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Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation

Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2007) Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation. Social Choice and Welfare, 29 (1). pp. 19-33. ISSN 0176-1714

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Identification Number: 10.1007/s00355-006-0196-x


In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue for the converse claim. After proving two impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation (using “systematicity” and “independence” conditions, respectively), we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation and prove Arrow’s theorem (stated for strict preferences) as a corollary of our second result. Although we thereby provide a new proof of Arrow’s theorem, our main aim is to identify the analogue of Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation, to clarify the relation between judgment and preference aggregation, and to illustrate the generality of the judgment aggregation model.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2007 Springer
Divisions: Government
Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
H Social Sciences > HV Social pathology. Social and public welfare. Criminology
Sets: Departments > Government
Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)
Research centres and groups > LSE Choice Group
Date Deposited: 22 Jun 2008 10:55
Last Modified: 20 Sep 2021 02:00

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