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Strategy-proof judgment aggregation

Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian ORCID: 0000-0003-1627-800X (2007) Strategy-proof judgment aggregation. Economics and Philosophy, 23 (3). pp. 269-300. ISSN 0266-2671

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Identification Number: 10.1017/S0266267107001496

Abstract

Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem. We also discuss weaker forms of non-manipulability and strategy-proofness. Comparing two frequently discussed aggregation rules, we show that “conclusion-based voting” is less vulnerable to manipulation than “premise-based voting”, which is strategy-proof only for “reason-oriented” individuals. Surprisingly, for “outcome-oriented” individuals, the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical judgments in equilibrium. Our results introduce game-theoretic considerations into judgment aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJourna...
Additional Information: © 2007 Cambridge University Press
Divisions: Government
Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
CPNSS
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Date Deposited: 22 Jun 2008 13:56
Last Modified: 01 Oct 2024 06:24
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5812

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