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Judgment aggregation without full rationality

Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2008) Judgment aggregation without full rationality. Social Choice and Welfare, 31 (1). pp. 15-39. ISSN 1432-217X

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Identification Number: 10.1007/s00355-007-0260-1

Abstract

Several recent results on the aggregation of judgments over logically connected propositions show that, under certain conditions, dictatorships are the only propositionwise aggregation functions generating fully rational (i.e., complete and consistent) collective judgments. A frequently mentioned route to avoid dictatorships is to allow incomplete collective judgments. We show that this route does not lead very far: we obtain oligarchies rather than dictatorships if instead of full rationality we merely require that collective judgments be deductively closed, arguably a minimal condition of rationality, compatible even with empty judgment sets. We derive several characterizations of oligarchies and provide illustrative applications to Arrowian preference aggregation and Kasher and Rubinstein’s group identification problem.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100385
Additional Information: © 2008 Springer
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Sets: Departments > Government
Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)
Date Deposited: 23 Jun 2008 08:22
Last Modified: 29 Apr 2015 09:25
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5803

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