Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2005) Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation. PEPP 13. The London School of Economics and Political Science, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.
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In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue the opposite. After proving a general impossibility result on judgment aggregation, we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation and prove Arrow’s theorem as a corollary of our result. Although we provide a new proof of Arrow’s theorem, our main aim is to identify the analogue of Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation, to clarify the relation between judgment and preference aggregation and to illustrate the generality of the judgment aggregation model.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Technical Report)|
|Additional Information:||© 2005 The Authors|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)|
|Sets:||Departments > Government
Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
|Identification Number:||PEPP 13|
|Date Deposited:||18 Jul 2014 15:31|
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