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Persuading voters

Alonso, Ricardo ORCID: 0000-0001-9559-0864 and Câmara, Odilon (2014) Persuading voters. USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series. University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business, Los Angeles, CA, USA.

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In a symmetric information voting model, an individual (information controller) can influence voters’ choices by designing the information content of a public signal. We characterize the controller’s optimal signal. With a non-unanimous voting rule, she exploits voters’ heterogeneity by designing a signal with realizations targeting di↵erent winning-coalitions. Consequently, under simple-majority voting rule, a majority of voters might be strictly worse o↵ due to the controller’s influence. We characterize voters’ preferences over electoral rules, and provide conditions for a majority of voters to prefer a supermajority (or unanimity) voting rule, in order to induce the controller to supply a more informative signal.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2014 The Authors, USC Marshall School of Business
Divisions: Management
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
J Political Science > JC Political theory
JEL classification: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
Date Deposited: 05 Aug 2014 15:22
Last Modified: 16 May 2024 12:03

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