Ashraf, Nava, Lee, Scott and Bandiera, Oriana (2013) Awards unbundled: evidence from a natural field experiment. Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers (EOPP 046). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.
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Abstract
Organizations often use awards to incentivize performance. We design a field experiment to unbundle the mechanisms through which awards may affect behavior: by facilitating social comparison and by conferring recognition and visibility. In a nationwide health worker training program in Zambia, employer recognition and social visibility increase performance while social comparison reduces it, especially for low-ability trainees. These effects appear when treatments are announced and persist through training. The findings are consistent with a model of optimal expectations in which low-ability individuals exert low effort in order to avoid information about their relative ability.
Item Type: | Monograph (Report) |
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Official URL: | http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/ |
Additional Information: | © 2013 The Authors |
Divisions: | Economics STICERD |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform |
Date Deposited: | 21 Jul 2014 08:09 |
Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 16:49 |
Funders: | International Growth Centre |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/58029 |
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