Ghatak, Maitreesh, Morelli, Massimo and Sjostrom, Tomas (2002) Credit rationing, wealth inequality and allocation of talent. TE, 441. London School of Economics and Political Science, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.
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We study an economy where agents are heterogeneous in terms of observable wealth and unobservable talent. Adverse selection forces creditors to ask for collateral. We study the two-way interaction between rationing in the credit market and the wages offered in the labour market. Both pooling and separating credit contracts can be offered in equilibrium. The minimum wealth needed to obtain a separating contract is decreasing in the wage, whereas the minimum wealth needed for a pooling contract is increasing in the wage. If the first effect dominates, the derived labour demand can be upward sloping, resulting in the possibility of multiple equilibria.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Working Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2002 the authors|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Occupational choice, adverse selection, wealth distribution, credit rationing|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
|Sets:||Collections > Economists Online
Departments > Economics
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
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