Alonso, Ricardo and Câmara, Odilon (2014) On the value of persuasion by experts. USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series, University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business, Los Angeles, CA, USA.
|
PDF
- Published Version
Download (567Kb) | Preview |
Abstract
A sender can influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness of a public signal. We show that the sender cannot benefit from becoming an expert, that is, from privately learning some information about the state. We then show that in some instances an uninformed sender is ex-ante strictly better off than an expert sender.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.marshall.usc.edu/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2014 The Authors, USC Marshall School of Business |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management H Social Sciences > HE Transportation and Communications |
| Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief |
| Sets: | Departments > Management Research centres and groups > Managerial Economics and Strategy Group |
| Date Deposited: | 05 Aug 2014 15:38 |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/58677/ |
Actions (login required)
 |
Record administration - authorised staff only |
Download statistics
Download statistics