Goodin, Robert E and List, Christian (2006) Special majorities rationalized. British Journal of Political Science, 36 (2). pp. 213-241. ISSN 1469-2112
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Abstract
Complaints are common about the arbitrary and conservative bias of special-majority rules. Such complaints, however, apply to asymmetrical versions of those rules alone. Symmetrical special-majority rules remedy that defect, albeit at the cost of often rendering no determinate verdict. Here what is formally at stake, both procedurally and epistemically, is explored in the choice between those two forms of special-majority rule and simple-majority rule; and practical ways are suggested of resolving matters left open by symmetrical special-majority rules – such as ‘judicial extrapolation’ or ‘subsidiarity’ in a federal system.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://journals.cambridge.org/jid_JPS |
| Additional Information: | © 2006 Cambridge University Press |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
| Sets: | Departments > Government Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS) |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Jun 2008 13:46 |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/5826/ |
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