Ardagna, Silvia and Caselli, Francesco
(2014)
The political economy of the Greek debt crisis: a tale of two bailouts.
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 6 (4).
pp. 291-323.
ISSN 1945-7707
Abstract
We review the events that led to the May 2010 and July 2011 bailout agreements. We interpret the bailouts as outcomes of political-economy equilibria. We argue that these equilibria were likely not on the Pareto frontier, and sketch political-economy arguments for why collective policymaking in the Euro area may lead to suboptimal outcomes.
| Item Type: |
Article
|
| Official URL: |
https://www.aeaweb.org/aej-macro/ |
| Additional Information: |
© 2014 American Economic Association |
| Divisions: |
Economics
Centre for Economic Performance |
| Subjects: |
H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance |
| JEL classification: |
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy Formation, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, Macroeconomic Policy, and General Outlook > E62 - Fiscal Policy; Public Expenditures, Investment, and Finance; Taxation
F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems
H - Public Economics > H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt > H61 - Budget; Budget Systems
H - Public Economics > H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt > H63 - Debt; Debt Management |
| Date Deposited: |
10 Nov 2014 10:59 |
| Last Modified: |
20 Sep 2021 00:56 |
| URI: |
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/60112 |
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