Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian 
ORCID: 0000-0003-1627-800X
(2005)
Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation.
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Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.
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Abstract
In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue the opposite. After proving a general impossibility result on judgment aggregation, we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation and prove Arrow’s theorem as a corollary of our result. Although we provide a new proof of Arrow’s theorem, our main aim is to identify the analogue of Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation, to clarify the relation between judgment and preference aggregation and to illustrate the generality of the judgment aggregation model.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Report) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2005 The Authors |
| Divisions: | Government Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method CPNSS STICERD |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jul 2014 15:31 |
| Last Modified: | 15 Sep 2023 22:06 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/58023 |
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