Felsenthal, Dan S. and Machover, Moshé (2000) Voting power and parliamentary defections : the 1953–54 French National Assembly revisited. In: Workshop on Game Theoretic Approaches to Cooperation and Exchange of Information with Economic Application, 2000-05-25 - 2000-05-27, University of Caen, France. (Submitted)
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Abstract
We reconsider Riker’s [10] test of the hypothesis that inter-party migrations in the French National Assembly in 1953–54 can be explained by deputies’ tendency to maximize their a priori voting power. However, instead of the Shapley–Shubik index used by Riker, we use the [absolute] Banzhaf measure, which we argue is more appropriate for this task. The theoretical model we use differs in some key respects from that of Riker, due to the difference in the underlying notion as to the nature of voting power. Our conclusion, however, is broadly in agreement with Riker’s: the hypothesis under question is not substantiated.
| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (Paper) |
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| Official URL: | http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/VPP/ |
| Additional Information: | Copyright © 2000 Dan S. Felsenthal and Moshé Machover. LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk>) of the LSE Research Online website. |
| Divisions: | LSE |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JC Political theory J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe) |
| Date Deposited: | 25 Jan 2006 |
| Last Modified: | 15 Sep 2023 08:18 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/594 |
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