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Introduction: sociality and negotiation

The object of this chapter is to position social citizenship as a process that is axiomatically global. The chapter proceeds from the premise that rights of citizenship are socially constructed. In that sense, all rights are social. However, the term 'social rights' has conventionally applied to the rights supposedly established by modern welfare states (Marshall, 1950). But the services and protection that are guaranteed by welfare states are complex contemporary manifestations of social processes that have always been central to human existence.

To assert that social rights of citizenship in particular are socially constructed implies two things. First, they are an expression of our sociality: they imply that humans, as interdependent social beings, make claims upon each other; claims based on shared experience and constructions of need. Second, like all rights they are not pre-ordained or analytically divined, but have their origins in negotiation between human beings as to the means by which needs may be acknowledged or recognized. The concepts of sociality and negotiation provide intersecting dimensions within which competing constructions of needs and rights may be understood. They resonate - in some senses - with those of 'group' and 'grid' in cultural theory (Douglas, 1977). Sociality is concerned with the extent to which individuals are bound and protected through social group membership, while negotiation is concerned with the extent to which the rules and conventions of everyday life and communication are governed and shaped though either formalized or informal frameworks of understanding.

The significance of this analysis is that it enables us better to evoke a multi-layered or multi-dimensional conceptualisation of social citizenship that 'loosens its bonds with the nation state, so that citizenship is defined over a spectrum that extends from the global, through to the local' (Lister, 2003: 196). Citizenship, for these purposes, is construed not as a status, but as a process. Social citizenship thereby provides a conceptual ground for a politics of need (Fraser, 1997; Soper, 1981); an understanding of citizenship which, contrary to Marshallian theory, does not follow in the wake of civil and political citizenship, but precedes it (cf. Isin et al., 2008). However, the chapter concludes that the idea of global social citizenship is not so much a unifying project for the perfection of social citizenship, as a way of reconceptualising the diverse forms that it may take.

The needs-rights nexus

Need is a notoriously elusive concept. Equally, the concept of rights is perennially contested. Human needs are concerned on the one hand with the basics of biological survival; on the other, with fundamental parameters of human existence - with the quality
of our lives, work and relationships. Discussions of human need are widely framed in terms of whether it is absolute or culturally relative (e.g. Doyal & Gough, 1991). Similarly, discussions of social rights - rights to health and social care, to housing or education and/or to a protected standard of living - have been framed in terms of whether they are realisable imperatives, or merely aspirational goals (Cranston 1976). My argument is that long standing distinctions between absolute and relative needs and between realisable and aspirational rights may together be distilled into the two dimensions to which I allude above: sociality and negotiation.

Sociality

Marx (1844) equated human need with the constitutive characteristics of our 'species being', and he counted 'sociality' as one such defining characteristic. JS Mill (1859) conceded that sociality and individuality must each 'obtain their due'. It is to sociality and its accommodation to individuality that we might attribute the invention we now call 'citizenship'. That conscious process of social accommodation surely preceded, and now transcends, the invention of the city (that bestowed to citizenship its etymological root) or the nation state (that bestowed it its modern form).

Human need is at one and the same time both individual and social (Titmuss 1955: 62). The human being is an individually embodied and sentient creature, but also utterly interdependent with other human beings; not merely in relation to her 'thin' survival needs, but also her 'thicker' needs - for sense of self, the means of consciousness and fulfilment (Dean 2000; 2004; 2010). The distinction between thin and thick needs (Soper 1993) does not necessarily imply that one kind of need is less important or worthy than another (cf. Walzer 1994); it defines a continuum of needs with different kinds of social orientation. The two distinct models of citizenship that emerged following the so called Western Enlightenment - the liberal and the civic-republican (Oliver and Heater 1994) - may be regarded as expressions of those different kinds of orientation. The liberal (Anglophone) model constituted the citizen as an autonomous individual whose freedom to survive nonetheless depended on collective guarantees. The civic-republican (continental European) model constituted the citizen as a member of a political community whose ability to participate depended on the integrity of the social order.

The focus may then have been on civil and political rights, rather than what we now call social rights, but each model implied a different understanding of human need and social wellbeing. Each understanding had its origins in a more ancient philosophical distinction between hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing (Aristotle, c. 350BC). The thinner, liberal understanding of need and wellbeing tends to the hedonic; to a utilitarian approach that regards the human condition as a struggle for the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. This translates into a contractarian understanding of citizenship rights; citizenship entails a contract between citizen and state whereby each individual foregoes unbridled freedom in return for protection against predation and unfair competition by other individuals. The thicker, civic-republican understanding of need and wellbeing tends more to the eudaimonic; to an approach that regards a good life as the pursuit of 'virtue', civic engagement and spiritual fulfilment. This approach translates into a more solidaristic understanding of citizenship; citizenship entails belonging and
commitment within a social collective upon which the individual depends for mutual protection against shared risks.

For heuristic purposes, we can understand sociality as a dialectical dimension with two opposing poles: the **individual** pole is thinner, tending to the hedonic, liberal and contractarian; the **social** pole is thicker, tending to the eudaimonic, civic-republican and solidaristic. It is within this dimension that ostensibly contradictory but essential compromises evolve.

**Negotiation**

The evolution of the needs-rights nexus does not occur 'naturally'. It is negotiated. Negotiation revolves around relatively formal or abstract conceptualizations of human need on the one hand and relatively informal or grounded perceptions as to its substance on the other; around relatively formal 'top-down' prescription of rights on the one hand and relatively informal 'bottom-up' demands for rights on the other.

Human need can be conceived in a reflexive or systemic way as being *inherent* to the individual by dint of her humanity. Or else it may be conceived in an *interpretive* manner with reference to the experience of everyday life. Inherent conceptions of human need require an explicit or implicit theory of 'personhood' and translate into *doctrinal* understandings of social rights. Interpreted conceptions of human need may be culturally constituted or pragmatically formulated and translate into *claims-based* understandings of social rights. Inherent conceptions entail a strong, if not hegemonically dominant, conceptual framework, that may be intellectually, ideologically or possibly religiously derived. They envisage the individual normatively: for example, as a utility maximizer pursuing her objective interests; as a market actor pursuing her subjective preferences; as a psychological subject responding to inner drives; as a human being striving to realize her humanity. Doctrinal understandings of rights correspondingly attribute rights to the dictates of God or Nature; or some legal code, moral logic or intellectual principle. Interpretive conceptions of need entail a hegemonically weaker or more flexible conceptual framework. Interpretation may occur as a matter of social custom or the conventions of everyday discourse and practice; or through the struggles of community activists; or it may be undertaken on behalf of the citizenry, for example, by responsive welfare professionals or policy makers. Claims-based understandings of rights correspondingly regard rights as the realisation of legitimate demands, or as achievements of struggle.

Inherent and interpretive conceptualisations of need are interdependent and both are dialectically implicated in the negotiation of rights. They relate to each other through what Giddens (1987) defined as a 'double hermeneutic'. Formalized theories of inherent need may be called upon strategically in aid of demands for the recognition of needs that have been informally interpreted, while informally interpreted needs may come in time to influence formalized conceptual understandings or beliefs. Human needs are defined and redefined across time and space through lived experience. The actual origins of social rights can therefore be difficult to disentangle, since just as inherent and interpreted needs inform each other, so do doctrinal and claims-based rights. Legal frameworks, charters, declarations or conventions and established social legislation may enshrine doctrines forged through compromises negotiated during struggles long past and may formally
incorporate demands once articulated informally from below (Bottomore, 1992). The subaltern demands of community activists and others may entail the artful adaptation of dominant ideologies once handed down from above (Scott, 1985).

Within the needs-rights nexus social rights are achieved, synthesized or negotiated at the point where competing formulations of rights collide. For heuristic purposes, we can once again envisage the negotiation dimension as a continuum with two poles: the formally framed, tending to inherent conceptions of need and doctrinal conceptions of rights; and the informally framed, tending to interpretive conceptions of need and claims-based conceptions of rights.

A needs-rights taxonomy

The substantive negotiation of social rights occurs within particular social contexts and relations of power. If we consider how the dimensions of sociality and negotiation intersect with one another it possible to identify four locations within the needs-rights nexus.

First, at the intersection between the individual pole of the sociality dimension and the informally framed pole of the negotiation dimension, needs are circumstantial and reflect the imperative of survival in a hazardous and competitive social environment. Insofar as one can claim against another a right to have needs met it is necessarily conditional. Autonomous individuals may bargain with one another for the means to satisfy their needs and this may give rise to everyday claims, expectations or 'rights', which regulate the conditions upon which some semblance of a bilateral exchange is conducted. The concept of rights may be tenuously transposed to a wider multilateral context: but if a person is unable to satisfy her needs independently, her right to 'social' assistance will depend on her moral desert. The administration of rights requires the exercise of authority and judgement. Entitlement is conditional on obedience.

Second, at the intersection between the individual pole of the sociality dimension and the formally framed pole of the negotiation dimension, needs are particular and reflect the call for autonomous enterprise in a harmoniously functioning market economy. The right to have needs met is doctrinally conceived in that the efficacy of markets is believed to depend on principles of equal opportunity. Such a right arises selectively where it can be proved that a particular need exists and a particular benefit will result from meeting it. A right to targeted assistance arises if a person can show that with good reason she lacks the means of subsistence and therefore the ability productively to participate. Insofar as markets may fail to foster the skills and promote the health of the labour force, a right to education and healthcare arises. The administration of rights must be efficient and consistent with the maintenance of an effective market economy. Entitlement correlates with civic duty: the principle that autonomous individuals should strive for productive participation and self-sufficiency.

Third, at the intersection between the social pole of the sociality dimension and the informally framed pole of the negotiation dimension, needs are held in common, reflecting an imperative of conformity and stability in a protective, but hierarchically ordered, society. The right to have needs met is claimed on the basis that one belongs to and accepts one's place within the social collectivity. Rights are protective and arise because the common denominator shared by all members of society is a degree of present
or potential vulnerability. Conceding rights to people binds and guards them from subversive influences; it preserves those traditional institutions and practices upon which social order depends. Entitlement is a matter of mutual moral obligation.

Fourth, at the intersection between the social pole of the sociality dimension and the formally framed pole of the negotiation dimension, needs are universal and reflect the call for human fulfilment. The right to have needs met is a moral imperative. Rights are axiomatically inclusive, comprehensive in nature and unconditional, though they may attach to citizens in response to different contingencies during different parts of the human life-course. Entitlement is premised on an ideal of collective responsibility.

This is no more than an idealized heuristic model, but it enables us to elaborate a wider understanding of the dimensions of social citizenship in its global context.

**Social citizenship as a multidimensional concept**

The focus so far has been on the various and contested ways in which social citizenship translates needs into rights. There is no single model of social citizenship that may be adopted or promoted on the global stage. To understand this we require a post-Marshallian concept of citizenship that is truly social; that centres on negotiation around human needs and social rights and which is not necessarily subservient to frameworks for constitutional civil and political order; that accepts 'that perhaps citizenship is social before it is civil and political' (Isin et al., 2008). Conceived in this way, social citizenship is constituted through the realities of human interdependency; it is a quotidian human practice that preceded and now transcends the invention of the city and the nation state; it can encompass a politics of need, rather than a politics of civil order; it reflects the manner in which we frame our claims on others and recognize the claims they make on us as social rights.

**Sociality: multiple sites of interdependency**

In relation to the concept advocated here the term social citizenship is a misnomer. It could have been applied, for example, to the governance of interdependency within nomadic hunting and gathering or pastoral groups or in village settlements as much as to those within cities. Social citizenship assumes the centrality of the social human being.

In practice the ancient Athenian citizenship ideal restricted government not just to the inhabitants of the city but exclusively to its patrician male inhabitants (Held, 1987: ch. 1). The Western Enlightenment ideals that subsequently established the rule of law and liberal democracy within the territories of sovereign nation states provided the necessary preconditions for the dominance of capitalism (Turner, 1986). Insofar as social rights of citizenship were conceded to those without power or property, the form they took represented not so much a negotiated victory for the working class as a framework for the regulation of labour power (Offe, 1984). According to Lockwood, the structuring of life chances and social identities in the welfare states of the global North was 'the direct result of the institutionalisation of citizenship under conditions of social and economic inequality' (1996: 532). The fine-tuning of social rights provides a mechanism for 'civic stratification' and the relative advantages or disadvantages citizens might experience depending on their social status. In this way social citizenship was
subordinated to a process whereby a market economy was embedded in a market society (Polanyi, 1944).

Recent decades have witnessed territorial de-coupling and re-coupling of social rights, for example at the European level (Ferrera, 2005) and within emerging economies, such as China, where social policy provision exhibits a considerable degree of 'variable geometry' (Shi, 2012). More fundamentally, however, transformations associated with globalisation (Amin, 1997), neo-liberalisation (Harvey, 2005), and the increasing 'liquidity' of social membership and belonging (Bauman, 2000) could either extinguish or transform the significance of social citizenship. As the risks to which human subjects are exposed become increasingly individualized (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2001) and their social attachments more fluid, they are enjoined to become increasingly self-governing individual subjects rather than social citizens (Rose, 1996). Economic processes become increasingly dis-embedded from social structures (Jessop, 2002) so diminishing their relevance to everyday struggles and class identities. The space for social citizenship is attenuated.

Is it possible to reconceptualize social citizenship for a post-Westphalian era? If, as suggested, we may attach the term 'citizenship' to pre-Westphalian or even pre-historic human societies, it is surely possible to apply it in a global context. As Yuval-Davis suggests, 'citizenship should not be seen as limited to state citizenship alone, but understood as the participatory dimension of membership in all political communities' (2011: 201). Essential here is the dimension of participation as much as membership: of practice or 'enactment' (Isin, 2009) as much as status or belonging. We shall return to the question of who may constitute a 'political' community, but any community must also have a social context and just as we hold multiple and overlapping social identities (Taylor, 1998), so any social being can embrace layered combinations of sub-national, trans-national citizenships or citizenships based on indigenous or diasporic, ethnic or religious identities.

Williams points to the way in which globalisation creates a context in which 'relations of interdependence are created that exceed the boundaries of the territorial state' (2007: 242). The effective communities so created may result from transnational migration or new forms of consumer, cultural or political alliances. Citizenship may be regarded as a constitutive element of these interdependencies, not necessarily through formal membership, but shared awareness of some common cause. The solidarities spawned by such interdependencies may sometimes be thin, but as the significance of territorial boundaries dissolve it is possible to envision a multiplication of diverse sites of social citizenship, ranging from local to global. In the global South, some social movements and their academic allies - the post-development theorists - have become sceptical towards the role of the state as guarantor of social rights. Social rights claims can seem at best trivial and at worst co-opting; the mere 'politics of demand' (Escobar, 1995; Waterman, 2001). But it is surely possible to imagine sites of social citizenship where the 'politics of demand' would entail the recognition of locally or globally shared human needs and interdependencies that do not necessarily require the subjugation of the communities affected to the power of failing or corrupt state governments.

Negotiation: multiple sites of dialogue
This alternative concept acknowledges that the negotiation of social rights can take place at a variety of sites; from the global to the local. Arguing for the introduction of a social rights clause in the Canadian constitution, Nedelsky and Scott sought thereby to promote social rights as 'sites of dialogue' or 'sites of social struggle'. Social rights, they asserted, should be understood not only in institutional terms, but in relational terms; as the means by which we may structure relationships of interdependency (1992: 69).

Insofar as social citizenship entails a process of negotiation, it is political. It entails a politics focused not on the promotion of a market economy, but the satisfaction of human need; not on procedural freedoms and legal minima, but substantive social rights and optimal fulfilment. Marx contended that humanity's needs may be defined by the characteristics that radically define our species. The revolution he sought would lead to a society without commodities; in which need would replace value as the measure of things. Recognising that such a revolution won't happen any time soon, Soper (1981) outlines what a politics of needs might entail under present circumstances. The problem, she contends, is that any society that attempts to read its needs from what it consumes is evading the question of needs. What is required is a strategy for the development of a different kind of social planning, with more relevant information and more social participation in decision making processes.

Flesh is put on the bones of this idea by Nancy Fraser who advocated a 'politics of needs interpretation' (1989: ch. 8). Her starting point was a critical account of political discourses of need. For 'needs talk' to enter the political sphere, it must be 'publicized'; projected from the economic sphere of labour relations and the domestic sphere of personal relations into the public forum of political debate. Our private everyday livelihoods and personal needs are political: a politics of needs interpretation would democratize them. Under present circumstances, Fraser claimed, it is only occasionally that the hidden 'runaway needs' become politicized through 'oppositional' forms of discourse. By and large it is the 'expert' discourses of professional problem solvers that colonize the definition of needs. In describing the dialogic nature of claim and counterclaim, definition and redefinition, entailed in the politics of need interpretation, Fraser captured precisely the dialectical relationship referred to above between inherent and interpreted conceptions of human need. Moreover, she declared herself to be in favour of 'translating justified needs into social rights' (1989: 183).

Through a critique of the liberal democratic public sphere, Fraser (1997: chs. 1 and 3) addresses what would be an essential precondition for a politics of needs interpretation, namely 'parity of participation' for those silent and oppressed groups or publics whose voice is drowned out by more vocal and powerful publics. Connected with this call is a wider demand that a politics of redistribution should go hand in hand with a politics of recognition (Fraser & Honneth, 2003). Fraser additionally demands a new politics of representation, claiming it is not merely that some people's voices (and needs) go unrecognized, but the issues of social justice and citizenship affecting them are 'misframed' (2010: 19). Frame-setting in a post-Westphalian global order would be best governed by the 'all-affected principle'; the principle that 'all those affected by a given social structure or institution have moral standing as subjects of justice in relation to it' (2010: 93).

The framing of needs claims and their projection into the public sphere entails processes of negotiation between inherent and interpreted understandings of need and
between doctrinal and claims-based conceptions of rights. There is a resonance here with Gramsci's notion of hegemonic struggle (1971). The negotiation 'dimension' conceptualized in this chapter is intended heuristically to capture the dialectic between strong and weak hegemonic conceptual frameworks; the tension between powerful/top-down and subaltern/bottom up roles in the negotiation of rights.

Key to any politics of need, however, is the extent to which there can be resistance to social injustice and a basis for the negotiation of claims. Barrington Moore's (1978) historical analysis of the circumstances in which moral anger at social injustice may spill over into resistance suggests different ways in which popular indignation can be either fostered or contained. People may not experience injustice if they are unaware that they are relatively disadvantaged compared to others in society (cf. Runciman, 1966). Nevertheless, Moore observes that people may subscribe: to a 'dog in the manger taboo' such that they will resent those who amass wealth and advantage yet wilfully frustrate the chances of those who have not; to meritocratic principles of equivalence such that they might object, for example, when they are paid less than they think their work is worth, or when others are paid more; to a guarded acceptance of class hierarchies and compensatory principles of noblesse oblige, though when provoked they may challenge the established order; to principles of equality achieved through mechanisms of social insurance, though they may yet question the fairness of the risk pooling that is involved.

For resentment to be expressed through negotiation there must be a forum. The forum in ancient Athens or Rome was a physical space in which public debate and negotiation between citizens took place. The term has become a metaphor for open debate, albeit that the negotiation of social rights that bear on the lives of ordinary citizens in modern nation states has tended to take place in remote legislative chambers at best or at worst in smoke-filled rooms. Abstract principles for open and un-coerced negotiation have been defined through Habermas' (1987) concept of the 'ideal speech situation' that might be realized within a global communication community (Apel 1980). We now live in a world where the capacity to communicate across time and space dissolves the significance of territorial boundaries and makes virtual communities with shared needs and interdependencies possible. A new generation of social media (Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia, Tumblr, etc. - whose reach and accessibility are augmented by wireless penetration) allow interactive communication and forms of virtual participation that can lead to actual engagement and protest. Castells contends that such technologies have ushered in an era of 'open source' politics and a range of possibilities that transform the way society operates (2009: 412).

If this is right, we must re-think the basis of social citizenship in order to understand how it might develop in future.

**Taxonomy: modes of social citizenship**

Drawing on the needs-rights taxonomy outlined above, we can generate a further taxonomy, through which to illustrate four ideal type modes of social citizenship defined with reference to the dimensions of sociality and negotiation. These are modes of social citizenship that do not necessarily conform to different kinds of welfare state regime (though they may have done in the past) but to layered and overlapping social processes
by which people may negotiate their relations of interdependence, in whatever time, territorial space or social/political community they may be found.

The first mode is founded on **habits of survival**: characterized by relatively weak sociality and a hegemonically weak negotiating framework. It is a mode hitherto consistent with the Poor Law regimes that preceded the modern capitalist welfare states (Thane, 1996) or with what have been dubbed 'insecurity regimes' in the global South (Gough, et al., 2004). People's priority in this mode is to secure a sufficient livelihood in competition with their neighbours. The hardships of life must be regarded as one of life's natural hazards. Notions of fairness and grounds for resistance are likely to be premised on the 'dog in the manger taboo' (Moore, 1978) since those who are luckier than others should observe the same rules as anybody else.

The second is founded on **utilitarian practices**: characterized by relatively weak sociality, but a hegemonically strong negotiating framework. It is a mode hitherto consistent with a liberal welfare state regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990) or with what have been dubbed 'productivist regimes' in the global South (Gough, et al., 2004). People's priority in this mode is to maximize their personal utility. Insofar as there may be hardships in life these will be seen as stemming from degrees of failure in individual economic performance and/or from a lack of opportunity to succeed. Notions of fairness and grounds for resistance are likely to be premised on a belief in equal reward for equal effort (Moore 1978) since people should get what they deserve (and no more) having regard to how hard they have studied and/or worked, assuming that they have had equal opportunities.

The third is founded on **communitarian customs**: characterized by strong sociality, but a hegemonically weak negotiating framework. It is a mode hitherto consistent with a conservative or corporatist welfare state regime (Esping-Andersen, 1980) or with what have been dubbed 'informal welfare regimes' in the global South (Gough, et al., 2004). People's priority in this mode is customary conformity. Insofar as there may be hardships in life these are regarded as a natural feature of the social order and as more or less inevitable. Notions of fairness and grounds for resistance are likely to be premised on the principles of *noblesse oblige* (Moore, 1978) since people should be able to look to social institutions and those in authority to look after them.

The fourth is founded on **cosmopolitan principles**: characterized by strong sociality and a hegemonically strong negotiating framework. It is a mode hitherto consistent with social democratic welfare state regimes (Esping Andersen, 1980) or, up to a point, with some emerging 'welfare state regimes' in the global South (Gough, et al. 2004). People's priority in this mode is to be compliant citizens. Insofar as there may be hardships in life these are believed to stem from failures of social organisation and are inherently unjust. Notions of fairness and grounds for resistance are likely to be premised on social insurance equality (Moore, 1978) since social membership should lead to universal entitlement and inclusivity.

These modes of social citizenship and the claims to which they give rise will inevitably intersect and overlap. But any conceptualisation of global social citizenship must necessarily recognize the spectrum of claims and contestations to which it gives rise. Habits of survival, utilitarian practices, communitarian customs and cosmopolitan principles may all lay claim to some basis in social citizenship with different implications.
and limitations so far as the ways in which human needs may come to be recognized and social rights can be implemented.

**Conclusion: a multi-layered politics of need**

The underpinning argument is that social citizenship may be conceptualized as a politics of need; as a quotidian politics of demand that may be expressed at a variety of levels; as the struggle to achieve recognition for human needs through a variety of negotiated means, ranging from local customs to international covenants. Social citizenship has found and will continue to find expression through a number of modes, some of which are at best suboptimal and at worst counterproductive. It could be argued that the optimum mode of social citizenship is that characterized by cosmopolitan principles (Appiah, 2007; Delanty, 2000; Held, 2010). But as an ideal, cosmopolitanism is hardly new (Dwyer, 2010; Fine, 2007). And though social democracy, premised on cosmopolitan universalism arguably represents the 'strongest' form of social citizenship, the idea that all human beings are citizens of the 'cosmos' is so far removed from the everyday struggles of the world's most disadvantaged inhabitants as to be a distraction. To promote *global* social citizenship we must first adopt a new and critical way of thinking about the daily practices through which human beings have always and will continue to negotiate their interdependency; to embrace not only the heady world of supra politics, but the gritty world of what Scott has referred to as 'infra politics' (1990: 183) and Holston as 'insurgent citizenship' (Holston, 2009; Davis and Pelissery, forthcoming); to nourish the sociality and negotiation upon which social citizenship is founded; to acknowledge the multitude of fragmented and often suboptimal manifestations of social citizenship that emerge around the world; wherever possible, to 'publicize' human need.

As social beings, our *social* citizenship is the expression of our universal interdependency. It is global.

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