoron or local representatives of the two main political parties (either BNP or Awami League). Interestingly these emerged with the coming of democracy in 1990. There is also growing evidence that the two are linked in a symbiotic relationship (as was the case with the mafia and local and state representatives in US cities). These processes

18 ‘The Derg devised a reasonably coherent and Jacobin policy to deal with the spatial contradictions of Ethiopian statehood’ (Bevan 2006:9).
profoundly modify the operation of the SKSP programme in practice: maintaining good links with mastaans and local party representatives is necessary to receive benefits, but at a price of loyalty, votes and other quid pro quos. Villagers claim that mastaans can influence access to health, education and other basic social services, negotiations with police or local legal institutions, and decisions around the provision of other services such as electricity’ (Devine 2006: 16). Thus the Faustian bargain and dependent security (at best) is reproduced. Whatever the benefits of these programmes to the poorest, they do not provide citizenship rights to critical need satisfiers.

The case of the Vaso de leche (VL) programme in Peru provides a useful contrast. This is the largest social assistance programme in the country providing benefits to 3m people, primarily children under seven. Though centrally funded it is administered according to precise legal guidelines by committees at the municipal level comprising women representatives. These are charged with procuring milk and foodstuffs and distributing them to the target groups. WeD researchers found that membership of these committees was valued, especially by younger and poorer women, for social reasons among others. But the material outcomes are too small to make any significant dent in overall inequality or absolute poverty. To that extent it can be seen as part of a social settlement that benefits the status quo (Copestake 2006:20). Yet, its non-material benefits are appreciated and it has proto-citizenship qualities, notably in its administration by the local committees of women. Many factors might explain the very different outcomes of this programme from its equivalent in Bangladesh, particularly its origins in 1980s Lima as a popular movement of women. In other words, the programme originated from direct pressures from below, rather than as in Bangladesh from pressures from outside and above.

To conclude, in the administration of all assistance programmes in developing countries, tensions are observed between formal rules and informal relations or between allocative efficiency and solidarity. Everywhere there are tendencies towards the latter, consequently everywhere there are unintended outcomes not anticipated by technical experts distant from local realities.

However, the wellbeing outcomes are very different. In Ethiopia, the power of local officials is enhanced (as well as markets for US grain producers?). Famine is now mainly prevented but systematic food insecurity and thus external dependence is reproduced. In Bangladesh, the Faustian bargain is reinforced, dependent security is reproduced but in new forms following democratisation. In Peru, a more participatory and legitimate programme maintains cultural identities as well as delivering benefits, probably as the result of past mobilisations from below.

6. DISTINCT REGIMES?

Let me now briefly bring together the above to characterise the overall welfare regimes in each of the countries.

Bevan (2006: 27) characterises Ethiopia’s regime as follows:
‘The bulk of Ethiopia’s residents get such security, human development and wellbeing as they manage to acquire through local informal security regimes more or less connected with macro social policy and economic development programmes. Rights are informal and are prone to vary according to age, gender, class, occupation and other local status markers. Food aid provides local government officials with a tool of political control as well as opportunities to benefit family and friends which are more or less seized… At
the macro level funds have helped to keep the current regime in power. Social policy in this context is not the result of a political settlement between government and citizens, demand for it being led by an international development social movement rather than organised collective action by the insecure.’

In addition she recognises a set of insecurity regimes in the vast border areas especially in the Horn of Africa where wars have produced many refugees and large population movements. ‘In these areas insecurity and illfare are stably reproduced’ (2006:27).

However, this seems to me to underplay the position of Ethiopia (and much of sub-Saharan Africa) in the new global economy. The total failure of capitalist economic development has, first, reproduced subsistence level living standards with frequent spells of gross malnutrition or famine. Second, it has meant no improvement in the pitiful level of social resources available for any form of policy rectification. This in turn has led to the continuing dependence on aid and external actors which she notes. Furthermore, the subsistence orientation is reproduced via ‘poverty traps, cycles and ratchets’. At times only individual efforts, such as migrating to beg, are available.

Bevan (2006: 29) concludes:
‘International and country donor organisations have been reluctant to engage with either politics or cultures of governmentality, working with a Western and sanitised development discourse far removed from the empirical realities of countries like Ethiopia, where civil society is often uncivil, ‘participation’ usually means forced labour and other contribution, and citizens are more aptly described as subjects.’

I would describe this as an externally dependent informal-insecurity regime.

The welfare regime in Bangladesh is based on a complex intermeshing of state, donors, NGOs and traditional community actors. Major public works and relief programmes straddle the welfare mix, but access is controlled by mastaans and party representatives. This generates ‘contamination’ of values, collusion, patronage and illegality. It also reproduces dependent in/security. The government of Bangladesh is now attempting to regulate this mix, under pressure from the MDGs and PRSPs. Real social productive expenditure has also risen, but inequality and poor quality limit its impact. However, despite impressive economic growth and rising life expectancy, literacy and gender-related welfare outcomes remain poor.

In conclusion growth and democracy in Bangladesh have not been accompanied by a new political settlement between the major social actors. Rather, as Wood (2007) argues, new politics based on fundamentalist millenarian identities are flourishing, partly in response to global developments. This is challenging the secular consensus which underpinned the Bangladeshi state and the dominant NGOs which emerged soon after. It is unlikely that a political settlement can arise given this schism. Indeed democracy is now threatened with the indefinite postponement of elections. Bangladesh remains a poorly-functioning informal security regime where moves towards formalisation and de-clientelisation are blocked. In this situation, kinship is ‘the oil of an otherwise fractious society’ (Wood 2007) – but it is an oil which reproduces just this society.

In Peru, democracy plus neo-liberal reforms in the Fujimori presidency has done little to dent its chronic segmentation, very high inequality and continuing poverty. In particular, Figueroa’s work indicates how a clear Blanco-Cholo-Indio racialised class hierarchy is reproduced through segmented labour markets, access to education and
political power (Copestake, 2003). Insecurity of livelihoods is ongoing and widespread, mitigated by continuing reliance on community and family mechanisms widely governed by personal relations and clientelism. Copestake notes some resurgence of human rights arising from the Shining Path insurgency and resistance to Fujimori’s authoritarianism. However, no broadly based and sustained social political settlement has emerged and it is difficult to see how one can in such an unequal and exclusionary society. Without it Peru will remain a dual welfare regime, with the majority reliant on informal support mechanisms in the context of exclusionary development.

The earlier characterisation of Thailand as a productive–informal welfare regime would seem to hold up (Gough 2004). Thailand has possessed a directive state machine capable of pursuing the goal of economic growth, aided by a benign regional environment. Its history of independence, monarchy and Buddhism has also underpinned a national drive to maintain Thai cultural values. Social policy has had a productivist emphasis on education and health with low social protection role. State social expenditure remains low as a share but has risen fast in real terms given the rapid growth rate; the new citizenship-based health programme is a significant addition. Informal provision is based on the Baan and cultural models of village community. It is also premised on generally successful family strategies which combine urban labour with marketised agriculture. In this way a remarkably large rural base has been maintained alongside rapid industrialisation and service growth.

Whether this is a benign or unstable symbiosis is open to question. One contradictory development is the combination of rampant materialism and dominant ‘money politics’ alongside explicitly Buddhist and non-materialist values. The strains of modernisation are witnessed in inter-generational tensions and a new politics of affluence and disgruntlement with the side-effects of modernisation. Indeed, democracy itself cannot be assumed safe in this, the richest of the four countries: the authoritarian tendencies of the Thai state have again been asserted in the 2006 military coup against Thaksin.

Conclusions
(tentative - note form only)

1. The critical shift in the global environment around 1990 did spread the Washington agenda of pro-market policies and Western democracy in our four countries, but in different and sometimes unforeseen ways. For example, in Bangladesh democracy has fostered more control by political gatekeepers over access to welfare resources. The rise of faith politics especially post-9/11 is also affecting national politics in all countries except Peru.

2. However, global pressures are mediated by national and cultural structures. Our detailed research on welfare/illfare outcomes and the welfare mix has broadly confirmed the regional analyses presented in Gough and Wood et al (2004). These appear to be deeply structured phenomena that are immune to gradual modification of even sustained economic growth, such as has occurred in Thailand and Bangladesh. Above all, the absence of clear ‘political settlements’ in any of the countries would predict that none will move from separate social programmes to a coherent rights-based social policy (Mkandawire, ;de Haan, forthcoming).

3. The WeD wellbeing perspective has added significant new insights. First, local and subjective measures of wellbeing outcomes (going well beyond questions on ‘happiness’) have enriched our understanding of the
contradictory effects of economic and human development (where they have occurred – not in Ethiopia). Local goals have much in common across the communities and countries but are affected too by cultural values, systems of difference and inequality, and opportunity structures. These, for example, qualify measures of Thai progress by highlighting concerns about intergenerational value clashes.

4. Second, the wellbeing approach views relationships as critical to accessing resources to improve wellbeing (or put another way, sees social and cultural resources as critical in accessing material and human resources). The WeD process research has revealed the way crucial individuals in the research sites and outside it act as gatekeepers to food aid and assistance in Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Peru. Everywhere formal rules are modified by informal relationships, but the impact of these on wellbeing outcomes varies.

5. Third, putting all these together, it illustrates how global and national political economies modify processes on the ground. But I would still conclude that broadly different welfare regimes are stably reproduced and with them broadly different patterns of wellbeing. To understand movements in both global/universal measures of welfare and local and subjective measures of wellbeing, an intermediate level of analysis – regional and regime-based – remains essential.
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