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Persuading voters

Alonso, Ricardo and Câmara, Odilon (2014) Persuading voters. USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series, University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business, Los Angeles, CA, USA.

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Abstract

In a symmetric information voting model, an individual (information controller) can influence voters’ choices by designing the information content of a public signal. We characterize the controller’s optimal signal. With a non-unanimous voting rule, she exploits voters’ heterogeneity by designing a signal with realizations targeting di↵erent winning-coalitions. Consequently, under simple-majority voting rule, a majority of voters might be strictly worse o↵ due to the controller’s influence. We characterize voters’ preferences over electoral rules, and provide conditions for a majority of voters to prefer a supermajority (or unanimity) voting rule, in order to induce the controller to supply a more informative signal.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL: http://www.marshall.usc.edu/
Additional Information: © 2014 The Authors, USC Marshall School of Business
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
J Political Science > JC Political theory
Sets: Departments > Management
Research centres and groups > Managerial Economics and Strategy Group
Date Deposited: 05 Aug 2014 15:22
Last Modified: 15 Jun 2017 14:06
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/58674

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